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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for money laundering (africa)
3 results foundAuthor: ESSAM (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group) Title: Report on Cash Courier-Based Money Laundering Summary: In general, there are three main methods by which criminal organisations and terrorist financiers move illicit money for laundering purposes. These are (i) the use of the financial system (ii) the physical movement of money (iii) the use of fraudulent trading arrangements. The Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendation IX on Cash Couriers obliges countries to put in place measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligations. The Special Recommendation also requires countries to ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected of been related to terrorist financing or money laundering or that are falsely declared or disclosed Countries should also ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false declarations and disclosures. In cases where the currency or bearer negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing or money laundering, countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones which would enable the confiscation of such currency or instruments. This study used of a detailed questionnaire to gather information on the current practices of cash courier-based money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the ESAAMLG region. The information focused on the ability of the ESAAMLG member countries to detect and combat cash couriers for AML/CFT purposes. This study concludes that cash courier based money laundering is an activity that is present in virtually all ESAAMLG member countries. All ESAAMLG member countries are predominantly cash-based economies and have porous borders, and thereby making the region more vulnerable to cash- courier-based money laundering. Most ESAAMLG member countries have limited or no legislation in place to combat cash couriers and the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks. There is a general shortage of technical expertise and resources required to deal with cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. There is a critical need for training and awareness raising to enhance skills and experience to combat cash courier based money laundering, Looking ahead, there appears to be a number of steps that could be taken within the ESAAMLG member countries to enable national authorities to cope with and combat cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. These measures can be grouped into legislative, effective institutional arrangements, awareness raising, training, and improving domestic, regional and international cooperation. Details: Mombasa, Kenya: ESAAMLG Typologies Working Group, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: WGTP doc.1 r (2008): Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 124915 Keywords: Money Laundering (Africa)Organized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Picarelli, John T., ed. Title: International Organized Crime: The African Experience Summary: In December of 2010, an international group of experts gathered in Courmayeur, Italy to focus their energies on the issue of transnational organized crime in Africa. Three observations led ISPAC and NIJ to believe that this was the best time to hold this meeting. The first was the growing evidence that transnational organized crime is a significant problem for all of Africa. In 2008, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a report that stated that 221 tons of cocaine transited West Africa annually, with a profit of $2 billion. Nongovernmental organizations have estimated that there are more than 500 human trafficking syndicates that enslave some 38,000 victims in South Africa alone. Frequent stories on piracy in the Horn of Africa and, increasingly, the Gulf of Guinea demonstrate further the growing challenge transnational criminal organizations pose to African countries. Second is the increasing attention that transnational organized crime in Africa is drawing from nation-states within Africa and around the globe. As this book demonstrates, Africa has a diversity of transnational criminal markets, including mainstays such as drug trafficking and human smuggling but also specialized markets such as financial fraud and illegal poaching. Criminal markets perpetrate significant economic, political and social harms on African states and citizens, drawing additional concerns for those states struggling to develop robust economic and governance structures. Thus while African states are working together to combat the threats transnational organized crime poses to their citizens, they also recognize that Africa serves as a transit zone through which illicit goods and services flow from one continent to another. Organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union and UNODC have noted the growing importance of West Africa as a transit zone for drugs from South America destined for European markets. The President of the ECOWAS Commission, His Excellency James Victor Ghebo, captured this sentiment in remarks before the 2010 ECOWAS Seminar on Transnational Organized Crime and Human Security in West Africa when he stated, “These crimes committed across our borders have the notable feature of being inspired and controlled by criminal rings and cartels both within and outside our geopolitical area.” Discussing the gravity of the situation, he noted that “I cannot overemphasize the importance and urgency of governments and institutions, both local and abroad, coming together sooner rather than later to fight this threat.” One last impetus for this meeting is the growing recognition among a number of nation-states that the time has come to update and expand the tools and programs employed to combat transnational organized crime. While states have come together to ratify and implement international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, states have more recently undertaken steps to enact new strategies to confront transnational organized crime. A good example is the 2011 U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which captures the pervasive threat and the comprehensive nature of the response required to meet it. The strategy details the social, financial, political and international threats that transnational organized crime poses to all nations and their citizens. The strategy lays out concrete legislative, enforcement, regulatory, economic and diplomatic goals that the United States will take in conjunction with bilateral, multilateral and private sector partners. The document mirrors those that the United Kingdom and other countries have issued recently. Details: Milan, Italy: ISPAC (International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme), 2010. 159p. Source: Selected papers and contributions from the International Conference on "International Organized Crime: The African Experience": Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://ispac.cnpds.org/download.php?fld=pub_files&f=internationalorganizedcrimetheafricanexperience.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://ispac.cnpds.org/download.php?fld=pub_files&f=internationalorganizedcrimetheafricanexperience.pdf Shelf Number: 125333 Keywords: Corruption (Africa)Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals (Africa)Drug Trafficking (Africa)Human Trafficking (Africa)Money Laundering (Africa)Organized Crime (Africa)Transnational Crime (Africa) |
Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Tracking Progress: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: Money laundering and terrorism financing pose a significant threat to security and developmental efforts worldwide and increasingly undermine the integrity of the global financial system and its long-term stability. Many states in the Greater Horn of Africa region are experiencing rapid economic growth and have increasing access to global markets. With predominantly informal and cash-based economies, these states are particularly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing activities. This vulnerability is further enhanced by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms as well as limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to respond to violations. Poverty, weak governance, corruption, porous borders, and political instability all contribute to the enabling environment for transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups in the Greater Horn region. Although overarching regulatory frameworks and institutional capacities remain low, political interest and technical attention and resourcing is growing in the region. In particular, a willingness to engage on these issues at the national level is rising. This report provides a new assessment of developments related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/ CFT) efforts in East Africa and the Greater Horn region and offers a review and analysis of 10 countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. It builds on the 2012 baseline study, titled "ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion," and includes two additional countries, Tanzania and Yemen, because of the geographical and strategic importance of these two countries to the cross-border risks shared among Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states and these non-IGAD members. This report combined desk research and analysis with limited in-country visits. To the extent possible, each country's assessment covers similar areas, including a recap of the findings from the 2012 baseline study and a summary of findings and recommendations to date; a broad economic snapshot of the country and relevant political context; progress on AML/ CFT efforts, such as the national legal framework and the operationalization of a financial intelligence unit; ongoing risks and vulnerabilities, largely focused on sectoral risks and concrete implementation of legal frameworks; and emergent entry points for action and further development. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 135379 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney Laundering (Africa)Organized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |