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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:20 pm
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Results for narcotics
50 results foundAuthor: Nilsson, Magnus Title: The Business of Narcotics: Do Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Affect Young Men's Experience of Narcotics? Summary: In this thesis, outlaw motorcycle gangs are used to measure the effects of organized crime on young men's expeience of narcotics. The study relies on panel data for Swedish countie stretching over the period 1995-2005, using results from conscript surveys to determine young men's experience of narcotics. Details: Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Economics, 2007. 46p. Source: Master's Thesis Year: 2007 Country: Sweden URL: Shelf Number: 113849 Keywords: Motorcycle GangsNarcoticsOrganized Crime |
Author: Peters, Gretchen Title: How Opium Profits the Taliban Summary: In Afghanistan's poppy-rich southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 39p. Source: Peaceworks No. 62 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 115811 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug TraffickingNarcoticsOpiumTaliban |
Author: Martinez, Angelica Duran Title: Organized Crime, the State and Democracy: The Cases of Central America and the Caribbean Summary: Over a decade on from the end of the civil wars that devastated the region, large parts of Central America are once again afflicted by chronic violence. This time, however, the principal culprits are narco-traffickers and criminal networks, undermining state structures through corruption and clandestine links to political parties, judges and law enforcement officials. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, a flourishing drug trade has brought wealth, but at the cost of rising homicide rates and grave damage to democratic institutions. Based on a two-day conference of experts held in early 2007 in New York, this report explores new thinking on the ills afflicting the region - including the highly controversial mara gangs - and how the international community might help remedy the problems of crime and corruption without undermining the fragile states that are the essential building blocks of any long-term solution. Details: Madrid: FRIDE (Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior), 2007. 16p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: Central America URL: Shelf Number: 118677 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal GangsCriminal NetworksDrug Trafficking (Central America, Caribbean)NarcoticsOrganized Crime |
Author: Kramer, Tom Title: From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt? The Future of Opium Bans in the Kokang and Wa Regions Summary: In the Kokang and Wa regions in northern Burma opium bans have ended poppy cultivation, but have caused chronic poverty and food insecurity as a result. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009. 12p. Source: Internet Resource; Drug Policing Briefing No. 29 Year: 2009 Country: Burma URL: Shelf Number: 119157 Keywords: Drug Enforcement (Burma)Drug Policy (Burma)NarcoticsOpium |
Author: Pryor, Crystal D. Title: Operation UNITE: A Qualitative Analysis Identifying Critical Factors for Implementation Summary: UNITE is an acronym meaning Unlawful Narcotics Investigations, Treatment and Education. It reflects the three-pronged, comprehensive approach deemed necessary to combating substance abuse in Kentucky Fifth Congressional District. Of Kentucky’s 120 counties, 24 of them do not have an organized regional drug task force. Fifteen of these counties with no active drug task force are represented in the Bluegrass Area Development District’s region. Current social and political perceptions across Kentucky recognize Operation UNITE efforts as largely successful. The evaluation responded to the following research questions: What factors lead to success in Kentucky’s Operation UNITE? Are these factors transferable in treating Central Kentucky’s substance abuse problems? An open-ended interview guide was used to collect data from fifteen Operation UNITE and three partnering organizations staff. The results identified 6 critical factors needed to implement Operation UNITE: a three-prong approach, financial resources, strong employee qualities, cross training, communication mediums, and checks and balances. The data collected also identified staff perceptions of internal and external success and challenges to service delivery pathways. The study’s findings are intended to assist in understanding the collaboration, coordination, and functionality of Operation UNITE. The study recommendations the findings be considered when implementing the UNITE regional drug task force model in the Bluegrass Area Development District region. Details: Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, Martin School of Public Policy & Administration, 2007. 58p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119282 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug Task ForceNarcoticsSubstance Abuse |
Author: Tajikistan. Drug Control Agency Title: Report on the Drug Situation in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2009. Summary: This report presents an analysis of illegal drug situation in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, a description of the criminal market for narcotic drugs in the area, and efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking in Tajikistan and the surrounding area. Details: Dushanbe: Tajikistan Drug Control Agency, 2009. 49p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Tajikistan URL: Shelf Number: 119121 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrugsNarcotics |
Author: Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo Title: Issues in Estimating the Economic Cost of Drug Abuse in Consuming Nations Summary: This report considers the current feasibility of constructing an estimate of the global cost of drug use. While national estimates exist for seven developed countries, most countries have yet to construct a comprehensive estimate. Furthermore, it is impossible to compare the existing national estimates because of differences in the construction, which may reflect varying political and social environments that influence the nature of use and its related harms. The report lays out a conceptual framework for initiating the construction of country-specific estimates in a fashion that would facilitate cross-national comparisons. It demonstrates the difficulty in trying to implement this framework using existing data, as current data available in the various countries suffer from inconsistencies in definitions, coverage, and measurement. The pitfalls and assumptions necessary to construct a comparable estimate using existing data, therefore, are quite significant. The report concludes that it is not possible at this time to develop a meaningful comparative estimate of the cost of drug use across countries. However, it points out that steps could be taken to improve the consistency of measurement in many of the indicators in future years through coordinated international efforts, not unlike that currently being undertaken by the EMCDDA for the European Community. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 47p. Source: Internet Resource; Report 3 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117656 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug and Narcotic ControlEconomicsNarcoticsSubstance Abuse |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Thematic Evaluation of Counter-Narcotics Enforcement in Central Asia Summary: The programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Central Asia covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Counter-narcotics enforcement (CNE) is by far the largest operation and is considered strategically important to the region. CNE projects with varying objectives account for 85 per cent of the region’s total portfolio and have been allocated a combined budget of about US$ 40 million. CNE projects are ongoing operations that are expected to remain a primary area of intervention for UNODC in Central Asia in the future. The present thematic evaluation aims to assess UNODC activities in the region by establishing what the Office has achieved to date under the CNE objective and to identify lessons learned and best practices to improve future operations. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2007. 71p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 115737 Keywords: Drub Abuse and AddictionDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug ControlDrugsNarcotics |
Author: Ahrari, Ehsan Title: Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: Narcotics production and trafficking is a critical dimension of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With Afghanistan as the world's largest opium producer, narcotics are the economic lynchpin connecting key players in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The increase in narco-trafficking routes through Russia and Central Asia to supply global demand introduces important international variables. This report assesses the global and regional dynamics of narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the implications for counterinsurgency efforts in the region. Details: Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009. 57p. Source: Internet Resource; NBR Special Report No. 20 Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 117571 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug Trafficking ControlNarcoticsOpium |
Author: Arizona. Attorney General's Office Title: Addressing the Meth Crisis in Arizona: Arizona Methamphetamine Conference Report 2006 Summary: This report presents the findings from a conference held on Februay 13 & 14, 2006, which addressed the issue of methamphetamine abuse in Arizona, and includes reommendations about the impact of methamphetamine and what is working nationwide in the areas of prvention, treatment and law enforcement. Details: Phoenix: Attorney General's Office, 2006. 44p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119280 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug TreatmentMethamphetamine (Arizona)Narcotics |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey Summary: For most of the 20th Century, morphine and codeine have been used for the relief of pain, suppressing coughs, and treating diarrhoea. Indeed, in the last thirty years both opiates have been recommended by the World Health Organisation as essential therapeutic tools with a wide range of medical applications and, more recently, in the treatment of cancer-related pain. Consequently, over the last twenty years the demand for opiate raw materials has increased significantly. However, mirroring this increase in the demand for opiates for legitimate medical and scientific needs has been an increasing concern over the illegal use of opiates, from smoking and eating opium in the 19th Century to smoking and injecting heroin in the late part of the 20th Century. The challenge for the international community has been to establish a regulatory system that ensures that the legitimate medical and scientific needs for opiates are met, whilst preventing diversion to illicit markets. This report seeks to assess the scale and nature of any potential diversion from the licit trade through a comparative analysis of the different processes and controls applied in two source countries, India and Turkey. It compares the different regulatory and control mechanisms that are applied in each of these countries and identifies lessons learned and ‘best practice’ in the cultivation, production and regulatory mechanisms for licit opium poppy. Details: Unpublished report, 2001. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2018 at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266277621_AN_ANALYSIS_OF_LICIT_OPIUM_POPPY_CULTIVATION_INDIA_AND_TURKEY Year: 2001 Country: Asia URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266277621_AN_ANALYSIS_OF_LICIT_OPIUM_POPPY_CULTIVATION_INDIA_AND_TURKEY Shelf Number: 116674 Keywords: Drug ControlNarcoticsOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Lloyd, Charlie Title: Drugs Research: An Overview of Evidence and Questions for Policy Summary: In 2001 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation embarked upon a programme of research that explored the problem of illicit drugs in the UK. The research addressed many questions that were often too sensitive for the government to tackle. In many cases, these studies represented the first research on these issues. This study gives an overview of the projects in the programme. The topics covered include: The policing of drug possession; The domestic cultivation, purchasing and heavy use of cannabis; Non-problematic heroin use, heroin prescription and Drug Consumption Rooms; The impact of drugs on the family; and Drug testing in schools and in the workplace. Details: York, UK: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2010. 70p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 119469 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug TestingDrug TreatmentDrugsNarcoticsSubstance Abuse |
Author: Weintraub, Sidney Title: Cooperative Mexican-U.S. Antinarcotics Efforts: A Report of the CSIS Simon Chair in Political Economy Summary: "Because of high U.S. narcotics consumption and Mexico’s role as the main transit country for cocaine from Colombia, the dominant narcotics activity in the Western Hemisphere takes place between the United States and Mexico. Competition among the large Mexican drug-trafficking organizations to maximize their sales in the United States has led to terrible violence in Mexico, and that country’s “war” against those organizations has amplified that violence. Mexico was a small player in the movement of cocaine to the United States before the 1980s, when the main route was from Colombia through the Caribbean to Florida. After that route was largely abandoned because of heavy U.S. sea and land interdiction, Colombian cocaine began to enter the United States through Central America and Mexico. This report focuses on four drugs: cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Mexico produces the last three of these drugs, which are shipped directly to the United States. If reliance on Mexico as the final transit country for cocaine sales to the United States were to become too costly for the drug-trafficking organizations, the route could change again. And while the violence in Mexico might then diminish, cocaine would still come into the United States because of the demand for the drug. For many years the U.S. government was unwilling to admit explicitly that U.S. narcotics consumption bore some responsibility for the violence in Mexico. During a visit to Mexico in March 2009, however, the U.S. secretary of state finally stated the obvious: that U.S. narcotics demand was fueling drug violence in Mexico. This report thus comes at a time of antinarcotics cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation does not mean that the problems related to drug trafficking and consumption are on their way to solution, only that issues not discussed earlier can now be put on the table. The purpose of this report is to provide a full discussion of such issues." Details: Washington, DC: Center for Stratigic and International Studies, 2010. 57p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 14, 2010 at: http://csis.org/publication/cooperative-mexican-us-antinarcotics-efforts Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://csis.org/publication/cooperative-mexican-us-antinarcotics-efforts Shelf Number: 119606 Keywords: Drug EnforcementDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingGun ViolenceNarcotics |
Author: Taraciuk, Tamara Title: Uniform Impunity: Mexico's Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations Summary: "This report details 17 cases involving military abuses against more than 70 victims, including several cases from 2007 and 2008. The abuses include killings, torture, rapes, and arbitrary detentions. Not one of the military investigations into these crimes has led to a conviction for even a single soldier on human rights violations. The only civilian investigation into any of these cases led to the conviction of four soldiers." Details: Internet Resource; Accessed August 14, 2010 at: Source: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009. 76p. Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: Shelf Number: 114623 Keywords: Human Rights (Mexico)Military Justice (Mexico)NarcoticsProsecutionRapeTorture |
Author: Nopens, Patrick F.P. Title: Countering Afghan Narcotics: A Litmus Test for Effective NATO and Russia Cooperation? Summary: Afghan opiates kill 100,000 people a year globally. Every year NATO countries lose over 10,000 people to heroin overdoses. In Russia an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people die of drug overdoses yearly. Counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is an area where NATO’s and Russia’s interests clearly coincide. If NATO and Russia cannot find a way of effectively cooperating in this matter, not only will the Afghan narcotic problem spiral completely out of control, but NATO-Russia cooperation could come under pressure. Details: Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2010. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Security Policy Brief, No. 14: Accessed October 5, 2010 at: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-14-Nopens-countering-afghan-narcotics.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-gov/SPB-14-Nopens-countering-afghan-narcotics.pdf Shelf Number: 119859 Keywords: Drug TraffickingNarcoticsOpiatesOrganized Crime |
Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction Title: Polydrug Use: Patterns and Responses Summary: In this report, individual data from the surveys carried out in 2003 by the European school survey project on alcohol and other drugs (ESPAD) are used to examine the characteristics of polydrug use among over 70,000 15- to 16-year-old students from 22 European countries. Details: Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2010 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_93217_EN_EMCDDA_SI09_polydrug%20use.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_93217_EN_EMCDDA_SI09_polydrug%20use.pdf Shelf Number: 119886 Keywords: Alcohol AbuseDrug Abuse and AddictionDrug OffendersNarcotics |
Author: McGuire, Peter L. Title: Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa: A Governance Challenge Summary: West Africa is one of the most impoverished, underdeveloped, and instability prone regions in the world. Many of the nation-states in the region are empirically weak: they lack the capacity to deliver public goods and services to their citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories, are marked by high levels of official corruption, and are plagued by political instability and violent conflict. Since 2004 the region has faced an unprecedented surge in illicit narcotics (primarily cocaine) trafficking, raising fears within the international community that foreign (largely South American) trafficking groups would engender escalated corruption and violence across the region. This paper examines the effect that the surge in narcotics trafficking has had on governance and security in the region, paying particular attention to the experience of Guinea-Bissau and neighboring Republic of Guinea (Guinea-Conakry), two West African states that have been particularly affected by the illicit trade. The central argument presented is that narcotics trafficking is only one facet of the overall challenge of state weakness and fragility in the region. The profound weakness of many West African states has enabled foreign trafficking groups to develop West Africa into an entrepôt for cocaine destined for the large and profitable European market, sometimes with the active facilitation of high-level state actors. Thus, simply implementing counter-narcotics initiatives in the region will have a limited impact without a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity, improving political transparency and accountability, and tackling poverty alleviation and underdevelopment. Without addressing the root issues that allowed for the penetration of trafficking groups into the states of the region in the first place, West Africa will remain susceptible to similar situations in the future, undermining the region’s nascent progress in the realms of governance, security, and development. Details: Boston: Boston University, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: The Pardee Papers, No. 9: Accessed October 13, 2010 at: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2010/03/Pardee_Paper-9-Narcotics-Trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 119953 Keywords: CocaineCorruptionDrug TraffickingNarcoticsOrganized CrimePoverty |
Author: Holmes, Jessie Title: Trends in Possession and Use of Narcotics and Cocaine Summary: This brief describes trends in possession and use of narcotics and cocaine, characteristics of these offences and offenders, and court outcomes for those charged with possession and/or use of narcotics or cocaine. Descriptive analyses were conducted on data sourced from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research’s police recorded criminal incident and person of interest databases as well as from the NSW Reoffending Database and NSW Local Criminal Courts. Data from NSW Health on recorded opioid and cocaine overdoses was also analysed. Recorded incidents of narcotics possession and opioid overdoses fell sharply between 1999 and 2006. Since 2006 both narcotics possession and opioid overdoses doubled, however their levels are still much lower than those recorded prior to the heroin shortage. Recorded incidents of cocaine possession and overdoses have been increasing since 2003 and in 2009, both reached their highest levels in 15 years. Narcotics possession incidents were generally detected on streets and footpaths and at residential premises within Sydney’s CBD and in the Fairfield and Liverpool Local Government Areas. Cocaine possession incidents were detected on streets and footpaths, and at licensed and residential premises, located in Sydney’s CBD and the Eastern Suburbs. Narcotics and cocaine possession offenders tended to be males aged 20 to 39 years. Almost all offenders convicted of narcotics possession had prior convictions (93%) compared with less than half of those convicted of cocaine possession (49%). Most offenders convicted of these offences in 2008 were issued with fines averaging $355 for narcotics possession and $406 for cocaine possession. Taking into account data from other sources, these results suggest that actual levels of narcotics and cocaine use are increasing in NSW. Details: Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2010. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Bureau Brief, Issue Paper No. 52: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/bb52.pdf/$file/bb52.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/bb52.pdf/$file/bb52.pdf Shelf Number: 120009 Keywords: CocaineDrug OffendersDrug OffensesHeroinIllicit DrugsNarcotics |
Author: Missouri. Department of Public Safety and Statistical Analysis Center Title: Nature and Extent of the Illicit Drug Problem in Missouri Summary: The study focused on illicit drug use, the societal impact of illicit drugs, and extent of the illicit drug industry in the State of Missouri. Details: Jefferson City, MO: Missouri Statistical Analysis Center, 2010. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2010 at:http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/pdf/2010NATUREANDEXTENTREPORT.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/pdf/2010NATUREANDEXTENTREPORT.pdf Shelf Number: 120176 Keywords: CocaineDrug OffendersHeroinIllicit Drugs (Missouri)MethamphetaminesNarcotics |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Development in a Drugs Environment: A Strategic Approach to 'Alternative Development' Summary: Whichever way we look at it Alternative Development is at a crossroads: there is confusion over language and terms, concerns over the technical capacity of implementing bodies, and the growing view that the attribution of both drug control and development outcomes to alternative development projects remains opaque. The result is funding for alternative development projects continues to fall. There are certainly many in the wider development community who question how alternative development differs from conventional rural development and whether the inclusion of key cross cutting issues such as poverty, gender, the environment and conflict have actually manifested in improvements in the lives and livelihoods of primary stakeholders. Without more robust evidence of the impact of these programmes on both human development indicators and illicit drug crop cultivation, as well as improved confidence in the effectiveness of those bodies that have traditionally designed and implemented alternative development programmes, it is unlikely that levels of funding for the kind of discrete area based alternative development projects of the past will actually recover. More recently in Afghanistan, and increasingly in other source countries in Asia, the term ‘alternative development’ has been substituted with ‘Alternative Livelihoods’ with little recognition of the conceptual and operational differences. Elsewhere terms such as ‘Sustainable Alternative Livelihoods’ and indeed ‘Sustainable Livelihoods’ itself are sneaking into the rubric of drug control agencies as they search for a common language and legitimacy with the development community. Even the term ‘Alternative Development’ still means ‘many things to many people’. For those whose performance is measured simply in terms of reductions in the amount of opium poppy and coca grown, alternative development is seen as simply as the ‘carrot’ to the eradication ‘stick’, and the provision of development assistance is contingent on reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation. For others, reductions in illicit drug crop cultivation are an externality of a development process (that includes extending good governance and the rule of law) aimed at achieving sustainable improvements in lives and livelihoods. In terms of both process and the primary goal there is still much disagreement with regard to alternative development. However, there is a danger of ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’. Alternative development projects have achieved both development and drug control outcomes in specific geographical areas where more conventional development agencies are often not even present, despite the prevailing levels of poverty and conflict. For those who have experienced the low levels of literacy, high incidence of food insecurity, infant mortality and malnutrition that typically exist in illicit drug crop producing areas, as well as the lack of governance and prevailing levels of violence and intimidation from both state and non-state actors, arguments about the relatively high income of opium poppy and coca growing households seems rather inappropriate and ill informed. To this group the subsequent improvements in the income and quality of life of communities that often accompany alternative development projects at the same time as levels of opium poppy or coca cultivation fall are obvious, even if they might have been documented better or achieved more cost effectively. Given the concentration of illicit drug crops in marginal areas where weak governance, conflict and poverty prevail it is clear that the current impasse on the role of the development community in improving the lives and livelihoods of those residing in illicit drug crop producing areas has to be overcome so that both development and drug control communities can meet their different but interrelated objectives. Yet, there is a need to recognise that greater engagement by the development community will not be achieved by launching a new marketing campaign and trying to sell what is already considered a faulty product more effectively, or simply tinkering with the name in the hope that non one notices the ‘alternative development’ product has actually passed its ‘sell-by-date’. Instead, there is a need for the proponents of alternative development to learn from the wider development community in terms of conceptual frameworks, understanding the nature of change in rural livelihoods, and in particular, to recognise that the more traditional project type intervention has its limitations and that a wider-sectoral approach is required to build an enabling policy environment for development efforts to have make a real impact. At the same time, there is a need for the development community to move way from what can be a rather unsophisticated and outdated model of the ‘profit maximising illicit drug farmer’ and further its understanding of the complex role that illicit drug crops play in the livelihoods of the rural poor. This Discussion paper is aimed at promoting just such an understanding between both communities. Indeed, it is targeted at a wider development community that has often been at best suspicious of the illicit drug issues and a drug control community that has often proved insular and unable to draw on the lessons learned from the implementation of more conventional rural development interventions over the last decade. The paper is intended to provoke both communities into a more constructive dialogue: a dialogue that is aimed more at developing a deeper understanding of the considerable overlap between drug control and development agendas; and that promotes partnership – no longer based on the distinct and rather artificial discipline of ‘alternative development’ in which neither development nor drug control community have ownership – but based on agreed principles of integrating an analysis of the causes of illicit drug crop cultivation into conventional development programmes, a common understanding of how development outcomes can translate into drug control achievements, and an ethos of doing ‘development in a drugs environment’. Details: Eschborn/Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2006. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.davidmansfield.org/data/Alternative_Development/GTZ/strategic_approach.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Asia URL: http://www.davidmansfield.org/data/Alternative_Development/GTZ/strategic_approach.pdf Shelf Number: 120269 Keywords: Drug ControlNarcoticsOpiumPoppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Governance, Security and Economic Growth: The Determinants of Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Districts of Jurm and Baharak in Badakhshan Summary: As this report shows the evidence from the centre of Baharak district in Badakhshan is that given the right conditions many households can prosper despite ceasing or significantly reducing opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy remains an input intensive crop. Not only does land have to be set aside for its cultivation but also water, seed, farm power and most importantly of all labour. When the opportunity cost of allocating these inputs to opium production rise due to the growth in the market for high value vegetable production, the recovery of livestock prices and significant increases in wage labour opportunities, households can make the shift from opium poppy cultivation to legal economic opportunities without enduring economic and political shocks. For instance, it no longer looks as economically attractive to allocate family members to work on such a labour intensive crop as opium poppy cultivation when salaried employment and consistent wage labour opportunities are available, particularly when opium prices are falling. Neither does it make sense to hire a workforce for opium poppy cultivation to substitute for this now gainfully employed family labour given relatively high wage labour rates. Instead it is rational to cultivate less labour intensive crops that can be managed largely utilising the remaining supply of household labour. Of course it is even more conducive to the household if these crops fetch good prices, attract traders to purchase them at the farmgate and obtain advance payments, as is currently the case in central Baharak. Land can also be allocated to fodder crops that are again less labour intensive and serve to increase the value added of livestock which has seen a recovery in prices and market size. As such, combining wage labour opportunities with high value cash crops and livestock production not only has the potential to generate a higher return to household resources but can also offer greater security than simply cultivating opium poppy. Of course in this scenario ‘security’ is not only a function of the different income streams available which act as a safety net against crop or market failure, but also a consequence of the household operating within the ‘rule of law’ and therefore less vulnerable to the potential excesses of both state and non-state actors. In this situation a household will also more often than not be a recipient of public goods such as education, health, physical infrastructure, as well as physical security which all serve to improve economic opportunities and extend social contract between the state and community. As experience in other former opium poppy growing areas in countries like Thailand and Pakistan illustrate once these gains are consolidated farmers are unlikely to return to opium production even when famgate prices increase significantly. However, this paper also shows that the opportunity cost of allocating household resources to opium poppy is not rising for all, indeed these development are typically highly localised and concentrated around central Baharak. In contrast in the more remote areas of Baharak district and across much of the neighbouring district of Jurm, circumstances are such that agricultural commodity and labour markets remain constrained. Limited natural assets, such as land and water, combined with poor roads and high transportation costs preclude the shift to high value vegetable production. Some recovery in livestock is taking place but the benefits of this tend to be concentrated amongst the relatively wealthy who have often restocked their herds using the proceeds from their opium crop. In these areas opium poppy persists all be it at lower levels than in 2006. In the more remote parts of the district of Baharak there is potential for opium to cease once infrastructure is improved, and more marginal households restock their herds and gain better access to labour markets through a growth in labour demand and/or skill development. Wage labour opportunities in Iran will continue to be seen as an important safety valve for households who cannot meet their basic needs by participating in local agricultural and labour markets. In the district of Jurm the prognosis is more bleak. The biggest constraint on reducing opium poppy in this area is the insecurity and poor governance that is currently stymieing the growth of the legal economy. Here the political and financial interests of competing commanders will only serve to continue high levels of dependency on opium production and prevent households making sustainable shifts to legal economic options. There is a danger that the growing insecurity in the centre of the district has a knock on effect in the upper areas in which currently the local commanders remain relatively inactive. In the centre of Jurm the uncertain political and security environment is already impacting on investment decisions. Attempts by the local and central authorities to reduce opium poppy cultivation are viewed with disdain and seen as part of a wider attempt by local commanders to reinforce their political and economic grip over the area. It is also impacting on the legal economy reducing disposable income and subsequently sales and employment opportunities. This in turn is further weakening the relationship between the state and local communities. As such there is a real risk that the political need for short-term results on levels of cultivation could undermine attempts to deliver sustainable development and counter narcotics outcomes. In such an environment greater focus needs to be given to stabilising the security and governance environment through anti corruption measures and extending service delivery, as well as promoting economic growth. It would appear that counter narcotics efforts such as eradication efforts may well have to wait until these pre-requisites are put in place and farmers have viable alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. Details: Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2007. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-eod-report-Badakhshan.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-eod-report-Badakhshan.pdf Shelf Number: 120270 Keywords: EconomicsNarcoticsOpiumPoppy Cultivation |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed Summary: The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world's opium, which competes with the country's licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government's capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities on its own. In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies' monitoring and evaluation efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency campaign. The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) policy and rules of engagement were changed to allow greater military involvement in Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between traffickers and insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by de-emphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and increasing agricultural assistance. The United States' use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies have reported progress within counternarcotics program areas, but GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to a lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for performance management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack of security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have challenged some counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and public information efforts have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgency-dominated provinces. In addition, other challenges affect specific program areas. For example, drug abuse and addiction are prevalent among the Afghan National Police. Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about current and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics areas have monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency oversight, contractor reporting, and/or third-party verification. For example, eradication figures were routinely reported by U.S. Department of State (State) officials and contractors, and verified by United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime monitors. U.S. agencies also conducted and documented program evaluations to improve effectiveness in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information program areas. However, State has not formally documented evaluations of its justice reform program. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-10-291: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10291.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10291.pdf Shelf Number: 120492 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug TraffickingDrugsIllegal Drug Trade (Afghanistan)Narcotics |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010 Summary: This year’s Afghanistan Opium Survey shows that while the total area under cultivation and the number of families growing opium poppy remained the same as in 2009, opium production fell drastically to roughly half of last year’s levels. The cause of the decline in production was a naturally occurring plant disease that affected Afghanistan’s major opium poppy-growing regions this year. Like opium production, the gross export value of Afghan opiates was halved this year. This indicates that the income of Afghan traffickers from the 2010 opium season is also down. But there is cause for concern. The market responded to the steep drop in opium production with an equally dramatic jump in the market price to more than double 2009 levels. Meanwhile, the price of wheat—one of Afghanistan’s principal crop alternatives to opium—has fallen. At current prices, planting opium poppies is six times more profitable than growing wheat. The high price of opium combined with a low wheat price may encourage more farmers to cultivate opium in 2011. The 2010 Survey continues to underscore the linkage between opium poppy cultivation and security in Afghanistan. In areas where there is a government presence and the rule of law prevails, only a few hundred hectares of opium cultivation remain. Twenty provinces are already poppy-free, and with some additional effort, Afghanistan could achieve five more poppy-free provinces next year (Hirat, Kabul, Kunar, Laghman and Zabul). We encourage their governors, the central Government and donors to help these provinces become poppy-free in 2011. Badghis and Zabul have achieved significant reductions, and we encourage efforts to stop the increased cultivation in Badakhshan and Nangarhar to avoid a return to the worrying levels observed in 2007. The significant expansion of cultivation in Kandahar Province over the past two years must also be stopped, and we urge the governor and other partners to play an active role in preventing any further increase and to ensure progress is made in eradication. Further growth in poppy cultivation in Kandahar would have an adverse effect on other provinces as well. Enabling farmers to make a living and support their families by planting licit crops is the most effective way to stop opium poppy cultivation. Providing villages with agricultural assistance encourages the cultivation of licit crops. For the first time this year, we saw a correlation between provision of agricultural assistance and a drop in opium cultivation. Providing farmers with access to markets for their crops also helps keep them away from opium poppy cultivation. In villages that are close to agricultural markets, farmers plant less poppy than in villages with no access to markets. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 14, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2010_web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2010_web.pdf Shelf Number: 120925 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionNarcoticsOpium Abuse (Afghanistan) |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: South-East Asia: Opium Survey 2010: Lao PDR, Myanmar Summary: This year’s South East Asia Opium Survey shows that while opium poppy cultivation in this region remains well below the problematic levels of the mid-1990s, the relentless rise recorded in the preceding three years continues. In addition, and despite the fact that governments have increase their eradication efforts, we estimate that potential opium production in 2010 has increased by approximately 75 per cent when compared with 2009. This has occurred largely as a result of two combined factors: more area under cultivation and higher yields. Poverty and instability are two of the drivers which push farmers to grow (or sometimes return to growing) illicit crops. The recent global economic crisis appears to have exacerbated the situation for poor communities that cultivate opium poppy. Another factor driving cultivation is the steeply rising price of opium over the last few years. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 14, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/SEA_report_2010_withcover_small.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/SEA_report_2010_withcover_small.pdf Shelf Number: 120926 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug ControlNarcoticsOpium (Asia) |
Author: Chalk, Peter Title: The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response Summary: Colombia currently accounts for the vast bulk of cocaine produced in Latin America. In 2009, the country produced 270 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, making it the principal supplier for both the United States and the worldwide market. Besides Colombia, Peru and Bolivia constitute two additional important sources of cocaine in Latin America. In 2009, these two countries generated enough base material to respectively yield 225 and 195 MT of refined product. Between 60 and 65 percent of all Latin American cocaine is trafficked to the United States, the bulk of which is smuggled via the eastern Pacific/Central American corridor. The remainder is sent through the Caribbean island chain, with the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Haiti acting as the main transshipment hubs. In both cases, Mexico serves as the main point of entry to mainland America, presently accounting for the vast majority of all illicit drug imports to the United States. Increasing amounts of Latin American cocaine are now also being sent to Europe, reflecting higher street prices than those in the United States and shifting consumer demand patterns toward this particular narcotic (and derivates, such as crack). The majority of the Colombian cocaine that is trafficked to Europe, either directly or via West Africa, is exported from Venezuela. In addition to cocaine, Colombia also represents a relatively important source for North America opiates, historically accounting for around half of the white heroin consumed east of the Mississippi. Although there has been a marked decline in opium-production levels in the past several years —largely due to successful poppy-eradication efforts — shipments still take place, with the main trafficking route running up the eastern Pacific to Mexico. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf Shelf Number: 121868 Keywords: CocaineDrug Trafficking (Latin America)Drug Trafficking ControlNarcotics |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: Explaining the Reductions in Opium Production in Central Helmand between 2008 and 2011 Summary: Since 2008 the amount of land cultivated with opium in Helmand province has fallen by an estimated thirty seven per cent. Further dramatic reductions are anticipated in the canal command area of the province in the 2010/11 growing season. These reductions in opium poppy cultivation in central Helmand have occurred at the same time as the deployment of a growing number of national and international troops in the province, changing levels of violence, dramatic shifts in the terms of trade between opium poppy and wheat, the disbursement of increasing amounts of development assistance and the launch of a counter narcotics effort known as the ‘Food Zone Programme’. In this complex environment where so many variables are potentially influencing farmers in their cropping choices, it is difficult to identify the underlying causes of the reduction in opium production without conducting detailed research over a number of years. This Study represents such a body of analytical work and was commissioned to answer two specific questions: (1) what has driven the recent reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Helmand province; and (2) how sustainable will these reductions be? The Study also offers a series of recommendations for policy development and the implementation of programmes that can deliver a more enduring counter narcotics outcome without undermining current stabilisation efforts. The Study draws on both remote sensing and household data collected over a three year period and focuses on twenty three distinct research sites located in the rural areas of the districts of Nahre Seraj, Nad e Ali, Lashkar Gah, Marjeh and Nawa Barakzai in central Helmand. These particular research sites offer sharply contrasting socio-economic, political and environmental conditions that allow the reductions in levels of opium poppy cultivation within the province to be examined, as well as the identification of the differing impact of these reductions on households with different resource endowments and divergent exposure to risk and uncertainty. For example, some sites located in the environs of the cities of Gereshk and Lashkar Gah have experienced an improvement in security, gained from enhanced service provision and an expansion in their portfolio of livelihood activities over the period of the Study. Other research sites are located beyond the environs of the urban areas and have been exposed to repeated and concurrent shocks, such as chronic conflict, a ban on opium production, and a dramatic increase in wheat prices, over the period of the research. Finally there are research sites where the Taliban dominate, where opium persists and where livelihood options are severely limited by environmental factors. Details: London: Independent Drug Policy Consortium, 2011. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: August 1, 2011 at: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Managing-concurrent-and-repeated-risks.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Managing-concurrent-and-repeated-risks.pdf Shelf Number: 122242 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyNarcoticsOpium (Afghanistan)Poppy Cultivation |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug Investigations Summary: The 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that the availability of illicit drugs is increasing. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in the Department of Justice (DOJ), works with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to carry out drug enforcement efforts. DEA and ICE signed a 2009 Interagency Agreement (Agreement) that outlined the mechanisms to provide ICE with authority to investigate violations of controlled substances laws (i.e., cross-designation). The Agreement also required DEA and ICE to deconflict (e.g., coordinate to ensure officer safety and prevent duplicative work) counternarcotics investigations, among other things. GAO was asked to assess the Agreement's implementation. This report addresses the extent to which DEA and ICE have taken actions (1) to implement the Agreement's cross-designation, deconfliction, and information-sharing provisions and (2) to monitor implementation of the Agreement and make needed adjustments. GAO analyzed documents such as the 2009 Agreement, related interagency agreements, and directives to field offices. GAO also interviewed DEA and ICE Headquarters officials as well as management officials and first line supervisors in 8 of the 21 DEA and 8 of 26 ICE field offices, based on geographic dispersion. Though not generalizable to all DEA and ICE offices, the interviews provided insights. DEA and ICE have taken actions to fully implement the cross-designation and deconfliction provisions of the Agreement, and are finalizing efforts to complete the information-sharing provisions. The Agreement allows ICE to select an unlimited number of agents for cross-designation consideration by DEA. The agencies have implemented these cross-designation provisions through a revised process that (1) elevated the levels at which requests are exchanged between the agencies and (2) consolidated multiple requests into one list of ICE agents. This new process is more streamlined and has resulted in enhanced flexibility in maximizing investigative resources, according to ICE officials. Also, DEA and ICE implemented local deconfliction protocols and used a variety of mechanisms (e.g., local deconfliction centers) to deconflict investigations. Further, in May 2011 DEA and ICE convened the Headquarters Review Team (HRT), comprised of senior managers from both agencies, who are, among other things, to resolve deconfliction and coordination issues that cannot be resolved at lower levels because they require management decisions. DEA and ICE headquarters and field office management officials GAO interviewed generally reported that the implementation of the Agreement and local deconfliction protocols had generally improved deconfliction by (1) ensuring officer safety and (2) preventing one agency's law enforcement activity from compromising the other agency's ongoing investigation. ICE has also partially implemented the Agreement's information-sharing provisions by sharing required data with two DOJ organizations that target drug trafficking organizations, and taking steps to share its drug-related data with a DEA organization focused on disrupting drug trafficking by fall 2011. DEA and ICE have conducted ongoing monitoring of the Agreement's implementation through established processes (e.g., supervisory chains of command) and according to officials from these agencies, the HRT did not identify any systemic issues. Specifically, DEA and ICE headquarters officials routinely coordinated with each other and their respective field offices to monitor the Agreement's implementation. DEA and ICE headquarters officials also said that the May 2011 meeting of the HRT, which is to periodically review the Agreement's implementation, constituted a review of the Agreement and affirmed that there were no overarching or systemic issues of coordination or deconfliction requiring headquarters-level intervention. DEA and ICE provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-763: Accessed August 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11763.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11763.pdf Shelf Number: 122570 Keywords: ContrabandDrug EnforcementDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Narcotics |
Author: Osler, Mark Title: What Would It Look Like If We Cared About Narcotics Trafficking? An Argument to Attack Narcotics Capital Rather Than Labor Summary: As the failure of the “War on Drugs” becomes ever more obvious, alternative strategies are coming to the fore. This article adds to that movement with a novel suggestion: That we cause drug networks to fail as a business through the tactic of focusing resources on the seizure of cash flow traveling back to source countries. To date, federal narcotics interdiction has centered on restricting the labor supply to drug traffickers by incarcerating street dealers, mules, and middle managers. It shouldn’t be surprising that this has not worked, because low-wage labor is in ready supply, and those workers are easily replaced. Instead, we should leverage the skills we have gained in interdicting cash flowing to terrorist organizations and apply it to drug networks. The result could be a self-financing law enforcement effort, a federal effort that is more consistent with the core values of federalism and a belief in markets, and an actual chance to succeed at the task of restricting the flow of narcotics. Details: Minnesota: University of St. Thomas - School of Law, 2011. 17p. Source: Working Paper: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2012 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800370 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800370 Shelf Number: 125365 Keywords: Drug TraffickingEconomics and CrimeNarcoticsWar on Drugs |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results Summary: Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine flow annually from South America to the United States, threatening the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. South American cocaine production and trafficking is centered in the five countries in the Andean region. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide counternarcotics assistance to stem production and trafficking of narcotics in these countries. ONDCP oversees and coordinates this assistance. In this report, GAO (1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counter- narcotics assistance in the Andean countries; (2) identifies amounts allotted for such assistance by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews the agencies’ reporting on their performance. GAO reviewed agency and U.S. strategy documents, analyzed available agency data, and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Recommends -- The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD submits performance summary reports to ONDCP including the Inspector General’s attestation that the reported information is reliable to facilitate good management and oversight. DOD concurred with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-824: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592241.pdf Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592241.pdf Shelf Number: 126009 Keywords: CocaineDrug ControlDrug TraffickingDrug Trafficking ControlNarcotics |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: A Little Bit Poppy-free and a Little Bit Eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2011-2012 Summary: While Balkh and Badakhshan have very different geographical, social, political, and historical contexts, it is hard to identify any factors which could significantly reduce cultivation of opium poppy in either province in the foreseeable future. In Balkh, some of the coercive approaches which have reduced opium poppy cultivation are not sustainable in the longer-term, especially where they go against the economic conditions prevailing in the rural economy. In Badakhshan, a half-hearted coercion has produced uneven results. In the context of the 2014 security transition, it is an open question as to whether the Afghan government and its international partners, preoccupied with other issues (e.g., security, presidential elections), will have the motivation and the means to maintain unpopular coercive approaches, especially where they require the application of consistent pressure on local officials and communities which may have different agendas. Household-level field research done during May 2012 in farming communities in two districts in Balkh (Chimtal, Char Bolak) and Badakhshan (Jurm, Khash) which had a history of opium poppy cultivation, revealed very different dynamics within the opium economy. In Balkh, analysis confirmed the role of state presence and coercion in suppressing opium poppy cultivation as well as the correlation of cultivation with insecurity, with poppy concentrated in areas inaccessible to the government. Balkh has retained its “poppy-free” status, first obtained in 2007, while also raising questions about metrics, as little independent or verifiable information is available on the insecure areas in which poppy is grown. It is also possible that in Balkh causality runs in both directions, and that at least some of the insecurity in areas in which opium poppy is found is the result of stresses and grievances connected with the suppression of cultivation. Deployment of local police(who have informally come to be called arbaki) was credited with improving security and helping to maintain the suppression of cultivation; the population is not confident that this security effect will endure, however, and they have raised concerns about the role that the “arbaki” may play, including allegations of involvement in poppy cultivation. In Badakhshan, analysis connected the decision of households to cultivate poppy with their efforts to resolve financial stress (including debt and asset sales) brought on by the long and harsh winter of 2011-12, and, based on the previous year’s experience, the lack of a credible threat of eradication. Among surveyed households, the number who reported growing poppy doubled from the previous year and the area devoted to poppy increased from four to ten percent of total area sown. Unlike in Balkh, where there has been one dominant leader who has been both motivated and capable of suppressing cultivation in most areas of the province, in Badakhshan power has been more contested and fragmented among local commanders and power holders, who have shown little interest in reducing cultivation, trafficking, and other illicit activities. During 2012, Badakhshan was estimated to have had a 13 percent increase in cultivated area, which moved the province into being a “moderate” rather than “low” producer of opium poppy. Also, unlike Balkh where cultivation is largely limited to two districts, cultivation is widely dispersed across the province’s 26 districts. Given Badakhshan’s mountainous geography and highly contested space, the reporting (post-fieldwork) of apparently much more extensive eradication raises the question of whether the authorities are attempting to impose their will in a more aggressive way than previously and, if so, what the reaction of communities and local power holders will be. While farming conditions in the spring of 2012 were much more promising than the previous year, analysis confirmed the importance of off-farm income in household livelihoods. Labour opportunities and wages in Balkh, especially Mazar-e Sharif (the provincial centre of Balkh), were much more plentiful than during the previous drought year. Meanwhile, in Badakhshan labourers were struggling to find work due to the delay in the start of the construction season. In both provinces, farming households, labourers, and shopkeepers spoke longingly of the “good old days” when the economy was thriving due to opium production and trade. While Badakhshan continues to be considered a drug transit route, this activity does not generate the same widespread incomes as did the extensive cultivation of the mid-2000s. The vast majority of surveyed households in Badakhshan were calculated to be existing on US$2 per person per day, with only about one-quarter meeting their grain requirements from their own production. With the political and security situation now on an unknown trajectory, reductions in cultivation may be more difficult to achieve or maintain, especially in an unstable or contested environment. The enormous pressure on power holders and aspirants, already understood to be preparing for post-2014 instability, to conclude local deals in order to control an area or resources will reduce incentives to adhere to national policies where such policies run up against local interests. In Balkh, which has served as a successful model not just of elimination of opium poppy but also economic development under a strong provincial administration, the shifting of emphasis from Kabul and from the international community may reduce the sorts of political incentives that have until now made it worth imposing unpopular policies. The anticipated contraction in the national economy due to the withdrawal of international spending and reduction in local investor confidence may reduce both household livelihoods opportunities and sources of patronage for power holders. Finally, given the dependence of so many households on off-farm income, pressure to relax the suppression of cultivation may rise in proportion to the anticipated contraction of the economy and the reduction in opportunities for work-related migration in the region. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 128976 Keywords: Drug EradicationIllicit DrugsNarcoticsOpiates (Afghanistan)Opium AbuseOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy: 2013 Summary: The United States, at the local, state, tribal, and Federal levels, has made a concerted effort to enhance, expand, and codify multiple measures designed to address the serious threats posed by illicit drug trafficking across the Southwest border and violence in Mexico. Despite many successes, improved cooperation, coordination, unity of effort, and information sharing, illicit drug trafficking continues to be a multi-faceted threat to our national security which requires additional focus and effort. Transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico with world-wide international connections continue to dominate the illegal drug supply chain and are continuing to expand their illegal activities throughout the United States. Indeed, 90 to 95 percent of all cocaine that enters the United States continues to pass through the Mexico/Central America corridor from the cocaine source countries further south. Mexico remains the primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also a source and transit country for heroin. The same organizations that traffic in drugs also control the south-bound flow of drug-related bulk currency and illegal weapons. The smuggling and illegal export of weapons from the United States into Mexico is a threat to the overall safety and security of both countries and continues to fuel violence along the Southwest border and in the interior of Mexico. Indeed, weapons smuggled into Mexico often end up in the hands of the Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) or other smuggling organizations where they can be employed against law enforcement officers and citizens in either country. On its northern border with the United States, Mexico experienced a dramatic surge in border crime and violence in recent years due to intense competition between Mexican TCOs that employ predatory tactics to realize their profits. The U.S. Government continues to respond to the challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations through a variety of coordinated activities, both at the operational and national policy levels. The U.S.–Mexico bilateral relationship continues to grow based on increasingly strong, multi-layered institutional ties. The commitment of both governments to improve citizen security in each country is underscored by the Merida Initiative, an unprecedented partnership between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law. Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond. Details: Washington, DC: ONDPC, 2013. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129615 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesNarcotics |
Author: Ostler, Sophia Title: Coca Leaf: A Political Dilemma? Summary: For fifty years the World's attitude to and treatment of the coca leaf and coca farmers has been controlled by the UN Drugs Conventions beginning with the Convention of 1961 which prohibited the production, possession and purchase of the coca leaf as well as cocaine. The assertion of this report is that the illegal status of the coca leaf is based upon a misinterpretation of science, first of all in 1950 with the publication of the misleading study of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf; and much later with the blocking of the publication of a report in 1995 by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which made abundantly clear that the coca leaf itself has "no negative health effects". ormally, coca leaf can be used for medicinal and scientific purposes, as prescribed by the 1961 Single Convention. It can also be used as a flavouring agent, as long as all the controlled alkaloids are removed. However because coca leaf contains the cocaine alkaloid, the consumer countries had a choice: either invest in the strengthening of the government and judicial systems of the producer countries and allow coca leaf to remain a legal product; or include coca leaf within the Conventions and invest in a war on drugs with massive weapons sales and fumigation programmes. The US, in particular, chose the latter course. During the past 50 years, fragile government institutions and judicial systems in some Latin American countries have been further weakened and corrupted by wealthy criminals whose fortunes have been inflated by the cocaine trade. This report does not, however, seek to comment upon the status of cocaine. The adverse consequences for coca farmers of the application of the UN Conventions to coca leaf cannot be overstated. They have inhibited important research into the potential of the coca leaf for farmers and communities, particularly in the Andean nations. The policy of spraying coca leaf farms in Colombia has caused appalling poverty. Also, the temptation for poor farmers and their families to work for the drug barons has been and continues to be irresistible while few, if any, alternatives are available. The WHO study of 1995 concluded that the coca leaf has positive therapeutic, cultural and social functions for indigenous Andean populations. We need to understand the full range of possibilities and the taxation potential of the range of products based upon the coca leaf, but this will be problematic while coca remains a controlled substance with the formal UN position being that it is harmful and addictive. If countries do legalise coca production in their own countries, as in Bolivia, then the implications of the fragile government institutions for the production of legal coca leaf products while prohibiting the production of cocaine need to be fully assessed and addressed. The rule of law and government institutions, most particularly those in the security and judicial sectors, will need to be strengthened before real progress can be made to enable the Andean Countries to benefit from a legal market in coca leaf products. Details: London: All Party Parliamentary Group for Drug Policy Reform for Drug Policy Reform (APPG - UK), 2013. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 6, 2013 at: http://www.undrugcontrol.info/images/stories/documents/coca-leaf-political-dilemma.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.undrugcontrol.info/images/stories/documents/coca-leaf-political-dilemma.pdf Shelf Number: 131586 Keywords: Coca Leaf (Latin America)Drug Policy ReformNarcotics |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Eyes Wide Shut: Counter-Narcotics in Transition Summary: It is now clear that the production and trade of opiates will have a significant influence on not only the economic, political and security landscape, but even the physical terrain of post-Transition Afghanistan. Levels of opium poppy cultivation are already rising; estimated cultivated area rose by 18 percent in 2012 and is likely to rise significantly over the next few years. And this trend may intensify further as politico-military actors make deals and form coalitions in response to the 2014 handover of security responsibility from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Even while NATO forces remain, the coercive power of the Afghan state has diminished in parts of provinces previously described as "models" for counter-narcotics efforts. In provinces such as Helmand and Nangarhar, there is likely to be a return to widespread opium poppy cultivation in the more accessible and fertile areas as NATO and the ANSF cease to operate outside the areas where the state has a history of control. As security forces withdraw, the state has either relinquished control of such territory to anti-government elements (AGEs), or delegated it to local power brokers who may have little interest in reducing opium poppy cultivation, and may even encourage it. Further increases in cultivation are also likely as opium poppy returns in greater amounts to some of the provinces previously deemed "poppy free," such as Ghor, Laghman and even Balkh. Perhaps more worrying is the potential for an expansion of opium into previously uncultivated areas of desert land in the South. The adoption of new technologies-such as deep wells, herbicides and solar power-will likely aid cultivation in these areas, reducing the cost of inputs and increasing productivity. Meanwhile, ill-sequenced and poorly-targeted counter-narcotics and development efforts coupled with a continuing global demand for opiates provide additional incentives for production. Increasing levels of cultivation have wider implications for the political economy of the country. In an increasingly contested rural space, narcotics and counter-narcotics policies are both likely to be a major source of patronage and division. The Taliban have a history of actively encouraging opium poppy cultivation as part of a strategy to gain the support of the rural population and highlight the weakness of provincial administration. By provoking crop destruction as part of counter-narcotics efforts, this strategy also increases rural antipathy to the state and its international partners. The myriad different local security forces operating under the sometimes loose supervision of Afghan and international military forces are less coherent. In some areas of Kandahar and Helmand the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are pursuing an aggressive counter-narcotics effort, conscious that they may lose their salaries and patronage if they do not. In other parts of these provinces as well as in Balkh, farmers allege that members of the ALP and even the Afghan Border Police either benefit from poppy cultivation or grow it themselves. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research And Evaluation Unit, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper Series: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Opium%20BP.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Opium%20BP.pdf Shelf Number: 132135 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug Control PolicyNarcoticsOpiumPoppy Cultivation |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: Evolving Terrain: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2013 Summary: It is generally assumed that there will be significant increases in the level of opium poppy cultivation after the critical year 2014, when international military combat forces will withdraw and Afghanistan will select its next president. In 2012-13, at the national level, area cultivated increased for the third consecutive year, and total opium production rose significantly. With 410 hectares (ha) of opium poppy recorded in the province, for the first time since 2007 Balkh is no longer classified as "poppy-free," while Badakhshan saw an increase of 23 percent in area cultivated, despite reported eradication of the largest area of any province. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Shelf Number: 132136 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug TradeNarcoticsOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached a sobering record high in 2013. According to the 2013 Afghanistan Opium Survey, cultivation amounted to some 209,000 hectares, outstripping the earlier record in 2007 of 193,000 hectares, and representing a 36 per cent increase over 2012. Moreover, two provinces that had previously been declared poppy-free, Faryab and Balkh in northern Afghanistan, lost this status. All in all, opium production in 2013 went up to some 5,500 tonnes, a 49 per cent increase over 2012. The hazard this situation poses to health, stability and development, and not only in Afghanistan, is well documented and has been internationally recognized frequently. At the same time, Afghanistan's counter narcotic institutions, also with the support of UNODC, have taken a significant step forward in terms of capacity and effectiveness. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics has moved quickly to advance policy and guidelines, as per its mandate. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan is still far from achieving the seizure rate witnessed in other producing countries, but police have nevertheless tripled their effectiveness over recent years to capturing well over 10 per cent of domestic production. The number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of powerful figures remains a concern, but progress has also been witnessed with two high profile cases this year. Finally, available services in country to deal with a growing addiction problem have expanded from 30 to 90. These are tangible and hopeful signs of improvement. In order to be successful and sustainable, counter-narcotics efforts must finally break out of their insular, silo approach. If the drug problem is not taken more seriously by aid, development and security actors, the virus of opium will further reduce the resistance of its host, already suffering from dangerously low immune levels due to fragmentation, conflict, patronage, corruption and impunity. What is needed is an integrated, comprehensive response to the drug problem, embedded in a long-term security, development and institution-building agenda. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opium_survey_2013_web_small.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_Opium_survey_2013_web_small.pdf Shelf Number: 132160 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionNarcoticsOpium Abuse (Afghanistan) |
Author: Rosen, Liana Title: Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition Summary: Afghanistan is the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political economy, is linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan appears to be worsening-just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014, and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond. According to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released in late 2012, the U.S. government envisions a counternarcotics policy future that results in "two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility." Not only does it envision the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics programming responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. Assuming a reduced U.S. security presence and limited civilian mobility throughout the country, the U.S. government is also increasingly emphasizing a regional approach to combating Afghan drugs. Although some counternarcotics efforts, including eradication and alternative development programming, are already implemented by the government of Afghanistan or by local contractors, others may require a two- to five-year time horizon, or potentially longer, before a complete transition would be feasible, according to Administration officials. Some counternarcotics initiatives are only in their infancy, including the Defense Department's plans to establish a new Regional Narcotics Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Other activities, particularly those that required a significant presence at the local and provincial levels, are anticipated to be reduced or limited in scope. The 113th Congress continues to monitor drug trafficking trends in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. policy responses. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the topic in early 2014 and included provisions in FY2014 appropriations (P.L. 113-76) that limit the scope of and resources devoted to future counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has also identified narcotics as a "critical issue" for policy makers. This report describes key U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in the context of the 2014 transition and analyzes policy issues related to these programs for Congress to consider as policy makers examine the drug problem in Afghanistan. The report's Appendix contains historical figures and tables on trends in Afghan drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43540: Accessed May 19, 2014 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf Shelf Number: 132395 Keywords: Drug Law EnforcementDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingIllicit Drugs (Afghanistan)NarcoticsOpium |
Author: Rubin, Barnett R. Title: Road to Ruin: Afghanistan's Booming Opium Industry Summary: This paper examines the historical context of Afghanistan's opium industry, its current nature, and past missteps of the United States and the rest of the international community in addressing the narcotics threat. It also offers recommendations for a more effective counter-narcotics strategy based on three principles: counter-narcotics policy must be integrated with broader international effects; increased security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan remain essential; and countering the drug threat in Afghanistan will require a full and long-term commitment. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2004. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/13935/azu_acku_pamphlet_hv5840_a23_r83_2004_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2004 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.afghandata.org:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/azu/13935/azu_acku_pamphlet_hv5840_a23_r83_2004_w.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 136787 Keywords: Drug Trade Drug Trafficking Heroin NarcoticsOpium |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: The Devil is in the Details: Nangarhar's continued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread drug production Summary: Nangarhar - a province that historically has been one of the major entry points for the capture of Kabul - is in complete disarray. It lies in chaos, riven by a process of political fragmentation that has increased in both pace and severity since the presidential elections and the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG). In fact, there seems little to currently bind the province together given the faltering economy, a reduction in aid flows and the continued disassembling of the political alliances that maintained stability during the early years of Gul Aga Sherzai's governorship. Further catalysing this are the drawdown and subsequent closure of the US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - an institution that was, for a period of time, a guarantor for the Afghan state in the province. Indeed, without US military support, and with little direction from Kabul, the Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF) appear reluctant to leave the sanctuary of their fortified bases. This has led to further losses in government-held territory, particularly in the districts south of the main highway, which runs east to west linking Kabul to the Pakistan border at Torkham. Details: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1602E%20The%20Devil%20is%20in%20the%20Details%20Nangarhar%20continued%20decline%20into%20insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1602E%20The%20Devil%20is%20in%20the%20Details%20Nangarhar%20continued%20decline%20into%20insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 137856 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceIllegal DrugsNarcotics Natural Resources OpiumPoppy Cultivation |
Author: International Narcotics Control Board Title: Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2015 Summary: The International Narcotics Control Board is uniquely placed to contribute to current discussions on international trends and emerging threats in drug control. It will contribute the insight and experience it has accumulated over decades of monitoring the implementation of the drug control conventions and identifying achievements, challenges and weaknesses in drug control. INCB will engage in the special session and its preparation by highlighting and clarifying the approaches and principles underlying the international system of drug control and making recommendations based upon the conventions. In its annual reports, published pursuant to the treaties, INCB has been addressing, particularly in the thematic chapters, most of the relevant aspects of the global drug problem and most of the critical points in the ongoing debate on the "right way in drug policy". Equally, the release of the present annual report of the Board for 2015, the annual report on precursors and the supplementary report on the availability of internationally controlled drugs is part of our contribution to the special session and the forthcoming policy discussions. The present report of the Board for 2015 contains a thematic chapter on the health and welfare of mankind and the international drug control system. It shows that concern for health and welfare is at the core of the international drug control system. INCB emphasizes that the system in place, when fully implemented, contributes to protecting the health and welfare of people worldwide and ensures balanced national approaches that take into account local socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions. Even with the reality of the constantly shifting contours of the drug problem, the 1961, 1971 and 1988 conventions have proved their value as the cornerstone of international cooperation in drug policy. The fact that the conventions have been almost universally ratified by States underscores that the desire to counter the world's drug problem is shared globally. States have regularly reaffirmed their commitment to working within the framework of the three international drug control conventions and the political declarations. Assessing the achievements and challenges of the current drug control system, INCB believes that the control of the international licit trade in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors has been an undeniable success, as today no noteworthy diversion of those substances from licit to illicit channels is taking place. On the other hand, the availability and accessibility of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical purposes is not at all satisfactory at the global level. Equally, the goal of a noticeable reduction in the illicit demand for and supply of drugs has not been reached. Finally, there are numerous new challenges emerging, such as new psychoactive substances. Details: Vienna: International Narcotics Control Board, 2016. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2015/English/AR_2015_E.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2015/English/AR_2015_E.pdf Shelf Number: 138127 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug ControlDrug PolicyIllicit DrugsNarcotics |
Author: Jakobsson, A. Title: From Gold Coast to Coke Coast: Politicians, Militaries and Large-Scale Trafficking of Cocaine in Guinea-Bissau Summary: The tiny West African nation of Guinea-Bissau made the news as the first narco-state in Africa during the mid-2000s. Guinea-Bissau had out-of-the-blue become a key transit point for cocaine out of South America on route to Europe. What's more, high-ranking government and military officials were supposedly deeply complicit in the illicit drug trafficking. This master's thesis applies the state crime theory of Penny Green and Tony Ward in order to explain the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. No previous criminological studies have ever revealed the reasons for these dynamics. In this thesis, I illustrate how weak institutions, corruption, unsustainable economy, porous borders, and a lack of military legitimacy have conspired to facilitate the development of the predatory state in this country. State power has become fundamental to individual gain, as state elements fused with crime. Consequently, I demonstrate that the large-scale trade of cocaine has greatly contributed to the rise of Guinea-Bissau as a predatory state. Details: Stockholm: Stockholm University, Kriminologiska institutionen, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://www.criminology.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.257044.1448011357!/menu/standard/file/2015m_15_Jakobsson_Angelina.pdf Shelf Number: 138594 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingNarcoticsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Moving with the Times: How Opium Poppy Cultivation has Adapted to the Changing Environment in Afghanistan Summary: This "watching brief" has described a number of trends with respect to agriculture, land settlement, and opium poppy in several areas of Afghanistan. It highlights two separate but highly related issues. First, what will be farmers' response to changes in technology and agro-economic conditions? While cost-reducing technology such as solar-powered tubewells may allow the cultivation of crops with lower returns than that of opium poppy, will farmers choose to grow these crops or will they stay with poppy? Will they even look to cultivate a second crop of opium poppy in May as some reports from the field suggest? Second, while the new technology has allowed the expansion of agricultural production to former desert areas and supported livelihoods for marginalised households, given Afghanistan's tenuous water resources (leaving aside climate change) and population growth rate, how sustainable is an agriculture that continues to deplete groundwater resources by allowing their use on an essentially "free" basis? Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Watching Brief: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf Shelf Number: 139288 Keywords: NarcoticsNational ResourcesOpiumOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Time to Move on: Developing an Informed Development Response to Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan Summary: After almost 15 years since the fall of the Taliban, the policy discussion on counter-narcotics remains uncertain of which way to proceed. In large part, this is because policy discussion is shaped by a superficial or misguided understanding of opium poppy and its role in rural livelihoods. This is not surprising given the disconnect that policymakers and the international community in Kabul have from rural realities, in large part due to the inability to get out of Kabul or even their own compounds. Another part is the natural tendency to downplay or even ignore problems which appear to be intractable. Many of the policy proposals reflect past thinking which has not proven successful, most notably the search for a “silver bullet” or one single crop that can compete with opium poppy. This focus is in large part the result of the way in which data and analysis have been presented to policy makers, in particular the annual estimates of opium area and yield presented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) along with its analysis of the reasons why farmers grow opium poppy. The most problematic aspects of that methodology are 1) the analysis of why farmers grow opium poppy, and 2) the assumption of a binary choice between wheat and opium poppy. Additional shortcomings are the limitations of the profit maximization model; drugs “fetishism”; focus on gross rather than net returns; endless search for the "silver bullet" (the single crop) which will replace opium poppy; assumption of a homogenous farmer; flawed survey methodology which relies on single responses and fails to correct for social desirability bias; and, lack of willingness to incorporate the work of others. The analysis in this report is based on fieldwork undertaken in the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar during the harvest and planting seasons of the 2014/15 and 2015/16 agricultural years. The analytical approach is based on the livelihoods framework in which opium poppy is seen as just one crop in a larger, complex system of agricultural commodities, livestock, and off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. More than a decade of fieldwork has allowed the incorporation of the effects of politics and power on farmers' decision-making, as well as questions of varying conditions, especially those that prevail in such vastly different areas as the former desert areas of the southwest. The current approach uses multiple methodologies, including extensive surveys of farmers in the field along with GIS and geo-spatial mapping which assists with research site selection and allows visualization of changes over time in settlements and cropping patterns. Analysis also distinguishes between use of household and hired labour (extremely important in a high-input crop such as opium poppy) and between owner cultivated land and sharecropped land. It reflects variations in fieldwork sites with respect to resources, infrastructure, access to markets and tenure arrangements, so as to capture the diversity in rural Afghanistan. Data collection utilized indirect questions in the field with farmers themselves, thereby avoiding the kind of speculation and bias that interviewing rural elites typically produces. Of course, the usual caveats associated with fieldwork in rural Afghanistan should be kept in mind, and this work should be seen as a "first cut" or "snapshot" that tries to capture conditions within a particular time frame. Fieldwork confirmed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, dramatic change is taking place in Afghanistan's rural economy, as farmers experiment with new varieties, complex cropping systems, and new technology such as chemicals and solar-powered water pumps. In part due to the development of transport and communication infrastructure, rural areas are more and more integrated with urban markets, and off-farm employment has become an increasingly important component of household livelihoods. Not all of this change is positive or sustainable in the long run, especially that which drains aquifers and potentially causes harm to humans, and much of it comes out of a desperate attempt to deal with adversity both agronomic and man-imposed. One of the most striking and consequential transformations is the settling of the former desert areas of south and southwest Afghanistan. The deserts have been made to bloom, although much of the flowering is opium poppy and it is not clear how sustainable life in the former desert will be. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 148016 Keywords: Drugs and CrimeHeroinNarcoticsOpium Poppy CultivationOpium Production |
Author: Lessing, Benjamin Title: The Logic of Violence in Criminal War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil Summary: Why do drug cartels fight states? Episodes of armed conflict between drug cartels and states in Colombia, Brazil and Mexico have demonstrated that 'criminal wars' can be just as destructive as civil wars. Yet insurgents in civil wars stand a reasonable chance of winning formal concessions of territory or outright victory. Why fight the state if, like drug cartels, you seek neither to topple nor secede from it? Equally puzzling are the divergent effects of state crackdowns. Mexico's militarized crackdown in 2006 was intended to quickly break up the cartels and curtail incipient inter-cartel and anti-state violence; five years later, splintered cartels are an order of magnitude more violent, with over 16,000 homicides and 600 of attacks on army troops in 2011 alone. Conversely, in Rio de Janeiro, a massive November 2010 invasion by state forces of a key urban zone that had been under cartel dominion for a generation failed to produce the grisly bloodbath that even the government’s defenders predicted. Instead, it heralded what appears to be a decisive shift by cartels away from confrontation. Why do some crackdowns lead to violent blowback, while others successfully curtail cartel-state conflict? The key to both puzzles lies in a fundamental difference between cartel-state conflict and civil war. Cartels turn to anti-state violence, not, as in civil war, in hopes of conquering mutually prized territory or resources, but to influence state policy. Like many interest groups, cartels expend resources to influence policy, usually acting at the level of policy enforcement, through corruption, but sometimes also at the level of policy formation, through lobbying. Yet licit interest groups are not targeted for destruction by the state, and generally possess no means of physical coercion. Cartels always face some level of state repression, but fighting back usually provokes even greater repression. Often, this leads them to 'hide' rather than 'fight', using anonymity and bribes to minimize confrontation; under certain conditions, though, violence may seem the best pathway to policy influence. The decision to turn to violent forms of policy influence is thus highly sensitive to what the state is doing; shifts in state policy, especially crackdowns, can trigger sharp variation in cartel-state conflict. This study first distinguishes the 'logics' of violent corruption and violent lobbying, as well as dynamics deriving from turf war among cartels, then identifies the conditions that make each logic operative. Violent corruption—epitomized by drug lord Pablo Escobar’s infamous phrase “plata o plomo?” (bribe or bullet?)—is central; it occurs, in all three cases, prior to and with greater consistency than violent lobbying or other mechanisms. States face a dilemma: they cannot crack down on traffickers without inadvertently giving corrupt enforcers (police, judges, etc.) additional leverage to extract bribes. A formal model of bribe negotiation illustrates the cartel's choice: simply pay the larger bribe, or use the threat of violence to intimidate enforcers and reduce the equilibrium bribe demand. The central finding is that blanket crackdowns in a context of widespread corruption can increase cartels' incentives to fight back, whereas more focused crackdowns that hinge on cartel behavior induce non-violent strategies. Conditionality of repression–the degree to which repressive force is applied in proportion to the amount of violence used by cartels–is thus a critical factor behind the divergent response of cartels to crackdowns across cases. A move toward conditional crackdowns occurred both in Colombia, after Escobar's demise and the fragmenting of the drug market, and in Rio de Janeiro, with its innovative ‘pacification’ strategy. In both cases, cartels have shifted away from confrontation and toward nonviolent 'hiding' strategies. In Mexico, by contrast, the state has insisted on pursuing all cartels without distinction, leading to sharp increases in cartel-state violence. Other, less central logics help explain contrasting modalities of cartel violence. Violent lobbying, in the form of narco-terrorism and direct negotiation with state leaders, is dramatic and chilling, but only makes strategic sense when there is an open policy question that cartels can realistically hope to influence. Moreover, if the benefits of policy change are 'public' or non-excludable, violent lobbying is subject to the free-rider problem, and only likely to occur if cartels can cooperate. Thus violent lobbying has been intense in Colombia, where cartels were initially united and extradition remained an open policy question for a decade; occasional in Brazil where a dominant cartel uses it to influence carceral policy, and relatively rare in Mexico, where cartels are fragmented and the president’s high-profile 'ownership' of his crackdown creates overwhelming audience costs to policy change. Inter-cartel turf war is far more intense in Mexico than elsewhere, driving logics of reputation building and false-flag attacks, and contributing to the prominence of 'propagandistic' violence like mutilation and 'narco-messages'. These turf-war dynamics are reinforced by the government’s kingpin strategy and its splintering of the cartels. Moreover, fragmentation has a general-equilibrium effect on the maximum pressure the state can apply to any one cartel, given its unconditional approach. This further reduces the sanction cartels face for using violence, and drives the escalatory spiral presently gripping Mexico. The study concludes by asking why leaders do or do not adopt conditional strategies. Even when leaders would like to do so, they face both logistical constraints arising from low capacity and fragmented security institutions, and acceptability constraints deriving from the negative optics of 'going easy' on less violent cartels (a necessary component of conditional repression). Case evidence helps identify political circumstances that minimize these constraints. Coalitions or partisan hegemony can mitigate institutional fragmentation, while the 'Nixon-Goes-to-China' effect allows leaders perceived as hardliners to overcome acceptability constraints, particularly if they present conditionality as a tactical, operational imperative. Details: Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley, 2012. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/03m9r44h Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/03m9r44h Shelf Number: 135319 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Policy Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug Wars Drug-Related Violence Narcotics |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Opioid overdose: preventing and reducing opioid overdose mortality Summary: Although data are limited, an estimated 70,000-100,000 people die from opioid overdose each year. Opioid overdose was the main cause of the estimated 99,000- 253,000 deaths worldwide related to illicit drug use in 2010. Opioid overdose is both preventable and, if witnessed, treatable (reversible). In its resolution 55/7 on promoting measures to prevent drug overdose, in particular opioid overdose, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs called upon Member States to include effective measures to prevent and treat drug overdose in national drug policies. In that resolution, the Commission requested the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), to collect and circulate available best practices on the prevention and treatment of and emergency response to drug overdose, in particular opioid overdose, including on the use and availability of opioid receptor antagonists such as naloxone and other measures based on scientific evidence. This discussion paper outlines the facts about opioid overdose, the actions that can be taken to prevent and treat (reverse) opioid overdose and areas requiring further investigation. Opioids, which can be chemically synthesized or derived from the opium poppy plant, are a group of compounds that activate the brain's opioid receptors, a class of receptors that influence perceptions of pain and euphoria and are involved in the regulation of breathing. Some of the more commonly known and used opioids are morphine, heroin, methadone, buprenorphine, codeine, tramado, oxycodone and hydrocodone. They are used as medicines to treat pain and opioid dependence. If used in excess or without proper medical supervision, opioids can cause fatal respiratory depression. In cases of fatal overdose, the victim's breathing slows to the point where oxygen levels in the blood fall below the level needed to transfer oxygen to the vital organs. As oxygen saturation (normally greater than 97 per cent) falls below 86 per cent, the brain struggles to function. Typically, the individual becomes unresponsive, blood pressure progressively decreases and the heart rate slows, ultimately leading to cardiac arrest. Death can occur within minutes of opioid ingestion. But often, prior to death there is a longer period of unresponsiveness lasting up to several hours. This period is sometimes associated with loud snoring, leading to the term "unrousable snorers". Worldwide, overdose is the leading cause of avoidable death among people who inject drugs. However, it is difficult to accurately estimate the number of fatal opioid overdoses because of the poor quality or limited nature of mortality data available. According to UNODC estimates, drug-related deaths account for between 0.5 percent and 1.3 percent of all-cause mortality at the global level among persons aged 15-64. In that regard, the recent Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study, 2010 found that there were an estimated 43,000 deaths in 2010 due to opioid dependence and 180,000 deaths due to drug poisoning, resulting in more than 2 million years of life lost. In the United States of America alone, there were an estimated 38,329 drug poisoning deaths in 2010, including 16,651 fatal opioid overdoses related to prescription opioid analgesics in 2010, with the remainder of those deaths largely involving heroin and/or cocaine. Opioid overdose accounts for nearly half of all deaths among heroin injectors, exceeding HIV and other disease-related deaths. Overdose was reported more frequently than were other causes in the 58cohort studies examined in a 2011 meta-analysis. That meta-analysis also indicated that overdose represented the most common specific cause of death, at 6.5 deaths per 1,000 person-years. Among the 10 per cent of people living with HIV in the United States who also inject drugs, overdose is a common cause of non-AIDS related death. A recent meta-analysis showed that HIV sero-positivity is associated with an increased risk of overdose: people who use drugs have a 74 percent greater risk of overdose if they are HIV-positive compared with their HIV-negative counterparts. In the Russian Federation, overdose is the second leading cause of death for people with HIV after tuberculosis. Nationally reported mortality data in both low-income and high-income countries are often insufficient to estimate overdose deaths. Current data on overdose mortality derive mostly from prospective cohort studies and national reporting systems, largely from high-income countries. To address these challenges, some countries have now adopted a standard case definition, contributing to an improved capacity for reliable overdose data. However, in a significant number of countries, data on overdose are limited, with the result that alternative data sources, often combined with expert opinion, are required to estimate rates. Consequently, overdose mortality generally tends to be underestimated, and nationally reported statistics in that regard are likely to be conservative. For example, against the backdrop of negligible numbers of fatal overdoses reported by national authorities of Central Asian countries, 25.1 percent of injecting drug users surveyed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2010 reported having witnessed someone die from an overdose in the previous 12 months. It is likely that people who use opioids also experience a high rate of non-fatal overdose. For instance, 59 percent of known heroin injectors in a study conducted in 16 Russian cities reported having had at least one non-fatal overdose in their lifetime. The proportion of heroin injectors reporting lifetime non-fatal overdose is similarly high in several other cities: 41 percent in Baltimore, 42 percent in New York City, 68percent in Sydney, 38 percent in London, 30 percent in Bangkok, and 83percent in Bac Ninh, Viet Nam. Non-fatal overdose can significantly contribute to morbidity, including cerebral hypoxia, pulmonary oedema, pneumonia and cardiac arrhythmia, that may result in prolonged hospitalizations and brain damage. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion paper, UNODC/WHO: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/overdose.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/overdose.pdf Shelf Number: 149846 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug OverdosesDrug-Related DeathsNarcoticsOpioid CrisisOpioid EpidemicOpioidsPrescriptions Drugs |
Author: Nicoletti, Michael Title: Opium production and distribution: Poppies, profits and power in Afghanistan Summary: Opium cultivation has occurred in Asia for centuries, but why has Afghanistan seen such an explosion in opium production during the last two decades? Furthermore, the increase in opium production disrupted the stability of rural livelihood strategies in the countryside. Some research tries to explain this trend by citing the Taliban's financial gains from opium production, or the international market for heroin. While these issues are significant, they alone do not critically examine the multi-faceted role that the opium trade has in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of nearly three decades of permanent turmoil, followed by the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban's reign, and the U.S. invasion in 2001. Before 1979, Afghanistan had a decentralized state and large swaths of the mostly rural country had a subsistence economy based primarily on agriculture, whereas the commercial and industrial sectors were small. A decade after the 2001 U.S. invasion, military occupation, and nation building efforts by the U.S. and its N.A.T.O. allies, the central government's capacities still remain limited, the Taliban insurgency still rages on, with the pervasive insecurity undermining any sustained effort at rebuilding a vestige of a functioning and sustainable national economy. As a result, the country now largely depends on foreign aid, and in many rural areas opium production has become a rural livelihood strategy. After the Soviet invasion in 1980, Afghanistan became the world's leading supplier of opium and has continued to do so in 2011. The prevailing explanations for the proliferation of the opium economy in Afghanistan point out several key factors: opium as a manageable and profitable cash crop brings a monetary income to farmers who are deprived of the ability to produce their food crops due to violence and the destruction of infrastructure, economic stability to farmers, drug trafficking thrives primarily when country has been in a state of permanent turmoil, and the Taliban fund their insurgency because of the drug trade. Some of these ideas are more insightful than others, but they all lack a careful analysis of the geographic, cultural, and social complexities of the context of Afghanistan's opium production. The country is geographically and demographically diverse. The geographical and political experiences for a landowning farmer in Balkh are substantially different than that of a seasonal wage laborer in Helmand. Yet both may earn income from opium production and the prevailing tendency is to view this as a farmer who earns income from illicit crops. These explanations fail to address differences in geography, income, land ownership, state penetration of society, and the internal and external political actions in Afghanistan. The research and literature on drug trafficking in Afghanistan is abundant and contested, especially because of the various external influences in the country. Historically, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. flooded Afghanistan with money and military equipment during the 1980s. The U.S. repeated this policy in its 2001 invasion, thus re-forging relationships with militia commanders that fought the Soviet Union. Part of this relationship, both in the 1980s and more recently, entailed the empowering of armed "resistance" groups to monopolize violence and control aspects of an illicit economy, one of which is opium production. Thus, the changing power relationships are vital in understanding the context of opium production in Afghanistan. The country's glaring lack of infrastructure and economic productivity are areas that were exacerbated by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Pakistan that also contribute to the context of opium production and resultant stability. However, using flawed analysis to understand the context of opium production only helps to reinforce the unequal power relationships that drive it and does not address dependency on opium as a livelihood. The question is not whether opium production is defined within the realm of what is legally permissible, or not. The questions that should be emphasized are ones that address the structural drivers of opium production and who actually benefit from it. It should also be concerned with the majority of the population who are involved with opium production, like the Afghan farmers, landowners, informal creditors, and wage and seasonal laborers that predominantly engage in this livelihood strategy. Clearly, a far more nuanced understanding of opium production should address these issues and determine the consequences for this group. A critical analysis of all of the factors involved with Afghanistan's opium production indicates that it may occur as a rural livelihood strategy for farmers, wage laborers, and landowners. It is not such a strategy for insurgents and drug traffickers who profit considerably more and engage in cultivation far less than these other groups. Opium production is neither uniform throughout the country, nor are the people that engage in it. The prevailing assumptions that farmers cultivate solely for profit, that the Taliban drive the insurgency, and that opium spreads corruption need a careful examination. Some farmers may profit whereas others are try to make ends meet. The Taliban have a monopoly on violence in certain areas of the country, but so does the Afghan state and militia commanders that have the support of the U.S. and its allies. This research addresses these issues and demonstrates that opium production as a rural livelihood strategy may or may not be locally generated, the geopolitical context of Afghanistan must be addressed, and those that engage in at as a strategy can become more vulnerable to physical and economic insecurity. Details: Chicago: DePaul University,College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Shelf Number: 150064 Keywords: Drug TraffickingNarcoticsOpium Production |
Author: New Jersey. Commission of Investigation Title: Corrupt Commerce: Heroin, Thievery and the Underground Trade in Stolen Goods Summary: In two years, he burned through an $800,000 inheritance, lost his home and allowed his family business to die. Desperate and broke, he found a lucrative new way to fund the heroin addiction that consumed his fortune and his life: stolen metal. He tore wire and copper pipe from buildings. He heaved manhole covers from the streets, ripped storm drains from parking lots, pulled heavy metal pins from construction barriers. Then, in an old sedan weighed down nearly to the pavement, he routinely took his haul to a booming scrap yard linked to organized crime in Hillsborough, Somerset County. There, the owner and employees readily bought the stolen metal for cash, no questions asked, not a word to the police. A hundred miles to the south, a young woman hit upon her own way to remedy the dopesickness that dictated her daily rhythms. She led a crew that shoplifted more than $100,000 in goods from major retail chains, then returned the items for gifts cards in the amount of the stolen merchandise. She sold those cards for 50 cents on the dollar to willing businesses across South Jersey. Again, no questions asked, no alert about suspicious behavior. The State Commission of Investigation has found that these circumstances are emblematic of a corrupt and enduring commerce in New Jersey's lightly regulated and often lawless world of scrap yards, pawn shops, cash-for-gold outlets and secondhand goods operations. Driven largely by the heroin and opioid epidemic, this shadowy underground economy is being exploited for profit across the state by convicted felons and elements of organized crime. In business after business, Commission investigators identified owners and employees with extensive criminal histories, including convictions for fraud, burglary, receiving stolen property, assault, firearms violations, narcotics distribution and racketeering. The SCI found evidence of drug-dealing directly from the counter at one shop, the illegal sale of handguns at another and links to a mob-related loansharking scheme at a third. At those locations and others, investigators found that owners and employees regularly accepted stolen goods, from jewelry to power tools, and in some cases directed customers to steal in-demand items likely to maximize profits upon resale. Collectively, the Commission estimates, the businesses have bought and sold tens of millions of dollars in stolen goods in recent years. This thriving marketplace, operating with little oversight or accountability, incentivizes theft and promotes destructive acts against both public and private infrastructure, putting residents in jeopardy. The widespread plundering of copper wiring and heavy-duty backup batteries from cell phone towers undermines cellular service during power outages. The theft of wire that transmits signals along train tracks delays commuters, requires costly repairs and strains an already overtaxed transit system. The removal of electricity-conducting wire from utility substations compromises the power grid. Little is off limits. Scrap hunters have ripped the risers from bleachers at schools, made off with aluminum street lamps from highways and stolen bronze vases from graves. The enormous costs of the illicit bargain between thieves and unscrupulous owners are borne by all New Jerseyans: the ratepayers who see higher bills for cell service and electricity; the consumers who pay more for goods at retail stores; the taxpayers ultimately responsible for replacing infrastructure that has vanished in the night. By providing an easy route for drug addicts and opportunists to cash in on stolen metal and merchandise, these enterprises have helped spawn an endless cycle of theft, one that law enforcement cannot keep pace with, much less end, without a muscular response from the State. The Commission carried out this investigation in keeping with its 50-year-old statutory mandate to identify and expose corruption, to highlight government laxity and gaps in oversight, to determine the effectiveness of New Jersey's laws and to inform the Governor, the Legislature, the Attorney General and the public about the influence and intrusion of organized crime. In particular, the findings set forth in this report build upon groundbreaking investigative work dating back nearly a decade when the SCI became one of the first agencies of government to identify the burgeoning opioid and heroin epidemic. Over the course of this inquiry, SCI investigators issued scores of subpoenas, analyzed banking records and conducted more than 100 interviews with law enforcement officers, metal recyclers, state and municipal officials, representatives of the telecommunications and retail industries, and the owners and employees of outfits engaged in suspect or illegal behavior. Just as significantly, the SCI interviewed those with the clearest view of interactions with these businesses: the addicts and former addicts who carried out thefts for drug money. SCI agents also conducted surveillance at suspect establishments and, in cooperation with police departments and confidential sources, participated in sting operations at scrap yards and secondhand goods stores. In those cases, items purchased by the Commission or lawfully obtained from utilities, phone companies and retail stores were sold to owners or employees with the fictive understanding the items had been stolen. The inquiry found that state and municipal regulations governing these businesses are scattershot, inadequate and unevenly enforced. The State licenses traditional pawn shops, which provide collateral-based loans, while municipalities license cash-for-gold shops, secondhand goods stores and scrap yards. Ordinances vary widely in strength and effectiveness from municipality to municipality. Laws governing some aspects of the businesses have proven to be window dressing, too minimal in scope and so erratically enforced they have failed to deter the prodigious flow of stolen goods. Equally troubling, SCI investigators found that many owners regularly flout the few rules that apply to them with little or no consequence. In some towns, the Commission found, law enforcement officials were unaware their governing bodies had passed ordinances giving police the means to crack down on the businesses - a breakdown in communication and coordination that has sapped accountability. The Commission is mindful that pawn outlets, secondhand goods stores and scrap metal recyclers contribute to the tax base in their communities and provide services helpful to the public. Local scrap yards are building blocks in the international commerce of recycled metal. In addition, not all owners and employees operate flagrantly outside the bounds of decency and the law. But in the absence of meaningful oversight, far too many of these operations have been subverted by criminal activity. The Commission recommends the State take the lead in licensing and regulating these industries. As the Legislature in recent decades has moved to root out organized crime from New Jersey's trash-hauling companies and casinos, so, too, should the State ban mob associates and those with extensive criminal records from trades that remain obvious and attractive pathways for the disposal of stolen property. Further, the Commission recommends requiring owners and employees to record all transactions in an online database accessible by law enforcement. Two such databases are already in use in neighboring states and in a minority of New Jersey municipalities, allowing investigators to more efficiently track sales, identify trends, find stolen merchandise and hold dishonest owners and employees accountable. Details: Trenton: The Commission, 2018. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2018 at: https://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/Stolen%20Goods%20Report%20Final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/Stolen%20Goods%20Report%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 150626 Keywords: Illegal TradeMetal TheftNarcoticsOpioid CrisisOrganized CrimeScrap Metal TheftStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTrafficking in NarcoticsUnderground Economy |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange Summary: The annual increase in the flow of drugs, mainly opiates from Afghanistan, has become a significant external threat for the Central Asian region. Since a key issue in the fight against illicit drug trafficking is the collection, analysis and exchange of information carried out by analytical units in the law enforcement agencies of the region, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project RER/F23 (F23), entitled "Drug law enforcement systems for criminal intelligence collection, analysis and exchange", was designed to fill this gap. The project originally began in 2002 and ended on 12 November 2017. The objective of the project was set as "a coherent and comprehensive system for intelligence, and information collection, analysis and exchange is established". The project installed modern intelligence systems and i2 analysis software ("iBase" and "Analysts Notebook") in 18 counter narcotic agencies in the project area. It was funded by Austria, Italy, Canada, France, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America through their respective agencies and by UNDP, with a total overall budget of USD 8,016,445 and implemented by UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA). The outcomes of the project are specified somewhat differently in the original project document and revisions, but taking all documentation together, the project aimed at a minimum, within at least one agency within each participating country, with respect to trafficking of narcotics, to increase/enhance 1) information gathering and 2) analysis, and 3) this was to be increasingly intelligence-led; and in addition it also intended to achieve: 1) progress on these dimensions in more than one agency in each country; 2) application a) in particular to transnational narcotics trafficking and b) more generally to other organized crimes; 3) increased exchange of intelligence between agencies within one country; and 4) increased exchange of intelligence between countries. The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) criteria assessing relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender equality, and the implementation of recommendations from the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation in 2012, deriving lessons learned, best practices and recommendations for future project interventions. Relevant lessons and recommendations for the new UNODC Regional Programme for Central Asian States 2015-2019 were also sought. The evaluation was undertaken by means of a mixed-methods approach with a gender-responsive evaluation methodology in line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC Norms and Standards. The evaluation time scope was 1 January 2012 to 2 December 2017 (end of the evaluation field mission) and the geographical coverage was Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the locations within which the project was actually implemented. The evaluation was carried out by a team of two external independent evaluators, one lead evaluator with experience in evaluating technical assistance projects in over 30 countries over the last 20 years, and one team member, expert in the area of law enforcement in Central Asia. The evaluation methodology considered primary and secondary data sources ensuring triangulation of findings, further promoting the participation of stakeholders throughout the evaluation process, including a desk review and field mission with semi-structured interviews and site visits including site observation to beneficiary agencies, from 20 November to 2 December 2017. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Independent Project Evaluation: Accessed November 12, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/RERF23_Final_Independent_Project_Evaluation_May_2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/Independent_Project_Evaluations/2018/RERF23_Final_Independent_Project_Evaluation_May_2018.pdf Shelf Number: 153401 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence Drug Enforcement Drug Enforcement Policy Drug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Narcotics |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Mexico's Out-of-Control Criminal Market Summary: This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multi-polar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multi-polar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multi-polar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another's territory and engage in internecine warfare. The Mexican crime market's proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government's inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting. The message has not yet sunk in that violence and aggressiveness do not pay. For example, the destruction of the Zetas has been followed by the empowerment of the equally aggressive Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Like the Zetas, the Jalisco group centers its rule on brutality, brazenness, and aggressiveness. Like the Zetas and unlike the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG does not invest in and provide socio- economic goods and governance in order to build up political capital. Equally, the internal re-balancing among criminal groups has failed to weed out the most violent groups and the policy measures of the Mexican governments have failed to reduce the criminal groups' proclivity toward aggression and violence. The emergence of the CJNG has engulfed Mexico and other supply-chain countries, such as Colombia,in its war with the Sinaloa Cartel. The war between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG provides space for local criminal upstarts, compounds instability by shifting local alliances, and sets off new splintering within the two large cartels and among their local proxies. To the extent that violence has abated in particular locales, the de-escalation has primarily reflected a "narco-peace," with one criminal group able to establish control over a particular territory and its corruption networks. It is thus vulnerable to criminal groups' actions as well as to high-value targeting of top drug traffickers. In places such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Monterrey, local law enforcement and anti-crime socio-economic policies helped in various degrees to reduce violence. When the narco-peace was undermined, the policies proved insufficient. At other times, the reduction of violence that accompanied a local narco-peace gave rise to policy complacency and diminished resources. Socio-economic policies to combat crime have spread resources too thinly across Mexico to be effective. Violence in Mexico has become diversified over the past decade, with drug trafficking groups becoming involved in widespread extortion of legal businesses, kidnapping, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and smuggling of migrants. That is partially a consequence of the fragmentation, as smaller groups are compelled to branch out into a variety of criminal enterprises. But for larger groups, extortion of large segments of society is not merely a source of money, but also of authority. Violence and criminality have also become "popularized," both in terms of the sheer number of actors and also the types of actors involved, such as "anti-crime" militias. Widespread criminality increases the coercive credibility of individual criminals and small groups, while hiding their identities. Low effective prosecution rates and widespread impunity tempt many individuals who would otherwise be law-abiding citizens to participate in crime. Anti-crime militias that have emerged in Mexico have rarely reduced violence in a sustained way. Often, they engage in various forms of criminality, including homicides, extortion, and human rights abuses against local residents, and they undermine the authority of the state. Government responses to the militias-including acquiescence, arrests, and efforts to roll them into state paramilitary forces-have not had a significant impact. In fact, the strength and emergence of militia groups in places such as Michoacan and Guerrero reflect a long-standing absence of the government, underdevelopment, militarization, and abuse of political power. In places such as Guerrero, criminality and militia formation has become intertwined with the U.S. opioid epidemic that has stimulated the expansion of poppy cultivation in Mexico. The over-prescription of opioids in the United States created a major addiction epidemic, with users turning to illegal alternatives when they were eventually cut off from prescription drugs. Predictably, poppy cultivation shot up in Mexico, reaching some 30,000 hectares in 2017. Areas of poppy cultivation are hotly contested among Mexican drug trafficking groups, with their infighting intensely exacerbating the insecurity of poor and marginalized poppy farmers. Efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation have often failed to sustainably reduce illicit crop cultivation and complicated policies to pacify these areas, often thrusting poppy farmers deeper into the hands of criminal groups that sponsor and protect the cultivation. Eradication is easier than providing poppy farmers with alternative livelihoods. Combined with the Trump administration's demands for eradication, the Enrique Peea Nieto administration, and Mexico historically, showed little interest in seriously pursuing a different path. Poppy eradication in Mexico does not shrink the supply of illegal opioids destined for the U.S. market, since farmers replant poppies after eradication and can always shift areas of production. The rise of fentanyl abuse in the United States, however, has suppressed opium prices in Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations and dealers prefer to traffic and sell fentanyl, mostly supplied to the United States from China, because of its bulk-potency-profit ratio. The CJNG became a pioneer in fentanyl smuggling through Mexico into the United States, but the Sinaloa Cartel rapidly developed its own fentanyl supply chain. Although the drug is deadly, the Sinaloa Cartel's means of distribution remain non- violent in the United States. Fentanyl enters the United States from Mexico through legal ports of entry. In the short term, fentanyl has not altered the dynamics of Mexico's criminal market, but in the long term, fentanyl can significantly upend global drug markets and the prioritization of drug control in U.S. agendas with other countries. If many users switch to synthetic drugs, the United States may lose interest in promoting eradication of drug crops. Such a switch would also weaken the power of criminal and insurgent groups who sponsor illicit crop cultivation. Even if they switch to the production of synthetic drugs, they will only have the capacity to sponsor the livelihoods of many fewer people, thus diminishing their political capital with local populations and making it less costly for the government to conduct counter-narcotics operations. Mexico's violence can decline in two ways. First, a criminal group can temporarily win enough turf and establish enough deterrence capacity to create a narco-peace, as has been the case so far. Alternatively, violence can decline when the state at last systematically builds up enough deterrence capacity against the criminals and realigns local populations with the state, from which they are now often alienated. Mexico must strive to achieve this objective. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155192 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingFentanylHomicidesNarcoticsOpioidsOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |
Author: Magliocca, Nicholas R. Title: Modeling Cocaine Traffickers and Counterdrug Interdiction Forces as a Complex Adaptive System Summary: Abstract: Counterdrug interdiction efforts designed to seize or disrupt cocaine shipments between South American source zones and US markets remain a core US "supply side" drug policy and national security strategy. However, despite a long history of US-led interdiction efforts in the Western Hemisphere, cocaine movements to the United States through Central America, or "narco-trafficking," continue to rise. Here, we developed a spatially explicit agent-based model (ABM), called "NarcoLogic," of narco-trafficker operational decision making in response to interdiction forces to investigate the root causes of interdiction ineffectiveness across space and time. The central premise tested was that spatial proliferation and resiliency of narco-trafficking are not a consequence of ineffective interdiction, but rather part and natural consequence of interdiction itself. Model development relied on multiple theoretical perspectives, empirical studies, media reports, and the authors' own years of field research in the region. Parameterization and validation used the best available, authoritative data source for illicit cocaine flows. Despite inherently biased, unreliable, and/or incomplete data of a clandestine phenomenon, the model compellingly reproduced the "cat-and-mouse" dynamic between narco-traffickers and interdiction forces others have qualitatively described. The model produced qualitatively accurate and quantitatively realistic spatial and temporal patterns of cocaine trafficking in response to interdiction events. The NarcoLogic model offers a much-needed, evidence-based tool for the robust assessment of different drug policy scenarios, and their likely impact on trafficker behavior and the many collateral damages associated with the militarized war on drugs. Details: S.L.: Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 27, 2019 at: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/16/7784.full.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.pnas.org/content/116/16/7784 Shelf Number: 157047 Keywords: CocaineDrug TradeDrug TraffickersDrug TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNarcoticsWar on Drugs |
Author: Eligh, Jason Title: The Evolution of Illicit Drug Markets and Drug Policy in Africa Summary: Globally, support for drug policy reform has grown over the past 10 years. Even as the drug prohibition consensus-keepers in Vienna have voted for yet another 10-year extension to their still unsuccessful 20-year strategy for global drug control at the March 2019 Commission on Narcotic Drugs High Level Review meeting, a reform movement among global member states has been gaining credibility and strength.The purpose of this report is to reflect on the changing drug policy environment in Africa, particularly in the period leading up to and after the seminal UNGASS 2016 meeting of member states. It also examines the politics of continental drug policy prohibition and reform in the context of the growing global movement to embrace drug policy alternatives to the once universal approach of strict prohibition. Observations and recommendations are made regarding incorporating drug policy reform in the context of achieving developmental success with respect to the continental Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 goals. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organized Crime (ENACT), 2019. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 12, 2019 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-06-30-continental-report-3.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Africa URL: https://globalinitiative.net/the-evolution-of-illicit-drug-markets-and-drug-policy-in-africa/ Shelf Number: 156961 Keywords: Drug Control Drug Policy Drug Use Narcotics |