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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:35 pm
Time: 8:35 pm
Results for ombudsman
4 results foundAuthor: Stone, Christopher Title: An Assessment of the Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel Summary: In March 2007, Boston Mayor Thomas Merino created the Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel (CO-OP) by Executive Order. The CO-OP serves as an appeals body to review complaints against police officers found to be "not sustained," "unfounded," or "exonerated" by the Boston Police Department. As of September 2008, approximately one year after the CO-OP began operation, only 7 out of 116 complainants eligible to appeal had appealed the finding. This report examines who so few complainants submit appeals through the CO-OP, and makes several recommendations based on the survey findings. Details: Cambridge, MA: Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Harvard Kennedy School, 2009. 27p., app. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 118723 Keywords: Complaints Against PoliceOmbudsmanPolice Misconduct |
Author: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: The Relationship Between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Summary: This inspection examines the overall relationship between the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and in particular, how requests for police intelligence surrounding historical cases are handled by the PSNI and recommendations from the OPONI, are considered and implemented by the PSNI. Concerns have been expressed from nongovernmental organisations, the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) and some families of victims of the Troubles that the PSNI were being unhelpful in supporting the OPONI investigations of historical cases. Questions were raised about whether the OPONI was able to access all sensitive intelligence material held by the police in respect of historical cases and about how the police were responding to recommendations and findings of the OPONI investigations into historical cases. Founding legislation never envisaged the OPONI conducting retrospective Troubles related investigations. However, in the absence of an agreed mechanism for dealing with the past, the Office must now fulfil these statutory obligations. The use of informants and actions or inactions of the police during the Troubles has little or no relevance for many of the operational officers of the PSNI, the majority of whom were recruited after the Belfast Agreement. However, the issue continues to divide public and political opinion and fuels the call for an agreed mechanism for dealing with the past. It is in the interest of both the OPONI and the police that a mutually respectful working relationship is developed. The police need to be confident that complaints made against officers will be investigated thoroughly and fairly, and the Police Ombudsman's investigators need to be confident that the police are co-operating fully with their investigations. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/b9/b97d8f4a-295f-42d5-8e63-ecc2199307c8.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/b9/b97d8f4a-295f-42d5-8e63-ecc2199307c8.pdf Shelf Number: 132471 Keywords: OmbudsmanPolice IntelligencePolice InvestigationsPolice Legitimacy (Northern Ireland)Police-Community Relations |
Author: Cho, David Title: Restoring Public Confidence: Recommendations For Improving Oversight of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Summary: The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, one of the largest policing agencies in the nation, has been the subject of media and public criticism for decades. Despite numerous attempts at reform over the past twenty years, the Department continues to exhibit numerous problems, ranging from excessive use of force to personnel corruption. In 2011, the Board of Supervisors formed the Citizens' Commission on Jail Violence in hopes of creating a better Sheriff's Department. In its report, the Commission called for the creation of an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) - an agency that would attempt to remedy the deficiencies present in the Sheriff's three current oversight entities. Special Counsel, the Office of Ombudsman, and the Office of Independent Review handle current Sheriff's Department audits, complaints, and investigations, respectively. They operate largely independent of one another and lack the coordination necessary for effective oversight. Thus, our analysis offered a design for a consolidated Office of the Inspector General. We relied on expert interviews, comparisons of other oversight bodies, internal LA County documents, financial review of County and external budget documents, and previous findings and literature for the majority of our data and information. We used these data to identify a combination of common elements and functions shared by oversight bodies: agency independence, investigative authority allowing for initiation of case investigations and policy audits, jail monitoring, reviewing of complaints, quality assurance/risk management, and communication & public engagement. Identifying these key elements allowed us to analyze the design of an OIG by considering the presence or absence of these elements. This discussion led us to consider three policy options for potential OIG models: - An Expert-Informed model that was constructed by the common views and opinions of industry experts on what elements and functions constitute an "ideal" OIG. - A Client-Preference model that captures the County's current preferences and its preliminary ideas of the structure and function of the OIG. - And a Hybrid model, which we propose that seeks to moderate the extremes of the previous two models. In evaluating these options, we considered the degree of oversight provided, political feasibility, and ease of implementation. Based on our analysis, we provided two recommendations for the design of an LA County Office of the Inspector General: - Short-term Recommendation: Due to the difficulties associated with pursuing statutory authority1 at the current time and because of the deficiencies in oversight present in the client's current preferences, we recommend that LA County pursue the Hybrid model. This model provides a fairly high level of oversight (even with the lack of statutory authority) and faces no significant barriers to implementation. - Long-term Recommendation: The County should adopt the Expert-Informed model by pursuing an amendment to the California Constitution in order to establish an OIG that has statutory authority and can compel the Sheriff to action. In addition, we evaluated the funding and staffing needs for the Hybrid model based on the assumption that the County must at least maintain the current staffing levels for the current three oversight bodies. At a minimum, the OIG will need to be staffed by twenty-five individuals led by an Inspector General. Their combined salaries, pension, and benefits, would cost the County approximately $3.5 million per year. Approximately another $1.1 million would be needed for annual operation costs for a total OIG budget of approximately $4.8 million per year. Los Angeles County has a unique opportunity to improve oversight of the Sheriff's Department. Various County stakeholders need to ensure that the Office of the Inspector General takes a leading role in this task. By identifying, correcting, and preventing issues, the OIG will begin to restore public trust in the Sheriff's Department. Details: Los Angeles: Meyer and Renee Luskin School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/13%20-%20County%20Sheriff.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/13%20-%20County%20Sheriff.pdf Shelf Number: 136140 Keywords: OmbudsmanPublic ConfidencePublic OpinionSheriffs |
Author: Marin, Andre Title: Oversight Unseen: Investigation into the Special Investigations Unit's operational effectiveness and credibility Summary: Canada received considerable unfavourable international attention last fall when millions witnessed the graphic video images of the last terrifying moments in the life of Robert Dziekanski. After a long and delayed international flight from his native Poland, Mr. Dziekanski arrived at Vancouver Airport, only to spend hours wandering hopelessly, unable to communicate or to obtain the assistance he needed to exit and meet up with his mother. As Mr. Dziekanski became increasingly confused and agitated, RCMP officers arrived and, within minutes, stunned him with a Taser. He was then restrained, and died shortly thereafter. In the aftermath of this tragedy, public accusations were made of cover-up and police using excessive force. People demanded assurance that the truth surrounding his ill-fated encounter with police would be revealed, and many voiced distrust of any investigation that would involve police investigating police. To Ontario's great credit, incidents in this province involving serious injury and death of civilians resulting from police contact are not investigated by police officials, but by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a civilian criminal investigative agency. Created in 1990, the SIU's existence is a testament to the strength of democratic principles in this province, and the value our government has placed on reinforcing public confidence in policing. Unfortunately, over the past two years, several serious concerns have been raised by individuals, families, lawyers and community advocates who complained to my Office about the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU. As previous independent reviews have documented, the SIU's early history was marked by successive governments failing to provide it with adequate resources, and by police officials aggressively resisting its oversight. While its resources have increased over time, and regulatory requirements now more clearly define police obligations, my investigation found that the Special Investigations Unit continues to struggle to assert its authority, maintain its balance against powerful police interests, and carry out its mandate effectively. The SIU is still very much a fledgling organization. It does not have its own constituting legislation, its mandate lacks clarity, it is administratively and technically challenged and it is dependent on the Ministry of the Attorney General. In turn, the Ministry of the Attorney General has relied on the SIU to soothe police and community sensibilities and to ward off controversy. But in doing so, it performance is subjectively evaluated and rewarded, compromising the SIU's structural integrity and independence. Its credibility as an independent investigative agency is further undermined by the predominant presence and continuing police links of former police officials within the SIU. It is so steeped in police culture that it has, at times, even tolerated the blatant display of police insignia and police affiliation. In addition to lacking the necessary statutory authority to act decisively when police officials fail to comply with regulatory requirements, the SIU often ignores the tools it does have, such as public censure, and adopts an impotent stance in the face of police challenge. Delays in police providing notice of incidents, in disclosing notes, and in submitting to interviews are endemic. Rather than vigorously inquiring into and documenting delays and other evidence of police resistance, the SIU deals with issues of police non-co-operation as isolated incidents. It ignores systemic implications and attempts to solve individual problems through a conciliatory approach. The SIU has not only become complacent about ensuring that police officials follow the rules, it has bought into the fallacious argument that SIU investigations aren't like other criminal cases, and that it is acceptable to treat police witnesses differently from civilians. Police interviews are rarely held within the regulatory time frames, and are all too often postponed - for weeks, sometimes even months. The SIU will not inconvenience officers or police forces by interviewing officers off duty. When it encounters overt resistance from police officials, the SIU pursues a low-key diplomatic approach that flies under the public radar. If disagreement cannot be resolved, the SIU more often than not simply accepts defeat. The SIU also fails to respond to incidents with rigour and urgency - at times inexplicably overlooking the closest investigators, and following routines that result in precious investigative minutes, sometimes hours, being lost. It has become mired in its own internal events, and introspective focus. The SIU's system of oversight is out of balance. It must not only ensure accountability of police conduct, but be perceived by the public as doing so. At present, the public is expected to trust that the SIU conducts thorough and objective investigations and accept that its decisions are well founded when it decides, for example, not to charge officers. But much remains hidden from public view, including Director's reports and significant policy issues. In order to properly serve the function it was created to fulfill, greater transparency is required with respect to the SIU's investigative outcomes, as well as those of the police disciplinary system triggered by SIU investigations. In theory, the SIU is a fundamental pillar of accountability in Ontario. However, the reality is that the SIU is capable of much more than it is achieving at present. It is incumbent on government to provide the agencies it creates with the means to fully accomplish their mandates. The citizens of Ontario are entitled to a Special Investigations Unit with the necessary resources and tools to be the best that it can be. With that in mind, I have made 46 recommendations in this report, addressed at improving the system. The first 25 recommendations focus on the SIU itself. I believe that there is much that the SIU can do on its own to enhance and inject more rigour into its investigative practices, and its response to challenges to its authority. I have also made recommendations to address the issues created by a lingering police culture within the SIU, and to achieve greater transparency. Details: Ottawa: Ombudsman Ontario, 2008. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Shelf Number: 136686 Keywords: Complaints Against the PoliceInvestigationsOmbudsmanPolice AccountabilityPolice BehaviorPolice MisconductPolice OversightPolice Use of Force |