Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:59 am
Time: 11:59 am
Results for opium poppy eradication
1 results foundAuthor: Mansfield, David Title: Stirring Up the Hornet's Nest: How the Population of Rural Helmand view the current Counterinsurgency Campaign Summary: A central tenet of US counter-insurgency during the Bush and Obama administrations was "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. This was termed a "population-centred" approach and was informed by a strategy of "clear, hold and build," in which coalition and Afghan forces would clear insurgents from a given territory, then hold it while their influence was mitigated, and invest in the development and governance of the area. The assumption was that such a strategy would gain the support of the population. Between 2008 and 2012, Helmand province was a focal point for just such a population-centred counterinsurgency effort. It was estimated that between 2009 and 2011, more than US$648 million was spent in the province in tandem with an inflow of over 20,000 US marines, as well as UK, Danish, and Afghan military forces.2 As early as late 2009, the district of Nawa Barakzai, just south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, became an emblem of counter-insurgency efforts and cited as an exemplar of the merits of "putting the population first." The approach was then replicated in the neighbouring districts of Nad e Ali and Marjah when over 3,000 US marines, 1,200 soldiers from the UK and 4,400 Afghan forces deployed under Operation Moshtarak in February 2010, while millions of dollars were spent on physical and social infrastructure. Levels of violence declined, but any gains were short-lived following the departure of international military forces in the summer of 2014, which diminished the mobility of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Development investments in central Helmand also dwindled along with the associated donor funds. By the fall of 2016, the insurgency had once again made major inroads, ANDSF had abandoned security checkpoints in Nad e Ali, Marjah and Nawa Barakzai and there were few rural development projects. In the wake of the Trump administration's debates over the future of US assistance to Afghanistan, a new counter-insurgency strategy-the South Asia Policy-came into play. Armed with a change in presidential authorities that supported a more aggressive military position against insurgent forces and those believed to be financing them, the United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), in the words of its commander General Nicholson, would take "the fight to the enemy in all its dimensions." This paper documents how this new strategy is perceived by the rural population of central Helmand, both in the canal-irrigated areas of Marjah, Nawa Barakzai, Nahre Seraj and Nad Ali and in the former desert areas north of the Boghra canal. It is based on the results of fieldwork in rural Helmand in May 2018 and high-resolution imagery. The paper emphasises how, by the turn of 2018, central Helmand was once again a battleground in which the population was not the prize-to coin the phrase used by proponents of population-centric counterinsurgency-but the perceived victims of a campaign of protracted violence that many farmers believe is at the behest of US and Afghan military forces. The paper also suggests that antagonism toward the government and the uptick in violence were exacerbated by a campaign of air strikes targeting heroin labs, a dramatic downturn in opium prices and a worsening economic situation. The allegations of corruption frequently levelled at Afghan officials and security forces without any notable investments in physical or social infrastructure only serve to further alienate the rural population from a government that is thought to only "fill its own pockets." The paper concludes that, in this environment, the US and Afghan government forces may be able to clear parts of central Helmand of insurgent forces, and even hold the area for a time, but there is little to suggest this strategy will win the support of the population. Finally, recommendations are offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed November 16, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1814E-STIRRING-UP-THE-HORNET%E2%80%99S-NEST.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1814E-STIRRING-UP-THE-HORNET%E2%80%99S-NEST.pdf Shelf Number: 153494 Keywords: Illegal DrugsIllicit CropsOpium Poppy EradicationPoppy Cultivation |