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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:32 am
Time: 11:32 am
Results for opium production
3 results foundAuthor: Mansfield, David Title: Time to Move on: Developing an Informed Development Response to Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan Summary: After almost 15 years since the fall of the Taliban, the policy discussion on counter-narcotics remains uncertain of which way to proceed. In large part, this is because policy discussion is shaped by a superficial or misguided understanding of opium poppy and its role in rural livelihoods. This is not surprising given the disconnect that policymakers and the international community in Kabul have from rural realities, in large part due to the inability to get out of Kabul or even their own compounds. Another part is the natural tendency to downplay or even ignore problems which appear to be intractable. Many of the policy proposals reflect past thinking which has not proven successful, most notably the search for a “silver bullet” or one single crop that can compete with opium poppy. This focus is in large part the result of the way in which data and analysis have been presented to policy makers, in particular the annual estimates of opium area and yield presented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) along with its analysis of the reasons why farmers grow opium poppy. The most problematic aspects of that methodology are 1) the analysis of why farmers grow opium poppy, and 2) the assumption of a binary choice between wheat and opium poppy. Additional shortcomings are the limitations of the profit maximization model; drugs “fetishism”; focus on gross rather than net returns; endless search for the "silver bullet" (the single crop) which will replace opium poppy; assumption of a homogenous farmer; flawed survey methodology which relies on single responses and fails to correct for social desirability bias; and, lack of willingness to incorporate the work of others. The analysis in this report is based on fieldwork undertaken in the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar during the harvest and planting seasons of the 2014/15 and 2015/16 agricultural years. The analytical approach is based on the livelihoods framework in which opium poppy is seen as just one crop in a larger, complex system of agricultural commodities, livestock, and off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. More than a decade of fieldwork has allowed the incorporation of the effects of politics and power on farmers' decision-making, as well as questions of varying conditions, especially those that prevail in such vastly different areas as the former desert areas of the southwest. The current approach uses multiple methodologies, including extensive surveys of farmers in the field along with GIS and geo-spatial mapping which assists with research site selection and allows visualization of changes over time in settlements and cropping patterns. Analysis also distinguishes between use of household and hired labour (extremely important in a high-input crop such as opium poppy) and between owner cultivated land and sharecropped land. It reflects variations in fieldwork sites with respect to resources, infrastructure, access to markets and tenure arrangements, so as to capture the diversity in rural Afghanistan. Data collection utilized indirect questions in the field with farmers themselves, thereby avoiding the kind of speculation and bias that interviewing rural elites typically produces. Of course, the usual caveats associated with fieldwork in rural Afghanistan should be kept in mind, and this work should be seen as a "first cut" or "snapshot" that tries to capture conditions within a particular time frame. Fieldwork confirmed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, dramatic change is taking place in Afghanistan's rural economy, as farmers experiment with new varieties, complex cropping systems, and new technology such as chemicals and solar-powered water pumps. In part due to the development of transport and communication infrastructure, rural areas are more and more integrated with urban markets, and off-farm employment has become an increasingly important component of household livelihoods. Not all of this change is positive or sustainable in the long run, especially that which drains aquifers and potentially causes harm to humans, and much of it comes out of a desperate attempt to deal with adversity both agronomic and man-imposed. One of the most striking and consequential transformations is the settling of the former desert areas of south and southwest Afghanistan. The deserts have been made to bloom, although much of the flowering is opium poppy and it is not clear how sustainable life in the former desert will be. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 148016 Keywords: Drugs and CrimeHeroinNarcoticsOpium Poppy CultivationOpium Production |
Author: Nicoletti, Michael Title: Opium production and distribution: Poppies, profits and power in Afghanistan Summary: Opium cultivation has occurred in Asia for centuries, but why has Afghanistan seen such an explosion in opium production during the last two decades? Furthermore, the increase in opium production disrupted the stability of rural livelihood strategies in the countryside. Some research tries to explain this trend by citing the Taliban's financial gains from opium production, or the international market for heroin. While these issues are significant, they alone do not critically examine the multi-faceted role that the opium trade has in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of nearly three decades of permanent turmoil, followed by the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban's reign, and the U.S. invasion in 2001. Before 1979, Afghanistan had a decentralized state and large swaths of the mostly rural country had a subsistence economy based primarily on agriculture, whereas the commercial and industrial sectors were small. A decade after the 2001 U.S. invasion, military occupation, and nation building efforts by the U.S. and its N.A.T.O. allies, the central government's capacities still remain limited, the Taliban insurgency still rages on, with the pervasive insecurity undermining any sustained effort at rebuilding a vestige of a functioning and sustainable national economy. As a result, the country now largely depends on foreign aid, and in many rural areas opium production has become a rural livelihood strategy. After the Soviet invasion in 1980, Afghanistan became the world's leading supplier of opium and has continued to do so in 2011. The prevailing explanations for the proliferation of the opium economy in Afghanistan point out several key factors: opium as a manageable and profitable cash crop brings a monetary income to farmers who are deprived of the ability to produce their food crops due to violence and the destruction of infrastructure, economic stability to farmers, drug trafficking thrives primarily when country has been in a state of permanent turmoil, and the Taliban fund their insurgency because of the drug trade. Some of these ideas are more insightful than others, but they all lack a careful analysis of the geographic, cultural, and social complexities of the context of Afghanistan's opium production. The country is geographically and demographically diverse. The geographical and political experiences for a landowning farmer in Balkh are substantially different than that of a seasonal wage laborer in Helmand. Yet both may earn income from opium production and the prevailing tendency is to view this as a farmer who earns income from illicit crops. These explanations fail to address differences in geography, income, land ownership, state penetration of society, and the internal and external political actions in Afghanistan. The research and literature on drug trafficking in Afghanistan is abundant and contested, especially because of the various external influences in the country. Historically, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. flooded Afghanistan with money and military equipment during the 1980s. The U.S. repeated this policy in its 2001 invasion, thus re-forging relationships with militia commanders that fought the Soviet Union. Part of this relationship, both in the 1980s and more recently, entailed the empowering of armed "resistance" groups to monopolize violence and control aspects of an illicit economy, one of which is opium production. Thus, the changing power relationships are vital in understanding the context of opium production in Afghanistan. The country's glaring lack of infrastructure and economic productivity are areas that were exacerbated by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Pakistan that also contribute to the context of opium production and resultant stability. However, using flawed analysis to understand the context of opium production only helps to reinforce the unequal power relationships that drive it and does not address dependency on opium as a livelihood. The question is not whether opium production is defined within the realm of what is legally permissible, or not. The questions that should be emphasized are ones that address the structural drivers of opium production and who actually benefit from it. It should also be concerned with the majority of the population who are involved with opium production, like the Afghan farmers, landowners, informal creditors, and wage and seasonal laborers that predominantly engage in this livelihood strategy. Clearly, a far more nuanced understanding of opium production should address these issues and determine the consequences for this group. A critical analysis of all of the factors involved with Afghanistan's opium production indicates that it may occur as a rural livelihood strategy for farmers, wage laborers, and landowners. It is not such a strategy for insurgents and drug traffickers who profit considerably more and engage in cultivation far less than these other groups. Opium production is neither uniform throughout the country, nor are the people that engage in it. The prevailing assumptions that farmers cultivate solely for profit, that the Taliban drive the insurgency, and that opium spreads corruption need a careful examination. Some farmers may profit whereas others are try to make ends meet. The Taliban have a monopoly on violence in certain areas of the country, but so does the Afghan state and militia commanders that have the support of the U.S. and its allies. This research addresses these issues and demonstrates that opium production as a rural livelihood strategy may or may not be locally generated, the geopolitical context of Afghanistan must be addressed, and those that engage in at as a strategy can become more vulnerable to physical and economic insecurity. Details: Chicago: DePaul University,College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=etd Shelf Number: 150064 Keywords: Drug TraffickingNarcoticsOpium Production |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/access-to-information/14115/14116 Shelf Number: 154100 Keywords: Development AssistanceDrug CultivationDrug TraffickingFarm-Gate ValueIllicit Crop CultivationIllicit EconomyIllicit TraffickingOpium Poppy CultivationOpium ProductionOpium YieldRule of Law |