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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:37 am
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Results for organized crime (canada)
11 results foundAuthor: Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Title: Project SPAWN: A Strategic Assessment of criminal Activity and Organized Crime Infiltration at Canada's Class 1 Airports Summary: The purpose of this report is to present a national strategic assessment of the scope of criminal activity and organized crime infiltration at eight Canadian Class 1 international airports - Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Otttawa, Montreal (Trudeau) and Halifax. This assessment should provide a basis for more effective prevention and enforcement action, including through enhanced inter-agency cooperation. Details: Ottawa; RCMP, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: Shelf Number: 114906 Keywords: Airport Security (Canada)Drug EnforcementDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Canada) |
Author: Motiuk, Laurence L. Title: Prison Careers of Federal Offenders With Criminal Organization Offences: A Follow-up Summary: There continues to be limited research on Canadian legislation that places people convicted for organized crime offences into prison. To date, there is one study profiling federal offenders convicted for organized crime offences. The present study follows a sample of federally incarcerated offenders who were convicted of organized crime offences during their stay in federal custody. The first study found federal offenders with criminal organization offences to be serving medium to long-term sentences for a new category of crimes coupled with other offences, mainly drug offences and in some instances serious violent crimes. These offenders also presented a group with prior criminal records, strong attachments to family and criminal groups. It was also noteworthy that offenders with criminal organization offences demonstrated more lifestyle stability (be married, employed and healthy) than their correctional counterparts. These characteristics suggested a group who at time of admission were likely to present themselves as good “risks” from a traditional corrections perspective. This follow-up of prison careers found that federal offenders with criminal organization offences were not significantly more likely than their matched correctional counterparts to be involved in security-related incidents, be placed involuntarily or voluntarily in segregation, or be transferred upward in security level. However, these observations may be an artifact of their being placed at relatively higher security levels than their matched counterparts. Similarly, the finding that this group did not participate in programming to the same extent as their matched counterparts may be due to the fact that they do not present as broad an array of criminogenic factors. This is deemed to be consistent with their general lifestyle stability apart from organized crime affiliation. Federal offenders with criminal organization offences were found to be significantly more likely than their matched counterparts to be released later in their sentence. The added time served in custody might explain why a higher percentage of them were granted escorted temporary absences and they were significantly more likely to be granted an unescorted temporary absence. Again, the aforementioned may be due to longer periods of stay in prison relative to their matched counterparts. It would seem for federal offenders with criminal organization offences that their prison experiences were remarkably uneventful. A longitudinal post-release follow-up is required before such a conclusion can be drawn about their correctional careers. Details: Ottawa: Research Branch, Correctional Service of Canada, 2009. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b42/b42-eng.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b42/b42-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 118803 Keywords: Inmates (Canada)Organized Crime (Canada)Prisoners (Canada) |
Author: Motiuk, Laurence L. Title: Prison Careers of Federal Offenders with Criminal Organization Offences: A Follow-Up Summary: The Federal Government of Canada has taken action against organized crime by amending the Criminal Code to: 1) introduce three new offences and tough sentences that target various degrees of involvement with criminal organizations; 2) improve the protection of people a role in the justice system from intimidation against them or their families; 3) simplify the definition of “criminal organization” in the Criminal Code; 4) broaden powers of law enforcement to forfeit the proceeds of crime and, in particular, the profits of criminal organizations and to seize property that was used in a crime; and 5) establish an accountability process that establishes immunity from criminal prosecution for law enforcement officers when they commit certain acts that would otherwise be considered illegal during the course of criminal investigations. In 2005, the Research Branch of Correctional Service Canada (CSC) with the assistance of the Corrections Policy Unit of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada set out to develop a research framework and to conduct a series of analyses of available information related to exploring the impact of the legislation in general, and federal offenders who are required to serve sentences for organized crime offences, in particular. At that time, however, any interpretation of findings had to be prefaced with a caveat concerning the limitations associated with available data on which waves of analyses were to be based. As one might appreciate, the three years since the legislation had come into effect was recent so definitive statements were difficult to ascertain about the full impacts of the legislation that may be occurring in the long run. So far, when describing federal offenders with criminal organization offences it can be said that they are a group serving medium to long-term sentences for a new set of criminal code offences coupled with other offences, mainly drug offences and in some instances serious violent crimes. As a group, they were found to present prior criminal records, strong attachments to family and criminal groups. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the finding that offenders with criminal organization offences demonstrate more lifestyle stability (be married, employed and healthy) than their correctional counterparts. However, a longitudinal follow-up of their correctional careers is required before such a conclusion can be drawn. The focus of this research is on their experience while in prison. There continues to be limited research on Canadian legislation that places people convicted for organized crime offences into prison. To date, there is one study profiling federal offenders convicted for organized crime offences. The present study follows a sample of federally incarcerated offenders who were convicted of organized crime offences during their stay in federal custody. Details: Ottawa: Research Branch, Correctional Service of Canada, 2006. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Brief 2009 No. B-42: Accessed March 26, 2011 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b42/b42-eng.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/briefs/b42/b42-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 121117 Keywords: Organized Crime (Canada)Sentencing |
Author: Gabor, Thomas Title: Community Effects of Law Enforcement Countermeasures against Organized Crime - A Retrospective Analysis Summary: Police operations against organized crime have limited to no measurable impact on the public's perception of safety or recorded levels of crime at the city-wide level. This report expanded on the body of research on organized crime (OC) counter-measures and reviewed how law enforcement operations targeting organized crime are evaluated. In particular, this research studied seven police counter-measures against OC activities that occurred between 1998 and 2004. The various operations targeted different types of organized crime groups. The purpose of studying these operations was to identify and assess the effects of the counter-measures on crime rates and perceptions of safety and well-being in the surrounding community. Although several data sources were reviewed for their suitability in addressing the current research questions, only the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR) and the General Social Survey – Victimization (GSS-V) data sets were used in the analysis. A review of newspaper articles about these law enforcement operations over the course of the study period was also conducted. The findings from the UCR and GSS-v data, as well as the content analysis of print media showed that police counter-measures had limited success in changing the public's perception of their safety and in recorded levels of crime. Only in a few situations can an association be made between a specific police countermeasure and residents' perceptions of personal safety or a reduction in criminal activity. Also, it is important to point out that perceived safety does not necessarily reflect actual safety. Although the analysis showed that these operations have limited success achieving tactical disruption and suppression goals, issues surrounding data availability makes it difficult to comprehensively evaluate the effect of police counter-measures on crime or the community overall. As with any retrospective study, this project had several limitations. For example, the GSS data was at the level of Census Metropolitan Areas and was useful in the assessment of police counter-measures that occur in larger cities, but was less useful in the analysis of effects for smaller cities. Additionally, the GSS-v data were not designed to measure Canadian perceptions of crime and the health of the community as they specifically relate to OC, but to crime more generally. Counter-measures often target individual OC groups and not the criminal marketplace overall. The content analysis demonstrated that the print media were more focused on the activities associated with police counter-measures and the follow-up stories (e.g., trials, profile of those involved in the case) than on providing an understanding of the views of those living in the communities. This finding is in line with other content analysis studies which have revealed that the media tends to focus on the sensational aspects of crime (e.g., the takedown of offenders and criminal trials) rather than on the effect of an operation on a community. While this retrospective study shed some light on the effects of the police counter-measures on crime rates, public safety, and quality of life issues, the report articulated the difficulty of measuring the impact of counter-measures. The research confirmed the need for performance measures on police OC counter-measures. Police from other countries (e.g, Australia) are moving towards the development of performance measures to indicate whether resources are being used effectively and efficiently. The authors also suggested that a corporate communication strategy to inform the public about counter-measures could be established by individual police forces, a national database on counter-measures be developed as a useful evaluative tool, and suggested that detailed, prospective evaluation plans be built into counter-measures proposals. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2010. 254p. Source: Report No. 006, 2010: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2012 at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-93-2010-eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-93-2010-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 125342 Keywords: Criminal Organizations (Canada)Law Enforcement (Canada)Organized Crime (Canada)Police Response (Canada) |
Author: Frank, Richard Title: Social Media Sites: New Fora for Criminal, Communication, and Investigation Opportunities Summary: Over the last two decades, rapid advances in communication technologies have significantly enhanced efficiency and information sharing. The spread of online discussion fora and most recently, social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter, has helped rekindle and maintain connections between friends and acquaintances, facilitated the building of various online communities that share common interests, and created a new space for entrepreneurship and business transactions. Social media tools help to link people with common interests, and facilitate a wide variety of activities in the legitimate sector; it follows that such popular communication and business tools may also facilitate work in the illegitimate sector, perhaps even the work of criminal organizations. The current research complements and builds on existing empirical information regarding the use of social media by criminal organizations and law enforcement by way of literature review and interviews with law enforcement officials and social media experts. All law enforcement respondents and social media experts indicated that law enforcement personnel and organizations have, and continue to, employ social media to connect to the communities that they serve. The goals of law enforcement use of social media as identified by respondents were to connect to and interact with the community, and to proactively monitor the community for disruptive events and activities. Respondents reflected on the challenges they faced when conducting such investigations online. These included the ability to find the correct person among the large number of online social media users, the procedural difficulties associated with acquiring private information from social media data owners, and the time consuming nature of following forensically sound procedures when collecting online evidence, particularly when it is done in such a way as to not leave behind traces of police activities. One recurring recommendation from respondents, which also appears in the literature, is that police officers need more basic training on using computers and the Internet for open source intelligence gathering. Respondents suggest that it is important that law enforcement personnel have access to different computers, websites, and software so that they can be more fluent with them and utilize a variety of tools. Respondents indicated that law enforcement personnel need to accept that police officers will want to use online social media sites for personal reasons. But, they warned that separating police work from personal work is a mandatory requirement. They expressed concern that many police officers do not understand the danger of posting photos and personal information on online social media sites (OSMS), even if they have strict privacy settings. Some respondents suggested that a set of principles be created and followed regarding how police should and can obtain evidence and what they should (not) do to a crime scene where a computer is involved. Respondents suggested that such a guideline would allow law enforcement personnel to be more effective and consistent in gathering evidence from computers. Moreover, such a guideline may help minimize trails left by law enforcement personnel during investigation. Most respondents agreed that persons suspected of organized crime involvement do not tend to display their illicit activities on their social media profiles, but instead use social media to keep connected to their networks. The intersections between the demographic characteristics of persons who use social media and those of persons involved with organized crime may be useful for targeting investigation and communication efforts. This comparison illustrates that, in general, persons involved in organized crime tend to be late-onset offenders, older than those who frequent social media sites, and may perhaps be less likely to use social media. Exceptionally, the two blog sites described in this report, Blogger and Wordpress, were shown to have an older cohort of users. It is possible that members of criminal organizations, like the older general public, may be more attracted to blog sites than to Twitter, FaceBook, or MySpace, and as such may be users or consumers of such social media. Unlike the typical social media user, women involved in criminal organizations tend to be non-Caucasian, with disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds (Beare 2010). As such, it is possible that female organized crime offenders are even less likely than their male counterparts to use social media sites. Details: Ottawa: Research and National Coordination, Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2012 at: http://www.sfu.ca/~icrc/content/PS-SP-socialmedia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://www.sfu.ca/~icrc/content/PS-SP-socialmedia.pdf Shelf Number: 125499 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyMedia and CommunicationsOrganized Crime (Canada)Social Media |
Author: Chorney, Brenda Title: Organized Crime Integrated Units: Analysis Report Summary: Public Safety Canada is maintaining a National Research Agenda on Organized Crime in support of the National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime (NCC). As a step in this process, Public Safety Canada contracted PRA Inc., an independent research company, to compile an inventory of organized crime integrated teams and units1 operating across Canada and to conduct further analysis of a subset of the identified integrated units. An important component of combating organized crime is a collaborative integrated approach. The inventory will provide a greater understanding of the integrated teams operating across Canada, and, as such, will identify existing teams and units, as well as some basic information on each unit. The analysis component examines a subset of the integrated units identified through the inventory phase to gain a greater understanding of the operational aspects, challenges, and keys to success for these units. This report presents the findings for the analysis component. The report also incorporates information obtained while compiling the inventory database. Details: Ottawa: Research and National Coordination, Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policing Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 7, 2012 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-101-2010-eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-101-2010-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 125500 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationLaw Enforcement CollaborationOrganized Crime (Canada)Police Investigations |
Author: Beare, Margaret Title: Woman and Organized Crime Summary: The fight against organized crime has been identified as a key priority for governments in Canada and on an international level. While many studies have focused on identifying organized crime groups, and on assessing the impact of such groups, the vast majority of the research in this area has focussed almost exclusively on male participation. There has been little attention paid to the involvement of women in these organizations, and the vast majority of the research that has been conducted in this area has focussed on women as victims of organized crime, or as occupying passive roles in directing the activities of criminal organizations. The primary objectives of this discussion paper were to: review the literature; enhance the understanding the nature and scope of women’s participation in organized crime; determine the extent to which women actively participate in and lead organized criminal activities; systematically examine the factors that influence women to participate in organized criminal activities; and, to determine how the criminal justice system deals with these offenders. The paper has been grouped into two distinct parts. The first part presents an overview of women’s overall participation in crime, in general, in Canada. The theories for female involvement in crime, a portrait of the “typical” female offender, as well as information on the types of crimes women engage in, and the level of female involvement in crime in Canada. This background information on female offenders serves to situate and contextualize the second part of the paper, which focussed specifically on women’s involvement in organized crime structures in Canada, and abroad. The theories behind women's involvement in organized crime, the particular roles women play in criminal networks, women’s roles in particular types of organized crimes such as drug trafficking, and human trafficking were also explored. The experience of female offenders with law enforcement and the legal system, and future areas of research with regards to women in organized crime were examined. The main findings of the literature review were that women generally commit “minor” crimes, such as common theft, common assault, bail violations, and fraud. Female offenders in Canada are often from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, non-white, they do not have much education, and they often have extensive histories of being victims of abuse. The findings pertaining specifically to women who engage in organized crime found that women who engage in organized crime activities may differ demographically from the “typical” female offender. While very few women have been convicted under the criminal organization legislation in Canada, the majority of organized crimes that women commit in Canada fall under the ‘participation’ offence – the lowest ‘tier’ of charges under the legislation. There was some evidence to suggest that women do occupy positions of trust in criminal organizations, and are much more involved in decision-making than previously believed. Internationally, there is evidence of women taking ‘leadership roles’ in diverse criminal organizations. As with all types of crime, women’s involvement with organized crime is statistically low, but all indications are that it has risen slightly, with some women participating at higher levels or holding leadership positions. Details: Ottawa: Research and National Coordination, Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-106-2010-eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-106-2010-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 125516 Keywords: Female Offenders, Organized CrimeOrganized Crime (Canada) |
Author: Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights Title: The State of Organized Crime: Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights Summary: Organized crime poses a serious long-term threat to Canada’s institutions, society, economy, and to our individual quality of life. Many organized crime groups use or exploit the legitimate economy to some degree by insulating their activities, laundering proceeds of crime and committing financial crimes via a legitimate front. Organized crime groups exploit opportunities around the country and create a sophisticated trans-national network to facilitate criminal activities and challenge law enforcement efforts. The Committee was informed that gangs and organized crime have been with us for at least 150 years. Alienated and disenfranchised young men long ago forged a common bond of lawlessness, using crime as a means of generating wealth. New opportunities for organized crime arrived when illicit drugs became more widely available, due to the increasing ease of international travel and commerce.5 Organized crime involves white collar criminal activity, gang activity and both domestic and foreign participants. Organized crime is of concern not only for its direct impacts, such as the selling of illicit drugs, but also for the indirect impacts, such as the violence that spills into the larger community when rival organized crime groups try to gain control over areas in which to sell drugs. There are immediate and direct costs to the victims of organized crime. These costs can be financial but, more importantly, they can be physical in nature as well as mentally and emotionally traumatic. The losses suffered by victims through such things as the violation of their sense of personal safety and security are long-lasting and difficult to measure. Victims of organized crime can be found everywhere as this type of crime knows no boundaries and carries out its activities in communities of all sizes. Such activities can occur everywhere through such things as fraud over the Internet, the sale of counterfeit goods, and breach of intellectual property laws. The cost of crime is not only a personal one, however, as it is passed on from victims to their insurance companies to businesses and then to consumers. In this way, the personal toll of organized crime becomes a burden on society as a whole. Furthermore, there is also a high price for taxpayers in the form of increased costs for law enforcement and the justice and correctional systems. Domestic policing efforts across Canada increasingly require the development of strategies and programs that address the international components of organized crime. Currently, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local law enforcement units are focused on reducing the threat and impact of organized crime. In countering the growth of organized crime groups and dismantling their structures and sub-groups, a critical component is the improved coordination, sharing and use of criminal intelligence and resources. This sharing of information and resources is used in support of integrated policing, law enforcement plans and strategies, and assists the police in communicating the impact and scope of organized crime. The impact of organized crime on the lives of Canadians was certainly communicated clearly to the Committee throughout its hearings. The Committee also heard a level of frustration with how the justice system functions in this regard. There was often an expressed perception that this system operates with a bias in favour of the accused rather than the victim. Details: Ottawa: House of Commons, 2012. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed july 20, 2012 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/parl/XC66-1-411-01-eng.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/parl/XC66-1-411-01-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 125701 Keywords: GangsOrganized Crime (Canada)White Collar Crime |
Author: Morselli, Carlo Title: The Mobility of Criminal Groups Summary: The present discussion paper will review evidence from past research that offers alternative themes and theories regarding the shifts and patterns in the mobility of criminal groups. Our main objective is to identify push and pull factors that will help us understand how and why criminal groups, organizations, or general organized crime patterns are present across a variety of settings (i.e., geographical locations, criminal markets, and legitimate industries). Push factors refer to forces which drive criminal groups from a setting. Pull factors refer to forces which draw criminal groups to a setting. Aside from reviewing past research in search of such factors, we also apply the general understanding that emerges from our analysis to assessing journalistic case studies that addressed organized crime threats in Canada during recent years. The concluding section of this report identifies the key issues that must be addressed within this area and provides a series of recommendations that law-enforcement officials and policy makers should find relevant for their own experiences with this particular problem. A distinction is made between contexts in which offenders organize around available opportunities (the strategic context) and contexts in which opportunities create organized offenders (the emergent context). The most general statement that can be formulated from the present exercise is that the opportunities matter more than the group itself. What we will demonstrate in this report is that the problems concerning geographical locations, criminal markets, and legitimate industries that are vulnerable to organized crime are persistent and stable over time. Groups that seize such opportunities, on the other hand, are transient and more than often short-lived. Thus, preventing the environmental problems that persist over time and from one criminal group to the next is a more effective approach than repressing one group at a time. This general guideline is supported by past research. Our assessment maintains that while many claim that criminal organizations are intentionally or strategically mobilizing themselves to seize opportunities in various geographical locations across the world, empirical demonstrations supporting such claims are lacking, with most restricted to anecdotal illustrations. Empirical research in this area is rare and the few studies that do provide some level of systematic data generally fall in a less strategic image of criminal groups. Instead, criminal groups are the product of offenders’ adaptations to the constraints and opportunities surrounding them. Such groups are self-organizing and emergent in settings where there are considerable vulnerabilities to exploit across a variety of cross-border, cross-market, and cross-industry contexts. In short, it appears that there is plenty of hype and little demonstration in favour of the more sensationalist strategic criminal organization. In turn, there is less hype and growing evidence for the less sensationalist emergent organized crime scenario. This research review probes the multitude of past studies on criminal market settings, the ethnic composition of criminal networks, criminogenic conditions in legitimate settings, and general research on criminal mobility patterns. The principal push and pull factors identified often overlap across each area of research, with some relating to specific contexts. Details: Ottawa: Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Report no. 004, 2010: Accessed February 8, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-91-2010-eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-91-2010-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 127555 Keywords: Criminal NetworksOffender MobilityOrganized Crime (Canada)Organized Crime Prevention |
Author: Glasser, Uwe Title: Estimating Possible Criminal Organizations from Co-offending Data Summary: A method of data mining regular police records to identify possible criminal organizations has been developed. Between 2001 and 2006, offending related to 236 possible criminal organizations was reported to RCMP "E" Division, with 39 of the groups being particularly serious. This study combined computational mathematical analysis, social network analysis methods, and data mining techniques in a unique way to automatically identify traces of possible criminal organizations in operational police records. Under Canadian law organized crime groups, such as gangs, are termed "criminal organizations." The minimum requirements characterizing a criminal organization are that it consists of three or more people; that there is the commission of a serious criminal offence that can result in a material benefit; and that group offending happen more than once. The dataset that was used in the study was extracted from the Police Information and Retrieval System of RCMP "E" Division. (RCMP "E" Division covers most of British Columbia, not including some urban areas in the Lower Mainland like Vancouver and the Victoria area.) The massive dataset of more than 4 million records covered all reported offences and all persons associated with a crime, from complaint to charge, from mid-2001 to mid-2006, for the policing jurisdiction. Using social network analysis methods, the research first identified groups of people that the police-reported data indicated had co-offended with one another. (A "co-offence" is when one or more offenders are associated with a crime incident.) The level of activity, seriousness of criminality, and material benefit associated with the offending for these co-offending groups was then calculated and compared between years. Two different methods were used to determine the level of criminality for a co-offending group. This identified which co-offending groups demonstrated the minimum characteristics of a possible criminal organization and which demonstrated the characteristics of a particularly serious criminal organization. The research then examined how group membership and the structure of these groups changed over time. The analysis identified more than 18,000 groupings of co-offenders in the crimes that came to police attention. Of these 18,000 groupings, approximately 300 groups were active over a period of time. Of the 300 groups active over a period of time, 236 committed at least one serious offence. These 236 groups represent possible criminal organizations, as they met the minimum quantitative criteria under law for a criminal organization. When only co-offending groups that were active over a period of time which consistently committed crimes that were of above average seriousness were considered, 39 possible criminal organizations of particular seriousness were identified. Most of the more serious criminal organizations that were identified were also very active over a number of years, indicating their greater stability and intensity of offending compared to the other possible criminal organizations. Similarly, if a group was more criminally active, its members were more likely to have committed serious crimes. Estimating Possible Criminal Organizations from Co-offending Data PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA - Most of the possible criminal organizations were quite small, with an average core group's size being between six and seven individuals. The particularly serious possible criminal organizations had an even smaller average size, of just less than five. The less serious possible criminal organizations tended to have more peripheral members and a less tightly connected core group. This type of analysis may eventually provide a useful tool for operational policing in the real-time identification of individuals possibly associated with a criminal organization, as well as serve as an alternative source of information in intelligence gathering and verification. Intelligence and further criminal analysis is required to properly use this type of information in the investigation of, and reporting on, organized crime because there are a number of caveats regarding these possible criminal organizations that have been identified. Further work would be required to determine if the possible criminal organizations identified were component parts of larger organized crime groups. It is possible that not all individuals in a criminal organization are included in the identified networks because only police-reported crime information was analyzed. Individuals operating in the background or who are more able to escape police interventions, who may be more likely to direct the activities of others, would not be captured with this type of methodology. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS14-7-2012-eng.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS14-7-2012-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 127602 Keywords: Co-offendingCriminal OrganizationsGangsOrganized Crime (Canada) |
Author: Hicks, David Title: Economic Sectors Vulnerable to Organized Crime: Securities Summary: This report offers a detailed and accessible study of the vulnerabilities to organized crime affecting the securities sector in Canada. Much of the focus is directly or indirectly placed on Toronto (Ontario) and Montreal (Quebec) given that these jurisdictions host and regulate the main Canadian stock and derivatives exchanges, respectively. Since 2002 the Criminal Code has provided an expansive definition of organized crime/criminal organizations that includes three or more persons involved in a group that has as one of its main purposes or activities the commission of serious offences. At the time of writing, we were unable to locate any securities-related cases where a Canadian court has issued a conviction for criminal organization charges although we are aware of one pending case. There are clearly ongoing difficulties in applying the label organized crime to the stereotypical groups (Type I), let alone the diversity of individuals and groups (Type II) that may facilitate or collude in securities-related misconduct and crime. The information reviewed shows that individuals who violate the Criminal Code are typically charged with fraud. The securities sector plays a key role in Canada's financial services industry and economy. The total market capitalization in 2010 amounted to $2.3 trillion or 4 per cent of total trading among the world stock exchanges. While the 2011 Supreme Court of Canada decision rejected the federal government move towards a national securities regulator, the sector is a complex and de-centralized model of provincial regulation and cooperative national harmonization of key features. In addition, 'national' self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that receive their mandate through provincial legislation play a critical role to regulate the member firms and their employees. The securities sector is vulnerable to organized crime for several reasons, not least that this is a hybrid zone with a focus on regulatory approaches and difficulties in applying crime labels. Potential wrong-doing can be difficult to identify and the interpretation of motivations and behaviour is not as clear as in other fields, such as interpersonal crimes. The securities sector is an area of low visibility that requires proactive enforcement and prevention, in part because victims may tend not to complain due to embarrassment or lack of knowledge, and industry participants may not want to report rule violations that would undermine confidence in their business. Organized crime involvement in capital market offences is possible at several levels in terms of the depth of its infiltration of the securities market. The securities sector may be a site for the laundering of proceeds of crime generated outside of the industry, for instance, drug money, or a site for fraud and related laundering of proceeds generated to varying degrees within or alongside the sector. Criminal organizations can establish real or paper-based companies and sell real or fictitious stocks outside the regulated market, or attempt to secure the cooperation of industry insiders through the threat of violence or in repayment of gambling debts. It is also possible that criminal organizations or their members may establish partial or direct beneficial ownership of brokerage houses and engage a broader and deeper exploitation of victims. Some schemes that occur in Canada include fraudulent high-yield investments, pyramid or Ponzi schemes, and illicit 'tax-free' investments. The 20 (N=20) interviewees expressed particular concerns about Canadian investor involvement with boiler-room operations and the regulatory light-touch segments of international markets such as pink sheets and Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) in the United States, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) in Germany, and domestic markets, such as exempt securities. Fundamentally, vulnerability is represented in the asymmetry between investors and (potentially fraudulent) market actors within or outside of the securities sector. The imbalance of information, knowledge and control in favour of market actors can be reduced through the scope and intensity of regulatory oversight. However, this can also result in push and pull factors for fraudulent behaviour to capitalize on variable standards across jurisdictions and national boundaries. Vulnerability is also a product of the convergence in the securities sector of a wide range of complementary and competing government, regulatory, industry and business, and investor interests. The essential profit-driven logic underlying commercial crimes is an apparently voluntary trade in (typically) legal goods and services combined with illegal (fraudulent) methods to manipulate market values to the disadvantage of victims. Enforcement data presented by regulatory authorities and the SROs illustrate their attempts to address these vulnerabilities. The volume of criminal charges in the securities sector remains limited in number but substantial in terms of estimated losses. Reducing the vulnerability to crime and organized crime in the securities sector can be achieved through systematic attention to the limitations and possibilities of market forces and control systems. There is an ongoing need for basic and enhanced public education for investors to better protect themselves and to promote a culture of lawful and ethical behavior. Control agencies should function as interdependent (rather than strictly independent) agents within a clear set of defined goals and a coordinated strategy is necessary to detect and deter violations and to reduce impact and harm by issuing proportionate sanctions. Stakeholders could consider research and policy development in the design and implementation of a national data collection and securities intelligence model. This could improve the separate and cumulative detection and deterrence of serious repeat offending in Canadian capital markets, and its potential utility as a vehicle for criminals and organized crime. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 26: Accessed October 28, 2013 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-123-2012-eng.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-123-2012-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 131494 Keywords: Financial CrimesOrganized Crime (Canada)Securities MarketWhite Collar Crimes |