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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:18 am
Time: 12:18 am
Results for paramilitaries
5 results foundAuthor: Briscoe, Ivan Title: A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in Guatemala Summary: This report seeks to dissect the multiple manifestations of the security crisis in Guatemala, and the ways in which the financial, political and criminal aspects of state fragility combine and reinforce one another. Based on numerous interviews and field research, it argues that the withering of public authority can be understood as the effect of a proliferation and fragmentation of business transactions between non-state groups, factions within the state and political leaders. Details: Madrid: FRIDE, 2009. 24p. Source: Working Paper 88 Year: 2009 Country: Guatemala URL: Shelf Number: 116503 Keywords: Criminal ViolenceParamilitaries |
Author: Title: Cutting the Links Between Crime and Local Politics: Colombia's 2011 Elections Summary: Deeply entrenched connections between criminal and political actors are a major obstacle to conflict resolution in Colombia. Illegal armed groups seek to consolidate and expand their holds over local governments in the October 2011 governorship, mayoral, departmental assembly and municipal council elections. The national government appears more willing and better prepared than in the past to curb the influence of illegal actors on the elections, but the challenges remain huge. The high number of killed prospective candidates bodes ill for the campaign, suggesting that the decade-old trend of decreasing electoral violence could be reversed. There are substantial risks that a variety of additional means, including intimidation and illegal money, will be used to influence outcomes. The government must rigorously implement additional measures to protect candidates and shield the electoral process against criminal infiltration, corruption and fraud. Failure to mitigate these risks would mean in many places four more years of poor local governance, high levels of corruption and enduring violence. Decentralisation in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the tasks and the resources of local government, but in many municipalities, capabilities failed to keep pace. This mismatch made local governments increasingly attractive targets for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Violence against candidates, local office holders and political and social activists soared. With a largely hostile attitude to local governments, guerrillas have mainly concentrated on sabotaging and disturbing the electoral process. By contrast, paramilitary groups, particularly after the formation of a national structure under the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), used their links with economic and political elites to infiltrate local governments and capture public resources. That peaked in the 2003 local elections. Since then, and particularly after the official demobilisation of these groups in 2006, the influence politicians linked to paramilitaries enjoyed has weakened but not disappeared. The October elections are the first test of how democratic institutions under the government of President Juan Manuel Santos cope with the growing power of new illegal armed groups and paramilitary successors (NIAGs), now acknowledged as the country’s biggest security threat. These organisations, which the government calls BACRIM (criminal gangs), are unlikely to have a unified stance towards the elections. Some will be content with minimal relations to local politics to guarantee their impunity, access to information and freedom of action. But NIAGs are rapidly evolving into larger, more robust criminal networks, so some could develop a more ambitious political agenda. Several advocates of land restitution for the victims of Colombia’s long-running armed conflict already have been assassinated, suggesting that this major Santos initiative is likely to be met by alliances between criminals and some segments of local economic elites, in defence of the status quo. Meanwhile, frequent attacks against prospective candidates and civilians suggest that the weakened FARC wants to prove it is not a spent force. Colombia is better prepared than in the past to take on these challenges. Impunity is decreasing, as judicial investigations into links between politicians and paramilitaries have resulted in the conviction of some two dozen members of Congress. Investigations and indictments are now moving down to the local government level, albeit slowly and unevenly. In July 2011, the government signed into law a far-ranging political reform, paving the way for the imposition of penalties on parties that endorse candidates with links to illegal armed groups or face investigation for drug trafficking and crimes against humanity. Election financing rules and anti-corruption norms have also been stiffened, although shortcomings in the legal framework remain. Over the long term, these changes should favour more competitive and cleaner local elections, but in the short term, their impact will, for a number of reasons, be limited. The approval of the political reform law less than four months ahead of the elections has heightened uncertainty, and time is running short to apply some of the innovations. More broadly, political parties remain weak, and there are doubts whether they can even effectively determine their own nominees in all cases. Meaningful competition is unlikely to emerge in regions where the political and economic environment is heavily biased towards elites formerly linked to paramilitaries. Clientelism continues to be a drag on local politics, while links between criminals and politicians are frequently difficult to expose because of deep-seated popular mistrust of unresponsive local authorities. Guaranteeing the conditions for free, fair and competitive elections remains the dominant immediate challenge for the government. But more needs to be done to protect local government from the influence of illegal armed groups over the long term. The National Electoral Council (CNE) must be strengthened and become more independent. Congress needs to update and simplify Colombia’s diverse electoral rules. Political parties must establish stronger internal structures and develop a culture of accountability. These changes will ultimately be insufficient, however, if local government continues to lack the institutional capacities to guarantee democratic, clean and efficient management of its affairs. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 37: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/37%20Cutting%20the%20Links%20Between%20Crime%20and%20Local%20Politics%20Colombias%202011%20Elections.pdf Shelf Number: 122156 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical Corruption |
Author: Torres, Cesar Title: Alternative Justice, Reconciliation and Colombia's Disarmed Paramilitaries: Beginning the Discussion Summary: Colombia is currently implementing a controversial process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of paramilitary fighters into local communities. The Colombian justice system is not equipped with sufficient technical, financial or human resources to examine the criminal record of all of the estimated 30,000 paramilitaries who are part of this process. The legal status of almost 19,000 of these paramilitaries has not been defined. Within this group of 19,000 there are some individuals who have perhaps committed what could be categorized as lesser crimes during the conflict. In other countries undertaking DDR processes, alternative justice mechanisms have been used to bring to justice and facilitate the reintegration of this category of demobilized excombatants. The Colombian Constitution and laws recognize the existence of alternative justice methods as socially‐accepted practices of conflict resolution at the community level. However, for a variety of complex reasons, the potential to leverage these alternative justice practices to deal with the DDR overload has received very little attention in Colombia to date. This project undertook an initial exploration of some of the constraints and opportunities –‐political, social, legal and security ‐‐ that would need to be considered if alternative justice mechanisms were to be used to address some of the less serious conflict‐related crimes committed by paramilitaries. The research used a mixed‐methods approach including key informant interviews and focus group consultations in Colombia, to gather information and opinions on the prospects for alternative justice processes as an adjunct to the DDR effort. The preliminary findings show that alternative justice is not well understood among certain sectors in Colombia and that stakeholder perceptions are divided around its potential to address issues of truth‐telling, justice and reparation for victims. The study illuminates in particular, the need for deeper research on the legal viability for using alternative justice, the preparedness of alternative justice operators to address conflict‐related crimes, and the risks involved for victims, family members, demobilized paramilitaries, judicial operators and other individuals involved in community‐based justice. Details: Ottawa, ON, Canada: The SecDev Group, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Final Project Technical Report, 105088: Accessed on December 8, 2011 at: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/45207/2/131672.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/45207/2/131672.pdf Shelf Number: 123505 Keywords: ParamilitariesRestorative Justice |
Author: Vallejo, Catalina Title: Iron fist politics in Colombia: A panorama of destruction Summary: During the last decade many Latin American countries have resorted to mano dura (iron fist) politics and militarisation to combat crime, drugs and subversion. The high number of killed, injured and displaced persons in Colombia is a testimony of the failure of the iron fist policy with regard to in a crucial aspect of security: developing cultures of respect. When making policy in response to illegal groups’ violence, does using the same violent strategy allow for constructive social engagement? Does it break cycles of violence? While the villains’ death makes for a peaceful ending in comic books, in Latin America it reproduces violence. It is urgent to reimagine heroism and restore “enemies” their human dignity. Details: Bergen, Norway: CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), 2011. 4p. Source: CMI Brief, Volume 11 No. 1: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4364-iron-fist-politics-in-colombia.pdf Shelf Number: 123886 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCriminal Violence (Colombia)ParamilitariesParamilitary GroupsPolitical CorruptionViolence (Colombia) |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Microdynamics of Illegitimacy and Complex Urban Violence in Medellin, Colombia Summary: For most of the past 25 years, Medellin, Colombia, has been an extreme case of complex, urban violence, involving not just drug cartels and state security forces, but also street gangs, urban guerrillas, community militias, paramilitaries, and other nonstate armed actors who have controlled micro-territories in the city's densely populated slums in ever-shifting alliances. Before 2002, Medellin's homicide rate was among the highest in the world, but after the guerrillas and militias were defeated in 2003, a major paramilitary alliance disarmed and a period of peace known as the "Medellin Miracle" began. Policy makers facing complex violence elsewhere were interested in finding out how that had happened so quickly. The research presented here is a case study of violence in Medellin over five periods since 1984 and at two levels of analysis: the city as a whole, and a sector called Caicedo La Sierra. The objectives were to describe and explain the patterns of violence, and determine whether legitimacy played any role, as the literature on social stability suggested it might. Multilevel, multidimensional frameworks for violence and legitimacy were developed to organize data collection and analysis. The study found that most decreases in violence at all levels of analysis were explained by increases in territorial control. Increases in collective (organized) violence resulted from a process of "illegitimation," in which an intolerably unpredictable living environment sparked internal opposition to local rulers and raised the costs of territorial control, increasing their vulnerability to rivals. As this violence weakened social order and the rule of law, interpersonal-communal (unorganized) violence increased. Over time, the "true believers" in armed political and social movements became marginalized or corrupted; most organized violence today is motivated by money. These findings imply that state actors, facing resurgent violence, can keep their tenuous control over the hillside slums (and other "ungoverned" areas) if they can avoid illegitimizing themselves. Their priority, therefore, should be to establish a tolerable, predictable daily living environment for local residents and businesses: other anti-violence programs will fail without strong, permanent, and respectful governance structures. Details: College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2010. 657p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 6, 2013 at: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/10242 Year: 2010 Country: Colombia URL: http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/10242 Shelf Number: 128671 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeParamilitariesRule of LawUrban AreasViolence (Colombia)Violent Crime |