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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:08 pm
Time: 9:08 pm
Results for parole (northern ireland)
1 results foundAuthor: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: Governance Inspection of the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland Summary: The Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland (hereafter the Parole Commissioners) are a very important element in the delivery of criminal justice in Northern Ireland. The Parole Commissioners make life-changing decisions about the safe release of offenders back into the community. Originally constituted as the Life Sentence Review Commissioners, the role of the Parole Commissioners is now significantly changed with the Criminal Justice Order 2008 introducing Extended Custodial and Indeterminate Custodial Sentences and making the Parole Commissioners responsible for Determinate Sentence recalls. The Parole Commissioners were established as an independent body with judicial character. Two considerations should be taken into account when reading this inspection report. Firstly, the impact of the Brooke judgement which defined the independence of parole boards, and secondly the Reilly judgement, which consolidated the court-like status of parole boards. The importance of these rulings is manifold in defining the remit of this inspection, the role of the sponsoring body and the nature and extent to which accountability and the trappings of accountability may be exercised. The work of the Parole Commissioners is driven by the number of prisoners considered for release in any one year. In 2008-09 46 cases were referred to the Commissioners and 40 were heard. It was in anticipation of a significant increase in the number of prisoners to be considered (estimates showed a projected increase from 88 in 2009-10 to a potential 407 in 2014-15; 162 cases were referred in 2010-11) that the number of Commissioners was increased from 24 to 40. The Parole Commissioners, led by a Chief Commissioner, make the decision whether or not to release prisoners. Commissioners are paid for their participation in casework decisions and for work ancillary to casework. Their work is supported by a Secretariat that provides assistance in relation to case administration, payment arrangements and other provisions. The current structure of the Parole Commissioners in Northern Ireland is unique. Unlike other arms length bodies within Northern Ireland, it is not an executive agency, a non-departmental public body, a commission or a tribunal. It also differs from the structural arrangements that underpin the work of the Scottish Parole Board and the Parole Board for England and Wales. The Department of Justice (DoJ) have adopted a standard model of governance with an Accounting Officer ostensibly held responsible for decision-making and financial management of the arms length body and set reporting procedures, but this does not happen in practice. The Chief Commissioner is not the Accounting Officer of the Parole Commissioners; is not the Chief Executive, and whilst supported by the Secretariat, is not their line manager. The Accounting Officer role is assigned to an Official within the DoJ reporting to the Permanent Secretary. The Official is the line manager for the Head of the Secretariat. The work of the Parole Commissioners is not subject to oversight by the Secretariat or the DoJ. The DoJ have developed a benefits realisation plan (Appendix 3) but this is a measure of the general effectiveness of the Sentencing Framework Initiative, and as it has not been agreed with the Chief Commissioner, it is not to monitor the work of the Commissioners. Additionally, the normal framework of accountability, as set out in a management statement and financial memorandum, do not apply in this instance due to the independent nature and judicial status of the Commissioners. The central issue in understanding the work of the Parole Commissioners in practice is the question of independence from the Executive in relation to decision-making. An issue is the importance of both real and perceived independence with regard to the work of the Commissioners. This issue has shaped both the establishment of the Parole Commissioners and subsequent formation. A key component of the debate is the Brooke judgement. The Brooke case was a judicial review that dealt with the issues of accountability and independence governing the Parole Board for England andWales. In this instance, the Court of Appeal found that the sponsoring department curtailed the independence of the Parole Board by exercising too much control over the appointment and tenure of the Commissioners by specifying the use of funding, by not adequately segregating support services and by including a policy element in the role of the Commissioners. The ruling extends not only to the decision-making but also the processes and arrangements that support decision-making. Although the Court of Appeal found that the ‘normal’ relationship between a ‘sponsoring department and its sponsored parole body did not automatically create a conflict of interest or automatically infringe the independence of the body’ the implication is that the relationship between a sponsoring body and its parent department may create a conflict. The subsequent ruling in the Reilly application (another judicial review) confirming the court-like status of the Parole Board strengthens the independence of the Commissioners and demands clear water between the Commissioners and the Executive – a situation not best met by the current arrangements. A straightforward comparison with the costs of cases in Northern Ireland and in England and Wales shows the former to be considerably higher. The average cost per referral was just under £8,000 in 2010-11. The comparable figures in England and Wales, and Scotland, are around £2,500, thus Northern Ireland is around three times as expensive. The Northern Ireland Parole Commissioners do not enjoy the economies of scale of the other jurisdictions (England andWales have almost 30,000 referrals per year). The development of the support structures, policies, procedures, recruitment and training of Commissioners and Secretariat staff incurred significant costs. This should reduce over the coming years and alongside increasing numbers of cases should see the unit cost decrease. There is a low level of delay in the cases heard by the Parole Commissioners and no judicial reviews of their decisions (both significant factors following the increase in cases in England and Wales). The Northern Ireland approach has incurred costs, although the achievement of timely hearings, the very low level of lifer recalls or judicial reviews indicate a high quality service. Our inspection has found that there is an inevitable conflict between any governance model proposed by the DoJ and that which complies with the legal rulings in a series of cases culminating in Brooke and Reilly. The thrust of these judgements was to emphasise the independence of the parole bodies and create a governance framework within which the sponsoring authorities must operate. The resulting impracticality of the current sponsorship arrangements with the potential legal ramifications arising from the Brooke judgement requires a rethink of the existing arrangements. The inspection recommends a strengthening in the governance arrangements underpinning the work of the Commissioners – within the constraints set by the Brooke judgement. Reconstituting the Commissioners as a tribunal accompanied by a transfer to the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service (NICTS) and listing the Chief Commissioner under Schedule 1 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, would provide a more suitable environment for a body of judicial character. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/03/03b77ef8-d196-447c-8d8d-52875dda6dcc.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/03/03b77ef8-d196-447c-8d8d-52875dda6dcc.pdf Shelf Number: 122628 Keywords: Parole (Northern Ireland)Parole BoardsParole Officers |