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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:05 pm
Time: 12:05 pm
Results for police discipline
6 results foundAuthor: Webbe, Simone Title: Simple, Effective, Transparent, Strong: An Independent Review of the Queensland Police Complaints, Discipline and Misconduct System Summary: The Queensland police complaints, discipline and misconduct system is dysfunctional and unsustainable. Complainants and police are subjected to a complex, administratively burdensome, overly legalistic and adversarial process that is dishonoured by chronic delays, inconsistent and disproportionate outcomes. This is not news. Many reviews over decades before this one have found police discipline entrapped by a system malaise that produces the perfect paradox, which is that despite the priority concern of individual ethical police officers for a quick and fair response to complaints made against them personally, the organisation formed by majority of those same officers tends to overcook investigations, oblige protracted delays and unnecessary complexity, and operationalise injustice as it surrenders to the rules and expectations of a system that serves no one well. Genuine organisational attempts and commitment to address the problems such as the recent hopeful trials for Project Verity have only served to increase frustration by their failure to progress a solution. There is an intimidating gap between the current police complaints, discipline and misconduct system and the ideal model that is 'simple, effective, transparent and strong' that was recommended recently by the Crime and Misconduct Commission in its report, Setting the Standard. Subsequently, the Premier called for this Independent Review to consider the big picture for a better system anchored by a requirement to also deliver the operational detail - and promote public confidence. The objective of the devolution policy implemented under the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 was to effect quicker remedial responses to complaints through police management taking responsibility. In the decade since, neither remedial nor timely objective has been achieved. Implementation was flawed in essential respects because although the legal responsibilities and rationale moved to a capacity building intent for police to manage police conduct, the legislative and procedural complaints system itself remained an outdated and ineffectual dominant orthodoxy of discipline and punishment. Public confidence was compromised by more 'police investigating police'. Public trust was undermined by long legalistic processes for possible retribution that excluded admissions, apologies, individual and organisational learnings. This Review concludes that the police complaints, discipline and misconduct system in Queensland needs to correct its fundamental structural inconsistency with the policy objective of remedial intent; manage risk according to circumstances; and incorporate solutions beyond discipline and punishment such as a more responsive consideration of the needs of the complainant and restorative justice principles. Details: Brisbane: Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2011. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2011 at: http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/reviews/assets/independent-review-of-qld-police-discipline-system.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/reviews/assets/independent-review-of-qld-police-discipline-system.pdf Shelf Number: 122190 Keywords: Complaints Against PolicePolice AccountabilityPolice DisciplinePolice EthicsPolice Misconduct (Australia) |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Improving police integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems. Summary of consultation responses and next steps Summary: 1.1 The consultation document Improving Police Integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems set out the Government's plans for reform of the police complaints and disciplinary systems, measures to strengthen protections for police whistleblowers, an extension to the remit of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), and changes to the role, powers and structure of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). The consultation presented 42 questions across four policy areas and invited comments from national, local and regional organisations, police forces, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), Police and Crime Panels, frontline practitioners, staff associations, trade unions and other groups or interested individuals. Method 1.2 The consultation took place over an eight week period from 11 December 2014. 1.3 The consultation document was made available on the Home Office website, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/improving-police-integrity-reforming-the-police-complaints-and-disciplinary-systems. A Welsh version was available on request, as were large print and audio versions. Responses to the consultation could also be completed anonymously online, submitted via email to policeintegrityconsultation@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk or posted to the Home Office. 1.4 To support the consultation process, three events were held to canvass opinions from policing partners and frontline practitioners. Key themes from these discussions were noted and have been reflected in the summary of responses. A list of the events is set out in the table on page 6. 1.5 The Government received a total of 170 responses to the consultation (97 were submitted by post or email, and 73 were responses to the online survey). Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9031: Accessed March 16, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/411970/improving_police_integrity_reforming_the_police_complaints_and_disciplinary_systems.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/411970/improving_police_integrity_reforming_the_police_complaints_and_disciplinary_systems.pdf Shelf Number: 134925 Keywords: Complaints Against PolicePolice DisciplinePolice Ethics (U.K.)Police PerformancePolice-Citizen Interactions |
Author: Mitchell, Nicholas E. Title: 2015 Annual Report Summary: The OIM is charged with monitoring the disciplinary systems in the Denver Police and Denver Sheriff Departments ("DPD" and "DSD," respectively), making policy recommendations to those departments, and conducting outreach to communities throughout Denver. The OIM is led by Independent Monitor Nicholas E. Mitchell, and advised by a seven member Citizen Oversight Board. The 2015 Annual Report includes information about complaints received, closed and monitored by the OIM in 2015. It also includes the OIM's assessment of several recent changes to DPD's policies, practices or training, including its policies on body worn cameras, shooting into moving vehicles, early intervention, and racial profiling. "The DPD made significant strides in 2015 by revising important policies to bring them in line with national best practices," said Independent Monitor Mitchell. The 2015 Annual Report also presents two subjects about which the OIM believes there are opportunities for improvement. Electronic databases, including the National Crime Information Center and the Colorado Crime Information Center ("NCIC/CCIC"), are important tools that DPD officers use every day solve crimes, apprehend fugitives, recover stolen property, and otherwise keep Denver's residents safe. By-and-large, DPD officers faithfully adhere to the requirement that the NCIC/CCIC databases must only be used for law enforcement purposes. Yet, when officers do misuse NCIC/CCIC for non law enforcement purposes, they are generally issued reprimands rather than stronger discipline. "These databases contain vast amounts of personal information about the American public, including community members in Denver," said Mr. Mitchell. "When they are misused, reprimands are not commensurate with the seriousness of that violation, and may not be strong enough to deter future abuse." The Annual Report recommends that the penalties for misuse of NCIC/CCIC should be strengthened within the disciplinary matrix that is maintained by the Executive Director of Safety. The Report also highlights the current gap in DPD policy and training on what kinds of force are permissible or effective to remove potential contraband from the mouth of an arrestee who is attempting to swallow it. The Report recommends that the DPD clarify its use of force policy, and specifically prohibit the use of strikes to remove potential contraband from the mouth of a person being placed under arrest. Details: Denver: Office of the Independent Monitor, 2016. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2016 at: https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/documents/2015%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/documents/2015%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 138333 Keywords: Complaints Against PolicePolice AccountabilityPolice DisciplinePolice Policies and PracticesPolice TechnologyPolice Use of ForceSheriffs |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Rights Division Title: Investigation of the Newark Police Department Summary: The Justice Department announced today it has reached a comprehensive settlement with the city of Newark, New Jersey, that will bring wide-ranging reforms and changes to the Newark Police Department (NPD). The agreement, which is subject to court approval, resolves the department's findings that NPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional stops, searches, arrests, use of excessive force and theft by officers in violation of the First, Fourth and 14th Amendments. The proposed consent decree also resolves the department's findings that NPD's law enforcement practices had a disparate impact on minorities in Newark. The Justice Department's findings were announced in July 2014 following a comprehensive investigation into the NPD started in May 2011. The investigation also found that this pattern of constitutional violations has eroded public confidence in the police. As a result, public safety suffers and the job of delivering police services was more difficult and more dangerous. Under the consent decree, the city of Newark and NPD will implement comprehensive reforms in 12 substantive areas. The agreement ensures that: -NPD will improve officer training to ensure that officers develop the necessary technical and practical skills required to carry out NPD directives consistently. -NPD will revise search and seizure policies, training and supervision to ensure that all stops, searches and arrests are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and in a manner that takes into account community priorities. -NPD will integrate bias-free policing principles into all levels of the organization, including comprehensive training of officers and supervisors. -NPD will reform use of force policies, including requirements for using de-escalation techniques whenever possible and appropriate, prohibiting retaliatory force and ensuring mandatory reporting and investigation standards following use of force. -NPD will deploy in-car and body-worn cameras to promote accountability, instill community confidence and improve law enforcement records. -NPD will implement measures to prevent theft of property by officers, including robust reporting and complete accounting of property or evidenced seized. -Office of Professional Standards investigators will be appropriately qualified and trained. Investigations of civilian complaints will be conducted in an objective, thorough and timely manner. -Newark will create a civilian oversight entity to give voice to and pursue concerns of its residents. -NPD will develop protocols for conducting compliance reviews and integrity audits. -NPD will implement steps to ensure that the disciplinary process is fair and consistent. -NPD will improve records management and early intervention systems and collect data on all uses of force and investigatory stops, searches and arrests, and develop a protocol for the comprehensive analysis of the data. The information will be publicly reported. -NPD will strengthen its public information programs to ensure that members of the public are informed of NPD’s progress toward reform. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2014. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2016 at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2014/07/22/NPD%20Findings%20Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2014/07/22/NPD%20Findings%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 138958 Keywords: Police BehaviorPolice CorruptionPolice DisciplinePolice EthicsPolice IntegrityPolice MisconductPolice Reform |
Author: Safer, Ron Title: Preventing and Disciplining Police Misconduct: An Independent Review and Recommendations Concerning Chicago's Police Disciplinary System Summary: A police department's disciplinary system must encourage good conduct by police officers. The process for investigating and resolving complaints alleging police misconduct should align with this objective. In recent years, there have been both external and internal concerns about how complaints of misconduct by members of Chicago Police Department (CPD) are investigated and disciplined. Allegations of a "code of silence" among Chicago police officers reveal the public's concern with the current disciplinary system. And there are concerns within CPD about the uncertainty that surrounds police discipline, including the length of time it takes to resolve misconduct complaints and a perceived lack of uniformity across punishments for similar violations. In particular, alleged incidences of misconduct by members of the CPD are investigated, and discipline is administered, pursuant to a complicated, time-consuming process. CPD's disciplinary system includes three separate City agencies - each created at a different time and for a different purpose - that are tasked with investigating and resolving alleged incidences of police misconduct: the CPD, including its Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA); the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA); and the Police Board. As a result, responsibility for identifying misconduct and administering discipline can be fragmented. In addition, historically multiple opportunities to appeal and/or grieve disciplinary decisions from one body to another at multiple stages in the process lengthened the time between the complaint and resolution, creating uncertainty surrounding the administration of discipline. The City's collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the unions of Department members limit the ways in which misconduct - studied the statutes, ordinances, collective bargaining agreements, and other legal requirements that define the current disciplinary system; -- analyzed data - including the number and types of misconduct complaints, and the amount of time it takes to resolve these complaints - provided by the three entities charged with investigating and resolving allegations of police misconduct: the CPD, including BIA, IPRA, and the Police Board; -- interviewed a wide cross section of people who participate in and/or are affected by the police disciplinary system, such as: current and former CPD members, including senior leadership, bureau chiefs, commanders, lieutenants, sergeants, and rank-and-file police officers; IPRA leadership, including its chief and deputy chief administrators; Police Board leadership; other public officials; and community representatives, ministers and other members of the faith community and representatives from organizations focused on police misconduct and accountability; -- analyzed best practices in other municipalities and jurisdictions; -- consulted subject matter experts, including Darrel Stephens of the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Merrick Bobb of the Police Assessment Resource Center; and -- undertook a thorough review of the relevant literature. Our recommendations fall into two categories. First, we propose changes to prevent misconduct from occurring in the first place, primarily by focusing on guidelines, education and training. We also suggest ways to make the consequences of misconduct more consistent, as well as to more effectively involve direct supervisors in the prevention and detection of misconduct. Second, we suggest improvements to the system for addressing the misconduct that does occur. We offer ways to make IPRA more accessible and transparent for complainants, as well as to accelerate the time from complaint to resolution; recommend adjusting the jurisdictions of BIA, IPRA, and the Police Board; and make suggestions for streamlining processes where possible. Details: Chicago: Police Accountability Task Force, 2014. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 146292 Keywords: Complaints Against PolicePolice DisciplinePolice IntegrityPolice Misconduct |
Author: Levine, Kate Title: Discipline and Policing Summary: A prime focus of police reform advocates is the transparency of police discipline. Indeed, transparency is one of if not the most popular accountability solutions for a wide swath of policing problems. This Article examines the "transparency cure" as it applies to Police Disciplinary Records ("PDRs"). These records are part of an officer's personnel file and contain reported wrongdoing from supervisors, Internal Affairs Bureaus, and Citizen Complaint Review Boards. This Article argues that making PDRs public is worthy of skeptical examination. First, it problematizes the notion that transparency is a worthy end-goal for those who desire to see police reform in general. Transparency is often seen as a solution with no downside, but this Article argues that, in the realm of PDRs, it comes with at least two major tradeoffs: first making PDRs public will not lead to the accountability that advocates seek, and in fact may cause retrenchment from police departments. Second, transparency on an individual level necessarily comes with major privacy tradeoffs. The problem with individualized transparency is not theoretical. in fact, it has been much critiqued by scholars in a different but comparable realm: the wide dissemination of criminal records. PDRs and criminal records have similar problems: due process issues, inaccuracy, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and permanent reputational harm. Indeed, the rhetoric used by law enforcement to defend their privacy rights sounds almost identical to the critiques scholars make of criminal record transparency. This Article argues that the comparison of PDRs and Criminal Records is instructive because it allows us to view criminal records through a new lens. As with criminal record publication, forced PDR transparency will likely not solve the problems advocates hope it will. Thus, the Article concludes that a more nuanced regime should be put in place for PDRs, and that advocates should use law enforcement rhetoric to support a more privacy-protective regime for criminal records. Details: Unpublished paper, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130980 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130980 Shelf Number: 150124 Keywords: Criminal ProcedurePolice AccountabilityPolice DisciplinePolicing |