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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:11 pm
Time: 9:11 pm
Results for police intelligence
6 results foundAuthor: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: The Relationship Between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Summary: This inspection examines the overall relationship between the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and in particular, how requests for police intelligence surrounding historical cases are handled by the PSNI and recommendations from the OPONI, are considered and implemented by the PSNI. Concerns have been expressed from nongovernmental organisations, the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) and some families of victims of the Troubles that the PSNI were being unhelpful in supporting the OPONI investigations of historical cases. Questions were raised about whether the OPONI was able to access all sensitive intelligence material held by the police in respect of historical cases and about how the police were responding to recommendations and findings of the OPONI investigations into historical cases. Founding legislation never envisaged the OPONI conducting retrospective Troubles related investigations. However, in the absence of an agreed mechanism for dealing with the past, the Office must now fulfil these statutory obligations. The use of informants and actions or inactions of the police during the Troubles has little or no relevance for many of the operational officers of the PSNI, the majority of whom were recruited after the Belfast Agreement. However, the issue continues to divide public and political opinion and fuels the call for an agreed mechanism for dealing with the past. It is in the interest of both the OPONI and the police that a mutually respectful working relationship is developed. The police need to be confident that complaints made against officers will be investigated thoroughly and fairly, and the Police Ombudsman's investigators need to be confident that the police are co-operating fully with their investigations. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2013. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/b9/b97d8f4a-295f-42d5-8e63-ecc2199307c8.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/b9/b97d8f4a-295f-42d5-8e63-ecc2199307c8.pdf Shelf Number: 132471 Keywords: OmbudsmanPolice IntelligencePolice InvestigationsPolice Legitimacy (Northern Ireland)Police-Community Relations |
Author: Lavery, Timothy A. Title: Targeting Violence-Prone Offenders: Examination of an Intelligence-Led Policing Strategy Summary: Analyses were conducted examining an offender targeting strategy implemented in the Chicago Police Department as part of a citywide violence reduction strategy. From approximately June 2003 to November 2007, violence-prone offenders were targeted for enhanced police contact, based largely on gang-related intelligence. The analyses examined whether, following identification, police were able to successfully make contact with targeted offenders, and whether such contact could plausibly be attributed to the strategy. A sample of offenders targeted during 2005 or 2006 (N = 885) were compared to a matched sample of non-targeted offenders (N = 3,366). Matches were identified based on propensity scores, using nearest neighbor matching. Poisson regression was used to compare targeted and non-targeted offenders on 45 post-treatment police outcome measures, purposely designed to vary in terms of the expected impact that the strategy would have on their levels. Consistent with expectation, differences between targeted and non-targeted offenders were more likely to emerge significant for outcome measures that assessed discretionary police contact (contact for lesser infractions where the police could choose not to respond). The results are used to discuss intelligence-led police practices and the police role in yielding crime deterrence effects. Details: Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013. 151p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 7, 2015 at: https://dspace-prod-lib.cc.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/11248/Lavery_Timothy.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://dspace-prod-lib.cc.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/11248/Lavery_Timothy.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 135166 Keywords: Intelligence-Led Policing Police IntelligencePolicing (Chicago) Street Gangs Violence Violent Crime |
Author: Yale Law School. Civil Liberties and National Security Clinic Title: Trapped in a Black Box: Growing Terrorism Watchlisting in Everyday Policing Summary: The report analyzes 13,000 pages of new information from a joint Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation by the ACLU and the clinic, which reveals that the U.S. government has drastically expanded the use of a consolidated watchlisting system that now includes hundreds of thousands of individuals. The watchlist, referred to as the Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) File, is part of a vast system of domestic surveillance of people whom law enforcement labels suspect based on vague and loose criteria, according to the report. The report contains new data that reveals for the first time the vast expanse of the watchlist now known as the KST File. It ballooned over 2000 percent from 2003 to 2008, growing at an average of 144 names per day to become a massive database of 272,000 entries by the end of 2008, according to the report. Today, the KST File contains hundreds of thousands of names. The names of these watchlisted individuals are disseminated to law enforcement officers nationwide through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, making them vulnerable to a heightened risk of unwarranted monitoring and surveillance as well as prolonged detention and questioning, according to the report. In addition, the report reveals for the first time that the government uses a function called "silent hits" to secretly track encounters with watchlisted individuals without alerting even the frontline law enforcement officers. When an officer searches for an individual listed as a silent hit, for example during a routine traffic stop, the officer receives no hit, but an automatic notification is sent to the FBI or other source agency, according to the report. As a result, the silent hits system effectively turns frontline law enforcement officers into domestic intelligence gatherers without their knowledge. In addition to unwarranted law enforcement scrutiny, these individuals face the risk of mistaken dissemination of watchlist information to private third parties, as well as discriminations in immigration and naturalization proceedings, the report found. Despite the threat to these individuals' due process and privacy rights, they have little recourse to challenge the watchlisting procedures. Details: New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2016 at: https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/clinic/wirac_9-11_clinic_trapped_in_a_black_box.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/clinic/wirac_9-11_clinic_trapped_in_a_black_box.pdf Shelf Number: 138809 Keywords: Civil Liberties Domestic Intelligence Freedom of Information Act Homeland Security Police IntelligenceTerrorism Terrorists |
Author: Kowalick, Phil Title: Opportunities abound abroad: Optimising our criminal intelligence system overseas Summary: Criminal intelligence (CrimInt) is so useful in serious criminal investigations that it's difficult to envisage a situation where it shouldn't be sought and used if it's available. This special report argues that Australia's current arrangements for gathering and disseminating CrimInt overseas are suboptimal. While additional resources are needed to address this condition, there's also a need to streamline priority setting and associated collection requirements, provide ways to evaluate and better coordinate the collection of information and intelligence product, and expand opportunities to improve training in CrimInt. The paper provides recommendations to improve the quality and utility of our overseas CrimInt effort for law enforcement, policy and regulatory agencies. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/opportunities-abound-abroad-optimising-our-criminal-intelligence-system-overseas/SR90_CrimInt.pdf Shelf Number: 139615 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsPolice Intelligence |
Author: Gunnell, Daniel Title: Social Network Analysis of an Urban Street Gang Using Police Intelligence Data Summary: As part of the Home Office's Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme a commitment was made to help police forces better understand their local gang issues (HM Government, 2013). This research aims to meet this commitment by testing the use of social network analysis using police intelligence data, as a tool to more systematically understand gangs and to help direct law enforcement activities. As such, the report serves as one example of how social network analysis can be used, but the approach could also be applied to other types of crime and disorder to explore the networks of people involved (such as those connected to acquisitive crime or sexual abuse). The research was undertaken in partnership with Great Manchester Police and addresses two research questions: 1. What can social network analysis tell us about gangs? 2. How useful are the social network analysis outputs for the police? For this, five individuals living in Manchester and identified as having gang links were chosen as the starting point for the network analysis. Further details about how to conduct social network analysis can be found in the 'How to guide' published as an annex to this report. Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 89: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491578/horr89.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491578/horr89.pdf Shelf Number: 139825 Keywords: Crime AnalysisPolice IntelligenceSocial NetworksStreet GangsYouth Gangs |
Author: New York (City). Department of Investigation Title: An Investigation of NYPD's Compliance with Rules Governing Investigations of Political Activity Summary: The Department of Investigation's ("DOI") Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department ("OIG-NYPD") has issued a Report detailing the findings of its review of the New York City Police Department's ("NYPD") compliance with the court-mandated rules governing the investigation of political activity. These rules, also known as the Handschu Guidelines, are codified in the NYPD Patrol Guide. In the course of this investigation, OIG-NYPD examined highly confidential intelligence files never before subject to review or available to non-police entities. OIG-NYPD's investigators examined, among other things, whether NYPD's Intelligence Bureau satisfied the established standard for opening investigations, met deadlines for extending investigations, and obtained necessary approvals for the use of human sources, which include confidential informants and undercover officers. The investigation found that the NYPD Intelligence Bureau failed to renew investigations before the authorization expired more than half of the time, resulting in investigations of political activity that continued without the requisite authorization. More than 25% of the extensions reviewed exceeded the required deadline by more than 31 days. Further, requests to use human sources were frequently approved despite failing to document the particularized role of confidential informants and undercover officers, as required. However, OIG-NYPD found that in all cases NYPD met the informational threshold required to open an investigation. Details: New York: New York City Department of Investigation, 2016. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2016 at: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/oig_intel_report_823_final_for_release.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/oig_intel_report_823_final_for_release.pdf Shelf Number: 140052 Keywords: Police IntelligencePolice InvestigationsPolitics |