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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:58 am
Time: 11:58 am
Results for police oversight
7 results foundAuthor: Committee on the Administration of Justice (Northern Ireland) Title: Human Rights and Dealing with Historic Cases - A Review of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Summary: In recent years, a number of concerns have been raised about the capacity of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) to investigate historic cases due to the length of time taken, the quality of the reports it has published, and the conclusions reached. The most recent reports into historic cases published by the Office of the Police Ombudsman have contributed towards a questioning of the Office’s ability and commitment to undertake robust and impartial analysis. A growing lack of confidence in the Office is further exacerbated by the experiences and perceptions of some of those who have referred complaints to OPONI, in particular, those families involved in historic cases due to the death of a loved one. Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, where complaints against the police relate to violations of the right to life, the UK government is obliged to conduct independent, effective, prompt, and transparent investigations. The UK government has argued during examinations before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (the body empowered to monitor compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights) that OPONI fulfils its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This report therefore reviews the Office of the Police Ombudsman on how well it discharges its duties in accordance with the requirements of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: effectiveness, efficiency (promptness), transparency and independence. Details: Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2011. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2011 at: http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2011/06/16/OPONI_report_final1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2011/06/16/OPONI_report_final1.pdf Shelf Number: 122024 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsOmbudsman (Northern Ireland)Police InvestigationsPolice Oversight |
Author: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: An Inspection Into the Independence of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Summary: This inspection arose because of concerns raised in relation to a lowering of the operational independence of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI). The purpose of the inspection was to assess the operational independence of the OPONI and examine any issues that could be said to undermine its independence. In the context of Northern Ireland the perception of independence as well as its reality is critical as it impacts directly on the confidence of those who engage with the organisation. In this inspection we have considered whether the independence of the OPONI has been or can be reasonably seen to have been reduced in terms of its decision-making capacity. The inspection report makes a number of findings. Firstly, that the legislative base for the work of the Police Ombudsman’s Office is solid and provides the necessary framework for the operation of an independent police complaints body. Moreover, there are a number of operational protocols in place that help define the nature of the relationship between the OPONI and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Again these help to secure the nature of the work of the organisation in relation to, for example, how complaints are dealt with. During the course of the inspection – with some exceptions – we did not hear any significant concerns over the ways in which the OPONI deals with current cases. This work comprises the vast majority of the work of the Police Ombudsman’s Office. The inspection did however identify a number of significant concerns over the ways in which the OPONI conducts investigations into historical cases. They include an inconsistent investigation process, a varied approach to communication with stakeholders and differences in quality assurance. In addition, we found a senior management team divided around the production of reports in this area and a fractured approach to governance and decisionmaking. The handling of sensitive material was also considered problematic. These issues have undermined confidence in the OPONI among some key stakeholders within the Non- Governmental Organisation (NGO) sector and a range of staff within the organisation. What is clear from the inspection is the flawed nature of the investigation process used in historical cases which seems to be buffeted from a number of different directions. This has led to a lack of confidence among many of those involved in the process including some investigators themselves, victims’ families and their representatives, and the police. The way in which the OPONI deals with the investigation of historic cases has led to a lowering of its operational independence. The investigation of historic cases has the capacity to undermine the entire work of the OPONI and serve to decrease public confidence in the work that it undertakes. It is essential that these issues are addressed in response to this report. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2011. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/18/18e1304a-9a19-4b5a-a1f8-faf1a5e807d6.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cjini.org/CJNI/files/18/18e1304a-9a19-4b5a-a1f8-faf1a5e807d6.pdf Shelf Number: 122672 Keywords: Ombudsman (Northern Ireland)Police InvestigationsPolice Oversight |
Author: Bastick, Megan Title: Integrating Gender into Internal Police Oversight Summary: The guidance note is designed to assist those working at the strategic or management level in police services and in bodies that manage and oversee the police, as well as those supporting police reform and/or gender mainstreaming strategies, including OSCE staff. It is intended to serve as reference material for good policing practice, presenting strategies that might be adapted to the different contexts, needs and resources of different police services. This guidance note includes: - An overview of police oversight; - Discussion of why gender is important to police oversight; - Guidance as to how gender can be integrated into police oversight in a number of key areas; - A self-assessment tool for police services; and - A list of additional resources. Details: Geneva: DCAF, OSCE, OSCE/ODIHR, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 23, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/118326?download=true Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.osce.org/odihr/118326?download=true Shelf Number: 134664 Keywords: Female Police OfficersGender-Based IssuesPolice AdministrationPolice OversightPolice Policies and PracticesPolice Reform |
Author: Roth, Lenny Title: External oversight of police conduct Summary: The importance of having a system of external oversight of police conduct was highlighted by the Wood Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service in the mid-1990s. The external oversight model that has been in place in NSW since that time has involved two key agencies: the NSW Ombudsman, which primarily oversees the way in which NSW Police deals with complaints, and the Police Integrity Commission, which investigates serious police misconduct as well as overseeing the way in which other agencies investigate such misconduct. In recent times, the effectiveness of this system has been called into question. In February 2015, a Legislative Council Select Committee report referred to "dysfunction" within the system and recommended that a further committee inquiry be held on reforming the system, "with a view to establishing a single, well-resourced police oversight body". The NSW Government has since appointed former Shadow Attorney-General, Andrew Tink, to review the police oversight system, including examining options for a single civilian oversight model. The terms of reference for the review were released on 21 May and Mr Tink has been asked to report by 31 August 2015. This paper revisits the Wood Royal Commission report, examines the current system in NSW, and discusses the many reviews of the system that have taken place over the past decade. It also outlines the police oversight models in other Australian jurisdictions and in the United Kingdom. In summary: - The Commonwealth has a very similar model to NSW. South Australia also has a multi-agency model but it comprises a Police Ombudsman and the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (this system is also currently under review). - Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia have a single agency model, in the form of a general anti-corruption commission. - In England and Wales, there is a single agency, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was set up in 2004 and investigates serious complaints and critical incidents. Reports have expressed concern at the IPCC's lack of resources and the effectiveness of the complaints. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper No. 6/2015: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/74D5A9F61C454021CA257E5B001EF114/$File/External%20oversight%20of%20police%20conduct.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/74D5A9F61C454021CA257E5B001EF114/$File/External%20oversight%20of%20police%20conduct.pdf Shelf Number: 136016 Keywords: Complaints Against the PolicePolice CorruptionPolice IntegrityPolice MisconductPolice Oversight |
Author: Marin, Andre Title: Oversight Unseen: Investigation into the Special Investigations Unit's operational effectiveness and credibility Summary: Canada received considerable unfavourable international attention last fall when millions witnessed the graphic video images of the last terrifying moments in the life of Robert Dziekanski. After a long and delayed international flight from his native Poland, Mr. Dziekanski arrived at Vancouver Airport, only to spend hours wandering hopelessly, unable to communicate or to obtain the assistance he needed to exit and meet up with his mother. As Mr. Dziekanski became increasingly confused and agitated, RCMP officers arrived and, within minutes, stunned him with a Taser. He was then restrained, and died shortly thereafter. In the aftermath of this tragedy, public accusations were made of cover-up and police using excessive force. People demanded assurance that the truth surrounding his ill-fated encounter with police would be revealed, and many voiced distrust of any investigation that would involve police investigating police. To Ontario's great credit, incidents in this province involving serious injury and death of civilians resulting from police contact are not investigated by police officials, but by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), a civilian criminal investigative agency. Created in 1990, the SIU's existence is a testament to the strength of democratic principles in this province, and the value our government has placed on reinforcing public confidence in policing. Unfortunately, over the past two years, several serious concerns have been raised by individuals, families, lawyers and community advocates who complained to my Office about the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU. As previous independent reviews have documented, the SIU's early history was marked by successive governments failing to provide it with adequate resources, and by police officials aggressively resisting its oversight. While its resources have increased over time, and regulatory requirements now more clearly define police obligations, my investigation found that the Special Investigations Unit continues to struggle to assert its authority, maintain its balance against powerful police interests, and carry out its mandate effectively. The SIU is still very much a fledgling organization. It does not have its own constituting legislation, its mandate lacks clarity, it is administratively and technically challenged and it is dependent on the Ministry of the Attorney General. In turn, the Ministry of the Attorney General has relied on the SIU to soothe police and community sensibilities and to ward off controversy. But in doing so, it performance is subjectively evaluated and rewarded, compromising the SIU's structural integrity and independence. Its credibility as an independent investigative agency is further undermined by the predominant presence and continuing police links of former police officials within the SIU. It is so steeped in police culture that it has, at times, even tolerated the blatant display of police insignia and police affiliation. In addition to lacking the necessary statutory authority to act decisively when police officials fail to comply with regulatory requirements, the SIU often ignores the tools it does have, such as public censure, and adopts an impotent stance in the face of police challenge. Delays in police providing notice of incidents, in disclosing notes, and in submitting to interviews are endemic. Rather than vigorously inquiring into and documenting delays and other evidence of police resistance, the SIU deals with issues of police non-co-operation as isolated incidents. It ignores systemic implications and attempts to solve individual problems through a conciliatory approach. The SIU has not only become complacent about ensuring that police officials follow the rules, it has bought into the fallacious argument that SIU investigations aren't like other criminal cases, and that it is acceptable to treat police witnesses differently from civilians. Police interviews are rarely held within the regulatory time frames, and are all too often postponed - for weeks, sometimes even months. The SIU will not inconvenience officers or police forces by interviewing officers off duty. When it encounters overt resistance from police officials, the SIU pursues a low-key diplomatic approach that flies under the public radar. If disagreement cannot be resolved, the SIU more often than not simply accepts defeat. The SIU also fails to respond to incidents with rigour and urgency - at times inexplicably overlooking the closest investigators, and following routines that result in precious investigative minutes, sometimes hours, being lost. It has become mired in its own internal events, and introspective focus. The SIU's system of oversight is out of balance. It must not only ensure accountability of police conduct, but be perceived by the public as doing so. At present, the public is expected to trust that the SIU conducts thorough and objective investigations and accept that its decisions are well founded when it decides, for example, not to charge officers. But much remains hidden from public view, including Director's reports and significant policy issues. In order to properly serve the function it was created to fulfill, greater transparency is required with respect to the SIU's investigative outcomes, as well as those of the police disciplinary system triggered by SIU investigations. In theory, the SIU is a fundamental pillar of accountability in Ontario. However, the reality is that the SIU is capable of much more than it is achieving at present. It is incumbent on government to provide the agencies it creates with the means to fully accomplish their mandates. The citizens of Ontario are entitled to a Special Investigations Unit with the necessary resources and tools to be the best that it can be. With that in mind, I have made 46 recommendations in this report, addressed at improving the system. The first 25 recommendations focus on the SIU itself. I believe that there is much that the SIU can do on its own to enhance and inject more rigour into its investigative practices, and its response to challenges to its authority. I have also made recommendations to address the issues created by a lingering police culture within the SIU, and to achieve greater transparency. Details: Ottawa: Ombudsman Ontario, 2008. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/marin_report_2008.pdf Shelf Number: 136686 Keywords: Complaints Against the PoliceInvestigationsOmbudsmanPolice AccountabilityPolice BehaviorPolice MisconductPolice OversightPolice Use of Force |
Author: Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Title: Special report concerning illicit drug use by Victoria Police officers Operations Apsley, Hotham and Yarrowitch Summary: This report presents the findings of key investigations by the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) into serious police misconduct involving the use of illicit drugs, and broader consideration of Victoria Police’s systems and practices to detect and prevent illicit drug use by its officers. IBAC's Operations Apsley, Hotham and Yarrowitch raise serious concerns about illicit drug use by sworn police officers and also highlight potential systemic weaknesses in Victoria Police's approach to this issue. Any illicit drug use by police is a serious problem with significant ramifications not only for the individual officers involved, but also for their colleagues, and the police force as a whole. Importantly, police use of illicit drugs adversely impacts the safety of the community and undermines the community's level of trust and respect for police and the law. In summary, illicit drug use by police is clearly unacceptable because: Illicit drug use, possession and trafficking are criminal offences which contravene the oath or affirmation sworn by all police officers, as well as contravening the professional and ethical standards and values they are required to uphold. Illicit drug activity exposes individual officers to compromise and corruption. An officer who procures and uses illicit drugs is by definition engaging in criminal conduct. This not only seriously compromises the officer but also leaves them vulnerable to blackmail or coercion and at real risk of engaging in other serious forms of misconduct or corruption. As previously reported by IBAC, organised criminals seek to exploit risk taking behaviour such as illicit drug use to compromise and corrupt public officials, especially police. Victoria Police's authority to uphold the law, and maintain the community’s respect for the law are eroded by police using illicit drugs. An individual officer using illicit drugs lessens their authority to enforce the law, and diminishes the collective authority of Victoria Police in the community. Illicit drug use by police officers also presents a serious health and safety issue for individual officers, their work colleagues and the broader community. It is imperative that an officer's judgement and performance are not impaired by illicit drugs, particularly when police are exercising a range of lethal and non-lethal force options, making decisions about arrest and the exercise of other powers, driving in unpredictable situations, or dealing with difficult and challenging situations. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/special-report-concerning-illicit-drug-use-by-victoria-police-officers.pdf?sfvrsn=6 Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/special-reports/special-report-concerning-illicit-drug-use-by-victoria-police-officers.pdf?sfvrsn=6 Shelf Number: 146150 Keywords: Illicit Drug AbusePolice AccountabilityPolice CorruptionPolice MisconductPolice Oversight |
Author: Morden, John W. Title: Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit Summary: The Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit was launched on September 23, 2010 by the Toronto Police Services Board. The Review examined issues concerning the role the Board played with respect to the policing of the G20 Summit that was held in Toronto on June 25-27, 2010. It also examined the role played by the Toronto Police Service during the G20 Summit, with a view to determining whether the plans developed and implemented were adequate and effective for policing of the Summit. The Board appointed the Honourable John W. Morden, a former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, to conduct the Review and provide a report and recommendations. Details: Toronto: Toronto Police Services Board, 2012. 475p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2017 at: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Shelf Number: 146909 Keywords: Civilian Oversight of PoliceComplaints Against the PolicePolice Accountability Police Oversight Police Policies and PracticesPolice ReformPublic DisorderRiots and Protests |