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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for port security
11 results foundAuthor: Bichou, Khalid Title: Security and Risk-Based Models in Shipping and Ports: Review and Critical Analysis Summary: The primary aim of maritime security assessment models is to assess the level of security within and across the maritime network. When managing risk through legislation, regulatory assessment models are used to assess risk levels and examine the impact of policy options, usually in terms of the costs and benefits of a regulatory proposal. This paper reviews the development, application and adequacy of existing risk assessment and management models to maritime and port security. In particular, it examines the problematical issues of security perception, value and impact, and discusses the limitations of the current regulatory framework in providing an integrated and effective approach to risk assessment and managment, including for supply chain security. Details: Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, International Transport Forum, 2008. 38p. Source: Internet Resource; Discussion Paper No. 2008-20 Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118796 Keywords: Harbors, Security MeasuresMaritime LawMaritime SecurityPort SecurityRisk AssessmentShipping, Security MeasuresSupply ChainsTransnational Crime |
Author: Haveman, Jon D. Title: Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost Summary: This report "describes and analyzes what could happen if a terrorist attack on a port where to occur, what can be done to deter such and attack, the characteristics of U.S. port security programs, what factors stand in the way of an adequate port security policy, and some alternative methods for financing that policy." Details: San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2006. 271p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119379 Keywords: Harbors, Security MeasuresMarine Terminals, Security MeasuresMaritime CrimePort SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Padavan, Frank Title: At the Water's Edge: Port Security in the Age of Terrorism Summary: The goal of the New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Port Security was to identify the state issues involved in an area of national, and global concern. The first part of the report looks at the maritime transportation system, from its creation to today, including an assessment of the importance of our ports; to commerce; to our national security; and to the environment. Part II discusses the terrorist threat, including an analysis of the vulnerability of our ports, particularly since September 11, 2001. Part III focuses on the federal and state response to the terrorist threat. Part IV looks at ways of securing our ports, including a proposal for an integrated approach to maritime transportation security. Details: Albany, NY: New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Port Security, 2006. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2011 at: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/001-nysl/ocn432663413 Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/001-nysl/ocn432663413 Shelf Number: 121583 Keywords: Maritime CrimePort SecurityTerrorism (New York) |
Author: Goslin, Charles Title: Maritime and Port Security: White Paper Summary: Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their associated facilities and infrastructure collectively represent one of the single greatest unaddressed challenges to the security of nations and the global economy today. The reason that ports and shipping activity are so difficult to secure lies primarily in their topography. Ports are typically large, asymmetrical activities dispersed over hundreds of acres of land and water so that they can simultaneously accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum product/liquid offload, storage or piping, and container storage. The movement of freight, cargo (solid or liquid), and transport through a port is generally on a “queuing” system, meaning that any delay snarls all operations1. Whether or not delays are related to security, security generally falls by the wayside in the interest of time management or convenience. Globally, there are very few uniform standards for point-to-point control of security on containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port’s security in one nation remains very much at the mercy of a port’s security, or lack thereof, in another nation. Organized crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority of them still do not require background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse employees. Most ports lease large portions of their facility to private terminal operating companies, who are responsible for their own security. The result of this is a “balkanized”, uneven system of port security and operations management as a whole. In spite of awareness by public policymakers that ports remain critically vulnerable, funding and government-led efforts to harden port facilities worldwide is moving at a glacial pace. Terrorists, in particular, are aware of this unaddressed vulnerability. As outlined below, the threats to the maritime industry are very real. Unfortunately, the question of whether terrorists will act to exploit the weaknesses in port facilities is, unfortunately, not a matter of “if” they will, but “when” they will. Details: Jacksonville, FL: duostechnologies International, 2008 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 124796 Keywords: Cargo SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPort SecurityTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS's Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing a resilience policy, but an implementation strategy is a key next step that could help strengthen DHS resilience efforts. DHS defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to adversity, and some high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level--the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has emphasized the concept of resilience and is currently in the process of developing a resilience policy, the initial steps of which have included creating two internal entities--the Resilience Integration Team and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). According to ORP officials, they saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, department-wide understanding of resilience that clarifies and consolidates resilience concepts from high-level guiding documents, and helps components understand how their activities address DHS's proposed resilience objectives. ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. However, DHS officials stated that currently there are no plans to develop an implementation strategy for this policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities; identifies resource needs; and lays out milestones is a key step that could help ensure that DHS components adopt the policy consistently and in a timely manner. For example, an implementation strategy with goals and objectives could provide ORP with a more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy. The Coast Guard and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with stakeholders to address some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but they could take additional collaborative actions to promote portwide resilience. The Coast Guard is port focused and works with owners and operators of assets, such as vessels and port facilities, to assess and enhance various aspects of critical infrastructure resilience in ports--such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts. In contrast, IP, through its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), conducts assessments with a broader regional focus, but is not port specific. An RRAP assessment is conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure "clusters" and systems in various regions--for example, a regional transportation and energy corridor. The Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some RRAP assessments, but there may be opportunities for further collaboration to conduct port-focused resilience assessments. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could collaborate to leverage existing expertise and tools--such as the RRAP approach--to develop assessments of the overall resilience of specific port areas. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another's resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders' understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help determine where to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for port areas. U.S. ports are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and a disruption to port operations could have a widespread impact on the global economy. DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime environment, and port safety and security, and IP works to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Recognizing the importance of the continuity of operations in critical infrastructure sectors, DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding resilience efforts, and (2) the Coast Guard and IP are working with port stakeholders and each other to enhance port resilience. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key legislation and DHS documents and guidance. GAO conducted site visits to three ports, selected based on geography, industries, and potential threats; GAO also interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders. Information from site visits cannot be generalized to all ports, but provides insights. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS develop an implementation strategy for its resilience policy and that the Coast Guard and IP identify opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to assess port resilience. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-11: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Shelf Number: 126819 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure ProtectionHomeland SecurityMaritime SecurityPort Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges Summary: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports - regardless of destination. NNSA provides partner countries with maintenance and technical support for about 3 years, after which it transfers the equipment and all related responsibilities to partner countries. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA's plans for completing and sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the Initiative and factors that reduce its effectiveness. GAO analyzed key documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited eight Megaports in five countries, selected on the basis of port size and unique characteristics, among other things. GAO recommends that NNSA take actions, including (1) finalizing its long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA's final transfer of equipment to partner countries and (2) developing and maintaining useful and reliable measures to assess the performance of the Initiative. GAO also recommends that NNSA and DHS jointly assess the extent to which the two Initiatives are effectively coordinating. NNSA and DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-37: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127143 Keywords: Maritime SecurityNuclear SmugglingNuclear WeaponsPort SecurityWeapons of Mass Destruction |
Author: Presidia Security Consulting Title: Economic Sectors Vulnerable to Organized Crime: Marine Port Operations Summary: The goal of this project is to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the vulnerabilities of Canadian commercial marine ports to organized crime. Research for this project places particular emphasis on the following key issues: - the different purposes behind the usage of marine ports by criminals and criminal organizations; - commodities smuggled through Canadian marine ports; - methods and techniques used to facilitate the criminal use of marine ports; - recent trends with respect to the vulnerability of marine ports to organized crime; - marine ports in Canada that are particularly vulnerable to organized crime; - conditions that contribute to the vulnerability of marine ports to organized crime; and - successful enforcement measures at Canadian marine ports. The vast majority of information for this study was gathered through a review of open source literature. Interviews were conducted with seven officials from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, and the Montreal Port Authority Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2011. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 25: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/412723/publication.html Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: The goal of this project is to provide a comprehensive description and analysis of the vulnerabilities of Canadian commercial marine ports to organized crime. Research for this project places particular emphasis on the follow Shelf Number: 136698 Keywords: Marine SecurityMarine TerminalsMaritime CrimeOrganized CrimePort Security |
Author: U.S. Presidential Task Force on combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud Title: Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud: Action Plan for Implementing the Task Force Recommendations Summary: On June 17, 2014, the White House released a Presidential Memorandum entitled "Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud." Among other actions, the Memorandum established a Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud (Task Force), co-chaired by the Departments of Commerce and State with 12 other federal agency members. The Task Force was directed to report to the President within 180 days with "recommendations for the implementation of a comprehensive framework of integrated programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud that emphasizes areas of greatest need." Those recommendations were provided to the President through National Ocean Council and published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2014. The 15 recommendations are broad in scope and call on agencies to take concrete and specific actions to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud throughout the seafood supply chain. By circumventing conservation and management measures and engaging in fraudulent practices, entities engaging in IUU fishing and seafood fraud undermine the sustainability of U.S. and global fish stocks and negatively impact general ecosystem health. At the same time, IUU and fraudulent seafood products distort legal markets and unfairly compete with the catch and seafood products of lawabiding fishers and seafood industries. The actions to address these issues fall under four general themes: 1) combating IUU fishing and seafood fraud at the international level; 2) strengthening enforcement and enhancing enforcement tools; 3) creating and expanding partnerships with non-federal entities to identify and eliminate seafood fraud and the sale of IUU seafood products in U.S. commerce; and 4) increasing information available on seafood products through additional traceability requirements. Each of these components is inter-related and complementary such that information and action developed under one supports the others. For example, these actions include establishing an integrated program that traces the path of seafood products from harvest or production to entry into U.S. commerce. This traceability program will feed enhanced information streams into improved enforcement targeting of illegal or fraudulent seafood products through newly integrated risk assessment and enforcement strategies. Similarly, the actions include efforts to improve the international governance of seafood harvest and trade that will complement our domestic efforts. Further, federal agencies are called upon to work with Congress to ensure that officials have the range of authorities necessary to identify and keep IUU seafood and fraudulent seafood products out of U.S. commerce. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf Shelf Number: 140120 Keywords: Consumer FraudFishing IndustryIllegal FishingPort SecurityUnregulated Fishing |
Author: International Organization for Migration Title: Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry Summary: In 2015 the mass rescue of foreign fishers trafficked for labour exploitation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels in Benjina and Ambon highlighted the lack of adequate policing of the fishing industry and a lack of scrutiny of working conditions on vessels and in fish processing plants. The case highlighted the expansive nature of this transnational criminal venture. Victims were recruited from numerous countries and forced to work illegally within Indonesia. National laws and regulations were breached and international conventions ignored. Front companies were established and illegally caught fish transshipped in the Indonesian EEZ and boundary areas, thus preventing interception by the Indonesian authorities. Ultimately the catch entered the global supply chain and was handled by legitimate suppliers of fish, unaware of its provenance and the human toll behind the catch. The situation in Benjina and Ambon is symptomatic of a much broader and insidious trade in people, not only in the Indonesian and Thai fishing industries, but indeed globally. This research provides a glimpse into a far-reaching and well-entrenched criminal industry operating alongside the legitimate fishing industry, and often overlapping. The situation represents the spread of transnational organized crime at sea and the threat it poses as a maritime security threat to nations, and a human security threat to fishers, seafarers and fishing communities. Human Trafficking and Forced Labour in Indonesia fishing industry is characterized by: - systematic and highly organized deceptive recruitment and exploitation of fishers and seafarers from multiple source countries in South East Asia; witness testimony of murder and the unlawful disposal of corpses; - extreme cases of labour exploitation with fishers working in excess of 20 hours per day up to 7 days per week; and - a lack of awareness at the local level of human trafficking and forced labour and associated criminal activity. IUU fishing in Indonesia is characterized by: - overlapping Indonesian government legislation and regulations has created confusion over the responsibilities of key government bodies responsible for the oversight of worker recruitment, conditions, and monitoring of fishing companies, manning agencies, and fishing vessels; - collaboration of more than 2 people: double-flagged vessels are registered in two different countries. This act of forging the deletion certificate is done by at least the ship-owner, the backers and field actors; - suspected commission of serious criminal offences: illegal fishers violate numerous laws, from deactivating the transmitter, using prohibited and destructive fishing gear, illegal transshipment, forging vessel documents and the logbook; - foreign masters working illegally for indefinite periods of time: although there has been a national law prohibiting the use of foreign crews, there are still lots of foreign fishing masters working on board vessels undertaking lengthy voyages. This shows that there is considerable planning to conduct the crime; - the pursuit of profit and/or power: the very reason for fisheries crime is to gain more profit and financial benefits with the least minimum effort in regards to compliance and exploiting the corruptible tendencies of some high level authorities and politicians; - operating at an international level: illegal fishers operate in multiple countries, fish in various areas, fly flags of convenience and land their catch directly to another State, and sell the fish in the international market at high cost; and - using commercial or businesslike structures: most illegal fishing operations are managed using large companies, often established with foreign investment, have valid licences, yet they are violating laws and evading taxes. - That port authorities record the movements of vessels, particularly foreign affiliated vessels; - That port officials fisheries investigators be trained in identifying indicators of human trafficking , forced labour and IUU fishing; - Minimise overlapping regulation / authority between Government agencies; - That all deaths on board fishing vessels or in port are investigated and an autopsy performed; - That Flag States take more responsibility for the actions of IUU Fishing vessels flying under their flags; - Efforts to establish a global vessel record (registry) are supported; - Support increased inspections and accessibility to fishing vessels and remote fish processing plants; - Support an increased role for investigators (navy, marine police and fisheries) to conduct inspections of fishing vessels for evidence of trafficking and IUU fishing; - Conduct human rights due diligence and human rights audits on fishing companies before issuing licences; - Establish centres for fishers and seafarers at ports (centre for fishers to report abuse, injuries, deaths and seek protection); - Support multi-agency inspections and investigations at ports; - Introduce a multi traceability policy to prevent human rights violations and reduce IUU fishing; and - Increase and consumer awareness of human trafficking in the fishing industry. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IOM, 2016. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf Shelf Number: 145805 Keywords: Fishing IndustryForced LaborHuman Rights AbusesHuman TraffickingIllegal FishingMaritime CrimeModern SlaveryPort Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are critical to the U.S. economy, but can be exploited by terrorists. Within DHS, CBP and the Coast Guard are responsible for maritime security. Through CSI, CBP identifies and examines U.S.-bound cargo that may conceal WMD, and through C-TPAT, CBP partners with international trade community members to secure the flow of U.S.-bound goods. Under the IPS program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to assess compliance with security standards. GAO was asked to review DHS's maritime security programs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the foreign ports that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain and focused its maritime container security programs to address those risks, and (2) actions DHS has taken to help ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs. GAO analyzed DHS risk models and maritime security program strategies, met with program officials, and visited six foreign countries selected on the basis of participation in CSI, varied cargo shipment risk levels, and other factors. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657893.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657893.pdf Shelf Number: 130141 Keywords: Cargo Security Homeland Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Port SecuritySupply Chains Transportation Security |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Theft of Goods in Ports: A review of TAPA EMEA IIS statistics Summary: This report examines patterns of reported cargo thefts at maritime transport facilities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) with respect to frequency, incident category, modus operandi, and targeted product category. The analysis is based on data obtained from the Incident Information Service (IIS), a database of transport-related crimes from the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in the EMEA region. The results are analysed and discussed within a frame of reference based on supply chain risk management and criminology theories. We find that maritime transport facilities constitute a rare target location for cargo thieves, as only 102 of more than 24,500 incidents (0.4%) in the IIS database occur there. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be made. First, there seems to be seasonality in day of the week, but probably not in month of the year. Second, violent and fraudulent modi operandi of theft at maritime transport facilities are about as common as in the whole data set. Thus, it could be conjectured that the impact from violent and fraudulent incidents is several times higher than the most common types of incident category or modus operandi, although this is unsupported in this study. The product categories signal that there is big variation in value in stolen goods. Third, it is possible that potential perpetrators consider security levels at maritime transport facilities to be higher, leading to fewer theft attempts. This study is limited by the content of and classifications within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Details: Turku, Finland: HAZARD Project, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, 2018. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Publications of the Hazard Project, 18:2018: Accessed November 27, 2018 at: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Shelf Number: 153852 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftHot ProductsMaritime CrimePort SecurityStolen GoodsTheft of Goods |