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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for privatization
83 results foundAuthor: Blumstein, James F. Title: Do Government Agencies Respond to Market Pressures? Evidence from Private Prisons Summary: This paper examined the role of privatization on the cost of government-provided services. It examined data on the cost of housing public and private prisoners from all 50 states over the time period 1996-2004, and found that the existence of private prisons in a state reduces the growth in per prisoner expenditures by public prisons by a statistically significant amount. Details: Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-16; Vanderbilt Public Law Review Paper No. 03-05, December 2007. 39p. Source: Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 114351 Keywords: Private Prisons - PrisonersPrivatization |
Author: Gilroy, Leonard C. Title: Public-Private Partnerships for Corrections in California: Bridging the Gap Between Crisis and Reform Summary: With a correctional system strained by severe overcrowding, a state fiscal crisis and a recent federal order to reduce the prison population by over 40,000 inmates, there are no silver bullet solutions to California's prison crisis. This report asserts that public-private partnerships offer a powerful policy option as part of a comprehensive strategy address California's corrections crisis. Details: Los Angeles: Reason Foundation and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, 2010. 72p. Source: Policy Study 381 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 118091 Keywords: Correctional Institutions (California)Prison Overcrowding (California)PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Mulheirn, Ian Title: Prison Break: Tackling Recidivism, Reducing Costs Summary: Crime costs the UK 72 British pounds each year. The failure to crack re-offending among prisoners serving short-term sentences is a key driver of these costs. This report calls for a new approach to tackle re-offending with much less public money. Its recommendations include the following: splitting the short- and long-term prison populations to enable more accountabile rehabilitation of persistent offenders on short-term sentences, and contracting out end--to-end offender management for all sub-12-month offenders to regional providers paid by results to reduce recidivism. Details: London: Social Market Foundation, 2010. 74p. Source: Accessed March 23, 2016 at: http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Publication-Prison-Break-Tackling-recidivism-reducing-costs.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117864 Keywords: Costs of CrimesPrisonsPrivatizationRecidivismRepeat Offenders |
Author: Cafferata, Fernando Gabriel Title: Privatisation of Security in Latin America: Review Summary: The privatisation of security in Latin America has recently gained the attention of scholars, politicians and policymakers alike. Until a few years ago, this issue had not been studied in depth, and therefore little time-series statistics or systematic historical data exist. Nevertheless, as insecurity has been growing exponentially in the region, the privatisation of security has captured the public’s attention. The state’s inability to address rising crime rates and the increasing concerns of citizens generate a growing demand for the services provided by private security companies (PSCs). Most of the literature on the subject revolves around a series of common issues that are the main theoretical and empirical findings of this document. Only eight documents examine the privatisation of security in Latin America. Of these, the first complete, in-depth analysis – and the most accurate so far – was produced in 2009 by FLACSO-Chile’s Citizen Security Program. Most of the other documents were produced at the initiative of the Organization of American States (OAS). Between them, these two organisations have produced more than 60% of the regional documents and more than 75% of the country-specific documents on PSCs. From the survey of the literature presented here, we identified eight “further research” areas. Of these, accurate parameter estimation regarding the number of PSCs, private security agents and weapon possession by PSCs is the most vital area of research to start with as well as the most difficult one in which to gain traction. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 29p. Source: Internet Resource; GCST Working Paper Series, no. 3 Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 119457 Keywords: Crime Prevention (Latin America)Private Security (Latin America)Privatization |
Author: Western Australia, Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services Title: Thematic Review of Court Security and Custodial Services in Western Australia Summary: Few publicly funded services have attracted as much attention as those involved in the custodial transport of Aboriginal elder Mr Ward on 27 January 2008. Mr Ward died a ‘terrible death’ i1from heatstroke at Kalgoorlie District Hospital following a journey from Laverton to Kalgoorlie. The service in question was provided under the Court Security and Custodial Services Contract. However, this Report extends into a much wider range of services conducted under the Court Security and Custodial Services Act 1999 (CSCS Act). These include services provided by the public sector as well as privately-provided services. The report includes the following chapters: Introduction; Court Operations; Transport Operations; Contract Management; The Contractor; Police Involvement; and Re-Tendering Court Custody and Security Services. Details: Perth, WA: Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services, 2010. 132p. Source: Internet Resource; Report No. 65 Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 119568 Keywords: Court Security (Western Australia)Prisoner TransportPrisonersPrivatization |
Author: Liss, Carolin Title: Privatising Anti-Piracy Services in Strategically Important Waterways: Risks, Challenges and Benefits Summary: In the past few years, an increasing number of Private Security Companies (PSCs – also sometimes referred to as Private Military Companies, PMCs) have emerged offering and conducting Anti-Piracy Services. These companies offer services in addition to security provided by states and their government agencies. PSCs are today hired to provide anti-piracy services in different parts of the world, but mostly in strategically important waterways where piracy is a serious security concern. This paper examines the employment of PSCs in two such waterways, namely the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden, and discusses the risks, challenges and benefits of privatising maritime security. Details: Hongo, Bunkyo-Ku, Japan: Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, 2009. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: GraSPP Working Paper Series: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/documents/GraSPP-DP-E-09-003OPU-DP-E-09-001.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/documents/GraSPP-DP-E-09-003OPU-DP-E-09-001.pdf Shelf Number: 120504 Keywords: Maritime SecurityPiracy/PiratesPiratesPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Carey, Emily P. Title: Outsourcing Responsibility: The Human Cost of Privatized Immigration Detention in Otero County Summary: On June 23, 2008, the Otero County Processing Center opened its doors in the rural border community of Chaparral, Otero County, New Mexico. Owned by Otero County and operated by the private prison contractor Management and Training Corporation (MTC), the facility has the capacity to house up to 1,086 immigrants through an exclusive contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As one of the only organizations in New Mexico monitoring civil liberties, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico (ACLU-NM) began receiving phone calls from attorneys and immigrant advocates across the country within days of the start of facility operations. Most of the immigrants in the facility are Mexican and Central American nationals apprehended in the area, while others have been transferred from cities like New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and Miami and originated from countries all over the world. The ACLU of New Mexico started to assist immigrants held by ICE far beyond the sixmonth limit established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis after they had been ordered removed by an immigration judge. In the course of this work, advocates, detainees, and family members of detainees approached ACLU representatives with other concerns about the facility including racial and religious discrimination, inadequate medical and mental health care treatment, arbitrary use of segregation, and intimidation and humiliation tactics. The ACLU monitored for patterns of civil and human rights violations and sought resolution in individual cases where abuse was egregious to protect the health and well being of detained immigrants. Local ICE officials were responsive in most of these cases. This report stems from interviews with more than 200 immigrants detained at the Otero County Processing Center from the time the facility became operational. Outside the boundaries of New Mexico, Otero became known in the advocacy communities as “The Hub” because of all of the immigrants arriving from out of state. In New Mexico, however, local, state, and federal elected officials, the general public, and even some immigrant advocates were not aware of the facility’s existence. For many, the Otero County Processing Center represents a national trend in immigration detention that relies on facilities built in remote locations, lacking legal and community resources for informal oversight, and managed by private, for-profit corporations. This report was conceived out of the desire to learn more about what happens inside the walls of the facility and to raise awareness in New Mexico of the role our state now plays in this matter of national concern. Details: Las Cruses, NM: American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico, 2011. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://aclu-nm.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/OCPC-Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://aclu-nm.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/OCPC-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 120645 Keywords: Immigrant DetentionImmigrantsImmigrationPrivatization |
Author: Flynn, Michael Title: The Privatization of Immigration Detention: Towards a Global View Summary: The phrase “private prison” has become a term of opprobrium, and for good reason. There are numerous cases of mistreatment and mismanagement at such institutions. However, in the context of immigration detention, this caricature hides a complex phenomenon that is driven by a number of different factors and involves a diverse array of actors who provide a range of services. This working paper employs research undertaken by the Global Detention Project (GDP) — an inter-disciplinary research project based at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies — to help situate the phenomenon of the privatization of immigration detention within a global perspective. Part of the difficulty in assessing this phenomenon is that our understanding of it is based largely on experiences in English-speaking countries. This working paper endeavors to extend analysis of this phenomenon by demonstrating the broad geographical spread of privatized detention practices across the globe, assessing the differing considerations that arise when states decide to privatize, and comparing the experiences of a sample of lesser known cases. Details: Geneva: Global Detention Project, Programme for the Study of Global Migration, The Graduate Institute, 2009. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/GDP_PrivatizationPaper_Final5.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/GDP_PrivatizationPaper_Final5.pdf Shelf Number: 120919 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivatization |
Author: Victoria. Auditor-General Title: Management of Prison Accommodation Using Public Private Partnerships Summary: Since 1996, the private sector has become increasingly involved in owning, operating and managing prisons through public private partnerships (PPP). A PPP is a long-term partnership between the public and private sectors to deliver a major capital asset and/or services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) manages several PPP contracts. When the Port Phillip Prison and Fulham Correctional Centre opened in 1997 the Infrastructure Investment Policy for Victoria (1994) applied. The Metropolitan Remand Centre and Marngoneet Correctional Centre contracts were signed in 2003 under a new policy adopted in 2001 called the Partnerships Victoria Framework. The new Ararat Prison contract was signed in 2010 under a later iteration of this framework, one that complies with the Infrastructure Australia National Guidelines (2008). As two of these PPP prison contracts date back more than 10 years, it is timely to review the operational phase of such long-term contracts. This audit evaluated whether the state is managing PPP prison accommodation services well, whether the services are meeting appropriate standards and whether value-for-money and appropriate risk allocation has been maintained. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2010. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2011 at: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20101509_Prisons_full_report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20101509_Prisons_full_report.pdf Shelf Number: 121329 Keywords: Correctional Administration (Australia)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Title: Prisons for Profit: A Look at Prison Privatization Summary: The economic downturn has resulted in a budget crisis for Ohio, as it has for other states, and out-of-control prison costs have emerged as a key concern. The ACLU of Ohio has been a forceful proponent of sentencing reform where policymakers may save taxpayer dollars and help create a more just society. Governor John Kasich’s new budget plan includes a sweeping overhaul of Ohio’s Department of Rehabilitation & Correction. The proposal includes commonsense sentencing reforms that would help ease our overcrowded prison system. Unfortunately, the proposed budget also includes a plan to sell five state correctional facilities to “prison for profit” operators like Corrections Corporation of America and contract with those companies to house inmates in them. Privatizing state prisons may in fact undermine sentencing reform’s goal to remove low-level offenders from the justice system. Prisons for profit are different from public institutions because they must generate revenues for their shareholders. As a result, they have a direct interest in ensuring that Ohio’s prison system stays full to maximize its profitability. This is not the first time prison privatization has been proposed as a cost-saving measure for Ohio taxpayers. In the 1990s, Ohio experimented with a private penitentiary in Youngstown that resulted in serious safety and fiscal concerns. Currently, the state has limited private facilities to Northcoast Correctional Facility and Lake Erie Correctional Facility, which hold inmates with minimal health and behavioral issues. Legislators are taking steps to correct our broken prison system, but privatization will negate this important work. This report seeks to explore the many problems that plague prisons for profit, in the areas of fiscal efficiency, safety, contributions to the community, accountability and effect on recidivism. Details: Cleveland, OH: American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2011 at: http://www.acluohio.org/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.acluohio.org/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf Shelf Number: 121466 Keywords: Private Prisons (Ohio)Privatization |
Author: Elliott D. Pollack & Company Title: Arizona Correctional Facilities Economic and Fiscal Impact Report Summary: As America’s leader in partnership corrections, CCA designs, builds, owns and manages more than 60 correctional facilities and detention centers across the country, providing corrections management services to federal, state and local clients. In Arizona, CCA owns and operates six facilities located in Eloy and Florence in Pinal County. These six facilities have a notable impact on both the local and regional economies of the State. It is estimated that the six CCA facilities currently generate: • 2,733 direct employees and 1,700 additional indirect and induced spin-off jobs. • $205.4 million in total wages each year • Annual economic output of over $435.2 million. Operations of the six facilities creates tax revenue for the State, county and local governments. Examples of taxes paid by CCA and the employees that are supported by CCA to the State and its political subdivisions include state income and unemployment taxes, sales taxes, property taxes and HURF and vehicle license taxes. In addition to the economic impacts stated above, it is estimated that CCA operations result in an impact of approximately $26.2 million in taxes to the State of Arizona and its political subdivisions annually. The continued expansion of CCA facilities in Arizona would create significant tax revenues for the communities and counties in which they are located, as well as for the State of Arizona as a whole. At an estimated cost of $200 million, the construction of a single 3,000-bed facility would generate: • 2,528 direct, indirect and induced person years of employment • $116.4 million in wages and • $300.1 million in total economic output for the entire construction period. As soon as the facility is constructed and operating it would create: • 450 direct jobs, 187 indirect and induced jobs. • $26.2 million in wages • $55.0 million in economic output on an annual basis. Each additional facility would generate revenues for State, County, and local governments of $16.9 million from construction-related activity and over $4.8 million annually from operations. Details: Scottsdale, AZ: Elliott D. Pollack & Co., 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2011 at: http://www.cca.com/static/assets/CCA_Arizona_Impact_Report_2009_FINAL_011810.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cca.com/static/assets/CCA_Arizona_Impact_Report_2009_FINAL_011810.pdf Shelf Number: 121491 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticePrison ConstructionPrivate Prisons (Arizona)Privatization |
Author: Manwaring, Max G. Title: A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies Summary: This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Shelf Number: 121700 Keywords: CartelsOrganized CrimePrivate Armies (Mexico)PrivatizationSecurityTerrorismViolence |
Author: Abrahamsen, Rita Title: The Ethical Challenges of Security Privatization Summary: While in the study of international relations the majority of attention toward the privatization of security has been devoted to the privatized military, commercial security companies have quietly become significant actors across the globe. In almost every country in the world, private security plays a significant and growing role in security provision. The private security industry is estimated to have a world-wide market value of over $165 billion, and growth rates of over 8%. In many countries, private security employees now outnumber their public counterparts, often by considerable amounts. This growth has been accompanied by the evolution of commercial security companies with extensive resources and geographic reach. Intriguingly, the largest of these firms are based in Europe. The world’s largest private security company, Group4Securicor (G4S), is one of the UK’s 100 largest corporations by capitalization, and the largest employer listed on the London Stock Exchange. With operations in 115 countries, it employs over half a million people. Following a similar pattern of expansion, the Swedish-based Securitas has also become a significant provider of security services across Europe and beyond. The world’s second-largest PSC, Securitas has implemented more than 60 acquisitions over the past two decades, employs more than 240,000 people in thirty-seven countries, and now has 12% of the global outsourced security market. The company’s total sales in 2007 amounted to approximately $6.9 billion, with an organic sales growth of 5%. The third largest PSC in the world, the Spanish company Prosegur, also mirrors the trend. Founded in 1976, the firm employs more than 75,000 people, and has extensive operations in Europe and Central and South America. The increasing role of private security challenges some of modern society’s most fundamental political assumptions. The idea that security is a quintessentially public good is at the heart of modern conceptions of sovereignty, so much so that an increasing monopoly of public force was long seen as a mark of movement toward modernity. The stunning growth of private security over the past three decades thus challenges deeply held political beliefs, including the assumption that modernity and development are marked (or even defined) by the increasing monopolization of security in the hands of the state, and that this process provides the stable benchmark for ethical evaluation. This Working Paper seeks to explore some of the ethical and political implications of the ‘rebirth’ of private security, focusing particularly on its transnational dimensions. We do so in a different manner from many treatments of security privatization in International Relations. First, we do not concentrate on the private military. Developments in this arena have received a great deal of attention, ranging from debates about whether it is a legitimate form of activity, or a simply a form of modern mercenarism, to questions about its relationship to military ethics and the just war tradition. While these are important debates, we focus here on the less analyzed but more pervasive forms of security transformation at work in the realm of commercial security. It is in this domain that private security is having some of its most extensive effects – effects that require empirical scrutiny and that raise ethical issues often quite different from those posed by military privatization. Second, our analytic standpoint differs from many existing treatments in that in the bulk of this paper we propose to treat the ethical less as a category of purely moral assessment or abstract philosophic reflection, and more as a domain of social power. The ethical implications of security privatization cannot be considered in isolation from the social conditions that have given rise to its rebirth. These social structures condition the terms of ethical debate. By locating ethical questions in context of social shifts and transformations in state structures, we will be in a better position to provide ethical appraisal and political judgement. Details: Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: INEX Project, INEX D.3.2.; Accessed May 10, 2011 at: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 121703 Keywords: EthicsPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: van Buuren, Jelle Title: A Report on the Ethical Issues Raised by the Increasing Role of Private Security Professionals in Security Analysis and Provision Summary: Private security is on the rise. Although difficulties emerge in exactly estimating the precise amount of private security in the total range of security, the available figures all point into the same direction. Private security has moved lately to a more central stage in science, after years of academic neglect. Traditionally, private security was symbolized by the Private Eye as reflected in American movies: a cynical, though male, breaking laws and norms while holding a bottle of whisky in one hand and a blonde femme fatale in the other hand. However, this Hollywood image of private investigators seems to be outdated. Private security nowadays covers a conglomerate of companies active in all possible fields of security. In this literature review, we will look into the dimension, size and functions of private security as reflected in the academic forum. Further, we will look into scientific discussions concerning explanations for the rise in private security, the functions of private security, the relationship with the state, the relationship between public and private security and the possible societal and political ramifications of private security. After examining the scientific knowledge on the organizational and personal values dominant in the private security sector, we will look at the possible ethical dilemmas embedded in the rise in private security. We will end with some conclusions regarding the current scientific knowledge on private security and possible avenues for further exploration of the ethical challenges to private security. Throughout this literature review we will understand private security companies as ‘commercial enterprises using public or private funds to engage in tasks where the principal component is a security of regulatory function'. Details: Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: INEX Project; Report D.3.3.: Accessed May 10, 2011 at: www.inexproject.eu Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 121704 Keywords: EthicsPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Great Britain. Ministry of Justice Title: Competition Strategy for Offender Services Summary: The Competition Strategy for Offender Services sets out our ambition for encouraging greater involvement of the private and voluntary sectors in the rehabilitation of offenders to cut re-offending and to improve outcomes and efficiency. Competition between providers will be used to drive efficiency, reform services and encourage innovation. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/competition-strategy-offender-services.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/competition-strategy-offender-services.pdf Shelf Number: 122084 Keywords: Offender RehabilitationOffenders (U.K.)Privatization |
Author: Baker, Bruce Title: Supporting Local Forms of Policing and Justice: Lessons from Africa and The Pacific Summary: The trend towards the pluralisation of policing concedes that state police no longer (nor should have) the monopoly in law enforcement, and that local institutions legitimately have a frontline role in the provision of security and policing services for citizens. In developed countries like Australia debate about plural policing is linked to outsourcing of policing responsibilities to the private security and corporate sectors. In Africa and the Pacific, as Baker points out, plural policing is not always a strategic policy decision to outsource policing and security, but rather is simply a reflection of local community initiative, borne of the limited capabilities of a poor and weak state. Localism, as the paper points out, brings many advantages including its complementarity with customary forms of justice and peace-building. It also has vulnerabilities (in common with public policing) to abuses of power and human rights violations. The paper applies a ‘lessons to be learnt’ format, through liberal use of boxed case-studies, with explicit articulation of the implications for international policing missions, as well as the priorities for AUSAID support for justice and law enforcement in the Pacific region. Details: Nathan, Qld: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, 2010. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Bruce%20Baker%20FINAL1_.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Bruce%20Baker%20FINAL1_.pdf Shelf Number: 122120 Keywords: Local PolicingPlural PolicingPolice ReformPolicingPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Justice Policy Institute Title: Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies Summary: At a time when many policymakers are looking at criminal and juvenile justice reforms that would safely shrink the size of our prison population, the existence of private prison companies creates a countervailing interest in preserving the current approach to criminal justice and increasing the use of incarceration. While private prison companies may try to present themselves as just meeting existing demand for prison beds and responding to current market conditions, in fact they have worked hard over the past decade to create markets for their product. As revenues of private prison companies have grown over the past decade, the companies have had more resources with which to build political power, and they have used this power to promote policies that lead to higher rates of incarceration. For-profit private prison companies primarily use three strategies to influence policy: lobbying, direct campaign contributions, and building relationships, networks, and associations. As policymakers and the public are increasingly coming to understand that incarceration is not only breaking the bank, but it’s also not making us safer, will this shrink the influence of private prison companies? Or will they use their growing financial muscle to consolidate and expand into even more areas of the justice system? Much will depend on the extent that people understand the role for-profit private prison companies have already played in raising incarceration rates and harming people and communities, and take steps to ensure that in the future, community safety and well-being, and not profits, drive our justice policies. One thing is certain: in this political game, the private prison industry will look out for their own interests. Details: Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2011 at: http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf Shelf Number: 121967 Keywords: PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Camp, Scott D. Title: Evaluation of the Taft Demonstration Project: Performance of a Private-Sector Prison and the BOP Summary: In 1996, the United States Congress directed the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to operate the federal prison at Taft, California as a demonstration of prison privatization (see Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3610, Making Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-208). This report describes selected measures of prison performance for the Taft Correctional Institution (TCI), operated by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, especially in comparison to three BOP prisons built upon the same architectural design at about the same time and holding similar types of inmates. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2005. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/orelappin2005.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/orelappin2005.pdf Shelf Number: 122438 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCorrectional InstitutionsPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Nelson, Julianne Title: Competition in Corrections: Comparing Public and Private Sector Operations Summary: On July 21, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) announced that Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (now The GEO Group) had won the competition for a 10-year contract to manage a new federal correctional facility. Located in Taft, California, the new facility — known as Taft Correctional Institution (TCI) — had been designed and built by the federal government to house low-and minimum-security inmates. In 2005, the CNA Corporation (CNAC) was asked to participate in the task of evaluating the first five years of this contract. The following report compares the cost of the TCI contract with the cost of operating the facility “in-house” during this period. A separate report prepared by the BOP analyzes the quality of contractor performance at Taft. A report prepared by Abt Associates reviews both the cost and quality of the contract services at this institution. CNAC analysis indicates that the observed cost of the TCI contract was virtually identical to the estimated cost of in-house operation by government employees — based on practices observed at similar BOP facilities. Using a cost model based on Circular A-76 guidelines and information available at the beginning of the TCI contract, we found that our initial estimate of the expected in-house cost of operating the facility was lower than the expected cost of the management contract. Using this model with actual (rather than expected) wage rates, inflation rates, and inmate population levels, we found that: • Observed contract costs were generally higher than our initial estimates of what the BOP would have spent to operate TCI itself (i.e., the costs avoided through private sector management of the facility). • Observed contract per diem costs exceeded expected contract costs, largely due to award fee payments and reimbursements for wage increases mandated by Service Contract Act revisions. Using observed expenditures reported at TCI and three similar BOP facilities, we found that: • Observed per diem costs with contractor management were not substantially different from observed facility-level per diem costs at BOP comparison sites. • Observed per diem costs with contractor management were slightly lower than observed per diem avoidable costs at BOP facilities during the first two years of fullscale operations. • In the last two years of the period under review, observed per diem contract costs were similar to observed per diem avoidable costs at comparable federal facilities once allowances were made for changes in the mix of security levels in the inmate population. In short, the cost of routine contract operations was very similar at TCI and the three comparable government facilities. It was also generally higher than our initial estimates of what it would have cost the BOP to run TCI once it was fully activated. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2005. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/cnanelson.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/cnanelson.pdf Shelf Number: 122439 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCost-Benefit AnalysisPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Liss, Carolin Title: Privatising the Fight Against Somali Pirates Summary: The recent audacious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the horn of Africa have fuelled the debate about the privatisation of maritime security. Ship owners and maritime security experts, as well as representatives of industry organisations, have stated that private security companies may be able to ensure safe passage for vessels through these pirate infested waters, a task at which government agencies have failed, despite international efforts. In fact, with more than 35 hijacked vessels this year, the first hijacking of a super tanker, attacks on UN aid ships and the unprecedented payment of millions of US dollars ransom for kidnapped crew and hijacked vessels, the arguments for hiring PSCs are strong. However, the employment of PSCs in Iraq and other places around the world has clearly shown that there are problems associated with the services provided by PSCs and the regulation of such companies in conflict zones. This paper explores the risks and benefits of employing PSCs to secure shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the horn of Africa. Details: Perth, Western Australia: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 2008. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 152: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Somalia URL: http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp152.pdf Shelf Number: 123078 Keywords: Maritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/Piracy (Somalia)Private SecurityPrivatization |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration Summary: The imprisonment of human beings at record levels is both a moral failure and an economic one — especially at a time when more and more Americans are struggling to make ends meet and when state governments confront enormous fiscal crises. This report finds, however, that mass incarceration provides a gigantic windfall for one special interest group — the private prison industry — even as current incarceration levels harm the country as a whole. While the nation’s unprecedented rate of imprisonment deprives individuals of freedom, wrests loved ones from their families, and drains the resources of governments, communities, and taxpayers, the private prison industry reaps lucrative rewards. As the public good suffers from mass incarceration, private prison companies obtain more and more government dollars, and private prison executives at the leading companies rake in enormous compensation packages, in some cases totaling millions of dollars. Details: New York: ACLU, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf Shelf Number: 123238 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrisonersPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Gilroy, Leonard Title: Annual Privatization Report 2010: Corrections Summary: This section of Reason Foundation's Annual Privatization Report 2010 provides an overview of the latest news and trends in corrections public-private partnerships (PPPs). Topics include: corrections PPPs in 2010; corrections PPPs Bring Savings in Texas, Florida; State Spotlight: Arizona; State Spotlight: California; State Spotlight: Florida; leveraging the Power of PPPs in Correctional Rehabilitation; corrections 2.0: A Proposal to Create a Continuum of Care in Corrections through Public-Private Partnerships. Details: Los Angeles, CA: The Reason Foundation, 2011. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on February 3, 2012 at http://reason.org/files/corrections_annual_privatization_report_2010.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://reason.org/files/corrections_annual_privatization_report_2010.pdf Shelf Number: 123929 Keywords: Correctional Institutions (Texas, Florida, ArizonaPrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Isaacs, Caroline Title: Private Prisons: The Public's Problem - A Quality Assessment of Arizona's Private Prisons Summary: Arizona has enthusiastically embraced prison privatization, with 13% of the state prison population housed in private facilities (the 11th highest percentage in the nation). Motivated by a belief that private enterprise could build and manage prisons safely and at lower cost than the state, the legislature has mandated construction of thousands of private prison beds. Little was done over the years to test actual performance of private prisons or to determine their cost effectiveness. In the summer of 2010, three inmates escaped from the privately operated Kingman prison, killed two people, and shattered the myth that private prisons can keep us safe. Since that time, more evidence has come to light unmasking the truth about the private prison industry in Arizona: It is costly, plagued by security problems, and in some cases is violating state and federal law. State leaders have failed in their responsibility to protect the public, to provide adequate oversight of this industry, or to hold the corporations accountable for their failures. This report is the first of its kind in Arizona. To date, no independent analysis of the performance and quality of all private and public prisons has been undertaken. Such an analysis is long overdue, given that private prisons have operated in Arizona for decades, and the state has invested billions of taxpayer dollars into this industry. The people of Arizona have had little or no evidence that these prisons are safe, cost effective, or competent at fulfilling the job taxpayers pay them to do. When AFSC learned that the state had not properly monitored and reported on private prison operations since state law mandated it in 1987, AFSC undertook its own investigation into the private prison industry in Arizona. The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) later announced that it would complete the statutorily-required biennial comparison review, which was released on December 21, 2011. The ADC study contains very little methodological information or supporting data, suffers from inconsistent data collection procedures, and overlooks important measures of prison safety. By contrast, AFSC’s report incorporates data that was omitted or deemed to be outside the scope of the ADC review, including security audits of private prisons before and after the Kingman escapes and data on six prisons operated by Corrections Corporation of America that are located in Arizona but do not contract with the state, putting them outside state oversight. In addition, AFSC’s analysis incorporates additional performance measures which have emerged as important aspects of the debate over prison privatization: recidivism, accountability, and transparency. The most common measurement of the effectiveness of a prison is its ability to reduce recidivism. Yet private prison corporations flatly refuse to measure their recidivism rates. The issues of accountability and transparency made headlines in 2010 when it was revealed that lobbyists for Corrections Corporation of America may have had a hand in drafting SB 1070, Arizona’s controversial anti-immigrant bill, which potentially represented millions of dollars in revenue for the corporation through lucrative immigrant detention contracts. Since then, more and more evidence has surfaced revealing the various prison corporations’ efforts to buy influence with state and federal governments, particularly through the involvement of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group whose members consist of elected officials and corporate lobbyists. ALEC holds conferences at exclusive resorts where legislators and corporate representatives draft model legislation that members introduce in their various home states. Yet this activity is not considered lobbying under many states’ law, and the reimbursements ALEC provides to legislators (and their spouses) for travel and lodging at these conferences are not reported as political contributions. Most importantly, AFSC’s analysis found patterns of serious safety lapses in all the private prisons for which data was available. Together, this data demonstrates a set of problems endemic to the industry that could lead to future tragedies like the Kingman escapes. Malfunctioning security systems go unrepaired for months, leading staff to ignore safety protocols. Under-trained guards combined with poor state oversight leads to assaults, disturbances, and riots. For-profit prison staff members are too often unprepared, or unwilling, to intervene in these events, and risk losing control of the facilities. Insufficient rehabilitation programs, educational opportunities, or jobs for the prisoners provide idle time for conflicts to brew. The result is facilities that are unsafe for the people living and working inside them, as well as the surrounding community. Regardless of differing political views, most Arizonans want the same thing from their prisons: Increased public safety. Yet the state has deliberately obscured information that would cast private prisons in a negative light. It is critical that the people of Arizona and our elected representatives have solid, objective data on which to base important decisions about the future of our prisons. Billions of tax-payer dollars and the safety of our communities hang in the balance. ADC cancelled the Request for Proposals (RFP) for 5,000 private prison beds in December 2011, but issued a new RFP for 2,000 private prison beds in early February 2012. The taxpayers of Arizona deserve an honest accounting of what we stand to gain and lose if we continue to follow the “tough on crime” mantra. This report offers new insights and original data that reveals the truth about for-profit prisons in Arizona. Details: Tucson, AZ: American Friends Service Committee-Arizona, 2012. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2012 at http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 124189 Keywords: Correctional Administration (Arizona)Evaluative StudiesPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Michigan Corrections Organization Title: Pitfalls and Promises The Real Risks to Residents and Taxpayers of Privatizing Prisons and Prison Services in Michigan Summary: Everyone is frustrated. Corrections spending just won’t come down. The prison population has been reduced, and corrections staff have been cut. Hard choices have been made. Risks have been taken, and sacrifices have been borne—but results remain elusive. Legislators are looking for new ideas. Private groups such as the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), the Center for Michigan and the Citizens Alliance on Prisons and Public Spending (CAPPS) have proposed ideas such as establishing a sentencing commission, expediting the parole process, and increased use of medical/geriatric parole—to name a few. Industry groups, meanwhile, are pushing to turn Michigan prisons over to for-profit companies. Privatization, however, is not a promising path. To understand why, this report examines the privatization of prisons and prison functions. The report begins with Michigan’s experience with private prisons then expands to other states’ experience. The focus is on costs and performance, paying special attention to the GEO Group, the private prison company most active in the state of Michigan. The report also reviews contracted correctional healthcare—again focusing on Michigan’s own experience, the experience in other states and Corizon, the company currently active in Michigan. Details: Lansing, MI: Michigan Corrections Organization - Local 562M, 2012. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2012 at: http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2012/02/MCO-Private-Prison-Report-v8.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2012/02/MCO-Private-Prison-Report-v8.pdf Shelf Number: 124859 Keywords: Prisons (Michigan)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Hartney, Christopher Title: Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. Summary: Reported crime is at the lowest level in decades, safe alternatives to incarceration are an accepted part of the corrections system, and private prisons have not provided the cost savings and improved conditions of confinement that their proponents promise. Nevertheless, business is booming for prison companies. Since their start in the 1980s, private prisons have come to hold 8% of all U.S. state and federal prisoners, including half of federal immigration detainees. A steady flow of inmates has meant huge profits for these companies. Just as steady have been the reports of abuse and neglect, poor management of inmate needs, and poor governmental oversight. Low pay, limited staff training, and other cost-cutting measures—the primary ways private prisons sustain their profits—can lead to unmet inmate needs and security issues, heightening the inherent dangers to staff and inmates in secure settings. Private prison companies spend millions of dollars on lobbying, political campaign contributions, support for legislation favorable to their profits, shaping public opinion, and research likely to support their practices, which leads many to question the prison industry’s influence on criminal justice policymaking. There also are significant issues with the government’s ability to effectively monitor what goes on at private prisons. Proponents’ claims that private prisons can provide higher-quality and more cost-effective service provisions, improved conditions of confinement, and economic growth in the communities where new facilities are built are neither borne out in research, nor seen in the scores of private facility incident reports across the country. The expectation that competition for contracts among free market players would lead to generally improved efficiency, quality, and cost savings has not been met. Nevertheless, proponents continue to use these claims widely as a basis for pursuing privatization. This report describes the findings of conversations with several experts in corrections privatization, a review of the academic and legal literature on private prisons, and a media review of newspaper and radio stories on private prisons. It also includes recommendations for responding to the expansion of private prisons. Secure, locked facilities designed for adults are the major focus of this report, although many of the same issues and potential solutions apply to other types of privatization, in corrections and elsewhere. Federal immigration detention and contracted services, such as in-custody health care and programming or post-release supervision and services, are also briefly discussed. Details: Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime & Delinquency, 2012. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2012 at: http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf Shelf Number: 125306 Keywords: Private Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Helyar-Cardwell, Vicki, ed. Title: Delivering Justice The Role of the Public, Private and Voluntary Sectors in Prisons and Probation Summary: The number of people in the criminal justice system has increased extraordinarily over the last two decades. The focus is often on rocketing prison numbers – quite rightly lambasted as one of the worst features of this extraordinary growth. But, so too have the numbers on community sentences increased over the last two decades; the probation service now manages some 230,000 offenders in the community. This huge increase in scope of the justice system come at a significant financial cost. For example, investment in prisons has increased by nearly 40% in real terms between 2003-04 and 2008-09, from £2.52bn to £3.98bn a year. Despite this, capacity has not been able to meet demand, and as a result the prison system is severely overcrowded. So too in the community, the challenge of high probation caseloads is well known. As well as questions about whether the size and scope of our criminal justice system, in particular the custodial estate, is necessary and appropriate, to which the answer is surely no, there is also debate about how the government intends to financially sustain the functions of the justice system whilst maintaining historic low crime rates, and what the respective roles of the private, public and voluntary sectors should be in delivering these functions. Private prisons were first introduced to the UK in the 1990s and represent part of the move from the 1980s onwards towards greater competition across a range of public services. The catalyst for prison privatisation was to address overcrowding, reduce costs and to some degree improve standards. The involvement of private companies in building, financing and operating custodial facilities has been endorsed and expanded by the former Conservative administration, New Labour and now the Coalition government. Despite being strongly against private prisons in their time in opposition in the 1990s, once elected, the Labour government, faced by a spiralling prison population, quickly announced that they would be allowing private companies to bid for the running of new prisons, and that existing private prisons would not be taken back into the public sector. A consensus had now been reached amongst the major parties in support of privately-run prisons. Despite this political consensus, there has been a consistent critique, including from academics (Teague, 2010), the penal reform lobby (Neilson, 2009) and sections of the media (Monbiot, 2009). Following this initial foray in the 1990s, the next major step towards privatization was the establishment of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in 2004, with the intention of introducing ‘contestability’ throughout the prison and probation services. The review by Patrick Carter (2003), on which the structure of NOMS was based, argued for ‘greater use of competition from private and voluntary providers’ (p.5), and called for this to be extended to existing prisons. It was clear that Carter, and subsequently the Government, envisaged a much greater role for the private and voluntary sector in the criminal justice system, and that the introduction of NOMS was seen as a way of facilitating this. The second important development was the announcement in 2008 that a number of charities were bidding in partnership with private sector companies for prison contracts. While the voluntary sector has long worked in both public sector and privately-run prisons, delivering services to prisoners, this was seen as a significant change in the landscape. There are now charities and private companies running prisons and delivering large-scale payment-by-results contracts within prisons. Perhaps the most significant ‘step change’ has occurred over the last year or so. Although the majority of the UK prison estate is managed by the public sector, there are now currently 14 private or ‘contracted out’ prisons. Last year Birmingham was the first public sector prison transferred to private sector management, and the government is currently tendering out a further nine prisons. At the same time probation services are being radically reshaped. The majority of probation functions are being competed out, with advice to courts and the management of high risk individuals retained in public sector. Probation Trusts will inevitably merge to form fewer, larger entities and become commissioners of services at local level, although it is questionable how ‘local’ this will be. Clearly, cuts in public spending are a significant cause of the current quickening in the pace of the privatisation of the prison estate, based on the (contested) belief that privately-run prisons are cheaper than their public sector equivalents. As NOMS Business Plan 2012-2013 makes clear, the stated aim of government is to drive down prison place costs (MoJ, 2012). The Probation Service has undergone a 19% real terms budget cut since 2008-09, and this pressure on cost is set to continue. While the ongoing debate about competition is sometimes presented as peripheral to the overall future of criminal justice policy, it is in fact highly significant. The issue of who delivers criminal justice services is important, and must be informed by full and accurate analysis of the benefits of different approaches. This collection of essays is intended to be a contribution to this debate. Details: London: Criminal Justice Alliance, 2012. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://www.criminaljusticealliance.org/delivering_justice.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.criminaljusticealliance.org/delivering_justice.pdf Shelf Number: 125314 Keywords: Criminal Justice Systems (U.K.)PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationProbationVolunteers in Criminal Justice |
Author: Mason, Cody Title: Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention Summary: The War on Drugs and harsh sentencing laws led to explosive growth in state and federal prison populations in the 1980s. The massive rise in prisoners overwhelmed government budgets and resources, and created opportunities for private prison companies to flourish. In 2010, one in every 13 prisoners in the U.S. was held by for-profit companies, despite evidence that private prisons often provide inadequate levels of service and are no more cost-effective than publicly-run facilities. In addition, private prisons operate on a business model that emphasizes profits over the public good, and benefit from policies that maintain America’s high incarceration rate. Nonetheless, these companies could count on predictable growth in the number of state and federal prisoners until 2008, when budget crises and policy changes led some states to reduce their prison populations and private prison contracts. The resulting losses for private prison companies were more than offset by expansion of their management of federal detainees under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Marshals Service. Between 2008 and 2010, the number of privately-held inmates decreased by 1,281, while the number of privately-held detainees increased by 3,327. This growth was part of a larger trend that saw the total private detainee population increase by 259 percent between 2002 and 2010; a change largely due to stepped up efforts to find, incarcerate, and deport people who violate immigration laws. There are indications that federal detention will remain a major market for private companies. There are two key concerns about the expansion of private federal detention that need to be addressed. First, many of the problems associated with private corrections appear equally valid in the area of private detention. These include unsubstantiated claims of cost savings, problems with oversight, and high staff turnover. Second, there are considerable concerns regarding transparency in the use of private detention. The way federal agencies report data on privately-held detainees, along with the complex contractual arrangements and tiered layers of bureaucracy that result from privatization, make it difficult to ascertain the full scope of detention privatization at any given time. Without such transparency, policymakers and citizens are inherently limited in their ability to assess the full effects of privatization. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2012 at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf Shelf Number: 125687 Keywords: Federal DetaineesFederal PrisonsImmigrant DetentionPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Finegan, Sharon Title: Watching the Watchers: The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law and the Need for Limits on Neighborhood Watch Associations Summary: On the night of February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, a member of a neighborhood watch program, was patrolling his community in Sanford, Florida when he spotted Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African-American high school student, walking through the neighborhood. Zimmerman called 911 and indicated that he was following "a real suspicious guy." Zimmerman then disregarded the police dispatcher's request that he discontinue following Martin and approached the teenager. In the resulting confrontation, Zimmerman used his legally-owned semi-automatic handgun to shoot and kill Martin. Martin had been returning from a local convenience store to his father's fiancée's house, where he was spending the night. He was unarmed. George Zimmerman is currently being charged with second-degree murder. It is unclear whether Zimmerman will be proven guilty of the offense, but what is certain is that despite the fact that Zimmerman was engaged in law enforcement activities, Zimmerman's conduct in approaching and confronting Martin is not governed by the same constitutional restrictions that limit the actions of police. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments that restrict police in detaining, searching, and interrogating suspects do not apply to neighborhood watch organizations. At the same time, in many states neighborhood watch members can carry firearms and are protected under Stand Your Ground laws from having to retreat when confronted by a suspect. Thus, neighborhood watch members wield significant authority, but with neither the training that police officers receive nor the restrictions that govern their conduct. While neighborhood watch groups, just like police, perform a valuable service to the community, they are also in need of statutory oversight and restrictions, just like the police. This Article proposes statutory provisions that could effectively address the problems posed by the growing privatization of criminal law enforcement as it relates to neighborhood watch associations. By enacting statutes that limit the abilities of neighborhood watch members to confront suspects, mandate training for those engaged in law enforcement activities, and expand the exclusionary rule to bar evidence seized illegally by private citizens engaged in law enforcement functions, legislatures would better ensure that due process guarantees are not abandoned when private actors participate in law enforcement activities. Details: Houston: South Texas College of Law, 2012. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2012 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139591 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139591 Shelf Number: 126396 Keywords: Gun ViolenceNeighborhood Watch (Florida, U.S.)PrivatizationStand Your Ground Laws |
Author: Greene, Judith: Mazon, Alexis Title: Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive. Unsafe. Unnecessary Summary: Presented before a House of Representatives briefing sponsored by Rep. Jared Polis of Colorado on September 13, 2012, Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive, Unsafe, Unnecessary chronicles the May 2012 Adams County Correctional Center uprising in Natchez, Mississippi, a private for-profit facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America, under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The report details some of the tragic personal consequences for Juan Villanueva, his family, and others caught in the midst of the horrific conditions at the facility, leading to the insurrection. The report weaves into this narrative a look at the rise and fall of the private prison industry, and its resurrection through the benefit of federal contracts to detain and imprison undocumented immigrants, in an atmosphere of moral panic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Details: Brooklyn, NY: Justice Strategies, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2012 at: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Shelf Number: 126464 Keywords: Federal PrisonsIllegal Aliens (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: John Howard Association of Illinois Title: Unasked Questions, Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Findings and Recommendations on Illinois’ Prison Healthcare System Summary: This special report is based on JHA’s analysis of healthcare in 12 diverse correctional facilities, which together embody the state of healthcare in the Illinois prison system. Our findings include the following: •There is insufficient external oversight of prison healthcare services, especially services provided by the private vendor, Wexford Health Sources, who in 2011 negotiated a 10-year contract to provide healthcare services to all 27 IDOC facilities at the cost of $1.36 billion to the state. •JHA found deficient staffing levels that can lead to staff burn out and prevent inmates from timely accessing medical care. •JHA found that while elderly inmates represent the fasting growing segment of prisoners, it is unclear how Illinois will pay for the housing, treatment, and medical care of this population. •The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) is in the process of implementing opt-out HIV testing at reception and classification centers and is piloting an electronic medical records program that promises to enhance data-sharing between facilities and improve quality of care. Details: Chicago: John Howard Association of Illinois, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://thejha.org/sites/default/files/Unasked%20Questions-Unintended%20Consequences.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://thejha.org/sites/default/files/Unasked%20Questions-Unintended%20Consequences.pdf Shelf Number: 126816 Keywords: Health CareMedical CarePrisons (Illinois)Privatization |
Author: Cole, Alexandra (Sachi) Title: Prisoners of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia Summary: As the number of immigrants detained annually approaches half a million, the prison-like conditions of immigration detention facilities and the substandard treatment afforded to the detainees are an area of increasing concern. Georgia is home to four immigration detention facilities: Stewart Detention Center (Stewart), North Georgia Detention Center (NGDC), Irwin County Detention Center (Irwin), and Atlanta City Detention Center (ACDC). Stewart is the largest detention facility in the U.S. It has become common practice for ICE to contract with private companies to operate detention facilities; indeed, private companies run three of the four detention facilities in Georgia documented in this report. Corrections Corporation of America, the largest private prison company in the U.S., whose annual revenue in 2010 was $1.7 billion, runs two of those facilities. Although it has been claimed that privatization of detention facilities is cost-effective, this proposition has been cast into serious doubt. What has been confirmed is the systemic violation of immigrant detainees’ civil and human rights while detained in substandard prison-like conditions ill suited for civil detainees. The ACLU of Georgia has documented the current landscape of immigration detention in Georgia. The following methods were used for documentation: · Interviews with 68 detainees from all four detention facilities · Interviews with detainees’ family members · Interviews with immigration attorneys · Detention center tours · Reviews of responses from officials · Review of grievances filed by detainees Findings from these diverse sources raise serious concerns about violations of detainees’ due process rights, inadequate living conditions, inadequate medical and mental health care, and abuse of power by those in charge. Details: Atlanta: ACLU of Georgia, 2012. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 26, 2012 at: http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/260/ Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/260/ Shelf Number: 127005 Keywords: Illegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrants (Georgia, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: National People's Action Title: Jails Fargo: Banking on Immigrant Detention, Wells Fargo's Ties to the Private Prison Industry Summary: Private prison operators are profiting from the deepening immigration crisis in the United States. Companies like CCA and GEO Group have seen steady growth due to the countryʼs policy of locking up immigrants in privately-managed detention facilities. These companies have spent millions to shape this policy, win contracts, and ensure that the rules are fixed in their favor – all at the expense of some of the countryʼs most vulnerable people. These companies would not be positioned to profit from the countryʼs immigration crisis without the help of prominent Wall Street banks. The industry is capital-intensive and requires enormous amounts of financing from banks that sit at the countryʼs financial and economic crossroads. One bank, in particular, has distinguished itself from the competition as an investor in and lender to the industry: Wells Fargo. This report details the financial ties between Wells Fargo and the top private prison operators in the country: Corrections Corp of America (CCA), GEO Group, and Management and Training Corp (MTC). The information compiled in the report shows that as a lender and investor, Wells Fargo has provided critical support for the private prison industry. This report is the first in a series. A future report will detail other aspects and consequences of Wells Fargoʼs support for the private prison industry, and will raise further questions about the bankʼs role in the private prison industry and the vicious cycle of imprisonment and detention, profit, and political influence it facilitates. Details: Chicago, IL: National People's Action, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2012 at http://www.npa-us.org/files/wells_fargo_-_banking_on_immigrant_detention_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.npa-us.org/files/wells_fargo_-_banking_on_immigrant_detention_0.pdf Shelf Number: 127247 Keywords: Banking IndustryDetention FacilitiesImmigrant DetentionImmigrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Tanner, Will Title: The Case for Private Prisons Summary: The U.K. Government made two major announcements on prisons at the end of 2012: the effective abolition of whole prison contracting to private companies and the decision not to introduce local pay in the prison system. Instead the Government will pursue a “new approach” limiting competition to rehabilitation and ancillary services. It will introduce an “efficiency benchmark” for public sector prisons. It will maintain national pay scales in prisons. The evidence shows that the Government’s new approach is mistaken. The Ministry of Justice rates prison performance under four headings (“domains”). New Reform analysis of this data shows superior performance by the private sector against comparable public sector prisons: >>Resource management and operational effectiveness: 12 out of 12 privately managed prisons are better than comparable public sector prisons >>Decency: 7 out of 12 privately managed prisons are better than comparable public sector prisons >>Reducing re-offending: 7 out of 12 privately managed prisons are better than comparable public sector prisons. >>Public protection: 5 out of 12 privately managed prisons are better than comparable public sector prisons Reform has also conducted new research into reoffending rates by prison, which also show superior private sector performance: >>10 out of 12 privately managed prisons have lower reoffending rates among offenders serving 12 months or more than comparable public sector prisons >>7 out of 10 privately managed prisons have lower reoffending rates among offenders serving fewer than 12 months, compared to public sector prisons. Existing research has shown that flexible terms and condition are one of the key reasons why private operators have been able to deliver better performance. Flexible working conditions have resulted in better staff-prisoner relationships, more positive prison environments, higher staff satisfaction and a more diverse workforce. Existing research has made clear that the threat of competition has itself been a spur for innovation in public sector prisons. 2 The evidence therefore suggests that a different approach is needed, based on the following recommendations: >> Market test all prisons. Market testing has been limited to just 17 of the 131 prisons in the estate. >> Introduce fixed term contracts for all prisons. >> Publish comparable cost and performance data for all prisons. >> Give prisons flexibility over pay and conditions. Details: London: Reform, 2013. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Reform Ideas No. 2: Accessed February 27, 2013 at: http://www.reform.co.uk/resources/0000/0635/Reform_Ideas_No_2_-_The_case_for_private_prisons.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.reform.co.uk/resources/0000/0635/Reform_Ideas_No_2_-_The_case_for_private_prisons.pdf Shelf Number: 127727 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrivate Prisons (U.K)Privatization |
Author: Geisler, Gregory Title: Lake Erie Correctional Institution Summary: The Lake Erie Correctional Institution (LAECI) is a medium/minimum security prison, housing Level 1 and 2 inmates. It is located on 52 acres in Conneaut, Ohio, Ashtabula County. The rated capacity for Lake Erie Correctional Institution is 1,798. On the date of the inspection, the institution housed 1,794 inmates. The institution scored high on the most recent ACA audit. Demographically, 60.1 percent of the inmates are classified as black, and 36.5 percent as white. The average inmate age was 33 years. The institution employs 275 staff. Since the last CIIC inspection in September 2011, the state sold the institution to the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA assumed control of operations on December 31, 2011. In 2012, the institution increased its population by 300 inmates. Inspection Overview: The inspection of LAECI raised a number of significant concerns. At CCA staff’s invitation, CIIC will conduct a full re-inspection in six months’ time to reevaluate; this report is therefore to be considered a progress report. LAECI’s primary issue is safety and security. Staff interviews, inmate focus groups, the inmate survey, and institutional data all indicate that personal safety is at risk at LAECI. Assaults, fights, disturbances, and uses of force have all increased in comparison to prior years. There is a high presence of gang activity and illegal substance use. Inmates reported frequent extortion and theft. Incident reports indicate that staff hesitate to use force even when appropriate and at times fail to deploy chemical agents prior to physical force, risking greater injury to both inmates and staff. Staff also do not appropriately sanction inmates for serious misconduct. At the time of the inspection, the facility had no options for sanctions other than the segregation unit, which was full. The above issues are compounded by high staff turnover and low morale. New staff generally do not have the experience or training to be able to make quick judgments regarding the appropriate application of force or how to handle inmate confrontations. Staff also reported that they are often required to work an extra 12 hours per week, which may impact their response. Staff have relayed that they have already instituted additional security measures to control contraband and that they are in the process of implementing a stratification plan that will improve the overall facility environment and violence levels. Following the inspection, LAECI staff were very responsive to CIIC’s concerns. Staff promptly developed extensive action plans and engaged in several follow-up discussions with CIIC regarding the identified issues. LAECI staff also relayed that they are actively engaging local stakeholders to build positive relationships with the surrounding community. Details: Cleveland: ACLJ of Ohio, 2013. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2013 at: http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013_0123LakeErieCorrectionalInstitutionFullReport.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013_0123LakeErieCorrectionalInstitutionFullReport.pdf Shelf Number: 128397 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrisons (Ohio, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Center for Behavioral Health Services & Criminal Justice Research Title: Halfway from Prison to the Community: From Current Practice to Best Practice Summary: With the growing emphasis on reentry readiness, federal, state, and local correctional agencies have developed reentry strategies that rely to varying degrees on “halfway” residential facilities, called “residential reentry centers” (RRCs) in this report. Some states (e.g., California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania), in addition to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, release a significant proportion of their offenders through RRCs. Indeed, untold millions are spent annually by government agencies on reentry services provided by RRCs. These services are often purchased through contracts between correctional agencies and private providers. As a whole, little is known about RRCs or the contracting process that funds them. There is no national database for these facilities. For this reason, strikingly little is known about who is providing the services; what these facilities do or are supposed to do; how much is spent on them; how correctional agencies contract for services and monitor performance; how many people they serve; how reentry performance is measured and reported; or whether these reentry intermediaries work in terms of reducing recidivism or lowering correctional costs. The Center for Behavioral Health Services & Criminal Justice Research at Rutgers University, with funding from the Langeloth Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, convened three roundtables from August to November 2012, to explore a variety of issues related to halfway house models and operations through a dialogue among researchers, policymakers, advocates, and practitioners. The dialogue was guided by a series of commissioned papers prepared by leading experts and presentations by representatives of RRCs. This report provides a framework and a set of guidelines for the structure, implementation, and evaluation of RRCs. What was most clear from Roundtable discussions and the review of the research is: the performance of RRCs, in general, has not reached its potential. The central issue, and the one addressed in this report, is how to move from current practice to best practice. Details: New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Behavioral Health Services & Criminal Justice Research, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2013 at: http://cbhs-cjr.rutgers.edu/pdfs/Halfway_house_RRC_Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://cbhs-cjr.rutgers.edu/pdfs/Halfway_house_RRC_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 128672 Keywords: Halfway HousesPrisoner Reentry (U.S.)PrivatizationResidential Reentry Centers |
Author: Hakim, Simon Title: Cost Analysis of Public and Contractor-Operated Prisons Summary: As states continue to grapple with aging correctional facilities, overcrowding, underfunded retiree obligations and other constraints, new research from Temple University’s Center for Competitive Government finds that privately operated prisons can substantially cut costs – from 12 percent to 58 percent in long-term savings – while performing at equal or better levels than government-run prisons. Temple economics Professors Simon Hakim and Erwin A. Blackstone analyzed government data from nine states that generally have higher numbers of privately held prisoners (Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas), and Maine, which does not contract its corrections services. The professors calculated both short- and long-run savings per state, finding that contracted prisons generate significant savings without sacrificing quality. "Contracts between private-prison operators and state governments can be very precise in terms of the outcomes the state expects," said Hakim, director of Temple’s Center for Competitive Government, which is affiliated with the Fox School of Business. "And contractors have an incentive to overshoot the performance metrics established by the state – lest they lose out to a higher-performing company on the next contract bid." The study uses economic models to determine each state’s avoidable costs, which are compared to the contracted per diem rates charged by the private operators. The study also takes into account underfunded pensions and retiree healthcare costs – a critical issue, with the Pew Center on the States reporting in 2010 of a $1.38 trillion gap between states’ assets and their pension and healthcare retiree obligations. Details: Philadelphia: Center for Competitive Government, Temple University, 2013. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed May 15, 2013 at: http://d3iovmfe1okdrz.cloudfront.net/cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Cost-Analysis-of-Public-and-Contractor-Operated-Prisons-FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://d3iovmfe1okdrz.cloudfront.net/cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Cost-Analysis-of-Public-and-Contractor-Operated-Prisons-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 128732 Keywords: Cost-Benefit AnalysisCosts of CorrectionsPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Duwe, Grant Title: The Effects of Private Prison Confinement in Minnesota on Offender Recidivism Summary: Evidence has been mixed as to whether private prisons are more effective than state-operated facilities in reducing recidivism. This study analyzes whether private prison confinement in Minnesota has had an impact on recidivism by examining 3,532 offenders released from prison between 2007 and 2009. Propensity score matching was used to individually match a comparison group of 1,766 inmates who had only been confined in state-run facilities with 1,766 offenders who had served time in a private prison facility. Using multiple measures of recidivism and private prison confinement, 20 Cox regression models were estimated. The results showed that offenders who had been incarcerated in a private prison had a greater hazard of recidivism in all 20 models, and the recidivism risk was significantly greater in eight of the models. The evidence presented in this study suggests that private prisons are not more effective in reducing recidivism, which may be attributable to fewer visitation and rehabilitative programming opportunities for offenders incarcerated at private facilities. Details: St. Paul: Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2013. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/documents/MNPrivatePrisonEvaluation_WebsiteFinal.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/documents/MNPrivatePrisonEvaluation_WebsiteFinal.pdf Shelf Number: 128882 Keywords: Private Prisons (Minnesota, U.S.)PrivatizationRecidivismRehabilitation |
Author: Mason, Cody Title: Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America Summary: In 2010 private prisons held 128,195 individuals, representing eight percent of America's total prison population and an 80 percent increase compared to 1999. This growth has been fueled by claims that private prisons provide equal or superior services compared to publicly operated facilities, and at a lower cost. This report details the history of the movement to privatize prisons in America and documents the increase in their use. It also examines the purported ability of private prisons to provide the same level of services as publicly operated facilities, but at a lower cost, as well as the lobbying and contribution activities of private prisons on the state and federal level. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf Shelf Number: 128892 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Markham, Timothy R. Title: Imprisoned by Profit: Breaking Colorado’s Dependence on For-Profit Prisons Summary: As Colorado tackles the issues around a declining prison population, Colorado WINS is releasing a new report that outlines how Colorado relies on the for-profit prisons and highlights the importance of prioritizing a transition away from them. “Imprisoned by Profit: Breaking Colorado’s Dependence on For-Profit Prisons” examines the costs and benefits and concludes that since the incarceration crisis of 20 years ago has receded and the state has a surplus of bed space, we need to put public facilities first. Details: Denver, CO: Colorado WINS, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2013 at: http://issuu.com/coloradowins/docs/imprisoned-by-profit Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://issuu.com/coloradowins/docs/imprisoned-by-profit Shelf Number: 129475 Keywords: Prisons (Colorado, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Mason, Cody Title: International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization Summary: For-profit prison privatization, which dates back to 16th Century England, began to enjoy a modern reincarnation in the United States in the 1980s. Privatization advocates promised low-cost, quality, detention services at a time when government resources were being strained under the weight of exploding prison populations. It was on the back of these promises that lawmakers and officials would hand over eight percent of America’s prisoners, as well as larger amounts of its federal pre-trial and immigrant detainees, to privately owned or operated facilities by 2011. However, although privatization has enjoyed a steady reemergence in the United States, the companies managing these facilities have faced persistent criticism for providing low-quality services, failing to save taxpayer money, and negatively affecting criminal justice policy. Despite these failures, several countries have followed the United States in utilizing private prisons and detention centers with the intent of decreasing correctional expenditures and reducing prison overcrowding. These developments have helped private U.S. prison companies diversify their investments at a time when America’s prison population growth has stalled. For example, 14 percent of the revenue for America’s second largest private prison company, The GEO Group, came from international services in fiscal year 2012. Similarly, the spread of prison privatization has also benefited for-profit companies from other countries, including UK-based G4S, which claims to be the largest security service provider in the world. Together, these companies have thrived off of the expanded privatization of prisons, immigration detention systems, and other governmental services, while often failing to deliver on the services that were promised. This report investigates the trends identified above and explores the growth of for-profit prison privatizations across the globe. Noteworthy findings discussed in this report include: • At least 11 countries, spread across North America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Oceania, are engaged in some level of prison privatization. • While the United States maintains the highest total number of privately held prisoners, Australia, Scotland, England and Wales, and New Zealand hold a larger proportion of prisoners in private facilities, with a high of 19 percent in Australia. • As in the United States, immigrant detention has been a particular target of privatization in the United Kingdom, which has 73 percent of its immigrant detainees held privately, and Australia, which has a wholly private immigrant detention system. • The prison privatization market outside of the United States is dominated by The GEO Group and two British companies, G4S and Serco. • Media reports from countries including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have reflected research conducted in the United States showing that private prison companies’ profit motives often lead to inadequate services and unsafe conditions. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2013 at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_International%20Growth%20Trends%20in%20Prison%20Privatization.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_International%20Growth%20Trends%20in%20Prison%20Privatization.pdf Shelf Number: 129671 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Centre for Social Justice Title: The New Probation Landscape: Why the voluntary sector matters if we are going to reduce reoffending Summary: The Ministry of Justice is in the process of implementing an extensive programme of reform for the delivery of probation services across England and Wales. As part of this agenda, which is designed to reduce 'stubbornly high rates of reoffending', work with approximately 236,000 low- and medium-risk offenders will be contracted out to private and voluntary organisations and statutory support will be extended to prisoners on short sentences. If these reforms are to be successful they will need to consist of strong and resilient partnerships between the private and voluntary sectors. This paper is designed to inform those partnerships and sets the nature of the organisations that make-up the sector; why they're important; and what they think about the reforms. Details: London: Centre for Social Justice, 2013. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2013 at: http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/Pdf%20reports/landscape.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/Pdf%20reports/landscape.pdf Shelf Number: 131625 Keywords: PartnershipsPrivatizationProbation (U.K.)Voluntary and Community Organizations |
Author: Kirby, Holly Title: Locked Up & Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers and the Private Prison Industry Summary: As part of the ongoing efforts to create truly just public safety policy, this report examines state governments' practice of transferring incarcerated people out of their home states to for-profit private prisons across the United States. Section I of this report provides a brief history of the private prison industry, including how private prison corporations have raked in enormous profits from mass incarceration in the United States. In Section II we discuss the lack of uniform laws regulating the leasing of prison beds from private prison corporations, both in and out-of-state. The paucity of laws, coupled with the latitude granted to the private prison industry, enables the mass interstate transfer of incarcerated people. Section III provides an overview of today's interstate prisoner transfer landscape, including details on which states currently have prisoners in out-of-state private prisons. We provide information on state spending and Corrections Corporation of America revenues for out-of-state private prison contracts. In Section IV we describe how the transfer of prisoners out of their home states undermines family connections and prisoner rehabilitation. In Section V we discuss oversight and liability issues for state agencies and private prison companies related to the interstate transfer of prisoners. Finally, Section VI provides our recommendations. We urge states to prioritize the return of incarcerated people currently housed out-of-state by taking steps to reduce their prison populations and passing legislation that bans the exportation of incarcerated people from their home states, particularly to for-profit private prisons. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/locked_up_shipped_away.pdf Shelf Number: 131762 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrisoners, Interstate TransferPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Warehoused and Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow Private Prison System Summary: In rural Texas, 3,000 men are locked inside a "tent city," sleeping in bunk beds spaced only a few feet apart. The tents are crawling with insects and the smell of broken, overflowing toilets. This is Willacy County Correctional Center: a physical symbol of everything that is wrong with enriching the private prison industry and criminalizing immigration. More than 25,000 low-security non-U.S. citizens languish at thirteen private prisons like Willacy under Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) contracts. For years, these for-profit prisons have been able to operate in the shadows, effectively free from public scrutiny. That ends now. Our report documents the ACLU's multi-year investigation into the five CAR facilities in Texas. We uncovered evidence of shocking abuse and mistreatment, families torn apart, and the excessive use of solitary confinement. The second-class prisoners in CAR facilities are trapped at the intersection of three disturbing trends: the national mass incarceration crisis, prison privatization, and the criminalization of immigration. This is the story of how and why things have gotten so bad. Details: New York: ACLU, 2014. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf Shelf Number: 132496 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrison ConditionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationSolitary ConfinementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: American Friends Service Committee Title: Treatment Industrial Complex: How For-Profit Prison Corporations are Undermining Efforts to Treat and Rehabilitate Prisoners for Corporate Gain Summary: "The Treatment Industrial Complex: How For-Profit Prison Corporations are Undermining Efforts to Treat and Rehabilitate Prisoners for Corporate Gain" highlights the expansion of the incarceration industry away from warehousing people and into areas that traditionally were focused on treatment and care of individuals involved in the criminal justice system - prison medical care, forensic mental hospitals, civil commitment centers, and 'community corrections' programs such as halfway houses and home arrest. These developments pose a tremendous threat of unintended consequences for states seeking to reform their criminal sentencing practices. The greatest financial gains for incarceration companies are in residential settings that allow a company to charge a "per diem" rate. If the stated goal is simply to reduce prison populations, there is real danger that the result will simply be "prisons by another name." Details: Philadelphia: AFSC, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/TIC_report_online.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/TIC_report_online.pdf Shelf Number: 134160 Keywords: Private Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Isaacs, Caroline Title: Death Yards: Continuing Problems with Arizona's Correctional Health Care Summary: On March 6, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) charging that prisoners in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections receive such grossly inadequate medical, mental health and dental care that they are in grave danger of suffering serious and preventable injury, amputation, disfigurement and premature death. This class action lawsuit has the potential to force the state of Arizona to improve its prison medical care. But legal battles are long and costly. The state is fighting tooth and nail, including an upcoming challenge to the suit's class action status. The final resolution will likely take years. But what has changed in the day-to-day provision of medical care to prisoners in Arizona? Have conditions improved in light of the charges brought by the suit? Has the transition in management of the medical care from one for-profit corporate contractor (Wexford) to another (Corizon) addressed any of the previous health care lapses? Sadly, the answer appears to be no. Correspondence from prisoners; analysis of medical records, autopsy reports, and investigations; and interviews with anonymous prison staff and outside experts indicate that, if anything, things have gotten worse. Details: Tucson: American Friends Service Committee -- Tucson, 2013. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/death-yards-continuing-problems-with-arizonas-correctional-health-care-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/death-yards-continuing-problems-with-arizonas-correctional-health-care-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 134161 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCorrectionsHealth CareMedical CarePrisonersPrisons (Arizona)Privatization |
Author: Rabuy, Bernadette Title: Screening Out Family Time: The for-profit video visitation industry in prisons and jails Summary: Video technology like Skype or FaceTime can be a great way to stay together for people who are far apart. It is not the same as being there in person, but it is better than a phone call or sending a letter. Given that there are 2.2 million people who are incarcerated, often many hundreds of miles from their homes, it should be no surprise that prison and jail video visitation is quietly sweeping the nation. But video visitation is not like Skype or FaceTime. For one, these well-known technologies are a high-quality, free supplement to time spent together, in-person. The video visitation that is sweeping through U.S. jails is almost the exact opposite. In order to stimulate demand for their low-quality product, jails and video visitation companies work together to shut down the traditional in-person visitation rooms and instead require families to pay up to $1.50 per minute for visits via computer screen. In this report, we collect the contracts and the experiences of the facilities, the families, and the companies. We: -Determine how this industry works, and explain the key differences between video visitation in jails (where it is most common and most commonly implemented in explicitly exploitative ways) and video visitation in prisons (where there is a proven need for the service and where prices are more reasonable yet the service is actually pretty rare). -Hold the industry's fantastic promises up against the hard evidence of experience, including the industry's own commission reports. -Give hard data showing just how unpopular this service is. We analyze the usage data, and then walk through exactly why families consider this unreliable and poorly designed technology a serious step backwards. -Identify the patterns behind the worst practices in this industry, finding that the most harmful practices are concentrated in facilities that contract with particular companies. -Analyze why the authors of correctional best practices have already condemned the industry's preferred approach to video visitation. -Review the unanimous opposition of major editorial boards to business models that try to profit off the backs of poor families, when we should be rewarding families for trying to stay together. -Identify how video visitation could be implemented in a more family-friendly way and highlight two small companies who have taken some of these steps. Finally, we make 23 recommendations for federal and state regulators, legislators, correctional facilities, and the video visitation companies on how they could ensure that video visitation brings families together and makes our communities stronger instead of weaker. Details: Northampton, MA: Prison Policy Initiative, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2015 at: http://static.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/ScreeningOutFamilyTime_January2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://static.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/ScreeningOutFamilyTime_January2015.pdf Shelf Number: 134559 Keywords: Families of InmatesPrison VisitsPrivatizationVideo VisitationVisitation |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Title: Private Sector Partnering in the Police Services Summary: 1 Police forces in England and Wales have contracted with the private sector for several decades. However, this activity has increased over the last two years as the service responds to the budget reductions required by the 2010 spending review,1 with more forces agreeing high‑value, long-term contracts. 2 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has reported on this increase in police/private sector partnering in three publications: Adapting to Austerity (2011), Increasing Efficiency in the Police Service (2012); and Adapting to Austerity: One Year On (2012). These found that: OO private/public partnerships can help forces develop new and more efficient approaches to providing services, but the service was not yet fully exploiting the benefits, and there are also associated risks (Increasing Efficiency in the Police Service); and OO there is a lack of good quality, comparative information on the potential benefits from different private or public sector collaborations (Adapting to Austerity). 3 As a result, HMIC identified a pressing need to share good quality, comparative information on the potential benefits of different private/public sector initiatives. 4 The National Audit Office (NAO) has produced numerous reports examining arrangements between the public and private sector in providing public services. These range from in-depth examinations of specific private finance initiative (PFI) contracts to wider reviews looking at thematic issues such as financing and tendering. The NAO also has a role in scrutinising the value for money of the grants that central government makes to the police service - for example, the NAO published a report looking at police procurement in March 2013. This report described the various types of collaboration forces entered into, including with private sector providers, and made recommendations for how further savings could be achieved. Details: London: HMIC, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2015 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/private-sector-partnering-in-the-police-service-20130705.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/private-sector-partnering-in-the-police-service-20130705.pdf Shelf Number: 134600 Keywords: CollaborationPartnershipsPolicing (U.K.)Private SectorPrivatization |
Author: In the Public Interest Title: Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and "Low-Crime Taxes" Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations Summary: This report discusses the use of prison bed occupancy guarantee clauses in prison privatization contracts and explores how bed occupancy guarantees undermine criminal justice policy and democratic, accountable government." Sections cover: why quotas (aka occupancy guarantee provisions, bed guarantee clauses) are important to the for-profit private prison company business model; the prevalence of quotas in contracts; and the impact of prison quotas on Colorado by contracts with Corrections Corporation of America(CCA), on Arizona by GEO Group and by Management and Training Corporation (MTC) contracts, and on Ohio by CCA and CiviGenics (now a part of Community Education Centers) contracts; and recommendations for governments to reject bed guarantee clauses. An appendix provides information about privatized correctional facilities in the United States - facility name, contracted company, location, customer, contract expiration date, and whether an occupancy guarantee exists. Details: Washington, DC: In the Public Interest, 2013. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2015 at: http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Criminal-Lockup%20Quota-Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/sites/default/files/Criminal-Lockup%20Quota-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135070 Keywords: Private Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Carson, Bethany Title: Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit with an Immigrant Detention Quota Summary: In 2009, in the midst of a multi-year decline in the undocumented immigrant population, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), then Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, inserted the following language regarding Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) detention budget into the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010:"...funding made available under this heading shall maintain a level of not less than 33,400 detention beds." This directive established what would become a controversial policy interpreted by ICE as a mandate to contract for and fill 33,400 (increased in 2013 to 34,000) detention beds on a daily basis. The directive would come to be known as the "immigrant detention quota" or "bed mandate." The immigration detention quota is unprecedented; no other law enforcement agency operates under a detention quota mandated by Congress. Since its implementation, the quota has become a driver of an increasingly aggressive immigration enforcement strategy. The immigrant detention system has expanded significantly since the implementation of the quota, and the percent of the detained population held in private facilities has increased even more dramatically. Two major private prison corporations have emerged as the main corporate beneficiaries of immigrant detention policies: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group. This report provides an in-depth assessment of the inception and implementation of the quota, with a specific focus on the role played by for-profit, private prison corporations. These companies have profited handsomely from the artificial stability provided by the quota while contributing millions of dollars in federal lobbying expenditures and in campaign contributions to ensure their interests are met. This report also features testimony from people directly impacted by detention and deportation, revealing the momentous human cost of the quota. Key Findings: 1.Private prison corporations have increased their share of the immigrant detention industry. Since just before the onset of the quota, the private prison industry has increased its share of immigrant detention beds by 13 percent. Sixty-two percent of all ICE immigration detention beds in the United States are now operated by for-profit prison corporations, up from 49 percent in 2009. Nine of the ten largest ICE detention centers are private. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the expansion of the entire ICE detention system by nearly 47 percent in the last decade. 2.Private prison corporations lobby on immigration and immigrant detention issues that affect their bottom line. Contrary to private prison corporation claims that they do not lobby on issues related to immigration policy, between 2008 and 2014, CCA spent $10,560,000 in quarters where they lobbied on issues related to immigrant detention and immigration reform. Of that amount, CCA spent $9,760,000, - 61 percent of total private prison lobbying expenditures - in quarters where they directly lobbied the DHS Appropriations Subcommittee, which maintains the immigrant detention quota language and shapes the way in which it is interpreted. Lobbying disclosure forms reveal spending on: "Issues related to comprehensive immigration reform", and "FY 2014 and FY 2015 Department of Homeland Security appropriations - provisions related to privately-operated ICE detention facilities". Since 2010, CCA has spent at least 75 percent of its lobbying expenditures in quarters where it has lobbied directly on the DHS Appropriations Subcommittee. Though GEO Group has not directly lobbied the DHS Appropriations Subcommittee, the company recently began lobbying on immigration and immigrant detention issues, spending $460,000 between 2011 and 2014 in quarters when they lobbied on these issues. 3.Two private prison corporations - CCA and GEO Group - dominate the immigration detention industry. Together, they operate eight of the ten largest immigrant detention centers. GEO and CCA combined operate 72 percent of the privately contracted ICE immigrant detention beds. In the years following the implementation of the immigrant detention quota, CCA and GEO expanded their share of the total ICE immigrant detention system from 37 percent in 2010 to 45 percent in 2014. GEO Group in particular has increased its share of the total ICE immigrant detention system to 25 percent in FY14 from 15 percent in FY10. Both companies have significantly augmented their profits since the implementation of the quota, CCA from $133,373,000 in 2007 to $195,022,000 in 2014. GEO experienced an even more dramatic profit increase from $41,845,000 in 2007 to $143,840,000 in 2014, a 244 percent increase. 4.CCA and GEO have recently expanded their immigrant detention capacity, including new contracts for detaining asylum-seeking families. Since FY2014, the most recent numbers released by ICE, both CCA and GEO have both expanded their capacity for detaining women and children in new family detention centers[22] in South Texas. The CCA-operated South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley opened in December 2014 and currently holds about 480 women and children. It is under expansion to grow to an expected capacity of 2,400 by May 2015. If this expansion proceeds, Dilley will be the largest immigrant detention center in the U.S. The GEO-run Karnes County Residential Center opened in June 2014 and now holds around 600 women and children, but will expand to a capacity of 1,200. Additionally, in January 2015, GEO acquired LCS Corrections, which owns several large immigrant detention facilities in Texas and Louisiana, further increasing its share of the immigrant detention business. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2015 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf Shelf Number: 135261 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsImmigrant DetentionPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Grassroots Leadership Title: The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of Corrections Corporation of America, Summary: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the nation's oldest and largest for-profit private prison corporation, is commemorating its 30th anniversary throughout 2013 with a series of birthday celebrations at its facilities around the country. Over the last 30 years, CCA has benefited from the dramatic rise in incarceration and detention in the United States. Since the company's founding in 1983, the incarcerated population has risen by more than 500 percent to more than 2.2 million people. Meanwhile, the number of people held in immigration detention centers has exploded from an average daily population of 131 people to over 32,000 people on any given day.[ CCA has made profits from, and at times contributed to, the expansion of tough-on-crime and anti-immigrant policies that have driven prison expansion. Now a multi-billion dollar corporation, CCA manages more than 65 correctional and detention facilities with a capacity of more than 90,000 beds in 19 states and the District of Columbia. The company's revenue in 2012 exceeded more than $1.7 billion. While the company has become a multibillion dollar corporation, it has also become exceedingly controversial, with a record of prisoner abuse, poor pay and benefits to employees, scandals, escapes, riots, and lawsuits marking its history. Faith denominations, civil rights groups, criminal justice reform organizations, and immigrant rights advocates have repeatedly argued that adding the profit motive to the prison and immigrant detention systems provides perverse incentives to keep incarceration rates high. To mark the company's milestone anniversary, Grassroots Leadership and the Public Safety and Justice Campaign have sought to highlight why there is nothing to celebrate about 30 years of for-profit incarceration. This report highlights just some of the shameful incidents that litter CCA's history. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2013. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for_web.pdf Shelf Number: 135436 Keywords: Corrections Corporation of AmericaIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Kirby, Holly Title: Locked Up & Shipped Away: Paying the Price for Vermont's Response to Prison Overcrowding Summary: This report is a Vermont-focused, supplemental brief to the November 2013 report, Locked Up and Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers and the Private Prison Industry, states - Vermont, Idaho, Hawaii, and California - collectively send more than 10,000 prisoners to out-of-state private prisons. Grassroots Leadership now coordinates the national Locked Up and Shipped Away Campaign to shed light on the experiences of those directly affected and demand that state leaders put an end to this inhumane practice, reduce the number of people behind bars, and cut ties with the private, for-profit prison industry. Grassroots Leadership has partnered with Vermonters for Criminal Justice Reform - whose mission is to work for a more restorative and effective criminal justice response - to fight for the return of nearly 500 Vermonters currently housed in out-of-state private prisons. This report presents the facts about Vermont's practice of shipping prisoners far from home, and most importantly, gives voice to the Vermont prisoners and their families and loved ones enduring the consequences Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/locked_up_shipped_away_vt_web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/locked_up_shipped_away_vt_web.pdf Shelf Number: 135437 Keywords: Correctional Administration Prison Overcrowding (Vermont)Prisoners, Interstate TransferPrivate Prisons Privatization |
Author: Rahall, Karena Title: The Siren Is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends Toward Privatization of Public Police Forces Summary: The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United has opened the floodgates to allow unlimited corporate campaign donations, and Supreme Court doctrine is shifting back to the Lochner-era's focus on economic rights. At the same time, there are efforts underway across the United States to privatize public services in order to alleviate what proponents claim is a shortfall in revenue due to the recession. Within those privatization efforts, public policing has become a new front, with outsourcing and wholesale privatization of the police underway. This Article adds to the existing scholarship a political analysis of privatization efforts, including how lobbying and campaign financing are making wholesale privatization in the area of policing a very real possibility. This Article looks at the example of Camden, New Jersey, where the city's entire police force was fired and replaced with a county-wide force in order to shed pension and wage obligations, as an incubator for future wholesale privatization of the police. Considering the trend of corporate lobbying through groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council that write model legislation and deliver it to lawmakers, as well as unlimited campaign donations, this Article traces the current trend toward police privatization. It argues that without more transparency and some limitations on such expenditures, the public cannot fully and fairly participate in decisions about whether to relinquish force-protection to private corporations. Understanding the potential consequences for both public safety and democratic principles requires systemic, legislative and electoral transparency that currently remains deficient. Details: Seattle: Seattle University, School of Law, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1495&context=faculty Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1495&context=faculty Shelf Number: 129684 Keywords: Private Policing Private Security Privatization |
Author: Prenzler, Tim Title: Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects Summary: This report examines developments internationally in private security, including the role of security in crime reduction. The review also examines forms of privatised and outsourced policing, and crime prevention partnerships between government and private security. Available evidence indicates that the current downward trend in crime internationally is largely attributable to the wide-scale uptake of security services across a range of institutional, commercial and domestic settings. Rising crime rates globally, and in Australia, appear to have been turned around, and long-term downward trends have set in across numerous offence categories. Growth in the security industry has included a variety of forms of outsourced and partnership policing. There is little evidence, internationally, of any deliberate and thorough-ongoing policies of privatisation of police departments. "Privatisation" has, instead, occurred primarily through market-driven growth in security. Growth has occurred in consumption by government, as well as private sector in-house and contract security. Despite the turnaround in crime rates, crime victimisation remains at high levels in many countries, including Australia. To address this problem, the traditional separation of police and private security needs to be systematically overcome through more organised and active partnerships. There are numerous case studies available of police working closely and successfully with private security, primarily through forms of crime prevention partnerships. These often involve local government and local business associations. Governments also need to make more of opportunities to reduce crime and reduce costs by installing advanced security systems and outsourcing security where a business case can be mounted. Governments also need to facilitate the general uptake of security in commercial, institutional and residential settings. This report concludes that there are enormous opportunities for governments, police and private security to achieve a synergetic effect in crime prevention. Although police and private security operate on different principles of private and public interests, contract arrangements and partnerships can be managed in ways that meet public interest criteria and satisfy democratic principles of accountability. Details: Crows Nest, NSW: Australian security Industry Association, 2013. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: https://www.asial.com.au/documents/item/13 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.asial.com.au/documents/item/13 Shelf Number: 135774 Keywords: Crime PreventionPrivate PolicingPrivate SecurityPrivatization |
Author: Panchamia, Nehal Title: Competition in prisons Summary: The Institute for Government has produced a series of short papers on the history of choice and competition in different public services. This paper traces the history of competition in the prisons sector, assesses what we currently know about its impact and draws out some lessons for those seeking to introduce greater competition in public services. Details: London: Institute for Government, 2012. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Prisons%20briefing%20final.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Prisons%20briefing%20final.pdf Shelf Number: 135905 Keywords: Private Prisons Privatization |
Author: Global Detention Project Title: A Survey of Private Contractor Involvement in U.S. Facilities Used to Confine People for Immigration-related Reasons Summary: The private prison industry in the United States has grown significantly during the last several decades and along with it there has been an apparent increase in the outsourcing of services at facilities used for immigration detention purposes. However, while much has been written about private ownership and management of detention facilities, the phenomenon of non-state-actor involvement in immigration detention extends beyond these activities. For instance, while private contractors are responsible for overall management of some two dozen immigration-related detention facilities in the United States, this report demonstrates that private contractors provide a range additional services at nearly 100 prisons, shelters, and detention centers across the United States that have been used to hold migrants and asylum seekers. Part of the difficulty in investigating this phenomenon is that the U.S. immigration detention estate is massive (involving several hundred facilities) and employs numerous types of institutions, from local jails and federal prisons to juvenile detention centers and dedicated immigration detention centers. Thus, to accurately document the extent of non-state-actor involvement in the U.S. immigration detention regime it is necessary to look at all these different types of facilities and assess the role played by different actors in them. This survey represents an initial, modest attempt to begin to fill some of the gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon. The information included in the following charts has been compiled based on an extensive search of available websites provided by facilities in the United States that have been used for the purpose of migration detention or by service providers active in those facilities. Based solely on this review of online information, the Global Detention Project was able to determine that of the hundreds of facilities that have been used in recent years to hold immigration detainees, no less than 83 explicitly mention on their websites some form of privatization. In addition, of the two dozen dedicated immigration facilities, all but one report outsourcing services to private contractors. The most common form of private involvement in these facilities is management. Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), one of the largest private prison companies, manages seven of the 24 dedicated facilities. However, private companies offer a range of other services at detention sites and a narrow focus on specialized immigration facilities fails to capture the full range of involvement of non-state entities in migration-related detention. In fact, one of the more notable outcomes of this limited research project has been to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the outsourcing of responsibilities at U.S. detention centers. Private actors provide food services, security, healthcare, among a host of other services. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Detention Project, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/Survey_of_US_contractors_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/Survey_of_US_contractors_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 136511 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Klopfer, Franziska Title: A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe Summary: The private security industry polarises opinion. For some, it is simply unacceptable to hand responsibility for public security to commercial entities driven - according to this argument - purely by the pursuit of profit. For others, private security companies (PSCs) offer a much needed complement or even an alternative to beleaguered state security services. Perspectives may vary for reasons as diverse as wider national attitudes to privatisation of state services in general or, for example, personal experience of PSCs. But views are always likely to reflect either strong opposition or support. In short, it seems that there is no general agreement about the role that PSCs should and can play as part of the security sector in a democratic state. This topic has been the focus of considerable attention in research and policy circles at national and international levels. Spurred by high profile incidents in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, much attention has been given to the role of PSCs and private military/security companies (PMSCs) in conflict and post-conflict environments. This has led to international non-governmental actors, governments and PSCs themselves coming together to develop international regulatory mechanisms that aim to ensure transparency and accountability while fostering good practices and improved standards within the industry. While developments on the international level provide important starting points for private security regulation, they do not provide a detailed analysis of how private security can contribute to ensuring security as a public good. Indeed, the answers to this question will differ significantly from context to context. A true understanding of private security and its regulation can only start from two fundamental considerations: (1) which role does the state want to attribute to private security providers within the security sector; and (2) which framework is most effective to enable private security to deliver those services and fulfil to clearly defined standards. The first question requires a political decision. The second situates private security within the wider framework of domestic security sector governance concerns. Crucially, both questions need to be answered based on a clear understanding of national security needs and the actual roles played by PSCs operating in a given context. Details: Belgrade; Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015. 129p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/282657912_A_Force_for_Good_Mapping_the_private_security_landscape_in_Southeast_Europe Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/282657912_A_Force_for_Good_Mapping_the_private_security_landscape_in_Southeast_Europe Shelf Number: 137018 Keywords: Private PolicingPrivate SecurityPrivatizationPublic Security |
Author: Papworth, Tom Title: Harnessing Entrepreneurship to Secure Britain's Borders: The Case for Privatising the Passport and Immigration Functions of UK Border Force Summary: - The UK border is becoming increasingly busy. In 2014-15 118 million passengers entered the UK; air passengers are expected to double by 2050. - UK Border Force (UKBF) is already under strain due to its workload doubling since it has been ordered to undertake exit checks for all people leaving the country. - UKBF has not performed well recently, and its ability to meet these new challenges is questionable. Poorly managed, understaffed, and struggling with outdated and unreliable IT systems and infrastructure, UKBF is failing to secure the UK's borders. - Currently, most of the 90,000 general aviation flights a year entering the UK are not met by UKBF. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration has criticised weak risk assessment and rising numbers of missed passengers. According to a 2013 PAC report, the Border Force missed eight out of 19 seizure and detection targets, six of which were missed by over 10%. Unless UKBF improves productivity, it will require a $1 billion/year increase in its budget (in 2015 pounds) to keep up with its workload. - The Government's most recent attempt to digitise border security failed catastrophically, with Raytheon, the official partner, suing the Home Office - who eventually settled out of court at a cost of potentially over $1 billion to the taxpayer. - According to the Major Projects Authority, the Digital Services at the Border programme is still facing "major risks or issues" such that "successful delivery is in doubt". - The efficient operation of the UK's borders is a core responsibility of the state, but the Home Office and UKBF have struggled to meet that requirement. UKBF and its predecessors have underperformed both as part of an arms-length agency and as an in-house directorate. - The potential cost savings from contracting out the IT and non-law enforcement operations needed to secure the border are the only way border control can be made both effective and affordable for the future. The Government should therefore contract out the border control functions of UKBF and transfer all staff to a new private sector contractor. Details: London: Center for Policy Studies, 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Pointmaker: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/160223111848-HarnessingEntrepreneurship.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/160223111848-HarnessingEntrepreneurship.pdf Shelf Number: 138126 Keywords: Border SecurityImmigration Law EnforcementPrivatization |
Author: Graziani, Cate Title: Incorrect Care: A Prison Profiteer Turns Care into Confinement Summary: This report details the strategic expansion by private prison corporations to fill profit gaps from efforts to reduce mass incarceration through an emerging Treatment Industrial Complex. As criminal justice reform sweeps the nation, an alarming trend has emerged that could mean private prison profiteers control a person's fate for life, not just the term of a prison sentence. The same private prison profiteers who built billion dollar empires as partners in tough on crime policies are adapting to reforms by rebranding themselves - as humane treatment providers. The criminal justice system has created ample opportunities for their expansion, including mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers, correctional healthcare, and community corrections. This report will look specifically at one segment of their expansion: mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers, facilities that represent the potential for lifetime confinement and long-term guaranteed profit. In fact, the same for-profit company is making aggressive moves to take over both types of facilities. Correct Care Solutions, formerly known as GEO Care, a spin-off of GEO Group, has deep roots in the private prison industry. Although the company has shifted and changed numerous times over the last few years, CCS currently runs seven 'treatment' facilities in Florida, Texas and South Carolina, including five mental health facilities and two civil commitment centers. This report's in-depth analysis of GEO Group, GEO Care and now Correct Care Solutions' involvement in operating mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers exposes serious concerns. Details: Austin, TX: Grassroots Leadership, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 16, 2016 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/incorrect_care_grassrootsleadership_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/incorrect_care_grassrootsleadership_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138252 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Mercadal, Gertrudis Title: Prison Privatization in the United States: A New Strategy for Racial Control Summary: There has been a stunning build-up of prisons and a growing trend in prison privatization in the last 30 years, including the rise of maximum security units. The goal of my dissertation is to understand the ideological, historic, political, and economic processes behind the changes in the criminal justice system of the United States. I analyze this problem from multiple angles - labor and policy history, discourse and public opinion, and race in America. The aim of this analysis is to uncover the reasons why crime legislation became progressively more punitive, reaction to African Americans gains in post-Civil Rights more hostile, and the manifold ways in which these phenomena drive the expansion of the prison system and its increasing privatization. In the process of this expansion, a racial caste system which oppresses young African Americans and people of color has become recast and entrenched. Specifically, I offer the notion that in the last three decades, punitive crime legislation focused on African Americans and served to deal with labor needs and racial conflict with harsher penal legislation; in doing so, it depoliticized race, institutionalized racial practices, and served the interests of private prison businesses in new ways oppressive ways. Using interdisciplinary methods which weave together qualitative and quantitative analysis, I find that punitive crime policies in the last thirty years used the concept of crime as political currency by government officials in order to appear tough on crime, and by business representatives interested in exploiting the prison industry. The conflation of business and political interests, and the recasting of crime as a race problem, served to taint public institutions and media dissemination with racist imperatives which stereotyped poor African Americans. The end result is a constant re-positioning of young black males as fodder for economic exploitation. The dissertation also addresses the high cost of imprisonment and the multiple social problems brought from shifting inmates from wards of the State to profit-making opportunities in the hands of private entrepreneurs. The result is high numbers of recidivism, and a growing underclass of people who will always be unemployed or underemployed and return to low income communities that suffer from the endless cycle of poverty and imprisonment. Details: Boca Raton, FL: Florida Atlantic University, 2014. 245p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 28, 2016 at: https://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A13688/datastream/OBJ/view/Prison_privatization_in_the_United_States__a_new_strategy_for_racial_control.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A13688/datastream/OBJ/view/Prison_privatization_in_the_United_States__a_new_strategy_for_racial_control.pdf Shelf Number: 138447 Keywords: African AmericansPrisonersPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationRacial BiasRacial Disparities |
Author: Strickland, Pat Title: Contracting out probation services, 2013-2016. Summary: This briefing paper charts the implementation controversial reforms to the probation service. Most offenders are now supervised by Community Rehabilitation Companies, which are mostly privately led. A new public sector National Probation Service manages high risk offenders. So what's the verdict so far? Under the Transforming Rehabilitation programme, the Coalition Government introduced major controversial reforms. These included: - Abolishing Probation Trusts - Contracting out the majority of probation work to private and voluntary sector providers in 21 new Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) - Introducing a new public sector National Probation Service (NPS)to manage high risk offenders and service the courts In addition, an extra 45,000 offenders are being brought into the probation system. This is because, for the first time, those sentenced to less than 12 months in prison are going to be supervised in the community upon release. Details: London: Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper No. 06894: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06894/SN06894.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06894/SN06894.pdf Shelf Number: 139056 Keywords: Offender SupervisionPrivatizationProbationProbation Reform |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Contract Prisons Summary: The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is the component of the Department of Justice (Department) responsible for incarcerating all federal defendants sentenced to prison, was operating at 20 percent over its rated capacity as of December 2015. To help alleviate overcrowding and respond to congressional mandates, in 1997 the BOP had begun contracting with privately operated institutions (often referred to as "contract prisons"), at first on a smaller scale and later more extensively, to confine federal inmates who are primarily low security, criminal alien adult males with 90 months or less remaining to serve on their sentences. As of December 2015, contract prisons housed roughly 22,660 of these federal inmates, or about 12 percent of the BOP's total inmate population. These contract prisons were operated by three private corporations: Corrections Corporation of America; GEO Group, Inc.; and Management and Training Corporation. The BOP's annual expenditures on contract prisons increased from approximately $562 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to $639 million in FY 2014. In recent years, disturbances in several federal contract prisons resulted in extensive property damage, bodily injury, and the death of a Correctional Officer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to examine how the BOP monitors these facilities. We also assessed whether contractor performance meets certain inmate safety and security requirements and analyzed how contract prisons and similar BOP institutions compare with regard to inmate safety and security data. We found that, in most key areas, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions and that the BOP needs to improve how it monitors contract prisons in several areas. Throughout this report, we note several important corrective actions the BOP has taken, in response to findings and recommendations in our April 2015 audit of the Reeves County contract prison, to improve its monitoring of contract prisons, including in the areas of health and correctional services. The BOP's administration, monitoring, and oversight of contract prisons is conducted through three branches at BOP headquarters and on site. According to the BOP, at each contract prison, two BOP onsite monitors and a BOP Contracting Officer, in cooperation with other BOP subject matter experts, oversee each contractor's compliance with 29 vital functions within 8 operational areas, including correctional programs, correctional services, and health services. The BOP monitors contractor performance through various methods and tools that include monitoring checklists, monitoring logs, written evaluations, performance meetings, and regular audits. Results in Brief We found that in a majority of the categories we examined, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions. We analyzed data from the 14 contract prisons that were operational during the period of our review and from a select group of 14 BOP institutions with comparable inmate populations to evaluate how the contract prisons performed relative to the selected BOP institutions. Our analysis included data from FYs 2011 through 2014 in eight key categories: (1) contraband, (2) reports of incidents, (3) lockdowns, (4) inmate discipline, (5) telephone monitoring, (6) selected grievances, (7) urinalysis drug testing, and (8) sexual misconduct.3 With the exception of fewer incidents of positive drug tests and sexual misconduct, the contract prisons had more incidents per capita than the BOP institutions in all of the other categories of data we examined. For example, the contract prisons confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the BOP institutions. Contract prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. We note that we were unable to evaluate all of the factors that contributed to the underlying data, including the effect of inmate demographics and facility locations, as the BOP noted in response to a working draft of this report. However, consistent with our recommendation, we believe that the BOP needs to examine the reasons behind our findings more thoroughly and identify corrective actions, if necessary. The three contract prisons we visited were all cited by the BOP for one or more safety and security deficiencies, including administrative infractions such as improper storage of use-of-force video footage, as well as more serious or systemic deficiencies such as failure to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents reviewed by onsite monitors over a 6-month period. The contractors corrected the safety and security deficiencies that the BOP had identified. As a result, the BOP determined that each prison was sufficiently compliant with the safety and security aspects of its contract to continue with the contract during the period covered by our review. However, we concluded that the BOP still must improve its oversight of contract prisons to ensure that federal inmates' rights and needs are not placed at risk when they are housed in contract prisons. Our site visits also revealed that two of the three contract prisons we visited were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became available in general population housing. These new inmates had not engaged in any of the behaviors cited in American Correctional Association standards and BOP policies that would justify being placed in such administrative or disciplinary segregation. When the OIG discovered this practice during the course of our fieldwork, we brought it to the attention of the BOP Director, who immediately directed that these inmates be removed from the SHUs and returned to the general population. The BOP Director also mandated that the contracts for all contract prisons be modified to prohibit SHU placement for inmates unless there is a policy-based reason to house them there. Since that time, the BOP informed us that the practice of housing new inmates in the SHU is no longer occurring in the contract prisons and that the BOP has not identified any further non-compliance to date regarding this issue. Finally, we found that the BOP needs to improve the way it monitors contract prisons. We focused our analysis on the BOP's Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist (checklist) because, as described by BOP operating procedures, it is an important element of the BOP's Quality Assurance Plan, as well as a mechanism BOP onsite monitors use to document contract compliance on a daily basis. We believe onsite monitors are best positioned to provide the BOP's quickest and most direct responses to contract compliance issues as they arise. We found that the checklist does not address certain important BOP policy and contract requirements in the areas of health and correctional services. As a result, the BOP cannot as effectively ensure that contract prisons comply with contract requirements and BOP policies in these areas and that inmates in contract prisons receive appropriate health and correctional services. For health services, the checklist does not include observation steps to verify that inmates receive certain basic medical services. For example, the observation steps do not include checks on whether inmates received initial examinations, immunizations, and tuberculosis tests, as BOP policy requires. We also found that monitoring of healthcare for contract compliance lacks coordination from BOP staff responsible for health services oversight. For correctional services, the checklist does not include observation steps to ensure searches of certain areas of the prison, such as inmate housing units or recreation, work, and medical areas, or for validating actual Correctional Officer staffing levels and the daily Correctional Officer duty rosters. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 1 6-06: Accessed August 29, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140070 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ConditionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: American Friends Service Committee Title: Community Cages: Profitizing community corrections and alternatives to incarceration Summary: As states pursue sentencing reform efforts to reduce prison populations and the federal government continues to grapple with comprehensive immigration reform, the private prison industry faces pressure to adapt to a shifting penal landscape that is moving toward alternatives to incarceration. In response to these developments, the private prison industry began rebranding and expanding into subcontracted prisoner health care, forensic mental health treatment, and other "alternative" programming. In 2014, The American Friends Service Committee, Grassroots Leadership, and the Southern Center for Human Rights identified this emerging trend as the Treatment Industrial Complex (TIC). In the present report, we offer an in-depth analysis of the community corrections segment. Community corrections refers to "front-end" alternatives to incarceration, such as probation, home arrest, diversion programs, and "back-end" reentry programs such as parole, halfway houses, and work release centers. Nearly two-thirds of people involved in the criminal justice system are not held in prison or jail, but are instead monitored via community correction programs. At the end of 2014, more than 4.7 million adults were under probation or parole. For prison corporations such as Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group, this represents a huge untapped market for privatization. Smaller companies are also springing up to meet the demand for community corrections programs and related services. In this report, we examine four different components of community corrections that are being aggressively privatized: 1. Electronic monitoring through the use of GPS ankle monitors and other mobile surveillance technology 2. Day reporting centers for individuals to "check in" and/or participate in rehabilitative programs and services 3. Intermediate sanctions facilities as an alternative to revocation to prison for technical violations of the terms of probation or parole 4. Residential reentry centers, more commonly known as halfway houses Details: Tucson: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2016 at: https://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/communitycages.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/communitycages.pdf Shelf Number: 140316 Keywords: Alternatives to IncarcerationCommunity CorrectionsDay ReportingElectronic MonitoringHalfway HousesPrivatization |
Author: Howard League for Penal Reform Title: Corporate crime? A dossier on the failure of privatisation in the criminal justice system Summary: 'The children and young people who were sent to secure training centres were sent there because they had acted unlawfully and to learn to obey the law, yet more of them were subject to unlawful actions during their detention. I need, I think, to say no more.' Mr Justice Foskett in a High Court ruling that children in the four privately run secure training centres were unlawfully restrained over the course of 10 years. (The Children's Rights Alliance for England v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 8 (Admin)) G4S and Serco have been the focus of public attention as the tagging scandal and alleged multi-million pound fraud of the taxpayer has unfolded in recent months. These are companies who have track records of failure in delivering public services: the infamous fiasco of G4S not providing sufficient security for the Olympics led to 3,500 army personnel being drafted in (Telegraph, 2013); the inquest into the death of Jimmy Mubenga, who was restrained to death by three G4S guards on a deportation fight, ruled that he had been unlawfully killed (Monaghan, 2013); and Serco has been heavily criticised and had its contract curtailed for failing to meet national standards, falsifying data and a 'bullying culture' in its operation of out-of-hours GP contract in Cornwall (BBC, 2013a). Questions remain regarding how much blame can be laid at these specific companies or whether this is a systemic issue raising wider questions about the role of the private sector in delivering public services. The privatisation of justice in England and Wales began 22 years ago. Wolds prison, run by G4S, was the first private prison, opening in 1992. Altcourse, run by G4S, was the first designed, constructed, managed and financed private prison in the UK, opening in 1997. Since then, the role of the private sector in the criminal justice system has steadily increased: there are now 18 privately run prisons and private companies hold a plethora of other contracts, including prison vans, courts and electronic tagging. Privatisation of the criminal justice system shows no signs of abating. The current Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling, is pushing through reforms to privatise 70 per cent of the probation service (Ministry of Justice, 2013). This is despite evidence that the probation service is one of the highest performing public sector services in the country: every probation trust was rated 'good' or 'exceptional' by the government's own performance ratings (National Offender Management Service, 2013a) and the probation service was recently awarded the British Quality Foundation's 'Gold Medal for Excellence'. It was the first time a public sector organisation has won the award (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Concerns and controversy have dogged the private sector since its role in the criminal justice system began. Most recently, G4S and Serco were found to have overcharged on its contracts for tagging, including claims for people who were dead or in prison (Hansard, 2013). They have been forced to pay back nearly L200 million, and have come under investigation from the Serious Fraud Office. Neither company is currently under investigation by the police for its role in the tagging scandal, despite it being behaviour which the chairman of G4S has acknowledged was "ethically wrong" (BBC, 2013b). Since opening in April 2012, G4S-run Oakwood prison has been bombarded with reports that it is unsafe, nothing works and prison inspectors found that 'it's easier to get drugs than soap' (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2013). It, alongside with Serco-run Thameside, were recently named among the country's three worst prisons, receiving the lowest performance rating possible, with the National Offender Management Service expressing 'serious concern' (National Offender Management Service, 2013b). The Prison and Probation Ombudsman identified 'serious failings' after a man was found collapsed and not breathing in his cell but staff were unable to access a defibrillator because it was locked away in a cupboard and there was no doctor on site (BBC, 2013c). In recent months there have been four rooftop protests and a riot. These were referred to by G4S and the government as not a riot, but 'concerted indiscipline' and not rooftop protests but 'working at height' (Hansard, 2014). It is a sign of the scale of the problems faced by Oakwood that both commissioner and commissioned now resort to semantics in order to defend the latest failure of outsourcing. These companies are well-resourced at the procurement stage, preparing competitive bids which put low costs before quality of service. There is, however, no evidence that they are any better at running prisons than the state (National Audit Office, 2013). Questions remain about the real cost of delivering services effectively; whether it presents value for money for the tax payer; and the effects of privatisation on the expansion of the prison system for the primary benefit of lining shareholders pockets. To make profit, the private sector needs business - there are questions to be asked about whether the aims of such companies are fundamentally at odds with the aims of reducing the prison population and reoffending. Details: London: The Howard League, 2014. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Privatisation-audit-full-version.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Privatisation-audit-full-version.pdf Shelf Number: 145131 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: In the Public Interest Title: The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies Summary: As America's incarcerated and detained populations have boomed in recent years, the business of owning and operating prisons and jails has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry. A new report uncovers which Wall Street banks finance the industry’s two leaders, CoreCivic (formerly "Corrections Corporation of America [CCA]") and GEO Group. The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies shows that six banks have played large roles in bankrolling CoreCivic and GEO Group: Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas, SunTrust, and U.S. Bancorp. The report also reveals how these banks profit from providing credit, bonds, and loans to private prison companies. Details: Washington, DC: In the Public Interest, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_BanksPrivatePrisonCompanies_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_BanksPrivatePrisonCompanies_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147942 Keywords: Banking IndustryPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi Summary: In April 2009, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded a contract to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is now known as CoreCivic, Inc., to house up to 2,567 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult male inmates in the Adams County Correctional Center (Adams County). The BOP exercised the contract's second of three 2-year option periods in 2015, extending it through July 2017 and increasing its value to about $468 million. As of June 2016, it was the third largest Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) contract in terms of dollars obligated since fiscal year (FY) 2009. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit, covering the period April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, to: (1) assess CoreCivic's contract performance; (2) determine whether CoreCivic complied with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract; and (3) assess the BOP's formation and administration of the contract. We found that CoreCivic's execution of the contract's requirements did not fully accomplish the BOP's program. goals in several respects. In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer's death and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. The riot, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit, was a consequence of what inmates perceived to be inadequate medical care, substandard food, and disrespectful staff members. A BOP after-action report found deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and inmates, and CoreCivic's intelligence systems. The report specifically cited the lack of Spanish-speaking staff and staff inexperience. Four years after the riot, we were deeply concerned to find that the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in correctional and health services and Spanish-speaking staffing. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot, we found CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the riot in terms of actual post coverage. Yet CoreCivic's monthly reports to the BOP, which were based on simple headcounts, showed that correctional staffing levels had improved in 36 of those 38 months. With regard to Spanish-speaking staff, while the BOP's post-riot after-action plan recommended adding to the contract minimum requirements for bilingual staff, we found that the BOP did not modify the contract to include this requirement until June 2015, subsequent to the start of our audit. Moreover, the contract modification does not define the level of speaking proficiency required and has no deadline or target date for compliance. As of July 2015, the facility's inmate population consisted of approximately 2,300 aliens, predominately Mexican-nationals, yet only 4 of 367 staff spoke fluent Spanish. By February 2016, CoreCivic officials told us the number of fluent Spanish-speaking staff actually dropped to three people, and CoreCivic's January 2016 job announcements for correctional officers stated no preference for bilingual applicants. In addition, the BOP told us that it does not validate the contractor's staff for Spanish-speaking skills, and has not established any validation criteria for doing so. We also found lower qualification levels and significantly higher staffing turnover rates for Adams County correctional officers and believe these factors contributed to the facility's lack of experienced staff, which the BOP identified in its after-action report as a systemic problem in the area of safety and security at the facility. We reviewed CoreCivic's hiring practices and determined the facility employs correctional officers with qualifications that would have been insufficient for employment at BOP-managed institutions. For example, the BOP requires entry-level correctional officers to have either a 4-year college degree or equivalent work experience, while CoreCivic does not require education beyond high school. Additionally, we found significantly higher turnover rates at the facility than those at comparable BOP institutions and believe it likely results from the substantially lower pay and benefits provided by CoreCivic. We found CoreCivic pays significantly lower wages and offers less time off than the BOP, and provides fewer career advancement opportunities. For example, the BOP pays entry-level correctional officers $18.69 per hour, 48 percent higher than the $12.60 per hour paid by CoreCivic. The State of Mississippi also offers its correctional officers more generous wages and paid time off than CoreCivic. Furthermore, the BOP offers new correctional officers noncompetitive promotion potential to $26.91 an hour, while CoreCivic pays correctional officers, throughout their careers, only the required prevailing wage rates set forth by the Department of Labor's Service Contract Act wage determinations. The BOP's contract with CoreCivic does not address either correctional officer qualification requirements or staff pay and benefits. We believe the BOP should evaluate the extent to which employee qualification levels and turnover rates impact safety and security concerns, and whether its contractual terms should be modified to address those concerns. In addition, while the BOP's solicitation that resulted in the Adams County contract required companies to develop a staffing plan that would illustrate the "total number of full-time equivalents (FTE) for each position title," based on our discussions with BOP and CoreCivic officials, it became apparent that the contract was vague about how staffing levels should be calculated. A 2011 contract modification provided that staffing levels should not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for Correctional Services and 85 percent for Health Services of the BOP-approved staffing plan. Both the BOP and CoreCivic told us they interpreted the contract to allow the calculation of staffing levels to be based on headcounts rather than FTE, and leave the determination of day-to-day staff assignments to the discretion of CoreCivic. As a result, we found the staffing levels CoreCivic reported to the BOP reflected neither actual staffing at the facility nor staffing insufficiencies. Specifically, CoreCivic reported to the BOP simple headcounts of staff recorded on payroll records, regardless of the hours each employee actually worked. When we re-calculated correctional services staffing levels based on FTEs using time and attendance records, we found that, throughout the 4-year period we reviewed, staffing levels were lower than the levels represented by CoreCivic's headcounts and were frequently lower than the BOP's minimum staffing threshold. We found similar issues regarding CoreCivic's reporting of health services staffing. Because the BOP was unaware of these staffing insufficiencies, it was unable to assess the adequacy of staffing levels at the facility. When we reported these issues and our concerns about them to BOP officials, they told us CoreCivic's reporting was consistent with the contract. We found that had the contract clearly specified that staffing levels should be measured using FTEs, between July 2011 and July 2015 the BOP could have taken $1,927,307 in invoice deductions as a result of inadequate correctional and health services staffing levels. We believe this nearly $2 million that the BOP expended could have been avoided with more precise contract language and was wasteful. We also found that, beginning in December 2012, CoreCivic excluded from its required staffing reports the status of five critical health services positions identified in the approved staffing plan, namely two dentists, two physicians, and one advanced registered nurse practitioner. As a result, the BOP, which was not notified of and did not identify the change, was unable to assess the effect of any vacancies on service provision or invoice amounts. We believe that this gap in oversight had a negative effect on CoreCivic's ability to provide quality health care at the Adams County facility. In fact, we found that between December 2012 and September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent of the time), resulting in inmate-to-provider ratios that were about double those specified in BOP program statements. Finally, we found several aspects of the BOP's control and oversight of the contract performance to be inadequate. The BOP structured this contract as a performance-based acquisition, for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. However, the BOP did not implement appropriate performance standards to measure and evaluate CoreCivic's performance. For example, the BOP's oversight of staffing levels is limited because the contract requirements do not sufficiently specify how CoreCivic should measure and report facility staffing levels. We also found CoreCivic inconsistently used industry-standard dietary guidelines to evaluate the nutritional adequacy of food service offerings at the facility, an issue that may have been avoided had the contract specified which standards CoreCivic should have followed. Additionally, the BOP's oversight of billings was inadequate in several ways, resulting in the BOP failing to identify instances where CoreCivic did not apply mandatory invoice deductions. In August 2016, the Deputy Attorney General directed the BOP to begin reducing, and ultimately end, its use of privately operated prisons. Because this order was issued after the close of our audit period, any analysis of its basis or effect were outside of this audit's scope. This report makes 9 recommendations to assist the BOP in improving operations under the Adams County contract and in addressing $42,300 we have identified as questioned costs. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Shelf Number: 145091 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsFederal PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the United States Marshals Service Contrast No. DJJODT7C0002 with CoreCivic, Inc., to Operate the Leavenworth Detention Center Leavenworth, Kansas Summary: In January 2007, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) awarded, on behalf of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), contract no. DJJODT7C0002 to Corrections Corporation of America, now known as CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic), to provide comprehensive detention services at the Leavenworth Detention Center (LDC) in Leavenworth, Kansas. This contract is a sole-source acquisition that includes a 5-year base period with three 5-year option periods and has a total estimated value of $697 million. Actual contract costs through January 2017 were $252 million. The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to assess USMS's and CoreCivic's administration of, and compliance with, contract terms and conditions in the areas of: (1) contract management, oversight, and monitoring; (2) staffing requirements; and (3) billings and payments. The audit time frame focused on, but was not limited to, October 2010 through May 2015. As an initial matter, we determined that the OFDT's justification for issuing a sole source contract did not include all of the language and supporting documentation required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Additionally, the USMS was unable to provide evidence, as required by the FAR, that the OFDT obtained competition to the maximum extent practicable and ensured the best overall value to the government. Specifically, the OFDT restricted contract performance to the city of Leavenworth, thus potentially limiting the pool of offerors, but it could not provide the required evidence that it had a sufficient justification for this restriction. We also concluded that the USMS failed to provide sufficient oversight of the LDC and that this failure resulted in several significant issues with LDC operations going unaddressed for extended periods of time. In our judgment, the USMS was inherently reactive: instead of actively monitoring LDC operations to identify discrepancies and thwart potential incidents, the USMS often became aware of incidents after they occurred. Of particular concern, the USMS Contracting Officer's Representative (COR), who was responsible for monitoring CoreCivic's performance at the LDC on a day-to-day basis, was located offsite, had no previous contract oversight experience, and received no formal guidance and negligible detention-related training. The COR maintained an infrequent onsite presence at the LDC, did not document the inspection activities performed, and did not develop an inspection program or monitoring procedures. Furthermore, in our judgment, the USMS's lack of effective continuous monitoring at the LDC presents risks that may extend throughout all its other contract detention facilities. Upon learning of these potentially systemic weaknesses in the USMS's contract oversight, the OIG issued a Management Advisory Memorandum to the USMS so it could take immediate action to address them. In response, USMS officials stated that their goal was to improve contract monitoring by establishing an onsite detention contract monitoring program at all private detention facilities. This program would be staffed by full-time professional Contract Administrators under the supervision of the USMS's Prisoner Operations Division. The OIG Memorandum and the USMS's responses to it are detailed in the body of this report and attached as appendices. Insufficient oversight by the USMS allowed several problems at the LDC to persist over a significant period of time. Among the issues affecting the safety and security of the LDC that we identified was its periodic under-staffing. We found that from October 2012 through September 2014, the LDC's staffing was generally consistent with the facility-wide staffing plan thresholds. However, from October 2014 through September 2015, the LDC's staffing levels deteriorated and the facility-wide average vacancy rate more than doubled to 11 percent. This was primarily driven by correctional officer vacancies, which reached as high as 23 percent. These correctional officer vacancies led to several problems in 2015, including the LDC's long-term use of mandatory overtime, which LDC personnel said led to lower morale, security concerns, and fewer correctional officers available to escort medical staff and detainees to and from the health services unit. LDC's vacancies led to the closure of security posts and reassignment of personnel, sometimes to the detriment of detainee services. Many of the closures occurred at posts that had been designated by CoreCivic as "mandatory," meaning they were required to be filled on each shift in order to run the facility in a safe and secure manner. The problem of post closures was especially acute from February 1 through March 31, 2015. During this period, the LDC closed at least one security post in all 118 shifts and closed an average of 7 posts per shift. LDC's vacancies also led to Unit Management personnel being assigned to security posts instead of performing their normal job duties, which included assisting detainees with casework and transitional services, developing individual detainee program plans, and delivering services and programs to detainees, among other duties. Rather than take steps to address understaffing, both USMS and CoreCivic took actions that exacerbated the problem. For example, CoreCivic did not utilize all available staffing options to remedy the under-staffing problem, such as by requesting temporary staff from other CoreCivic facilities. In fact, during a period when the LDC was understaffed, CoreCivic temporarily transferred LDC personnel to other CoreCivic facilities, which in one instance led to a significant reduction in the size of the LDC's already shorthanded Special Operations Response Team, weakening its ability to operate effectively and fulfill its mission in the event of a significant incident. We also found that the USMS allowed CoreCivic to contract with a local government to house non-federal detainees at the LDC - at a rate below that being paid by the USMS - without considering the staffing implications of the arrangement. We also learned during our audit that, unbeknownst to the USMS, LDC officials had uninstalled beds prior to an American Correctional Association (ACA) inspection in 2011 in order to conceal from ACA that the LDC was triple bunking detainees. Following the OIG's discovery of this issue, CoreCivic conducted an internal investigation, which revealed that similar conduct may have occurred prior to the 2005 and 2008 ACA audits and that a former CoreCivic divisional Managing Director was aware of these efforts. CoreCivic told the OIG that in response to this finding, its Ethics & Compliance office instituted an ethics liaison program and completed training at LDC on employees' duty to report misconduct, options for reporting misconduct, and CoreCivic's non-retaliation policy for employees who report misconduct. We were informed by ACA that it had decided not to take any action against CoreCivic, in part because the senior officials involved were no longer with CoreCivic. Our audit further determined that the USMS has issued conflicting guidance on the allowability of triple bunking by its contractors, and that it should clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the rules and procedures governing this practice. Additionally, we found that the USMS did not detect several weaknesses in CoreCivic's contractually-required quality control program at the LDC, which our review determined had significant shortcomings. For example, the LDC Quality Assurance Manager received minimal instruction and guidance on how to conduct facility reviews; there was insufficient evidence proving that the LDC inspection review steps were conducted; the LDC's plans of action did not properly address deficiencies and did not provide viable long term correction; and the LDC had insufficient evidence proving that plans of action were implemented. Despite the LDC's staffing deficiencies and the other instances of non-compliance with contract requirements, we determined that the USMS had not used available contractual mechanisms to hold CoreCivic accountable. According to the contract and USMS policy, the USMS may issue contract price reductions for contractors' significant or repeat deficiencies, failure to fill essential staff positions, and having an unacceptable number of vacancies. Yet we found that, from March 2006 through January 2017, the USMS had not proposed or issued any contract price reductions for any of its 15 contract detention facilities, including the LDC. We further found that the COR for the LDC contract had never seen the USMS's price reduction guidance, and USMS officials were unable to provide us with evidence that such guidance was sent to any of the current USMS District CORs responsible for the other 14 USMS contract detention facilities. Additionally, the USMS was not entering contractor past performance evaluations into the government-wide electronic evaluation reporting system, as required by the FAR, or conducting Performance Evaluation Meetings as required by the contract. Finally, the OIG determined that one of CoreCivic's employee fringe benefits called the "sick account" contained excess funds that could be interpreted as "cash equivalents" that should have been paid to employees on a regular basis. Because CoreCivic's benefits administrator withheld these funds for months or years before disbursement to employees, it is questionable whether the sick account is compliant with applicable labor standards for federal service contracts. We believe the USMS should work with the Department of Labor, and as necessary CoreCivic, to address the issue. CoreCivic also improperly requested - and the USMS improperly paid - $103,271 in salaries and benefits for commissary positions not funded through the LDC contract. These unallowable payments have a compounding effect over time because they are incorporated into each monthly invoice until the contract ends. In March 2017, the USMS issued a contract modification to CoreCivic to recover the unallowable price adjustments and to modify the Monthly Operating Price to reflect the proper monthly price. This report makes 24 recommendations to assist the USMS in improving contractor operations and enhancing the USMS's monitoring and oversight at the LDC. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2017. 129p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 17-22: Accessed January 28, 2017 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1722.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1722.pdf Shelf Number: 145186 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Wassenaar, Mattheus Title: Public vs. Nonprofit Incarceration: The Case of the Netherlands Summary: Outsourcing of detention is a complex public task, due to quality risks from incomplete contracts, the public responsibility for sentencing and execution, and related social opinions. In the Netherlands, the debate about the outsourcing of prison services to the private profit sector has recently restarted. At the same time, in the Netherlands there is extensive experience of outsourcing prison services - in particular for juvenile detention and internal forensic psychiatric care - to nonprofit organizations. In the Dutch experience, we have not found differences between public and nonprofit execution, with respect to the type of contract with the prisons, costs and quality. The Dutch experience shows that outsourcing to nonprofit entrepreneurs in civil society can be an alternative to outsourcing to the private market. Details: Tinbergen: Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam, 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2017-023/VIII: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920440 Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920440 Shelf Number: 145389 Keywords: Detention FacilitiesPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Small, Mary Title: A Toxic Relationship: Private Prisons and U.S. Immigration Detention Summary: A new report, A Toxic Relationship: Private Prisons and U.S. Immigration Detention, by Detention Watch Network (DWN) builds on the overwhelming evidence that the privatization of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention exacerbates due process violations, egregious conditions and transparency concerns that are endemic to the immigration detention system. In addition, the report amplifies the experiences of 42 individuals who were or are held in privately-run detention centers. The report comes as the Homeland Security Advisory Council subcommittee presents its findings later today from an investigation into the use of private prisons for ICE detention. Regardless of the subcommittee's findings, A Toxic Relationship shows that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) secretary, Jeh Johnson already has the evidence he needs to severe ties with private prison companies, a crucial step that the Department of Justice announced it is taking earlier this year. Over 73 percent of immigrants held in ICE custody are incarcerated in facilities operated by private companies. The two largest and most notorious companies, The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO) and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is currently attempting a re-brand, have well documented track records of abuse, mismanagement and neglect. Both companies are heavily lobbying the federal government in the hopes of increasing their bottom line as detention numbers climb to over 40,000 people behind bars. In 2015, CCA and GEO received $765 million for immigration detention - more than double the $307 million they received in 2008. The report details four fundamental problems with the use of privately-run detention centers, as our research indicates that private contractors: Seek to maximize profits by cutting costs -- and subsequently critical services -- at the expense of people's health, safety and overall well-being; Are not accountable, and often do not bear any consequences when they fail to meet the terms of their contracts; Exert undue influence over government officials, and push to maintain and expand the immigration detention system; Are not transparent, and in fact, fight hard to obscure the details of their contracts and operations from the American public. The issues of cost-cutting and indifference towards immigrant lives was reaffirmed just this week as news broke of two more deaths at privately-run detention centers over Thanksgiving weekend, bringing this year's total to 12. Raquel Calderon de Hildago died at the CCA operated Eloy Detention Center in Arizona on November 27th and Esmerio Campos died at the GEO operated South Texas Detention Complex (Pearsall) in Texas on November 25th. Recent investigations into deaths in immigration detention have found that inadequate medical care at detention centers has contributed to numerous deaths, and shine a particular spotlight on Eloy - the deadliest detention center in the country. The lack of transparency is clearly demonstrated by DWN and the Center for Constitutional Rights' ongoing Freedom of Information Lawsuit with the federal government. In July, a federal judge ruled that under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the government must release details of its contracts with private prison companies. The government chose not to appeal, but the private prison companies intervened to stop the release and filed an appeal of their own. This latest tactic by GEO and CCA to obscure the details of their contracts and operations from the American public demonstrates the dangerous degree to which they feel entitled to influence the government and block public's right to know what their government is doing. Details: Washington, DC: Detention Watch Network, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/A%20Toxic%20Relationship_DWN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/A%20Toxic%20Relationship_DWN.pdf Shelf Number: 145811 Keywords: Detention CentersImmigrant DetentionImmigration EnforcementPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Detention Watch Network Title: Banking on Detention: Local lockup quotas & the immigrant dragnet Summary: This report identifies the use of local "lockup" quotas, referred to as guaranteed minimums in detention facility contracts, in at least half of ICE's field offices. These contractual provisions obligate ICE to pay for a minimum number of immigration detention beds that they are encouraged to not only fill, but exceed. As a result, local "lockup" quotas serve as a tax-payer funded insurance policy for private prison corporations. The report draws on information obtained from a FOIA request filed in November 2013 Details: Washington, DC: Detention Watch Network, 2015. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2017 at: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20CCR%20Banking%20on%20Detention%20Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/DWN%20CCR%20Banking%20on%20Detention%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147367 Keywords: Illegal Immigrants Immigrant Detention Private Prisons PrivatizationUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Bedard, Mathieu Title: Private Reinforcements for Public Police Forces? Summary: Policing costs have been rising for 25 years in Canada, while the number of criminal incidents per officer has fallen. These growing costs can be explained in part by an increase in the number of police officers, which has certainly contributed to a reduction in the crime rate, but also by the fact that those officers perform a growing number of tasks. In order to contain these rising costs while ensuring the same quality and scope of public safety services, the work of police officers should be refocused on their essential duties, and other categories of personnel should be employed wherever possible. Some efforts have already been made in this direction, among other things by entrusting police cadets with certain foot patrol or bicycle duties, and by getting them to help during outdoor events. The next step in controlling costs is to call on private security companies, which can under certain circumstances supply qualified personnel who are less expensive than police officers. Details: Montreal: Montreal Economic Institute , 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Economic Notes: Accessed September 27, 2017 at: http://www.iedm.org/files/note0115_en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://www.iedm.org/files/note0115_en.pdf Shelf Number: 147478 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticePrivate PolicePrivate SecurityPrivatizationSecurity Officers |
Author: Stringham, Edward Title: A Report on the Patrol Special Police and Community Safety in San Francisco Summary: This paper provides an analysis of one of the longest established private police groups in America, The San Francisco Patrol Special Police (PSP). Dating back to the days of the Gold Rush, the PSP are a collection of independent companies that the city charter authorizes to patrol difference neighborhoods at the request of private clients. Details: Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 2009. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Independent Institute Working Paper Number 74: http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/74_privatepolicing.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/74_privatepolicing.pdf Shelf Number: 147589 Keywords: Private PolicingPrivatization |
Author: Andrew, Jane Title: Prison Privatisation in Australia: The State of the Nation Summary: Australia now imprisons more people than at any point in its history. As of June 2015, 36,134 people were incarcerated across eight states, and the national imprisonment rate stood at 196 prisoners per 100,000 people. The total annual net cost of Australia's prison system stands at $3.4 billion. As a result of the growth in prisoner numbers and a variety of pressures on the sector, state governments continue to look for new ways to deliver prison services that are thought to be both socially and fiscally responsible, including various forms of privatisation. Prison privatisations have been justified on a number of grounds. The first examination of prison privatisation in Australia, made through the Kennedy report of 1988, asserted that 'In some particular areas the private sector can do it cheaper and better' (Kennedy, 1988: 88). Subsequently, in 2009 the New South Wales General Purpose Standing Committee 'Inquiry into the Privatization of Prisons and Prison Related Services' concluded that' the private management of prisons will also likely produce greater cost savings and efficiencies than if they were to remain in the public system' (GPSC-NSW, 2009: 51). Similarly, in 2013 the Queensland Commission of Audit (QCA) claimed that ' greater efficiencies can be achieved by private operation of correctional facilities'. Equally, the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA), in a 2015 report on Western Australian prisons, remarked that ' private prisons are held to higher standards of accountability and transparency than public prisons'. Accordingly, privatisation has been mooted as a way of providing prison services with greater performance, lower cost, better efficiency and stronger accountability but in reality, little is known about the consequences of privatisation and whether or not they deliver these benefits to the community. Private prisons now incarcerate 18.5% of the prison population of Australia (Productivity Commission, 2014: Table 8A.1), and clearly play a large part in the functioning of the custodial system in Australia. In fact, Australia has the highest rate of private incarceration per capita of any country in the world (Mason, 2013: 2). Out of a total of 101 prisons in Australia, private contractors operate nine facilities in five different states: two prisons in Queensland, two in New South Wales, one in South Australia, two in Victoria and two in Western Australia. Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory do not have private prisons and are therefore outside the scope of this report. Parklea (NSW), Arthur Gorrie (QLD) and Mount Gambier (SA) prisons all deal with remand prisoners. Port Phillip (VIC) and Parklea (NSW) both take maximum security prisoners. The remaining facilities house medium- and low-security prisoners, and do not take part in remand activity. As of 2015, there are only three private contractors responsible for managing custodial services in Australia. These are GEO Group (GEO), G4S and Serco. Private prisons are now responsible for over 6,000 Australian prisoners (Productivity Commission, 2014: Table 8A.1), and absorb a considerable amount of taxpayer money nationally. Despite this, research into private prisons in Australia is extremely limited. Indeed, there has been no single publication or study in the last ten years that has covered all of Australia's private prisons in detail. The present report aims to deliver such a review and in doing so demonstrates that not only do privately managed prisons across Australia vary greatly in terms of their accountability, costs, performance and efficiency, but also that it is very difficult to assess these criteria because of a general lack of transparency. This comprehensive report of the sector seeks to address this information gap and, as a result, intends to better inform future public debate on prison privatisation. The purpose of this report is to provide a description of Australian private prisons as they have evolved across the country. Our overview of private prisons in Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia will give an understanding of the 'State of the Nation' with regard to prison privatisation and its impact. As stated, our study considers private prisons in Australia against four key categories: accountability, costs, performance and efficiency. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney Business School, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 11, 2017 at: https://sydney.edu.au/business/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/269972/Prison_Privatisation_in_Australia-_The_State_of_the_Nation_June_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://sydney.edu.au/business/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/269972/Prison_Privatisation_in_Australia-_The_State_of_the_Nation_June_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147660 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCosts of CorrectionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Montgomery, Ruth Title: The Use of Private Security Services for Policing Summary: Over a decade ago, the Law Reform Commission of Canada (2002) opened a dialogue on the trend in the growth of private policing in Canada. A continued rise in police expenditures, combined with economic downturns, have contributed to pressure being placed on police services around the world to become more effective and efficient. This has resulted in a growing interest in discussing the value of privatizing or civilianizing functions of public police services (Public Safety Canada, 2012). This study examines the intersections between private security and public policing, with an emphasis on those functions that private security are now performing that have traditionally been performed by the public police, as well as cooperative efforts between public police and private security. METHOD The research included a literature review of the roles and responsibilities of private security and public police in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, a review of relevant Canadian legislation, and interviews with key individuals in Canadian government, private security, policing, and police governance organizations. FINDINGS There is the potential for private security to play an important role in community safety and addressing issues of crime and social disorder. Research evidence as to the effectiveness of police-private security initiatives in preventing crime and reducing disorder is mixed. A key factor in the success of these initiatives is management; that is, ensuring there is open communication among the parties, the integrity of the initiative, effective supervision of police and private security officers, and protocols for evaluation. In all of the jurisdictions reviewed, a major challenge is that the core functions of the police have not been defined. This makes it difficult to identify the parameters of the role and responsibilities of the public police, and to determine the niche for private security, working in partnership either with the police, or in an outsourcing or privatization arrangement. There are a number of key factors that are important to the success of police-private security partnerships: 1) a common interest in reducing a specific crime or crime set; 2) effective leadership, with personnel with authority from each partner organization driving participation; 3) mutual respect; 4) information sharing based on high levels of trust in confidentiality; 5) formal meetings of consultation and communication; and, 6) a willingness to experiment and consider all ideas. These processes seem to be in their infancy in Canada. The tiered policing system in Alberta is perhaps the best current example of a system-wide framework for police-private security collaboration. Ideally, police-private security partnerships would be a component of strategic plans that identify areas where collaboration between public police and other groups in the community can be undertaken, monitored, and evaluated. Cost should be one of only several metrics that are used to evaluate the effectiveness of these collaborative partnerships and of outsourcing. Given the unique role of the police in society, other metrics including the legitimacy of the police, the community's view of the various initiatives, and the sustainability of collaborative partnerships must be examined. It is evident that the size and scope of activities of new private security services is expanding. Despite this, there are few, if any, protocols in place to ensure communication and information sharing between these units, many of which are staffed by ex-police and security officers, and the public police. Similarly, there is no information on the size of these units, their budgets, and their activities. At present, these firms seem to inhabit a parallel universe to both public police and traditional private security firms. It is often assumed that privatizing and outsourcing traditional police tasks will result in reductions in the numbers of sworn police officers. Public police-private security collaboration may, on the other hand, result in innovative initiatives that previously did not exist. Little attention has been given to the legal framework within which private security firms operate. There has been little attention given to developing compliance standards and structures for a regulatory regimen. There is also considerable variability across jurisdictions in provisions for enforcement where regulations do exist. Most often, sanctions involve revoking operating licenses. In the absence of a national, provincial or territorial strategic plan for private security, there has also been a failure to develop mechanisms to ensure effective oversight of private security. This has a number of consequences, including an inability to ensure that private security companies are not vulnerable to organized crime, unethical and/or illegal behaviour. The movement to expand the role of private security is occurring in the absence of empirical research studies that would reveal the nature and extent of cost savings, the effectiveness, and the sustainability of policeprivate sector partnerships, outsourcing, and privatization. Cost savings are most often assumed rather than demonstrated. Within the larger context of the economics of policing, there is no published data on the relative cost-effectiveness of private versus public police. The absence of evaluation research on private policing in Canada precludes an informed discussion on proposals for expanding the activities of private policing companies. As well, it is difficult to assess the proposals that are made by private security companies to assume responsibilities currently managed by public police, or to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies that are being proposed by private security firms. There is a need to know more about what private security personnel are doing, the rationale for their activities, and whether these rationales are supported by empirical data. There is no information on the ethics of private security, the values of private security officers, and the private security subculture - all key facets in the study of public police. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2015. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report: 2015-R041: Accessed October 17, 2017 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-R041/2015-R041-en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-R041/2015-R041-en.pdf Shelf Number: 147706 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticePartnershipsPolicingPrivate PolicingPrivate SecurityPrivatizationSecurity Officers |
Author: Beard, Jacqueline Title: Contracting out probation services Summary: This briefing paper charts the progress of recent reforms to probation services in England and Wales. It also brings together some of the commentary. Background In the 2010 Coalition agreement, the Government said it would introduce a "rehabilitation revolution that will pay independent providers to reduce reoffending". On 9 May 2013, the MoJ published Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform, announcing its plans to invite providers from the voluntary and private sectors to bid for rehabilitation services. One of the main new changes was splitting the probation service in two, with the public sector managing high risk offenders and providing services to the courts, and the new Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRC) managing low and medium risk offenders. In September 2013, the MoJ invited bids to run 21 CRCs across England and Wales, worth a combined $450 million. The list of new owners of CRCs was released on 18 December 2014. Only one of the CRCs was won by an organisation outside the private sector. Implementation Payment by Results (PbR) is an outcome-based payment scheme central to the Government's reforms. Under the contracts, a proportion of a provider's payment is determined by the reductions in reoffending they achieve. The Transforming Rehabilitation strategy document said this would create an incentive for providers to "focus relentlessly on driving down reoffending". Transforming Rehabilitation introduced a nationwide "Through the Gate" resettlement service. The intent was to give most offenders continuous support, usually by the CRC, from custody into the community. CRCs began providing "Through the Gate" services from 1 May 2015. Inspections Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) produced five reports evaluating the reforms as they progressed. The final report, published in May 2016, found improvements in joint working and communication between the CRCs and the NPS, particularly in dealing with breaches or increased risk of harm However, there were problems with court work, staff training and morale. In its thematic inspections, HMIP said that the 'Through the Gate' services were so poor that if they were removed the impact would be "negligible". HMIP also found in a separate report that the reforms had meant services for women offenders were less focused. In a further report, HMIP found that CRC enforcement decision making in relation to community orders, suspended sentence supervision orders and post-sentence supervision was poor. HMIP began individual area inspections in summer 2016. They have found overall that CRCs are performing below expectations, with particular criticism for some CRCs monitoring offenders by telephone. Reactions to the reforms There has been widespread comment on the reforms in Parliament, and by charities, inspectors and directors of prisons and probation. Transforming Rehabilitation has primarily attracted criticism since the reforms were announced. Initial concerns focused on the speed of the reforms, the splitting of the probation service into two, and the possible ideological reasons behind the changes. During the reforms, criticism focused on the performance of CRCs, with lower than expected workloads causing financial difficulties. The Public Accounts Committee found that the MoJ had yet to bring about a "rehabilitation revolution" and questioned the effectiveness of the reforms. More recently, in 2017, both the Chief Executive of the National Offender Management Service and the Chief Inspector of Probation have said the new system is not working well. The Justice Select Committee is conducting an inquiry into Transforming Rehabilitation, seeking to find out how current Government measures are effectively addressing the challenges facing the probation services and what more needs to be done in the shortterm to improve the probation system. The Government's position In July 2017, Sam Gyimah, then Minister for Prisons and Probation, accepted that there had been problems with the delivery of the reform programme, blaming in part the reduction in the number of low or medium risk offenders. He said the Government acted urgently to adjust the payment mechanism to make CRC income "less sensitive to changes in demand". The Government hopes that this will provide CRCs with more certainty of their future income, allowing them to invest in delivering the necessary services. The Government also set out plans to develop a joint protocol with the health authorities, as well as funding a new inspection framework for probation. The Government set up a dedicated unit in Her Majesty's Prisons and Probation Service in the summer of 2017 to coordinate implementation of all recommendations made by inspectorates and other bodies in relation to offender services. Details: London: Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper no. 06894: accessed March 6, 2018 at: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06894#fullreport Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06894#fullreport Shelf Number: 149319 Keywords: Offender SupervisionPrivatizationProbationProbation Reform |
Author: Kinosian, Sarah Title: Security for Sale: Challenges and Good Practices in Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in Latin America Summary: Just before midnight on March 2, 2016, assassins broke into Berta Caceres' home and murdered her in her bedroom. Caceres was an indigenous leader in a peaceful campaign against the Agua Zarca dam on a river considered sacred by the indigenous Lenca community of Honduras. In the months leading up to her death, Caceres, along with the resistance movement she led, endured threats, smear campaigns, physical assaults, sexual assaults and forced eviction. The recently-arrested executive president of the company building the dam, Desarrollos Energeticos SA, (DESA), was a former military intelligence officer. On DESA's board sits a former justice minister and several members of one of the richest and most powerful families in Honduras. An international group of lawyers studying the case established "shareholders, executives, managers, and employees of Desarrollos Energeticos Sociedad Anonima (DESA); private security companies working for DESA; and public officials and State security agencies implemented different strategies to violate the right to prior, free and informed consultation of the Lenca indigenous people. The strategy was to control, neutralize and eliminate any opposition." So far nine people have been arrested, four of whom have ties to the Honduran military. Among many other issues, including high-level corruption, the Caceres assassination is emblematic of many problems associated with the private sector security industry in Latin America. The lines between current and retired military personnel and the private company were blurred. There was an interwoven network of current military, former military, private security, business elites and government officials. The dispute involved an energy project opposed by a local community, a context in which many of the worst Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) abuses occur across the region. The sustained use of surveillance, threats, and force against the Lenca community-culminating with Caceres' assassination- was excessive and politicized, clearly violating the rules of engagement for public and private security forces. Some of the individuals responsible for the murder were only arrested after significant international outcry, but most of the masterminds behind the killing remain free. Details: Washington, DC: The Dialogue, 2018. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2018 at: https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Security-for-Sale-FINAL-ENGLISH.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Latin America URL: https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Security-for-Sale-FINAL-ENGLISH.pdf Shelf Number: 149813 Keywords: Citizen SecurityMilitary PersonnelPrivate SecurityPrivatizationSecurity Companies |
Author: Mitchell, Matthew Title: The Pros of Privately-Housed Cons: New Evidence on the Cost Savings of Private Prisons Summary: Three-fifths of all U.S. states contract with private corporations to house a portion of their state prisoners. A host of studies have analyzed the cost of incarceration in many of these prisons. This study takes a broader approach. It compares state per-prisoner department of corrections budgets across 46 states. Accounting for a number of cost factors, significant perprisoner savings were found in states that house a portion of their prisoners privately. All other factors being equal, states such as New Mexico with forty-five percent of their prisoners in private custody spent about $9,660 less per-prisoner in 2001 than non-privatized states. Given New Mexico's prison population of 5,300 this is an annual savings of $51 million. Forty-five percent privatization is expected to reduce the typical department of corrections budget by about one-third. The paper begins with a short history of the privatization movement and a discussion of the motivation to privatize. Details: Tijeras, NM: Rio Grande Foundations, 2003. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/12247.pdf Year: 2003 Country: United States URL: https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/12247.pdf Shelf Number: 150057 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsCosts of PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Eagly, Ingrid Title: Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking Summary: This Article is the first to identify and analyze the growing practice of privatized police policymaking. In it, we present our findings from public records requests that reveal the central role played by a limited liability corporation - Lexipol LLC - in the creation of internal regulations for law enforcement agencies across the United States. Lexipol was founded in 2003 to provide standardized policies and training for law enforcement. Today, more than 3,000 public safety agencies in thirty-five states contract with Lexipol to author the policies that guide their officers on crucial topics such as when to use deadly force, how to avoid engaging in racial profiling, and whether to enforce federal immigration laws. In California, where Lexipol was founded, as many as 95% of law enforcement agencies now rely on Lexipol's policy manual. Lexipol offers a valuable service, particularly for smaller law enforcement agencies that are without the resources to draft and update policies on their own. However, reliance on this private entity to establish standards for public policing also raises several concerns arising from its for-profit business model, focus on liability risk management, and lack of transparency or democratic participation. We therefore offer several recommendations that address these concerns while also recognizing and building upon Lexipol's successes. Details: Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 2018. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 18-09; Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship Research Paper No. 3142035: Accessed May 8, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142035 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142035 Shelf Number: 150099 Keywords: Community PolicingCriminal Justice ReformImmigration PolicingPolice TrainingPolicingPrivatization |
Author: Papageorgiou, Ioannis V. Title: Explaining the asynchronies in the introduction of prison privatisation in England and Wales: A structural Marxist approach Summary: he expansion of prison privatisation presents distinctive traits. One of them is its peculiar temporal expansion in a comparative point of view. This research focuses on the intrastate temporal expansion and more specifically in the case of England and Wales. What is researched is the reason behind the delay in the emergence of prison privatisation, in other words the asynchrony between the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies. This Thesis rejects explanatory frameworks based on historical analogies, pragmatic concerns or economic arguments and puts the explanation in a discourse of political interaction. In this framework, previous approaches related to the concept of globalisation, commodification of citizenry and political culture do not provide either suitable analytical tools in explaining the asynchrony in question. This research, instead, aims to bring forward the class struggle as catalytic agent in criminal justice system developments using a Structural Marxist concept of the State and its transformations. In the Capitalist Mode of Production the State acquires a unifying role among the contradicting classes by promoting the supposed general interest of the society, in order to allow the continuation of class domination and labour exploitation. This is feasible through the constantly unfolding hegemonic strategy which organizes the cohesion of the power bloc and disorganizes the dominated classes. Hegemonic strategy substantiates in the State Apparatuses which is not just a tool for policy making but rather a point where contradicting class powers condense; policy formation as such reflects the vector of class power in the apparatuses. Hegemonic strategy is set in motion by the State Personnel which is relatively independent knot in the transmission of domination between the power bloc and the dominated classes. State transformations are indications of this strategy since they inscribe in the structure of the State the vector of the class struggle. Hegemonic strategy took interesting contours after the mid-'60s. The capital over-accumulation crisis on the one hand and on the other Authoritarian Statism promoted extensive State transformations as in the case of privatisations. Massive reactions, however, caused by the labour movement, required their containment and consequently a smoothly operating criminal justice system. The entrenchment of prison officers, therefore, from the wider changes in the labour status became crucial and a state transformation in itself, although by absence. This explains the delay of prison privatisation which appears indeed at the end of a long socially unstable period. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2013. 367p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/7804/Papageorgiou2013.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/7804/Papageorgiou2013.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 150349 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Sentencing Project Title: Private Prisons in the United States Summary: Private prisons in the United States incarcerated 128,063 people in 2016, representing 8.5% of the total state and federal prison population. Since 2000, the number of people housed in private prisons has increased 47%. States show significant variation in their use of private correctional facilities. For example, New Mexico incarcerates over 40% of its prison population in private facilities, while 23 states do not employ any for-profit prisons. Data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and interviews with corrections officials find that in 2016, 27 states and the federal government incarcerated people in private facilities run by corporations including GEO Group, Core Civic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America), and Management and Training Corporation. According to BJS data, 19 of the states with private prison contracts incarcerate more than 500 people in for-profit prisons. Texas, the first state to adopt private prisons in 1985, incarcerated the largest number of people under state jurisdiction, 13,692. Since 2000, the number of people in private prisons has increased 47%, compared to an overall rise in the prison population of 9%. In six states, the private prison population has more than doubled during this period. The federal prison system experienced a 120% increase in use of private prisons since 2000, reaching 34,159 people in private facilities in 2016. Among the immigrant detention population, 26,249 people - 73% of the detained population - were confined in privately run facilities in 2017. The private immigrant population grew 442% since 2002. The private prison population reached its peak in 2012 with 137,220 people. The population then declined for three years before increasing again in 2016. At the federal level, a 2016 Obama Administration policy shift to reduce reliance and ultimately phase out private prison contracts was reversed by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in February 2017. The reversal took place despite significant declines in the federal prison population and a scathing report by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General that found federally contracted prisons had more safety and security incidents than public prisons. Currently, the federal Bureau of Prisons maintains the nation's highest number of people managed under private prison custody. Changes in policy at the Department of Justice in 2017 that are likely to increase sentence length and expand prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses may contribute to the expansion of private facility contracting. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2018. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 8, 2018 at: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-United-States.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-United-States.pdf Shelf Number: 151062 Keywords: PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation Title: Domestic abuse: the work undertaken by Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) Summary: An estimated two million people experienced domestic abuse last year. A good proportion of people in receipt of probation services are domestic abusers, and domestic abuse constitutes a sizeable proportion of the work of Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs). In this inspection we set out to assess how well CRCs are working to reduce domestic abuse and protect victims. Overall, we found CRCs nowhere near effective enough in this critical area of work, and yet good work here could make so much difference to the families and individuals concerned, and to society as a whole. There is no overall strategy from the MoJ or HMPPS to drive the quality of CRCs' domestic abuse practice. Contractual targets have led to CRCs prioritising process deadlines above good quality and safe practice. HMPPS has worked hard to provide interventions for use with domestic abuse perpetrators, and to support CRCs in their delivery of these, but needs to take a more strategic and coordinated approach to this work. HMPPS guidance needs updating. CRCs had developed new structures, operating models and case management tools that appropriately prioritised domestic abuse cases. However, these tools were not fully embedded or used effectively to improve practice or to help identify local need. Some CRCs supported their aspirations with helpful policies and guidance. However, the policies and guidance were not translating into effective practice and there were no systems in place to test that they did. We found a lack of strategic approach nationally and at CRC level to make sure that CRCs provided the right range, volume and quality of domestic abuse interventions to meet identified need and that RAR interventions were evidence-based and delivered effectively. CRCs were providing BBR and working to improve access to this. However, there were too few referrals to this programme. Many individuals experienced extensive delays before joining a course, and too many did not complete one. Individuals had access to domestic abuse RARs and a range of other locally devised interventions. These were mainly created by enthusiastic practitioners, without a recognised evidence base. They were being delivered by a mix of experienced facilitators but also by new staff who lacked the confidence and knowledge to deliver the course material well. Overall, practitioners were not empowered to deliver a good-quality domestic abuse service. They had unmanageable workloads and many needed more training and oversight. Inexperienced probation workers had full and complex caseloads and, because of the emphasis on remote working in some CRCs, they were unable to obtain support from their colleagues. The lack of knowledge, skill and time dedicated to managing domestic abuse led to considerable shortfalls in the quality of case management. Details: Manchester, UK: The Inspectorate, 2018. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Thematic Inspection: Accessed September 25, 2018 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/09/Report-Domestic-Abuse-the-work-undertaken-by-CRCs.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/09/Report-Domestic-Abuse-the-work-undertaken-by-CRCs.pdf Shelf Number: 151660 Keywords: Case Management Domestic Abuse Family Violence Intimate Partner Abuse Offender Rehabilitation Offender Supervision PrivatizationProbation |
Author: Garofalo, Jontue J.G. Title: The Globalization of the Private Prison Industry and its Effects on Mentally Ill Inmates. An Examination and Analysis of the Treatment of Mentally Ill Prisoners Housed in Private Prisons in the United States, Australia, Scotland, England, New Zealand and Summary: The purpose of this paper is to examine the globalization of the private prison industry and its effects on mentally ill inmates. This paper will discuss what globalization means, the international privatization of the private prison industry, mental health policies and the care of mentally inmates in these private prisons, as well as what can be done to improve to improve the treatment of mentally ill inmates in private prisons throughout the world. Introduction Several industries have fallen prey to globalization and the private prison industry is not immune from this global business model. The treatment of mentally ill individuals in prisons is critical, especially because these individuals are vulnerable and often abused while incarcerated. Left untreated, their psychiatric conditions often grow worse, and they leave prison sicker than when they entered. As a society, we owe it to those who suffer from mentally illness in the most dire of conditions (prison cells), to restructure the current system and find a solution to the revolving doors of the system. Details: Phoenix: Arizona Summit Law School, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2019 at: https://www.azsummitlaw.edu/sites/default/files/tjasls_files/GAROFALO%20THE%20GLOBALIZATION%20OF%20THE%20PRIVATE%20PRISON%20INDUSTRY%20AND%20ITS%20EFFECTS%20ON%20MENTALLY%20ILL%20INMATE.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.azsummitlaw.edu/sites/default/files/tjasls_files/GAROFALO%20THE%20GLOBALIZATION%20OF%20THE%20PRIVATE%20PRISON%20INDUSTRY%20AND%20ITS%20EFFECTS%20ON%20MENTALLY%20ILL%20INMATE.pdf Shelf Number: 155014 Keywords: Correctional Health Care Mental Health Care Mentally Ill Inmates Private Prison Privatization |
Author: Highsmith, Brian Title: Commercialized (In)Justice: Consumer Abuses in the Bail and Corrections Industry Summary: This National Consumer Law Center report examines the growing problem of consumer abuses by private companies profiting from the U.S. criminal legal system and mass incarceration, disproportionately affecting people of color and low-income people, and makes recommendations for reform. This report discusses the growing problem of "commercialized injustice"-consumer abuses perpetuated by companies profiting from the criminal legal system and mass incarceration. Although not always visible to people who do not live in heavily-policed communities or who are protected by other forms of privilege, the scale of private industry's involvement in the contemporary criminal legal system is staggering. These companies provide a wide range of products and services, and operate in various relationships with the government. Some contract directly with governments (e.g., private probation and prison phone services). Others sell directly to consumers, but under specific authority to administer criminal legal functions (e.g., commercial bail and certain rehabilitation and diversion programs). And others simply profit from the contours of our modern criminal legal system (e.g., pre-arrest diversion programs that contract with private retailers). The expanding reach of the modern corrections industry represents the intersection of two troubling trends: (1) the outsourcing of the criminal legal system to the private sector, exemplified by the growth of the private prison industry; and (2) the imposition of fines and fees on mostly low-income defendants to fund the criminal legal system. States and local governments are outsourcing various core functions of their criminal legal systems-traditionally public services-to private corporations operating to maximize profit for their owners. At the same time, they have sought to shift the cost of operating the criminal legal system onto those who have contact with the system and their loved ones, particularly through the assessment of fines and fees on those accused of criminal activity. The corrections industry's growth exacerbates these trends, combining the conflicts of interest endemic in so-called "user-funded" financing structures with the lack of public accountability that advocates have long criticized in the private prison context. Every industry discussed in this report shares this common feature: each profits from financial extractions from individuals based on their exposure to the criminal legal system. The growth of the corrections industry accelerates the trend whereby the costs of our legal system are imposed on low-income, disadvantaged communities least able to shoulder such burdens, rather than shared as a collective public responsibility. The corrections industry operates for the primary purpose of maximizing profits for its owners-creating strong incentives to achieve new forms of monetary extraction in addition to shifting the burden of existing costs. Details: Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2019. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2019 at: https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf Shelf Number: 155462 Keywords: Bail IndustryConsumer AbusesCorrectionsPrisonsPrivate IndustryPrivate Legal SystemPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Worth Rises Title: The Prison Industrial Complex: Mapping Private Sector Players Summary: This report exposes over 3,100 corporations across twelve sectors that profit from the devastating mass incarceration of our nation's marginalized communities. It aggregates critical information about these corporations to help advocates, litigators, journalists, investors, and the public fight the commercialization of the criminal legal system. Details: New York: Worth Rises, 2019. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2019 at: https://worthrises.org/resources Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/5cc7c27b9e3a8d00018649c5/1556595324791/The+Prison+Industrial+Complex+-+Mapping+Private+Sector+Players+-+2019.pdf Shelf Number: 156216 Keywords: Mass Incarceration Prison Industrial Complex Prison Population Private Prisons Private Sector Privatization |