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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for radicalization
165 results foundAuthor: Githens-Mazer, Jonathan Title: Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: A London Case Study Summary: The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non-Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe - planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other - such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like "Tsunamis of Muslim immigration", and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a "European way of life". While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as 'junk-polling'. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as "violent radicalisation" (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 - 'the war on terror' - and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours. From our perspectives and experience, both academic and practitioner, the rise of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime is morally abhorrent and needs to be countered. Muslim communities in the UK and Europe have important contributions to make to the local communities and broader societies in which they live. Yet to date, these communities, and Islam more broadly, are often the subject of misunderstanding and vilification. Whereas Islamic legal and political traditions have, at key points, inspired and informed Western political and intellectual traditions, and Muslims in Europe have historically made, and especially today continue to make, important contributions at every level of British and European society, portrayals of their religion and identity still often seem to focus on terrorism, intolerance, and issues such as the veil. While such portrayals are unjust and empirically untrue, they still appear to academically, politically and popularly inform perceptions of Islam in Britain and Europe. This insidious phenomenon runs the very real risk of driving deep divisions through European societies, and of alienating friends, neighbours and political partners. Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: a London case study represents an initial and introductory first report for the newly formed European Muslim Research Centre (EMRC). Initial and introductory because this is a long-term ongoing project, and what follows here is only the tip of the iceberg. We are particularly pleased to be presenting the report at the London Muslim Centre (LMC) in Whitechapel on 28 January 2010. In important respects both the venue and location are symbolic. At the end of the nineteenth century and again in the twentieth century Whitechapel has been at the hub of resistance to anti-Semitic and anti-racist violence (Catterral, 1994; Malek 2006). Most famously in the 1930s in opposition to Oswald Mosley's fascist Blackshirts (Dorril, 2007), and again in the 1970s and 1980s in opposition to the National Front (NF), Londoners united in Whitechapel to defeat the sectarian street violence that invariably accompanies fascist, neo-Nazi politics (Hann and Tilsey 2003). After analysing our research findings we anticipate that Londoners will once again need to unite in Whitechapel against a violent, sectarian threat during the next decade. Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: a London case study is therefore our first contribution to what we anticipate will again be a successful long-term grass roots campaign against the politics of hate. The extremist nationalist politics that once targeted Jews and Asians in East London is now unambiguously aimed at Muslims (BNP 2006, 2009). Suffice to say Whitechapel is now home to many poor Muslim families in the way that it once was home to poor Jewish families. LMC is at the hub of numerous good citizenship initiatives in Whitechapel and surrounding areas and serves local Muslims and other local citizens well (Jameson 2009, Green and Silver 2009). The LMC itself binds together different sections of London Muslim communities, and stands as a key site of social, cultural and political organisation - an Islamically inspired form of political organisation which is occasionally portrayed as a threat by key commentators and policy makers. Not only does our research challenge this kind of analysis of Islamically inspired political organisation, it suggests that Muslim Londoners and their neighbours and allies will need to overcome mainstream as well as extremist bigotry before they can claim any kind of success. This is why we have set aside the next ten years to monitor and facilitate progress. For us, the method to counter Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime is clear: education. By creating an unimpeachable body of academic work, and by creating mechanisms to empower Muslim communities to put forward their positions � now and in the future, we hope to help dispel the ignorance that has thus far fuelled the populist appeal of Islamophobia and the hate crimes it spawns, and challenge those individuals and organisations that seek to pursue agendas that demonise and alienate European Muslims. At its most basic, the European Muslim Research Centre (EMRC) will seek to engage these kinds of falsehoods, and seek to explore, teach and examine the nuances of Muslim contributions in the European context. As an interdisciplinary centre, such a focus will mean contributing to debates about the role of Muslims and Islam from the perspectives of politics, history, law, business studies/economics, sociology, anthropology, literature, English, cultural studies, theology and the sciences. In this way, we hope to take academically sound research and introduce it as a corrective to the current debates over the role of Muslims in contemporary European society. Finally, we have contributed in recent years to what has become a dense and over-populated field of study: radicalisation, counterradicalisation and de-radicalisation. Nearly 100% of this crossdisciplinary study is focused on Muslims and it has the tendency, both intentionally and unwittingly, to problematise Muslims and their faith. It is our hope that this report will encourage scholars to return to a wider view of the problem of political violence - one in which the 'radicalisation' of convicted members of a violent extremist nationalist milieu such as ex-British soldier Terence Gavan receive as much detailed scholarly attention as convicted British Muslims who lacked Gavan's sophisticated bomb making skills. Details: Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, European Muslim Research Centre, 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2018 at: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Islamophobia_and_Anti-Muslim_Hate_Crime.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Islamophobia_and_Anti-Muslim_Hate_Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 117759 Keywords: Bias-Motivated CrimesHate CrimesHuman Rights AbusesIslamophobiaMuslimsRadicalization |
Author: Vargas, Alejandro, Jr. Title: Applying Psychosocial Theories of Terrorism to the Radicalization Process: A Mapping of De La Corte‘s Seven Principles to Homegrown Radicals Summary: This study contains an application of psychosocial theories to the process of radicalization among Muslim militants (jihadis) with a history of activity in the United States. Drawing extensively from De la Corte‘s seven psychosocial principles of terrorism, the study codes each principle into a corresponding example from case studies of American jihadism. The end result is the use of theory to create a new empirical and psychosocial perspective into homegrown jihadism. The application of De la Corte‘s theory is also used as a framework to suggest frameworks for detection, intervention, and interdiction when it comes to homegrown jihadi activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Shelf Number: 122777 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorists |
Author: Neumann, Peter Title: Preventing Violent Radicalization in America Summary: In December 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder told journalists that the terrorist threat had changed from “foreigners coming here to… people in the United States, American citizens.” A number of independent studies have confirmed this assessment. One of the most recent – published by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University – showed that “nearly half” of the 175 cases of al Qaeda-related homegrown terrorism since September 11, 2001 occurred in 2009 and 2010. The threat is sufficiently serious to ask whether the U.S. government is fully prepared to confront this new challenge. “Hard” counterterrorism efforts – both at home and abroad – have become sophisticated and successful, yet there still is no domestic equivalent of the State Department’s “Countering Violent Extremism” policy seeking to prevent young Americans from being radicalized at home. Last September’s report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) National Security Preparedness Group, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, concluded that the lack of a coherent approach towards domestic counter-radicalization has left America “vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying.” The purpose of this report is to provide guidance on ongoing efforts aimed at developing such an approach. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Shelf Number: 122909 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorists |
Author: Deardorff, Robert B. Title: Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity Summary: It is crucial for the United States to confront the increasing incidence of Americans who turn to violence against their fellow citizens in support of Islamist terrorists. This thesis explores the application of “soft power,” the government’s ability to mitigate the recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists by attraction rather than coercion, in order to prevent “homegrown” terrorism. Methods include a comparative policy analysis of counterterrorism models in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a survey of conservative Muslim leaders in the Houston area, and an extensive literature review. Recent arrests portend an increasing threat if the United States continues along its “hard power” path exclusively. Potential solutions require active engagement by government leaders, coordinated messaging, and continuing contact between government agencies and vulnerable communities. A broad national strategy, refined and implemented at a regional level, is required. Strategies that balance hard and soft power separate radicalizing influences from their recruiting pool, alter the social context of potential recruits in favor of democratic process, and make partners of potential antagonists. Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) offer a mechanism to develop and support strategies that combine government, nongovernment, and community leaders to combat terrorism at the ideological level. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed April 12, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Shelf Number: 124942 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)Violent Extremism |
Author: Liebling, Alison Title: An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 Years On Summary: This original research represents a significant milestone in our understanding of the role of an effective prison officer and the crucial ways in which prison staff contribute to positive relationships with offenders. While it represents a snapshot shot of one high security prison at one particular point in time, its findings present National Offender Management Service with an opportunity to reflect on the impact of changes within the high security estate, and beyond, of demographics, sentence management, power dynamics, faith issues and the particular challenges posed by extremism and concerns around radicalisation. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2012. 201p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-research/staff-prisoner-relations-whitemoor.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-research/staff-prisoner-relations-whitemoor.pdf Shelf Number: 125763 Keywords: Corrections OfficersPrison AdministrationPrison ManagementPrison StaffPrisoners (U.K.)PrisonsRadicalization |
Author: Lindekilde, Lassee Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Denmark Background Report Summary: This report provides background information for understanding and assessing the impact and effectiveness of Danish counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies on minority ethno-cultural communities, in particular Muslim ones. The report contextualises questions of impact – positive as well as negative – in Denmark in terms of the demographic/socio-economic profile of immigrants; general perceptions of threats from terrorism and perceptions of discrimination experienced by minorities; the legal framework of counter-terrorism; policies of radicalisation prevention and their implementation in practice; key institutional structures of counter-terrorism and division of labour; high profile terrorist court-cases; and developments in the general political climate and public discourse regarding issues of ‘integration’ and security. Part 1 of this report focuses on the demographic and socio-economic profile of minority communities in Denmark and on their perceptions of discrimination. It shows that immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants, most of whom are of Muslim origin, currently make up 6.8% of the Danish population, a proportion which is expected to increase to around 10% by 2050. These communities are of relatively recent origin: nearly all came after 1967, and 67% arrived in, or were born in, Denmark after 1980. Their socio-economic profile indicates relative disadvantage. Even allowing for the fact that they are younger than the general population, they are disproportionately absent from the labour market: only 50% of those of working age are employed, against 74% of ethnic Danes. 75% of ethnic Danes but only 49% of descendants from non-Western countries complete some form of further or vocational education. Those immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries who are employed are generally found at the lowest levels of the labour market. With regard to discrimination, one regular survey shows perceptions of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity/religion declining from 40% in 2000 to 31% in 2011, with discrimination encountered primarily in the workplace. Official figures for hate crimes report only a handful each year, but these figures are probably not reliable, and one survey reported a suspected racial motive in 10% of cases of violence and vandalism. Part 2 introduces the legal context of counter-terrorism in Denmark. It shows how Danish counterterrorism legislation was introduced in two main packages, one in 2002 and one in 2006, and looks at checks on counter-terrorism powers, both formal and in the shape of reactions in the public debate. In general, the 2002 and 2006 packages simply implement Council of the European Union, Council of Europe and United Nations resolutions, while the definition of terrorism employed is taken almost wordfor- word from the Council of the European Union resolution. Where Danish legislation has gone beyond these international models is primarily in regard to electronic surveillance and data collection, most notably in increasing access by the internal security service to the wealth of centrally linked, very detailed and generally accurate data concerning all individuals resident in Denmark that is held by various government departments and agencies. The use of secret evidence is also permitted in terrorism cases. Police gained stop-and-search powers in specified areas of Denmark in 2004, but in response to gang violence rather than terrorism. These powers are perceived to have been used especially against minority youths. Checks on all these powers consist primarily of international human rights law, which has occasionally been invoked in Danish courts, sometimes with success. There has been much public criticism surrounding the use of secret evidence to land convictions, and notably concern that in at least one case, a police informant may have been acting as an agent provocateur. Part 3 deals with Danish counter-radicalisation policies, while providing an overview of how these are perceived by the general public and by minority communities. This part shows how comprehensive counter-radicalisation measures were implemented in Denmark by one government in 2009 and then tacitly revised by another in 2011-12. The 2009 policy defined extremism very widely to include intolerant ideas and attitudes, and its counter-radicalisation measures included spreading information concerning democracy and citizenship. These and other measures were implemented by a range of local government bodies, building on existing practices, and coordinated and reinforced by a central government body. They included targeted interventions, initially by local government and mentors and ultimately by the internal security service. Of these measures, only the targeted interventions have been retained since the change of government in 2011. Part 3 also covers arrangements for oversight of both the internal security and foreign intelligence services, which are currently being revised following a number of controversial events, only one of which was connected to terrorism. Looking at the level of general trust and experiences of discrimination by the police among ethnic minority groups, it can be concluded that although trust is relatively high in comparative terms, there are groups of predominantly young male immigrant descendants living in urban areas who socialise little with ethnic Danes, who in general have lower average trust in the police and who experience a high level of police discrimination, notably in connection with ‘inspection zones’ in which stop-and-search powers can be used. Part 4 focuses on security threats and cases of terrorism in Denmark. There has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark since 2001, but there have been thirteen high-profile terrorist cases. Two of these involved the extreme left, while extreme right-wing violence has not so far been prosecuted as terrorism in Denmark, though there are signs of changes in attitudes since the Breivik attacks. Two cases involved attempted attacks on Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist responsible for the best-known cartoon published during the Cartoon Crisis (the one of the prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban), and four cases involved attempted attacks from outside Denmark against the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper that printed the cartoons. Other cases involved assistance to, or preparation for, terrorism; no targets were actually established. Part 5 offers a brief account of the development of the political climate in Denmark with regard to counter-terrorism and minority communities from 2001 until today. It shows that three events have had a significant impact on majority-minority relations in Denmark since 2001. One was the 2001 election campaign, which focused on ‘new politics’ issues of immigration, identity, and security. The second was the Cartoon Crisis of 2005-06, which took place against the background of the ‘new politics’ issues that had emerged in 2001, and caused a division in the public mind between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, as well as playing a part in the development of the original counter-radicalisation policies considered in part 3 of this report. The third was the election of 2011, which marked a turn away from the identity questions that had dominated the political agenda over the previous decade, and led to subsequent modifications in counter-radicalisation policies. Whether this last change will prove temporary or permanent remains to be seen. Part 6 of this report presents and discusses existing academic and official literature dealing with the impact and effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and of radicalisation prevention policies on minority groups in Denmark. Counter-terrorism measures might be considered a success in the sense that there has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark, but less so in terms of the possible contribution to the construction of Danish Muslims as a ‘suspect community’. Radicalisation prevention policies may be judged a success in terms of output, but outcomes are harder to assess. Some interventions may have worked, but certain academic studies, notably that of Lindekilde, indicate that counter-radicalisation discourses may have had an opposite impact from that intended, whether through frustrations generated by role-model campaigns or through the exclusion from the public debate of voices that fear accusations of radicalism, leaving the field open to those who have may have less to lose from such accusations. Three methodological challenges are identified: the case-based and anecdotal nature of the available data, which makes generalisation of impacts and valid conclusions on causality difficult; the difficulty of excluding alternative explanations of observed impact; and the often multiple, layered and abstract policy objectives, that create major problems in designing clear indicators of success. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Denmark URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Shelf Number: 126852 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Denmark)MinoritiesRacial DiscriminationRadical GroupsRadicalizationRight-Wing ViolenceSocio-Economic ConditionsTerrorists |
Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Sweden Background Report Summary: This report provides an overview of the development of counter-terrorism policies and policing in Sweden, and the impact these have had on minority communities in Sweden, particularly Muslim communities. The report presents existing research and information on demographics and socio-economic contexts of ethnic minority communities, the development of a legal framework to address terrorism, the history of policy and policing with regard to counter-terrorism, the security context and attitudes towards counter-terrorism, and the political context surrounding migration, citizenship and terrorism. Part One outlines the history and current context of immigration and settlement of ethnic minority groups in Sweden, and provides a background on Sweden’s demographics. In recent years, ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. This section provides an overview of Muslim migration to and settlement in Sweden, and the mixed and unfavourable outcomes for Muslims and other minority groups in the labour market, education and housing. It sets out recent data on ethnic and religious discrimination in Sweden, particularly towards Muslims after 9/11. Finally, this section outlines levels of cooperation between the government and Muslim civil society organisations, and notes that there have been high levels of cooperation; Muslim civil society organisations have also received generous funding from the state and Swedish foundations. Part Two details the key legislation used in relation to counter-terrorism in Sweden. Sweden was first confronted with acts of terrorism in the early 1970s, and the government introduced the first anti-terrorist legislation in 1973. It sets out the criminalisation of terrorist attacks, legal definitions of terrorism, and the institution of special laws on criminal responsibility for financing terrorism. This section furthermore discusses the legal framework for investigatory measures and surveillance, including the controversial FRA law which had allowed the National Defence Radio Establishment to monitor all phone and email communications to and within Sweden without warrant, and, after heavy criticism, was amended in 2009 to improve privacy. Part Two ends with a discussion of checks and balances on counter-terrorism measures and laws. Part Three covers the policy context for counter-terrorism, providing an overview of the key policies in place to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Sweden. These include the ‘Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism’, presented in December 2011, and ‘Sweden’s national counter-terrorism strategy’, presented by the government in February 2012. This section presents the key institutional structures, including the structure of the Swedish Police Service, and roles and responsibilities in countering terrorism in Sweden. It then outlines mechanisms for accountability within for these structures, detailing parliamentary committees and consultations set up to scrutinise the work of the police and other institutions. The section ends with a discussion of police behaviour and incidences of police misconduct and discrimination in Sweden. Several key incidents have drawn attention to the problem of racial profiling by the police in Sweden. Part Four discusses Swedish experiences with terrorism, providing an account of terrorist incidents in Sweden since the early 1970s, when cases of Croatian separatist terrorism brought terrorism onto the political agenda. This section includes the numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism offences in Sweden, and details several key events in recent years that have contributed to increased concerns about terrorism. This includes the 2007 publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, which sparked protests and violent threats towards Sweden and the cartoonist himself. The most recent significant terrorist attack on Swedish soil was the December 2010 suicide bombing in Stockholm, perpetrated by a Swedish citizen of Iraqi descent. This section also discusses perceptions of the threat of terrorism among the Swedish public. Part Five explains the political climate surrounding minority communities and counter-terrorism in Sweden, and how political parties have addressed issues concerning migration, citizenship, security and terrorism. Though Swedish politics has historically been characterised by consensus across party lines on the subject of immigration, and such issues have not been politicised, recent years have seen the perceived importance of immigration and terrorism as political issues grow. The emergence of the Sweden Democrats -an anti-immigrant party arguing for increased political attention to Islamist extremism and the ‘threat’ posed by Muslim communities- in Parliament has not wavered the positions of mainstream parties on these issues. However, this section notes that the climate has become much harsher and the ‘tough on crime’ card is more often played in election campaigns, and immigrants and Muslim communities in particular are often presented as ‘problem’ communities in this respect. This shift in climate has significantly impacted ethnic and religious minorities in Sweden, and has had a particularly negative impact on Muslim communities, who have increasingly become the victims of suspicion and hatred, manifested in discrimination and violence. This report draws upon existing research on the Swedish population, the development of migrant and minority communities, and in particular Muslim communities. It refers to official government communications and external analyses to paint a picture of the legal and policy approaches to counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism in Sweden. Though there are Ombudsman statistics available on mistreatment by the police, and there has been some recent research to better understand attitudes and discriminatory behaviour within the police, more work must be done to assess the relationship between minority communities and the police. There has been little research directly on the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities in Sweden, and this report lays the groundwork for future inquiries on this issue. Given the existing state of research, it is, however, clear that through a combination of persistent socio-economic disadvantage, shifts in the political climate on security and migrant communities, the occurrence of Sweden’s first suicide bombing by an Islamist extremist, and increased government attention paid to Islamist extremism in Sweden, Muslim communities in Sweden have increasingly been subject both to suspicion and discrimination. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Sweden URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Shelf Number: 126884 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Sweden)MinoritiesRacial DiscriminationRadical GroupsRadicalizationRight-Wing ViolenceSocio-Economic ConditionsTerrorists |
Author: Camilleri, Raphaelle Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report Summary: This report aims to provide an overview of French counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies, and assess their potential impact on the Muslim community in France. Part One focuses on the demographic composition and socioeconomic profile of the French Muslim community; the largest such community in the European Union. It finds that the Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in socioeconomic terms in relation to the mainstream French population, and that Muslims frequently report higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in France. This broad finding helps inform subsequent sections, which look specifically at perceived discrimination by French police and security services on the basis of racial or ethnic origin. Part Two focuses on the legal framework within which French counter-terrorism policy is anchored. It reviews the development of counter-terrorist legislation since the mid-1980s, and explains how French legislation has evolved in recent years to tackle the new challenges posed by novel forms of terrorism. This section of the report also outlines the key pieces of legislation governing the operation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in the fight against terrorism in France. It concludes by providing an overview of the main constitutional and institutional mechanisms which place checks and balances on the operation of the police agencies responsible for implementing counter-terrorist policies. Part Three of the report focuses on the law-enforcement agencies responsible for enacting counterterrorist policies ‘on the ground’. It provides a comprehensive list of the key government departments, as well as policing and intelligence agencies, involved in the fight against terrorism, and assesses the nature of their (often troubled) relationship with affected communities. Although more research is needed in this area, initial findings seem to suggest that Muslim communities generally perceive themselves to be unfairly targeted by the police on the basis of their ethnic or religious background. In light of these circumstances, In light of these circumstances, this section of the report also outlines official guidelines on non-discrimination and lists the various governmental and non-governmental institutions charged with protecting the rights of citizens. Part Four of the report looks at the broader security context within which counter-terrorist policies and legislation have been formulated in France. It critically assesses the extent of the terrorist threat in France, both in real and perceived terms. Two significant findings emerge. Firstly, despite the focus on religiouslymotivated Islamist terrorism since 2001, separatism terrorism carried out by Basque and Corsican nationalist groups continues to be the most pressing threat posed to the French state. Secondly, despite the initial trauma caused by Mohammed Merah’s killing spree, French public opinion nevertheless deems the terrorist threat to be quite low, suggesting that the French public does not regard terrorism as a pressing threat. Part Five builds on these initial observations by focusing on the way in which French political parties have framed the terrorist threat (particularly that emanating from suspected Islamists) especially in the aftermath of the Toulouse and Montauban shootings. It examines the impact of the shootings on the presidential race, but finds little evidence that they had any bearing on the final outcome of the election. Nevertheless, the strong performance of the far-right movement of Marine Le Pen (Front National) at the polls is underlined, but it is balanced against the conciliatory tone recently adopted by the left-wing government of François Hollande on security issues. Throughout this report, existing research by academic institutions, think tanks and government bodies on the impact of counter-terrorism policies on the Muslim community is referenced when relevant. Notable gaps in the literature are also highlighted, along with recommendations for further research. A full bibliography is provided for reference at the end of the document, as is an exhaustive list of academics, researchers, policymakers and civil society organisations, which may make a substantial contribution to future research in this area. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: France URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 127033 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (France)MinoritiesMuslimsRacial DiscriminationRadical GroupsRadicalizationRight-Wing ViolenceSocio-Economic ConditionsTerrorism |
Author: SpearIt Title: Facts and Fictions About Islam in Prison: Assessing Prisoner Radicalization in Post-9/11 America Summary: This report assesses the radicalization of Muslim prisoners in post-9/11 America. In the last decade, Muslim prisoners have been scrutinized for ties to terrorist and other extremist organizations, not to mention characterized as both a “threat” and a “danger” to national security, due to the influence of foreign jihadist movements. However, closer scrutiny shows that these fears have failed to materialize — indeed, despite the existence of an estimated 350,000 Muslim prisoners, there is little evidence of widespread radicalization or successful foreign recruitment, and only one documented case of prison-based terrorist activity. Nonetheless, some prison systems have implemented an aggressive posture toward these inmates and have made suppressive tactics their bedrock policy. This approach unfortunately overlooks Islam’s long history of positive influence on prisoners, including supporting inmate rehabilitation for decades. Moreover, Muslim inmates have a long history of using the court system to establish and expand their rights to worship and improve their conditions of confinement. Hence, a closer look at “life on the ground” turns the prevailing discourse on its head by demonstrating that Islam generally brings peace to inmates and that the greatest “threat” posed by Muslim inmates is not violence, but lawsuits. Details: Saint, Louis, MO: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2013. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, January 2013 Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-5: Accessed February 11, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206583 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206583 Shelf Number: 127565 Keywords: IslamPrisonsRadical GroupsRadicalizationRe-entryRehabilitation |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomegrown TerroristsHomeland SecurityJihadist TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Spalek, Basia Title: Key Evaluation Findings of the West Midlands (WM) 1-2-1 Mentoring Scheme Summary: This report presents key findings from an evaluation of the West Midlands One-to-One (WM 1-2-1) mentoring project. The project arose from a concern that there is a shortage of easily accessible and quality assured, accredited and vetted mentors who can provide one-to-one support to people assessed to be at risk of violent extremism (Al Qaeda influenced, extreme Right Wing and Animal Rights). The initial focus of the project was to design a structure for selection and recruitment of a suitable pool of mentors, with agreed professional daily rates; as well as to develop a governance plan to sustain the process after the first phase of recruitment. Dr Basia Spalek, Professor Lynn Davies and Dr Laura Zahra McDonald from the University of Birmingham were commissioned to undertake an evaluation study of the scheme. This focussed on examining whether the WM 1-2-1 mentoring project was addressing its key objectives and whether it had a sustainable business model. It therefore looked at the managerial structure, the concept of mentoring, the support and training needs of mentors, risk, the measurement of success and how the project would enhance understanding of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The methodology comprised interviewing in depth 16 people across the different management components of the scheme (Project Board, Steering Group, Mentor Selection Panel), observing meetings of these Boards and analysing documentation. The evaluation is qualitative, presenting the views of participants, seeking patterns of agreement as well as debate, and relating to existing literature and research. Details: Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, Institute of Applied Social Studies, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2013 at: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/west-midlands-1-2-1-evaluation-findings.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/west-midlands-1-2-1-evaluation-findings.pdf Shelf Number: 127815 Keywords: Mentoring (U.K.)Radical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida understand that they can now wield influence as effectively with a video camera and an Internet connection as with an improvised explosive device. Such groups also invest heavily in their marketing capabilities. They have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at this form of strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Al-Qaida’s call to arms, for example, is a globally resonant expression of its outlook, grievances, agenda, and demands and has a proven ability to turn passive observers into active participants in violent extremism. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report is the result of a study, undertaken as part of a broader effort on the part of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation to enhance multilateral capacities to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, that aims to examine how this message has been perceived and received by three key stakeholder communities around the United Nations: its own staff (at headquarters, in specialized agencies, and in the field); member states; and the broader public, collectively considered the “UN community.” Three main objectives underpin this project. 1. To identify the core message of the United Nations on countering terrorism and violent extremism and how this message shapes counterterrorism policy and practice 2. To examine whether and how this message informs and impacts three key audiences: (a) the UN system, including field missions and specialized agencies; (b) UN member states; and (c) the broader public 3. To explore how strategic communication can be used to enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism and contribute to national and regional efforts to address terrorism and diminish radicalization and recruitment that bolster extremist groups This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication tools can amplify and enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, through the United Nations’ own initiatives as well as by supporting member states. The first two sections offer an overview of counterterrorism practice and the shift toward prevention, as well as the parallel shift at the United Nations, where the focus on preventive diplomacy, mediation, and conflict prevention has increased over the past decade. Section three examines the evaluation of strategic communication in practice and how it has been adopted by governments, civil society, and extremist groups. Sections four and five offer an analysis of UN counterterrorism communication and how it is perceived by internal and external audiences. Section six sets out some key lessons learned regarding the practice of strategic communication; although this study focuses on the United Nations, these principles may also be applicable to national and civil society actors. The last section offers a set of practical recommendations for consideration by UN actors, ranging from the macro to the micro level, in many instances considering how these ideas may be initiated within the existing counterterrorism architecture at the United Nations. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Shelf Number: 127841 Keywords: CounterrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Berkebile, Richard E. Title: Causes of Domestic Terrorism: 1970-2010 Summary: Contrary to conventional wisdom, the structural determinants of transnational and domestic terrorism are not necessarily synonymous. A domestic terrorism event population was derived by applying definitional criteria to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database. Economic, political, systemic, and social structural determinants were tested with a negative binomial regression on 194 states between 1970 and 2010. Results suggested an inverse U relationship between wealth and the incidence of terrorism. Interestingly, short term economic growth had the opposite effect. It depressed terrorism. Political regimes were categorized into three different types - autocracies, anocracies, or democracies. Autocracies were the least susceptible to terrorism. Anocracy was the regime type most conducive to terrorism. Democratic regimes occupied the middle space. They suffered more terrorism than dictatorships but less than anocratic regimes. Cold War bipolarity systemically encouraged terrorism compared to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era, suggesting superpower rivalry manifested in more terrorist violence. Social tension effects varied depending on type. Linguistic fractionalization increased the incidence of violence. Paradoxically, ethnic fractionalization impeded terrorism. Religious fractionalization had little impact on terrorism. Among control variables, population and a history of terrorism were directly related to terrorism. Mountain terrain and urbanization were not significantly related to it. Details: Columbia, MO: University of Missouri-Columbia, 2012. 191p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 127851 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.)Homeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Variables |
Author: Mesoy, Atle Title: Poverty and Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: A Causal Link? Summary: The consensus in past research into terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) is that generally there is no link between poverty and radicalisation, and if such a link exists, it is a weak one. However, insufficient attention has been paid to how terrorism has changed over the last few years to become a phenomenon that frequently occurs in weak, conflict-ridden states. In these states, poverty seems to play an essential role especially with regard to the motivation of suicide bombers. In the case of Pakistan, a current hotbed of terrorism, little research has been done on this issue and what little research that has been conducted points in opposite directions. However, more recent research has concluded that RVE and terrorism have to be researched in each country/area where terrorism exists and conclusions cannot be generalised to all countries. There is reason to believe that there is a causal link between poverty and RVE, especially in countries such as Pakistan, where there are high levels of poverty and militant groups both recruit and supply social services, and where poverty-stricken young men have few livelihood options other than that of joining a militant group. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2013. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: NOREF Expert Analysis: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Shelf Number: 128212 Keywords: Economic Conditions and CrimePovertyRadical Groups (Pakistan)RadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism Summary: Following the intervention of the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia in October 2011 in reaction to the increase in kidnappings on the Kenyan coast, the threat of terrorism in Kenya increased considerably. Initially the perception was that the threat originated from Somalia and that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans consequently committed attacks in Kenya. As arrests were made, Kenya was confronted with the reality that Kenyan nationals were responsible for the majority of these attacks. This sparked introspection and the need to understand where this threat originated. This paper aims to provide an overview of the threat of terrorism in Kenya; to consider the drivers of radicalisation, especially among the youth; and to propose counter-strategies that policymakers and security officials might adopt to prevent and counter radicalisation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 245: Accessed May 3, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Kenya URL: Shelf Number: 128615 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismYouthful Offenders (Kenya) |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists Summary: The troublesome question of how and whether to consider what are commonly referred to as Lone Wolf terrorists within the broader roster of terrorist groups is something that has regularly confounded security analysts for a variety of reasons. This article attempts to create some sort of typology to start to define the group, with specific reference to the instances of Lone Wolves (or Lone Wolf Packs, an admittedly paradoxical choice of words that is defined in the article as small, isolated groups of individuals involved in terrorism) who claim to adhere to an extremist Islamist ideology. The article offers four subsets to the definition, drawing upon a detailed analysis of a variety of different plots in Europe and North America: Loner, Lone Wolf, Lone Wolf Pack, and Lone Attacker. The purpose of the article is to offer some preliminary thoughts on the issue of Lone Wolves, and start a process towards deeper understanding and closer analysis of the phenomenon. This is of particular salience given the frequency with which security analysts cite the phenomenon as a threat and the increasing way in which Al Qaeda ideologues refer to it. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2014 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf Shelf Number: 131928 Keywords: Islam Lone Wolf Terrorism RadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Christmann, Kris Title: Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence Summary: The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales' (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review. The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis. Furthermore, although a growing body of literature investigating the radicalisation process is emerging, the weight of that literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation. As such, the evidence is concerned with that smaller cohort of individuals who, once radicalised, go on to commit acts of violence in the pursuit of political or religious aims and objectives. This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the radicalisation process that preceeds terrorism, including radicalisation that does not lead to violence. Despite these limitations, the systematic review found that Islamic radicalisation and terrorism emanate from a very heterogeneous population that varies markedly in terms of education, family background, socio-economic status and income. Several studies have identified potential risk factors for radicalisation, and, among these, political grievances (notably reaction to Western foreign policy) have a prominent role. The review found only two evaluated UK programmes that explicitly aimed to address Islamic radicalisation in the UK. These were outreach and engagement projects running in London: the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and the 'Street' Project. In addition, the review drew heavily upon the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) rapid evidence assessment, Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence (Pratchett et al, 2010). This advocated the adoption of capacity building and empowering young people, and interventions that "challenge ideology that focus on theology and use education/training". The Netherlands-based Slotervaart Project was identified as an exemplar of the outreach/community-based approach recommended by the DCLG review. The review also considered a number of de-radicalisation programmes operating in several Islamic countries and programmes tackling right-wing radicalisation. These programmes provide some potential learning points for future UK programmes, chiefly around the need for those engaging with radicalised individuals to carry authority and legitimacy, and to be equipped with profound ideological knowledge. Details: London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Shelf Number: 131942 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsInterventionsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationReligionViolent Extremism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Countering Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort "combating violent extremism" (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting. The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the Administration released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP's three objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: R42553: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Shelf Number: 131948 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationViolent Extremism |
Author: CLEEN Foundation Title: Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria Summary: The violent activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which draws its members largely from the youth, have underpinned growing concern over youth radicalization and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. Radicalisation as it is understood here entails the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. Against this backdrop, this study examined the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The aim of the study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study were to: Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria; Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalization to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and Proffer actionable recommendations on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis. The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, and primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires and focus group discussions. Commissioned consultants and researchers conducted the field study in two towns in six states in Northern Nigeria - Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe - selected for the study. It found that ignorance of the true teachings of the religion (Islam) provides the most important source through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by extremist or terrorist groups. The study also found that the excesses of security forces are not a 'major' factor in youth radicalisation, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. However, obvious shortcomings of security forces deployed in counter Boko Haram operations need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities. In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the study recommended, among others, better monitoring and regulation of religious preaching in Nigeria; creation of job opportunities for the youth; delivery of robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children; expansion of access to quality education; and promotion of peace education. In view of some limitations encountered, the study concluded that there was still much to be done in unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisation, particularly in relation to the specificities of each state where the phenomenon of radicalisation has and is taking place in Northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the utility of the study lies in the fact that it has taken the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria through an empirical research. The distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and sustainable solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria. Details: Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2014. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series, No. 20: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Shelf Number: 132802 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Radical Groups RadicalizationReligionTerrorist Organizations Terrorists (Nigeria) |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Radicalisation in Kenya Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Summary: Despite a history of extremism and unconventional political developments in Kenya, relatively little empirical research has been done to determine why and how individuals join al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). This paper is based on interviews with Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan individuals associated with al-Shabaab and the MRC. These organisations have very different profiles. Al-Shabaab pursues an Islamist terrorist agenda while the MRC pursues a secessionist agenda; the latter has not carried out terrorist attacks. Muslim youth have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they see as government-imposed 'collective punishment' driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals are potential terrorists. As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/ religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 265: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper265.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper265.pdf Shelf Number: 133184 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadical Groups (Kenya)Radicalization |
Author: Feakin, Tobias Title: The new frontiers of Islamist extremism: Understanding the threat that al-Qaeda affiliates pose to African security Summary: Over the past decade various groups that had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three groups- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. All of these groups are separate from the al-Qaeda core. They haven't taken up the al-Qaeda model because they've been told to, but they're emulating it. They're all looking to become dispersed, decentralised movements that frame local grievances in the language of the global jihad. For the international community, the danger lies not so much in the immediate threat to Western targets from African Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state that would provide a base for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists. The proven capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups' most immediate international impact. There are no clear solutions for African states combating the Islamist groups but any solution will necessarily be complex. Unfortunately, if the situation's allowed to continue, there is danger that we'll see a rise in instability in the regions where the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 133413 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Africa)Radical GroupsRadicalizationViolent Extremists |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia Summary: Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab's rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 266: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Shelf Number: 133566 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (Africa) |
Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan Summary: - Kyrgyzstan, having twice overthrown autocratic leaders in violent uprisings, in 2005 and again in 2010, is the most politically open and democratic country in Central Asia. - Many Kyrgyz observers remain concerned about the country's future. They fear that underlying socioeconomic conditions and lack of public services-combined with other factors, such as drug trafficking from Afghanistan, political manipulation, regional instability in former Soviet Union countries and Afghanistan, and foreign-imported religious ideologies-create an environment in which violent extremism can flourish. - One of the fault lines occurring among its population of 5.7 million is between those who value the Soviet legacy of secularism, svetski in Russian, and an emerging generation that sees Islam as a core part of its identity. The mistrust between these two constituencies prevents them from addressing a mutually recognized problem: the grassroots radicalization of young men and women, especially in Fergana Valley. - The polarizing influences of hyper-ethnic nationalists and uneducated and often unaccredited religious leaders is particularly worrisome for women, whose status has become marginalized over the past two decades. Extremist notions with regard to limited women's rights are a bellwether for instability down the road. - A long-term strategy to counter violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan requires finding common ground between leaders and influential members of the secular and religious constituencies. Together they can develop strategies to foster a national identity inclusive of diverse religious creeds and ethnic backgrounds and to challenge extremist ideas on religious, moral, and cultural grounds. - To offset pressures from Russia and China, its larger neighbors to the north and east, more coherent efforts are needed to find effective practices in countering violent extremism between Kyrgyzstan and its immediate neighbors, such as Kazakhstan, that involve other regional actors and institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 355: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Shelf Number: 133945 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomics Conditions and CrimeViolent Extremism (Kyrgyzstan) |
Author: Saifudeen, Omer Ali Title: The Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model Summary: The starting premise of this study is that internet-based communications possess unique characteristics that warrant the need to have a discrete pathway model to explain online radicalisation. This online radicalisation pathway model would especially apply to the growing communities of young netizens whose socio-psychological makeup is shaping a "new normal" in the way we exchange information and interact. The proposed Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model (CEOP) describes how online cognitive radicalisation can move towards real-world violent extremism. The model also elucidates the multitude of competing forces in cyberspace that promote or impede such radicalization and what this means for online counter-radicalisation strategies. The CEOP model is based on inferences made from content and discourse analysis of extremist narratives on the internet and current studies about internet-based communications. The research took into account distinctive factors that made internet-based messaging more persuasive and this includes the effects of crowdsourcing. Finally, the CEOP model suggests how the same persuasive communication strategies used on the internet by extremists can be conversely used to counter online radicalisation. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Working Paper No. 283: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Shelf Number: 134170 Keywords: CybercrimeExtremismExtremist GroupsInternetRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Title: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach Summary: Terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE. The OSCE participating States are determined to combat all acts of terrorism, without exception, as most serious crimes. States, through their police agencies in particular, have a duty to protect all individuals within their jurisdictions from terrorism, as part of their human rights obligations to guarantee the right to life, the right to security and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. This requires that they adopt a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), while upholding human rights and the rule of law. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's actions against terrorism will be undermined if the state, through any of its agencies, uses its power in violation of international human rights standards. As the police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial that the police be held accountable for their actions in order to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, people advocating the abolition of slavery or who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion or ethnicity. Countering VERLT requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There are many issues, relevant but not specific to terrorism that need to be genuinely addressed, in their own right and without undue security bias. The police have a key role in the criminal-justice response to VERLT, but their role should be limited in proactive prevention efforts. The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon. OSCE participating States have acknowledged the usefulness of such joint efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in countering terrorism. There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Details: Vienna: OSCE, 2014. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Shelf Number: 134917 Keywords: Community-PolicingCounter-terrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists (Europe)Violent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism Summary: Unlike traditional law-enforcement and military responses to terrorism and conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts take a preventive approach aimed at reducing the appeal and recruiting potential of extremist groups. Recent attacks across the world, such as those in Ottawa and Sydney, for example, have highlighted concerns about smaller groups and individuals who may be acting with little or no formal association with a terrorist group. Consequently, preventive approaches that serve to enhance early identification and response capacities have gained greater traction. The relative youth of foreign fighters traveling from both Western and non-Western countries to Iraq and Syria has also highlighted the need for creative and innovative interventions. However, despite the increased emphasis on countering violent extremism by governments and international actors like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), preventive approaches have continued to focus on measures associated with criminal justice, law enforcement, and legal responses. The use of sports, arts, and culture is sometimes considered by policymakers and practitioners as too peripheral to security issues and yet extremist groups effectively utilize them in their narratives and recruitment strategies. Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism have sought increasingly to engage youth, communities, and marginalized groups, including women, and sports, arts, and culture offer much underutilized platforms to address the ideologies and root causes of violent extremism. As the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy notes, in the long term, such efforts "will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield." To foster a more inclusive discourse on multidimensional approaches to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, have partnered on a series of workshops to bring together governments, practitioners, and experts to share lessons learned and best practices, as well as to inform the development and implementation of CVE policies and programs. One of these workshops, held at Hedayah in Abu Dhabi in May 2014, focused on the role of sports, arts, and culture in CVE efforts, particularly on the ways they might enhance educational initiatives to directly or indirectly contribute to CVE objectives. The workshop drew on, and complemented, other discussions that focused on the role of education and the roles of families and communities in countering violent extremism and enhancing community resilience, and projects focused on counternarratives and strategic communication, among others. This brief explores the history of cultural diplomacy and use of sports in conflict situations and draws on discussions at the May 2014 workshop, as well as desk research, to examine relevant lessons learned and good practices for integrating sports, arts, and culture into CVE efforts. It concludes with some practical policy and programming recommendations for policymakers and practitioners focusing on countering violent extremism. It is important to note that sports, arts, and cultural interventions for CVE purposes should take into consideration the local push and pull factors leading to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism as well as the local context where these policies and programs will be carried out. That is, sports, arts, and cultural programming do not necessarily have to be specifically related to countering violent extremism, but this policy brief outlines ways in which sports, arts, and culture could be effectively integrated into CVE programming. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Shelf Number: 135391 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSportsViolence PreventionsViolent Extremism |
Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland SecurityLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Euer, Katrin Title: Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalization (STRESAVIORA) Part I: Literature analysis Summary: Radicalization is a complex process. Former research pointed to the importance of multiple factors covering the social-, demographic- and psychological spheres. Furthermore, triggers like the deceasing of a family member or drastic events that circulate on (social) media, play an important part in the development of radical ideas. Especially youngsters and adolescents who are in the process of developing a social identity, are vulnerable to influences from charismatic role models or peers. In this report the results of the research on the process of violent radicalization are presented. During this research, our focus evolved from paying attention to deradicalization interventions and risk factors to prevent radicalization, to a mind set in which we became conscious that the focus should be on positive experiences, instead of fighting against situations we do not want to happen. An overview is given of risk factors as well as protective factors on several levels and related to different spheres in the process of violent radicalization. In the consulted literature, little has been written about protective factors, therefore our aim was to uncover these during the qualitative interviews. Instead of only focussing on aspects which should be banished, attention should be paid to hopes, wishes and dreams. Further, in this report an overview of promising practices concerning trainings for the enlargement of resilience among youths is presented. This research aims to prevent certain (radical) attitudes to develop. Although the process of involvement in radical movements or developing radical attitudes is difficult to grasp, some preventive strategies could be identified. Also, indicators to take into account for the design and evaluation of trainings are discussed, in order to hand out guidelines for the development of tools. There is no univocal answer to the question: which measure or intervention is the most effective and efficient. Yet, we state that a comprehensive, integrated approach is useful if combined with a focus on positive factors, in order to increase youngsters� resilience to prevent involvement in violent radicalization. Details: Brussels: Belgian Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Shelf Number: 135542 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadical Groups (Europe)RadicalizationTerroristsViolence |
Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online Summary: This report was commissioned by the Danish government and has been written by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). It draws on discussions and conclusions from three days of meetings in Copenhagen in June 2013 with a range of relevant stakeholders to discuss ways of tackling online extremism. Co-organised by the Danish government and ISD, these international meetings involved academics, practitioners, central and local government policy makers, intelligence agencies and representatives from the private technology sector. The purpose of this paper is not to summarise those discussions, but drawing on them to offer a framework and series of recommendations for the ways that governments should structure and resource their responses to online extremism. The report offers the following findings and recommendations for governments: Extremists and violent extremists are using the Internet and social media to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people to their cause, whether as passive supporters, active enthusiasts or those willing to become operational. Not enough has been done to date to tackle the use of the Internet and social media by extremists and violent extremists. Most effort has been focused on negative measures, such as take-downs and filtering. While this is important, more focus and resources need to be invested to enable the silent majority to be better equipped to see through extremist propaganda, take control of online spaces, and actively push back on extremist messages. There are three areas where government should focus its efforts: Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people i. Governments should support mainstream digital literacy and critical consumption programmes through state schools and also support provision through youth and community organisations; ii. Governments should support at arm's length projects working with at risk youth to deconstruct extremist messages Increasing counter-messaging, counter-narrative and alternative narrative activity: i. Government strategic communications need to be centralised and coordinated, either through a dedicated unit or by assigning lead status to a single unit or department ii. Governments need to be realistic about the challenges that limit their ability to play an active 'messenger' role in counter-narrative, apart from in limited circumstances. iii. Governments should make significant investments in funding non-governmental organisations able to offer credible alternatives. Building the capacity of credible messengers: i. Governments should make significant investments in building the skills and expertise of the most effective counter-messengers to build their capacity in technology, production, communications, and campaigning. ii. Governments should use their convening power to bring the private tech sector to the table as their expertise can help the voices of credible messengers. iii. Governments should fund centralised information gathering to provide economies of scale and ensure that effective counter-messengers have the information they need to work, such as analytics, audience profiling, and the sharing of good practice in alternative and counter-narratives. iv. Government must work multilaterally to pool resources in this area, taking an active role in streamlining the cross-border exchange of expertise and lessons learned in capacity building. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Shelf Number: 135638 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationExtremist GroupsOnline ExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial Networks |
Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention Summary: Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of 'the enemy', and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the 'rise of the far right' remains confused in many ways. Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two? Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Although the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural environments that inform them. For example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot "simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture." Despite this, by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135685 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Behr, Ines von Title: Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Summary: This paper presents the results from exploratory primary research into the role of the internet in the radicalisation of 15 terrorists and extremists in the UK. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners and the academic community have begun to examine how the internet influences the process of radicalisation: how a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism associated with terrorism. This study advances the evidence base in the field by drawing on primary data from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations. The 15 cases were identified by the research team together with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and UK Counter Terrorism Units (CTU). The research team gathered primary data relating to five extremist cases (the individuals were part of the Channel programme, a UK government intervention aimed at individuals identified by the police as vulnerable to violent extremism), and ten terrorist cases (convicted in the UK), all of which were anonymised. Our research supports the suggestion that the internet may enhance opportunities to become radicalised and provide a greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs. However, our evidence does not necessarily support the suggestion that the internet accelerates radicalisation or replaces the need for individuals to meet in person during their radicalisation process. Finally, we didn't find any supporting evidence for the concept of self-radicalisation through the internet. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Shelf Number: 136018 Keywords: Extremist GroupsInternet CrimeRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 136368 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Exxtremism |
Author: Edwards, Charlie Title: Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada Summary: When the Kanishka project was being designed in 2010, there was a widespread perception both within Canada and internationally that the country had largely managed to avoid the threat from Al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism. While there had been one or two isolated cases, these were rare exceptions. Canadian government officials rightly described the threat picture in Canada as 'limited' in comparison with European states and the country's next door neighbour, the US, where attacks directed by Al-Qa'ida had been successful or had reached a mature stage in planning. In contrast, the domestic threat picture in Canada was relatively benign. During the fieldwork phase the authors found this view to be largely still accepted by politicians, law-enforcement practitioners and the public at large. What was interesting to the authors, however, was that this view - influenced by events in Canada and overseas - was changing. A few cases of predominantly Islamist terrorism with links to Canada had appeared over the years. These cases involved, for example, Ahmed Ressam and Momin Khawaja, two individuals with Canadian passports (indeed, Khawaja is Canadian-born). They had connected with elements close to Al-Qaiida and had been involved in planning attacks at the international level, but neither had planned to launch terrorist attacks within Canada itself. A more 'home-grown' threat appeared to emerge in 2006, when Canada's security and intelligence agencies uncovered the so-called 'Toronto 18' cell; their ambitious plans were the first expression of a maturing and purely domestic threat, seeking connections through a network of young radicals across Europe and North America. The plot was successfully disrupted before it reached fruition. Shortly before the publication of this report, the situation changed dramatically as Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism. On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa; police exchanged fire and eventually shot dead the gunman inside the parliament building. Two days earlier, Martin Couture-Rouleau had deliberately driven a car into a group of Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, killing one and injuring others. Both individuals are thought to have been recent converts to Islam who had become radicalised. Prior to these events, the last major attack that had directly involved Canadian citizens with links to the homeland was the bombing on 23 June 1985 of Air India Flight 182 when Sikh extremists killed 329 people - the majority of whom were Canadian citizens flying from Toronto. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201502https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Shelf Number: 136369 Keywords: Community PolicingDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? Summary: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies. Summary - Afghanistan's population is among the world's youngest and fastest growing: half its population is under eighteen and more than three-quarters under forty. - The need is dire for strategies and policies to respond to the largest and fastest-growing segment of the population and to enable these citizens to meaningfully engage in their country's affairs. - Many young men are frustrated with real and perceived injustice, regular and observable impunity and corruption, and lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities. - All those who want to learn more about radical and violent extremist ideologies do not necessarily become violent extremists. - Violent extremist groups such as the Taliban use traditional and modern media tools and platforms to lure youth into jihad. - Being proactively opposed to extremism not only undermines the appeal of such messages but also offers alternative narratives. - To address grievances appropriately, the international community must continue to provide assistance to the Afghan state on fundamental issues, such as corruption and rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief No. 188: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Shelf Number: 136458 Keywords: ExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Responding to cyber jihad: towards an effective counter narrative Summary: "Who is in control of the narrative?" is the mantra that now echoes in the hallways of the EU's headquarters in Brussels. Spurred in part by large-scale jihadist propaganda, approximately 20,000 people from 50 countries have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria. So far, authorities in their countries of origin have not been able to address the jihadist radicalisation messages transmitted via the internet and social media. Many new initiatives were recently announced, however, including the establishment of a European counter-narrative centre in Brussels. In this research paper, ICCT Research Fellow Dr. Bibi van Ginkel analyses the role of the internet and social media in processes of radicalisation. It offers an outline of the various aspects of the jihadist narrative, in order better to understand what message needs to be countered. The counter-actions against this cyber jihad can take different forms. Parallel to the way in which advertisement campaigns are tailored to sell products to a certain target group, strategic communication should take into account how a number of recurring elements play a role in the counter-messaging. The understanding of who the target group is, what jihadist narrative is used and how that message can be countered, who the credible messenger should be, and what medium can best be used to deliver the message are all relevant questions that can only be answered in a context-specific manner. The report concludes with several recommendations on how the recently announced new European counter-narrative centre can effectively contribute to the already diverse landscape of counter-narrative initiatives. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136490 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Keen, David Title: Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding. A discussion paper Summary: Security threats defined as stemming from 'terrorism' or 'rogue regimes' have significant public profile, and have led to responses from different branches of government. In tackling these threats - through counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding - a 'mainstream' approach has evolved, which involves defining conflicts in a way that designates some actors as 'spoiler(s)' (i.e. 'terrorists', 'radicalised groups', etc.) and proceeds to address such conflicts by opposing 'spoilers' in partnership with whatever allies can be found. The paper begins from the assumption that counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches - while distinct from each other, and different in different contexts - are linked in important ways, and have followed a discernible pattern in recent decades as part of what we describe here as the 'mainstream' approach. This typically involves use of military force, generally combined with - or followed by - some kind of 'stabilisation' or 'statebuilding' effort. This can involve negotiating a pragmatic 'deal' with influential actors (with a willingness to overlook the limitations of allies), which reinforces those actors included in the deal while continuing to use force against 'spoilers'. However, as the recent past illustrates, this approach has not proven to have had sustainable success; here we examine the drawbacks of this position and propose alternatives to the mainstream. In this paper, David Keen and Larry Attree discuss how the international community has tried to counter terror, achieve stability, build states and foster peace around the world. It examines whether these objectives and approaches are being pursued effectively and coherently and whether there are contradictions between them. It is based on a review of relevant literature, is not exhaustive in scope, and is intended to stimulate debate among the policy actors and practitioners engaged in these approaches. Details: London: Saferworld, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/875-dilemmas-of-counter-terror-stabilisation-and-statebuilding Year: 2015 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 136504 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Great Britain. Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism Title: Tackling Extremism in the UK Summary: The UK deplores and will fight terrorism of every kind, whether based on Islamist, extreme right-wing or any other extremist ideology. We will not tolerate extremist activity of any sort, which creates an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them on a pathway towards terrorism. The killing of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich was the impetus to look closely at whether the government was doing all it could to confront extremism and radicalisation. We know that the international terrorist threat to the UK comes primarily from those people who are inspired by Al Qa'ida's distorted interpretation of Islam and use that as justification for killing innocent people. But we must tackle extremism of all kinds, including the Islamophobia and neo-Nazism espoused by the murderer of Mohammed Saleem to justify his terrorist attacks against mosques in the West Midlands. The Prime Minister set up the Extremism Task Force to identify any areas where our current approach was lacking and to agree practical steps to fight against all forms of extremism. We have made progress since this government came to power. We have removed over 18,000 items of online terrorist propaganda and intervened more often than ever before to limit the opportunities for hate preachers to spread their messages. But we recognise that we can and should do more. This response is broader than dealing only with those who espouse violence - we must confront the poisonous extremist ideology that can lead people to violence; which divides communities and which extremists use to recruit individuals to their cause; which runs counter to fundamental British values such as freedom of speech, democracy and equal rights; which says that 'the West' is at war with Islam and that it is not possible to be a true Muslim and to live an integrated life in the UK. Details: London: HM Government, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136617 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: Michel, Steve Title: Use of Programs and Interventions with Canada's Federally Sentenced Radicalized Offenders Summary: What it means By examining the institutional and community-based interventions which the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has utilized with radicalized offenders and the congruence of these interventions with identified needs, CSC achieves a more comprehensive understanding of how past and current intervention options address the needs of radicalized offenders. This knowledge can be used to inform any future intervention referrals for radicalized offenders, identify limitations in current intervention options, and highlight opportunities for adaptation of existing or new interventions for this group. What we found The three most commonly attended interventions by radicalized offenders were identified as institutional employment, education, and psychological services. When examining core correctional programming specifically, radicalized offenders were most likely to participate in living skills, violent offender, personal development, and substance abuse programming, however this involvement was much less frequently identified than participation in other institutional interventions such as social programs or chaplaincy. Those with an identified need in the education and employment domain were the most likely to participate in at least one intervention that addressed the education and employment domain. The next most common need domain addressed was community functioning (for those assessed by the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis, or DFIA) and personal/emotional needs (for those assessed by both the DFIA and its revised version DFIA-R). Least likely to be addressed were needs related to the marital/family domain; however this was a need area that was not frequently identified as problematic for radicalized offenders. Why we did this study Since 1989, CSC has applied the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principle in order to identify and address the risks and criminogenic needs of the federally sentenced offender population. The effectiveness of this approach has been empirically assessed and validated on offender populations in general. However, to date, there has not been research to demonstrate the applicability of the RNR principle with radicalized offenders. This paper identifies the interventions in which radicalized offenders participated in relation to their identified criminogenic and violent extremist needs. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report No. R-345: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136628 Keywords: Correctional ProgramsCounter-terrorismRadicalizationRadicalized offendersRehabilitationRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Tahiri, Hussein Title: Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia Summary: Community and Radicalisation: an Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia was a year-long national study designed and conducted as a qualitative research project through a partnership between Victoria Police, Victoria University and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The key aims of the study were: - To identify how communities understand the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism. - To explore community perceptions of the underlying drivers for radicalization and extremism. - To explore perceptions of the impact of radicalization and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion. - To solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism in Australia. - To provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies and strategies to counter radicalisation and extremism in Australia. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University and Victoria Police, 2013. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 136689 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Violent Extremists in Federal Institutions: Estimating Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization in the Federal Offender Population Summary: There is a growing recognition of the need to understand and address violent extremist threats in Western countries. Given that the majority of research in this area has been conducted on nonoffender populations outside of Canada, there is a need to better understand the scope, nature, and process of radicalization in Canada. In recognition of the fact that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is in a position to contribute to addressing this gap, Public Safety Canada entered into a Letter of Agreement with the CSC to produce a report focused on CSC's data holdings on and estimation of violent extremism. This report summarizes the data holdings and gaps in the area, as well as the results of three studies focused on the examination and estimation of radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization of offenders under CSC's jurisdiction. The first study was a qualitative examination of the unique characteristics of offenders who are radicalized and who are susceptible to radicalization, from the perspective of operational staff. Based on data collected at a total of 10 focus groups involving institutional and community security and front-line staff from each of CSC's five regions, a number of themes emerged. Participants recognized the complex, multi-faceted nature of radicalization, and identified a wide range of behaviours indicative of radicalization or susceptibility to radicalization. In most cases, responses (e.g., vocalization of shared grievance, changes in religion) were consistent with the literature, though staff also suggested unique responses. Staff also drew attention to areas of possible improvement. The second study was a quantitative examination of differences between radicalized and nonradicalized offenders. Informed by literature and by the results of study 1, radicalized and nonradicalized offenders were compared on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data. There were many areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders, including ethnicity and citizenship, education and employment, substance abuse history, previous contact with the criminal justice system, and characteristics of their offence(s). The data suggested that, in some ways, radicalized offenders may be more similar to radicalized individuals in the community than to other offenders. The third study involved a theory-drive attempt to identify constructs associated with susceptibility to radicalization. Based on a literature and data review, frequency analysis of variables, and principle component analysis, nine constructs were identified and explored. Though considerable additional work is required to confirm the role and nature of these constructs in influencing susceptibility, this study represents an important first step in this endeavour. Together, the three studies have allowed the CSC to contribute to the evidence base surrounding violent extremism in Canada. The results of these studies may also inform institutional operations and policies at CSC. They consistently demonstrate the need for additional research focused on population management for radicalized offenders, with a particular need for research focused on effective interventions for this group. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. R-313: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136785 Keywords: Extremist GroupsInmatesPrisonersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Haque, Raheem Ul Title: Youth Radicalization in Pakistan Summary: Amid the serious threat of extremism within Pakistan's large young adult population, author Raheem ul Haque explores the process of youth radicalization and recommends how policymakers can best confront the growing challenge. Summary -- - Pakistani leaders face serious domestic extremism challenges; more than 47,000 thousand lives have been lost in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan over the past decade. - Effective counter-radicalization processes must take into account Pakistan's large young adult population (ages 15-29), which collectively accounts for at least 30 percent of the overall population. - Youth radicalization in Pakistan can be understood as the product of an exclusively Islamic identity - meaning a majority of youth identify primarily through their religion over nationality - combined with a broader reactive movement comprised of militant, political and missionary organizations. - A variety of religious, political and militant organizations operating within Pakistan, some with the tacit or active support of the state, have fostered an enabling environment for radicalization and at times violent action. Some groups provide forums for interaction and connections with more militant actors, while others carry out the whole range of social, political and violent activity. - When radical groups can popularize an exclusive Islamic or sectarian identity, even nonviolent organizations can become connected or aligned with more radical organizations and concepts. - Confronting youth radicalization in Pakistan requires a holistic approach that supports political, social and educational alternatives to exclusionary Islamic identities, reducing the space for groups that espouse violence in the name of an exclusive Islamic identity. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 167: Accessed September 21, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 136849 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationYouth Violence |
Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice Summary: This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Conference was also sponsored in part by the European Commission and the United States Department of State. The event was attended by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of its kind in the region, the 2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE. The intention for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of cutting-edge CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers on a global scale. Details: Perth, WA, AUS: Curtin University, 2015. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Shelf Number: 136857 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremists GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: CounterterrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Vurmo, Gjergji Title: Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Albania Summary: This study has collected, generated, and analyzed data on the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism with the aim of informing policymaking and stakeholders involved in addressing this phenomenon and the challenges interrelated with it. The research methodology approaches the identification and comprehensive analysis of the context by employing a variety of sources to understand the extent and relevance of several factors that enable or fuel religious radicalization and forms of violent extremism. These factors and 'drivers' are often combined with one another and interact with the context through various forms. However, the list of drivers analyzed in this study is not exhaustive, because in different contexts and times the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism may be fueled by other factors. During the research period (September 2014 - May 2015), a wide range of official, academic and other reliable sources of data was examined. In addition, a considerable number of actors have been involved in the preparatory phase of the study as well as in the fieldwork to generate data and to conduct the survey and interviews with key informants and focus groups. The entire framework of the research methodology, the findings, the conclusions, and the recommendations drawn in this study have been subjected to validation process to ensure quality, objectivity, compliance with the Albanian context, and inclusive approach based on the data. The IDM study finds that, while religious radicalization in Albania is in its early phase, lack of attention and inclusion in addressing 'push' or enabling factors may serve to aggravate the phenomenon. The study sheds light on the inactivity of most state institutions, particularly those outside the security domain, and of non-state actors in addressing and preventing religious radicalization. The phenomenon of religious radicalization may be further developed due to the lack of contextual cooperation between non-security state authorities and leaders of religious communities on the prevention of the phenomenon. The religious radical groups' agenda may be facilitated and favored by the inexistence of civil society in remote rural areas creating a big gap with regard to "safeguarding" activities on religious radicalization and violent extremism. The broad support of the communities of religious believers to the liberal tradition of faith, religious institutions, and to the values of religious harmony should not serve as an excuse for state and non-state actors' inactivity. On the other hand, misinterpretation of the phenomenon and minimization of its relevance or its identification with consequences (mainly in the security aspect) lead to the wrong approach and eventual counter-productivity of the effects of institutional response. Religious radicalization (as a process) and violent extremism (as a result) are enabled, fueled and/or shaped by a rich array of factors and drivers, which operate in a particular country context at both macro (societal) and micro (individual / group) level. Details: Tirana: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2015. 246p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Albania URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Shelf Number: 137021 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationReligious ViolenceViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 137893 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. By virtue of its large number of supporters and highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers and more recently, the immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while using social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks. Although much ink has been spilled on the topic of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions remain unanswered, including such fundamental issues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who they are, and how many of those supporters take part in its highly organized online activities. Previous efforts to answer these questions have relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS social network. Because of the small, cellular nature of that network, the examination of particular subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small numbers, may create misleading conclusions. The information vacuum extends to - and is particularly acute within - the sometimes heated discussion of how the West should respond to this online campaign. While there are legitimate debates about the bounds of free speech and the complex relationship between private companies and the public interest, some have argued against suspending terrorist social media accounts on the basis that suspensions are not effective at impeding extremist activity online. These arguments that are usually predicated on very small samples of potentially misleading data, when data is proffered at all. We set out to answer some of these important questions using innovative techniques to create a large, representative sample of accounts that can be clearly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to define the boundaries of ISIS's online social network. The goals of the project included: - Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter using a very large and accurate sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper). - Outline a methodology for discovering and defining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for future research using consistent comparison data (section 3). - Create preliminary data and a path to further investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspended by Twitter and the effects of suspensions (section 2.5). Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, include: - From September through December 2014, we estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. - The 46,000 figure is our most conservative estimate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; however, we believe the truth is closer to the low end of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). - Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization's territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded (section 1.4). - Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). - ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users (section 2). - Much of ISIS's social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume (section 2.1). - A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended (section 2.5.1). - At the time our data collection launched in September 2014, Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this prevented us from creating a pre-suspension dataset, we were able to gather information on how the removal of accounts affected the overall network (section 2.5.4). - Account suspensions do have concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on social media. They do not, at the current level of implementation, eliminate those activities, and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any balanced evaluation of current levels of suspension activity clearly demonstrates that total interdiction is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over how suspensions affect the performance of the network and whether a different level of pressure might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions in a manner that would be far more devastating to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an approach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). - The process of suspension does create certain new risks. Most importantly, while suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS's social network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization (section 4.3). - Further study is required to evaluate the unintended consequences of suspension campaigns and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). - Social media companies and the U.S government must work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Although discussions of this issue often frame government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures of how suspensions are applied (section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis Paper No. 20: Accessed November 27, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Shelf Number: 137342 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamic State (ISIS)Radical GroupsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist GroupsInternet Online CommunicationsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Bergin, Anthony Title: Gen Y Jihadists: Preventing Radicalisation in Australia Summary: In September 2014 the terrorism threat level was raised from 'medium' to 'high' - the first change in 13 years. This year, the government estimated that the number of high risk terrorist threats being monitored by security agencies had doubled and that more than 100 Australians were fighting for groups in Syria and Iraq. A team of ASPI analysts has examined the scope and nature of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism in Australia through a comprehensive database of the high-profile Australians identified as foreign fighters and those that have come to the attention of authorities in Australia. Based on the findings from this research, the paper assesses the policy responses by the government to date and offers recommendations. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Shelf Number: 137449 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses Summary: The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years. In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Cafe siege1 and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters. On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the Australian Police Journal estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadis took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries. This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/72ABFCEDB075A6A1CA257F4C0011969F/$File/Radicalisation+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: .https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 137747 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders Summary: This study allowed for an enhanced understanding of the motivations and needs of radicalized offenders, while providing the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) with further evidence that can be used in its considerations of how to intervene and case manage this population of offenders in the future. This research underscores the need for increased attention to offender motivation and how it impacts case management, supervision, and intervention strategies for radicalized offenders. What we found Results indicated that 30% of radicalized offenders had purely ideological motives for their actions, 17% were purely motivated by criminal (non-ideological) drivers, and 53% held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their crimes. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change, and a desire to respond to a group grievance. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship. Those radicalized offenders who committed the more serious acts (as per the definition of radicalized offender) and those who were seen as leaders of the group were more frequently identified as having purely ideological motivations. Assessment of criminogenic needs via the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis instrument revealed that a large proportion of radicalized offenders had needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a small proportion had needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. These differences were more pronounced when ideologically-motivated offenders were examined separately, indicating that perhaps the needs of non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders are more similar to those found in the non-radicalized, general offender population. Similarly, ideologically motivated offenders held many more of the other violent-extremist needs than did non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders. Why we did this study CSC strives to contribute to the safety and security of society through identifying and addressing the criminogenic needs and criminal motivations of the federally incarcerated offender population. While much is known about the needs of the general offender population, there exists significantly less empirical evidence concerning the needs of those federally-sentenced individuals motivated by ideology: radicalized offenders. This research sought to examine and understand the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an evidence-based approach to effective correctional interventions and case management for these offenders. What we did Using data from the Offender Management System (OMS) as well as information coded from various sources, the motivations (ideological Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137811 Keywords: Extremist GroupsPrison AdministrationPrisonersRadical GroupsRadicalizationRadicalized Offenders |
Author: Denmark. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs Title: The Challenge of Extremism: Examples of Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programmes in the EU Summary: In January 2010 a survey on deradicalisation and disengagement was initiated. In this survey five respondent countries have described specific deradicalisation and/or disengagement programmes targeted towards individuals. These five countries are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. This report focuses on these intervention programmes, because the main objective of the survey is to map such programmes. The main objectives of the survey were: - To map the practical experiences in EU member states with policies and programmes on deradicalisation and disengagement, focusing on how to intervene when individuals have been attracted to extremism. - To support the exchange of experience and good practice among the EU member states in the further efforts to address the challenges of extremism and radicalisation. The questionnaire was sent to all 27 EU member states. 18 EU member states replied extensively by giving descriptions of their overall strategies on prevention of extremism. All but one of the 18 countries have developed, or are developing, strategies to prevent radicalisation and extremism. Accordingly most of the strategies are broad initiatives on early prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The implementing partners in the strategies are often a mix of different authorities and organisations on a national, regional and local level. Out of 18 countries, 13 countries have experienced problems with right-wing extremism, 12 countries have experienced problems with left-wing extremism, 10 countries have experienced problems with militant Islamism, and seven countries have experienced problems with separatist movements, animal right groups and/or other groups. In most countries right-wing extremism and militant Islamism are assessed as the biggest threats. Details: Copenhagen: The Ministry, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2016 at: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137813 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Saltman, Erin Marie Title: The Role of Prevent in Countering Online Extremism Summary: The following White Paper addresses the role of the UK government and social media companies and Internet service providers (ISP) in monitoring and policing the Internet for extremist and/or terrorism-related content. This paper seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the UK government's Prevent strategy and provide recommendations for its improvement in line with the current nature of the threat. Currently, the two biggest challenges for UK counter-terrorism are the radicalisation and recruitment of individuals by the jihadist organisation Islamic State (IS) and the use of the Internet by IS and other extremist organisations to spread unwanted and potentially dangerous ideologies and narratives internationally. This subject is of great importance, especially as government debates how best to tackle extremism and adequately implement counter-extremism measures both in real terms and online. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the framework of the government's Prevent strategy, while sections 4 through 9 detail the challenges extremism and terrorism-related content online pose. Section 10 addresses the role of Prevent in countering online extremism in the UK. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: White Paper: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137849 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismExtremismExtremist GroupsOnline CommunicationsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial Media |
Author: Stuart, Hannah Title: Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford Summary: Since the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, police forces nationally have implemented successive counter-radicalisation policies. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism, based on a series of interviews with senior police officers from the West Yorkshire Police and the North East Counter-Terrorism Unit, provides a practical perspective on the challenges of delivering preventative work at grassroots level as well as on policy debates about the remit of counter-extremism in a free society. Key findings include: ◾The police advocate building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; and recognise the need to be representative and to respond to changing community dynamics; ◾A focus on successful community policing and "quality of life issues" allows the police to proactively create resilient partnerships rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; ◾A strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism; helps isolate extremists; and promotes dialogue around other controversial issues, such as grooming; ◾Promoting safe giving is a key response to the religious injunction for charity within Muslim communities, which can increase vulnerability to fundraising for criminal or terrorist intent and to intimidating styles of fundraising that take advantage of a generous and permissive cultural attitude towards giving; ◾Police forces are well-placed to identify grievances and negative perceptions within communities. Successful work around education, internet safety and grooming demonstrates the value of promoting counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding issue rather than simply as a counter-terrorism tool; ◾Among the biggest challenges anticipated for 2015 is ensuring consistency in relation to freedom of speech and the thresholds used to measure extremism, particularly as it manifests either online or in public situations, for example at universities and during political protests. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper No. 4: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137850 Keywords: Community PolicingCounter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Hussain, Ghaffar Title: Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it Summary: Online extremism and the role the Internet plays in the radicalisation process is currently being debated and discussed by journalists, academics, technologists and government officials alike. This report demystifies the topic of extremist content online and exposes the manner in which online tools are being used by Islamist extremist organisations and individuals to recruit and propagandise. Current measures to tackle online extremism are also assessed and critiqued, after which the report details a practical strategy for countering extremism online and making the Internet a less hospitable domain for extremists. The research conducted for this report focuses on 30 Islamist extremist groups operating in the UK and France, mapping their use of the Internet and what they hope to achieve through their online activities. Popular online platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter as well as chat rooms, discussion forums and static websites are analysed with a view to assessing the role online extremist messaging plays in the radicalisation process. The report also addresses the issue of censorship, assessing the effectiveness of current filtering methods available and their overall efficacy. Research for this report was based on original data collection and analyses as well as interviews with a range of experts, mentors and target audiences. Key findings in this report: - With the Internet often being accused of producing radicalisation in isolation of other factors, this report found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. In other words, the Internet does not radicalise in isolation of other factors and should not be targeted as the 'cause' of radicalisation. As such, the Internet's role is less about initiating the radicalisation process; rather it acts as a facilitator and catalyst for the radicalisation process by 1) indoctrinating, 2) educating and 3) socialising individuals. - Although governments are increasingly relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism, this report found that negative measures, or censorship in general, was not only ineffective and costly but also potentially counter-productive. - Positive measures, such as developing counter-extremist efforts through online counter-speech content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism are much more effective in challenging extremist ideologies. However, there are currently not enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to monopolise certain issues. - We found that results from search engines rarely, if ever, provide links to content that supported Islamist extremism. It was equally rare to find content countering extremist narratives. - Research also found that available Islamist extremist content websites were most successful if they provided more subtle, non-illegal information platforms with links to active social media platforms for users. Available static websites served primarily to 1) propagate the Islamist narrative through specific interpretations of scriptures, 2) promote martyrdom and 3) solidify a 'self versus other' allegiance to Muslims, rejecting non-Muslims. This report seeks to differentiate itself from previous reports on online extremism in two ways; firstly the research itself is much more in-depth and diverse, combining qualitative and quantitative data to reach conclusions. Secondly, this report offers a comprehensive and practical list of recommendations which, if implemented fully, could unleash a new wave of online activism that will take the fight to extremists online, breaking the current monopoly they hold over certain socio-political issues. Recommendations to public, private and third party sectors based on our findings: - Establishing a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so. - Improving digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities. - Encouraging the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda. - A mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence. - Establishing a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter-extremism initiatives. - More research into how the far right is using the Internet to propagandise giving a broader view of 'extremism online'. The findings and recommendations of this report suggest a clearer understanding of the role the Internet plays in radicalisation process and an appreciation of the dangers of relying on illiberal censorship can contribute towards the development of a more holistic approach to tackling extremism online. Relying on the cultivation of grassroots initiatives to develop and promote counter-speech online, as opposed to censorship, could help turn the tide against current extremist efforts. However, co-operation and regular communication between stakeholders from key sectors is vital in order for the above vision to be realised and, thus, the establishment of a forum that allows this to take place is also important. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137854 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsInternetIslamistsOnline CommunicationsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Cohen, Katie Title: Who Will Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet Summary: Solo actor terrorism, also known as lone wolf terrorism, is a growing threat against civil security, partly due to the fact that Internet access makes it easier than ever to engage in study and dissemination of extremist views. A large variation regarding factors such as ideology, social background, psychopathology and personality type means there is no clear profile for lone wolf terrorists. An assessment of which individuals from a population of political extremists that will go on to commit acts of terrorism can therefore not only be based on factors such as individual experiences or personality traits. A threat assessment should rather be based on the potential perpetrator's behaviour during the time closely preceding the attack. Hence, behaviours that have been empirically proven to precede terrorist attacks and other incidents of planned violence, such as mass murder or school shootings, so called warning behaviours, can have an important role in assessing lone wolf terrorist threats. Warning behaviours often precede terrorist acts and are in their turn preceded by a radicalisation process, where an individual gradually enters a state of mind characterised by a proneness to premeditated violence with the purpose of advancing an ideology. Most lone wolf terrorists have gone through a process of self-radicalisation, wherein media has had a crucial role. Internet is indisputably the medium that has had the greatest influence on the radicalisation process during the last decade. However, while it has facilitated the process, the Internet has also created new possibilities of discovering warning behaviours prior to an actual terrorist attack. From an existing typology of eight different warning behaviours, the three that can most easily be inferred from the subject's Internet communication will be discussed in the following report: (1) Leakage, when the subject, more or less specifically and more or less intentionally, informs a third party about an intent to perpetrate a terrorist attack, (2) fixation, which expresses an extreme preoccupation with a person or cause or extensive gathering of facts about a target, and (3) identification, which comprises a self-image characterised by fantasies about being a hero or warrior and/or a strong interest in weapons and military paraphernalia, as well as a strong influence from other radical proponents of lone wolf terrorism. The aim of the following report is firstly, to shed light on different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind self-radicalisation and the interaction between the individual and the environment during the radicalisation process, and secondly, to examine the possibility of using semi-automatic techniques for text analysis of the subjects Internet communication to discover warning behaviours. Details: Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2015 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Shelf Number: 137887 Keywords: Lone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsThreat Assessment |
Author: Buch, Ryan K. Title: The Day of the Cyber Wolf Summary: Terrorism has become a concern for public safety and security and can take on many appearances. However, in recent years the dilemma that presents the most substantial endangerment to public security comes from the threat of leaderless terrorists, also known as "lone wolves." Due to the rapid advancement in technology over the past few decades, societies, specifically the United States, have become dependent upon it economically and socially. Terrorist organizations, as well as the lone wolf terrorist, understand that their enemies rely on technology in order to function and have recently redirected their efforts towards cyberspace. As a result, cyber-terrorism has become one of the greatest imminent threats to national security. This literature review presents an analysis of the issues and challenges faced in dealing with modern day terrorism in the forms of lone wolf terrorism and cyber terrorism. Why has this increase in lone wolf attacks occurred? Why are lone wolf terrorists more dangerous than terrorist organizations? What threat do cyber terrorist attacks present to the world, specifically from lone wolves? Why should cyber terrorist attacks be as great a concern as physical attacks? How can both of these forms of terrorism actually have an effect on society and a government's infrastructure? Lone wolf terrorism presents a clear and imminent threat to national and international security. In light of this, the following research seeks to answer the question: Is there an imminent threat that the next major terrorist attack will come from a lone wolf cyber terrorist? An in-depth understanding of previous lone wolf terrorists and cyber terrorism, as well as the attacks that have been committed, is needed in order to combat future problems Details: Denver, CO: Regis University, 2014. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 28, 2016 at: http://epublications.regis.edu/theses/210/ Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://epublications.regis.edu/theses/210/ Shelf Number: 137888 Keywords: Cyber Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist RadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Coultas, Bryan T. Title: Crowdsourcing intelligence to combat terrorism: Harnessing bottom-up collection to prevent lone-wolf terror attacks Summary: U.S. officials have acknowledged that attackers of the lone-wolf and isolated-cell organizational type are on the rise and now pose a greater threat than major coordinated actions. Traditional intelligence methods, using a top-down approach with an emphasis on signals intelligence, are ill-equipped to identify and prevent terrorists using lone-wolf tactics. Crowdsourcing, as a problem-solving technique, is a relatively new idea but has shown great promise in tackling issues similar to the identification of lone-wolf terrorists. At its core, crowdsourcing is a method for thousands or even millions of people to contribute their knowledge, expertise, or skills towards a unified task. Done correctly, it has produced results unachievable by traditional tasking of humans or computers. This thesis identifies how the signals surrounding lone-wolf attacks are different and more subtle in nature from those mounted by organized terror groups. In turn, the thesis examines the potential benefits of crowdsourcing intelligence in order to strengthen the U.S. intelligence community's ability to approach this emerging problem of lone-wolf terrorism. In short, this thesis proposes that the U.S. intelligence community harness the power of U.S. citizens to help prevent identify the subtle indictors presented by lone-wolf terrorists in order to prevent lone-wolf terrorist attacks. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library, 2015. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Shelf Number: 137891 Keywords: Domestic IntelligenceLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review Summary: This paper is the first publication in the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project, which aims to improve understanding of, and responses to, the phenomenon of (potentially) violent lone actors through analysis of comprehensive data on cases from across Europe. Despite recent depictions within the media, lone-actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon; however, research suggests the threat is increasing as pressure from security services forces a tactical adaptation and groups - including Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) - call on those who share their ideology to act alone without direction or support. This paper examines the current state of knowledge surrounding the phenomenon, assessing the limitations of the literature and identifying where further research should focus to add real value to countering the threat. Three recommendations are made: first, increased methodological rigour in empirical research; second, focus on process as well as perpetrators; and third, specific examination of the confluence between returning foreign fighters, domestic Daesh supporters, and the lone-actor threat. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 1: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137894 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityIslamic StateIslamistsJihadLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Terrorist Chatter: Understanding what terrorists talk about Summary: Since the early 2000s the Internet has become particularly crucial for the global jihadist movement. Nowhere has the Internet been more important in the movement's development than in the West. While dynamics differ from case to case, it is fair to state that almost all recent cases of radicalization in the West involve at least some digital footprint. Jihadists, whether structured groups or unaffiliated sympathizers, have long understood the importance of the Internet in general and social media, in particular. Zachary Chesser, one of the individuals studied in this report, fittingly describes social media as "simply the most dynamic and convenient form of media there is." As the trend is likely to increase, understanding how individuals make the leap to actual militancy is critically important. This study is based on the analysis of the online activities of seven individuals. They share several key traits. All seven were born or raised in the United States. All seven were active in online and offline jihadist scene around the same time (mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s). All seven were either convicted for terrorism- related offenses (or, in the case of two of the seven, were killed in terrorism- related incidents.) The intended usefulness of this study is not in making the case for monitoring online social media for intelligence purpose - an effort for which authorities throughout the West need little encouragement. Rather, the report is meant to provide potentially useful pointers in the field of counter- radicalization. Over the past ten years many Western countries have devised more or less extensive strategies aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radical ideas or de- radicalizing (or favoring the disengagement) of committed militants. (Canada is also in the process of establishing its own counter- radicalization strategy.) Radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. It is no surprise then that counter-radicalization initiatives are equally complex. Even among the seven subjects in this project there are only limited commonalities in terms of interests and views. While all seven subjects share a common background, based on the evidence of their online activities, their interests, views and approaches remain highly diverse. Some are focused mostly on religion; others are more interested in political issues. Some immediately adopt a jihadist mindset; others seem to undergo a long radicalizing trajectory. Given this diversity, it becomes obvious that any counter- radicalization needs to be tailored to the specifics of the case. Flexibility is the name of the game. Another key finding is that, at least in the beginning of their trajectories, the individuals studied here are all avid seekers of knowledge and information on religion. All refer to religious concepts and frames throughout their posts. Jihadism is a complex ideology that mixes religion and politics. But this study confirms the importance of its religious aspect for many of those who embrace violence - a fact some studies have dismissed. Any counter-radicalization effort, while not ignoring other aspects, should take into consideration the centrality of religious issues for those embracing jihadism. While for legal, political and cultural reasons it might be difficult to replicate in the West some of the religion-based counter- radicalization efforts adopted in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Singapore, the religious aspect should take a central role. The study also shows that those interested in religion are extremely inquisitive during the first stages of their radicalization trajectories. In the first months or even years of their posting life, in fact, these individuals constantly engage with fellow posters for sources and opinions on religious matters. They seem to be constantly searching for validation of their opinions. Over time, this openness seemed to slowly decrease, and by the end of the posting trajectory, there are only limited traces of questions. In the late stages, instead of questions, statements appear, often filled with confident pronouncements of their own knowledge. This attitude provides an enormous opportunity for counter- radicalization. It is arguable that it is in this phase that any kind of intervention might be more likely to succeed. Details: Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: NPSIA Working Paper Series: Working Paper No. 03, 2015: Accessed February 26, 2016 at: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Shelf Number: 137979 Keywords: InternetJihadismOnline CommunicationsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Khan, Khalida Title: Preventing Violence Extremism (PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community Summary: The vast majority of Muslims are against violent extremism and terrorism and would like to help to counteract it. They are as appalled by violent extremism as anyone else and reject any justification that it can be condoned by Islamic teachings. However, the government's approach to dealing with terrorism by targeting the whole Muslim community as 'potential terrorists' in its Prevent Strategy is flawed and fraught with perils. We believe that rather than creating community cohesion and eliminating terrorism it has the potential to create discord and inflame community tensions. Furthermore, we believe this unprecedented strategy constitutes an infringement of civil liberties and human rights. There is a danger that PVE is becoming a well-funded industry with vested interests. Our concern is that political considerations and frictions that have nothing to do with the Muslim community or the hundreds of people who, like us, have been working on the ground for decades are obstructing the vital work of producing communities at peace with themselves and each other. As an organisation with extensive experience of working for the welfare of Muslim families we are seriously concerned about the implications of the Prevent strategy and how it is impacting in local Muslim communities. In this paper we intend to highlight why we believe the government's approach towards its Muslim community is flawed and will offer constructive recommendations as to what the government should be doing. Details: London: An-Nisa Society, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Shelf Number: 137995 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 1: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the first of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. This paper focuses on the personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists, resulting in a number of policy recommendations. The analysis specifically outlines the importance of benchmarking and looking at different sub-groups. It further identifies the importance of trust and openness, and of multi-agency co-operation. These factors might be the basis of formulating an effective response to the challenge of lone-actor terrorism Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism series No. 5: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138003 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone-Wolf TerroristsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Palombi, Simon Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the second of four policy papers in the CLAT series, published by RUSI on behalf of Chatham House. The CLAT project identified a need to understand the factors underlying the attack methodology and logistics of lone-actor terrorists. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the key variables of the data set. The results are then used to develop a more nuanced understanding of the lone-actor terrorism threat in Europe. Details: London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 6: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138006 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Smith, Melanie Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the third of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Preventing every single instance of lone-actor terrorism is impossible. This is particularly true in countries where freedom of thought, speech and privacy are highly valued and must be protected. The recommendations stemming from this paper's analysis provide practical suggestions for preventing instances of lone-actor terrorism - based on findings relating to motivations, political engagement and online activity - that adhere to these principles. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 7: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Shelf Number: 138004 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities Summary: This is the fourth and final policy paper in the CLAT series. It outlines the policy implications of analysis in relation to changes in perpetrator behaviour, 'leakage' of extreme views or intention to act, and interactions with public authorities in the time leading up to an attack. It provides a series of practical policy recommendations in order to develop an effective response to various lone-actor threats. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 8: Accessed march 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Shelf Number: 138005 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone-Wolf Terrorists RadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf TerrorismRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Online Activism and Social Media Usage among Indonesian Extremists Summary: Indonesian extremists have a long history of online activism, but links to the Islamic State (still better known in Indonesia by its former acronym ISIS) have raised questions about whether social media usage is significantly changing patterns of radicalisation and recruitment. The answer seems to be a qualified no, but ISIS propaganda seems nevertheless to be having an impact, persuading some Indonesians that the "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq is a well-run state where devout Muslim families can find fulfilment. Where social media has made a difference is in its ability to turn anyone with a Twitter account into a potential propagandist, meaning that the ISIS message may start with friends and family linked into online networks but quickly reaches a much broader public. Despite the heavy reliance of Indonesian extremists at home and abroad on Facebook, Twitter a"d WhatsApp and similar services, "self-radicalization" and "lone wolf " actions have been extremely rare. Personal contacts and direct face-to-face engagement in religious discussion groups (pengajian) remain important, with friendships reinforced through Internet messaging and mobile phone communication. As one analyst notes, individuals do not become supporters of ISIS by simply by being exposed to propaganda, but the propaganda can help transform them from passive supporters into active members. Social media may play a more important role in recruitment in countries like Malaysia with a very strict legal regime, where police monitoring of suspected extremists is so strict that the only relatively "safe" means of interaction is online - and then only with some form of encryption. In Indonesia, however, it is easy for extremists to hold meetings and discussions, and this is where recruitment generally begins. The very few Indonesian groups that have identified potential members through Facebook have been among the least competent, in part because they have not been able to vet potential members properly. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 24: Accessed March 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Shelf Number: 138034 Keywords: ExtremismExtremistsLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial Media |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Shelf Number: 138035 Keywords: ExtremistsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing Summary: The majority of this report was written as part of Quilliam's evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (HASC) inquiry on Countering Extremism. In addition to the analysis of the Islamist narrative and the strategic framework required to counter it, this strategic briefing includes three case studies of counter-narratives put together by Quilliam (not included in the HASC submission), and recommendations based on experience, expertise and these case studies for future counter-narrative approaches. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 138130 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Manning, Ruth Title: In and Out of Extremism Summary: Quilliam's latest report In and Out of Extremism features testimonies from 10 former extremists who have now deradicalised and provides analysis on their shared experiences. Building on Maajid Nawaz's personal deradicalisation story In and Out of Islamism, this report looks at the human processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation in five former far-right extremists and five former Islamist extremists. Combining interviews and correspondence with the former extremists, with Quilliam's own expertise and experience in these processes, this report synthesises the human with the academic to provide a deeper understanding of a complex phenomenon. - In particular, this report shows factors which increase vulnerability to radicalisation, the ways in which this vulnerability is exploited by extremist groups and individuals in the radicalisation process, and the factors that prompt escalation from contemplation to action. - In and Out of Extremism finds that when political grievances are combined with personal grievances, individuals consider extremist ideologies and narratives to better understand the world or to find perceived solutions to their personal difficulties. While these ideologies and narratives appear comforting in their simplicity, the former extremists found that they seldom changed the world or improved their lives. - This report also sheds light on the factors that have intervened in the radicalisation process to prompt the individuals to consider their commitment to extremist ideologies and narratives. In and Out of Extremism finds that challenging extremist messaging is central to this intervention and that the message should be targeted for the individual, with the identity, language, and even appearance of the messenger being of central importance. - Quilliam is well-known for our contribution to the macro debate on counter-extremism strategy and policy, but this report shows our value at a micro level, providing inspiration and support in deradicalising extremists. - In policy terms, this report also considers the value of refining the teaching of critical thinking skills in schools to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation, and of improving progressive online counter-extremism efforts through the development of a greater number and variety of counter-narratives. Details: London: Quilliam, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/in-and-out-of-extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/in-and-out-of-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 138131 Keywords: DeradicalizingExtremismExtremists GroupsMuslimsRacial GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Cedros, Christopher R. Title: Lone-wolf terrorist radicalization and the prisoner's dilemma: ensuring mutual cooperation between at-risk Muslim Americans and local communities Summary: While scholars study the radicalization process that produces lone-wolf terrorists in America, news stories regularly report on Muslim Americans leaving their local communities to join terrorist organizations. Currently, radicalizing individuals to act as lone wolves is the most successful method of Islamist attack on the American homeland. A novel approach to analyzing radicalization is employment of the prisoner's dilemma, which examines the motivations behind individual decision-making. The prisoner's dilemma is used by game theorists and international-relations scholars to demonstrate how persons who might ordinarily be expected to cooperate may actually work against each other and defect from previous agreements or understandings. Because lone-wolf attacks will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the U.S. homeland, it is imperative to learn how potential homegrown terrorists can be encouraged to identify with their local communities rather than defect from the social bonds of church, school, neighborhood, and workplace. This thesis explores how the prisoner's dilemma may reveal ways to discourage radicalism in at-risk Muslim Americans. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138134 Keywords: Homeland SecuritiyLone Wolf TerrorismLone Wolf TerroristMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Winter, Charlie Title: Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Summary: This report illuminates the strategic thinking behind Islamic State's propaganda machine. Building on the theoretical framework established in 'The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy', the following analysis is based upon an exhaustive 30-day survey of Islamic State's media output. At 24 hour intervals from 17 July to 15 August 2015, the Islamic month of Shawwal, all media output from Islamic State's official outlets, from the provincial offices to the central foundations, was compiled for aggregated analysis. A total of 1146 separate events - discrete batches of propaganda - were recorded in the data collection period: a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on. After the data collection period had ended, the archive was translated and refined, as events were grouped according to their primary narrative and, if applicable, sub-narratives. Following this, the data was rigorously tested against a number of variables to determine inconsistencies and anomalies. Then, the archive was broken down into its various narrative groupings, which were qualitatively assessed both in isolation of, and respect to, each other. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Shelf Number: 138172 Keywords: CaliphateIslamic StateMediaRadical Groups Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism Terrorists |
Author: Rafiq, Haras Title: Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State Summary: The following report discusses the appeal of the Islamic Sate 'caliphate' to women. To do this, the authors have embarked upon a close analysis of Islamic State's official propaganda and unofficial proselytisers. In the process, four promises "empowerment, deliverance, participation and piety" are identified as the organisation's key pull factors. -The promise of empowerment conveyed by Islamic State's official and unofficial propaganda encourages women to understand joining the organisation as a means to reverse the ills that they face in life outside the 'caliphate'. By joining Islamic State, the line goes, women can defiantly take charge of their lives in the same way that men can: through living in Islamic State's "caliphate" and supporting its jihad by marrying a fighter, women are led to believe that they can emancipate themselves from kufr (disbelief). - The deliverance promise focuses on the idea that, by joining Islamic State, grievances that women suffer in the West are immediately resolved. Women can be freed from daily degradations and disbelief, and are instead assimilated into a tight-knit collective sisterhood that will provide them with a network of support and friendship. Reflective of this, the ideas of redemption and deliverance tend to be directed to females by females. - The participation promise incentivizes women to join Islamic State even though their role is strictly non-military. It conveys a sense that there is more to the 'caliphate's' jihad than fighting and that, for women, there is a specific state-building role. A constant theme in Islamic State propaganda is that supporting the 'caliphate', making it grow and flourish, is the job of everyone. For women, this takes the role of providing, maintaining and educating its 'cubs', the next generation of fighters, as well as supporting their soldier spouses. - The last promise of Islamic State's women-orientated propaganda is piety, something built up the theological imperative to join the group. The alleged pristine nature of an 'Islamic existence' in the "caliphate" is a means of justifying each stress and sacrifice and also acts as a means for recruiters to exert peer pressure to push others to make hijra (migrating). - These four themes alone do not cause female supporters of Islamic State in the West to make hijra. However, when combined with the group's copious amounts of audio-visual propaganda, they play a crucial role in the rhetorical armoury of the 'caliphate's' recruiters. �-The discussion on the radicalisation of women is overly gendered and, all too often, predicated on misconceptions. In reality, when it comes to joining violent extremist causes, women are susceptible to the very same processes as men: narratives, ideology, grievances, and various push and pull factors. Reflecting this, the last part of this report delivers policy recommendations on how we must reappraise our attempts to counter the twin processes of female radicalisation and recruitment, in line with general counter-radicalisation, but using women as specific entry points. The four promises used in Islamic State propaganda, and cited in this report, are not exhaustive. There are a multitude of factors that contribute to an individual's radicalisation, of which propaganda can play an important part. As such, research into the key narratives employed by the 'caliphate' can shine an important individual's journey to jihad. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Shelf Number: 138173 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-TerrorismDe-radicalizationIslamic State Media MuslimsRadical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State�s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Brett, Julian Title: The Evaluation Study: Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts Summary: This evaluation study collates lessons being learned from Danish efforts and those of other development actors on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) that can inform evidence based policy making and increase shared understanding on CVE-related programming in development contexts. The study is based on the premise that CVE concerns policies and actions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social cultural and religious ideologies and groups. As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism. The study notes that, while violent extremism is clearly a global problem, it is developing countries that bear the brunt of its social and economic costs. In the countries most affected, it increases insecurity, has links to organised crime, lowers investment and increases the costs of economic activity, destroys infrastructure, and can cause significant human displacement and migration. The foreign fighter phenomenon, whereby nationals from one country join extremist movements in another, is a significant factor fuelling conflict. With many of these individuals coming from developing countries, preventing and mitigating radicalisation and violent extremism is becoming a development priority. The study provides an overview of current thinking on CVE and the key challenges being faced. The central feature of this is that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. Push factors are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. Pull factors are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social status. Enabling factors relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that, to be successful, CVE initiatives need to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk. In non-permissive environments, this is likely to be particularly challenging. Details: Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Shelf Number: 138466 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Phillips, Peter J. Title: Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory Summary: This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This approach permits a computable opportunity set within a risk-reward or mean-variance framework. Optimal choices can be determined using the Markowitz quadratic programming technique. The framework may provide a useful foundation for an economic perspective on 'offender profiling' applied within a terrorism context. Mapping attack methods into mean-variance space provides a more definitive categorisation of the riskiness of attack methods from the terrorist's perspective and suggests the possibility of identifying the terrorist's revealed risk preference. Inferences about the unknown offender may be drawn that complement other aspects of the investigative process. One of the key challenges of law enforcement is drawing inferences about the offender's location and the location of potential targets. Superimposing a game theoretical payoff matrix over a geographic location where payoffs are partially informed by the terrorist's choices and risk preference may contribute another, economic, perspective to this part of the law enforcement process. Prospect theory may also contribute useful insights into the geographical profiling problem. Details: Toowoomba, QLD: University of Southern Queensland - Faculty of Business, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Shelf Number: 138469 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Geographic ProfilingLone Wolf Terrorists Offender ProfilingRadicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process Summary: Research on terrorism prior to 2010 had been described as too descriptive and atheoretical. To partially address this deficiency, the current project is anchored theoretically and empirically in two of the most widely cited perspectives on social movements and the process of radicalization: role identity theory and framing theory (Snow and Machalek, 1983; Snow and McAdam, 2000; Snow, 2004; Stryker 1980). Drawing on these two overlapping perspectives, we contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey. Typically, this journey begins with a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, and moves toward a more radical identity and corresponding orientation. This process enhances the likelihood of employing targeted forms of violence because the prospect of desired change is seen as laying outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena. As implied, a key component of the process is the adoption or evolution of a radical identity. Five key concepts associated with the identity and framing perspectives are central to the analyses and findings: identity salience and pervasiveness, identity work, and diagnostic and prognostic framing. Identity salience is premised on the observation that identities are arrayed in a hierarchy, with those at the top, or most salient, in a given situation being most likely to be called on or invoked. Pervasiveness extends the notion of salience from one situation to multiple situations or encounters, such that the identity is in play in numerous situations. Identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987; Snow and McAdam 2000) encompasses a range of activities individuals and groups engage in that give meaning to themselves and others by presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with individuals or group interests. Five types of identity work have been identified: (1) Engagement in group relevant demonstration acts or events, such as engaging in activities preparatory for the commission of violence; (2) arrangement and display of physical settings and props, such as flying or posting the confederate flag; (3) arrangement of appearance, such as engagement in cosmetic face work or body work; (4) selective association with other individuals and groups; and (5) identity talk, which involves not only the avowal and/or attribution of identities, but also talk relevant to framing. The two key framing concepts - diagnostic and prognostic framing - direct attention to the ways in which some issue or grievance is problematized and blame is attributed and to the call or plan for dealing with the problem. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, University of Arkansas, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 30, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Shelf Number: 138501 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Cilluffo, Frank Title: Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prison Radicalization Summary: The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the national security of the U.S. Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization. With the world's largest prison population (over 2 million - ninety-three percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) and highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000), America faces what could be an enormous challenge - every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that "[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells - radicalized online, in prisons and in other groups of socially isolated souls - may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection." The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, to name just two incidents, illustrate the threat posed by a state's own radicalized citizens. By acting upon international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position. Under the leadership of The George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), a task force of diverse subject matter experts was convened to analyze what is currently known about radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prison systems at the federal, state and local levels. The goal of this diverse, multidisciplinary group was to give unbiased and well-informed recommendations for further action. The task force performed an extensive literature review and received briefings from professionals with expertise in this area. Federal, state and local officials provided background information on radicalization and ongoing efforts to decrease the threat of terrorist activity in prisons. The task force sought and received perspectives from religious service providers in prisons and jails, behavioral and social scientists, and members of the national security and intelligence communities. Researchers of radicalization in foreign prisons provided first hand accounts of radicalization and terrorist activities overseas. Due to the sensitive nature of many of these briefings and the desire of some briefers to remain anonymous, this report makes reference to information for which no source is cited. All information provided, where no source is provided, originates from task force briefings with subject matter experts and officials with personal experience in dealing with prisoner radicalization. This report focuses on the process of radicalization in prison. Radicalization "refers to the process by which inmates...adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes." By "extreme views," this report includes beliefs that are anti-social, politically rebellious, and anti-authoritarian. This report focuses, in particular, on religious radicalization in conjunction with the practice of Islam. Radical beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world. Just as young people may become radicalized by "cut-and-paste" versions of the Qur'an via the Internet, new inmates may gain the same distorted understanding of the faith from gang leaders or other influential inmates. The task force recognizes the potentially positive impact of religion on inmates, and it should be noted that inmates have a constitutional right to practice their religion, a right reinforced by further legislation. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute; Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group, 2006. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2016 at: https://med.virginia.edu/ciag/wp-content/uploads/sites/313/2015/12/out_of_the_shadows.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: https://med.virginia.edu/ciag/wp-content/uploads/sites/313/2015/12/out_of_the_shadows.pdf Shelf Number: 102908 Keywords: GangsIslamMuslimsPrisoner RadicalizationPrisonersRadicalizationReligionTerrorists |
Author: Benotman, Noman Title: The Children of Islamic State Summary: The future of children born and raised in Islamic State is a pertinent and pressing problem, requiring the immediate attention of the international community. There are currently 31,000 pregnant women within the 'caliphate'. As many as 50 children from the United Kingdom are growing up on jihad in Islamic State, and no prior research examines what will happen to them if they choose to return. This report attempts to fill this gap by addressing the reintegration, re-education, and rehabilitation challenges of returning or escaping children. Over the last six months, Quilliam researchers have archived, translated, and analysed propaganda released by Islamic State featuring children. This is the first database of its kind, and reveals the following: - The largest amount of Islamic State media featuring children relates to violence, comprising either of children directly participating in violence, or being exposed and normalised to violence. - Islamic State's wilayats in Iraq have released the most images showing children and teens in combat and acting as suicide bombers. - In the last six months, Islamic State propaganda depicts 12 child executioners, and one child participating in a public execution. The report highlights the following exclusive findings which pertain to the recruitment and training of child soldiers in the Islamic State: - Direct coercion into joining Islamic State generally occurs through abductions. However, Islamic State also engages in more indirect, systemic coercion where people, specifically children, are pressured to join the group out of fear. - Children can not only assist in meeting the present needs of the 'caliphate', but can continue to propagate its existence and expansion once they grow up, thus securing the long-term survival of the 'caliphate'. - The current generation of fighters sees children as better and more lethal fighters than themselves. Rather than being converted into radical ideologies, children have been indoctrinated into extreme values from birth or at a young age. - Schools and the education system are central to shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation. The indoctrination that begins in schools intensifies in training camps, where children between the ages of 10 and 15 are instructed in shari'a, desensitised to violence, and are taught specific skills to best serve the state and take up the banner of jihad. - Boys learn a rigid Islamic State curriculum, where drawing, philosophy and social studies, the 'methodology of atheism', have been removed. Instead, children churn out memorised verses of the Qur'an and attend 'Jihadi Training', which includes shooting, weaponry and martial arts. Girls, also known as the 'pearls of the caliphate', are veiled, hidden, confined to the home, and taught to look after husbands. - The prolonged exposure and desensitisation to violence that children experience affects their physical and psychological well-being, both in the short term and in the long term. Looking to the future, it is inevitable that these children will suffer from severe physical and mental trauma, as well as systematic extremist indoctrination. By coupling in-depth fieldwork with extensive research, Quilliam was able to discern not only what life for children within Islamic State is like, but the extent of the challenge of re-integration to come. Based on our findings, the report proposes a thorough assessment process for children who return or escape from Islamic State. This procedure evaluates the extent of radicalisation of the child, their degree of agency in joining Islamic State, the trauma and abuse they have suffered, and the immediate and long-term needs for ensuring effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation DDR(R). The recommendations detail a multi-structural support network for monitoring a child's progress. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2725/files/2016/04/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 147741 Keywords: CaliphateChild SoldiersCounter-terrorismExtremismIslamic StateJihadRadicalizationTerrorist |
Author: Hofmann, David Title: Warriors and Prophets: The Role of Charismatic Authority in the Radicalization Towards Violence and Strategic Operation of Terrorist Groups Summary: In the past four decades, there has been increased multi-disciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. However, there is little systematic theoretical and empirical examination of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of charismatic leaders in the formation, operation, and demise of terrorist groups. This dissertation seeks to re-orient and stimulate future scholarship through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between charismatic authority, the radicalization towards violence, and strategic operation of terrorist groups. The introductory chapter grounds the subsequent research by providing working definitions of core concepts, reviewing the current literature on terrorist leadership, discussing methods to improve future analyses of terrorist leadership, before ending with a brief consideration of methods, data, and research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of how the current terrorism literature misuses the social-scientific concepts of charisma and charismatic authority. After examining where and how the literature has fallen short, it provides a synthesis of the available multi-disciplinary social-scientific research on charismatic authority, identifies the three common ways in which the concept of charisma is commonly misused in terrorism studies, and explores several challenges and opportunities for future research. Building upon this foundational analysis, chapter 3 contributes to future research by presenting and justifying a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups based upon Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic leadership in new religious movements. This framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between the presence of charismatic authority and the radicalization towards violence within the far-right terrorist group 'The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord'. Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of the relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority, choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices), and results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. The concluding chapter provides a synthetic summary of the findings, discusses the contributions of the dissertation to the literature, makes several policy-relevant suggestions, considers study limitations, and outlines avenues for future research. Details: Waterloo, ONT: University of Waterloo, 2015. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138583 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: A Man's World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Summary: In recent years, the role of women in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has gained momentum in the international counterterrorism policy discourse. Several questions emerge when discussing the particulars of why and how women partake in both violent extremism and P/CVE efforts. For example, what are the different roles that women can undertake in a terrorist organization? Are females recruited differently than their male counterparts? What roles do they play in inciting or persuading others to join violent extremist groups? Is there a particular role for women in countering terrorism and P/CVE? Are specific policies aimed at women a necessity moving forward? How can a gender analysis be effectively integrated into P/CVE policy and programming? The collection of essays contained in this edited volume by the Global Center and Hedayah seeks to build the body of literature on women and P/CVE by drawing on examples from a number of countries and regions. The essays contain both policy-level recommendations as well as programmatic-level recommendations, and seek to answer some of the outstanding questions regarding the types of roles women might play in P/CVE efforts. Details: London: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/AMansWorld_FULL.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/AMansWorld_FULL.pdf Shelf Number: 138596 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups RadicalizationTerrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Grimwood, Gabrielle Garton Title: Radicalisation in Prisons in England and Wales Summary: Many prisoners enter prison with a faith and others find one while in prison. Few of these prisoners will be "radicalized" or become involved in extremism or terrorist activity, although (obviously) those that do present huge challenges to the authorities. This Commons Library briefing describes how the Government is seeking to tackle extremism and, in particular, radicalisation in prisons. It examines -The difference between faith and radicalisation -Why people become radicalised -What is happening within prisons -How radicalisation is being countered in prisons and -Whether the National Offender Management Service is doing enough. Details: London: Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper no. 07487: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Shelf Number: 139055 Keywords: Prisoner RadicalizationPrisonersRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Buggy, Kate Title: Under the Radar: How might Australia enhance its policies to prevent 'lone wolf' and 'fixated person' violent attacks? Summary: This paper addresses the detection, intervention and prevention of so-called 'lone wolf' and 'fixated perso' violent attacks in Australia. It argues that while the threat of terrorism may vary over time, the increase in lone wolf terrorism over the past decade requires a more focused approach to the identification and monitoring of individuals who are moving along the pathway from radical ideology to radical violence. The paper proposes that a specialised unit, the National Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, be established to assess the threat posed by such persons, regardless of whether they fall into the category of lone wolf, fixated persons or other, grievance-fuelled violent actors. It also proposes community-friendly options of e-referral and a new hotline in an effort to identify persons on a radicalisation pathway. With research confirming that the majority of such individuals suffer from mental illness or mental instability, the paper concludes that these initiatives should reduce the risk by providing an opportunity to intervene before violent activity occurs. Details: Canberra: Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 139257 Keywords: ExtremistsLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Shelf Number: 139409 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Netherlands. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Title: Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Summary: The murder of film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 deeply shocked Dutch society. People began to realise that the ideology of violent jihad against the West, which explicitly manifested itself in the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, had also established a foothold in the Netherlands. Since the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the threat of a terrorist attack on European soil had loomed over a number of European countries. The murder of Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 proved that the Netherlands as well had become a scene of terrorist violence. Although it was an individual assassination rather than the large-scale attack feared in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, its background, motives and justification suggested a type of religious- inspired terrorism as propounded by Al-Qaeda since the late 20th century. It ensued that the murderer, and most other members of the extremist network to which he belonged, were young Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands. While on 11 September 2001 New York was hit by an enemy from abroad and the Madrid attacks were perpetrated by a group of North African migrants, the Netherlands had to face the fact that a group of indigenous Muslims had metamorphosed into (potential) terrorists within a short period of time. At an international level, the murder of Van Gogh thrust the Netherlands into the limelight as a country which had now - after years of ethnic and religious tolerance - produced its own jihadists. The attacks on public transport in London in July 2005 by British-Pakistani Muslims, however, have shown that the Dutch situation is by no means unique and that a new phase in the threat from Islamist terrorism appears to have set in. This phase, in which the threat emanates principally from extremist European Muslims who are prepared to commit attacks in their own country, is hereinafter referred to as European jihad. This new phase is in line with developments in Islamist terrorism during recent years. In December 2002 the AIVD pointed out that the future threat would manifest itself in and emanate from the West, and that it would possess a more endogenous character. There were indications that radical Muslims brought up in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for jihad and that they might proceed to perpetrating localised terrorist attacks. The attacks in Madrid, London and Amsterdam confirmed these fears. Increasing numbers of migrants' children with an Islamic background are going through a radicalisation process in Europe, which in some cases leads them to use violence. Young jihadists justify this violence by referring to the Koran - often on the basis of interpretations by radical ideologists - and view themselves as prospective martyrs. In addition to the acute threat of possible terrorist attacks, the problems involved in Islamist radicalism and terrorism also represent a long-term threat, as a polarization between various ethnic-religious population groups may undermine social cohesion. In the long term this may have an undesirable effect on the democratic order in the Netherlands. The murder of Van Gogh inflamed certain interethnic and social issues in the Netherlands. The murder set in motion processes involving both positive and negative aspects as regards the threat assessment in the immediate future, the consequences of which are as yet unpredictable. One negative development is the intensification of radicalisation tendencies among sections of ethnic minorities and the indigenous population, which poses an increasing risk that groups or individuals will resort to violence. It is alarming that certain youth groups among the younger generation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only appear receptive to radicalisation, but perceive violent jihad as positive and 'cool'. A positive aspect, however, is the fact that a process of political and social consciousness-raising has set in, involving a cautious mobilisation of moderate forces in society - also among ethnic minorities - who are prepared to counteract radical and extremist tendencies. The complexity of the problem as well as the lack of organization within certain communities account partly for this initial reluctance. The shortcomings of certain spokespersons also play a part. Furthermore, fear for lack of support from the rest of Dutch society as well as uncertainty about possible repercussions which might ensue as a result of clearly establishing their position within their ethnic group, as well as in regard to their supporters, can delay or impede such initiatives. This paper describes how the threat from Islamist terrorism currently manifests itself in the Netherlands. It attempts, for instance, to answer the question of why young people born and bred in the Netherlands turn their backs on society to propagate and commit acts of violence in the name of Islam. Another question is, to what extent the situation in the Netherlands differs from that in neighbouring countries. Details: The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2006. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Netherlands URL: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Shelf Number: 139419 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Jihad |
Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsIslamic ExtremistsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schuurman, Bart Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139817 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremistsJihadMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh Summary: As the Awami League (AL) government's political rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government's legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to de-politicise and strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can address the country's myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic collapse. The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of violence and a brutal state response. The government's excesses against political opponents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Police tasked with targeting the government's rivals and an overstretched justice system compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creating opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. The government's reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that these groups can further exploit. Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by investing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts and sentences. The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict. The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate avenues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the trust of citizens in the state's provision of both justice and security. So long as there is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and political rights, and in New Delhi's by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If mainstream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to view violence and violent groups as their only recourse. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 277: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 139829 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsPolitical ViolenceRadical GroupsRadicalizationViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 139949 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsExtremistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth Title: Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), like no other terrorist organization before, has used Twitter and other social media channels to broadcast its message, inspire followers, and recruit new fighters. Though much less heralded, ISIS opponents have also taken to Twitter to castigate the ISIS message. This report draws on publicly available Twitter data to examine this ongoing debate about ISIS on Arabic Twitter and to better understand the networks of ISIS supporters and opponents on Twitter. To support the counter-messaging effort and to more deeply understand ISIS supporters and opponents, this study uses a mixed-methods analytic approach to identify and characterize in detail both ISIS support and opposition networks on Twitter. This analytic approach draws on community detection algorithms that help detect interactive communities of Twitter users, lexical analysis that can identify key themes and content for large data sets, and social network analysis. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html Shelf Number: 140129 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups RadicalizationSocial Media Terrorism |
Author: Meitz, Eric Title: What About the Women? Understanding and Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans Summary: In many ways, female recruits, both from the Western Balkans and other regions, are attracted to the Islamic State for the exact same reasons as men, highlights BCSP guest researcher Eric Mietz. This policy paper aims to bring attention to an oft-neglected security problem in the Western Balkans: women being recruited by and migrating to the Islamic State. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism (CVE) policymaking. The first part of the paper looks at the numbers of women leaving from the Western Balkans to Islamic State-held territory, the profiles of women who migrate, and the roles they take on in the Islamic State. To explain why women are influenced to migrate, the second part examines the "push" and "pull" factors of Islamic State recruitment. The last part focuses on the efforts of Western Balkans governments to criminalize participation in or support of the Islamic State and the disadvantages of relying solely on this policy Details: Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Shelf Number: 140145 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationRecruitment, WomenTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M. Title: Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT - The Hague Research Fellow Tinka Veldhuis makes an argument for a Realist approach to rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for inmates with a terrorist or extremist background. Accordingly, within the Realist framework, it is stressed that the outcomes of rehabilitation programmes should be understood as a product of the policy mechanisms and the context in which they are implemented. To maximise the likelihood of success it is important to make explicit the underlying assumptions about how the intervention should, given the unique context, contribute to achieving its objectives. This paper endeavours to highlight some of the key questions that need to be answered before and during the implementation of rehabilitation policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 140257 Keywords: ExtremistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Offenders |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2015-16 Evaluation of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative: Final Report Summary: Program evaluations support accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. They also support deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the expected outcomes efficiently and cost-effectively. Program evaluations support policy and program improvements by helping identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined This evaluation examined the relevance and performance of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative, a $10-million, five-year initiative established in 2011, to address gaps in understanding of terrorism in Canada and the way it manifests itself in Canadian communities. The Initiative has several components, including a grants and contributions component that is designed to fund research studies and support direct engagement with researchers. Given that the Initiative includes a grants and contributions component, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the design, delivery and administration of this component of the Initiative conformed to the requirements of the Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Why it is important Terrorism is considered a threat to Canada's national interest and security. In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents has been increasing steadily, both in Canada and around the world. Many countries, including Canada, are facing radicalization to violence, particularly of youth. More than 180 Canadians are known to have gone abroad to take part in foreign armed conflicts. Preventing, detecting, denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities and responding to these developments are among the Government of Canada's, and by extension, the Department of Public Safety's highest priorities. The Initiative plays an important role in creating networks across sectors, generating knowledge for decision-makers, and increasing Canadians' understanding of terrorism and counter-radicalization to violence, which is increasingly needed to contribute to building a safe and resilient Canada. What we found Relevance The raison d'etre of the Initiative was to invest in research on pressing questions to enable Canada to better understand what terrorism meant in the Canadian context and what could be done to support effective policies and programs to counter-terrorism and violent extremism in Canada. Despite its contribution to date, there is still a continued need for the Initiative to shed more light on these issues. The Initiative is well aligned with the federal government and PS's priorities, as ensuring the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad continues to be among the top priorities of the government. The emphasis on the need for further research communicated as part of the Government's commitment to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization attests to the relevance of the Initiative and ongoing need for similar activities. Performance To a large extent, the Initiative has contributed to the achievement of its expected outcomes: It has supported the creation of various networks and other mechanisms for ongoing dialogue across different sectors on terrorism and counter radicalization; through funding research studies and other mechanisms, the Initiative has facilitated the generation of knowledge and tools to ensure that Canadian policy and decision-makers, as well as frontline officers and other practitioners have access to more relevant and timely information to do their work; and researchers affiliated with the Initiative have more resources and support at their disposal to conduct research and to study the identified priority areas. The Department has put in place a robust governance framework to oversee the delivery of the Initiative. For the most part, the Initiative was delivered efficiently and economically. The design, delivery and administration of the grants and contribution components of the Initiative were found to generally conform to the requirements of Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Notwithstanding the above achievements, the evaluation identified a few opportunities for improvement. The following recommendations are provided in the spirit of continuous improvement. Recommendations The ADM of the Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch and/or the future Senior Departmental Officer responsible for the Office for Community Outreach and Countering Radicalization to Violence should ensure that: 1. Kanishka-related research findings are better communicated to policy and decision makers and the general public. In collaboration with the Assistant Deputy Minister Corporate Management Branch ensure that: 2. funding recipients' reporting requirements are proportionate to their current risk profile. Management Response and Action Plan Management accepts all recommendations and will implement an action plan. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: 2016-06-28: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140524 Keywords: Counter-radicalizationRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish Speaking Latin America Summary: Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi'ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran - a designated State-sponsor of terrorism - , its nuclear program, Hezbollah and the "D Bolivarian revolution" led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi'ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chavez' Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new converts, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Shelf Number: 140597 Keywords: Cyber NetworksIslamist NetworksLaw Enforcement IntelligenceRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial NetworksTerrorism |
Author: Cassim Cachalia, Raesah Title: The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence Summary: Youth radicalisation towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability. This paper reviews the evidence on the factors that may contribute to the dynamics of youth radicalisation. Available findings from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, and North Africa are used to understand the dynamics that may contribute to radicalisation and, potentially, to violent extremism. Many factors emerge including political, economic, social and individual factors. Religion, identity and gender also arise as topics for further analysis. Youth radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that cannot be attributed to any one explanation or set of factors. This paper recognises these complexities, offers recommendations and identifies additional issues that should be explored further. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 296: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140598 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point Summary: Key Facts - 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned. - Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010. - The UK's annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from L594 million in 2015-16 to L670 million for 2016-17. - The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 36,500 requests per year. - The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed. - Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were linked to terrorists. Google removed over 14 million videos globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse. - Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of themselves as British - a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities effectively. - Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. Details: London: House of Commons, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 135: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Shelf Number: 140678 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Acheson, Ian Title: Summary of main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice Summary: 1. This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations. 2. In September 2015 the then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a departmental review, supported by external expertise, to: assess the threat which Islamist Extremism (IE) and the radicalisation which sustains it pose to prisons and probation services; and assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to manage that threat. 3. The review team submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations to the then Secretary of State on 17 March 2016. 4. Given the nature of its content, and implications for public safety and security, the review is in the form of a classified report to the then Secretary of State. The subject matter is complex, with significant policy implications. The main findings of the review have been summarised below. 5. The then Secretary of State welcomed the review as a vital element of the MoJ's overall approach to addressing the threat presented by extremism and radicalisation in prisons and probation. Its findings will inform future policy development and operational practice, about which more will be said in the coming months. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140760 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamist ExtremistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Parvez, Tariq Title: The Islamic State in Pakistan Summary: - The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nearby areas in January 2015. - There is currently no evidence of Daesh's central leadership directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks to demonstrate their support. - Daesh's far-reaching ideology -- which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate - can make it appealing to both existing and potential militants in Pakistan. - A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter Daesh's dangerous ideology. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 2013: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 145074 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamist StateRadical GroupRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda. 5th International Report Summary: The fifth edition of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety develops, from the urban perspective, various topics relevant to the current context in cities. As with previous editions of the Report, the first chapter is a constant of ICPC's International Reports, reviewing major trends in crime and in its prevention. The following two chapters address the relationship between the urban setting and the prevention of crime through two distinct lenses: the first gives a general overview of the issues and major trends facing cities; the second, in contrast, offers a comparative perspective, particularly in relation to national-local relationships in the Latin American context. The final three chapters address three fundamental topics on the prevention of urban crime: public transport, the prevention of drug-related crime, and the prevention of violent radicalization. Details: Ottawa: ICPC, 2016. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145994 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug-Related ViolenceExtremist GroupsPublic TransportRadical GroupsRadicalizationUrban Areas and Crime |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted � still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationDe-RadicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Thornton, Amy Elise Title: Understanding Radicalisation Summary: Given the considerable amount of effort and public resources invested in countering radicalisation, achieving a clearer understanding of what radicalisation is and of its causes is arguably a worthwhile and necessary endeavour. This thesis argues that such an understanding is lacking at present. Up until recently, researchers have relied upon interviews with current or former radicals in order to try and tease out those factors which might have contributed to radicalisation. As a result of the methodological approach, the focus has been upon individuals who are radicalised and their personal backgrounds, rather than on causal factors and mechanisms which might have been at work at other levels of analysis. Utilising and developing a tripartite theory of radicalisation by Bouhana and Wikström 2011, this thesis focuses on the emergence of radicalising settings. The role of so-called macro-level, or systemic, factors, which would affect the broader ecology and explain why settings propitious to radicalisation do or do not emerge in particular environments (e.g. communities) at particular times has been largely overlooked. One explanation is that such factors are rarely accessible through interviews conducted with those who commit terrorist acts. By using a relatively new methodology in the field, agent-based modelling, simulation experiments were conducted to examine the impact of collective efficacy and social disorganisation upon the emergence and maintenance of radicalisation within a setting. Systematic reviews were conducted in order to elucidate existing data for modelling parameters, while interviews with former radicals and current deradicalisation experts were carried out in order to provide new data for the model and add to a field in which this primary data is still limited. Agent-based modelling is shown to provide the field of radicalisation studies with a methodology in which to test and refine theory, scientifically examine current hypothesis and generate more by investigating potentially unexpected results from simulation experiments. This could be of great help to practitioners who seek to understand the impact of their interventions when conducting counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation work in the future. Details: London: University College London, 2015. 241p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Shelf Number: 147912 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationDe-RadicalizationRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating, or Preventing? Summary: Summary • Women’s role in violent extremism has too often been simplified to a binary: either victim of the choices of men or deviant anomaly. • Women play a diverse range of roles in violent extremism in Afghanistan—as they do around the world—not only as peacebuilders but also as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and preventers. • Roles and motivations vary, but what is clear is that the construct of disempowered victims simply does not hold true for all women involved. • Women’s roles in violent extremism and the underlying reasons behind those roles need to be fully understood and appropriately reflected in policy and practice. • Women’s rights and place in society are central to the narratives of violent extremist groups, and these narratives are the terrain on which women in Afghanistan fight to establish their rights. • Women have the potential, whether through their own involvement or as family members of those who are involved, to counter radicalization dynamics. • Countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming needs to include women as specific target groups, be engendered more generally, and address the underlying issues of women’s status and agency. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 396: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146123 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Title: Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat Summary: Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiiin, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa, has long been perceived as a Somali organisation – albeit one that represents a security threat to the wider region. But since at least 2010, Al-Shabaab has aspired to become a truly regional organisation, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. In 2010 the group staged its first major external operation, in Kampala, Uganda, and issued its first propaganda video in the Swahili language. Since then, Al- Shabaab has become active in no less than six countries of the region, striking five of them with terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response. This determined expansion of Al-Shabaab’s ambitions and operational reach is in large part the result of the strategic direction adopted by Al-Shabaab's former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye, who currently heads the movement. In late 2013, Godane re-organised Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. While the latter formation has yet to mount an effective operation on Ethiopian soil, the Jaysh Ayman launched a series of cross-border attacks into Kenya in 2014 and, despite a Kenyan counter-offensive in late 2015, the group remains a serious threat to the country's national security. In 2013, Godane also gave instructions for Al-Shabaab’s special operations wing, the Amniyaad, to step up attacks against neighbouring countries, notably those contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This resulted in a spate of attacks between 2013 and 2015 in Kenya that claimed over 350 lives, an attempted suicide bombing of a football match in Addis Ababa in October 2013, and the suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. In October 2014, Al-Shabaab again attempted a suicide bombing in Addis Ababa, this time apparently targeting a busy shopping mall, but the plot was detected and foiled. Al-Shabaab-affiliated networks in Kenya also continued to plan terror attacks during this period, but less successfully than Jaysh Ayman. Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, experienced growing pressure from the security services, and suffered a steady attrition of its leadership. As a result, Al-Hijra cadres withdrew from major hubs of activity in Nairobi and Mombasa, dispersing their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout the country – notably within the prison system. Al-Hijra operatives and recruits – including a growing proportion of women – continued to travel back and forth to Somalia, typically receiving training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations. Kenya also witnessed increasing activity among Al-Shabaab sympathisers, organising themselves spontaneously online via social media and mobile applications. While many of these individuals remain purely aspirational, some have gone on to plan operations, reaching out to members of Al-Shabaab or Al-Hijra for guidance and support. Others have sought advice concerning travel to Somalia or Syria. Confronted by the evolving threat, regional states are exploring ways to strengthen their common response to Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, whose forces are drawn mainly from IGAD countries, continues to support the efforts of the Somali Federal Government and emerging federal member states to confront Al-Shabaab militarily, steadily driving the jihadists out of the last remaining strongholds and helping to build the capacity of Somali security forces. Outside Somalia, IGAD Member States have devoted greater efforts to monitoring and disrupting Al-Shabaab activities within their borders. The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services (HISS) of the member countries of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) met twice in 2015 to deepen security cooperation and harmonise efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In August 2015, a two-day experts’ meeting in Djibouti took the first steps towards the establishment of a Centre of Excellence to Counter Violent Extremism for the IGAD region. In addition, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) launched a new Transnational Security Threats (TST) Initiative to promote security cooperation between member states: the initiative under which this report has been commission and published. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for further action, including: • Enhanced security cooperation in countering Al-Shabaab, including a joint review to identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities in strengthening cooperation to combat Al-Shabaab, such as the types of information to be shared and the processes for doing so; more joint activities to confront Al- Shabaab; and inviting Tanzania to participate in any IGAD-led efforts to counter this threat. • Better understanding of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and possible counter-measures, including appropriate Counter-IED (C-IED) strategies, enhanced technical capabilities for post-blast investigation and analysis, and improved information sharing within the region. • Adaptation to evolving patterns of radicalisation and recruitment, such as the shifting of extremist activities away from former hubs, such as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, to new geographic areas; sensitisation and training of public officials, in order to help them identify and react appropriately to potential threats; enhance surveillance of terrorism suspects and networks inside the prison system and put in place appropriate responses; and undertake additional research and analysis into current trends of radicalisation and recruitment among young women, in order to formulate appropriate responses. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Shelf Number: 147782 Keywords: Al-QaedaExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Jensen, Michael Title: Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Summary: The Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project uses a mixed-method, nested approach to explore a number of key research questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? To address these questions, EADR researchers built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database includes 147 variables covering demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information for 1,473 violent and non-violent extremists from across the ideological spectrum. The database was analyzed using comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression techniques. Additionally, project researchers produced 56 life-course narratives of individuals who radicalized in the U.S., which were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), a methodology that makes it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. EADR produced a number of findings that are relevant for domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, law enforcement, criminal justice policy, and academic research. First, a descriptive comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted radicalization warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment, are not more common among extremists than they are for the general population. CVE programs designed to address feelings of relative deprivation may be ineffective in many cases. The results also indicate that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Programs designed for juveniles and men may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, who are especially prevalent among the far right and single-issue milieus, and women, who are found in large numbers on the far left. In addition to addressing issues of age and gender, intervention programs should look to take advantage of the comparatively long radicalization durations that exist across the ideological spectrum, which often last several months or years, and they should target the face-to-face and virtual social networks that mobilize lone and group-based extremists to act. Second, through a set of robust statistical models, the project identified a number of factors that indicate which extremists are most likely to engage in violent acts. All other things held constant, pre-radicalization criminal activity and post-radicalization clique membership are strongly associated with violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. To the extent that law-enforcement agencies and CVE programs prioritize potentially violent individuals over others when resources are constrained, this finding suggests that their focus should be placed on individuals with prior interactions with the criminal justice system and those who are known to associate with others holding extreme views. Other factors uncovered by this analysis suggest that individuals on the far right and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies are more likely to engage in violence, while those with stable employment histories and those motivated by animal rights and environmental concerns are significantly less likely to do so. Lastly, EADR reveals that psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors can combine in complex ways to produce many pathways to violent extremism. Social and behavioral indicators of radicalization are embedded in complex processes that unfold in non-linear ways. Using fs/QCA techniques, the project reveals that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways to violent extremism. Of these, the majority are driven by psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that stem from lost significance, personal trauma, and collective crises. These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances. Programs that place an undue focus on particular communities are likely to be counterproductive by exasperating feelings of collective victimization. Successful programs, on the other hand, will be tailored to specific ideological groups and sub-groups, and will address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. The results of the EADR project lend good support to radicalization mechanisms that are based on personal and collective psychology. That said, our analysis failed to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of 35 cases of violent extremism that were analyzed, which indicates that extant radicalization research does not account for all of the causal conditions that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future research efforts should focus on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations in order to identify these missing conditions. Doing so will also allow researchers to more closely chart how attitudinal and behavioral traits change over-time. The results of these efforts should be used to inform domestic CVE efforts, especially when it comes to program design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145380 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: Key Findings - American Muslims are increasingly using the Web and social media to help counter violent extremism. Discussions with a number of Muslim leaders active in social media suggest that it is possible to expand such efforts even further, and doing so is a major objective of the August 2011 White House strategy to counter violent extremism. - While Muslim Americans play an active role in countering extremism, several factors may work to undermine higher-level engagement, including: low radicalization rates among American Muslims, negative perceptions of U.S. counterterrorism policies, a limited reservoir of leadership capacity and CVE funding (which prevents effective outreach), and being viewed as sell-outs to those most sympathetic to jihadi causes. - In some cases, the First Amendment may limit U.S. government attempts to fund CVE programs of an ideological bent, but this restriction could ultimately benefit CVE discourse as it frees Muslim groups of the taint of government funding and prevents the government from having to "choose sides" in intra-Muslim discourse and debate. - Both the U.S. State Department and the "think-do tank" Google Ideas have initiated insightful programs that seek to build capacity and otherwise promote credible Muslim voices. - Recommendations include desecuritizing efforts to counter violent extremism, addressing sources of mistrust within the Muslim community, focusing engagements and CVE education on social media influencers, building leadership and social media capacity in the Muslim community, enhancing private sector funding and engagement, and finding avenues to enhance government funding. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Shelf Number: 144830 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsMuslimsRadicalizationSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Ellis, B. Heidi Title: Understanding Pathways to and Away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees Summary: The overall objective of the proposed project was to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali immigrants: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as civic engagement? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? In this project we empirically examined the principle of multi-finality, or pathways leading from a shared refugee experience to multiple outcomes. Understanding these different trajectories, and the factors that shape an individual's progress towards diverse outcomes, provides critical information to local and state government agencies as they respond to the potential threat of domestic radicalization. Somalis in North America offer a window into the remarkable potential that can be realized by refugees/immigrants despite experiences of severe adversity as well as the challenges some subgroups encounter when adjusting to life in a new country. Somalia has endured one of the longest and most brutal wars of the past 30 years. Civil war broke out in 1991 and the nation has existed in what has been described as a "perpetual anarchy" to this day (Agbiboa 2014). This enduring conflict has led to millions of Somalis being dispersed as refugees across the globe. As refugees with limited resources, many Somalis in North America are resettled in poor urban neighborhoods where they are visibly different, not only because of race or ethnicity but also because of dress, especially for women who wear a Muslim head covering. Somali refugees have also found themselves inserted into the unfamiliar black and white dichotomy that dominates American racial discourse (Kusow 2006). In this regard, though Somalis came to North America to escape the horrors of war, they often find themselves facing new problems, such as lack of jobs, loss of status, high levels of neighborhood violence, and racial and ethnic discrimination (Betancourt et al. 2014; Abdi 2015). In addition, the community has been plagued by violence. For example, in Minneapolis, MN, where the greatest number of Somali refugees in the US has settled, the community has faced gang violence and the threat of youth radicalizing simultaneously. In the two-year period between December 2007 and January 2010, eleven Somali American youth were killed in gang violence in the twin cities and twenty left to join Al-Shabaab (Yuen 2010). More recently, nine Somali youth have been arrested and have been sentenced or are awaiting sentences for their attempts to join (Yuen, Ibrahim, and Aslanian 2015;Yuen, Ibrahim, & Xaykaothao, 2016). While the number of Somali American youth joining these groups are small and while the majority of Somali Americans are law-abiding citizens, the terrorist groups' ability to recruit these youth and to convince some of them to engage in violent acts is concerning not only to policymakers and law enforcement but also to the Somali community's which fears losing more youth to violence or having the community reputation sullied by being associated with terrorism. While some of the social and cultural factors affecting Somalis are unique to that ethnic group, they also share experiences common to many immigrants - navigating identity development and duality as they move between home and host cultures, contending with discrimination as religious, racial and ethnic minorities, and striving to achieve their dreams while struggling to gain socioeconomic stability. Thus understanding their developmental trajectories may inform our understanding of other immigrant and refugee groups as well. Details: Boston: Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Shelf Number: 146650 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationRefugeesSomali ImmigrantsTerrorismViolent Radicalization |
Author: Parker, Tony C. Title: Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization Summary: Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America's homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144858 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDeradicalizationExtremismHomeland SecurityPrisonersPrisonsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko HaramCitizen AttitudesExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons Summary: This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legislators and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the development of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice. This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to addresses the manifestation of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United Nations. It provides practical guidance on: • The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent extremism) • Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalization to violence) • Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at facilitating their social reintegration upon release. Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support. Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all recommendations made in the Handbook: • Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice: It is crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are permissible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice,1 although certain manifestations may be subject to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of public order or the respect of others’ rights). At the same time, Member States should prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. • Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management: Guidance on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulnerability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in a disorderly manner. • The importance of definitions and differentiation: This Handbook reiterates that prisoner radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are important, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radicalization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action. • Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners: The above notwithstanding, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be managed, as this Handbook will set out. The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the different legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not necessarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence. Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Criminal Justice Handbook Series; Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Shelf Number: 141300 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationExtremist GroupsExtremist PrisonersExtremistsPrison ViolenceRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: Boko Haram's rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women's economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 242: Accessed march 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 141379 Keywords: Boko HaramFemale TerroristsJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolence Against Women, Girls |
Author: Schomerus, Mareike Title: Countering violent extremism: Topic guide Summary: Definitions and concepts There is no consensus on what violent extremism is and how best to prevent or counter it. The term 'violent extremism' has become a catch-all for a number of phenomena, and there is considerable variation in how terminology is used. Radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism are often used interchangeably, even though they describe different processes. The term violent extremism conflates belief and use of force. Critics also see the use of 'extremist' as always politically motivated: it can be used to denounce those that threaten the political status quo. Its use to describe primarily Islamist groups has obscured the fact that extremist beliefs and support for violence are found across different cultures, religions, and political situations. More attention is now being paid to, for example, right-wing or left-wing violent extremism. The breadth of definitions and debate may offer an opportunity for more creative policy and programme engagement. However, it can also encourage ad hoc policymaking. What we know about violent extremism Rigorous empirical research that would allow conclusive statements on violent extremism is rare, so extremist violence tends to be explained through untested theories. Political interests may also inform an explanation or definition. Causes of violent extremism are often divided into 'push' and 'pull' factors. This overlooks links between them, however, and can lead to over-generalisation. 'Individual' and 'community' factors are more useful categories - though still interconnected. Factors at the individual level include: Personal relationships: These are important in spreading or reinforcing extremist ideas, and a radicalising peer group can provide a sense of belonging. Beliefs, values and convictions: Extremist beliefs can be religious, spiritual, moral, or political and tend to express the conviction that a group, a way of life, or a political system needs to be challenged or destroyed. The perception of being denied recognition at a collective and personal level is considered critical. Manipulation: Manipulation by extremist groups happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors. Whether there is a causal relationship between access to information (including to social media) and extremism is under-researched. This also challenges counter-approaches that use media strategies. Trauma and humiliation: How emotions of humiliation and betrayal result in the reproduction of violence is a topic in urgent need of research. Factors at the community level include: History and narratives: Legacies of oppression, subjugation, and interference by dominant powers matter. Sharing an oppression narrative with a community can create a sense of belonging in a marginalised situation. Rejection of an external system: Externally imposed or international systems that are associated with injustice and humiliation can create resistance that can turn violent. Governance: Poor/unjust governance can promote acceptance of an extremist group. Failure of a government to deliver services may enable violent extremists to establish safe havens. Business and crime: Commercial interests can drive violent behaviour. Some extremist groups act as credit institutions where no others are available. Marginalisation and lack of choices: Violence can be seen as a way of gaining more choices, an audible political voice, or a stronger economic position. Those who join violent extremist groups come from diverse backgrounds and arrive via different paths. Violent extremism is not the consequence of a long-term political or religious 'maturation'. There is no straightforward link between violent extremism and religious faith or specific practices. Many of those radicalising have only a faint grasp of the holy texts of the religion they are purportedly defending. This highlights that a belief - which can be a strong driver of violence - is not to be equated with a religious faith based on the interpretation of scriptures. A large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan found neither religious practice nor support for political Islam was related to support for violent extremist groups. A direct link between education and specific attitudes has not been established: lack of education does not cause extremist views. Neither radicalisation nor state collapse necessarily leads to violent extremism. Some scholars argue that in a situation of collapse it is in fact more difficult for extremist ideologies to gain traction. Violent extremism involves local, regional and international dimensions, so strategies to tackle it are needed at different levels. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 144892 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsJihadistsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Understanding the Rising Cult of the Suicide Bomber Summary: The sharp rise in the number of suicide bombings over the last few years is incontestable. 1982 - the year of the Hezbollah attack on the Tyre headquarters of the Israeli army - is often cited as the beginning of the 'modern age' of suicide bombings, but the relatively limited activities of the 80s and 90s cannot compare with the current scope of the problem. Before 2000, no year saw more than 22 suicide attacks worldwide. In 2015, there were at least 600. Over the last five years of AOAV's Explosive Weapons Monitoring Project (EWMP), which records data on explosive weapon usage worldwide according t0 English-language news sources, suicide bombings have consistently caused high levels of civilian harm. In total, 1,191 incidents were recorded across the 2011-2015 period, resulting in 31,589 civilian deaths and injuries. This is an average of 27 civilians killed or injured per incident. Of the ten worst incidents recorded by AOAV over the five-year period, five were suicide bombings - a figure only matched by airstrikes. In the same period, AOAV also recorded a worrisome overall trend of rising civilian deaths and injuries from suicide bombings, as well as ever-greater numbers of countries affected. In 2015, for example, suicide bombings were recorded in 21 countries - the highest number ever recorded by AOAV or by other datasets. Indeed, both 2015 and 2016 saw a considerable uptick in the overall lethality of suicide bombings. This was in spite of similar incident numbers to previous years. Suicide strikes in 2015 resulted in an average of 36 civilian deaths and injuries per incident, markedly higher than the five-year average of 28. In 2016 that figure has risen to 38. This rise can largely be attributed to an intensification of high-profile suicide bombings launched by Boko Haram and IS, but also by other armed groups involved in conflicts in Syria and Yemen, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP). In spite of the clear differences in scale and objectives between the 1980s and the post-9/11 world, this is largely not reflected in modern scholarship. Most studies on suicide bombings - even those emerging after the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Iraqi insurgency of the mid-2000s - focus on the relatively small-scale nationalist campaigns of the 80s and 90s. This is probably largely because of the comparatively large amounts of available data on these campaigns (such as the relatively comprehensive information on Palestinian suicide bombings, for example). Much of this scholarship into the drivers of suicide attacks has also focused at the individual level, ambitiously, searching for the magical last piece of the puzzle that will explain 'what makes a suicide bombe''. The overwhelming majority suicide bombers in recent years are, with a few exceptions, internationalist Islamists of a Salafi-Jihadist persuasion (or, more accurately, those who carry out bombings on behalf of such organisations). This should not be taken to mean that suicide bombing is a problem somehow 'stemming from Islam', unique to Islamists, or even particularly characteristic of Islamist political movements as a whole. What it does mean, is that these groups - rather than nationalist movements - should be the centre of current research, as well as policy and military discussions on reducing the current impact of suicide bombing. Another concern regarding recent scholarship is that most has focused on finding a single underlying cause for all uses of suicide bombing worldwide. Suicide bombing is a tactic that can be used in many different ways and for many different strategic objectives. It obviously emerges under specific conditions - but this does not mean its use will be limited to those conditions. The suicide bombing that killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 shares no more with a huge market truck bombing in 2015 Baghdad than the means of activation method. This report sets out to address the main factors that contribute significantly in creating the cult of suicide bombers in armed Salafi-Jihadi groups. Our research found that suicide bombers of Salafi-Jihadi groups blow themselves up for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the concept of martyrdom propagated by Salafi-Jihadi groups seems to appeal to many who have personal and individual desires pertaining to elevation of status. Such desires are often rooted in a sense of inferiority, whether it is socio-economic or social, and is often caused by (perceived or real) discrimination. The act is often justified as a defence of Islam, which gives the bomber both a sense of fulfilling a purpose and hero status among their peers. Religion often serves as the binding force, and usually becomes a factor towards the end of an individual's radicalisation process. These more 'ideological' motivations are, in general, most predominantly found in foreign fighter suicide bombers. Secondly, some bombers are merely motivated by the logic of the battlefield or by personal experience. For example, many Syrian suicide bombers have spent time as political prisoners or witnessed deaths caused by airstrikes, which may give them enough grievances to exert revenge. Suicide bombings might also be motivated by more pragmatic reasons, for example as a means to protect one's home community.Thirdly, the deterioration of conflict in Syria and Iraq, as well as the sectarian climate that has been developed as a result of these conflicts, has polarised the Muslim population and has undoubtedly eradicated some of the neutral positions in each conflict. This has paved the ground for more suicide attacks in the short run but also for jihadi sympathisation in the long run. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Shelf Number: 145312 Keywords: IslamRadicalizationSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Hamilton, Carolyn Title: Children and Count-Terrorism Summary: Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. However, it has acquired new dimensions in the twenty-first century. Terrorist groups have become more structured, and are now often transnational; the majority of the latest terrorist attacks are religiously motivated; and terrorist acts have become increasingly brutal, particularly in terms of civilian casualties. The ever-evolving character of terrorism, together with the sense of anxiety that such a phenomenon creates in the community, has prompted States to adopt counter-terrorism policies and measures to tackle the issue. Children are increasingly affected and victimised by terrorism, but at the same time, the last few years have shown them to be increasingly engaged in terrorist related activity. International policy and law-making has struggled to keep up with the rapid changes, and the rights of children affected by terrorism and counter-terrorism have not entered into mainstream discourse, and have been largely overlooked. The overall objective of this report is to shed light on the particular vulnerability of children and juveniles in the context of counter-terrorism, and to increase the capacity of governments to integrate existing international juvenile justice and child protection standards into their national counter-terrorism frameworks. The report examines the position of children in international law as perpetrators and victims of terrorism. It also explores radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation by analysing counter-terrorism laws and practices of two case study countries. Finally, the report provides a number of generally applicable recommendations that will allow governments to strengthen their capacity to integrate international child rights standards into domestic counter-terrorism frameworks. Details: Torino, Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2016. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2017 at: http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/files/Children_counter_terrorism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/files/Children_counter_terrorism.pdf Shelf Number: 145337 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Deradicalization RadicalizationTerrorism Terrorist Recruitment |
Author: Bonnell, Joe Title: Teaching approaches that help to build resilience to extremism among young people Summary: This report presents the findings from a large-scale, in-depth research study into teaching methods - knowledge, skills, teaching practices and behaviours - that help to build resilience to extremism. The focus is on teaching methods to be used in a general classroom setting rather than as part of interventions targeted at those deemed at risk of extremism. The research methods used were 10 in-depth case studies of relevant projects and interventions, including interviews with teachers, practitioners and students and classroom observation, a literature review conducted according to systematic principles, and close engagement with 20 academic and other experts in the field. The study was commissioned by the former Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF), now the Department for Education (DfE), with support from the Home Office. The Office for Public Management (OPM), an independent public service research and development centre, conducted the research in partnership with the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER), which is the UK's largest independent provider of research, assessment and information services for education, training and children's services. The primary aim of the research was to provide a strong evidence base for schools and other education providers to help them adopt and commission the appropriate interventions to build resilience to extremism. Following detailed analysis and synthesis of findings from the case study visits, together with findings from the literature review, we identified a number of key ingredients which were important for resilience-building teaching activities. Taken together, these ingredients help to counteract the impact of factors that can help to either push or pull young people towards extremism and / or violent extremism, such as a sense of injustice or feelings of exclusion. The key ingredients can be clustered under three headings: 1. making a connection through good design and a young-person centred approach 2. facilitating a safe space for dialogue and positive interaction 3. equipping young people with appropriate capabilities - skills, knowledge, understanding and awareness. Whatever the setting and resources available, the principles of good design and facilitation - the first two of the three - are crucial and non-negotiable. This research suggests that a well-designed, well-facilitated intervention will go a long way to building resilience. To be more confident of longer-term, sustainable resilience, however, an additional focus is needed, over and above good design and facilitation, on building 'harder' skills, knowledge, understanding and awareness, including practical tools and techniques for personal resilience. Details: Feethams, Darlington, UK: Department of Education, 2011. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report DFE-RR119; Accessed May 9, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teaching-approaches-that-help-to-build-resilience-to-extremism-among-young-people Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teaching-approaches-that-help-to-build-resilience-to-extremism-among-young-people Shelf Number: 145364 Keywords: Educational ProgramsExtremismRadicalizationResilienceViolent Extremism |
Author: Sheikh, Sanah Title: Teaching methods that help to build resilience to extremism Rapid Evidence Assessment Summary: The Office for Public Management (OPM) was commissioned by the Department for Education (DfE) to conduct a review of the literature on good practice in preventing gangs and gun activity and extremist behaviour amongst young people. This review is part of a wider programme of work being undertaken by OPM, in partnership with the National Foundation for Educational Research (NfER), for DfE, the aim of which is develop an evidence base about the teaching methods and tools that work in building resilience to extremism. The specific objectives of this review were to provide an overview of the evidence relating to: - What works in building resilience against and prevention of the following risky behaviours amongst young people: - Guns and gangs crime/violence/activity - Extremist behaviour, including Al-Qaeda inspired extremism, far right extremism or racist extremism - The role of teachers and schools in the prevention of the above behaviour Representatives from the DfE and OPM team recognised from the outset that the broad nature of the subject of study had a number of implications for the literature review, including: - There is likely to be a greater amount of high quality material relevant to the prevention of gangs and guns activity compared with extremist behaviour, particularly Al-Qaeda inspired extremism - The inclusion of international literature means that there is likely to be a broad range of preventative initiatives identified in the literature, with varying degrees of relevance to the UK context - Methodologies used, particularly, in the case of evaluations of preventative initiatives, are likely to vary considerably, thus making it difficult to compare across studies and generate conclusions This review has thus been designed to 'map out the terrain' and to adopt a strategic approach to honing in on particular areas that have the greatest potential in yielding key insights and learning points to inform DfE's work. Details: Feethams, Darlington, UK; Department of Education, 2011. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report DFE-RR120; Accessed May 9, 2017 at: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/3597/1/3597_DFE-RR120.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/3597/1/3597_DFE-RR120.pdf Shelf Number: 145365 Keywords: Educational ProgramsExtremismExtremist ViolenceGangsGun-Related ViolenceRadicalizationResilience |
Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Women and Violent Radicalization: Research Report Summary: Highlights - Women are victims of all forms of violent radicalism, but can also be participants, or active accomplices, of violence in the name of an ideology. - Pursuant to the mandate in the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan, Radicalization in Quebec: Act, Prevent, Detect and Live Together, the Secretariat a la condition feminine (SCF) and the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) were asked to collaborate in defining the angle and scope of the present study, whose purpose is to document the differentiated radicalization factors among women and men in Quebec. The CSF and SCF also drew on the expertise of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) for empirical information. - Radicalization leading to violence is a complex process whereby people adopt a system of extreme beliefs and a willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence, to promote an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation. - Throughout history, women have been involved in violent radicalism, whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia. The violent radicalization of women is not a new phenomenon. - Despite the historical presence of women in violent extremist movements, and episodes of political violence perpetrated by them, violent radicalism is a marginal phenomenon among women in comparison to men. - Often viewed through the distorting lens of gender stereotypes and a presumption of passivity, women who join radical groups, or who engage directly in political violence, should not be thought of exclusively as victims, since they are also active participants. To understand their choices, we must explore the particular paths they have taken. The scholarly literature and most media reports have long seen radical women as manipulated and subservient to men, who are seen as the "true" drivers and actors of violent radical movements. - The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated, controlled by romantic urges, dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency. It also contributes to the belief that women who are recent immigrants are by definition more submissive toward men than women who are not. In contrast, a postcolonial approach avoids this simplistic, erroneous view of immigrant women by considering the perspective of those directly concerned. Details: Montreal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Shelf Number: 145556 Keywords: Extremist GroupsImmigrant WomenRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Exit Strategies Summary: This approach involves setting up de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation), or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the very best of prevention efforts, some individuals still go on to become (violent) extremists. While en route to that stage, they may fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and - in some cases - of judicial and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual - perhaps after finishing a prison sentence, or when he or she is tired of the movement or is pushed by loved ones to change - needs to be re-integrated into society. For successful re-integration into society it is important to offer de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to prisoners charged with violent extremist offences . But "Exit" programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different advanced stages of the radicalisation process: from those that have strong views and legitimise the use of violence, those aligned with extremist groups but who have not yet undertaken violent extremist activities, to those that have themselves executed violent extremist or even terrorist attacks. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145563 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Family support Summary: This approach aims to support families vulnerable to and dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism. The role of families in the process or radicalisation has become central to the debate on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Many believe that one of the keys to stopping the process at an early stage lies behind the door of the family home. Proponents of this approach believe that building resilience and creating awareness for parents and other family members will mean that young people are better protected from extremist influences. In reality, families may be both helpful and harmful in radicalisation processes. A distinction should be made between families' intentions and their behaviour. Family members may sometimes do more harm than good because they are unsure how to talk to a relative who they may fear is becoming radicalised. Family members may also explicitly encourage a relative to take an extremist path, as they believe this is the right direction. Families can however also be the key to creating a safety net and be instrumental in helping someone leave an extremist movement and mind-set. Each scenario and family's involvement will be different and requires tailored solutions. Although we talk about families as a whole, the dynamics within families and the roles of each family member will impact radicalisation processes differently. It is therefore important to understand who constitutes the family? Who is part of this group or network of people that considers itself a family? This may differ quite substantially across different cultural backgrounds. Honorary culture within families might also play an important role in both directions. Once there is an understanding as to who is part of the family, dynamics between these individuals can be observed and analysed. For this to happen, a family's cooperation is of utmost importance. Without a family's commitment it will be very difficult for 'outsiders', whether police, family counsellors, social workers or other actors, to build trust and help build resilient family engagement. A family's connection to the wider environment (other families, the community they are part of, institutions) is also a crucial element in family support. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145567 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremism Family EngagementRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools: issues and perspectives Summary: Violent radicalization, in and of itself, is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, movements have called upon their followers to use violence in defence of an ideology or cause, whether for religious, social, political or other motives. However, the current context is one of growing activity by violent radical movements that, although extremely diverse in terms of their ideologies and motivations, all eat away at the Promise of Togetherness and pose a direct threat to our collective security. Quebec has not been spared in the emergence and proliferation of radicalization leading to violence, which is how it came about that in 2015 several young Quebecers left for Syria to join extremist groups on the ground there. College de Maisonneuve has been hit especially hard by this state of affairs; it was at the instigation of the college that the CPRLV undertook the present study to document the situation, produce a cross-sectional analysis and propose recommandations. The report explores the following broad topics: - Explaining radicalization leading to violence linked to jihadism and the situation in Syria - Placing Quebec in context with regard to this phenomenon - Understanding the radicalization of some students from College de Maisonneuve and other young people receiving counselling from the CPRLV - Identifying strategies for preventing radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools. The different recommendations generated by this analysis (and presented at the end of the rapport) are directed not only at College de Maisonneuve, schools and government agencies but also at ordinary citizens affected by the question who would like to engage in a helpful and proactive manner with those around them. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Shelf Number: 145633 Keywords: ExtremismRadical ExtremistRadical GroupsRadicalizationSchoolsTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander Title: Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Review, 2006-2016 Summary: This literature review seeks to recalibrate our understanding of online radicalisation, hiw it is conceptualised within the literature and the extent to which the policy debate has advanced in response to technological and legal developments. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ResearchPerspectivesonOnlineRadicalisation.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ4985_Lit_Review_020517_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 145639 Keywords: Online RadicalizationRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Feldstein, Michelle Title: Into the Fold: Evaluating Different Countries' Programs to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists Summary: Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country's efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state's level of repression affects that country's level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state's official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious reeducation or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country's de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country's level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country's de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state's religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists-as a practice and concept-is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2015. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145667 Keywords: De-radicalizationIslamist TerroristMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Wilson, Tom Title: Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg Summary: Shakeel Begg, described in court by a judge as "an extremist Islamic speaker who espouses extremist Islamic positions", has established himself as an influential figure within numerous public bodies and groups - even after the ruling, where he lost a libel case against the BBC. A new Henry Jackson Society report, Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg, has found that Begg firmly entrenched himself within numerous community groups, and has been active even since he was declared to be an extremist in court. He has also continued to associate with senior politicians, including the leaders of major British political parties. The report's main findings include: He shared a platform with Tim Farron and Stella Creasy in December after the ruling declared him an extremist. This was not reported at the time. He shared a platform in 2013 with Jeremy Corbyn in the days following the Lee Rigby killing - in spite of the fact that the killers came from the mosque where he was Imam, and the fact that his mosque has a long history of hosting hate preachers. The John the Baptist Primary School put documents on their website stating that they work to promote British values, and gave the fact that they worked with Begg as evidence for this. This relationship continued after the ruling, with school children visiting Begg's mosque. This was a clear breach of the Prevent duty. Begg sat on a body at Lewisham Council charged with advising on religious education. He was advised them on their response to the Trojan horse revelations. Begg is known to have worked closely with the police in community partnerships, and the police provided character witnesses during the libel case. He has been a Muslim chaplain at Lewisham and Greenwich NHS trust in the past. He was also a chaplain at Goldsmith's university, and has continued to visit as a guest speaker since. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism , 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 8: Accessed May 25, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/ Shelf Number: 145800 Keywords: ExtremistsIslam RadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Gaub, Florence Title: The Crime-Terrorism Nexus Summary: That there is a link between terrorism and crime is common knowledge: terrorism itself is a crime, often funded by organised criminal activity. But in the case of Daesh, the link goes much further. The organisation recruits more former criminals, and funds itself more through petty - not organised - criminal activities than other groups. Yet this also offers law enforcement officials an opportunity to pursue it from another angle beyond the usual radicalisation narrative. This requires a zeroing in on hitherto neglected petty criminals, however. Details: Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief Issue no. 10: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 145827 Keywords: Financing TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: Penal Reform International Title: Global Prison Trends 2016 Summary: This is the second annual edition in our Global Prison Trends series, describing key global trends in the use and practice of imprisonment and the pressing challenges facing states that wish to organise their penitentiary systems in accordance with international norms and standards. Topics include for example: developments in international criminal justice policy; notable changes to policy at the national level; prison population trends; prison management issues (eg. security and violence, radicalisation, corrections in fragile and conflict states, corruption) and new technologies. The 2016 also has a new section on the provision of food in prisons, with some representative data on food expenditure. Significant international developments and recent research projects are highlighted throughout. The report also includes a Special Focus pull-out section -= Prison staff: Overworked and underpaid? Working in a prison requires specific skills, but prison staff can be poorly paid, under‑trained and experience high levels of work‑related stress and violence. This special feature provides a global perspective on prison staff recruitment, pay and conditions, professional training, and issues relating to their health, safety and well‑being Details: London: PRI, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Global_prison_trends_report_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Global_prison_trends_report_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 145899 Keywords: Alternatives to Incarceration Prison Administration Prison Guards Prison Policy Prisons Radicalization |
Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Shtuni, Adrian Title: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo Summary: What started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the Syrian regime escalated in the five years that followed into an intractable sectarian war that has engulfed both Syria and Iraq, drawn in a suite of regional actors and world powers, and attracted an unprecedented number of volunteer combatants from more than a hundred countries. Although so-called foreign fighters have been a common feature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and Dagestan, Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, their flow to Syria and Iraq is the largest influx of its kind in recent history. More than 36,500 individuals, including at least 6,600 from Western countries, are estimated to have traveled to the conflict theater since 2012, mostly to join designated terrorist organizations operating in the region. Not long after the bloody secessionist wars that brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western Balkans became a prime source of foreign fighters for the Syrian conflict. More than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012. The significance of this number becomes apparent in the context of the combined population across these small countries of less than nineteen million. Rates of mobilization relative to the population size - particularly in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia - are far higher than in western European countries most afflicted by the phenomenon. Now that the flow of those traveling to the conflict theater has subsided - for a variety of reasons - and about 37 percent of all Kosovan nationals estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq have returned home, the task of understanding the dynamics of their radicalization has become even more critical. This is not only in regard to managing the security challenge associated with their return but also to adopting effective strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This report explores the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, focusing on the flow of foreign fighters as the most prominent symptom of a multifaceted religious militancy problem facing the country. It is important to emphasize from the outset that though the number of foreign fighters in itself represents a quasi-insignificant minority of the Kosovan society, it also constitutes merely a fraction of an extensive network of like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks. This report shines some light on that less well-understood part of the supply chain of violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Shelf Number: 146019 Keywords: Foreign FightersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Robinson, Eric Title: What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen? Summary: Why do some individuals become terrorists? Why do some choose to travel overseas to become foreign fighters and others remain home to engage in political violence? More than academic, the answers to these questions inform a central component of U.S. national security strategy: countering violent extremism. This report addresses the topic of radicalization - or individual motivations to engage in political violence-in Yemen. This report uses data from focus groups and a national survey conducted during the spring of 2016. Yemen is in the midst of a civil war. In the wake of the collapse of the government of Tunisia in 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets in major cities to protest the reelection of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After protracted negotiations by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was Saleh's vice president, took over the presidency in February 2012. By then, the internal strife had gained momentum. The Houthis, who had fought several wars against Saleh's forces, had used the unrest to expand from their stronghold in the Sa'ada governorate. They eventually seized the capital of Sana'a in September 2014. President Hadi and his forces retreated to Aden and southern Yemen, but the Houthis pushed south and assaulted Aden's international airport in March 2015. The civil war had begun. More than 10,000 people have died in Yemen's civil war. Nearly 2.2 million-out of a total population of 27 million-are internally displaced and an additional 200,000 are refugees overseas. Various nonstate armed groups exist. Some fight with the aforementioned Houthi movement. Others have joined the local al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Still, others are associated with the Islamic State. These armed groups fight against one another as well as the Yemeni military forces and those of the Arab coalition. With such a widespread conflict, it would be easy to understand the motivations of those who are sympathetic to, or become involved in, political violence. But rather than focus on support for political violence per se, the report looks at the other side of the coin - why individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen. It argues that the more effective approach to countering violent extremism is to reinforce a propensity toward nonviolence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Shelf Number: 146245 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Islamic Radicalization in Belgium Summary: Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile a ground for Islamic radicalization? This paper points to the low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community. These poor demographic realities of the Belgian Muslim community might be significant in providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic parties and organizations to influence and recruit. This paper analyzes Islamic radicalization in Belgium. The first part of this paper examines Belgian-Muslim demographics, including population, integration, political participation, and organization. Then, Belgian Islamic radicalization is examined through the theoretical frameworks of both McCauley and Moskalenko and Social Movement Theory. To conclude, this paper considers governmental responses and recommendations for future preventative actions. Details: Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Shelf Number: 146257 Keywords: MuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceIslamic StateRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: On June 17, 2015, nine people were shot and killed in Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, reportedly hoped that his act of violence would spark a race war. In November 2015, Robert Dear left three people dead and four wounded after he opened fire on a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At a court appearance following his arrest, Dear referred to himself as a "warrior for the babies." Two weeks later, 14 people were killed and 22 wounded in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The assailants, a married couple named Syed Riawan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were self-identified supporters of the Islamic State (ISIL). Malik even proclaimed her loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on Facebook as their attack was under way. Acts of violence inspired by extremist ideologies are a real threat with which communities across the country are increasingly contending. In the wake of each of these attacks, our nation and others have been left to grapple with why they occurred and how they can be prevented. Increasingly, solutions for addressing these types of attacks have been found in partnerships among various types of government service providers-such as between the police and health and human services departments - as well as between government service providers and members of the community. The aims of these partnerships are to strengthen social cohesion within the community and to provide assistance to community members at risk of radicalization to violent extremism, diverting them from the path to violence. Violent extremism is not a problem that law enforcement agencies can solve through arrests and prosecutions alone. At a 2015 National Institute of Justice conference, called "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.," researchers identified issues with identity, a desire for belonging, past trauma, personal connections to violent extremists and extremist narratives, and mental illness among some of the potential risk factors for radicalizing to violence. These are issues that police can address more effectively in cooperation with community leaders, social service providers, and other non-law enforcement stakeholders. To explore these issues, on September 18, 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) held a forum on Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism. This forum, which took place in Minneapolis in partnership with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, and the Saint Paul Police Department, brought together police leaders and community partners from across the country to share their recommendations for how to build successful partnerships to prevent violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2017. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2017 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 146441 Keywords: Extremist GroupsPolice-Community PartnershipsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A Process Evaluation in Los Angeles Summary: Countering violent extremism (CVE) work to date in Los Angeles, led by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and its law enforcement and community partners, has centered on a community policing approach. Community policing forms partnerships between law enforcement and communities and emphasizes proactive joint problem-solving so as to build trust and cooperation and address the conditions that mitigate public safety. Overall, research studies of community policing have shown that it can improve citizens' satisfaction with and trust in the police, but it does not necessarily decrease crime. Community policing was cited in the White House's Strategic Implementation plan of 2011 as a key component of CVE. A recent national study led by Duke University concluded that nearly half of policing agencies in the U.S. are using community policing practices of outreach and engagement to communities being targeted for recruitment to terrorism. The LAPD and its partners believe that community policing to counter violent extremism can build community resilience to violent extremism. This would mean that community policing can strengthen the capacities of communities to prevent violent radicalization and to stop attacks. However, there is presently a lack of adequate understanding and evidence about how exactly community policing practices can achieve this or otherwise contribute to CVE and also what are its limitations. Research is needed to build that knowledge. We are researchers from the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) who conducted an independent research study of the LAPD's strategy of using countering violent extremism tailored community policing (CVETCP). The type of study we conducted is called a process evaluation. A process evaluation examines the course and context of a program so as to understand what is happening, to identify best practices, and to understand the program in its broader context and why it turned out the way it did. Our overall conclusion is that adopting a community policing model is a necessary approach to better protect and serve communities at risk for violent radicalization. Some of those communities are comprised of Muslim immigrants and refugees from countries where the police were feared and citizens learned to turn away. Community policing can humanize officers for these communities and help shift these attitudes. Our process evaluation of their work identified five community policing practices: Engage. Community outreach officers meet and establish one-on-one relationships with community leaders to open communication channels. They also build partnerships with community-based organizations, including faith-based and interfaith organizations. Build Trust. Community outreach officers work to establish honest and open dialogue on sensitive issues with community leaders and members, such as concerning terrorism, hate crimes, and discrimination. They acknowledge and promote mutual understanding of communities' historical traumas and their present needs and strengths. The officers aim to be as transparent as possible regarding crime fighting and police conduct. Educate. Community outreach officers teach communities about crime (including hate crimes), police work, and community resources to combat criminal activity. This includes building knowledge and awareness in communities about violent extremism and how to prevent it. Problem Solve. Community outreach officers help communities and individuals respond to their current problems. This includes helping communities respond appropriately to Islamophobia, discrimination, and hate speech and crimes. They also help community members access available resources to address social, legal, and mental and physical health concerns. They provide communities with knowledge and skills to assess the threat level of individuals and educate them on how to respond. Mobilize. Community outreach officers promote the civic engagement of community members, including promoting women and youth advocacy on civic and public safety issues. They assist immigrants and refugees in promoting their integration and addressing their security concerns. They also provide community-based organizations with consultation, materials, information, and support regarding how their organization can contribute to building resilience to violent extremism. These should be considered emerging practices given that CVETCP is a new practice and is currently based on evidence which is not research-based. We then worked with the LAPD and their law enforcement and community partners to build a logic model of their current program. The model could be used to inform conducting a program evaluation of CVETCP as it is currently being practiced. This logic model and these emerging practices lay an important and necessary foundation for additional work which is needed in order to effectively build community resilience to violent extremism, some of which could be incorporated into community policing approaches. Additional work should include incorporating public health models of prevention and building resilience that rely on evidence based strategies for addressing upstream risk factors and root causes (Weine and Ahmed, 2012). It should also include a stronger emphasis on developing and maintaining partnerships, drafting logic models that include a theory of change, building multi-level change-oriented interventions, and evaluating outcomes. Efforts to build community resilience cannot possibly succeed without adequately understanding the community context. This study identified and described multiple key contextual issues which should inform the further development and implementation of CVETCP and CVE in Los Angeles and elsewhere. These included: challenges growing up Muslim in America today; challenges for parents and families; challenges for mosques and Imams; bias against Muslims, and; history of surveillance and sting operations in Southern California. We concluded that CVETCP and CVE could be strengthened by better understanding and addressing these contextual issues in program activities. One of the most important contextual issues that needs to be better understood is the community opposition to CVE and CVETCP. We describe the polarized discourse of pro- and anti-CVE engagers. When we talked with persons about CVE, the position taken often seems less rigid than the public rhetoric. Many factors went into the polarized CVE discourse, but it is not one that necessarily needs to persist. The variabilities amongst and commonalities between the pro- and anti-CVE engager suggests that a broader and equitable approach to violence prevention utilizing community policing could possibly gain the mutual trust and cooperation that both communities and law enforcement seek. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 22, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_CommunityPolicingtoCounterViolentExtremism_July2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_CommunityPolicingtoCounterViolentExtremism_July2017.pdf Shelf Number: 146809 Keywords: Community Policing Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups RadicalizationViolent Extremism |
Author: Eerten, Jan-Jaap van Title: Developing a social media response to radicalization The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization Summary: Radical groups thrive by spreading their message. They have increasingly used social media to spread their propaganda and promote their extremist narratives. Including on websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In this study, the main question that we investigate is to what extent it is possible to use counter-narrative programs via social media to de-radicalize individuals or prevent violent extremism. We focus on violent radicalization connected to SalafiJihadism. Due to the political and societal context in which this project was initiated, NCTV and WODC were interested in this specific form of radicalization. The method we used consisted of a literature study, interviews (n=8) and three focus groups (n=6, n=7 and n=8) with people with different expertise and backgrounds (including academics, field workers, social media students and a former radical. In this study, narratives are conceptualized as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through (online) strategic communication activities by state and non-state actors in attempts to shape how target audiences feel about or understand events or issues, and ultimately, guide their behavior in a manner that is conducive to their aims and goals. We conceptualize counter-narratives as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through strategic communication (or messaging) activities with the intention to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives of violent extremist groups. Narratives have been projected by radical groups through a wide range of social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. For counter-narratives on social media, we identify three domains: (1) countermessaging (e.g., activities that challenge extremist narratives head on); (2) alternative messaging (e.g., activities that aim to provide a positive alternative to extremist narratives); and (3) strategic communication by the government (e.g., activities that provide insight in what the government is doing). A central outcome of our analysis is that to the extent that people have become more radical and strongly identify with an extremist ideology or group, they are less likely to be persuaded by any counter-narrative campaign. In general, it's challenging to persuade people with strong convictions through (online) campaigning. They are typically not very receptive to messages that aim to change their views. However, it will be very difficult to challenge people with extremist attitudes. They may not pay attention to these messages or even may adopt a stronger attitude in the other direction than intended as a reaction to this persuasive attempt. Thus, we argue that counter-narrative campaigns may be most useful for prevention purposes. They could perhaps focus on those that appear to be sensitive to extremist views and information - to the extent that they can be identified meaningfully. In addition, we have raised the question whether or not such counter narrative efforts may have some effect for the individuals from radical groups who show a glimpse of doubt about their group. For such individuals, a counter-narrative message may fall on fertile grounds and a seed may be planted, although this is highly speculative at the moment and more research is needed to support this notion. A sound starting point for designing a counter-narrative campaign is research. One should develop a sound understanding of (the context of) 'the problem', underlying determinants, where communication can potentially contribute to a solution. Here it is advisable to consider relevant theories and insights about radicalization and attitude and behavioral change. Beyond borrowing from existing theory, program planners do well to develop a sound theory of change that explicates how campaign efforts are expected to lead to the desired result. In addition, the audience should be carefully defined and segmented on the bases of meaningful variables. This requires thorough audience research. Campaigns targeting an overly broad and general target audience run the risk of being ineffective and may be counterproductive. It is therefore recommendable to focus on narrow, specific audience segments. In addition to studying the audience, it is important to develop an in-depth understanding of the extremist narratives one aims to counter. When deciding upon which elements of, for example, the Salafi-Jihadi narrative one aims to counter, we argue it is also important to consider why members of the target audience in question may be attracted to these narratives. Radicalizing individuals that are looking for extremist content may have different motives. Different motives of radical people may request different alternative or counter-narrative content. Some may be drawn to an extremist ideology. However, there are a variety of other reasons that may motivate people, such as the need for group-membership and camaraderie, a search for meaning, the need for excitement and adventure. As suggested, it is important to clarify the desired outcome, and the steps towards that outcome. Relatedly, at the outset of a campaign, goals and objectives should be delineated that clearly specify which change one aims to achieve. Well-defined objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Running an effective social media effort also requires adequate resources (time, finances, people) which should be assessed at the outset of a program. It is also important to give consideration to potential partners. Involving partners from within local communities in campaign development and delivery may benefit a campaign effort. Control over the message is not strictly assured when it is released on social media. Of course, it is still important to give consideration to the content of the message. As put forward earlier, to the extent that this is possible, it may be fruitful to consider the different motives of radical people. Besides content, it is important to think about different aspects of the message. Messages that use the narrative format have the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people and may overcome various forms of resistance. In addition, double-sided messages (in which one side is being discredited) and messages with a strong emotional appeal may prove to be particularly persuasive. In terms of sources, it is clear that they need to be perceived as credible by the audience in order to function as trustworthy messengers. Commonly mentioned candidates are former extremists, victims of violence, peers and family, as well as key members of communities and civil society actors. The potential of the government to serve as a credible source might be limited. Among other things, the government often suffers from a say-do gap in the eyes of relevant target audiences. Yet, which messenger will in fact effective will depend on the context, the target audience, and the message one wants to relay. Also, it should be noted that source is a murky entity in social media environments. For instance, processes of information transfer may obscure the original source of a message or make it difficult to interpret who the source is. Some researchers also maintain that social media environments complicate traditional insights about credibility indicators. In terms of selected channels, obviously they should be frequently utilized by the audience one intends to reach. Using multiple channels is argued to be beneficial. Importantly, social media may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and linking online with offline activities is suggested to be particularly effective. In terms of message dissemination, one may join already on-going 'conversations'. Also, it may be beneficial to partner up with people and organizations that have already established a strong social media presence and are popular among the target audience. In some cases, it may also be useful to ask established online (news) outlets to share the message. Furthermore, it may be important to create opportunities for audience engagement. One should also give consideration to aspects such as timing and volume. Finally, we argue it is important to assess the potential risks, challenges and limitations when developing a communication strategy. These might include losing control of the message, counter-campaigns, threats to safety and well-being of messengers, and multi-tier approval processes that hamper campaign efforts, as well as the notorious difficulty of demonstrating the effect of counter-narrative efforts. Generally speaking, it is not easy to establish an effect of a policy or measure in counter violent extremism (CVE). For the potential effectiveness of a counter-narrative campaign, it is important to distinguish between a formative evaluation, a process evaluation and a summative evaluation. Specifically tailored at online interventions, we argue that a combination of awareness (e.g., reach and views) and engagement metrics (e.g., likes, shares, comments and emoji responses) can provide some insight into the extent to which a counter-narrative campaign achieved its desired effect. More traditional research techniques such as interviews and focus groups can give insight in the reception of online materials (thus useful in the formative phase), but can also provide input in the interpretation of quantitative data in the summative evaluation phase. Experiments (either offline or online) offer insight in the cause-and-effect-relationship, while "netnography" makes use of data usually obtained from observations of people in their regular social media environments. Sentiment and content analyses are methods to distract the overall evaluation towards a counter-narrative campaign as well as the specific narratives that were put forward in a particular online community. Finally, social network analyses may give insight into the structure of a group and potentially how this might change over time, although the use of this technique in this field has not yet been fully established. Government actors are not well-suited to act as a counter-narrative producer or messenger. They tend to lack credibility as effective messengers with relevant target audiences. In part, because they are perceived to suffer from a say-do gap, which means their actions and words do not always match in the view of the audience. However, they still can still their part. First, governments can fruitfully engage in streamlining their own strategic communications in terms of explaining their own actions locally and in an international context. Second, the government can play a valuable role by facilitating grassroots and civil society actors best placed to act as counter-narrative messengers. They can do so by establishing an infrastructure to support these initiatives and by sponsoring such efforts (providing help, expertise or financial support) as well as. Yet, they should be cautious, as government endorsement or support for such initiatives may act as a 'kiss of death' and undermine them. Thirdly, they could stimulate thorough monitoring and evaluation, as there is only limited evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narrative efforts. Finally, government efforts could focus on supporting the development of programs in the area of strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption skills In terms of limitations of the current study, in our analysis, we have focused only on counter-narratives with respect to the Jihadi ideology. As such, it is not possible to generalize these findings to other groups (e.g., extreme right wings groups). Furthermore, due to the fact that there is hardly any strong empirical research available, we had to base some of our analysis on the general literature on persuasion and communication campaigns, as well as some "grey literature" (e.g., policy papers, working papers, and recommendations). This undermines the options to draw strong conclusions from the current analysis, as one might question the extent to which it is possible to generalize from the general field of persuasion to the specific field of online counternarratives. We conclude that, although presenting online counter-narratives appears to be intuitively an appealing strategy to employ, our analysis shows that this may not be an ideal option to deradicalize people. It might be more fruitful to use counter-narratives in a prevention context, in which people's minds are still open enough to register and process the information presented. Alternatively, it might be possible to explore the options to expose known individuals (e.g., a convicted prisoner) with specific counter-narratives, but ideally not in an online context, but an offline context, in order to directly monitor the reactions of the individuals. Details: Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology/Department of Political Science, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Shelf Number: 148510 Keywords: Counter-radicalizationExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Singh, Jasjit Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Shelf Number: 148691 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action. Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Shelf Number: 148692 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland Security Peer InfluenceRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Ferguson, Kate Title: Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies: A review of the evidence Summary: This report presents the analysis of a corpus of academic and grey literature relevant to a key challenge facing our society. How can media and communications be used to counter identity-based violence (IBV) or Violent Extremism (VE)? Part I focuses on "Counter-Narratives", looking at the evidence relating to strategic policy communication strategies and counter-propaganda techniques. This reflects literature from policymakers, think-tanks, and civil society initiatives rather than the academic literature base. Key findings include the following: - Current literature and policy concerned with countering propaganda is dominated by the language of 'counter-narratives' but a common understanding of this relatively new lexicon has yet to emerge. - There is little hard evidence that proves interaction with VE content leads to participation in VE activities. - The hypothesis that VE narratives or the real life threat of VE can be countered by an alternative set of communications is an assumption that remains unproven. These findings challenge claims that responding to propaganda strategies by firing back with "counter-narratives" can be effective. Part II looks at "Alternative Approaches" to the use of the media to counter violent extremism, drawing on insights from the "media development" and "media assistance" sectors, and research into whether mass media and new communication interventions can inhibit identity-based violence in certain crisis situations. Key findings include the following: - The theoretical foundations for these alternative approaches are supported by a stronger and more established research base, drawn from the multi-disciplinary fields of development, peace building, and social cohesion. - Media projects have less impact if seen to be linked to a political agenda. - A growing evidence base suggests that radio and television drama addressing issues of identity, reconciliation and tolerance have a positive an impact on public attitudes and behaviour. - Media assistance can ensure that local and domestic media can respond appropriately to VE narratives. - There is an emerging evidence base regarding the potential for rapid reaction media and communication strategies in situations where there is a threat of IBV. These findings suggest that alternative media strategies can help. But the trust and credibility of information providers is crucial. The final section "Reflections" concludes that the research landscape is fragmented and disconnected. but suggests several professional/practitioner sectors and academic disciplines could shed light on potentially effective media and communication CVE strategies. More needs to be done to draw the threads together to learn lessons and to identify and prioritise gaps in our knowledge and understanding. Details: Cambridge, UK: Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research University of East Anglia, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2018 at: http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf Shelf Number: 148926 Keywords: ExtremismMass MediaMedia CampaignsRadicalizationViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System Summary: In the past few years, the international community has been increasingly confronted with the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Numerous reports have shed some light on the extent of this disturbing phenomenon. Estimates indicate that, since 2009, about 8,000 children have been recruited and used by Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, some boys have been forced to attack their own families to demonstrate loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls have been forced to marry, clean, cook and carry equipment and weapons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights received consistent reports that some boys and girls were increasingly being used as human shields and to detonate bombs. In May 2015, for example, a girl about 12 years old was used to detonate a bomb at a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe State, killing seven people. Similar incidents were reported in Cameroon and the Niger. During attacks by Boko Haram, abducted boys were used to identify those who refused to join the group, as well as unmarried women and girls. In 2015 alone, the United Nations verified 274 cases of children having been recruited by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations verified the existence of centres in rural Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and rural Raqqah that provided military training to at least 124 boys between 10 and 15 years of age. Verification of the use of children as foreign fighters has increased significantly, with 18 cases involving children as young as 7 years of age. The use of children as child executioners was reported and appeared in video footage. In Iraq, in two incidents in June and September 2015, more than 1,000 children were reportedly abducted by ISIL from Mosul district. While the lack of access to areas in conflict undercuts the possibility to gather precise data, it is known that recruited children were used to act as spies and scouts, to transport military supplies and equipment, to conduct patrols, to man checkpoints, to videotape attacks for propaganda purposes and to plant explosive devices, as well as to actively engage in attacks or combat situations. These figures are likely to be significant underestimates because of the limited opportunities to gain access and monitor violations against children. Child recruitment is also perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia,5 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and neighbouring countries and by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, to name a few. Owing to the expanding reach and propaganda of terrorist and violent extremist groups, child recruitment and exploitation are in no way limited to conflict-ridden areas. More and more children are travelling from their State of residence to areas controlled by terrorist and violent extremist groups, in order to join them. They may travel with their families or by themselves, and obtaining comprehensive data on their participation in hostilities is often difficult. In the case of ISIL, for instance, information often becomes available only after the children's death, when they are eulogized as martyrs and their country of origin is revealed. Data collected for more than one year, during the period 2015-2016, concerned 89 children who died in hostilities. They included not only nationals of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but also nationals of Australia, France, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yemen. These figures do not include children taken to ISIL territory by their families. Finally, children may also be recruited to support the groups, or even carry out attacks, in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Shelf Number: 148961 Keywords: Child ExploitationChild ProtectionExtremist GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Gavrielides, Theo Title: Young, marginalised but not radicalised: A comparative study of positive approaches to youth radicalisation Summary: Prevention and control have been dealt with as top down responsibilities of governments, but young people believe that it is now time that they have their say. YEIP was created in response to the lack of effective youth policies that can enhance young people's social inclusion and minimize the risk of radicalization with greater 'buy in' from youth themselves. The conference will launch the book "Young, marginalised but not radicalized: A comparative study of positive approaches to youth radicalization". This is the outcome of research that was carried out in the UK, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece and Sweden. It features the national findings written in native languages as well as their comparative analysis and summaries written in English. Details: London: IARS International Institute, 2018. 359p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2018 at: http://yeip.org/awareness-raising-material/yeip-ebooks/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://yeip.org/awareness-raising-material/yeip-ebooks/ Shelf Number: 149412 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Counter-terrorism ExtremismRadicalization Restorative Justice Violent Radicalism Youth Empowerment |
Author: Rushchenko, Julia Title: Prison Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders: Is Separation Effective? Summary: - In the European Union, many states do not have any terrorist prisoners in their jails, and most of the countries house only a handful of terrorism-related offenders. When such prisoners appear in the correctional system, they can have a powerful effect on other inmates. The presence of violent extremist offenders in the criminal justice system generates unique challenges for most states worldwide, and this issue has prompted an ongoing debate concerning the rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, and on the successes and failures of the prison policies. - According to Europol, in recent years there has been an increase in terrorism-related arrests in the UK, France and Spain. The largest proportion of arrests in the EU in 2013- 2015 was linked to Islamist terrorism, compared to smaller numbers of arrests for separatist, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. The phenomenon of returning foreign fighters is yet another concern for criminal justice systems worldwide, including the processes of prosecution and incarceration. In October 2017, the BBC reported that 121 British foreign fighters have been convicted, but little information is available about how exactly inmates with foreign military training are managed in the UK prison system. - British prisons have a long history of coping with terrorists and political and religious extremists. Most recently, the increase in legislative scope and security responses in the wake of 7/7 led to a significant increase in conviction rates for terrorist offences. As of June 2015, there were 182 offenders convicted of, or on remand for, offences linked to terrorism and extremism in prisons in England and Wales, including people who hold neo-Nazi views and Islamist extremists. Current trends of returning foreign fighters suggest that the number of people to be prosecuted is likely to increase. - Most of those who appear to be radicalised in prisons begin their incarceration with not particularly strong religious affiliation. Radicalisation in prisons has been mentioned repeatedly by academics and practitioners as one of the most pressing security concerns, particularly in the context of Islamist ideology. While both prison and probation are supposed to be strong partners in deradicalisation and resettlement, instead of promoting disengagement from violence, these systems frequently facilitate extremism because of the push and pull factors discussed in this report. - Unlike traditional criminals whose illicit activities are often disrupted in prisons, violent extremists might be comfortable with their convictions because of opportunities to preach in correctional institutions. According to an inquiry carried out by Ian Acheson in 2016, Islamist ideology in prisons could be threatening in various ways, including Muslim gang culture, charismatic prisoners acting as self-styled "emirs" and exerting a radicalising influence on Muslim inmates, aggressive encouragement of conversions to Islam, availability of educational materials promoting Islamist extremism, exploitation of staff's fear of being labelled racist, and so on. - Following the above-mentioned inquiry, the government announced its plans to crack down on the spread of Islamist ideology in prisons by creating three "separation centres" (HMP Frankland near Durham, HMP Full Sutton near York and HMP Woodhill in Milton Keynes) which are expected to hold the most subversive offenders, including Michael Adebolajo and Anjem Choudary. As of January 2018, HMP Frankland near Durham has been created, and it is the first time the UK government has practised the policy of separating terrorism-related offenders. - At the same time, most of the mass media coverage of the UK experiment with regard to tackling radicalisation in prisons has been negative and focused on drawing parallels between UK separation centres and Guantanamo Bay, labelling the centres "jihadi jails". One of the main points of criticism revolves around the idea that segregation is counterproductive as it could potentially give an elevated status to the most dangerous extremists and intensify the issue of Islamism in prisons. - Currently, a more balanced and nuanced evaluation of the containment policy is absent from UK discourse. Although there is a risk that a new intervention will generate additional safety concerns, this report argues that separating the most dangerous terrorism-related offenders is the only viable solution for mitigating the threat of prison radicalisation. However, it is crucial to develop a comprehensive policy framework that takes into account the recent dynamics of radicalisation threats, including demographic changes such as gender and age. Details: London: Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149566 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationIsolationMuslimsRadicalizationRestrictive HousingTerrorist-Related OffendersTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Wilson, Tom Title: Mend: "Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians" Summary: Compiling years' worth of evidence, the report, Mend: "Islamists Masquerading As Civil Libertarians", demonstrates how Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. Our findings include: How Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. It reveals how Mend has regularly hosted illiberal, intolerant and extremist Islamist speakers, while also pushing a message that risks being inflammatory and making British Muslims feel further alienated from wider society. Mend and key figures in the organisation have also attacked moderate Muslim groups. Mend has openly sought to undermine counter-terrorism legislation and counter-extremism efforts, in addition to having its own links to extremists. Despite this, the group received public funding from Tower Hamlets council to review part of the borough's counter-radicalisation Prevent programme. Several of the organisation's employees and volunteers, including senior figures, have publicly expressed a range of disturbing views on terrorism and anti-Semitism. This has included expressing support for terrorists overseas, dismissing recent terror attacks in the UK, promoting anti-Semitic conspiracies and even calling on British Mosques to hold prayers for "the Mujahedeen". Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149596 Keywords: ExtremistsIslam IslamophobiaRadicalizationTerrorists |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismDark NetDe-RadicalizationIslamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency Summary: In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa's enduring insurgencies. In order to better understand Boko Haram now and in the future, this report, edited by Jacob Zenn, challenges some key misconceptions about the insurgency and provides new analyses and insights based on many exclusive primary source materials and datasets. To provide these unique insights, several authors with on-the-ground experience contribute to six areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa: - Ideology (Abdulbasit Kassim) - Gender (Elizabeth Pearson) - Leadership (Atta Barkindo) - Counterinsurgency (Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri) - Regional dynamics (Omar Mahmoud) - Terrorist networks (Jacob Zenn) It is hoped that these analyses of 'Africa's enduring insurgency' will be useful to counterterrorism practitioners, humanitarian organizations, and academia and will assist in understanding and, ultimately, mitigating and resolving the conflict. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism center at West Point, 2018. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Shelf Number: 150341 Keywords: Boko HaramRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Tesfaye, B. Title: "If youth are given the chance": Effects of education and civic engagement on Somali youth support for political violence. Summary: Understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict to promote long-term stability is a perennial focus of development programs, yet policymakers still struggle to find proven, effective solutions. Underlying this challenge is a dearth of evidence regarding violence-reduction approaches. Though an increasing number of empirical studies have focused on evaluating the impact of development programs on attitudes and behaviors related to violence (including Mercy Corps' research in Somaliland and Afghanistan), questions remain about the relative effectiveness of different types of interventions and about the conditions under which some interventions may or may not succeed in reducing violence. The motivation behind this research study is to help fill these knowledge gaps. In particular, this research seeks to test the impact of two common violence-reduction approaches- education and civic engagement-on youths' level of support for armed violence. By expanding our previous study from Somaliland to examine education, civic engagement, and political violence in South Central Somalia and Puntland, this study also allows us to understand whether the effects of the same education and civic engagement interventions persist across different contexts. Somalia faces many challenges and opportunities when it comes to violence reduction. Though the nation is striving to move beyond decades of unrest and violent conflict and toward stability and broad-based development, the security situation remains tenuous. The two truck bombs that exploded on October 14, 2017, killing more than 500 people in Mogadishu, highlight both how deadly armed opposition groups continue to be and Somalia's continued vulnerability to violence. Armed groups have proven repeatedly how resilient they can be, constantly adapting to new threats- both internal and external-to ensure their own survival. A steady source of resilience for armed opposition groups is a large pool of frustrated youth whom they can recruit and indoctrinate. To promote stability, several youth development programs in Somalia seek to engage vulnerable youth and address their needs, including Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Learners Initiative (SYLI), which focused on increasing access to secondary education and civic engagement opportunities for youth. Evaluating the SYLI program provided an opportunity to better understand if and how improved access to formal secondary education and increased opportunities for civic engagement can reduce young Somalis' support for armed groups and the use of violence to achieve political aims. Details: Washington, DC: Mercy Corps, 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/If%20Youth%20Are%20Given%20the%20Chance_LR_FINAL.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/If%20Youth%20Are%20Given%20the%20Chance_LR_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 150404 Keywords: At-Risk YouthEducation and CrimeInterventionsPolitical ViolenceRadicalizationTerrorismViolence Prevention |
Author: Reynolds, Louis Title: Digital Resilience: Stronger Citizens Online Summary: The more important the online aspects of our lives have become, the more vulnerable democratic, pluralistic, societies have found themselves. In the last three years, extremist groups and state actors have systematically spread disinformation online in order to warp our perceptions, damage social cohesion and influence elections across Europe and North America.1 Extremists thrive where critical thinking, media literacy and awareness of the dynamics of the online space are lacking. Just this month, an Al Qaeda dossier was released which demonstrated that their recruiters strategically targeted young people who were most na�ve and the ignorant and disaffected. 2 Many former recruiters for extremist organisations will tell you the same thing; that a young person with a grievance who has not been taught critical thinking skills or media literacy is a perfect target. This phenomenon is deeply worrying for our society. It serves as a reminder that the nature of the extremist threat online is constantly evolving. When our perception of the world is so heavily shaped by social media, social media becomes a more attractive target for extremists. The bedrock of a democratic state has always been good citizenship, and this requires a considered and nuanced understanding of and response to the world around us. With the rise of the Internet and social media, this aspect of good citizenship is more important than ever. Yet across the globe, education systems have been slow to react to this challenge. We are failing to prepare our young people for the online world, with potentially disastrous consequences. For the past three years, ISD has been developing and testing curriculum and pedagogical approaches to teach critical thinking skills and online awareness techniques in an engaging and effective manner. The aim is to develop scalable models to undermine the efforts of extremist groups and hate movements to manipulate our young people, with positive evidence of impact. In this report, we present the findings from our Digital Resilience pilot, which has been developed and delivered in vocational colleges in three cities in the Netherlands. This pilot forms part of a growing body of evidence collected by ISD, from pilot projects and ongoing programmes across Europe, which suggests that digital citizenship educational approaches can be an effective tool for increasing the resilience of young people to extremist grooming and exploitation online. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2018 at: http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Digital_Resilience_Project_Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Digital_Resilience_Project_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 150510 Keywords: Extremist Groups Online Communications Online Victimization Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media |
Author: European Court of Auditors Title: Tackling radicalisation that leads to terrorism: the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but with some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation Summary: I. European Union (EU) Member States are responsible for national security, including the fight against terrorism. They are in charge of designing and implementing measures at national level that aim to tackle radicalisation, i.e. the phenomenon of people embracing extremist ideologies and behaviours which could lead them to commit acts of terrorism. As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of preventive actions are generally deployed to address the problem. The Commission's role is to support Member States in their efforts and help to ensure that good practices are exchanged. To do so, the Commission draws on an increasingly wide range of EU funds. II. Our audit examined whether the Commission manages this cross-cutting support well. In particular, we assessed whether: the Commission provides Member States with relevant support; the actions financed by the different EU funds are coordinated to make the most of any synergies; the Commission has put in place a framework to assess the effectiveness and value for money of its support. III. Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation. IV. The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network. V. The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes. This has resulted in synergies between its actions. However, despite recent improvements, there is still scope to improve the coordination of Commission actions. For example, the Commission's overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies. We also found that the RAN, one of the Commission's main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects. VI. The Commission has not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its support is effective and offers value for money. For example, it has not broken down the overall policy objectives into more specific and measurable objectives, and the funds that the Commission has used are not accompanied by indicators and targets designed to measure success in addressing radicalisation. VII. Moreover, the achievements of specific actions are often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness. As a result, there is a risk that useful lessons might not be disseminated or taken into account when the Commission designs actions or develops its policy further. VIII. On the basis of its findings, the ECA recommends that the Commission should: improve the framework for overall coordination of actions addressing radicalisation; increase practical support to practitioners and policymakers in Member States; and improve the framework for assessing results. Details: Luxembourg City, Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 15, 2018 at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 150558 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismNational SecurityRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Blokland, Arjan Title: Profielen van Nederlandse outlawbikers en Nederlandse outlawbikerclubs Summary: The criminal careers of members of Dutch outlaw motorcycle clubs and their supportclubs: a study using conviction data Decisive action against criminal outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG's) ranks high on the Dutch criminal justice agenda since 2012. Nevertheless, the number of OMG-chapters in the Netherlands, and presumably therefore the number of Dutch OMG-members, has rapidly increased over the last couple of years. This rise was accompanied by an increase in the number of official support clubs or puppet clubs as well. There are reasons to believe that these support clubs are not only used as incubators for new OMG-members, but also to lend a hand in criminal activities and to provide leverage in intergang conflict. The current study aims to describe the (officially registered) criminal behavior of OMG- and support club-members. This research builds on previous research into the criminal careers of Dutch OMG-members by using official data on the conviction histories of 1.617 police-identified OMG-members, and 473 members of support clubs. Results show that the vast majority of OMG- and support club-members is convicted at least once. Convictions often also pertain to serious crimes. Several criminal trajectories can be distinguished, of which some are characterized by a rather high level of convictions during the adult years. Profiles of Dutch outlaw bikers: a latent class analysis The Netherlands are confronted with a rapid growth of the outlaw biker subculture. On theoretical grounds it is expected that such a steep increase is accompanied by radicalization of the outlaw biker milieu, and an increasing number of OMG members involved in organized crime. Expansion also leads to increased rivalry between OMG's, further contributing to radicalization by making membership attainable to those motivated by other sentiments than a love for motorcycles. In a partial test of these explanations the current study examines the nature of the crimes committed by OMG- and support club-members, and whether, based on combinations of different types of offenses, meaningful criminal career types can be distinguished. Results show that in OMG's and support clubs different criminal career types can be distinguished, but that these criminal career types are not the same in OMG and support clubs. Over one third of Dutch OMG-members exhibits a criminal career type that is indicative of radical sentiments. Among support club-members a criminal career type is found that is characterized by violence. Crime amongst Dutch outlaw motorcycle gangs Crimes by outlaw motorcycle gangs are a source of concern for the Dutch police and local authorities. Since 2012, OMG's have therefore been subjected to a whole-of-government approach, targeting in principle every Dutch OMG. Spokesmen of OMG's have opposed to this approach on the grounds that it indiscriminately and unjustly puts all OMG's on the same level. Based on a sample of 1617 police-identified members of Dutch OMG's, the current study paints a quantitative picture of the extent to which Dutch OMG's are involved in various types of crime. By distinguishing between common club-members and club leaders, Dutch OMG's can be placed along the club/gang-continuum proposed by Barker (2007; 2015). Results show that Dutch OMG's differ in both the percentage of ever convicted members, as well as the average extent of these members' criminal records Details: Apeldoorn;: University of Leiden, Law School, 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2018 at: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b324baabe80ePW101.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b324baabe80ePW101.pdf Shelf Number: 150701 Keywords: BikersCriminal CareersGangsMotorcycle GangsOrganized CrimeRadicalization |
Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Dispositif d'intervention sur la radicalisation violente en milieu ouvert : identification des difficultes et des besoins des professionnels des SPIP, aide a l'adaptation des pratiques Summary: The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) carried out a research-action over 18 months in collaboration with the French Penitentiary Administration (DAP) in order to develop an intervention response for individuals who have been radicalized or are in the process of radicalization within the Penitentiary Services for Integration and Probation (SPIP) within the probation system. This project was developed in three pilot sites: Grenoble, Lyon and Nice. This "intervention response" is understood as a set of actions and initiatives implemented at the institutional level to counter violent radicalization, namely: - A decision-making support system in the process of identifying and reporting individuals who have been or are being radicalized. For this purpose, the following products were developed by the research-action: - An Identification and Reporting Protocol for individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence, and - A Semi-Structured Interview Guide for the Identification of individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence. - A support system for individuals who are at risk or are already radicalized. For this component, three different actions were developed: - Two collective actions, one of which is primary-secondary prevention (Vivre Ensemble) and the other is secondary-tertiary prevention (CODE), as well as - An individual program for the prevention of recidivism (Accordeon). This research-action is a world first. Never has a project of such magnitude been implemented within the probation system. Violent radicalization although very popular remains very difficult to apprehend. This is the reason why this research-action is quite unique considering its very great ambition that is to think of and create identification and support procedures and methods. This Report is aiming to present the work achieved from July 4, 2016 to December 31, 2017, by pilot research units (mainly professionals of the Ministry of Justice and the ICPC) in the framework of the project: "Intervention response to violent radicalization within the probation system: identifying the challenges and the needs of the SPIPs professionals, and support to adapt practices". This report describes the methodology used, developed products, the results of the process evaluation and the impact of this approach as well as the actions implemented. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2018 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Year: 2018 Country: France URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Shelf Number: 150761 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolencePrisonersProbationersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Counter Extremism Project Title: Extremists and Online Propaganda Summary: Official propaganda materials produced by the media arms of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and al-Shabab are intentionally crafted to radicalize, inspire, and incite individuals to violence. These groups have produced propaganda in a myriad of textual, audio, and video forms - from music videos to glossy magazines - that have helped to convince individuals around the world to travel abroad to join extremist groups and to conduct deadly attacks in their home countries. At times, they have even offered specific guidance on how to do so. Abdirizak Warsame, who was arrested at the age of 19 for attempting to join ISIS abroad, stated that while watching violent ISIS execution videos on YouTube, he started to believe that he was "doing something for a greater cause --- for good" by supporting the group. Warsame was one of 57 individuals documented by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) who attempted to join an extremist group abroad, and one of 72 individuals who accessed explicitly violent propaganda materials. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev - who detonated two homemade bombs along with his brother, Tamerlan, at the April 2013 Boston Marathon - told investigators that he and his brother built the bombs using instructions from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s Inspire propaganda magazine. The Tsarnaev brothers were two of 26 individuals documented who successfully enacted an act of terror, and two of 25 individuals who accessed propaganda materials that provided instructions on how to prepare or execute violent terrorist acts. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice 2013, Slate, Foreign Policy, CBS News) Official extremist group propaganda materials are easily disseminated and accessed on the Internet. The individuals documented in this report accessed extremist group propaganda on a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, Paltalk, and WhatsApp. Several individuals also played a part in further propagating extremist propaganda materials. Of the 168 individuals documented by CEP, at least 51 disseminated propaganda materials either online, in person, or via mail, and 59 viewed or discussed propaganda materials with another individual. Even if extremist groups lose control over territory in their respective regions of operation, their ability to reach out and spread propaganda online will allow them to continue to attract support from across the globe. For example, even as ISIS steadily lost ground in Iraq and Syria throughout 2017, U.S. permanent resident Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov was still inspired by the group's propaganda videos to carry out a vehicular attack in New York City on October 31, 2017, that killed eight people. As long as extremist groups continue to produce compelling propaganda that plays a part in inspiring and inciting individuals to violence - and remains easily accessible online - terrorism in the name of these extremist groups will remain a threat worldwide. (Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2017) Details: New York, NY: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists-online-propaganda Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Extremists%20and%20Online%20Propaganda_040918.pdf Shelf Number: 154062 Keywords: al-Qaedaal-ShababCounter Extremism ProjectExtremismInternet ISISRadicalizationSocial MediaTalibanTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction It is the responsibility of both Government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of these incidents. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for providing a protective security overlay. They have been specifically identified - nationally and internationally - as attractive targets by those wishing to engage in terrorism, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places around the world such as sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues. Crowded places present a particularly attractive target for terrorism, due to the ready access to large numbers of potential victims. Attacks which occur in crowded places are particularly insidious because crowds using these places are often distracted by the venue event, reducing their situational awareness of their immediate environment. The Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active armed offender incidents pose in crowded places. The Guidelines seek to illustrate the key role that owners and operators of crowded places can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the 'Crowded Places Advisory Group' (CPAG) on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter - Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines for Crowded Places. Purpose These Guidelines aim to increase the awareness of owners and operators of crowded places of the dynamic terrorism threat, while providing guidance on the issues and options which can be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. These Guidelines set out several broad guiding principles which public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce the vulnerability of their site to the threat of terrorism. The Guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach. - Effective security outcomes in complex crowded place environments require cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment, and options for preventing and dealing with active armed offender incidents, will enable owners and operators in the private sector in particular to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage the active armed offender threat to crowded places. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of 'contingency plans' or sub-plans to supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/active-armed-offender-guidelines-for-crowded-places.aspx Shelf Number: 154371 Keywords: Active Armed OffenderAustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesEvent SecurityNew ZealandRadicalizationRisky FacilitiesSporting StadiumsTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVenue Security |
Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Radicalising Our Children: An Analysis of Family Court Cases of British Children at Risk of Radicalisation, 2013-2018 Summary: At least 156 children have been involved in family court cases in which concerns over extremism or radicalisation have been cited, according to a new study released by the Henry Jackson Society. Of the cases examined, the think tank found that 48% of families had one family member or more who joined IS. Nikita Malik, Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism and the report's author, today warns that the UK's courts are not currently up to the task of handling a wave of women who joined the 'caliphate' returning with their children. The report concludes that the family court is frequently powerless to take steps to protect the welfare of children, even when the counter-terrorism division is aware that parents involved are often terrorists with extremist mindsets. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile, welcomed the report, and stated it is "apparent that the family court is not always able to take the appropriate steps to protect" the children of extremists. Meanwhile, Tim Loughton MP, the former Children's Minister, stressed that the Family Courts require "better protocols, guidance and support" to deal with this "increasingly urgent part of their role". Contrary to claims the girls of Islamic State were vulnerable brides, the report finds that, far more so than boys, girls who travel to the 'caliphate' made their own decisions. The author concludes that boys tended to join Islamic State under the influence of their families, whereas girls were more active and independent in seeking out extremist material - often online. All of the girls in cases analysed by the study who had self-radicalised were motivated in part by the possibility of marriage to a person of their choice. The study, which qualitatively analyses the 20 cases with the most comprehensive court records over recent years, also found that: 55% of cases had links to Al-Muhajiroun, the banned group founded by Anjem Choudary. 67% of families had a history of domestic abuse or a history of wider criminal conduct. Almost 20% of the children involved were home-schooled; while, 38% families contained children absent from school. In cases where gender was known, 64% of children involved in court actions were boys. The report calls for a bespoke set of powers for judges to use in cases of extremism involving children. Citing the high burden of proof required for the more traditional option of care orders, the report argues that the powers imbued with wardship have proved more suitable in many cases, to meet the growing and pertinent challenge of countering radicalisation. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2019. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154812 Keywords: At-Risk YouthExtremismIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist Recruitment |
Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Jackson, Brian A. Title: Practical Terrorism Prevention: Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of Ideologically Motivated Violence Summary: Terrorism prevention - superseding the programs and activities previously known as countering violent extremism (CVE) - policies seek to broaden the options available to address the risk of individual radicalization and mobilization to ideologically driven violence. These programs provide alternatives to arrest, prosecution, and incarceration by countering recruiting or radicalizing messages, intervening before individuals have committed serious crimes, or supporting the reentry and desistance from violence of individuals convicted and incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses. Government involvement in these programs has been controversial, due to concerns about such efforts' potential to infringe on Constitutionally protected rights and the risk of outreach or intervention activities stigmatizing communities by associating them with terrorism or extremism. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of Policy requested that the Homeland Security and Operational Analysis Center examine past U.S. CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts, evaluate the DHS and interagency posture for federal efforts, and explore policy options to strengthen terrorism prevention going forward. Researchers found that current terrorism prevention capabilities are relatively limited. Most initiatives are implemented locally or outside government, and only a subset receive federal support. Among interviewees in law enforcement, government, and some community organizations, there is a perceived need for a variety of federal efforts to help strengthen and broaden local and nongovernmental capacity. However, doing so will be challenging, since concerns about past counterterrorism and CVE efforts have significantly damaged trust in some communities. As a result, terrorism prevention policy and programs will need to focus on building trust locally, and designing programs and federal activities to maintain that trust over time. Key Findings -- Current terrorism prevention efforts are limited Limited programmatic focus and resource investment since 2014, coupled with sustained opposition that focused on limiting CVE efforts, have constrained efforts to develop approaches to individuals at risk of ideological violence other than arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Reinvestment in federal field staff is key Personnel who are based locally but who are aware of the federal picture could help to build relationships, strengthen trust, and act as on-the-ground facilitators of local terrorism prevention efforts. This could both deliver immediate results and help to build for the longer term. Interviewees identified specific needs in the areas of awareness and training, federal support, federal program development, and research and evaluation Objective threat information is needed by technology companies to guide their efforts in the online space. Improved risk-assessment tools also would be useful to manage programming for individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Sharing best practices and knowledge was viewed as important, and interviewees noted the value of bringing together researchers, implementers, and others to share information. Federal action to facilitate local programs and capability-building should be the priority across multiple components of terrorism prevention. A more robust and interdisciplinary research community is needed for terrorism prevention, and, although efforts in the past regarding CVE were useful and should be continued, they are not enough. Recommendations For countermessaging and intervention programming, the federal government should focus on funding and assisting state, local, and nongovernmental organizations and private actors rather than building capabilities itself. The federal government should continue to provide community awareness briefings and training exercises to local groups. These activities were viewed by interviewees as successful in disseminating needed information. Recent reductions in staffing have limited federal capacity to do so. Adapting existing tools like table-top exercises to help empower local areas to explore the types of terrorism prevention that are appropriate for their circumstances appeared to be promising. Openness and transparency in training delivery would help to support trust in a controversial area, and using unclassified and open source information that can be shared broadly is more practical for efforts that must bridge many organizational boundaries. Pursuing public-private partnerships and broadening support from nonsecurity agencies would be a practical approach to supporting terrorism prevention efforts in a way that is potentially more acceptable to communities and members of the public. Building and maintaining the bench of expert practitioners will be important in developing programs from the national to the local levels. Strengthening investment in evaluation would address criticism of the effectiveness of both past CVE and current terrorism prevention efforts in the future. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019. 335p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html Shelf Number: 155851 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremismRadicalizationTerrorism PreventionTerrorism Risk Assessment |
Author: Muslim Public Affairs Council Title: Safe Spaces: An Updated Toolkit for Empowering Communities and Addressing Ideological Violence Summary: Safe Spaces is about empowering communities in order to secure the sanctity of the mosque and Muslim communities in promoting Islamic values of civic engagement, public safety and healthy identity formation. We realize that violent extremism is a small problem in number, but incalculable in impact, especially when it comes to American Muslim communities. Safe Spaces is an alternative to both heavy-handed law enforcement tactics and government-led countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Rather than accepting the notion that the only way to deal with terrorism is through tactics such as widespread surveillance and the use of informants, Safe Spaces relies on community-led and community-driven programs that communities and mosques will benefit from beyond the national security context. In fact, Safe Spaces is a framework that can be used for issues other than violent extremism, and will most likely be used for those other issues. For example, having a safe space that openly and honestly discusses relevant issues with community members provides a healthy environment for people to deal with issues of addiction, family issues, domestic violence, political grievances, among many more. It also serves as a safe environment for individuals to access the necessary resources they need. Safe Spaces is about empowering communities in a way that promotes healthy vibrant communities, and the public interest for all people. Details: Los Angeles: Author, 2014? 80p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 2, 2019 at: https://www.mpac.org/safespaces/files/MPAC-Safe-Spaces.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.mpac.org/safespaces/files/MPAC-Safe-Spaces.pdf Shelf Number: 156828 Keywords: Bias-Motivated Crimes Community Programs Extremism Hate Crimes Muslims RadicalizationViolent Extremism |