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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:13 pm
Time: 9:13 pm
Results for skidmore family
1 results foundAuthor: HM Inspectorate of Probation Title: Independent Review of the Case of Leroy Campbell: Final Report Summary: Overview Leroy Campbell has a history of serious sexual offending, and a predilection for attacking lone women. Whilst under probation supervision in late 2016, he told his NPS probation officer that he felt vulnerable and isolated (feelings that he said were linked with his previous offending) and that he might reoffend, might rape again. A few weeks later he raped and killed Lisa Skidmore in her own home. He also attempted to murder her elderly mother in Lisa’s home, and then set fire to the property, leaving her for dead. Mrs Skidmore survived. These were dreadful crimes. They have been devastating for the family. We offer them our sincere and heartfelt condolences. We understand that they need to know in sufficient detail, how Leroy Campbell came to reoffend in this way, and whether there is anything in the way he was supervised that increased the risk of such a thing happening. If there were failings, then family members will wish to know what is being done about it, and whether any individuals are called to account. When those under probation supervision commit serious further offences, the probation provider conducts a review of how well the individual was supervised by their staff while on probation. That happened in this case. The multi-agency supervision arrangements for Leroy Campbell meant that a second type of review could also be instigated, and that happened in this case as well. We have evaluated both of those reviews, and found them honest and reliable overall. There are one or two areas where we might have formed a different judgement, but they are not material. We agree with the reviewers: the supervision of Leroy Campbell was inadequate in several crucial respects. As a result, Lisa Skidmore, other women and the wider public were put at risk unduly, with grave consequences. We set out in this report the detail of what happened in the supervision of Leroy Campbell, starting in 2000 when he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Many good decisions were made about his supervision within prison and upon release, but a series of unrelated yet questionable decisions and one final, very poor decision meant that his risk was not adequately managed. While in prison, Leroy Campbell was assessed as requiring management under what are known as Multi-Agency Public Protection arrangements (MAPPA), upon release. These are designed to ensure cooperation and integration of police, probation and other agencies’ work to protect the public once the offender is back in the community. Many high-risk offenders are managed under one of three levels of MAPPA arrangements. Level 3 arrangements (the highest level) are reserved for the small proportion of individuals where the greatest agency cooperation and management is thought necessary, to protect the public. Level 1 is by far the most common level in use. Leroy Campbell was expected to be managed under Level 2 or 3 upon release, but this was reduced to Level 1 during his time in prison. Although the MAPPA level was reconsidered pre-release the level was not revised and the supporting paperwork was not completed by the Probation Officer as it should have been. As a result he left prison assessed at the lowest level (Level 1) rather than the higher level expected and anticipated by senior probation staff: evaluation and record-keeping procedures were not followed properly. We find that unacceptable, and inexplicable. While in prison, a series of 11 probation officers were responsible for his case. While changes over a long sentence are inevitable, this rate of change was exceptional. It does not support effective relationship-building or assessment. Leroy Campbell had a persistent offending history, and was serving a life sentence for the latest in a series of violent and serious sexual offences when the Parole Board decided to recommend his release. At that stage he was 11 years over his five-year tariff. The Parole Board had a difficult decision to make in this case, and having looked at the evidence available to us, we do not criticise the decision. Upon release, Leroy Campbell was managed in the community. In this case, police and probation responses at a critical time were not sufficiently co-ordinated, and a key piece of information was not recorded by Probation or shared with Police as it would have been, had Leroy Campbell been managed at a higher MAPPA level. Opportunities to review the MAPPA level during his release on temporary license were not taken. Curfew requirements imposed on Leroy Campbell by the Parole Board were relaxed, in a more casual manner than expected and sooner than expected as well. There were some indications given to probation officers by Leroy Campbell to suggest he remained a risk to women. He said things that could have been taken either way, but when put together they should have given probation staff cause for concern. While under release on temporary licence, he breached licence conditions designed to keep the public safe. However, most striking in this case is a decision by probation services when Leroy Campbell was no longer living in Approved Premises. Probation staff decided NOT to respond actively enough to a clear indication that risk may be increasing notably. This individual came into the probation office and stated to his probation officer that he was thinking of raping again, and that he has been looking at - or had noticed - open windows (he had previously entered a victim’s house, to then rape her). In our view that should have resulted in immediate, positive and firm action to protect the public – either an immediate move back to Approved Premises, or recall to prison. Instead, Leroy Campbell was left free to commit these terrible crimes. It was an aberrant decision, to leave Leroy Campbell at large. In the circumstances, we have looked at how the NPS has acted since, and the steps it has taken to hold its own staff to account for their standard of work. We find it odd that managers did not consider conducting an investigation immediately, or suspending any of the staff involved pending an investigation. In our view there was sufficient evidence to indicate that immediate action could and should have been taken. It was not. In the weeks following the offences, NPS managers scrutinised a broader sample of the work of the probation staff and managers involved in the case. The focus was to establish whether the poor judgement exercised was part of a pattern of poor practice. We have concluded that in the circumstances of this case, this approach was not sufficient. In other areas of professional endeavour, professionals who fall far short of accepted professional standards on any occasion can be referred to their professional body for investigation and consideration of their fitness to practice. No such arrangements exist for probation professionals. While that remains the case, it is all the more important in our view that disciplinary procedures and their application pass muster, and provide the public and individuals with the assurance they need that appropriate actions are taken, and taken promptly when things go seriously wrong. We question whether the organisation’s disciplinary procedures and its underlying disciplinary culture are sufficiently robust. The guidance available to managers on handling conduct and disciplinary investigations focused on situations where there were clear breaches of professional conduct, with little about dealing with failures in professional judgement. Some disciplinary proceedings have now been instigated here, but exceptionally late in the day and only after our interim report. Disciplinary actions should be timely in our view, to be as fair as possible to all concerned, and to maintain public trust. As well as dealing fairly and properly with significant professional failings, we and the wider public expect public services to learn from mistakes and put in place arrangements to reduce the risk of similar things happening again. Here the NPS has done that. It has put a lot of effort into developing a fulsome action plan and following it through. Regrettably however, the plan does not address two issues that are of national significance. Firstly, what is expected of senior probation officers whenever they supervise and oversee the work of less experienced staff is not sufficiently clear in our view. Professional supervision failed in this case both when Leroy Campbell was in prison and after his release – most especially when the probation officer concerned consulted a senior probation officer when Leroy Campbell disclosed he was thinking of rape. The right actions were not decided, or taken, even though Campbell’s history of offending suggested plainly the risk of a serious further offence. The NPS has recently reminded staff of how to deal with such disclosures, and we welcome that, albeit it is late and it simply confirms what we already expect of professional probation staff. We think there is a broader problem, however. With senior probation officers now responsible for a range of management duties, it is not clear what is expected by way of their professional supervision of less senior professional staff and their cases, or the priority to be given to that important work. The NPS should be more specific about the requirements, in our view, but progress here is slow. Secondly, the plan does not address in any way the shortcomings of the organisation’s disciplinary procedure, or the disciplinary and accountability culture that prevails. In this case, managers responded to what we think are clear professional failings by looking at the quality of an individual’s work overall. While that is valuable in checking that an individual generally works to standard in protecting the public, it does not go far enough. Our view is that, whatever such an exercise shows, it is simply not acceptable that aberrant decision-making is left unaccounted for. It is unacceptable to the relatives and surviving victims of a further offence and to the wider public. In our view, the NPS should look afresh at its disciplinary policy and also consider how it deals with extremely poor decision-making, keeping public expectations about accountability in mind. The Skidmore family feel they have been poorly treated by the NPS following these dreadful crimes, and we agree. The NPS’s national procedures at the time for accounting to victims and their families were in our view difficult to defend: victims and families were presented with a review report to read on the spot, rather than take away. This does not build trust, and thankfully these procedures have now changed. In this case, reports were prepared to a good standard but it was a lot for the family to take in. What is more, in the meeting that followed immediately after their reading of the material, and subsequently, the family have found the NPS defensive, and unwilling to admit management shortcomings or to hold any individuals to account. Indeed, although the NPS developed and implemented its action plan, it is only after the family’s determined pursuit of the facts and then the intervention of the minister, that certain actions have been taken by the NPS. That does not reflect well on the organisation, or restore the family’s trust. Some individuals are now subject to disciplinary proceedings, but it is very late in the day. Finally, this family’s distress at the loss of Lisa and the ghastly circumstances of her death was exacerbated by an application by the defendant for a second post mortem. The NPS were unaware of this application. Leroy Campbell made that application just one day before the time limit for application expired. It had regrettable consequences for the family, and their grief. The family suspect the applicant had self-serving reasons for the request, rather than the pursuit of justice. We do think government should consider whether the process of application for second post mortems is sufficiently robust. Details: London, UK: 2018. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2019 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/09/HMI-Probation-Independent-Review-LC-Final-.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/about-our-work/inquiriesandreviews/ Shelf Number: 154096 Keywords: At-Risk High-Risk Offenders Investigation Leroy Campbell Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements Parole Board Probation Probation Officers Probation Supervision Rape Reoffend Sexual Assault Sexual Offender Skidmore Family |