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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for smuggling
110 results foundAuthor: U.S. Congress. House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Investigations. Majority Staff Title: A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat of the Southwest Border Summary: The Texas-Mexico border region has been experiencing an alarming rise in the level of criminal cartel activity, including drug and human smuggling, which has placed significant additional burdens on Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. This interim report will examine the roots of the crimnial enterprise and its effects on the local populations, what steps are being taken or should be taken to counter the threat, and the significance of these issues for the overall homeland security of the United States. Details: Washington, DC: 2006 Source: Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113887 Keywords: Criminal ActivityHomeland SecuritySmuggling |
Author: Lithuanian Free Market Institute Title: A Study on Economic Causes of Smuggling Summary: From the report: "The purpose of this study is to analyse economic causes and preconditions of smuggling and to offer proposals for eliminating them. This study looks at market forces behind smuggling and identifies and explores economic causes and preconditions of smuggling. Economic policy measures that would help to eliminate the causes and preconditions of smuggling are proposed." Details: Vilnius, Lithuania: 2004. 38p. Source: Year: 2004 Country: Lithuania URL: Shelf Number: 116188 Keywords: EconomicsSmuggling |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats Summary: This report looks at the relationship between organized crime and instability: how illicit commodities usually originate in trouble spots, are then trafficked through vulnerable regions, to affluent markets. It focuses in particular on the impact of drug flows (cocaine and heroin), as well as piracy around the Horn of Africa, and the impact of minerals smuggling on Central Africa. Details: Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. 59p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117626 Keywords: Drug TraffickingPiracy/PiratesSmuggling |
Author: Hastle, Jo Title: Back in Business: Elephant Poaching and the Ivory Black Markets of Asia Summary: This report presents a catalogue of ivory seizures during calendar year 2002. Sections of the report include: The Singapore Seizure; China's Emerging Ivory Market; The Impact on Elephant Populations; Illegal Ivory on the Move; and Conclusions and Recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2002. 25p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2002 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118754 Keywords: Elephant PoachingIllegal HuntingIvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Gasparini Alves, Pericles Title: Illicit Trafficking in Firearms: Prevention and Combat in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: A National, Regional and Global Issue Summary: Since the 1980s, Brazil has faced one of the worst small arms problems in the world. Drug and arms trafficking have lead to increasing levels of violence in Brazilian society, notably in large cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This publication offers and account of the arms trafficking situation in Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Government's response to it. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2001. 66p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2001 Country: Brazil URL: Shelf Number: 119478 Keywords: CrimeIllegal Arms TransferSmugglingTransnationalViolence |
Author: Partnership Africa Canada Title: The Lost World: Diamond Mining and Smuggling in Venezuela Summary: This report on the diamond mining industry of Venezuela documents how and why Venezuela’s diamonds – an industry that produces from 150,000 to 200,000 carats per year, worth as much as US$20 million annually – have been driven underground. PAC further details the inability of Venezuela’s Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining (Miban) to control the diamond trade, officially ignoring the problem, while official diamond exports dwindled to nothing. Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2006. 19p. Source: Internet Resource; Occasional Paper #16 Year: 2006 Country: Venezuela URL: Shelf Number: 119538 Keywords: DiamondsIllegal TradeSmuggling |
Author: Environmental Investigation Agency Title: Rogue Traders: The Murky Business of Merbau Timber Smuggling in Indonesia Summary: During 2009 and 2010 EIA/Telapak carried out undercover investigations into the illicit merbau trade in China and Singapore, as well as Surabaya, Makassar and Papua in Indonesia. These investigations reveal how significant amounts of illegal merbau, in the form of square logs and rough sawn timber, continue to be smuggled out of Indonesia, with the bulk bound for China. They also uncover the illegal activities of two rogue timber traders; Hengky Gosal, the man behind a foiled attempt to ship 23 containers of merbau logs, and Ricky Gunawan, a serial smuggler based in Surabaya. Details: London: Environmental Investigation Agency; Bogor, Indonesia: Telepak, 2010. 13p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: Indonesia URL: Shelf Number: 119547 Keywords: Illegal LoggingIllegal TradeOffenses Against the EnvironmentSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Ferrier, Peyton Title: The Economics of Agricultural and Wildlife Smuggling Summary: The United States bans imports of certain agricultural and wildlife goods that can carry pathogens or diseases or whose harvest can threaten wildlife stocks or endanger species. Despite these bans, contraband is regularly uncovered in inspections of cargo containers and in domestic markets. This study characterizes the economic factors affecting agricultural and wildlife smuggling by drawing on inspection and interdiction data from USDA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and existing economic literature. Findings reveal that agricultural and wildlife smuggling primarily include luxury goods, ethnic foods, and specialty goods, such as traditional medicines. Incidents of detected smuggling are disproportionately higher for agricultural goods originating in China and for wildlife goods originating in Mexico. Fragmentary data show that approximately 1 percent of all commercial wildlife shipments to the United States and 0.40 percent of all U.S. wildlife imports by value are refused entry and suspected of being smuggled. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Services, 2009. 35p. Source: Internet Resource; Economic Research Report No. 81. Accessed August 16, 2010 at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err81/err81.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err81/err81.pdf Shelf Number: 116551 Keywords: Agricultural CrimeIllicit TradeOffenses Against the EnvironmentSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Kalacska, Margaret Title: Technological Integration As A Means of Enhancing Border Security and Reducing Transnational Crime Summary: “This report examines the porosity of the Canada-US border, focusing on the areas between ports-of-entry. Such locations have traditionally been perceived as low risk areas, but actually facilitate criminal activities that endanger the national security and economies of both countries. This analysis also considers the root causes of major illicit activities that flourish as transnational ventures in these border regions, and reiterates the need for increasing security without imposing further restrictions on legitimate travel and trade. This report makes eight recommendations to improve security between the major ports-of-entry: • Increase technological infrastructure for the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) and Coast Guard teams between the ports-of-entry. • Increase basic security and communications measures at the small and medium rural ports-of-entry. • Increase international interoperability and communication (such as real-time, integrated shared databases on criminal records, investigations in progress, and outstanding warrants) between the Canadian Border Services Agency, US Customs and Borders Protection, IBET and municipal, provincial, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Such a united, coordinated effort will be more successful at intercepting transnational crime and cross border insurgency. • Develop a mechanism to enable agents from one country to pursue fleeing suspects across the border to maintain visual surveillance on their whereabouts until authorities from the other country are able to respond. • Harmonize the sentences for smugglers and traffickers of narcotics, arms and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora-related products between Canada and the US without eligibility for early release for those convicted in Canada. • Remove the allowance of acquiring and possessing methamphetamine and methylene-dioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) chemical precursors that do not have any legitimate industrial use. • Increase the use of operationally proven technology to improve security in the areas between ports-of-entry to provide real-time information on threats to enforcement teams. • Increase the number of IBET teams: these teams should have the capability to respond to threats near real-time. Identifying the most likely between-ports-of-entry crossing points from actual data, and the field experiences of the officers on the ground, will increase the number of individuals apprehended for illegally crossing the border having significant impacts on illicit enterprises. If used correctly, appropriate technology will augment the effectiveness of the agents on the ground, especially when resources are limited.” Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119748 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsSmugglingTransnational Crime |
Author: Hale, Geoffrey Title: In Search of Effective Border Management Summary: Effective border security is compatible with the efficient management of border processes to allow the free flow of low-risk people and goods for purposes of mutual benefit between countries. Recent economic shocks have demonstrated that neither Americans nor Canadians can take their prosperity and economic security for granted. The risks of external and domestic terror attacks increasingly resemble long-term challenges to effective security and border management such as organized criminal activity and unregulated migration, rather than the crisis atmosphere which marked initial responses to 9/11. Failure to consider border security and facilitation issues in this context is likely to result in sub-optimal security and economic outcomes. Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: A Changing World: Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities, No. 3: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119750 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecuritySmugglingTerrorismTrafficking |
Author: Title: Illicit Arms in Indonesia Summary: A bloody bank robbery in Medan in August 2010 and the discovery in Aceh in February 2010 of a terrorist training camp using old police weapons have focused public attention on the circulation of illegal arms in Indonesia. These incidents raise questions about how firearms fall into criminal hands and what measures are in place to stop them. The issue has become more urgent as the small groups of Indonesian jihadis, concerned about Muslim casualties in bomb attacks, are starting to discuss targeted killings as a preferred method of operation. The Indonesian government could begin to address the problem by reviewing and strengthening compliance with procedures for storage, inventory and disposal of firearms; improved vetting and monitoring of those guarding armouries; auditing of gun importers and gun shops, including those that sell weapons online; and paying more attention to the growing popularity of “airsoft” guns that look exactly like real ones but shoot plastic pellets. The problem needs to be kept in perspective, however. It is worth addressing precisely because the scale is manageable. Indonesia does not have a “gun culture” like the Philippines or Thailand. The number of people killed by terrorist gunfire in Indonesia over the last decade is about twenty, more than half of them police, and most of the deaths took place in post-conflict central Sulawesi and Maluku. The nexus between terrorism and crime is not nearly as strong as in other countries. There have been a few cases of bartering ganja (marijuana) for guns – and one case of trading endangered anteaters – but in general, narco-terrorism is not a problem. Jihadi use of armed robberies as a fund-raising method is a more serious issue, with banks, gold stores and ATMs the favourite targets. As of this writing it remained unclear who was behind the Medan robbery – although criminal thugs remain the strongest possibility – but jihadi groups have robbed Medan banks before, most notably the Lippo Bank in 2003. Such crimes constitute a miniscule proportion of the country’s robberies, but it is still worth looking at where the guns come from when they occur. The problem may increase as the larger jihadi groups weaken and split, particularly those that once depended on member contributions for financing day-to-day activities. Recruitment by jihadis of ordinary criminals in prisons may also strengthen the linkage between terrorism and crime in the future. There are four main sources of illegal guns in Indonesia. They can be stolen or illegally purchased from security forces, taken from leftover stockpiles in former conflict areas, manufactured by local gunsmiths or smuggled from abroad. Thousands of guns acquired legally but later rendered illicit through lapsed permits have become a growing concern because no one has kept track of them. Throughout the country, corruption facilitates the circulation of illegal arms in different ways and undermines what on paper is a tight system of regulation. Details: Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Briefing; Asia Briefing No. 109: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B109-illicit-arms-in-indonesia.aspx Year: 2010 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B109-illicit-arms-in-indonesia.aspx Shelf Number: 119762 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGun ControlGun ViolenceGunsIllicit FirearmsSmugglingWeapons |
Author: Mavhinga, Dewa Title: Deliberate Chaos: Ongoing Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe Summary: Human rights abuses remain rampant in Marange, the diamond-mining area of eastern Zimbabwe. Military personnel continue to engage in forced labor and to punish those who seek to mine outside of soldier-run syndicates. Torture, beatings, and harassment are also prevalent in this community, which faces forced relocation without adequate compensation from the diamond-rich areas in which they make their homes. As this report went to press, a Zimbabwean civil-society activist was in prison for having divulged sensitive information about persistent human rights abuses in Marange. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an international group that monitors the diamond trade and seeks to restrict the sale of conflict diamonds, meets in Israel in June 2010. Kimberley Process members should suspend Zimbabwe and withhold shipment of diamonds from Marange until the abuses documented by Human Rights Watch have ceased. Zimbabwe should comply with recommendations made by the Kimberley Process in November 2009 to demilitarize the diamond fields and end the rampant smuggling of diamonds. As Zimbabwe recovers from a man-made humanitarian crisis, Human Rights Watch also calls on the government to account for lost diamond revenue from Marange and use this revenue to improve socioeconomic conditions in the country. Details: New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2010 at: http://www.hrw.org/node/90988 Year: 2010 Country: Zimbabwe URL: http://www.hrw.org/node/90988 Shelf Number: 119849 Keywords: DiamondsHuman Rights AbusesSmuggling |
Author: Aguiar, Jose Carlos Title: Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices and the Control of Illegality in South America Summary: The Tri-Border Region in South America spreads across the frontiers of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. It encompasses a trans-border urban conglomerate of about 600 thousands inhabitants in the three countries. Through the years, it has been a frontera porosa (porous border) where trafficking boomed after Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner declared Ciudad del Este a free-trade zone in the 1960s. The city soon became a shopping paradise for counterfeit cigarettes and spirits. Yet, since the 2000s there are signs of some reordering in the region. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government encouraged national states to control the flows of people and goods at the region. Allegedly, illegal activities are headed by international networks, which would finance religious extremism around the globe. The governments have accordingly launched a number of plans to improve surveillance, such as the Integrated System of Migration Registration (SICaM in Spanish) in Argentina in 2005 and the 'sacoleiro law' in 2009, an attempt to regulate smuggling in Brazil. Paraguay has also embarked in 2009 in the renewal of the customs office at the international bridge. These policies reveal programmes of increasing state intervention to halt trafficking in electronics, drugs, weapons and humans, and any kind of undocumented border crossing. This article poses the concept border synergy to capture the mobility of goods and values across boundaries, which entails a double connotation, that of the border as the national limit between countries, but also the one defining legal and illegal domains. This argument is based on ethnographic material gathered at the Tri-Border Region during a period of three years. Participant observations, interviews and visual recording were among the research techniques applied. The informants include local entrepreneurs and sellers, social workers, religious leaders, municipal and federal authorities, and smugglers. Polyphony guarantees here a dense ethnographic description. The results presented give evidence from an anthropological perspective on the trans-border smuggling across the national frontiers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and the extent economic agents manipulate borders in region. The policies implemented to 'regulate' smuggling and halt illegal practices at the Tri-Border Region raise relevant questions regarding the study of border cities, transnational trade and illegality. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: New Voices Series, No. 6: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/181_New_Voices_Series_6_-_Stretching_the_Border_-_Smuggling_Practices_and_the_Control_of_Illegality_in_South_America.pdf Shelf Number: 120164 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingIllicit TradeSmuggling |
Author: Xiu, Liu Title: Organized Crime and the Black Economy in China Summary: Organized crime has now become a serious social problem in all cities in China. Officially, the Chinese government has thus far acknowledged that only a few criminal groups have acquired so-called mafia-like characteristics in their organizational structure. However, there are no real mafia-type organizations in China. Organized crime in China mainly engages in drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, human trafficking, manufacture and smuggling of counterfeit money and guns, prostitution, etc. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 7: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Year: 2010 Country: China URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Shelf Number: 120299 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (China)ProstitutionSmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in Federal Government's Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling Summary: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead federal agency responsible for inspecting travelers who seek to smuggle large volumes of cash--called bulk cash--when leaving the country through land ports of entry. It is estimated that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a year in bulk cash across the southwest border. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is responsible for reducing the risk of cross-border smuggling of funds through the use of devices called stored value, such as prepaid cards. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of actions taken by CBP to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country and any challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps, if any, of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements of stored value, and (3) if gaps exist, the extent to which FinCEN has addressed them. To conduct its work, GAO observed outbound operations at five land ports of entry. GAO also reviewed statutes, rules, and other information for stored value. This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2010. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. In March 2009, CBP created an Outbound Enforcement Program aimed at stemming the flow of bulk cash leaving the country, but further actions could be taken to address program challenges. Under the program, CBP inspects travelers leaving the country at all 25 land ports of entry along the southwest border. On the Northern border, inspections are conducted at the discretion of the Port Director. From March 2009 through June 2010, CBP seized about $41 million in illicit bulk cash leaving the country at land ports of entry. Stemming the flow of bulk cash, however, is a difficult and challenging task. For example, CBP is unable to inspect every traveler leaving the country at land ports of entry and smugglers of illicit goods have opportunities to circumvent the inspection process. Other challenges involve limited technology, infrastructure, and procedures to support outbound operations. CBP is in the early phases of this program and has not yet taken some actions to gain a better understanding of how well the program is working, such as gathering data for measuring program costs and benefits. By gathering data for measuring expected program costs and benefits, CBP could be in a better position to weigh the costs of any proposed expansion of the outbound inspection program against likely outcomes. Regulatory gaps of cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements exist with the use of stored value. For example, travelers must report transporting more than $10,000 in monetary instruments or currency at one time when leaving the country, but FinCEN does not have a similar requirement for travelers transporting stored value. Similarly, certain anti-money laundering regulations, such as reports on suspicious activities, do not apply to the entire stored value industry. The nature and extent of the use of stored value for cross-border currency smuggling and other illegal activities remains unknown, but federal law enforcement agencies are concerned about its use. FinCEN is developing regulations, as required by the Credit CARD Act of 2009, to address gaps in regulations related to the use of stored value for criminal purposes, but much work remains. FinCEN has not developed a management plan that includes, among other things, target dates for completing the regulations. Developing such a plan could help FinCEN better manage its rulemaking effort. When it issues the regulations, law enforcement agencies and FinCEN may be challenged in ensuring compliance by travelers and industry. For example, FinCEN will be responsible for numerous tasks including issuing guidance for compliance examiners, revising the way in which it tracks suspicious activities related to stored value, and addressing gaps in anti-money laundering regulations for off-shore entities that issue and sell stored value. GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, gather data on program costs and benefits and that FinCEN develop a plan, including target dates, to better manage its rulemaking process. CBP and FinCEN concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-73: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1173.pdf Shelf Number: 120339 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesIllegalMoney LaunderingSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands Summary: Federal and tribal lands on the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are vulnerable to illegal cross-border activity. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--through its U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol)--is responsible for securing these lands, while the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) manage natural resources and protect the public. GAO was asked to examine the extent that (1) border security threats have changed on federal lands; (2) federal agencies operating on these lands have shared threat information and communications; and (3) federal agencies have coordinated budgets, resources, and strategies. GAO reviewed interagency agreements and threat assessments; analyzed enforcement data from 2007 through 2009; and interviewed officials at headquarters and two Border Patrol sectors selected due to high volume of illegal cross-border activity (Tucson) and limited ability to detect this activity (Spokane). GAO's observations cannot be generalized to all sectors but provide insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands. On the southwest border, the Tucson sector is the primary entry point for marijuana smugglers and illegal aliens, and over the last 3 years apprehensions on federal lands have not kept pace with Border Patrol estimates of the number of illegal entries, indicating that the threat to federal lands may be increasing. On the northern border, the Spokane sector is a primary entry point for air smugglers of high-potency marijuana, but technical challenges preclude fully assessing threats to these borderlands. In the Tucson sector, federal land managers said they would like additional guidance to determine when illegal cross-border activity poses a sufficient public safety risk for them to restrict or close access to federal lands. DOI and USDA efforts to determine whether additional guidance is needed--consistent with internal control standards for the federal government and in line with DHS contingency plans for southwest border violence--could help federal land managers more easily balance public safety and access to federal borderlands. Information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA have increased in recent years, but critical gaps remain in implementing interagency agreements. Agencies established forums and liaisons to exchange information; however, in the Tucson sector, agencies did not coordinate to ensure that federal land law enforcement officials maintained access to threat information and compatible secure radio communications for daily operations. Coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. There has been little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. Interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and knowledge for more effective border security operations on federal lands. GAO is recommending that DOI and USDA determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures, and that DHS, DOI, and USDA further implement interagency agreements. DHS, DOI, and USDA concurred with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-177: Accessed December 10, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11177.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11177.pdf Shelf Number: 120443 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecuritySmuggling |
Author: TRAFFIC Title: Traffic Bulletin Seizures and Prosecutions: March 1997 - March 2010 Summary: The cases reported here, extracted from the TRAFFIC Bulletin, represent a selection of seizures and prosecutions that have taken place around the world over the past 12 years. The sources of this information are cited at the end of each country section. The CITES Appendix-listing for each species is placed in parentheses, where appropriate. Details: Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC, 2010. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 13, 2010 at: www.traffic.org/traffic-bulletin/traffic_bulletin_seizures_1997-2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 120491 Keywords: Offenses Against the EnvironmentSmugglingWildlife Crimes |
Author: Lin, Leo S.F. Title: Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia in the Era of Globalization: Taiwan's Perspective Summary: This paper aims to scrutinize the transnational organized crime (TOC) in East Asia, and Taiwan in particular, in the era of globalization. This paper provides with a conceptual framework which allows us to examine the nature of transnational organized crime in the globalized world. It argues that TOC is a dual dimensional phenomenon—entity and activity dimensions— both dimensions of TOC have been largely affected by globalization. In East Asia, especially People’s Republic of China, where globalization has boosted the economy tremendously, created an unprecedented opportunity for TOC to grow. This paper argues that since most of the non-traditional TOC groups are difficult to classify because it is very much depending on the cases, it would be more clear and effective to profile the traditional type of TOC in East Asia. Several important traditional criminal groups are identified. Regarding the activity dimension, human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling are the two most serious and complicated issues in East Asia. This paper also identifies the source, transit and destination countries in human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling. As regards the TOC situation in Taiwan and its relations with East Asian countries, this paper analyzes the origin of Taiwan’s organized crime groups, which is both from locality and mainland China. Following globalization and Taiwanese economy recovery, Taiwan’s underworld went into a new stage of development, penetrating political, economic and other aspects in the society. As a result, many traditional organized crime groups vigorously expand their organizations oversees. Human trafficking and drug trafficking and smuggling are the main concerns for Taiwan government. Under the efforts of the government, the situation of both issues is improving. In recent years, with the openness and the increase exchanged with Mainland China, human and drug trafficking from Mainland China has become serious problems in Taiwan. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 146: Accessed December 16, 2010 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122411 Year: 2010 Country: Taiwan URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122411 Shelf Number: 120533 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingOrganized Crime (Taiwan)Smuggling |
Author: Obidzinski, Krystof Title: Timber Smuggling in Indonesia: Critical or Overstated problem? Forest Governance Lessons from Kalimantan Summary: Over the last few years, illegal logging has been at the center of policy debates about the current state and future prospects of Indonesia’s forestry sector. To a significant extent, the policy dialogues as well as public understanding of the illegal logging problem have been influenced by the timber establishment’s view that clandestine timber smuggling is responsible for illegal logging activities in the country. Echoing this sentiment, the Indonesian government has been at odds with neighboring countries Malaysia and Singapore over their perceived lack of cooperation in stemming the illegal flow of Indonesian timber across the border and thus helping to rein in illegal logging. At the same time, timber smuggling has become the focus of forest law enforcement operations in Indonesia. This paper scrutinizes the assumption that timber smuggling is at the core of the illegal logging problem in Indonesia. Taking the border zone between Indonesia and Malaysia on the island of Borneo (Kalimantan) as a sample unit of analysis and complementing it with data from other parts of Indonesia, the paper shows the intensity of timber smuggling was relatively high between 2000 and 2003, but has since declined by over 70%. Despite this decline, illegal logging in Indonesia still continues at a rate of approximately 40 million m3 per year. It seems clear that timber smuggling is not the primary driver of illegal logging in Indonesia. Instead, the core of the problem is the extraction of timber by Indonesian forest concession holders, plantation developers, road construction companies and other ventures that abuse company permits and violate prevailing forestry regulations. The current timber trade system, controlled by the government regulating bodies BRIK and ETPIK, stresses the administrative and documentary compliance of forestry businesses in Indonesia. However, this is not enough because these requirements are relatively easy to manipulate and their enforcement is lax. There is an urgent need for a timber legality standard that would be more difficult to manipulate, simpler to enforce and easier to evaluate – e.g. the standard developed collaboratively by LEI, TNC and other parties. This will require a lot of political will, commitment and sustained effort from a range of government agencies to endorse the legality standard, develop the implementation framework, provide public policy incentives and remove disincentives, allow third party independent verification of legality, and perhaps most importantly develop a comprehensive plan to balance the supply and demand for timber in Indonesia. While this is a lot to hope for, it seems to be the only way to make meaningful and lasting progress on the illegal logging issue in Indonesia. Details: Bogar, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, 2006. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BObidzinski0601.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BObidzinski0601.pdf Shelf Number: 120562 Keywords: Illegal Logging (Indonesia)Offenses Against the EnvironmentSmuggling |
Author: Parry-Jones, Rob Title: The Feasibilitiy of Using Canines to Detect Wildlife Contraband Summary: The use of detection dogs worldwide, cheifly for narcotics, bears testament to the recognised efficacy of canines in locating contraband items in trade. Despite the commitment of governments to prevent the illegal trade in wildlife, however, only a few detector dog programs currently exist around the world to detect wildlife in trade. These programs, located in the USA, South Africa, and Canada, have limited resources but, nonetheless, clearly illustrate that dogs can be used as an effective law enforcement tool to enhance the effectiveness of CITES and domestic wildlife trade controls. Details: Hong Kong: TRAFFIC East Asia, 1997. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.traffic.org/enforcement/ Year: 1997 Country: International URL: http://www.traffic.org/enforcement/ Shelf Number: 120591 Keywords: DogsIllegal Wildlife TradeSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: ProFauna Indonesia Title: Pirated Parrots: ProFauna's Investigation of the Indonesian Parrot Smuggling to the Philippines Summary: There are about 85 parrot species in Indonesia, 14 of them are classified as threatened. One of the regions with many parrot species is Wallacea which includes Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, and the Maluku Islands. 4 endangered species in Wallacea are the red-and-blue Lory (Eos histrio), yellowcrested Cockatoo (Cacatua sulphurea), blue-napped Parrot (Tanygnathus lucioinensis), and blackwinged Lory (Eos cyanogenia). The most threatened genus in Wallacea are the lorry and cockatoo ones, mainly caused by the trapping for trade. This trapping is made worse by habitat loss resulting in local extinctions for some species like the yellow-crested Cockatoo (Cacatua sulphurea), salmon-crested Cockatoo (Cacatua moluccensis), red-and-blue Lory (Eos histrio), and the chattering Lory (Lorius garulus). All parrot species (Psittaciformes spp) are in Appendix II CITES, except those in Appendix I and a few in Appendxi III. There are 5 parrot species listed in Appendix I: Goffin’s Cockatoo (Cacatua goffini), the salmon-crested Cockatoo (Cacatua moluccensis), yellow-crested Cockatoo (Cacatua sulphurea), palm Cockatoo (Probosciger aterrimus) and the red-and-blue Lory (Eos histrio). This means that the commercial international trade in these parrots is principally prohibited and must be from captive bred birds not wild caught ones. Other species in Appendix II can be traded under the catching quotas and the permits issued by the Forestry Department. In 2007, Indonesia didn’t issue export quotas for any species, including parrots. Therefore, there is no legal export of Indonesian parrots. Even though there is no legal export for parrots from Indonesia, poaching of birds from the wild which are subsequently smuggled into the Philippines and domestically traded is still going on. A ProFauna Indonesia investigation in June – September 2007, funded by Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), reveals the fact that parrot smuggling from Maluku, Indonesia to the Philippines has been taking place until now. This poses a serious threat towards the parrot conservation in the wild. Details: Malang, Indonesia: ProFauna Indonesia, 2008. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2010 at: http://www.profauna.org/download/publication/pirated-parrot-(2008).pdf Year: 2008 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.profauna.org/download/publication/pirated-parrot-(2008).pdf Shelf Number: 120625 Keywords: Illegal Wildlife TradeOffenses Against the EnvironmentPoachingSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Hubschle, Annette, compiler Title: Organised Crime in Southern Africa: First Annual Review Summary: In 2005 representatives of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Secretariat of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) discussed the lack of reliable information and research on organised crime and how it impacted on law enforcement in southern Africa. The lack of credible homegrown research data ultimately led to the conceptualisation of a joint research project between the Cape Town-based ISS Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme and SARPCCO. The Enhancing Regional Responses Against Organised Crime (EROC) Project commenced in January 2008 and concludes in December 2010. The objectives of the research are to: Provide in-depth information on contemporary organised criminal activities in the sub-region to policy and decision makers; Analyse the transnational dynamics of organised criminal groups and networks; Determine whether, and to what extent, links exist between organised crime and terrorism; Consider and document the role that corruption plays in organised crime; and Evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in the sub-region to overcome organised crime. This report comprises the research findings of the first year of data collection (2008) for the EROC project. It is the first of three such reports that will be published by the ISS in collaboration with SARPCCO. It looks at selected organised criminal activities and observed levels of prevalence in 12 southern African countries. Research questions, methodologies, limitations and ethical considerations are discussed in detail. Due to the lack of statistical and quantitative data, the report relies mostly on qualitative methodologies. Representatives of law enforcement agencies, government departments and para-statals, civil society, business and professional associations, academics, prisoners, former gang members and members of the broader communities whose lives have been affected by organised crime, were consulted in one-on-one interviews, focus groups, observations and workshops. A team of field researchers led by a research coordinator collected the data presented and analysed in this report. The research was informed by a working definition of organised crime which was jointly developed by the heads of criminal investigation departments in southern Africa and the research team. The report shows that the more serious forms of crime in terms of the monetary value involved or the potential harm they cause have a transnational dimension, both in terms of being committed by people of varying nationalities and in terms of affecting more than one country. It has been established that organised crime in most countries is underpinned by corruption, which is either a facilitating activity or an organised criminal activity in its own right. The geo-political and economic environments of individual countries amplifies the significance of specific criminal activities, the commonest forms of which have been identified as stock theft, theft/hijacking of motor vehicles, cultivation of marijuana and a broad spectrum of economic crimes. Further, the research has shown that although economic crimes may not be as prevalent as other forms of crime, statistically their impact on the society and the economy are far reaching. Furthermore, the effectiveness of law enforcement against organised crime has been put in the spotlight. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/OrgCrimeReviewDec2010.pdf Shelf Number: 120675 Keywords: CorruptionCounterfeit GoodsDrug MarketsFinancial CrimesHuman TraffickingMoney LaunderingOffenses Against the EnvironmentOrganized Crime (South Africa)PoachingSmugglingStolen Motor VehiclesWildlife Crime |
Author: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Title: Tobacco, Terrorism, and Illicit Trade: China, Paraguay, Ukraine: Inside the World's Top Smuggling Hubs; Taliban, al-qaeda, Other Terrorists Funded by Cigarette Black Markets Summary: The six-part series is part of Tobacco Underground, a year-long investigation by ICIJ into cigarette smuggling — featuring interactive maps, undercover video, online interviews with experts, and links to groups and documents worldwide. In addition to fueling corruption, organized crime, and terrorism, the illicit trafficking of tobacco robs governments of needed tax money and spurs addiction to a deadly product, the ICIJ series reports. “ICIJ shows again how the illicit trafficking of tobacco is out of control,” said Center Executive Director Bill Buzenberg. “Renegade factories, multinational companies, and weak enforcement all play a role in fueling this multi-billion dollar illegal trade, whose profits rival those of narcotics.” Experts believe that smuggled cigarettes — either untaxed legitimate brands or counterfeits — account for 12 percent of all cigarette sales, or about 657 billion “sticks” annually, making tobacco the world’s most widely smuggled legal substance. The cost to governments worldwide is massive: an estimated $40 billion to $50 billion in lost tax revenue each year. ICIJ first exposed the complicity of Big Tobacco in smuggling nine years ago, helping spark lawsuits and government crackdowns around the world. This report includes the following articles: (1) Terrorism and Tobacco: Extremists, Insurgents Turn to Cigarette Smuggling. Terrorists are increasingly turning to cigarette smuggling for funding. The move is part of a larger trend toward use of criminal rackets by terrorists, who find trafficking in cigarettes a high-profit, low-risk way to finance operations. Among the groups are Pakistan’s Taliban militias, for whom cigarettes are now second only to heroin as a funding source. (2)China’s Marlboro Country: A Massive Underground Industry Makes China the World Leader in Counterfeit Cigarettes. China now produces an unprecedented 400 billion counterfeit cigarettes annually. Cheap Chinese fakes are now sold in major cities worldwide, from New York delis to London storefronts. Officials believe China is the source of 99 percent of U.S. counterfeit cigarettes and up to 80 percent of those in the European Union. Lab tests reveal the Chinese counterfeits release 80 percent more nicotine and 130 percent more carbon monoxide than brand-name cigarettes, and have impurities that include insect eggs and human feces. (3) Smuggling Made Easy: Landlocked Paraguay Emerges as a Top Producer of Contraband Tobacco. Paraguay’s renegade factories produce more than 20 times what the country consumes, and are now responsible for 10 percent of the world’s contraband tobacco, experts estimate. The vast majority of the cigarettes — up to 90 percent of production, worth an estimated $1 billion— disappears into an often violent black market, law enforcement officials say. (4) Ukraine’s “Lost” Cigarettes Flood Europe: Big Tobacco’s Overproduction Feeds $2 Billion Black Market. Each year, the world’s four top multinational tobacco companies — Philip Morris International, Japan Tobacco International, Imperial Tobacco, and British American Tobacco — produce and import 30 billion cigarettes in Ukraine beyond what the country can consume, fueling a $2 billion black market that reaches across the European Union. Today, Ukraine is rivaled only by Russia as the top source of non-counterfeit cigarettes smuggled to Europe. Details: Washington, DC: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2009. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/1534/ Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/1534/ Shelf Number: 119537 Keywords: Black MarketsCounterfeit ProductsIllegal TobaccoIllicit TradeSmugglingTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center Summary: The border between the United States and Mexico presents a long-standing challenge to U.S. law enforcement. Criminal organizations smuggle illicit drugs, undocumented aliens, and other contraband across the border into the United States, and cash and weapons into Mexico. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) led and funded intelligence center, located in El Paso, Texas, near Juarez, Mexico. EPIC focuses its programs on the collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence. EPIC provides federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies information they can use in investigations and operations that target smuggling and other criminal activities. When it was established in 1974, EPIC focused primarily on Mexican heroin traffickers and illegal alien and weapon smugglers. EPIC’s focus today is broader, providing an intelligence resource that targets a wider range of criminal activity. EPIC’s mission has evolved in response to a shift in focus to Southwest border smuggling and associated violence, and the need for improved collaboration and timely information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. EPIC currently hosts representatives from 21 different agencies and provides information to over 19,000 law enforcement officers and analysts who are approved EPIC users. This review by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined the roles and functions of EPIC and its analysis and dissemination of intelligence in support of federal, state, and local law enforcement investigations and interdiction operations. In this review, we interviewed representatives of investigative agencies that obtain intelligence from EPIC. We also conducted site visits at EPIC and several law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border and elsewhere, analyzed EPIC data and its performance measures, and reviewed U.S. national counter-drug strategy and policy materials. In addition, we administered a nationwide survey of EPIC users to obtain their perspectives on EPIC’s products and services. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2010. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: I-2010-05: Accessed February 18, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf Shelf Number: 120826 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug Trafficking ControlSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Illicit Tobacco: Various Schemes Are Used to Evade Taxes and Fees Summary: Tobacco products face varying levels of taxation in different locations, creating opportunities and incentives for illicit trade. Cigarettes are taxed at the federal, state, and in some cases, local levels. According to industry representatives, taxes and other fees make up significant components of the final price of cigarettes, averaging 53 percent of the retail price. While the national average retail price of a pack of cigarettes was $5.95 in 2010, in New York City, a pack can cost up to $13.00 or more due to high combined state and city taxes. In contrast, a pack of cigarettes in Richmond, Virginia, can cost approximately $5.00, due to low state cigarette taxes there. The tax differential between a case of cigarettes (typically containing 12,000 cigarettes) in New York City and Richmond is over $3,000, creating incentives for illicit trade and profits. Excise taxes and other fees on tobacco products can be evaded at numerous points in the supply chain. Law enforcement officials told us another incentive to engage in this activity is the fact illicit tobacco penalties are comparatively less severe than other forms of illicit trade. According to experts we spoke with and literature we reviewed, a wide range of schemes are used by different actors to profit from illicit trade in tobacco products, mainly through the evasion of taxes. Schemes can range from individual consumers purchasing tax-free cigarettes from Internet Web sites, to larger-scale interstate trafficking of tobacco products, to smuggling cigarettes into the country by criminal organizations. For example: (1) A California distributor purchased approximately $1.4 million in other tobacco products (e.g., cigars and chewing tobacco) from an out-ofstate distributor, who disguised the shipments using falsified documents and black plastic wrapping. The California distributor then sold it to customers and failed to pay state excise taxes. (2) A criminal organization attempted to conceal two containers of counterfeit cigarettes and pass them through Customs at the Los Angeles/Long Beach port by declaring them as toys and plastic goods. (3) A manufacturer evaded Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) escrow payments. The manufacturer underreported its cross-border sales to numerous states, including Virginia. By underreporting its sales to Virginia, the manufacturer evaded approximately $580,000 in escrow payments. Law enforcement officials reported that patterns of schemes are dynamic and identified links between illicit trade in tobacco and other crimes. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-313: Accessed March 8, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11313.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11313.pdf Shelf Number: 120888 Keywords: Illegal TradeSmugglingTax EvasionTobacco |
Author: Haddal, Chad C. Title: Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation’s first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP’s primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-related differences between the northern border with Canada and the Southwest border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the Southwest border, the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The northern border is more than two times longer than the Southwest border, and features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams. Some issues for Congress to consider could include the slow rate of integration between the USBP’s biometric database of illegal aliens and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) biometric database of criminals and terrorists; the number of unauthorized aliens who die attempting to enter the country each year; the increasing attacks on Border Patrol agents, and the threat posed by terrorists along the sparsely defended northern border as well as the more porous Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: RL32562: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf Shelf Number: 121027 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Nunez-Neto, Blas Title: Border Security: Apprehensions of “Other Than Mexican” Aliens Summary: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with securing our nation’s borders between official ports of entry (POE). As the USBP discharges its mission it encounters unauthorized aliens from around the world attempting to illegally enter the United States. In fiscal year (FY) 2004, USBP agents apprehended 1.16 million people attempting to enter the country illegally between official POE; 93% of these aliens were Mexican nationals. Because the vast majority of people apprehended each year by the USBP are Mexican nationals, the agency categorizes aliens as Mexicans or Other Than Mexicans (OTM). Over the past three years, OTM apprehensions have more than tripled nationwide and have been concentrated along the South Texas border. The reasons for this dramatic increase, and its geographical concentration in Texas, are not altogether clear. The number of people entering the country illegally between POE, and the concomitant proliferation of human and drug smuggling networks, can present risks to national security due to the ever-present threat of terrorism. Terrorists and terrorist organizations could leverage these illicit networks to smuggle a person or weapon of mass destruction into the United States, while the large number of aliens attempting to enter the country illegally could potentially provide cover for the terrorists. Additionally, the proceeds from these smuggling networks could potentially be used to finance terrorism. The issue of OTM apprehensions has received publicity recently for many of these reasons, which were highlighted during congressional testimony by DHS then-Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy when he stated that Al-Qaeda is considering infiltrating the Southwest border due to a belief that “illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational security reasons.” OTMs apprehended along the Southwest border by the USBP between official POE cannot be returned to Mexico because Mexico will not accept them. Instead, they must be returned to their countries of origin, or third countries that will accept them, by the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, DRO does not have enough detention beds to accommodate every OTM that is apprehended. As a result of this, the majority of OTMs apprehended by the USBP are released into the interior of the United States with notices to appear before an immigration judge. Most of these released OTMs fail to show up for their hearings and are not ultimately removed. In order to address the increasing number of OTMs being apprehended and circumvent the regular removal process, the USBP is currently expanding its Expedited Removal (ER) program. Issues for Congress include the potential for terrorist infiltration, the lack of detention bed-space that causes OTMs to be released into the interior of the country, and how best to deploy DHS resources to address the growing number of OTMs entering into the country illegally. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: RL33097: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf Shelf Number: 121028 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Caulkins, Jonathan P. Title: Smuggling and Excise Tax Evasion for Legalized Marijuana: Lessons from Other Excise Taxes Summary: We explore three lines of evidence that may shed light on whether marijuana excise tax revenue could be threatened by black market sales and smuggling: (1) Comparing the Ammiano Bill’s proposed $50 per ounce tax to various other current and proposed excise taxes on a variety of metrics, (2) Placing a $50 per ounce tax in the context of cross-sectional state-level data relating tobacco smuggling to tobacco excise taxes, and (3) Comparing the tax to current marijuana prices on a per pound basis. This exercise suggests that: As compared with other familiar excise taxes, a $50 per ounce excise tax on marijuana is either very high or truly unprecedented depending on the metric employed. California should expect at least some degree of tax evasion; it is hard to see why evasion would be less of an issue than it is with cigarettes. California should not rule out the possibility that tax evasion would wipe out essentially all of the potential revenues from a $50 per ounce excise tax. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND Drug Policy Research Center, 2010. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 766-RC, 2010. 10p. Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 121357 Keywords: Drug LegalizationDrug PolicyMarijuana (California)SmugglingTax Evasion |
Author: Texas Border Security Council Title: Texas Border Security Council Report to Governor Rick Perry Summary: During the 80th Texas State Legislative Session, Governor Perry requested that the Texas Legislature appropriate $100 million to support border security operations along the 1,254 miles of Texas/Mexico Border. The 80th Texas State Legislature allocated $110 million for border security and created the Border Security Council through Senate Bill 11. The Council was formed to make recommendations to the Governor on reporting requirements, performance standards and audit measures for the use of state funds appropriated for border security, and to advise the Governor on the allocation of discretionary state homeland security funds. The Border Security Council held a series of five public hearings in the fall of 2007 and received testimony from business owners, law enforcement officers, local elected officials and private citizens. Throughout their five public hearings and three open meetings, the Border Security Council found the following: General Findings: Powerful and ruthless Mexican crime cartels dominate the U.S. drug and human smuggling business, and they use former military commandos and transnational gangs to support their operations on both sides of the border. The citizens who live in the smuggling corridors along the border suffer the daily consequences of smuggling-related violence, burglary, vandalism, and trespassing. Drug and human smuggling organizations victimize illegal aliens in search of economic opportunities in the U.S. A porous Texas/Mexico border threatens every region in the state and the nation. An unsecured border provides potential terrorists and their supporters an opportunity into enter the U.S. undetected. The federal government has not yet sufficiently staffed and equipped the Border Patrol to secure the Texas/Mexico border between the ports of entry. Border Security operations require substantial coordination, hard work and sacrifice by dedicated local and state law enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection and other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. The Council found that an exceptional level of coordination and cooperation among the local, state, and federal law enforcement community is essential for success. The federal government has not sufficiently staffed and equipped the Office of Field Operations at the ports of entry to prevent smuggling at the ports of entry, nor have they provided for the secure and efficient movement of people and commodities to and from Mexico. Until the federal government is able to secure the border, the State of Texas has an obligation to work closely with its local and federal partners to acquire and maintain operational control of the Texas/Mexico border. The Texas Border Security Strategy established by Governor Perry in February 2006, has been successful in reducing crime and enhancing border security. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Border Security Council, 2008. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2011 at: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/Border-Security-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 121497 Keywords: Border Security (Texas/Mexico)CartelsDrug TraffickingIllegal AliensSmuggling |
Author: Shepherd, Chris R. Title: Elephant and Ivory Trade in Myanmar Summary: Myanmar has been a Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) since 1997. Illegal trade in ivory and other Asian Elephant Elephas maximus products remains widespread, especially in markets along Myanmar’s international borders. In 2006, TRAFFIC surveyed 14 markets in Myanmar and three border markets in Thailand and China, and found some 9000 pieces of ivory and 16 whole tusks for sale, representing the ivory of an estimated 116 bulls. Illegal killing and capture of elephants for trade continues to be a major cause of decline for Myanmar’s wild Asian Elephant populations. Ivory and other elephant parts are routinely smuggled out of Myanmar in contravention of the Protection of Wildlife and Wild Plants and Conservation of Natural Areas Law (State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No.583/94.1994), suggesting a serious lack of law enforcement and a blatant disregard for international conventions and national laws. The fact that retail dealers openly display ivory and other elephant parts, and rarely hesitate in disclosing smuggling techniques and other illegal activities with potential buyers, further highlights that effective law enforcement is lacking. The observed and reported levels of cross-border trade indicate that neighbouring countries, especially China and Thailand, also have enforcement problems, and that illegal international trade is frequently carried out with minimal risk of detection. In addition to trade in ivory, TRAFFIC documents reports of some 250 live Asian Elephants being exported from Myanmar to neighbouring countries in the last ten years; this is mostly to supply the demand of tourist locations in neighbouring Thailand. It is important to note that no cross-border exports or imports of live elephants have been reported to CITES by either Myanmar or Thailand. Based on observations and discussions with interviewees, the capture of live elephants may be at such a rate that it is also having a negative impact on wild populations. The most significant apparent loophole in Myanmar’s legislation is the allowance of tips of tusks and tusks from government and privately-owned elephants that have died of natural causes to be sold legally. To the extent that this practice defines the current situation, it provides a ready avenue for illicit ivory to be traded under the guise of legally-acquired stocks. Dealers seem well aware of the ambiguous legislation and the potential loopholes it provides, and exploit the situation accordingly. The Government of Myanmar should increase efforts to stop the illegal trade in elephant products, especially ivory, focusing on major trade centres, including Yangon and Mandalay, and at important border markets such as Tachilek. The Government of Myanmar should likewise increase efforts to stop the illegal trade in live elephants, especially when it pertains to cross-border trade. With respect to continued domestic trade in elephants and elephant products, TRAFFIC proposes that Myanmar instigates an effective control system that complies with the requirements of CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP14). The Governments of China and Thailand should take action against the traders of illegal wildlife products along the borders with Myanmar, and work in co-operation with the Myanmar authorities to deal with illegal trade in elephants and elephant products. Based on the findings of this study, TRAFFIC makes the following recommendations: • Recognizing that international co-operation is essential to put an end to this illegal crossborder trade, Myanmar’s CITES, Customs and police authorities should be encouraged to work closely with enforcement officers in neighbouring Thailand and China, the two main consuming countries of Myanmar-sourced ivory. • With respect to both the domestic and international trade in ivory, Myanmar needs to comply with CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP14). Myanmar needs to adopt comprehensive internal legislative, regulatory, and enforcement measures. All importers, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers dealing in raw, semi-worked or worked ivory products need to be registered or licensed. Recording and inspecting procedures to enable appropriate government agencies to monitor the flow of ivory in the country by means of a compulsory trade control over raw ivory and a comprehensive reporting and enforcement system for worked ivory need to be introduced. It should be made compulsory for shops, traders, and retail outlets to inform tourist and other non-nationals that they should not purchase ivory in cases where it is illegal for them to import it into their home countries. • Myanmar needs to submit any data on the seizure of elephant products to the Elephant Trade Information System, and a comprehensive overview of trade in ivory should be prepared prior to the CITES Conference of the Parties 15 (CoP15). • Authorities at airports and other points of international entry and exit must be more vigilant to prevent ivory from being carried across Myanmar’s borders. Myanmar should ensure that staff based at these checkpoints are sufficiently trained in CITES implementation, enforcement and species/parts of species identification. • Regular monitoring by Myanmar’s law enforcement agencies of the markets in Myanmar should be carried out to identify and apprehend illegal trade participants, as well as monitor trends in the trade, as a move towards effective enforcement. • Offenders should be prosecuted, to ensure just punishment and to serve as a deterrent for repeat offenders and other dealers. • Myanmar, as a Party to CITES, must introduce and enforce Category I CITES-enabling legislation and clarify the existing national legislation on domestic ivory trade. • Greater monitoring of domestic elephant populations is needed employing microchip and tattoo-based identification/registration systems to prevent illegal cross-border elephant trade, and to assist with management of Myanmar’s wild and captive elephant populations. Details: Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia; TRAFFIC Southeast Asia, 2008. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/globalmarkets/wildlifetrade/WWFBinaryitem10999.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Burma URL: http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/globalmarkets/wildlifetrade/WWFBinaryitem10999.pdf Shelf Number: 121688 Keywords: Illegal Trade (Myanmar)IvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Martin, Esmond Title: Ivory Markets of Europe: A Survey in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK Summary: The European Union (EU) in 1989 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1990 prohibited commercial imports of raw and worked ivory. The EU allows the import of ivory antiques, defined as items manufactured prior to 1 June 1947, and raw and worked ivory can be exported from EU countries subject to the destination country issuing CITES certificates authorizing the import. The domestic trade in raw and worked ivory is legal, subject to strict EU and national regulations based primarily on European Council Regulation 338/97. This monograph reports on a survey of the ivory trade in five European countries chosen for their assumed large ivory markets: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy. The purpose of the survey was to establish a set of baseline indicators in the selected countries, such as the prices of raw tusks, numbers of ivory craftsmen and workshops, numbers of shops selling ivory items, and the retail prices of ivory items. The age of ivory items and the nationalities of the customers were also looked into to add qualitative information. Using these data, conservationists will be able to monitor and evaluate future changes in the ivory trade. The target users of this report are national government officers, non-government organizations (NGOs) involved in wildlife conservation, CITES officials, the media, and researchers. The information in this monograph assesses the effectiveness of policies, laws, and enforcement activities related to ivory trading, both nationally and internationally. The investigators, Martin and Stiles, carried out fieldwork in Europe in April, May, September and November 2004. This survey was sponsored by Save the Elephants and Care for the Wild International. The principal findings were: • Over 27,000 ivory items were seen for retail sale in 1,143 shops in 14 cities and towns. Germany and the UK had the largest numbers of ivory items, with 16,444 and 8,325 respectively, followed by France with 1,303, Spain with 621 and Italy with 461. • The retail ivory markets of Germany and the UK were larger in scale than expected, and exceeded those found in countries such as China, Japan, Cameroon and Nigeria, all of which are viewed as active ivory market countries. In addition, the UK alone had more outlets selling ivory than any of the entire regions previously surveyed by the investigators (Africa, South and South East Asia, East Asia), and the number of outlets in Germany was second only to Thailand. • The average number of worked ivory items per town/city in Europe was approximately one-third the number of those seen in Africa and Asia. • The great majority of worked ivory seen for sale in Europe was either manufactured prior to 1989 or was made more recently from raw ivory imported prior to 1989, making it in principle legal, though much of the worked ivory lacks proper documentation. • Small amounts of raw and worked ivory are smuggled from Africa into Europe, and it is probable that some of the fairly abundant East Asian worked ivory seen is also imported illegally. • Official seizures of ivory have decreased sharply from the early 1990s for France and the UK, but they have remained stable in Germany and Spain. Data for Italy are lacking. • There are few controls on the sale of worked ivory. Ivory items are commonly sold as antiques or as legal, recently-made pieces with only occasional verification by the authorities. • Germany and France were the only countries with raw ivory stockpiles. These are held mainly by craftsmen and museums, and the ivory is registered with the governments. Additional unregistered ivory is held by individuals as a legacy of the colonial period. The total raw ivory stockpile is not known for either country. • Raw tusks sold wholesale in Germany and France for USD 92/kg and USD 108/kg respectively for 5-10 kg tusks, and for USD 244/kg and USD 132/kg respectively for 15-20 kg tusks. These prices are lower than for comparable tusks in most of Asia. • In France, the only country with past and present wholesale price data, the price of tusks decreased significantly from 1989 to 2004, strongly suggesting that demand for tusks declined over this time. In the UK, the 1988 wholesale price for 5-10 kg tusks was in inflation-adjusted terms the same as the retail price in 2004, also suggesting a decline in value of wholesale raw ivory, thus a drop in demand. • France and Germany were the only countries with active ivory craftsmen. France had 46 to 51 artisans (not counting antique restorers) using ivory, and Germany had 8 to 10 ivory carvers. • In France the number of ivory craftsmen more than halved from 1974 to 2004, while the number in Germany decreased by over three-quarters from 1981 to 2004. Italy had a small number of ivory craftsmen prior to 1989, but there are none nowadays. The UK and Spain have no legal ivory craftsmen working today. • Germany consumes more than 300 kg and France 350-400 kg of raw ivory a year. The UK, Spain and Italy use virtually no raw ivory. This signals a vast decline from the several tonnes a year used in the 1970s and 1980s. • In France most ivory is used to make figurines, knife handles and jewellery; in Germany, figurines and jewellery predominate. • Presently, controls on the domestic ivory carving business, especially on stocks of tusks, satisfy CITES’ requirements in Germany and France. • The main buyers of retail ivory items in the countries surveyed were nationals of those countries, except in the UK where Americans were the most numerous and Britons were second. The second most numerous customers in each country, other than the UK, were Americans. East Asians also purchased worked ivory in Europe in small quantities. • The main elephant ivory substitute in shops in Germany and France was mammoth ivory, which was mostly imported from Russia. The carvers in Germany were the only craftsmen to work mammoth ivory, and paid middlemen USD 122-427/kg for it. In France, worked mammoth ivory was imported from China. Mammoth ivory items were rare or absent in the UK, Spain and Italy. In the European Latin countries semi-precious stones, plastic, resins and plaster were common ivory substitutes. • Vendors in Europe did not believe that the 1999 CITES ivory auctions in southern Africa for Japanese buyers had any influence on ivory market activity. Nor did they believe that the CITES approval in 2002 for a future such sale would have any market effect. • The ivory artisans and sellers in Germany believed that the demand for new ivory items will continue to decline and that there is no long-term future for ivory carving. Those in France thought that the craft could continue into the foreseeable future at a low scale, and they were actively promoting it. Vendors in the UK, Spain and Italy thought that the antique ivory market would continue, but that there was no future for new ivory. • European ivory dealers believed that the bans in their countries of imports of raw ivory would not be lifted in the near future. Details: Kingsfold, UK: Care for the Wild International; London: Save the Elephants, 2005. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://www.savetheelephants.org/files/pdf/publications/2005%20Martin%20&%20Stiles%20Ivory%20Markets%20of%20Europe.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Europe URL: http://www.savetheelephants.org/files/pdf/publications/2005%20Martin%20&%20Stiles%20Ivory%20Markets%20of%20Europe.pdf Shelf Number: 121689 Keywords: Illegal Trade (Europe)IvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Allen, Elizabeth Title: The Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and How to Tackle It Summary: This publication aims to raise awareness of the growing and evolving illicit trade in tobacco products. It is a compilation of facts and views from a wide range of sources including respected academics, private sector consultants, journalists, international enforcement organizations, government revenue authorities and industry. It defines the different aspects of illicit trade and provides information on ways of measuring its size. It analyzes the nature of the problem, its causes and consequences, and offers authorities best practice guidance on implementing anti-illicit trade strategies. Case studies are used to provide evidence of good practice and global efforts to tackle this serious problem. Details: Brussels: International Tax and Investment Center, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.iticnet.org/Public/PublicDocLanding.aspx?id=41&type=Brussels Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.iticnet.org/Public/PublicDocLanding.aspx?id=41&type=Brussels Shelf Number: 121692 Keywords: Illegal CigarettesIllegal TradeIllicit TradeSmugglingTobacco |
Author: Sakamoto, Masayuki Title: Black and Grey - Illegal Ivory in Japanese Markets - 2nd edition Summary: The second edition of ‘Black and Grey’ -Illegal Ivory in Japanese Markets, brings to the readers the fundamental failures in policies regarding ivory trade in Japan. This is an improvised version of the first edition and carries the same contents as the former. The objective of printing the second edition is to protect the endangered wild elephant species of the world by letting the policy makers and dignitaries of the 50th CITES standing committee know the exact situation in the Japanese ivory market. This report also analysis the domestic trade control of ivory in Japan with some interesting facts including smuggling of illegal ivory. Details: Tokyo: Japanese Wildlife Conservation Society, 2004. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2011 at: http://www.jwcs.org/data/Black_and_Grey_2nd_edition.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Japan URL: http://www.jwcs.org/data/Black_and_Grey_2nd_edition.pdf Shelf Number: 121746 Keywords: Illegal Trade (Japan)IvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: de Koning, Ruben Title: Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Interventions Summary: Mineral resources have played a crucial role in fuelling protracted armed conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Illegal armed groups, state forces and civilian authorities are all involved in illicit rent seeking from the mineral sector, with serious repercussions for security, human rights and development. This Policy Paper examines the the prospects for and interactions between various trade- and security-related initiatives that are aimed at demilitarizing the supply chains of key minerals. It also describes the changing context in which such initiatives operate following a series of military campaigns against illegal armed groups. Finally, it offers policy recommendations for how the Congolese Government and international actors can coordinate and strengthen their responses in order to break resource–conflict links in eastern DRC. Details: Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: SIPRI Policy Paper 27: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: Shelf Number: 121979 Keywords: Armed ConflictCriminal Violence (Congo, Democratic Republic of)Illegal TradeNatural ResourcesSmuggling |
Author: Solis Rivera, Luis Guillermo Title: Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean: Summary of Articles Summary: This document is both a summary and translation of the book Crimen Organizado en América Latina y el Caribe, which was edited by MA. Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera and PhD. Francisco Rojas Aravena. The book was developed by the General Secretariat of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO after its initials in Spanish) and the Open Society Institute (OSI). It was originally published by Editorial Catalonia and the General Secretariat of FLACSO in 2008. The book is made up of 12 essays and it has 379 pages. The essays have been written by a group of distinguished authors from different backgrounds and each one contributed in the area of his or her expertise. The 12 essays are characterized by their diversity because each of them addresses different aspects of organized crime. And even though most authors agree that the strongest manifestation of organized crime is drug trafficking, they also analyze other intimately related issues such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, the smuggling of various goods, juvenile gangs, and money laundering. They also agree on some of the most important consequences of organized crime such as the corruption of many public officials, violence, insecurity, problems with democratic governance and the gradual erosion of the democratic system as a whole. The authors agree on the above aspects, but they each analyze the problem from a different perspective. Some essays address the issue from a general perspective and the perspective of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, while other essays focus on certain case studies like the current situation in Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, among others. Aside from this geographic variety, there is a methodological variety as well. Some authors focus on the definition of organized crime and other concepts that are linked with it such as public safety, democracy, corruption, and democratic governance. Other essays, however, evaluate empirical facts and current data for various countries of the region. Some authors explore the regional history, and why the particular histories of some countries have made them vulnerable to organized crime. Others reflect mainly on the current situation and search for answers to this serious problem. What they have in common is that, both from a past or present perspective, they analyze organized crime in its entire context and how the multiple economic, social, political, and cultural structural deficiencies have made Latin America prone to these criminal activities. This book provides solutions for the problem such as the need to strengthen international cooperation, transparency and governance, participation of civil society, and the importance of not attacking violence with violence, but concentrating on solving the structural and systemic problems. In sum, it analyzes organized crime from an integral and multidimensional perspective. Details: San Jose, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 2009. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 27, 2011 at: http://www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Organized_Crime.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.flacso.org/uploads/media/Organized_Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 122180 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGangsHuman TraffickingOrganized Crime (Latin America and Caribbean)SmugglingViolent Crime |
Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Confronting the Triple Threats Summary: West Africa’s relative stability following a period of violent and protracted conflicts in the 1990s is under increasing attack from a range of existing and emerging threats. The emergence or in some cases re-emergence of certain trends, namely armed sub-state groups, small arms flows and the narcotics trade could erode the stability that the region currently enjoys. Despite progress in consolidating democracy over the past two decades, a series of recent military coups has raised questions about the state of the democratic structures that are currently in place. More generally, much of the region is still waiting for a ‘democratic dividend’: despite the return to civilian rule and holding of periodic elections, the social and economic well being of the vast majority of people in the sub-region remain dire. The near simultaneous assassination’s of President Joao Bernado Vieira of Guinea Bissau and the country’s Chief of Staff, General Tagme Na Waie in 2008 was a glaring reminder of West Africa’s troubled past. Although a military takeover in Guinea (Conakry) was foreseen if and when the oft expected death of its long-term leader happened, the occurrence of a coup d’etat in December 2008, against the inept and incompetent regime following the death of President Lansana Conté, was nonetheless an unsettling development. There is no doubt that the re-emergence of coup d’etats is a manifestation of the weaknesses of the democratic systems that have been established; highlighting the need to ensure that democracy transcends the holding of periodic elections. At the heart of the problem is the growing abuse of power by civilian authorities. For instance, the issue of term limits has proved to be contentious as several civilians Heads of State have attempted to change their national constitutions to prolong their stay in power often in defiance of public opinion. Recent attempts by Niger’s President, Mamadu Tandja to change the country’s constitution to allow him a third term is a glaring manifestation of this troubling pattern. Meanwhile, the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliated groups, primarily in the Sahel constitutes a new form of transnational threat with wider global consequences. The activities of groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb pose serious security threats to countries in the Sahel and beyond. Organized crime is also running rampant in the region. Outsiders find it hard to distinguish between criminal groups that are engaged in smuggling contraband items including hard drugs, groups with terrorist links and those with a political agenda. Establishing the differences between these groups is one of the hardest challenges confronting national, regional and international actors in their efforts to combat the multiple threats to stability in West Africa. These developments, coming against the backdrop of the current global economic and financial crisis has placed tremendous pressure on national governments as they struggle to cope with the dire effects of the crises and responding to these threats. The challenges are compounded by the shifting priorities of donor countries, some of whom have been forced to scale back their assistance due to the impact of the financial meltdown on their national budgets. It is against this backdrop that this paper addresses three critical transnational challenges, referred to as the “triple threats” confronting West Africa: governance, drug trafficking and small arms and light weapons (SALW). The combined effect of these threats could undermine the security and stability of the entire sub-region. The paper argues that understanding the broad dynamics and impacts of poor governance, the proliferation of SALW and drug trafficking is critical to maintaining regional stability as a whole. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2009. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2011 at: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/conflict/docs/bah_ecowas.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/conflict/docs/bah_ecowas.pdf Shelf Number: 122576 Keywords: ContrabandDrug Trafficking (West Africa)Organized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection Summary: BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-893: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Shelf Number: 122673 Keywords: Cellular TelephonesCorrectional FacilitiesPrison ContrabandPrison SecurityPrisonersRisk ManagementSmuggling |
Author: National Gang Intelligence Center Title: 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends Summary: According to the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment released by the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), approximately 1.4 million gang members belonging to more than 33,000 gangs were criminally active in the U.S. as of April, 2011. The assessment was developed through analysis of available federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and corrections agency information; 2010 NDIC National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS) data; and verified open source information. "Gangs continue to expand, evolve, and become more violent. The FBI, along with its federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, strives to disrupt and prevent their criminal activities and seek justice for innocent victims of their crimes," said Assistant Director Kevin Perkins, FBI Criminal Investigative Division. Other key findings are as follows: - Gangs are responsible for an average of 48 percent of violent crime in most jurisdictions and up to 90 percent in several others, according to NGIC analysis. - Gangs are increasingly engaging in non-traditional gang-related crime such as alien smuggling, human trafficking, and prostitution. - Gangs are also engaging in white-collar crime such as counterfeiting, identity theft, and mortgage fraud. - Gangs are becoming increasingly adaptable and sophisticated, employing new and advanced technology to facilitate criminal activity discreetly, enhance their criminal operations, and connect with other gang members, criminal organizations, and potential recruits nationwide and even worldwide. Details: Washington, DC: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 22, 2011 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011%20National%20Gang%20Threat%20Assessment%20%20Emerging%20Trends.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011%20National%20Gang%20Threat%20Assessment%20%20Emerging%20Trends.pdf Shelf Number: 123088 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangs (U.S.)Human TraffickingOrganized CrimeProstitutionSmuggling |
Author: Bakir, Niyazi Onur Title: An Analysis of Truck Cargo Security at Southwestern Borders and Potential Impacts of Cross-Border Trucking Services of Mexican Carriers on Terrorism Risk Exposure Summary: This report aims to assess the feasibility of Mexican truck border crossings beyond the current commercial zone os 20 miles, while maximizing the federal government's ability to deter and intercept smuggling of weaspons and nuclear materials. This assessment includes a review of inspection processes on either side of the border and security challenges faced by Mexican factories, truck-drivers and customs brokers. Details: Los Angeles: Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, University of Southern California, 2006. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report #06-003): Accessed January 23, 2012 at: http://create.usc.edu/research/54710.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://create.usc.edu/research/54710.pdf Shelf Number: 123739 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Cargo SecurityRisk Assessment, TerrorismSmuggling |
Author: Sosuh, Margaret Mansa Title: Border Security in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects Summary: The threats that confront border security exist since the creation of borders by the colonial imperial powers. Unlike the developing world, the institutions in the developed world mandated to monitor their borders are often times able to confront these threats. In most developing world as well as Ghana, adequate institutional capacity to enforce the rule at the borders is one of the main challenges that face border security. This paper has therefore examined the dynamics as it pertains to Ghana and has identified among others that the institutional challenges centre around lack of modern border infrastructure and facilities, capacity building of the agents directly involved in border security and those that lend support to apprehend and deal with suspects. Lack of public knowledge on border issues also compounds the problem. Regarding the drawbacks, the paper has suggested that the states commitment to ensuring effective border security must go beyond legislation and be exhibited in the provision of border infrastructure. Other actors involved in the security issues at the borders are also to contribute their quota to enhance the state of security at the borders. Details: Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2011. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 32: Accessed January 27, 2012 at: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/Occasional-Paper-32-Margaret.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Ghana URL: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/Occasional-Paper-32-Margaret.aspx Shelf Number: 123787 Keywords: Border Security (Ghana)SmugglingTrafficking |
Author: Addo, Prosper Title: Cross-Border Criminal Activities in West Africa: Options for Effective Responses Summary: The aim of this paper is to explore particular cross-border crimes in West Africa, and recommend options for effective responses. In doing this, it seeks to (a) identify and discuss the different categories of cross-border crime; (b) examine the actors involved in these crimes and their modes of operation; (c) review efforts aimed at curbing cross-border criminal activities by looking at levels of staate collaborative processes and regulatory frameworks; and finally (d) recommend effective options for government and civil society action on the issue. Details: Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2006. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: KAIPTC Paper No. 12: Accessed January 27, 2012 at: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/no_12.aspx Year: 2006 Country: Africa URL: http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/no_12.aspx Shelf Number: 123788 Keywords: Border Security (West Africa)SmugglingTrafficking |
Author: Sweeting, Jeff Title: Anti-Contraband Policy Measures: Evidence for Better Practice Summary: Tobacco taxation has been used in many jurisdictions as a policy measure to discourage smoking. The effectiveness of taxation strategies can be undermined by widespread availability of tobacco products. This knowledge synthesis presents information on a wide-range of tobacco anti-contraband measures, in an effort to ascertain the relative effectiveness of various policy measures for addressing contraband in Canada and around the world. This report is based on a comprehensive literature search, a series of key informant interviews, and four Expert Focus Panels with participants from Canada, the United States and several European jurisdictions. This paper identifies and defines the different forms of contraband tobacco, including casual bootlegging, organized international smuggling, illicit manufacturing, tax-avoidance from duty-free sources, and counterfeit cigarettes. The effectiveness of ten anti-contraband policy measures are explored: licensing, tax-markings/stamping, tracking and tracing, record-keeping/control measures, enhanced enforcement, export taxation, tax harmonization, tax agreements/compacts, legally binding agreements with the tobacco industry and memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and public awareness campaigns. Analysis suggests that both type of contraband and means of distribution influence the effectiveness of different policies and the unintended consequences of action. For example, policy measures that were effective for legally manufactured, but cross-border smuggled cigarettes in the 1990s are less effective for illicitly manufactured and counterfeit cigarettes that dominate contraband activity today in many countries. Case studies of Brazil, Australia and Canada indicate that while contraband sources often emerge domestically, given the ease of transport and manufacture, sources can be easily displaced to neighboring or overseas jurisdictions. Inter-agency cooperation (both domestic and international) emerges as a vital component of all successful anti-contraband strategies. The dynamic nature of contraband supply requires a comprehensive approach that focuses on both immediate and future threats. Policies designed to ensure contraband tobacco products do not appear in the legitimate retail sector (such as tax-paid markings, licensing, record-keeping) and measures to ensure that counterfeit products are easily identified (such as enhanced taxation stamps) are vital resources. Adequate investment in enforcement is critical to the success of anti-contraband measures. Ontario Tobacco Research Unit 2 Given the global scope of the phenomenon, greater international cooperation and information sharing is paramount. Obstacles and potential solutions to implementing various anti-contraband measures are examined from the unique perspective of Canadian First Nations. Very little data exists on contraband tobacco and there is almost no evaluative research on the effectiveness of anti-contraband policy measures, making study of the problem extremely challenging. Details: Toronto, ON: Ontario Tobacco Research Unit, 2009. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report Series: Accessed February 13, 2012 at: http://www.otru.org/pdf/special/special_anti_contraband_measures.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.otru.org/pdf/special/special_anti_contraband_measures.pdf Shelf Number: 124123 Keywords: Black MarketsContraband CigarettesContraband TobaccoIllegal TobaccoSmugglingTaxes |
Author: Mazzitelli, Antonio L. Title: Mexican Cartels Influence in Central America Summary: According to the US Government, over 60 percent of the cocaine intended for the US market transit through Central American. Since the early 1990’s, Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) established logistics bases both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central America, facilitating the movements of large shipments of cocaine. In establishing these routes, the DTOs took advantage of a number of local enabling factors. Among them, the preexistence of well-established smuggling networks, the weakness of law enforcement and judicial structures in most countries in the region, and the overall culture of lawless and impunity resulting from the civil conflicts that marked the paths to democracy of some of these nations. The tough campaigns launched against DTOs by the governments of Colombia and Mexico during the past eight years, coupled with the gradual evolution of both local and foreign criminal organizations (COs) involved in (but not exclusively) cocaine trafficking, seem to have further worsened the situation in Central America. Old styled DTOs and local “transportistas”1 are increasingly challenged by new criminal groups, usually emerging from the military and claiming specific territories. These new groups are exerting a capillary control over all types of criminal activity taking place in the territories under their control. The confrontation between two different criminal “cultures”-- the first, business oriented; the second one, territorial oriented-- constitutes a serious threat not only to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation of balanced democratic rule in the region. Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central American, if left unchecked. Responses by national institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have to privilege investments in the areas of financial investigations, specialized prosecution and international cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In combatting COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment of local police corps that would then be capable of controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat, its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial international cooperation (both investigative and judicial) that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the use of common investigative instruments and harmonized procedures. Details: Miami, Florida: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Applied Research Center, Florida International University, 2011. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Central America URL: Shelf Number: 124217 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffikcingMexicoOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Kego, Walter Title: Russian Organized Crime: Recent Trends in the Baltic Sea Region Summary: A new criminal landscape is emerging in Europe. A key factor behind the dramatically increasing crime levels is Russian organized crime. While these groups are often comprised of Russians, they are not based solely on eth-nicity, often members are also from former Soviet repub-lics. According to Europol, these groups are among the most dangerous criminal groups operating in Europe to-day. They are involved in every type of illegal activity and excel in exploiting new opportunities in the economic and financial sectors. They make exorbitant amounts of money from illegal activities such as money laundering, human and drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion. Their activities have grown and spread to other countries to such an extent that they pose a serious problem affect-ing all EU member states. This report documents recent trends. Details: Nacha, Sweden: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2012. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2012 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_kego-molcean_russian-organized-crime-recent-trends.pdf Shelf Number: 124923 Keywords: Drug TraffickingExtortionMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Europe)Russian Organized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Mulliken, Teresa A. Title: South Africa's Trade in African Grey Parrots Summary: South Africa has long been perceived as a major player in the international wild bird trade and, there have been allegations that the country serves as a base for smuggling operations involving native and protected species. Concerned with ongoing rumours of illegal trade, and recognising that little actual research on South Africa's bird trade had been conducted, TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa initiated a comprehensive study in mid-1993. Research was completed in early 1994, with the results of TRAFFIC's bird trade study to be made available in 1995. During its examination of the larger trade, TRAFFIC paid particular attention to those bird species imported to South Africa in the greatest numbers. African Grey Parrots, popular as cage-birds in Europe, North America and Asia as well as South Africa, topped the list. This report documents the scale of South Africa's trade in African Grey Parrots, analyses existing trade controls, captive breeding and domestic market dynamics, and provides recommendations on means to more effectively control the trade in the future. Recognising the government institutions and policy are currently undergoing profound transitions in South Africa, some of the information contained in this report may have changed since the research was conducted. In particular, it needs to be noted at the outset that South Africa comprised four provinces and 10 so-called homelands, four of which regarded by the South African Government as independent, when this study commenced. Since then, the Republic of South Africa has reshaped and now comprises nine regions, each with its own conservation authority. Consequently, readers need to bear in mind that any reference to the Cape, Natal, Orange Free States and/or Transvaal provinces in this report refers to the geographical and political entities that existed in 1993. Regardless of the recent changes, it is hoped that the findings of this study will serve as a useful tool to inform and guide the government, conservationists, bird breeders and others who have an interest in ensuring that South Africa is a positive force for the conservation of African Grey Parrots and other wildlife species in trade. Details: Johannesburg, South Africa: TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, 1995. 44p. Source: A Traffic East/Southern Africa Report: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2012 at http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_birds9.pdf Year: 1995 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic_species_birds9.pdf Shelf Number: 125081 Keywords: Illegal Wildlife Trade, Birds (South Africa)SmugglingTransnational CrimeWildlife Crime (South Africa) |
Author: Goddard, Terry Title: How to Fix a Broken Border. A Three-Part Series Summary: If the United States wants effective border security, then more effective law‐enforcement measures must be taken. The first step is to identify the right target: the increasingly sophisticated smuggling organizations known as the “cartels.” By attacking the money laundering which is the life blood of the cartels, and making the bi‐national criminal investigation and prosecution of cartel bosses a priority, the border can be made significantly more secure. In the process, the violence in Mexico and the smuggling of drugs and people into the United States will be reduced. But this requires a unified focus, with state and federal law‐enforcement agencies cooperating to target organized criminal activity rather than economic migrants. As described in the How to Fix a Broken Border series of papers, written by former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard, an effective border‐enforcement strategy must do the following: Adopt a Coordinated, Multi‐dimensional, Bi‐national Approach • We must stop compartmentalizing border objectives by illegal activity. Current agency efforts are incorrectly focused on stopping particular kinds of contraband. But a successful effort cannot be about unauthorized immigrants alone (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), or drugs alone (Drug Enforcement Agency), or guns alone (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). It must address, disrupt, and destroy the total business of the cartels. • We need a comprehensive, bi‐national, border‐wide strategy that includes federal authorities and Mexican law enforcement, as well as state and local police. Target Cartel Money • A more effective border‐enforcement strategy starts with the money. Billions of dollars in illegal revenue from the sale of drugs and other contraband flows into cartel pocketbooks each year. This revenue crosses the border, from the United States into Mexico, by many means, ranging from bulk cash shipments and wire transfers to funnel bank accounts and stored value devices. • Any serious border defense must go after the cartel’s money, but that is not happening. U.S. Treasury Department officials who observe and regulate the international movement of currency remain unwilling or unable to go after money laundering across the Mexican border. • Generally speaking, the failures of the anti‐money laundering effort are not because of inadequate statutes, but a failure of enforcement. Again and again, huge amounts of funds flowing illegally out of this country could be stopped if financial institutions and government agencies focused on the problem and aggressively policed unlawful or questionable behavior. • Current federal law limits the circumstances under which prosecutors can seize the cash they believe to be part of a criminal scheme. In contrast, Arizona law makes it far easier to hold suspected funds pending further examination of their source. Expanding federal authority, with appropriate safeguards, would enhance anti‐money laundering efforts. Close Money‐Laundering Loopholes • The cross‐border movement of “stored value” devices is a particularly critical problem. These innocent‐looking plastic cards can contain thousands if not millions of dollars and are not covered by any currency disclosure requirements at the border. Under U.S. law, no traveler may take over $10,000 in cash or cash equivalents, called “monetary instruments,” into or out of the United States without declaring that money at the border. However, stored value devices are not listed as monetary instruments or otherwise subject to declaration at the border, even though they could contain many times the $10,000 disclosure threshold. This loophole, clearly identified by federal authorities over five years ago, provides smugglers with a massive opportunity to evade anti‐money laundering security at the border. • The U.S. government must enforce existing anti‐money laundering provisions, and quickly close existing loopholes, to stop (or at least slow down) the cash flowing to the cartels. Until government agencies, especially Treasury, get more serious about cutting off the illegal international flow of funds, we can never say we have a “secure” border. Go After Cartel Bosses • Current law‐enforcement efforts primarily target low‐level subcontractors for the cartels. • This country must focus on the arrest and incarceration of cartel leaders. We need to send a clear message that it will be extremely hazardous for anyone to take a fallen leader’s place. • For example, the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of Chapo Guzman, the notorious leader of the Sinaloa cartel, would significantly boost our border‐enforcement efforts. • Ultimately, going after the cartel bosses will require federal leadership and close cooperation with the law enforcement of Mexico. The lack of bi‐national coordination, in effect, provides cartel leaders a sanctuary south of the border. Protect Ports of Entry • One of the consequences of the hysteria about border security is the buildup of the Border Patrol at the expense of customs enforcement. With the de‐emphasis on customs inspections, more contraband gets through the ports. • By appearing tough—making fortification of the border with additional Border Patrol the top priority, while deemphasizing the ports of entry—it is now easier for the criminals to come through our front door. • Most of the criminal activity has shifted to the border crossings, not the places in between. We need more resources for inspections at ports of entry. If this country wants to stop smuggling, we must take a broader and more analytical approach to what motivates the smugglers—and the means by which they illegally move drugs, money, guns, and people in such large volumes with such impunity. Going after the contraband product or smuggled people, as this country has been doing for years, is destined to be an endless chase. The cartels will just regroup and continue operations, learning from their mistakes. If we are serious about stopping the threat on the border, we have to dismantle the criminal organizations that carry the contraband and take away the tools that make them so effective. Anything less will fail. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 3 parts Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2012 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series Shelf Number: 125429 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Bagrosky, Michael Patrick Title: The Triple Border Area: A Re-Conceptualization of the Problem and U.S. Policy Summary: The Triple Border Area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay is major hub for international crime that generates billions of dollars annually and is the most important center for financing Islamic terrorism outside the Middle East. The primary criminal activities in the TBA are smuggling and money laundering. The proprietors of these illicit acts include local opportunists, multinational criminal organizations and Middle Eastern terrorist fundraisers. The first argument of this thesis is that the current concept, or view, of the TBA has been too fragmented. There are several different models and theories that address parts of this phenomenon, however, there is no single model that describes how the TBA works and no complete theory that attempts to explain the existence of this phenomenon. The second argument of this thesis is that the U.S.'s policy has been too narrow and the result of this narrowness has contributed to the perpetuation of crime in the TBA. To resolve this problem there needs to be a re-conceptualization of the TBA and U.S. policy. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2009. 185p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 24, 2012 at: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553250 Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553250 Shelf Number: 125748 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized Crime (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay)SmugglingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Gabriel, Grace G. Title: Making a Killing: A 2011 Survey of Ivory Markets in China Summary: An unprecedented surge in ivory seizures occurred in 2011. Media reported that 5,259 elephant tusks were seized worldwide in that year alone, representing the lives of at least 2,629 elephants. In spite of the government’s efforts to regulate the ivory trade, China continues to be the world’s main recipient of smuggled ivory. In 2004 China introduced an ivory product registration and certification system to control the domestic ivory market and to meet the conditions required by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) for the purchase of stockpiled ivory from some African countries. In July 2008, the CITES Standing Committee approved of China as a trading partner for the second so-called “one-off ” sale of ivory from Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. IFAW has been investigating ivory markets in Asia for the past ten years. Recently we initiated our fifth survey of ivory markets in China. This survey was conducted two and half years after the 62 tonnes of ivory China bought at the CITES approved sale were officially imported in March 2009. The survey was conducted by local experts who both visited physical markets and monitored online marketplaces. The physical market visits were conducted in September and October 2011 in five cities along the eastern seaboard of China. Online marketplaces were monitored for one week in January 2012. In general, the survey found widespread abuse of the ivory trade control system. It became clear that illegal ivory, once smuggled to the country can be laundered freely through the legal market. The legal trade is sustaining and perpetuating a rising demand for elephant ivory. Details: Yarmouth Park, MA: International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2012. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2012 at: http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Making%20a%20Killing.pdf Year: 2012 Country: China URL: http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/Making%20a%20Killing.pdf Shelf Number: 125995 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal Ivory TradeSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Sidibé, Kalilou Title: Security Management in Northern Mali: Criminal Networks and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Summary: The three principle and intertwining security threats in the North of Mali are trafficking (drugs, arms, cigarettes, cars, etc.), rebellious uprisings and terrorist activity. Any attempts at maintaining law and order are undermined by the fragility of state structures, and the lack of equipment and infrastructure for the armed forces. These threats also weaken the socioeconomic fabric of local communities and Malian national and territorial unity. The Malian government endeavours to address these challenges by adopting and implementing security and anti-terrorism policies, as well as social and economic development programmes. External partners support the Malian government in its efforts through a variety of joint anti-terrorism and development policies aiming to strengthen the state’s operational capacity in the region. Furthermore, local communities work alongside state actors in the development and securitisation of Northern Mali by employing traditional conflict-management mechanisms (intercommunity and interclan solidarity systems). This strategy builds strong links that considerably reduce the risk of open conflict and contributes to the establishment of a multilevel shared governance system. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2012. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report Vol. 2012, No. 77: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mali URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RR77.pdf Shelf Number: 126041 Keywords: Anti-Terrorism PoliciesConflict-ManagementCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingSecuritySmuggling |
Author: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Title: Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing and Ivory Trade Summary: Illegal killing of elephants for the illegal international trade in ivory is currently a very serious threat to elephant populations in many range States and may be leading to dramatic declines in some populations, particularly in central Africa. Data from the CITES MIKE programme indicate a continuing increase in levels of illegal killing of African elephants since 2006, with 2011 displaying the highest levels since MIKE records began. Similarly, data from the ETIS show a steady increase in levels of illicit ivory trade from 2004 onwards, with a major upsurge in 2009, and 2011 emerging as the worst year ever for large ivory seizures. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2012. 29p. Source: Conference Document SC62 Doc. 46.1: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2012 at http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-46-01.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/62/E62-46-01.pdf Shelf Number: 126094 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal Ivory TradeSmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Great Britain. Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew Title: A Survey of the Orchid Trade in Thailand Summary: The report presented to the eighth meeting of the Conference of the Parties on the Review of Significant Trade in Species of Plants included in Appendix II of CITES (Doc. 8.31), included a recommendation to carry out a survey of the Thai orchid trade. In addition, it recommended that assistance be provided to the Thai Government for the protection of native orchids and the development of appropriate national CITES controls. A first step taken with respect to this recommendation was the acquisition of a computer for the Management Authority of Thailand for Plants to improve and facilitate annual reporting. The Government of Japan and TRAFFIC Southeast Asia funded this project. Thailand is the world’s major producer of orchids for international trade. Commercial orchid production is well established within the country, with nurseries propagating a range of native and non-native species. At the same time however, Thailand exports a significant quantity of wild orchids, collected within the country. The present project was developed in close consultation between the CITES Secretariat, the CITES Management Authority of Thailand (MA, Thailand) and the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, UK (RBG Kew) - the CITES Scientific Authority for Plants of the United Kingdom. The resulting project proposal was approved by the ninth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, the CITES Standing Committee and supported by the CITES Plants Committee. Details: London: Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 1999. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/studies/orchids_thailand.pdf Year: 1999 Country: Thailand URL: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/pdf/studies/orchids_thailand.pdf Shelf Number: 126583 Keywords: Illegal Wildlife TradeOrchids (Thailand)SmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute Title: Orchids Trade Study - Laos 2009 Summary: The export of wild and/or semi-cultivated orchids, in any form or otherwise semi-processed, is now illegal in Lao PDR unless CITES permits. However, there are many types of illegal activities in the orchid trade, for example, Wild Orchids are mainly exported to China for medicinal uses. For horticultural purposes, villagers or retailers sell plants directly harvested from the forest to local or foreign people without any reference to sustainable harvesting and, no CITES certification. Due to the fast economic changes in Laos, some critical gaps have emerged now concerning the sustainable use of Botanical Orchids and their conservation. This study would show the importance of the orchid harvesting and illegal trade all around the country. Details: Laos: National Agriculture and Forestry Research Institute, Lao Agriculture Database, 2009. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://lad.nafri.org.la/fulltext/2239-0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Laos URL: http://lad.nafri.org.la/fulltext/2239-0.pdf Shelf Number: 126584 Keywords: Illegal Wildlife TradeOrchids (Laos)SmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Reinstating the Duty-Free Trade at Bulgarian Land Borders: Potential Setback in the Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption Summary: Since the early 1990s the duty-free shops along Bulgaria’s land-border crossings were used as a channel for illegal import of excise goods (cigarettes, alcohol and petrol). With the increase of excise and VAT taxes in the second-half of the 1990s, the risk of alcohol and cigarettes smuggling increased rapidly. The duty-free shops gradually evolved into one of the main channels for the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel. At that period, duty free operators existed without a legal regulation but only with a licensing permit from the Minister of Finance. The smuggling was tacitly tolerated from the highest political level. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2012. 4p. Source: CSD Policy Brief No. 32: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2012 at http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861 Year: 2012 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=20861 Shelf Number: 127105 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityCorruptionOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Permal, Sumathy Title: Safe Waters: Malaysia’s Response to Enhancing Security in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Domain Summary: Europe and Asia share a long history of multilateral and bilateral relations. Both regions have many things in common including political, economic and cultural ties which have always been closely interlinked. Despite these long-standing relations, new challenges are currently emerging. Maritime security issues such as piracy, cross-border illegal activities and threats emanating from non state actors are bound to pose challenges to the maritime security environment. Malaysia has bilateral and tri-lateral cooperation mechanisms in place to address these challenges, although stronger initiatives along these lines with the EU are yet to materialise. The same can be said of cooperation between the EU and Asia on this issue, and advancing efforts on maritime security in the region and beyond where Malaysia’s interests are at stake require the development of a comprehensive security framework for Europe and Asia. Maritime piracy is a highly sophisticated crime involving all the activities of legitimate company operations although its profits also underwrite other illegal activities such as human trafficking. As with challenges facing other areas of maritime security, there has been scant cooperation between the EU and Asia on addressing this scourge. This study aims to propose links through comprehensive country studies that would bring the EU and Asia closer together in this area by addressing maritime security challenges in the Southeast Asia region with specific attention to issues affecting Malaysia. Details: Kuala Lumpur Malaysia: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper: Accessed June 4, 2013 at: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Year: 2012 Country: Malaysia URL: http://www.eu-asia.eu/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/KAS_Files/documents/Paper_Permal.pdf&t=1370440410&hash=de2d3586ef8d80f7905acda873625de38236203b Shelf Number: 128933 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingMaritime Crime (Malaysia)Maritime SecurityPirates/PiracyRobberySmuggling |
Author: Howard, Russell D. Title: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? Summary: In a globalized and increasingly interconnected world, the transfer of information, expertise, and relationships are becoming more complex and more commonplace. The interconnectedness of criminal organizations that span not only countries but across regions of the globe is troubling. However, more troubling is the possibility of the linking of transnational criminal organizations with insurgent and terrorist organizations as addressed in this work by Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard and Ms. Colleen Traughber. The radical ideologies propagating politically motivated violence now have the opportunity to leverage and participate in traditionally criminal enterprises. This melding of form and function provides criminals with new networks and violent extremists with new funding sources and potential smuggling opportunities. General Howard and Ms. Traughber delve into the nexus between violent extremist elements and transnational criminal elements by first clarifying whether a real problem exists, and if so, what is the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in confronting it. The authors bring rigor to the subject matter by dissecting the issue of intention and opportunities of criminal organization and violent extremists. The question is confounded by the authors who note the wide variance in the motivations and opportunities of both different criminal organizations and extremist organizations. What the authors do make clear is that the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and contraband (HWDC) is a natural way for the criminals and extremists to cooperate. To bring the issue into focus, the authors systematically examine case studies dealing with the nexus between specific organizations and HWDC trafficking opportunities. Human trafficking in Europe and the former Soviet Union; weapons trafficking in the Far East, Asia, and South America for money; the narcotics trade by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia; Hezbollah and Kurdistan Workers' Party, as well as contraband smuggling of cigarettes, are all used to examine the extremist/criminal nexus. The connections become clear as the authors discuss each of the HWDC issues within the nexus; what is also clear is that often the nexus is a simple marriage of convenience. General Howard and Ms. Traughber transition from the vignettes to how this nexus will impact SOF and interagency partners. Most importantly, the authors recognized a need for SOF to expand their mission set, and authorities to more appropriately address criminality in support of extremist groups. The authors identify issues for SOF including the traditional delineation between law enforcement activities and military activities. The findings, therefore, make a case that as SOF move into the future and are required to confront the nexus between extremists and criminals, a new definition and some deep thought need to be given to expanding SOF roles and authorities. Details: MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 13-6: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 131881 Keywords: Cigarette SmugglingExtremist GroupsHuman TraffickingSmugglingTerrorismWeapons Smuggling |
Author: Kartas, Moncef Title: On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border Summary: Tunisia, Libya, and much of the Arab world are in the midst of political and social upheaval widely known as the 'Arab Spring-. Thus far, the tidal wave of change that began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 December 2010 has led to the end of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year dictatorship and to the fall of fellow dictator Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while also setting off government transformations and conflict across the region. The revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have not only changed the political landscapes in both countries, but also affected the informal networks and ties that have long characterized the shared border region of the two nations: the Jefara. Indeed, the revolution in each country has profoundly affected the other and will probably continue to do so. With this understanding, this report investigates how the Libyan armed conflict and its aftermath have affected the security situation in Tunisia, particularly in light of the circulation of firearms and infiltrations by armed groups. As the circulation of Libyan small arms and light weapons in Tunisia cannot be adequately understood without a closer look at the tribal structures behind informal trade and trafficking networks in the border region, this report examines how the Libyan revolution affected such structures in the Jefara. This Working Paper presents several key findings: - Despite the weakening of the Tunisian security apparatus and the ongoing effects of the armed conflict in Libya, the use of firearms connected to crime and political violence has remained relatively low in Tunisia. Even in light of recent assassinations of two prominent leftist politicians and regular armed clashes between violent extremists, the military, and security forces on the AlgerianTunisian border, the use of firearms remains the exception rather than the rule. - In Tunisia, firearms trafficking currently exists in the form of small-scale smuggling. However, larger smuggling operations have been discovered and tied to Algeria-based violent extremist networks-such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-which have infiltrated the country. - Since the 1980s, tribal cartels have been in control of informal trade and trafficking in the Jefara. Their continued control rests on the cartels' strategic stance, informal agreements with the government, and their ability to withstand new, Libya-based competitors (both tribal and militia-based). Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of international and Development Studies, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper no. 17: Accessed April 19, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP17-Tunisia-On-the-Edge.pdf Shelf Number: 132077 Keywords: Armed ConflictArms TraffickingBorder SecurityCriminal NetworksExtremistsGun-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Riccardi, Michele Title: The Theft of Medicines from Italian Hospitals Summary: Along with counterfeiting, theft of medicines is emerging as the new frontier of pharmaceutical crime. In Italy between 2006 and 2013 one hospital out of ten has registered thefts of pharmaceuticals, suffering, on average, an economic loss of about 330 thousands euro each episode. This report represents the first study on this booming but almost unknown criminal phenomenon. In particular it carries out: - An exploration of the background behind pharmaceutical theft and of the drivers that influence the demand and the supply of stolen medicines; - An analysis, based on cases reported by media, of thefts of medicines from Italian hospitals between 2006 and 2013 Details: Milan, IT: Transcrime, 2014. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/the-theft-of-medicines-from-italian-hospitals/ Year: 2014 Country: Italy URL: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/the-theft-of-medicines-from-italian-hospitals/ Shelf Number: 132812 Keywords: HospitalsIllicit TraffickingMedicinePharmaceutical Crime (Italy)Pharmaceutical IndustrySmugglingTheft |
Author: KPMG Title: Illicit Tobacco in Australia Summary: For the first time since the implementation of Australia's plain packaging experiment we now have hard data to replace the anecdotes and predictions about its true impact, and the data show that since the introduction of this policy the black market has grown while consumption of tobacco overall has not declined. This report shows that smugglers and counterfeiters have been the big winners in Australia since the implementation of plain packaging at a great loss to the treasury. In less than a year, consumption of illegal, branded cigarettes, some of which now enjoy higher market share than legal brands in Australia, has increased by 154 percent. As a result, the government has lost up to AUD1.0 billion in tax revenue, while the criminal gangs behind this activity have lined their pockets. PMI supports reasonable regulation, but we believe governments have a responsibility to ensure the laws they pass meet their stated goals, uphold the rule of law, are evaluated based on objective standards and do not lead to negative consequences, such as boosting the illegal market at the expense of legitimate manufacturers and retailers. As studies quantifying actual changes in behavior and the marketplace since the introduction of plain packaging continue to come out of Australia, it is our hope that this evidence will not be ignored. Details: London: KPMG, 2014. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: https://www.imperial-tobacco.com/assets/files/cms/KPMG_FY2013_Illicit_Trade_Report___FINAL___11_April_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: https://www.imperial-tobacco.com/assets/files/cms/KPMG_FY2013_Illicit_Trade_Report___FINAL___11_April_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 132880 Keywords: CounterfeitingIllegal MarketsIllegal Tobacco (Australia)Illicit TobaccoSmugglingTax Evasion |
Author: Lallerstedt, Karl Title: Illicit Trade Flows: How to deal with the neglected economic and security threat Summary: Illicit trade flows generate massive costs for the EU, yet the countermeasures have been inadequate. A shortage of data, the tendency to look at different forms of illicit trade as separate phenomena, and the complexity of the problem have led to an under-prioritisation of illicit trade among policymakers. Globally, the illicit trade in products that replace those that are generally licit (such as counterfeit goods and contraband excise goods) represents the biggest monetary turnover and hurts government and corporate revenues directly. Still, it is particularly under-prioritised. Synergistic effects for smuggling different items relate to the fact that there are over one thousand international poly-crime groups operating in the EU, the same smuggling routes can be used for different commodities, and the same corrupt officials or purveyors of false documentation can deliver their services to multiple "operators". Illicit trade also makes the EU more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. It finances terrorist organisations, and well-established smuggling routes make the borders more porous. To address the problem, better data need to be generated showing its extent and impact. Taking a holistic view of the various aspects of illicit trade is important to facilitate coordination among the relevant authorities. The costs of this work represent investments which - beyond enhancing security - will generate income by boosting tax revenues, reducing crime, creating jobs and driving economic growth. Details: Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2014. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: FIIA Briefing Paper 151: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/405/illicit_trade_flows/ Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/405/illicit_trade_flows/ Shelf Number: 132970 Keywords: Economic CrimeIllegal Trade (Europe)Illicit TradeSmuggling |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America Summary: Mexico's Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian Crisis at the Line with Central America, which examines migration patterns, human trafficking and smuggling, security, and U.S. and Mexican policy at Mexico's southern border. With dozens of images, maps, statistics, and testimonies, the report not only explains what Mexico's "other border" looks like, it shows very clearly that the real humanitarian emergency is not just in shelters and detention facilities in south Texas - it runs along the entire migration route to the United States. Mexico's Other Border also outlines what is at stake for policymakers under pressure to "do something" about the current surge in migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what some in Washington allege, lax U.S. border security is not to blame for this surge. (In fact, the number of security personnel on the U.S.-Mexico border has doubled in the past eight years.) WOLA found that Mexican authorities and migrant shelters alike have seen a sharp rise in migration from Central America, including the influx of families and unaccompanied children that authorities are now struggling to manage in south Texas and elsewhere on the U.S.-Mexico border. The report documents a modest but accelerating buildup of U.S.-funded security forces and infrastructure on both sides of the Mexico-Guatemala border. In a series of recommendations, authors Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Gabriela Morales call for an approach that can ease the humanitarian crisis facing Central American migrants in transit, without the risks of a large deployment of undertrained, uncoordinated, and unaccountable military, police, intelligence, and migration forces Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2014. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Year: 2014 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wola.org/publications/mexicos_other_border Shelf Number: 133260 Keywords: Border Law EnforcementBorder Security (U.S.)Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrationSmuggling |
Author: Brazil Ministry of Justice Title: Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas Summary: Behind the scenes of the festivities surrounding Brazil's hosting of the football World Cup this summer, vulnerable Brazilians and immigrants were being trafficked into exploitation for many different purposes, including football itself. New research on trafficking in children, women and men at the Brazilian land borders identified forms of exploitation that were previously unknown to policy-makers and researchers. From the Amazon to the Iguazu Falls, a team of researchers conducted field research in the regional capitals of all eleven border states in Brazil - along a land border that is 16,886 km long, and separates Brazil from nine other South American countries and a French overseas territory. The resulting research report, Assessment of Trafficking in Persons in the Border Areas of Brazil, was launched in Portuguese in Brasilia late last year and has just been published in English and Spanish. Brazil's recent rapid economic growth, largely based on tapping into its vast natural resources, has led to situations of labour and sex trafficking for men, women and children. Both Brazilian and foreign, they are exploited at hydroelectric power plants, in mines, on plantations and on cattle ranches. Some children and adults were also identified as trafficked for exploitation in illegal activities, such as illegal logging, drug cultivation, drug trafficking and the smuggling of contraband goods. Sexual exploitation remains the most common form of trafficking identified, and affects girls, boys, young transgender women and girls, and adult women, both with and without prior experience working in the sex industry. Girls from impoverished rural families are also trafficked into wealthier families under the guise of an informal fostering system that would allow them to receive an education. This system is then abused to exploit the girls through domestic work. Boys are taken to and from Brazil with promises of success as professional footballers, but neither they nor their families receive the promised payments. A clear geographical pattern emerges from this research, which was funded by the Brazilian government and coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), headquartered in Vienna, in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Sexual exploitation was most commonly reported in the Northern border region, whereas forced labour was more commonly identified in the Centre and South Region. The report also reveals a pattern to the profiles of trafficked people; some indigenous groups, women, children and transgender women can be more vulnerable. While there may be some fear of reporting trafficking and exploitation to the authorities, many trafficked people and their families are in such a state of economic and social vulnerability that they see no viable alternative to being trafficked and exploited in order to survive. The Brazilian Minister of Justice, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, who launched the research in Brasilia in October of last year, calls trafficking an "underground" crime, because of the lack of police records. According to Cardozo, 'the research identified a permissive culture that legitimises the commission of the crime. Without numbers, it is difficult to carry out an efficient investigation and to effectively combat trafficking.' Among the recommendations ensuing from the assessment is for Brazil to develop its migration policy with a focus on providing assistance to migrants, including trafficked people, as well as to improve local service provision and public policies to ameliorate the individual, social and situational vulnerability of potential trafficking victims in the border area. Clearly, the opportunity to earn an income through some form of decent work would go a long way in preventing these situations from arising. Details: Brussels: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2013. . 270p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 11, 2014 at: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/ICMPD_General/Publications/2014/Enafron_IN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 133281 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingForced LaborHuman Trafficking (Brazil)Sexual ExploitationSmuggling |
Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O. Title: The Impact of Organised Crime on Governance in West Africa Summary: There are several types of organised criminal activities and operatives in West Africa. These activities include drug trafficking, advanced fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, money-laundering, arms manufacture, arms trafficking, and armed robbery as well as oil bunkering . Transnational organised criminal activities often involve collaboration among domestic and foreign criminal groups. Organised criminal groups infiltrate governments, businesses, political and economic systems. They undermine the effectiveness of these systems, sometimes through corruption and violence. It is imperative that enough effort is given to the understanding of the impact of organised crime on governance in West Africa. Aim and scope of study In this study, the following issues are addressed: - Variety and trends of organised crime in West Africa; - Impact of organised crime on peace, stability, development and the rule of law; - Transnational linkages of organised crime; and - Linkages between state institutions/politics and organised crime. The focus of the study is different from the prevalent approach to the subject and reports on organised crime in West Africa, which have been more concerned with drug trafficking, human trafficking and scams directed at European and North American countries. Inadequate attention has been paid to other forms of organised crime. More significantly, there has been a lack of attention to the impact of organized crime on the fragile political, economic and social systems of the region. The responses by international, regional and national actors involved in developing and implementing measures against organised crime emphasise developing the capacity of law enforcement and judicial officials to enable effective interdiction and enforce the law. However, experience over the past two decades in many parts of the world indicates that reliance on law enforcement alone may not be an effective and sustainable enough approach. A broader understanding of actors, modes of operation, networks, of the nexus between organised crime and political systems, and the impact of organised criminal activities and actors on the economies and societies of West African countries is a prerequisite for developing a comprehensive and effective response to the activities of criminal networks. Details: Abuji, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Shelf Number: 133292 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingHuman traffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (West Africa)SmugglingTobacco SmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Milliken, Tom Title: Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: As Assessment to Improve Law Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project Summary: Illegal rhino horn trade has reached the highest levels since the early 1990s, and illegal trade in ivory increased by nearly 300 percent from 1998 to 2011, according to a new report by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partner TRAFFIC. The report, Illegal trade in ivory and rhino horn: an assessment to improve law enforcement, is a key step to achieving USAID's vision to adapt and deploy a range of development tools and interventions to significantly reduce illegal wildlife trafficking. The report was prepared by the wildlife monitoring network TRAFFIC in partnership with USAID. The assessment uses robust analysis to identify capacity gaps and key intervention points in countries combating wildlife trafficking. Seizure data indicate that "the fundamental trade dynamic now lies between Africa and Asia," according to the report. In China and Thailand, elephant ivory is fashioned into jewelry and carved into other decorative items, while wealthy consumers in Vietnam use rhino horn as a drug which they mistakenly believe cure hangovers and detoxify the body. Rhinos and elephants are under serious poaching pressure throughout Africa, with even previously safe populations collapsing: Central Africa's forest elephants have been reduced by an estimated 76 percent over the past 12 years while in Tanzania's Selous Game Reserve, elephant numbers have fallen from 70,000 in 2007 to only 13,000 by late 2013. A record 1004 rhinos were poached in 2013 in South Africa alone - a stark contrast to the 13 animals poached there in 2007 before the latest crisis began. Record quantities of ivory were seized worldwide between 2011 and 2013, with an alarming increase in the frequency of large-scale ivory seizures (500 kg or more) since 2000. Preliminary data already show more large-scale ivory seizures in 2013 than in the previous 25 years. Although incomplete, 2013 raw data already represent the greatest quantity of ivory in these seizures in more than 25 years. Both rhino horn and ivory trafficking are believed to function as Asian-run, African-based operations, with the syndicates increasingly relying on sophisticated technology to run their operations. In order to disrupt and apprehend the individuals behind them, the global response needs to be equally sophisticated. "There's no single solution to addressing the poaching crisis in Africa, and while the criminals master-minding and profiting from the trafficking have gotten smarter, so too must enforcement agencies, who need to improve collaborative efforts in order to disrupt the criminal syndicates involved in this illicit trade," says Nick Ahlers, the leader of the Wildlife TRAPS Project. Rhino horn is often smuggled by air, using international airports as transit points between source countries in Africa and demand countries in Asia. Since 2009, the majority of ivory shipments have involved African seaports, increasingly coming out of East Africa. As fewer than 5 percent of export containers are examined in seaports, wildlife law enforcement relies greatly on gathering and acting on intelligence to detect illegal ivory shipments. The report recommends further developing coordinated, specialized intelligence units to disrupt organized criminal networks by identifying key individuals and financial flows and making more high level arrests. Also critically important are improved training, law enforcement technology, and monitoring judiciary processes at key locations in Africa and Asia. Details: Cambridge, UK; TRAFFIC International; Washington, DC: USAID, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: A Traffic Report: Accessed September 27, 2014 at: http://www.traffic.org/storage/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.traffic.org/storage/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf Shelf Number: 133456 Keywords: Animal PoachingCriminal NetworksIllegal TradeIvoryRhinosSmugglingWildlife CrimeWildlife Law EnforcementWildlife Trafficking |
Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband Summary: The report makes four main points that run counter to previous conceptions of crime-terror connectivity and the global illicit network. 1) Rather than operating in numerous smaller networks, the criminals and terrorists in our study are largely subsumed (98%) in a single network of 2,700 individuals with 15,000 relationships. Connectivity among actors within the illicit marketplace is relatively high. This should not be construed to say that the network is a cohesive organizational entity. Rather, the phenomenon observed and documented here is a self-organizing complex system built through social connections from the bottom up. 2) By most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers. The transnational nature of some terrorist actors allows them to link disparate criminal groups. Importantly our study does not provide evidence that terrorists are shunned by criminal actors because of their ideological motivations. 3) The conventional wisdom that explains crime-terror connectivity as a product of failed or economically poor states is challenged here. Generally speaking, connectivity between terrorists and criminals is highest in resource-rich countries that have little incentive to support substate actors (comparative advantage theory) and resource-poor countries that are incentivized to support criminal or terrorist groups (augment state capabilities theory). 4) Despite the interest surrounding big data and data science, the results of data acquisition and utilization often falls short of their potential. A growing number of data sources and tools offer an opportunity to conduct analyses addressing global challenges like the crime-terror "nexus." Advancing this agenda requires asking questions in unique ways and pursuing creative approaches and partnerships to aggregating and analyzing data. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Shelf Number: 134009 Keywords: ContrabandCriminal NetworksIllicit GoodsSmugglingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Paudel, Lekh Nath Title: The Highway Routes: Small Arms Smuggling in Eastern Nepal Summary: The Highway Routes: Small Arms Smuggling in Eastern Nepal, a new Issue Brief from the Small Arms Survey's Nepal Armed Violence Assessment project, examines various dimensions of the illicit trade in small arms in eastern Nepal, based on fieldwork conducted between December 2013 and April 2014, including over 100 interviews with representatives of law enforcement and the underworld. The Issue Brief analyses the sources of illicit small arms, the methods of smuggling and routes used, illicit trade and related activities, and the consumers and other actors involved, as well as relevant government policies. Its major findings include: ##Most firearms circulating in eastern Nepal are trafficked via the open border with India rather than the more heavily regulated frontier with China. They transit through towns and cities in the border areas to the main destinations of Kathmandu, Dharan, and Chitwan. - The trafficking of small arms in Nepal is predominantly an 'ant trade', carried out by individuals or loosely organized groups. ##Criminal elements increasingly prefer to rent rather than own illicit firearms because it reduces the likelihood of arrest. - The illicit traffic in small firearms is dominated by craft (country-made) and counterfeit guns. ##Government and police efforts to curb the trafficking of small arms and ammunition have included a range of legal and policy responses, with mixed results. 'Buy-and-bust' sting operations have succeeded in arresting and disbanding a number of smuggling rings, although some maintain that it is generally the carriers who are arrested rather than the main organizers. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/NAVA-IB4-Highway-Routes.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nepal URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/NAVA-IB4-Highway-Routes.pdf Shelf Number: 134165 Keywords: Illicit TradeIllicit Trafficking (Nepal)Organized CrimeSmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Hallaj, Omar Abdulaziz Title: The balance-sheet of conflict: criminal revenues and warlords in Syria Summary: The conflict in Syria is forging new forms of territorial control, and a political economy that is not unlike the patronage system that was previously fostered by the ruling Ba'ath party. As a result of the extended war efforts and the need for revenues to fund them, the national economy is now deeply affected by illicit activities such as trade in antiquities, oil and drugs, as well as smuggling, kidnapping, looting and extrajudicial land expropriations. Warlords and armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) must fund their military campaigns. However, at the same time, they have to balance the extraction of local revenues with the loyalty of the civilian populations they control. At stake are their reputations and their abilities to raise money from foreign donors and to perpetuate their coercive governance. This paper proposes a rough estimate of the size of the funding streams used by loyalist and rebel militias. The paper also argues that the creeds and beliefs that initiated the conflict are no longer the sole motors of violence; indeed, greed is increasingly shaping the nature of hostilities and the strategies adopted by armed groups. As a result, the framework proposed in the Geneva Communique for achieving peace in Syria is not likely to succeed alone in solving the conflict. Recent experiences in other countries suggest that transitional political arrangements for the transfer of power are failing to dislodge war profiteering. Additional approaches to enable a progressive recovery of livelihoods and the provision of local services should be considered a key part of the peacebuilding process. It is also vital to consider other factors sustaining the war economy, including international sanctions and external funding. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Syria URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135841 Keywords: Illicit TradeLootingSmugglingTerrorism OrganizationsTerrorist Financing |
Author: Otis, John Title: The FARC and Colombia's Illegal Drug Trade Summary: In 2014, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Latin America's oldest and largest guerrilla army known as the FARC, marked the 50th anniversary of the start of its war against the Colombian government. More than 220,000 people have been killed and more than five million people uprooted from their homes in the conflict, which is the last remaining guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere. However, this grim, half-century milestone coincides with peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC that began in Havana, Cuba, in November 2012. The Havana talks have advanced much farther than the three previous efforts to negotiate with the FARC and there is a growing sense that a final peace treaty is now likely. So far, the two sides have reached agreements on three of the five points on the negotiating agenda, including an accord to resolve an issue that helps explain why the conflict has lasted so long: The FARC's deep involvement in the taxation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs. On May 16, 2014, the government and the FARC signed an agreement stating that under the terms of a final peace treaty, the two sides would work in tandem to eradicate coca, the plant used to make cocaine, and to combat cocaine trafficking in areas under guerrilla control. A decade ago, Colombia supplied about 90 percent of the world's cocaine. But due to anti-drug efforts in Colombia as well as Peru's reemergence as a major producer, Colombia since 2011 is believed to provide less than half of the world's cocaine, according to U.S. officials. Yet drug profits continue to be a vital source of cash for the FARC, a smaller Marxist rebel group known as the National Liberation Army, or ELN, and other criminal organizations in Colombia. Massive drug profits help the FARC to buy weapons, uniforms, and supplies and to recruit fresh troops. The fight between the FARC and illegal right-wing paramilitary groups over coca fields and drug smuggling corridors has been a key factor in the conflict's extreme levels of violence, forced displacement and land grabs. When the two sides first met to discuss the drug issue in November 2013, Colombia's chief peace negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, called the illegal drug trade "the fuel that feeds the conflict." During the last round of peace talks with the government that lasted from 1999 to 2002, the FARC was at the peak of its military power thanks, in part, to a surge in drug income and made almost no effort to seriously negotiate a peace treaty. Since then, the U.S. government has provided Colombia with $9.3 billion in aid, much of which has been spent on counterinsurgency and counterdrug programs targeting the FARC. The Colombian military's successful efforts to weaken the FARC and reduce its drug income through targeting coca fields, drug laboratories, and smugglers have helped convince FARC leaders to return to the bargaining table for negotiations that hold much promise for a final peace accord. This paper will examine the FARC's long history of involvement in Colombia's illegal narcotics industry and the impact of rebel drug profits on the course of the armed conflict. It will also explore the likely impact of the drug accord reached at the peace negotiations in Cuba on efforts to extricate the FARC from the drug-trafficking equation, possible changes in Colombia's counterdrug policies, as well as the strong possibility that some FARC members will continue producing and smuggling drugs in a post-conflict scenario. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Shelf Number: 136289 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceRevolutionary Armed Forced of ColombiaSmuggling |
Author: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Title: A Comprehensive Approach to Combating Illicit Trafficking Summary: Responsible for more than $300 billion per year in trade and comprising a wide variety of products shipped over a complex web of interlocking transport routes, illicit trafficking constitutes a major security challenge that no single country or anti-trafficking organization could possibly manage alone. Indeed, the cross-border and transnational nature of the trade, combined with its diversity and the increasing agility and technological sophistication of the traffickers involved, demands a multilateral and multidimensional response from those who hope to combat it. An effective response, moreover, will require much closer coordination between the public and private sectors than exists today, as well as sturdier partnerships between and among the many national, regional, and international agencies - including a host of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) - now charged with responsibility for one or another dimension of the illicit trafficking challenge. Indeed, pooling the expertise and resources of all the relevant stakeholders in support of an overarching comprehensive approach that leverages their collective capabilities is arguably the only way to make As for the specifics of a comprehensive approach, it must address several underlying characteristics of the current trafficking problem that are not widely understood and remain difficult to manage. First, in addition to the multi-product and inter-regional aspects of illicit trafficking noted above, a comprehensive approach must come to grips with the way in which many legal activities - including those performed by white-collar, middle-class collaborators - are intertwined with and help to facilitate illegal activities in the trafficking realm. Second, such an approach must also understand (and target) the many linkages that exist between and among the various trafficking streams for the shipment of drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW), chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, counterfeit products, laundered money, and human beings, as well as the way in which control over the transit route for one type of commodity may allow traffickers to control the flow of other goods, both legal and illegal, that pass along the same route. Third, and on a related note, the anti-trafficking community must fully expect, and prepare for the prospect, that illicit traffickers will try to shift their shipments, if at all possible, from route to route - and from one form of transport to another - in order to avoid detection and interception. Closing off one trafficking flow, therefore, may simply trigger the opening of a new route in a less carefully monitored part of the world. Further on this last point, in today's globalized economy, illicit traffickers are increasingly inclined to base their operations in remote and poorly governed areas, where they can conduct business relatively free of outside interference. They appear to be especially partial to what the head of the UN's Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently referred to as "geographic blind spots" - that is, largely forgotten areas in failed or failing states that are "out of government control, and too scary for investors and tourists," where radar, satellite, and other forms of surveillance are limited or nonexistent. Operating from such locations, traffickers can run fleets of ships, planes, and trucks loaded with a mix of products with little fear of disruption. Many of these areas, moreover, are burdened with large numbers of unemployed youth who are often all too willing to provide the traffickers with a local workforce that has few alternatives to make money, and is likely to remain compliant. Hence, in addition to better surveillance and interdiction capabilities, any serious effort to stem illicit trafficking must also include a development component aimed at easing (if not eradicating) the socio-economic and political vulnerabilities in "blind spot" territories that traffickers seek to exploit. As suggested above, yet another increasingly important dimension of illicit trafficking to bring under a comprehensive approach is the ever-expanding and more sophisticated use of technology by traffickers. Access to the latest technology, including satellite hook-ups, cell phones, and GPS equipment, is effectively what has empowered loose bands of poor, illiterate Somalis to capture ocean-going vessels operated and/or relied upon by the world's richest and most powerful countries. So, too, cyber crime has allowed traffickers in remote areas to steal the identities of people half a world away, while also facilitating money laundering via lax banks and/or corrupt officials. In the not too distant future, access by traffickers to the technical skills and equipment necessary to handle CBRN-related materials could easily promote a growth in the trade of these key components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Getting a better handle on the many ways in which technology is likely to be used by traffickers and their fellow travelers in the years to come, therefore, will require input from a wide array of public- and private-sector technology experts. Equally important, a public-private initiative along these lines holds the best chance of discovering how the anti-trafficking community itself can leverage technology to detect and disrupt smuggling and related crimes. There is also a need for much greater informa eater information sharing between and among anti-trafficking groups with regard to current and emerging trafficking routes, the products and services being trafficked along these routes, the number of traffickers using these routes, and the inter-relationships between and among these traffickers. Closer institutional collaboration on such matters would be particularly helpful within regions (and between adjacent regions) where illicit trafficking is well entrenched, but where intra- and inter-regional cooperation may be hampered by ethnic and sectarian rivalries, unresolved border disputes, and contrasting approaches to law enforcement. Important steps have been taken in this regard, including ongoing efforts to strengthen countersmuggling capabilities along the infamous Great Silk Road via national and IGO support for the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in Romania and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) in Kazakhstan. Similar initiatives can and should be pursued in other regions where traffickers now thrive. Details: Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/files/existing-good-practice/united-states-4 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/files/existing-good-practice/united-states-4 Shelf Number: 136363 Keywords: Human TraffickingIllegal TradeIllicit TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Janecek, Michael J. Title: Policing Iranian Sanctions: Trade, Identity, and Smuggling Networks in the Arabian Gulf Summary: There are continual debates regarding the effectiveness of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803 and 1929 as tools for limiting the Islamic Republic of Iran's goals for a nuclear program. This thesis examines the enforceability of the maritime sections of both resolutions at the police level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Arab nations along the Arabian Gulf have had long-standing maritime trade relations with Iran and the greater Indian Ocean that extend generations into history. This relationship led to the extensive merging of Arab and Persian cultures in the GCC, as well as the growth of an immigrant workforce from South Asia. With this influx of identities and nationalities, challenges were developed in enforcing both resolutions, specifically as it relates to the inspection of Iranian maritime cargo. Alongside this merging of cultures, is the growth of successful maritime drug-smuggling networks that weapons proliferators could exploit to intentionally violate UNSCR 1803 and 1929. Based on the challenges of maritime trade, cultural and national identity, as well as criminal activity, it is argued that both resolutions are an unnatural fit in the Arabian Gulf, and are therefore questionable as policy choices in the GCC countries. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2013. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Iran URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32840/13Mar_Janecek_Michael.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136483 Keywords: Drug TraffickingMaritime CrimeMaritime SecuritySmuggling |
Author: Smith, Lucy Olivia Title: Evaluation of the Costs and Impacts of Environmental Crime: CITES Trade of the Horsfieldii Tortoise Summary: Testudo horsfieldii is a tortoise and is classified as Vulnerable (VU)1 on the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List following an evaluation of its conservation status in the wild by the Tortoise and Fresh Water Turtle Specialist Group in 1996. For this reason the horsfieldii was categorized to Appendix II of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) allowing for monitored trade of the species based on quotas self-designated by Parties to the Convention in a manner meant to sustain the species in the wild in its natural range. The horsfieldii is native across Central Asia and can be found in Armenia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, northwest China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since the mid 1970s the horsfieldii has been subject to heavy trading for the global pet market. Horsfieldii are either caught in the wild or bred in captivity and exported from its range into the pet trade in predominantly Western countries. The US, Japan and Europe are the main importers of the species. While there are many turtle and tortoise species involved in the pet trade, the horsfieldii is one of the most heavily traded and illegal trade is suspected to take place. Firstly, it is likely that more specimens are traded than are actually reported in CITES trade data. Secondly, it is suspected that the improper use of CITES labels that differentiate between wild and captive bred specimens results in a much higher number of wild caught specimens existing in trade than the data reported would suggest. Finally, tortoise is naturally found in a very vast range which includes countries that are not party to CITES (e.g. Tajikistan), which opens the possibility of illegal transport and smuggling through non-party countries or countries with less stringent environmental and enforcement standards. Despite that certain patterns in trade reveal potential illegality, it is difficult to calculate the rate of extinction of the species or its monetary value as a species because there is a serious lack of reliable data. This is a common reality for many species listed in CITES and therefore is not a justifiable reason for non-inclusion in such evaluations. Unlike the elephant and rhino that are also included in the CITES valuation study of the EFFACE project, the horsfieldii is an example of the omnipresent but invisible nature of illegal wildlife trade. This case is representative of many species that face the threat of unsustainable harvest but that are less emblematic and therefore risk drifting into population decline and possible extinction without notice. The commercial harvest of horsfieldii for the pet trade is regarded by conservation biologists as the foremost threat to its survival and existence in the wild. For data, this study relied on publicly available trade data provided by CITES that indicate quotas and information on the quantity of exports and imports. Despite the many infrequencies that exist when using such data, it is possible to show how illegal trade may take place and at what scale. A significant challenge to understanding the impact of commercial trade on turtle and tortoise conservation status and that of the horsfieldii specifically, is the fact that there remains little data collection or information about their population status in the wild, which results from the fact that they are difficult to count in their vast range and also considered of lesser importance or reputation than some other flagship species (e.g. panda, rhino, elephant). The data limitation on population and replacement rate was a significant obstacle in the calculation efforts of this study to determine the rate of extinction and sustainability of the current trade. Details: Berlin, Germany: Ecologic Institute, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: This study was completed as part of the EFFACE project. Accessed August 21, 2015 at: http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE%20D3.2f%20Quantitative%20and%20monetary%20analysis%20-%20Horsfieldii%20Tortoise%20hunting.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/EFFACE%20D3.2f%20Quantitative%20and%20monetary%20analysis%20-%20Horsfieldii%20Tortoise%20hunting.pdf Shelf Number: 136515 Keywords: Endangered Species Illegal Trade SmugglingTortoise Wildlife Crime Wildlife Trade |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Financing of Organised Crime Summary: Enhancing the knowledge of the financing of organised crime is an indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to prevention and investigation. Accessing capital is a significant constraint for some criminals when they seek to become big players in illicit markets for goods and services, yet the processes and structures involved in the financial investment of criminal markets are largely under-researched. Whilst there is general information available regarding the level of financing required for a criminal group's operations in specific illicit markets - for example, the illicit drugs market is relatively well documented and there is a reasonably sound understanding of the pricing available along the entire value chain of operations, from production prices, smuggling and wholesale prices, middle-level dealing, to retail distribution, as well as with costs of the business - this is not the case with a number of other illicit markets such as organised VAT fraud, illicit excisable goods, smuggling/trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money, payment card fraud, and trafficking in stolen vehicles, etc. To enter a criminal market at the wholesale level, organised criminals may need significant financial resources including, but not restricted to, credit facilities. Their need for financing concerns every level of organized crime. However, while millions (upfront and/or on credit) may be needed to enter the cocaine market at wholesale level, participation at the retail level requires only modest resources. The same applies to manifestations of organised crime that do not require entrepreneurial characteristics and are based on predatory activities. For example, small criminal groups may need only several tens of thousands of euros to launch an international banking fraud. The entry costs for many e-crimes are insignificant. Various financial mechanisms and opportunities are available for criminal actors to fund new or existing illicit activities. However, fairly little has been done in terms of systematically analysing or targeting individuals or processes that are mainly involved in the financing of criminal structures and organised criminal activities. The financing of organised crime is the type of horizontal issue that several analyses as well as threat and strategic assessments - analyses and assessments that have been previously criticised us unreliable sources of information on organized crime - often skip, focusing instead on the proceeds of crime, criminal assets and/or money laundering. Official and informal financial services may all be used to finance organised criminal operations in one way or another. Previous research has shown that financiers are often behind the financing of large-scale trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs. Yet despite the influence of these financiers, they remain outside the scope of analysis of organised crime being done at EU level, where such information is largely omitted. Although considerable research has been conducted on the proceeds of crime and the financial management of several organised criminal activities, the financing of terrorism and money laundering, little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting individuals, structures and processes that are involved in the "preceeds" of crime, especially on crimes unconnected with the financing of terrorism. Little has also been done in terms of analysing whether criminal entrepreneurs engage in a process that disguises a legitimate source of funds that are to be used for illegal purposes, a process that has been defined as "reverse money laundering." Following these observations, a number of academics and law-enforcement officials from across Europe were contacted in order to gather information regarding the respective situations in their countries. It was established that many faced a similar situation, where some operational knowledge on the issue existed, yet (excepting the Netherlands) analytical units had not given much specific attention to it. Therefore, an interest was expressed to gather this knowledge at the EU level, as well as to exchange knowledge and experiences with partner countries where this issue has been paid more attention. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317 Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317 Shelf Number: 136598 Keywords: Human TraffickingIllegal MarketsOrganized CrimeSmugglingStolen VehiclesTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Flight Capital and Illicit Financial Flows to and from Myanmar: 1960-2013 Summary: Myanmar is the most porous economy we have studied in depth. Long isolation, trade restrictions, and attempts to regulate currency exchange rates have combined to drive a substantial part of the economy underground. Totaling the flight capital numbers indicates that Myanmar has experienced largely unregulated financial movements of nearly US$120 billion over the period (a small portion of flight capital may be licit), while total illicit flows amounted to almost US$100 billion. In 2013 alone, unregulated financial inflows totaled some US$10 billion, over 20 percent of GDP. Purely illicit inflows were on a similar scale in that year, at 17 percent of GDP. And these numbers do not include the smuggling of drugs, timber, precious stones, and other goods, transported across various routes and mountain passes to and from India and China, as indicated by a brief selection of satellite images included in the pages following. Interestingly, the greater part of what we can analyze as illicit flows have been inward, in reaction to import controls and to escape import levies. Undervalued and smuggled imports have sustained the weakened economy through years of insularity, isolation, and instability. Tax collection to GDP at seven percent is one of the lowest in the world, undermining the ability of the state to provide adequate health and education services. Corruption, according to Transparency International's Perceptions Index, places Myanmar among the bottom 20 in the world. These are extremely serious challenges for a nation just beginning, haltingly, to emerge from its shadows. Within our focus on financial transparency concerns, we recommend that Myanmar 1) make concerted efforts to adopt and enforce Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing regulations, 2) provide its Customs Department with real-time world market trade pricing data, 3) greatly improve its statistical capabilities, and 4) enhance border security and curtailment of smuggling. For this the nation will need sustained external financial and technical assistance for years to come. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Burma URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 137330 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingSmugglingTax EvasionTerrorist Financing |
Author: Spence, Caroline Title: Smuggling in early Modern France Summary: This dissertation will examine the crime of smuggling in early modern France from circa 1500 to 1789. Smuggling was extremely common in early modern Europe, but in France it was particularly widespread and often violent. Goods of every kind were smuggled in and out of the country, and especially within the provinces of the kingdom. However, little has been written in English on smuggling in early modern France. As a result, a considerable amount of the secondary sources read are in French. These sources tend to focus on one commodity or one area, yet this dissertation is a much broader examination of the topic, encompassing the entire country and several different commodities. The dissertation also required a visit to the Musee National des Douanes in Bordeaux, which has an archive containing documents relating to the national customs administration. Many of these documents were essential for my topic and period of study and have been included here. The primary argument of this dissertation is that smuggling occurred as a result of the indirect taxes that the crown levied on different commodities. The administration of the indirect taxation will be examined in chapter one. The second, third, and fourth chapters will discuss the smuggling of salt, wine, and tobacco respectively. Each chapter will begin by discussing how the taxes on these commodities caused them to be smuggled. Subsequently, the nature and methods of smuggling these goods will be examined. Chapter five will investigate who the early modern French smuggler actually was. The treatment of the tax collectors will be discussed, as well as the question of the increasing professionalisation of smuggling. The involvement of ecclesiasts, soldiers, nobles, tax collectors, women and children will be discussed. The dissertation will conclude that the fundamental cause of smuggling was the harsh fiscal regime and especially the irregular way in which taxes were levied throughout the kingdom. Details: Coventry, UK: University of Warwick, 2010. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/emforum/projects/disstheses/dissertations/spence-caroline.pdf Year: 2010 Country: France URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/emforum/projects/disstheses/dissertations/spence-caroline.pdf Shelf Number: 137857 Keywords: SmugglingStolen GoodsTax Evasion |
Author: Global Witness Title: Lords of Jade: How Southeast Asia's biggest drug lord used shell companies to become a jade kingpin. Summary: Southeast Asia's most notorious narcotics trafficker has become one of the most powerful figures in the country's corrupt, abusive jade business, a new Global Witness report reveals today. Building on Global Witness' explosive recent reporting, Lords of Jade shows how Wei Hsueh Kang controls a range of companies licensed to exploit the Hpakant jade mines in conflict-affected Kachin State. Wei is the architect of a methamphetamine epidemic that has ripped through Southeast Asia, and is the subject of sanctions and a US$2 million bounty from the US government. His network is alleged by business insiders and observers to control Yadanar Yaung Chi, a company that was depositing waste at the tailings dump in Hpakant that collapsed on 21 November, killing over a hundred people. Companies controlled by Wei Hsueh Kang were originally given jade licences by Myanmar's military dictatorship following a ceasefire deal with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the best equipped of the country's ethnic armed groups, in which Wei has played a leadership role. The US authorities announced indictments and sanctions on Wei's jade business in 2005 and 2008, but it simply shed one corporate skin and grew another. As one analyst of drugs business told Global Witness, "It's a shell game, they just changed the shell". Wei's group have used their connections with the much-feared UWSA to deter scrutiny of their activities. Described by one jade business insider as "a gangster group doing black business", they operate a form of protection racket that exerts control over at least fifty jade mines. Many insiders consider them the most powerful players in Myanmar's staggeringly lucrative jade sector. In the words of one, "If you don't use the Wa name, you cannot operate in Hpakant". The firms at the core of this group collectively posted sales of over US$100 million in jade across two official gems sales events in 2013 and 2014 but are reported to have made far more through smuggling of jade into China. While many of Wei Hsueh Kang's international business connections are believed to be in China and Hong Kong, the front man for the jade companies he controls has a close relationship with American machinery giant Caterpillar Inc., which has invited him on promotional tours of several countries. This reflects both the extent of Wei Hsueh Kang's evasion of US sanctions and the risks that international investors face in Myanmar. In the case of Caterpillar, these risks have been exacerbated by the company's apparent failure to do adequate due diligence on the owners of its dealership in Myanmar. Wei Hsueh Kang's role is a stark reminder of the toxic state of the jade trade, but Myanmar's new government does have options to start addressing it. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global anti-corruption scheme which Myanmar joined in 2014, offers one entry point for tackling the opacity of the jade business, including the specific problem of hidden company ownership. It recommends that companies in the oil gas and mining industries be required to disclose their ultimate 'beneficial' owners and Global Witness is arguing that this provision be applied to jade and other extractive industries as soon as possible. Meanwhile, US sanctions on jade and key players in the business such as Wei Hsueh Kang offer a source of leverage which can be used constructively to reinforce and provide incentives for an agenda for cleaning up the sector. Details: London: Global Witness, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/lords-jade/ Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/lords-jade/ Shelf Number: 138578 Keywords: Drug TradeNatural ResourcesPrecious MetalsSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports. GAO was asked to review TSA's oversight of airport perimeter and access control security since GAO last reported on the topic in 2009. This report examines, for airport security, (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment and security activities; analyzed relevant TSA security event data from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; obtained information from TSA and industry association officials as well as from a non-generalizable sample of 11 airports, selected based on factors such as size. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that TSA update its Risk Assessment of Airport Security, develop and implement a method for conducting a system-wide assessment of airport vulnerability, and update its National Strategy for Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-632: Accessed May 31, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677586.pdf Shelf Number: 139249 Keywords: Airport SecurityAviation SecurityDrug TraffickingRisk AssessmentSmugglingTransportation Security |
Author: KPMG Title: Illicit Tobacco in Australia. 2015 Half Year Report Summary: This bi-annual report provides an overview of the nature and dynamics of the legal and illicit tobacco markets and an independent assessment of the size of the illicit tobacco market in Australia. It is commissioned jointly by British American Tobacco Australia, Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited and Philip Morris Limited. Key highlights: - Illicit tobacco consumption declined marginally to 14.3% of total consumption in the twelve months to June 2015. This was the first decline seen since 2012 - The overall decline was driven by a significant decrease in contraband consumption, such as manufactured cigarettes - The decline in illicit tobacco consumption was partially offset by a large rise in unbranded ("Chop Chop") tobacco. Details: London: KPMG, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2015/11/illicit-tobacco-in-australia.html Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2015/11/illicit-tobacco-in-australia.html Shelf Number: 139255 Keywords: Counterfeiting Illegal Markets Illegal Tobacco (Australia) Illicit Tobacco Smuggling Tax Evasion |
Author: Bafilemba, Fidel Title: Congo's Conflict Gold Rush: Bringing Gold into the Legal Trade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Summary: A trade in illegally mined and smuggled "conflict gold" is fueling both high-level military corruption and violent rebel groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), according to a new report by the Enough Project. "Congo's Conflict Gold Rush: Bringing gold into the legal trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo," by the Enough Project's Fidel Bafilemba and Sasha Lezhnev, offers an in-depth portrait of the conflict gold supply chain, from muddy artisanal mines where gold is dug out with shovels and pick-axes, through illicit transport routes in Uganda, Burundi, and Dubai. Based on seven months of field research at mines and in regional capitals, the report provides an in-depth discussion of solutions to the conflict gold supply chain. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/April%2029%202015%20Congo%20Conflict%20Gold%20Rush%20reduced.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/April%2029%202015%20Congo%20Conflict%20Gold%20Rush%20reduced.pdf Shelf Number: 139291 Keywords: GoldIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNatural ResourcesSmuggling |
Author: Ernst & Young Title: Counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling: Growing threat to national security Summary: The report, titled, "Counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling: Growing threat to national security", highlights the drivers of financing of terrorism and how activities such as counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling have become channel for sustaining criminal and terrorist activities. It analyzes and provides insight into the links between counterfeiting, smuggling and financing of terrorism. Details: London: Ernst & Young, 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Government-and-Public-Sector-Growing-threat-to-national-security-an-analysis/$File/EY-Counterfeiting-piracy-and-smuggling-Growing-threat-to-national-security.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Government-and-Public-Sector-Growing-threat-to-national-security-an-analysis/$File/EY-Counterfeiting-piracy-and-smuggling-Growing-threat-to-national-security.pdf Shelf Number: 139366 Keywords: CounterfeitingPiracySmugglingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Tallis, Joshua Title: Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory Summary: This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative) - the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature. Details: Fife, Scotland: University of St.Andrews, 2016. 311p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 20, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Shelf Number: 139719 Keywords: Broken Windows TheoryMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPiracySmugglingTerrorism |
Author: Ochola, Gumbi Vincent Title: The effect of contraband smuggling on rehabilitation of inmates in Kenya: the case of Kamiti maximum prison Summary: The main mission of Kamiti Maximum prison is to rehabilitate its inmates in order to make good citizens once they are out of the facility. Contraband on the other hand finds their way into the prison via different means hence posing a great challenge to the process of rehabilitation. The aim of this study therefore was to find out how the contraband are smuggled into prison, why inmates use contraband and to examine the effect of contraband on inmates‟ rehabilitation. This qualitative research among 36 Prison Officers and 70 inmates examined the effect and use of contraband. It is clear that there are several routes of entry and reasons why inmates use contraband. This study has shown that the most popular routes of entry is through members of staff, during social visits and contraband thrown over perimeter walls of the prison at 25%, 19% and 17% respectively. Majority of inmates (63%) use contraband as a form of currency to make prison life more comfortable and maintain own contraband use. This study also reveals the negative effect associated with contraband use including an increase in insecurity, namely bullying, violence and withdrawal. It is essential that prisons provide adequate detoxification to reduce withdrawal symptoms and alleviate their need to import or purchase illegal drugs. Prisons must increase their efforts to reduce supply. This will reduce opportunistic use, and with it the risk of prisoners developing ‟jail habits‟ in custody. Devising a policy for tackling contraband in prison is prudent for major contribution in reducing criminal behaviour in prison as well as offences outside prisons. Finally it is essential to recognise that increased security has significant effects; it can disorganise and eliminate contraband supply routes. Details: Nairobi City, Kenya: Kenyatta University, 2015. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Year: 2015 Country: Kenya URL: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Shelf Number: 140115 Keywords: ContrabandPrison ContrabandPrisoner RehabilitationSmuggling |
Author: de Koning, Ruben Title: Striking Gold: How M23 and its Allies are Infiltrating Congo's Gold Trade Summary: The M23 rebel group has taken over a profitable part of the conflict gold trade in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC. It is using revenues from the illicit trade to benefit its leaders and supporters and fund its military campaign by building military alliances and networks with other armed groups that control territory around gold mines and by smuggling gold through Uganda and Burundi. M23 commander Sultani Makenga, who is also allegedly one of the rebels' main recruiters of child soldiers according to the U.N. Group of Experts on Congo, is at the center of the conflict gold efforts. This report documents how Makenga and his former co-commander Bosco Ntaganda have led the M23 rebels to work with local armed groups in gold-rich territories to smuggle gold to Uganda via an M23-controlled border crossing, as well as to Burundi, where it is sold internationally. Much of this conflict gold then reaches markets in the United Arab Emirates, or UAE, before going on to banks and jewelers, which together make up 80 percent of global gold demand. Gold is now the most important conflict mineral in eastern Congo, with at least 12 tons worth roughly $500 million smuggled out of the east every year. The other main sources of revenue for armed groups - the "3T minerals" of tin, tungsten, and tantalum - have been steadily reduced due to global conflict-minerals reforms spurred by the U.S. Dodd-Frank financial regulation law, but it is still relatively easy to smuggle gold. Limiting gold smuggling from eastern Congo must therefore become a priority for the international community. M23 commander Makenga is taking over a gold-smuggling network that former cocommander Bosco Ntaganda built over several years. As military leader of the rebel National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, a forerunner of M23, Ntaganda in 2011 reportedly brokered several multimillion-dollar gold deals in Goma, DRC; Kampala, Uganda; and Nairobi, Kenya, between Congolese traders and overseas buyers. In 2012, Ntaganda led the newly created M23 as it broke away from the Congolese army, in which its troops had been integrated as part of a peace deal. During his time with M23 and in the shadow of the peace talks in Kampala between Congo's government and the M23, Ntaganda facilitated the transfer of an estimated 325 kilos of gold worth $15 million to Kampala for sale, according to the U.N. experts. Ntaganda admitted to the U.N. experts that he played a role in one deal in 2011 in Goma, but he never commented on his role in other deals he allegedly brokered. In March 2013, Ntaganda surrendered to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, where he requested to transfer to the International Criminal Court, or ICC, to face charges of war crimes. Since then, Enough Project's investigations with gold-trade insiders, Congolese civil and military authorities, and members of the Congolese diaspora communities in Kampala and Bujumbura show that Makenga is taking over Ntaganda's relationships with smugglers in Uganda. Makenga has also mobilized several other military and business players loyal to former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda to create a business network entirely separate from Ntaganda, according to Enough Project investigations. To capture a greater share of the gold trade, M23 has built alliances with individuals and armed groups that control large mines in eastern Congo. These include Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi of the Nduma Defence of Congo, or NDC, armed group in Walikale territory of eastern Congo - the alleged mastermind of the mass rape of more than 300 women, children, and men at Luvungi in 2010. M23 has built ties with Justin Banaloki - whose alias is "Cobra Matata" - the armed leader who is based in Ituri District and was highlighted in the October 2013 National Geographic. M23 is also associated with Congolese army defector and militia leader Maj. Hilaire Kombi in Beni and Lubero territories, according to U.N. experts and Enough Project research. Traversing otherwise hostile ethnic and political divisions, these alliances are based partially on economic gain. Many of those who reap the greatest profits are also those most directly implicated in atrocities and crimes against humanity. On the basis of recent Enough Project investigations and past research by the U.N. Group of Experts, this report identifies three main gold exporters that the Enough Project believes are enabling M23 and associated armed groups to profit from the gold trade by either running or using official gold export companies in Uganda and Burund - all of which is in violation of the U.N. arms embargo: - Rajendra "Raju" Kumar, who currently trades through Mineral Impex Uganda and formerly ran Machanga, Ltd. - Mutoka Ruganyira, who currently operates through Ntahangwa Mining in Burundi and formerly ran Berkenrode - Madadali Sultanali Pirani, who currently runs Silver Minerals in Uganda Additionally, a major Congolese exporter has reportedly been trading gold from mines controlled by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, and other armed groups for several years, according to several U.N. Groups of Experts: - Evariste Shamamba, who currently runs Etablissement Namukaya and New CongoCom Airlines16 The international community has done very little to combat the sale of conflict gold effectively. None of the above-mentioned individuals, or the companies they currently run, face U.N., U.S., or E.U. sanctions. The only international sanctions against conflict gold companies were enacted in 2007, but the owners of the sanctioned companies immediately set up new gold-exporting businesses under different corporate names. Sanctions against the four exporters would make an important dent in the conflict gold trade, since they control a significant portion of the illicit trade. Gold exporters generally claim to purchase their gold either domestically or in countries that are not under a U.N. arms embargo. The fact that a significant part of conflict gold trade enters the formal worldwide gold trade shows an urgent need to levy targeted international sanctions on the individual exporters - the beneficial owners of these businesses - who are complicit. In order to conduct and facilitate due diligence following guidelines established by the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, the international community should intensify pressure on companies, company owners, and their host governments that are importing and refining gold from the region. While such sanctions are important to bring the illicit gold trade under control and further reduce sources of revenue for armed groups, the agony of eastern Congo will ultimately end when the key parties - Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda - reach a just, comprehensive peace agreement. The best hope for that is the process led by U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson, following the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework signed earlier this year. Details: Enough Project, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf Shelf Number: 140353 Keywords: Conflict MineralsGold MiningGold SmugglingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNatural ResourcesSmuggling |
Author: International Fund for Animal Welfare Title: An Investigation of Hawaii's Online Ivory Trade Summary: Over the last decade, surging consumer demand for ivory has triggered a nearly unprecedented poaching wave, one that threatens to drive African elephants toward extinction unless the killing - and demand for tusks and carvings - is halted soon. Many countries including the United States have moved this issue to the top of their conservation policy agendas, most importantly by restricting their domestic ivory markets. The U.S. federal government is expected to finalize a strong ivory trade ban soon that will address imports, exports, and interstate trade, and several states have passed laws to complement the federal rule by restricting intrastate ivory commerce. Hawai'i, which has perhaps the country's biggest remaining market for ivory products, is poised to follow suit. These local efforts are crucial to stopping sales of illegally-imported items - Law enforcement officials estimate that some 90% of smuggled shipments leak past border inspections and find their way into the marketplace, where they are largely indistinguishable from older, legal ivory. For this report, investigators compiled advertising and sales data from 47 Hawai'i-based retailers and individual sellers engaged in the online trade of elephant ivory and related wildlife products, including walrus tusks, whale teeth and bone, mammoth ivory, and hippopotamus teeth. They found a total of 4,661 products in stock or for sale, with an overall value of more than $1.22 million, over a six-day period. The vast majority of this inventory (85.5%) was elephant ivory. Few of these retailers provided any evidence that their wares had been legally imported into the state. Some 28% of the sellers (14 of 47) referred to their advertised items as being "pre-ban," "antique," or "vintage," but only one of the 47 provided supplemental documentation of legal import. Taken together, this large overall inventory and scant proof of legality are cause for concern. Add to this the fact that Hawaii is a known destination for illegal ivory shipments, and the case grows for strong restrictions on intrastate ivory sales. Details: IFAW, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/IFAW-2016-Hawaii-Market-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/IFAW-2016-Hawaii-Market-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 145898 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal TradeIvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Van Riper, Stephen K. Title: Tackling Africa's First Narco-State: Guinea-Bissau in West Africa Summary: The U.S., Europe and regional African players must tackle drug smuggling in West Africa to prevent that region from falling into chaos. Today, West Africa is a significant nexus for the illegal trafficking of oil, weapons, cigarettes, drugs and other commodities. The United States has labeled Guinea-Bissau Africa's first narco-state and it has become the epicenter of a region where Transnational Criminal Organizations are corrupting governments and societies at an alarming rate. Their nefarious efforts, and Guinea-Bissau's state failure, conflict with U.S. stated interests. Tackling corruption, neutralizing spoilers, and increasing the societies' culture of lawfulness are necessary steps to save West Africa. This will be challenging in Guinea-Bissau due to geography, culture, government structure, and a corrupted military. But with the right adjustments to resources, authorities and priorities, it can be done. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2014. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2016 at: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/VanRiper_monograph_Final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Guinea-Bissau URL: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/VanRiper_monograph_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 146013 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOil IndustryOrganized CrimeSmugglingTrafficking of Goods |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit TradeIllicit NetworksISISNational SecurityOrganized CrimeSmugglingTerrorismTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Obale, Offah Title: From Conflict to Illicit: Mapping the Diamond Trade from Central African Republic to Cameroon Summary: The Central African Republic (CAR) is the only source of traditionally defined conflict diamonds in the world today. Since May 2013, exports of its diamonds have been under international embargo by both the United Nations and the Kimberley Process (KP), the initiative that regulates the production and trade of rough diamonds. CAR was suspended from the KP after a March 2013 coup d'état that sparked widespread civil unrest in the country. The coup was the inevitable outcome of years of political instability forged by a coalition of rebel groups, known as Seleka, who attacked the government and incrementally seized territory, including the strategic diamond-mining town of Bria. On March 24, 2013 Séléka captured the capital city of Bangui and overthrew the government, initiating a bitter internal conflict that continues to fester to this day. The civil war and regime change forced the United Nations and the international community to impose economic sanctions on CAR. Not only were all diamond exports prohibited, the KP urged diamond-trading countries to exercise enhanced vigilance and ensure that diamonds produced in CAR were seized and not allowed to circulate in legitimate trade. While the ban on CAR’s exports was partially lifted in 2016 from regions deemed to be KP compliant, that has not stopped the flow of CAR's conflict diamonds to international markets—while it was under full embargo or regions still prevented from trading today. This report examines the smuggling of diamonds from the Central African Republic into Cameroon. Further, it focuses on the impact this illicit trade has on Cameroon’s internal controls as well as the broader integrity of the diamond supply chain. The report describes the methods used and the key actors involved in this illicit trade. It concludes that the KP and frontline countries like Cameroon need to do more to interrupt the illicit trade of conflict diamonds from CAR and support each other in taking action. Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: http://pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/from-conflict-to-ilicit-eng-web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/from-conflict-to-ilicit-eng-web.pdf Shelf Number: 147323 Keywords: Conflict DiamondsConflict MineralsDiamondsIllegal TradeIllicit TradeSmuggling |
Author: Tobacco Institute of India Title: The Threat of Growing Illegal Cigarette Trade in India: Adversely Impacting Legal Industry, Government Revenue and Livelihood Summary: Illegal Cigarette trade comprising international smuggled and locally manufactured tax-evaded cigarettes accounts for as much as 1/5th of the Cigarette Industry in India. Extremely high tax rates and constantly increasing tax rates on Cigarettes provide a profitable opportunity for tax evasion by illegal trade in both international smuggled and domestic tax evaded cigarettes Details: New Delhi: Tobacco Institute of India, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 10, 2017 at: http://www.tiionline.org/bookpublications/threat-of-growing-illegal-cigarette-trade-in-india-july-2015/ Year: 2015 Country: India URL: http://www.tiionline.org/bookpublications/threat-of-growing-illegal-cigarette-trade-in-india-july-2015/ Shelf Number: 146002 Keywords: Cigarette TaxesIllegal Cigarette TradeIllegal CigarettesIllegal Tobacco TradeIllegal TradeSmugglingTobacco Industry |
Author: Bakker, Anne Title: At the Gate: Civil and military protection of Europe's Borders Summary: The migratory pressures on Europe's borders present the EU with an enormous challenge to get its act together. While the objectives and mandates of internal and external security actors increasingly overlap, these actors often still live in separated worlds. This Policy Brief analyses how the EU’s border security can be strengthened through a more joined-up approach between internal and external security actors. Furthermore, it looks into how civil-military connectivity in border security can be changed from the existing ad hoc nature to more structural cooperation. Despite the EU deal with Turkey in early 2016, the migration pressure on Europe's borders persists. The Syrian war lingers on, while instability and conflicts in Northern Africa continue to offer human traffickers ample opportunities to conduct their dirty business. Many politicians earmarked 2016 as the political breakthrough year in halting massive migration flows to Europe. Stepping up the protection of Europe's borders can certainly help to better manage migration flows. Yet, gatekeeping alone will not solve the problem. Cooperations agreements have been signed, but further steps are needed to translate this into action. With so many actors involved in mapping the routes and modus operandi of smugglers, sharing information is crucial to ensure the complementarity of action and to avoid any duplication of efforts. This also requires an increase in civil-military cooperation concerning capablities. Details: The Hague: Clingendael, 2017. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB_At_%20the_%20gate.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB_At_%20the_%20gate.pdf Shelf Number: 145397 Keywords: Border SecurityHuman TraffickingIllegal MigrantsMigrationSmuggling |
Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: Structure of a Transnational Criminal Network: "Los Zetas" and the Smuggling of Hydrocarbons Summary: Mexico is currently one of the most important hotspots of criminal activity with effects in the Western Hemisphere. In this criminal dynamic, the Sinaloa Cartel, The Gulf Cartel, "La Familia Michoacana", "The Knights Templar" and "Los Zetas" are some of the most relevant criminal networks that originated in Mexico, but currently reach and operate in different countries across Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. While the operations of criminal networks inside of Mexico are severely violent, outside of Mexico their operations mainly consist of smuggling, transportation and distribution of illegal drugs, and other such activities. "Los Zetas", initially created out of former elite army soldiers, was the armed wing of the criminal network known as the “Gulf Cartel” [Cartel del Golfo] at the beginning of the present century. However, very quickly "Los Zetas" began operating as an independent criminal network, currently challenging the Gulf Cartel for control of trafficking routes and "plazas", meaning gaining local power in municipalities. Bearing this in mind, in this paper we present and discuss a model of a transnational criminal structure of "Los Zetas". Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 12: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_b8156d42310843a1b9dbcce4095c51b8.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/f53019_b8156d42310843a1b9dbcce4095c51b8.pdf Shelf Number: 141197 Keywords: Criminal NetworkDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingSmuggling |
Author: Jeffray, Calum Title: On Tap Europe: Organised Crime and Illicit Trade in Greece: Country Report Summary: Organised crime in Greece has historically been presented as an external threat, and the country’s vast coastline is indeed vulnerable to small-scale smuggling of various illicit goods from overseas, while its two major ports are frequently targeted by smugglers. As a result, Greece is widely cited as a key entry point for illicit goods into Europe, with the majority of illicit trade occurring in the regions where the two biggest cities and ports – Athens and Thessaloniki – are located. Illicit trade is not seen as an isolated problem in Greece, but as part of a broader category of economic crimes. It is closely linked to tax evasion, corruption and fraud. However, specific information on the scale and the scope of illicit trade in Greece is limited and tends to be largely anecdotal, reflecting a lack of publicly available information on organised crime more broadly. Authorities suggest that the way in which criminals in Greece organise themselves has evolved from strict, hierarchical structures to a more flexible ‘enterprise model’ in which a network of smaller OCGs is established for a particular operation. Groups that smuggle goods tend to deal across multiple commodities, moving between products based on the profit that can be made at any one time, regardless of the risk. Some illicit markets seem to be growing: data show that legitimate tobacco and alcohol sales are both decreasing, but there has not been a similar reduction in consumer demand. This paper makes various key findings. First, the debt crisis that has affected Greece since 2008 has undeniably had an impact on local illicit markets, making the black market more attractive to some consumers and affecting the resources available to law enforcement authorities. Second, during this period of economic uncertainty, authorities have focused on tackling crimes that they believe have the biggest impact on state revenues, such as tax evasion, excise evasion, fraud, and bribery and corruption. Third, Greece has become an attractive hub for smuggling activity for various reasons, including its combination of remote and porous land borders and its long coastline, the scale of operations at the port of Piraeus, which makes monitoring the content of incoming containers a challenge, and because the country is in the Schengen Area, which means that the circulation of goods into the rest of Europe is relatively straightforward. Fourth, there is only limited information available on the scale and scope of organised crime activity, and of illicit trade in particular. Finally, identifying 'little and often' smuggling operations, whether by sea or by land, requires an excellent intelligence picture, which Greece has struggled to achieve. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper; On Tap Europe Series No. 3: Accessed February 24, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201702_op_on_tap_europe3_greece.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Greece URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201702_op_on_tap_europe3_greece.pdf Shelf Number: 141207 Keywords: Corruption and FraudDrug Trafficking Illegal Tobacco Illicit Goods Illicit Trade Organized CrimeSmugglingTax Evasion |
Author: Hunter, Marcena Title: Follow the Money: Financial Flows Linked to Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Sierra Leone: A Case Study Summary: Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) has largely been dismissed as an economically insignificant, subsistence based activity in Sierra Leone. This is in sharp contrast to the artisanal diamond sector, which has historically been seen as a much more significant livelihood option. As one Mining Ministry agent stated: it's different with diamonds, you understand. If you are in diamonds, you want the license, because it's worth so much. But with gold, not so much: it's small and quick and just for survival. However, an investigation into the sector reveals that Sierra Leone's ASGM sector is not only active and vibrant, but also generating significant economic value. Despite government and civil society efforts at formalisation, Sierra Leone's ASGM remains largely in the informal sector. Investigations reveal most of Sierra Leone's gold never enters the formal supply chains within its borders. Rather, gold is mined, bought, sold and exported through informal networks that only occasionally and selectively intersect with formal supply and value chains prior to crossing the border. Consequently, the country records minimal gold exports and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) reaps little benefit from the gold sector through formal channels of taxation. This is not to say the sector is not benefitting the people of Sierra Leone. ASGM is providing rural communities a critical livelihood option across Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone registers some of the most challenging development and poverty statistics in the entire world, ranking 181 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index. The Ebola crisis (2014 - 2016) seriously exacerbated these challenges, extracting a massive socio-economic toll on the country. ASGM has evolved in this context as a strong economic magnet, drawing in old stakeholders and new entrants alike. In addition, ASGM plays a vital economic function in many communities, providing investment opportunities, an economic social safety net, an avenue to social mobility, and contributing to local economic growth. While a number of positive attributes can be linked to ASGM in Sierra Leone, the informality of the sector also results in undesirable outputs and impacts including: value from the ASGM sector is not equitably distributed; evidence of bribery and corruption of traditional and government officials; negligible protections against environmental degradation; and opportunity for money laundering and criminal exploitation. In turn, while there are a number of short-term benefits to informality, persistent informality has the potential to undermine long-term development and governance aims. The informality of Sierra Leone's gold sector is perpetuated and exacerbated by downstream illicit financial flows (IFFs). Defined as 'money illegally earned, transferred or used', IFFs are paradoxically dualistic. On the one hand, IFFs linked to ASGM serve a critical economic function, fuelling an informal sector which plays an important role in poverty alleviation and economic development in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, IFFs are facilitating complicated layers of exploitation and victimisation by opportunistic actors along the value chain. In the Sierra Leonean context, many upstream financial transactions (i.e. those which take place at the mine site) are better characterised as informal transactions, while those that take place further downstream (i.e. the buying and selling of smuggled gold) are IFFs. Upstream actors who engage in IFFs tend to reinvest profits back into the ASGM sector, thus perpetuating supply chains and financial relationships reliant on informal and illicit activity at all levels. In turn, IFFs are a bulwark against ASGM sector formalisation efforts in Sierra Leone. Any attempt must acknowledge the complex nature and impacts of IFFs if they are to hope to be successful without further marginalizing vulnerable populations. Without appreciating the extent and efficiency of ASGM and related IFFs to meet local economic needs, formalisation efforts will fail to replace them, and at worst could have devastating consequences. As a government agent stated, gold mining is a livelihood activity, so it is difficult to strongly enforce laws that are perceived to be harmful to local people (GOV080716c). Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/sierra-leone_06.03.17.compressed.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sierra Leone URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/sierra-leone_06.03.17.compressed.pdf Shelf Number: 146411 Keywords: Financial CrimesGold MiningIllicit GoldMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePovertySmugglingSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Water Theft and Water Smuggling: Growing Problem of Tempest in a Teapot? Summary: Fresh water is vital for human survival and health, the production of food and energy, industrial activity, and the functioning of the entire global economy, as well as for the survival of other animals, plants, and natural ecosystems. Water scarcity, whatever its cause—natural catastrophes, pollution, poor water management, or theft—can have grave consequences. In this paper, Vanda Felbab-Brown examines the highly controversial and emerging topics of water theft and smuggling, and the policy failures that give rise to problematic illegal water markets around the world. The topic is highly controversial because there is no common definition as to what constitutes water theft and smuggling, or, for that matter, whether such phenomena exist at all. Increasingly, newspaper articles around the world, particularly in countries experiencing intense drought and water shortages, are highlighting water theft as a growing problem. Yet water experts, water-focused nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), governments, and communities do not agree whether there is any such a thing as water theft. There are two broad schools of thought about the use of and access to water. One school defines water as a basic human right, and often opposes the pricing of water, particularly increases in prices. Another school of thought sees water as a commodity to which value needs to be assigned,[1] contending that, like electricity, it needs to be priced properly to maintain its sustainability and efficient use. According to this premise, the concept of water theft is valid—theft being the appropriation of water without the required payment, or in violation of existing rules. The first school of thought, however, is deeply uncomfortable with the concepts and language of water theft and smuggling. While this school does see the unauthorized taking of water from a neighbor’s tank as theft, it questions whether the unauthorized taking of water from a public source or the commons, such as river, can be called "theft," particularly if such behavior is driven by need. Rather, punitive enforcement of regulations against unauthorized use of water from common or public sources can constitute the denial of a human right. Thus, legislation and regulations concerning water use can be politically divisive and explosive, since these opposite views can be strongly held even within the same polity. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2017. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2017 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_201703_water_theft_smuggling.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_201703_water_theft_smuggling.pdf Shelf Number: 144588 Keywords: Environmental Crime Natural Resources Offenses Against the Environment SmugglingWater Theft |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: The Dilemma of Lawlessness: Organized Crime, Violence, Prosperity, and Security along Guatemala's Borders Summary: For centuries, the Central American region has been among the world's most important transit zones. The Spanish shuttled the gold, silver, and other valuables from Southeast Asia and from South America across the Panamanian isthmus. Later, the French and the Americans competed to control and improve that route with a water canal, either in Panama or Nicaragua. Since the emergence of the United States as a major economy and consumer market, the region has been a key zone for the northward flow of all kinds of products - legal and illegal. Economically, the countries of Central America, particularly northern Central America (including Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador), have traditionally been among the most unequal in the Americas. Throughout most of these countries' histories, political power and state resources were controlled by the same families and networks that owned most of the land and industries. Relatively few resources and little state attention were dedicated to improving the lives of the poor, especially in isolated rural areas. Except during infrequent instances of insurgency, civil war, or interstate conflict, border control or even preserving a state presence in rural areas in these regions was not an important concern. In practical terms, national territorial borders were unmarked and did not exist. What is today considered smuggling was a normal, everyday practice. Many border communities had closer economic ties to cities, agricultural zones, or economic infrastructure such as railroads or ports in countries across the border than they did to those within their own country. Moreover, most of the residents of these rural areas were indigenous and largely disconnected from the country in which they lived and the government that notionally had authority over them. In this way, most border zones in these countries have traditionally been "ungoverned," or "undergoverned," in terms of their relations with the national and provincial or departmental governments. Over the decades, numerous groups have taken advantage of the porousness of these borders, and the general lawlessness of these remote areas (many of which are heavily forested and/or mountainous), to elude governments or armed forces. In addition to the ever-present smugglers, armed insurgent groups from both the left and the right, as well as paramilitaries of all stripes, crossed borders to conduct their operations during the Cold War. The most recent, and by some accounts the most dangerous, type of actors to exploit these weakly governed, porous borders in northern Central America have been narcotics trafficking networks. Illegal drugs have been smuggled from the world's foremost coca production zone - the northern Andean foothills - to the world's richest and largest drug consumption market - the United States - since at least the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, however, an international crackdown on drug smuggling through the Caribbean region led Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico. The Colombians moved product through the region largely by buying the services of local trafficking networks. These networks were particularly well developed in Guatemala as a result of the intelligence and transport networks the military created during that country's civil war from the 1960s to the 1990s. Over time, Mexican trafficking networks grew into competitive cartels themselves and began to fight each other for control over valuable transport and smuggling routes. Mexico's largest cartels-including the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Zeta-grew their operations from merely trafficking the product of others to buying the product upstream and controlling its transit in Central America. Traditionally, Colombian- or Mexican-run trafficking cartels operated in Guatemala by buying the services of local trafficking networks, but around 2008 they began to seek to control routes themselves. Many of these routes lie along the Guatemalan coast, where drugs are brought in by boat and then transferred onto land for transit into Mexico. Other routes enter from Honduras, with the drugs being flown in from Venezuela or brought in via boat. Recently, there has been evidence not only of a broad presence of Mexican drug-trafficking networks across Guatemala but also of the expansion of their operations there, particularly into drug processing. They also sell more of their product in local markets, rather than shipping it onward, fueling local gang activity and urban violence. Details: Arlington, CA: CNA; Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Shelf Number: 144948 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingGang-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmugglingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Associacion Civil Paz Activa Title: 2 - Informe del Observatorio de delito organizado en Venezuela (The increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy Summary: Venezuelans perceive that the state security forces, instead of fighting, favor the existence and operation of Organized Crime. Sixty-six percent of the interviewees considered that it was the police and the military who sold arms to Organized Crime. The three most common activities at the national level are: drug trafficking, product smuggling and theft and sale of vehicles and spare parts. On average, about one in 3 respondents who said that drug trafficking is "very present" in the country, one interviewee said that they are "not present". The Organized Crime Observatory and the Social Sciences Laboratory (LACSO) are pleased to present the II report of the Organized Crime Observatory, based on the "Results of the 2nd Organized Crime Survey in Venezuela", a study carried out in 7 regions Of the national territory in the period of July and August of this year 2015. Beyond the mere disclosure of the results of our research, we consider it extremely important to inform the citizen in some way about the nature of these crimes and how not to be part of them or victims of these in particular. As reflected in the pages of this publication, more than half of Venezuelans believe that the increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy, and even more so in this time where we perceive their presence in much of our daily lives. Here are some relevant results of this study: The three most common activities at the national level are: drug trafficking, product smuggling, theft and sale of vehicles and spare parts. Gangs, mafias and bands, along with pranes and armed groups, are the groups that are considered to be the cause of Organized Crime. For every 3 people who reported that the activity of gangs, mafias and gangs are responsible for Organized Crime, 1 person said otherwise. Sixty-six percent of the interviewees considered that it was the police and the military who sold arms to Organized Crime. More than half of the interviewees expressed fear of the complaint and cooperated with the police and the judicial system. Half of those surveyed nationwide in the past 12 months have been the victims of robbery or theft. Sixty-four percent of respondents felt that it was easy or very easy to get drugs in their community. This perception has increased little between 2013 and 2015 by 3 percentage points. The interviewees consider that personal insecurity has worsened in the country in the last twelve months. This is perceived by 76% of the respondents. The actors identified as responsible for Organized Crime were gangs, mafias and gangs, prisons in the prisons and groups. There was little attribution to the paramilitaries and guerrillas. An important majority of the population considered that the military had been corrupted by drug trafficking. The population considers that organized crime should be combated with the application of the law and not negotiate with criminals or zones of peace. The vast majority of the population, throughout the country and all social or political sectors, believes that the increase in Organized Crime is a threat to democracy. English Summary Details: Caracas: Asociacion Civil Paz Activa, Observatorio de delito organizado. 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2017 at: http://observatoriodot.org.ve/cms/images/documentos/ODO_2do_informe_web_v11_carta.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Venezuela URL: http://observatoriodot.org.ve/cms/images/documentos/ODO_2do_informe_web_v11_carta.pdf Shelf Number: 145156 Keywords: Automobile TheftCitizen SecurityDrug TraffickingGangsOrganized CrimeSmuggling |
Author: Partnership Africa Canada Title: Fugitives and Phantoms: The Diamond Exporters of Brazil Summary: Brazil's diamond sector is in crisis. Three of the country's largest diamond producers and exporters have been arrested and are now facing an array of criminal charges. A joint task force of Brazil's Federal Police, Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and Internal Revenue Service have alleged that the three are behind a mega scheme for smuggling diamonds using fraudulent Kimberley Certificates. According to police, the smuggled diamonds come partly from domestic garimpeiro production, partly from Indian reserves where diamond mining is outlawed, and partly from Africa. The head of Brazil's National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) in Minas Gerais - responsible for issuing Kimberley Certificates - has also been arrested. He too, is facing charges, and has been fired from his post as Minas Gerais director. Diamond exports have been suspended while Brazil's Federal Police investigate the fraudulent export of nearly US$3 million dollars worth of diamonds by Hassan Ahmad, owner of a Belo Horizonte firm called Primeira Gema. This fraud, involving Brazil's Kimberley Certificate 64, was first uncovered by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) in May 2005. Within the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM), a special committee has been charged with examining the circumstances of Certificate 64 and making a report on the fraud by the middle of March 2006. The US$ 3 million Certificate 64 fraud, however, is but the tip of the iceberg. Further investigation by PAC has uncovered a wealth of evidence proving that for diamond exports from Brazil, fraud is not the exception, but the norm. In this report, PAC reveals that the same never-worked mining claims listed as the source of the diamonds in the US$3 million Certificate 64 scam are also given as the front for the diamonds in other fraudulent exports of nearly equal value. Furthermore, according to the DNPM's own statistics, the garimpeiro who owns these claims is Brazil's 6th largest diamond producer, responsible for 8.14% of Brazil's production in 2004. PAC's research reveals that this miner - who never once in his life touched a shovel - has been dead since 2001. In other words, Brazil's 6th largest diamond producer is a ghost. Brazil's fourth largest diamond producer, PAC also reveals in this report, is an indigent vagrant from Sao Paulo. In 2004, this phantom drifter produced nearly US$3.5 million worth of diamonds, 16.37% of Brazilian production, all of it exported with government issued Kimberley Certificates, none of them worth the paper they were printed on. Brazil's second largest diamond producer is a company named S.L. Mineradora, Ltda. Its owner, Paulo Traven of Juina, Mato Grosso, recently surrendered to Brazil's Federal Police, after spending a week as a fugitive on the run. After spending five days in jail, he was released, facing a variety of charges related to the illegal export of diamonds. On the production side, PAC reveals that some 25% of Brazil's diamond production by value came from fraudulent sources, and left the country with fraudulent Kimberley Certificates. Another 19% came from a source - Paulo Traven - who is now under criminal investigation. According to the production statistics, then, nearly 44% of Brazil's diamond production came from fraudulent or deeply suspect sources. The export statistics tell a similar tale. In this report, PAC reveals that some 53% of Brazil's exports by value in 2004 were the work of one man with a history in the African diamond trade, Hassan Ahmad. PAC demonstrates that Ahmad was almost certainly the perpetrator of the fraud involving Certificate 64. He, too, recently surrendered to Federal Police after spending a week on the run. He, too, is facing charges. Given this, there is good reason to suspect the legitimacy of Ahmad's other diamond exports. The production statistics, the export numbers, and PAC's research all point to one conclusion: 50% of Brazil's diamond production comes from fraudulent or highly suspect sources; one in two Brazilian Kimberley Certificates is probably false. Half the country's diamond exports are the work of fraudsters, fugitives and phantoms. In this report, PAC makes a number of recommendations for short, medium, and long-term reform of Brazil's system of internal diamond controls. Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2006. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper #3: Accessed August 5, 2017 at: http://www.shawnblore.com/Reports/FugitivesPhantoms.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.shawnblore.com/Reports/FugitivesPhantoms.pdf Shelf Number: 146745 Keywords: Conflict DiamondsIllegal TradeMining IndustrySmuggling |
Author: Kemp, Walter Title: Crooked Kaleidoscope: Organized Crime in the Balkans Summary: The Balkans is back in the spotlight. A coup attempt in Montenegro, tensions between Belgrade and Pristina over the status of northern Kosovo, a wire-tapping scandal followed by political unrest in Macedonia, rivalries in Bosnia about the future status of Republika Srpska, as well as the impact of the refugee crisis have started to ring alarm bells. A region which had been out of the limelight for a decade and considered to be on a path towards peace and prosperity is once again looking vulnerable. This can be attributed in part to the failure of the region - and its friends - to come to terms with organized crime and corruption. The report urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform. It recommends a more joined-up approach to looking at and responding to organized crime in the Balkans, as well as for enhancing networks to strengthen resilience to this threat. This report looks at organized crime in the Western Balkans. In particular, it focuses on the impact of organized crime on politics and stability. It warns about the impact of relations between political, business and criminal elites, and the spill-over effect of illicit activity in areas of weak governance. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the current situation, and asks why the Balkans is vulnerable to organized crime. Chapter 2 looks at the main types of organized crime in the region, particularly drugs, weapons and the smuggling of migrants. Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between crime and governance. It asks if organized crime is a transitory phase of state-building, or if there is a more deep-seated relationship between crime and politics in the Balkans that results in criminalized states. Montenegro is used as an illustrative case study. The dangerous nexus between crime and ethnicity is looked at in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Chapter 4 looks at responses of the international community to organized crime in the Balkans. Chapter 5 concludes by warning that the international community, particularly Western European institutions, should pay greater attention to the impact of organized crime in the Balkans. It also provides recommendations of what can be done to more effectively prevent and combat organized crime. This report illustrates that in the Balkans things are not always what they seem. When first looking through the hole of the kaleidoscope, certain shapes appear. Turn the kaleidoscope, and while some of the figures may be the same, the impression changes. Such is the Balkans: what might look like an ethnic conflict is actually a diversion from high-level bi-ethnic collusion. Someone who looks like a businessman one day may be a politician or a crook the next. With one quick twist, a calm image can fracture into myriad pieces. Friends may betray you, while enemies may assist you. This is the crooked kaleidoscope of organized crime in the Balkans. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OC_balkans.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OC_balkans.pdf Shelf Number: 146952 Keywords: Organized CrimePolitical CorruptionSmuggling |
Author: Global Witness Title: An Inside Job: Zimbabwe: The State, The Security Forces, and a Decade of Disappearing Diamonds Summary: Global Witness has uncovered new evidence linking Zimbabwe's state and partisan security forces to a decade of disappearing diamond wealth. Despite offering early promise and hope, diamonds have failed to benefit the Zimbabwean people. Instead, they have provided secret off-budget funding for state security forces consistently implicated in their oppression. As elections and a divisive presidential succession struggle loom, this has serious implications for Zimbabwe's democratic future, and casts serious doubt on President Mugabe's claim that private investors are solely to blame for billions of dollars of missing diamond revenues. Details: London: Global Witness, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2017 at: file:///C:/Users/pschultze/Downloads/GW_Zim_diamonds_An_inside_job__report_download_sng%20(1).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Zimbabwe URL: file:///C:/Users/pschultze/Downloads/GW_Zim_diamonds_An_inside_job__report_download_sng%20(1).pdf Shelf Number: 147225 Keywords: Diamonds Political Corruption Precious Gems Smuggling |
Author: VienEast Title: An Investigation into Oil Smuggling and Revenue Generation by Islamic State Summary: Oil sales have represented a considerable proportion of IS's income, amounting to around 45% (other key sources including taxes and private donations). However, the major destination for oil products appears not to be external but rather a 'captive market' inside Syria and Iraq, i.e. the local population, other rebel groups, and the Assad regime. Various local observers allege IS and Turkish intelligence coordination prior to summer 2015 on matters including border security, weapons/equipment supplies and recruit replacement. However, IS does not engage directly in external oil sales but instead sells all surplus oil 'at the pump' to private traders, only some of whom engage in small-scale 'jerry-can' smuggling. There is no current evidence to implicate senior-level public officials in Turkey in the illegal oil trade from Syria. Smuggling into Turkey is instead undertaken in small volumes by career smugglers making relatively negligible profits. Such official complicity as has been observed involves local Turkish officials 'turning a blind eye' in the local economic interest. Smuggling routes connecting IS areas and Turkey represent complex supply lines involving multiple actors often transporting legal dual-purpose items usable in bomb-making or else vital in maintaining combat readiness. Similarly, the Syrian war economy is a complex symbiotic web; blanket actions such as blockades are in fact liable to drive inflated prices and local dependence on IS, as well as having a broader negative humanitarian impact. Since summer 2015 contacts inside Turkey have noted a significant increase in border and internal security, apparently as a result of a hostile shift in official policy to IS for domestic security and strategic geopolitical reasons. Kurdish YPG gains have also denied IS access to the Turkish border save a closely monitored, and diminishing, 70km stretch along the Azaz Corridor. IS has access to ten major oil fields across Syria and Iraq but overall oil quality is poor and production hampered by airstrikes, natural depletion and a lack of technical capacity. The organisation's sole access to advanced refining is via trade with the Assad regime, with refined products prioritised for its own strategic needs. Low global oil prices and increased border security further compound motivation for smuggling to external markets. Claims by the Russian Defence Ministry regarding large-scale oil smuggling by IS with Turkish state collaboration are comprehensively rejected and discredited. The claims are refutable on various levels. The claims are consistent with earlier 'misinformation' tactics by the Kremlin, apparently intended to discredit Turkey whilst screening Moscow's own actions in Syria. Russian airstrikes against IS oil assets appear intended firstly to deny FSA rebels oil supplies, rather than to hit IS oil sales, based on the calculation that it would still retain enough oil and income to maintain an effective 'second front' against the core rebel opposition. Meanwhile, airstrikes enable Moscow to showcase its anti-IS credentials, especially vis-a-vis Turkey, while serving as a 'warning' both to backers of IS and the Free Syrian Army ('FSA'). Both the Russia-Assad alliance and Turkey presently have shared parallel interests in maintaining IS as a disruptive force against the Kurdish PKK-YPG and FSA respectively. That IS retains its status as a 'second-tier' foe to most primary actors involved, including Gulf Arab states, appears to be one of the main reasons for IS's continued survival and sustained offensive capacity. Details: London: ViennEast, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: http://www.vienneast.com/uploads/7/1/2/6/71267015/is_smuggling_investigation.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.vienneast.com/uploads/7/1/2/6/71267015/is_smuggling_investigation.pdf Shelf Number: 147230 Keywords: Illegal Trade Islamic State Oil Smuggling SmugglingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Vigne, Lucy Title: The Ivory Trade of Laos: Now the Fastest Growing In the World Summary: Executive summary - From 2013 to 2016, Laos's retail ivory market has expanded more rapidly than in any other country surveyed recently. - Laos has not been conforming with CITES regulations that prohibit the import and export of ivory. Since joining CITES in 2004, only one ivory seizure into Laos has been reported to the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). - Almost no arrests, let alone prosecutions and punishments, have been made of smugglers with ivory coming in or out of the country. - Most worked ivory for sale in Laos originates from elephants poached in Africa. - Ivory has also been entering Laos illegally from Thailand, as Thai traders have been offloading their ivory following the imposition of much stricter regulations there. - In late 2013 the average wholesale price of raw ivory sold by Lao traders peaked at about USD 2,000/kg. - By late 2016, the average wholesale price of raw ivory in Laos had declined to USD 714/kg, in line with prices elsewhere in the region. This price was much higher than in African countries, such as Sudan (Omdurman/Khartoum), where the average wholesale price of ivory was USD 279/kg in early 2017. This price differential is due to the extra expenses incurred in transport and bribes to government officials on the long journey to Asia. - In Laos, the decline in the wholesale price of raw ivory between 2013 and 2016, as elsewhere in the region, was mainly due to the slowdown in China's economy, that resulted in an oversupply of illegal ivory, relative to demand. - Ivory items seen for sale in Laos are carved or machine-processed in Vietnam by Vietnamese and smuggled into Laos for sale, or are processed by Chinese traders in Laos on new computerdriven machines. Ivory carving by Lao people is insignificant. - In Laos, the survey found 81 retail outlets with ivory on view for retail sale, 40 of which were in the capital, Vientiane, 21 in Luang Prabang, 8 in Kings Romans, 5 in Oudom Xay, 3 in Pakse, 2 in Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort and 2 in Luang Nam Tha. - The survey counted 13,248 ivory items on display for sale, nearly all recently made to suit Chinese tastes. Vientiane had 7,014 items for sale, Luang Prabang 4,807, Kings Romans 1,014, Dansavanh Nam Ngum Resort 291, Oudom Xay 93, Luang Nam Tha 16, and Pakse 13. - Most outlets, displaying the majority of worked ivory, also sold souvenirs, Chinese herbal teas or jewellery, or were hotel gift shops. - Outlets were usually owned by traders from mainland China. The number of Chinese-owned shops had risen in Laos from none recorded in the early 2000s to several in 2013, including one main shop in Vientiane's Chinese market and two on the main tourist street of Luang Prabang. By 2016, there were 22 and 15 outlets, respectively, in these two areas, both of which are popular with Chinese visitors. By 2016, Chinese outlets with ivory had also sprung up in other locations, mainly those visited by the increasing number of Chinese. - In 2016, the most common ivory items for sale were pendants, followed by necklaces, bangles, beaded bracelets and other jewellery, similar to items for sale in 2013, but in far larger quantities. - The least expensive item was a thin ring for USD 3 and the most expensive was a pair of polished tusks for USD 25,000. - Retail prices for ivory items of similar type were higher than elsewhere in Kings Romans, which is visited primarily by wealthier Chinese visitors with money to spend. - Mainland Chinese buy over 80% of the ivory items in Laos today. There are sometimes buyers from South Korea and other Asian countries, according to vendors. - Laotians today generally buy amulets that are made of bone or synthetic material, rather than ivory items. - Virtually no mammoth ivory items were seen for sale. - Retail prices in Laos for worked ivory on display were considerably lower than in China, as most items in China at that time were in expensive licensed outlets incurring higher official paperwork costs. Lao prices for worked ivory were a little lower than in the cities of Vietnam as Lao shop owners have smaller overheads. - In the absence of effective law enforcement, vendors believe that sales of ivory items in their shops to Chinese consumers will continue to do well, in line with the anticipated increase in the number of Chinese in Laos and the projected expansion in Chinese investment. - Nearly all the items seen for sale today originate from illegally imported (post-1990) ivory. There is virtually no law enforcement so shops are able to display these items openly. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Save the Elephants, 2017. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: http://www.savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Vigne-Lao-Ivory-Report-web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Laos URL: http://www.savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Vigne-Lao-Ivory-Report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 147501 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal TradeIvorySmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) Title: First Class Crisis: China's Criminal and Unsustainable Intervention in Mozambique's Miombo Forests Summary: This report updates a January 2013 EIA report on forest crime in Mozambique - First Class Connections. It details research, investigations and analysis conducted by EIA between mid-2013 and 2014 which found that: - Over the past seven years an average of 81 percent of all logging in Mozambique was illegal. In 2013, a staggering 93 per cent of logging in the country was illegal - The shocking scale of illegality is largely driven by booming timber exports, with 76 per cent of timber exported from Mozambique worldwide in 2013 being illegally cut in excess of reported harvests - The vast majority of exports (93 per cent on average between 2007 and 2013) were shipped to China. In 2013, when Mozambique became China's biggest African supplier of logs by value, 46 per cent of China's 516,296 cubic metres (m3) of timber imports from Mozambique were also smuggled out of the country, maintaining a pattern and scale of crime by Chinese companies already documented by EIA in 2012 - This illegal logging and timber smuggling has driven harvesting volumes way beyond sustainable levels, despite claims by Mozambican officials to the contrary, raising serious concerns about the Government's ability to credibly manage the country's forest resources - EIA analysis shows that an excessive focus on just a handful of commercial timber species - for both export and domestic markets - raises the likelihood that commercial stocks will be largely depleted over the next 15 years - All of this crime and environmental mismanagement has robbed Mozambique's rural poor and wider population of US$146 million in lost exploration and export tax revenues since 2007 - Despite some evidence of law enforcement by the Mozambican Government, and the promotion by the Chinese Government of voluntary guidelines on legal forestry activities for Chinese businesses, corruption and ineffective governance in both Mozambique and China's business sector are a structural impediment to resolving the crisis - Multiple Chinese-owned timber companies already exposed by EIA and others continue to smuggle illegal Mozambican timber to China. Without a sea-change in how Mozambique's Government and law enforcement community do their jobs, with corruption an ongoing problem, and with no enforceable laws on illegal timber imports in China, Mozambique's forests and forest economy face a bleak future. The degree to which poor rural communities will bear the burden of Mozambique's ongoing illegal logging crisis - in what is now the second least developed nation on Earth - is a critical development and governance challenge that needs immediate and credible action by all concerned parties. Details: London: EIA, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/First-Class-Crisis-English-FINAL.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mozambique URL: https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/First-Class-Crisis-English-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 147502 Keywords: Environmental CrimesForestsIllegal LoggingNatural ResourcesOffenses Against the EnvironmentSmuggling |
Author: Haenlein, Cathy Title: On Tap Europe. Organised Crime and Illicit Trade in Romania: Country Report Summary: THIS IS THE fourth in a series of five country-level papers on the role of organised crime groups (OCGs) in the illicit trade in tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals across Europe, focusing on Romania as a case study. The criminal networks behind illicit trade in Romania are sophisticated, often internationally connected, and capable of adapting to exploit opportunities to maximise profits and avoid detection. As in a number of other cases across Europe, there is evidence that OCGs in Romania are moving away from trafficking in high-risk commodities, such as drugs, to engage in illicit trade in products such as tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals. In some cases, OCGs will deal in different commodities simultaneously, as new opportunities and potential profits arise. Against this backdrop, attention to illicit trade among law enforcement has increased. The issue is now understood to be one driven by organised crime and is addressed alongside other forms of fraud and corruption, to which a concerted response has been mounted. Despite this, domestic demand for illicit goods persists, with illicit consumption largely viewed without social stigma. While there is insufficient data to compare shifts in consumption of illicit alcohol and pharmaceuticals over time, available evidence indicates that consumption of illicit cigarettes in Romania is increasing, and continues to sit well above average European levels. Romania plays numerous roles in facilitating the illicit trade in tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals, acting at different times as a source, transit and destination country for different products. This paper identifies five core drivers that underpin illicit trade across the country. The first is the broad social acceptability of purchasing illicit goods. Despite signs of growing recognition that illicit trade has contributed to the country's historic economic challenges, the presence of a persistent domestic market for illicit goods is clear. Often, those involved in illicit trade may be viewed as providing a service to disadvantaged citizens, with many individuals quick to excuse participation in smuggling activities on this basis. A second driver is linked to the country's geographic position between EU and non-EU states, and the resultant price differentials across neighbouring states. Notably, the low price of tobacco and alcohol in Romania's non-EU neighbours acts as an incentive for smuggling into the country. In the case of tobacco, further price differentials with other EU states drive Romania's role as a transit state, as cigarettes are smuggled on to European markets further afield. A third driver applies specifically to the illicit trade in pharmaceuticals, and concerns the Romanian government's cap on the price paid for medicine. This policy makes the country vulnerable to illicit trade, as pharmaceutical companies have retreated and legal stocks have dried up. Demand for illicit sources has grown as patients have found themselves without the drugs they need, with gaps in domestic supply increasingly met by illicit sources. A fourth driver concerns the inconsistent application of sanctions for illicit trade. Existing legislation offers relatively stringent penalties, yet these are infrequently applied fully; particularly for alcohol and tobacco, fines are the most common penalty. The result is that sanctions do not act as a consistent deterrent: in many cases, the same individuals return to illicit trade following the payment of fines, often with greater knowledge of law enforcement techniques. Fifth, corruption has historically been recognised as a challenge, with numerous cases of arrests of officials for involvement in illicit trade at both land borders and ports. However, perceptions may also be influenced by a more stringent response in recent years, as a concerted attack has been launched on high-level corruption and considerable strides made in tackling the issue at a systemic level. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: On Tap Europe Series No. 4: Accessed November 17, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201710_rusi_on_tap_europe_romania_haenlein_and_eyal_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Romania URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201710_rusi_on_tap_europe_romania_haenlein_and_eyal_web.pdf Shelf Number: 148222 Keywords: Corruption Illegal Products Illegal Tobacco Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Organized Crime Smuggling |
Author: Jenkins, Jeffrey Title: Checking on Checkpoints: An Assessment of U.S. Border Patrol Checkpoint Operations, Performance, and Impacts Summary: In 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol asked the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (BORDERS)1 to evaluate a 2009 review of the agency's traffic checkpoints. The review recommended that the Border Patrol take actions in four major areas: data integrity and quality, community impacts, performance models and measures and managerial tool development (GAO 2009, 78). BORDERS conducted a two-year study to examine and advise the Border Patrol on how to address the following GAO recommendations: Data integrity and quality a) Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data. Community impacts b) Implement quality of life measures that have already been identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints have on local communities. c) Use the information generated from the quality of life measures with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations and address identified impacts. Performance models and measures d) Establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing through the checkpoint undetected. Managerial tool development e) Require that the Border Patrol conduct traffic volume studies to guide the number and operation of inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, and document these requirements in checkpoint design guidelines and standards. f) Along with planning new or upgrading existing checkpoints, conduct a workforce needs assessment to determine the levels of staff and resources needed to address anticipated volumes of illegal activity around the checkpoint. Details: Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona, National Center for Border Security and Immigration, 2014. 69p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2018 at: http://borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/checking-on-checkpoints_2014-09-09.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/checking-on-checkpoints_2014-09-09.pdf Shelf Number: 148941 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Immigration Enforcement Smuggling |
Author: Chng, Serene C.L. Title: Escalating Black Spotted Turtle Geoclemys Hamiltonii Trade in Asia: A Study of Seizures Summary: Illegal international trade of the Black Spotted Turtle in Asia has escalated over recent years and immediate action is required to stem the flow, a new TRAFFIC report has found. The attractive spotted visage of the Black Spotted Turtle Geoclemys hamiltonii may well be its downfall. The species is known to be traded for meat, medicine and pets, although TRAFFIC's research attributes the sudden rise in demand to the exotic pet trade. Over 1,960 animals were seized between January 2008 and March 2014. Of these, 95 per cent were confiscated in the final 15 months of that period. A seizure of another 230 turtles on May 14th underscored the seriousness of the threat. Royal Thai Customs officers in Suvarnabhumi International Airport found the turtles packed in unclaimed bags which had come in on a flight from Kolkata, India. Seizure information indicates that shipments of the turtles from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan transit through South-east Asian hubs such as Bangkok and are destined for East Asia, in particular Hong Kong. Most of the seizures are from passengers using commercial airlines concealing animals in their baggage. The majority of couriers caught were arrested but only two of the 22 cases recorded resulted in successful prosecutions. "Enforcement authorities' efforts to detect and apprehend smugglers are commendable, but a lack of follow-on investigations and prosecution is undoing their good work," said Dr Chris R Shepherd, Regional Director for TRAFFIC in Southeast Asia. The Black Spotted Turtle is protected under national laws in its range countries and is listed in Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES). All commercial international trade in this species is illegal. The report (PDF, 1.1 MB) recommends improving enforcement and prosecution through multilateral and multi-agency coordination. Timely and detailed reporting of seizures to the CITES Secretariat and in the media, together with the outcomes of successful prosecutions, are also urged. "Wildlife enforcement networks already exist in South and South-east Asia, but given the transnational operations of the criminal networks they are up against, the challenge is to ensure a fully co-ordinated global enforcement response to their activities is delivered," said Dr Yannick Kuehl, Regional Director for TRAFFIC in East and South Asia Next week, Viet Nam hosts the 9th Meeting of the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network in Hanoi, at which Strategic Action Plan Development will be discussed, alongside the Special Investigations Group approach on key wildlife trafficking issues linking South-east Asia and other trading partners. "TRAFFIC hopes our targeted analysis of trafficking routes will assist the region's Wildlife Enforcement Networks in planning enforcement actions aimed at breaking the lines of supply and demand," said Shepherd. TRAFFIC's findings were released today, World Turtle Day, to highlight the plight of the Black Spotted Turtle and many other species of turtles worldwide, particularly those in Asia which are under threat mainly from habitat loss and over-exploitation for food, medicine and the exotic pet trade. "Turtle species are seriously threatened - nowhere more so than in Asia with 17 of the 25 most critically endangered tortoises and freshwater turtles on the IUCN Red List found in the region," said James Tallant, Senior Programme Officer - Species, IUCN Natural Resources Group, Asia. Details: Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: TRAFFIC, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 20, 2018 at: http://www.traffic.org/home/2014/5/23/alarming-rise-in-black-spotted-turtle-trade-across-asia.html Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://www.traffic.org/home/2014/5/23/alarming-rise-in-black-spotted-turtle-trade-across-asia.html Shelf Number: 149537 Keywords: Endangered SpeciesIllegal TradeSmugglingTurtlesWildlife CrimeWildlife Enforcement |
Author: Rossi, Alessandra Title: Uganda Wildlife Trafficking Assessment Summary: The report, "Uganda Wildlife Trafficking Assessment," produced by TRAFFIC as part of the USAID-funded Wildlife TRAPS Project, provides a comprehensive look at Uganda's illegal and legal wildlife trade, poaching trends, and wildlife trafficking routes over the last 10-15 years. Uganda is home to a spectacularly diverse array of wildlife, housing more than half of the world's remaining mountain gorillas, 50% of Africa's bird species, almost 40% of Africa's mammal species, and 19% of Africa's amphibian species. "Uganda's incredible biological diversity is one of the world's great treasures, and the rightful heritage of all Ugandans," says Mark Meassick, Mission Director of the USAID Mission to Uganda. "Successfully managing wildlife conservation is not only fundamental to achieving Uganda's sustainable development goals, it is our collective responsibility to future generations." Despite serving as a trafficking hub, the majority of Uganda's wildlife does not face major threats from organized poaching inside the country's borders. Elephant poaching is less of a concern in Uganda as compared to ivory trafficking, although some poaching episodes are still registered by the authorities. In fact, Uganda's elephant population has increased slightly in recent years. Terrestrial smuggling routes exist between Uganda and neighbors Tanzania, Kenya, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and extend to at least the Central African Republic. The main international destinations for wildlife products being smuggled from Uganda are China and Viet Nam. "Uganda relies on its wildlife and natural resources to support its economy, growth and development through tourism. Wildlife conservation and sustainable use are therefore paramount for the country's global development objectives," says TRAFFIC's Alessandra Rossi, author of the assessment. The report also provides an overview of the main bird, reptile and mammal species in Uganda that are legally and illegally traded. Birds: Uganda has seen a decrease in the legal bird trade since 2006, which can be attributed to a number of factors including habitat degradation and stricter protection measures put in place and enforced by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). The most targeted species for illicit trade taking place in Uganda are the Grey Crowned-crane (the national bird of Uganda) and the Shoebill. Reptiles: Reptiles were traded mainly between 2000 and 2005, with a prevalence of trade in chameleon species, followed by the Leopard Tortoise. Trade declined between 2005 and 2009 for most reptile species before resuming slowly from 2009 to 2014. Overall, though, the reptile trade is in decline, due to dwindling wild populations and a change in UWA's management strategy to promote trade in captive bred species. The illegal trade in reptiles often runs alongside the legal trade, largely due to the difficulty in identifying reptile shipments. Mammals: Hippopotamus teeth are heavily traded between Uganda and Hong Kong. Despite a ban in 2014 to protect declining hippopotamus populations, this trade has continued illegally in Uganda. Poaching of mammals in Uganda is practiced mainly for meat and due to human-wildlife conflict, with the exception of pangolins, which have been heavily targeted for poaching and trafficking in the country. Between 2012-2016, over 1,400 pangolins were seized in Uganda. To reduce the threat of poaching and trafficking in Uganda, the report offers recommendations for governments, conservation groups and the donor community to take action. They include suggestions for strengthening law enforcement and managing ivory stocks, as well as wildlife seizure and trade information, increasing regional collaboration, and working with communities to raise awareness around wildlife conservation issues. FOR MORE INFORMATION: View the full report Photos for media use Report Citation: Rossi, A. (2018). Uganda Wildlife Trafficking Assessment. TRAFFIC International, Cambridge, United Kingdom. About IUCN The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is a membership Union uniquely composed of both government and civil society organisations. It provides public, private and non-governmental organisations with the knowledge and tools that enable human progress, economic development and nature conservation to take place together. About Wildlife TRAPS The USAID-funded Wildlife Trafficking, Response, Assessment and Priority Setting (Wildlife TRAPS) Project is an initiative that is designed to secure a transformation in the level of co-operation between an international community of stakeholders who are impacted by illegal wildlife trade between Africa and Asia. The project is designed to increase understanding of the true character and scale of the response required, to set priorities, identify intervention points, and test non-traditional approaches with project partners. About USAID The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is responsible for the majority of overseas development assistance from the United States Government and leads international development and humanitarian efforts to save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance and help people on their journey to self-reliance. About UWA Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) is a semi-autonomous government agency that conserves and manages Uganda's wildlife for the people of Uganda and the whole world. This agency was established in 1996 after the merger of the Uganda National Parks and the Game Department, and the enactment of the Uganda Wildlife Statute, which became an Act in 2000. UWA is mandated to ensure sustainable management of wildlife resources and supervise wildlife activities in Uganda both within and outside the protected areas. Details: Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC International, 2018. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2018 at: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27882787/1523867065007/Uganda+Wildlife+Assessment_FINAL.pdf?token=JL3Pc0bxP725CIqZ38NV%2FBfUG0s%3D Year: 2018 Country: Uganda URL: http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/27882787/1523867065007/Uganda+Wildlife+Assessment_FINAL.pdf?token=JL3Pc0bxP725CIqZ38NV%2FBfUG0s%3D Shelf Number: 149798 Keywords: Animal PoachingIllegal Wildlife TradingIvorySmugglingTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife CrimeWildlife Trafficking |
Author: Guerrero Castro, Javier Enrique Title: Maritime Interdiction in the War on Drugs in Colombia: Practices, Technologies and Technological Innovation Summary: Since the early 1990s, maritime routes have been considered to be the main method used by Colombian smugglers to transport illicit drugs to consumer or transhipment countries. Smugglers purchase off the shelf solutions to transport illicit drugs, such as go-fast boats and communication equipment, but also invest in developing their own artefacts, such as makeshift submersible and semisubmersible artefacts, narcosubmarines. The Colombian Navy has adopted several strategies and adapted several technologies in their attempt to control the flows of illicit drugs. In this research I present an overview of the 'co-evolution' of drug trafficking technologies and the techniques and technologies used by the Colombian Navy to counter the activities of drug smugglers, emphasizing the process of self-building artefacts by smugglers and local responses by the Navy personnel. The diversity of smugglers artefacts are analysed as a result of local knowledge and dispersed peerinnovation. Novel uses of old technologies and practices of interdiction arise as the result of different forms of learning, among them a local form of knowledge 'malicia indigena' (local cunning). The procurement and use of interdiction boats and operational strategies by the Navy are shaped by interaction of two arenas: the arena of practice - the knowledge and experience of local commanders and their perceptions of interdiction events; and, the arena of command, which focuses on producing tangible results in order to reassert the Navy as a capable counterdrug agency. This thesis offers insights from Science and Technology Studies to the understanding of the 'War on Drugs, and in particular the Biography of Artifacts and Practices, perspective that combines historical and to ethnographic methods to engage different moments and locales. Special attention was given to the uneven access to information between different settings and the consequences of this asymmetry both for the research and also for the actors involved in the process. The empirical findings and theoretical insights contribute to understanding drug smuggling and military organisations and Enforcement Agencies in ways that can inform public policies regarding illicit drug control. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2017. 345p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/22950/Guerrero2017.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/22950/Guerrero2017.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 150324 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug EnforcementDrug InterdictionDrug TraffickingSmugglingWar on Drugs |
Author: Bate, Roger Title: Large Cigarette Tax Hikes, Illicit Producers, and Organized Crime: Lessons from Pakistan Summary: With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan's authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled. Details: Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2018 at: https://www.aei.org/publication/large-cigarette-tax-hikes-illicit-producers-and-organized-crime-lessons-from-pakistan/ Year: 2018 Country: Pakistan URL: https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Large-Cigarette-Tax-Hikes-Illicit-Producers-and-Organized-Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 151466 Keywords: CigarettesIllicit TradeOrganized CrimeSmugglingSmuggling of GoodsTobacco |
Author: Wasser, Samuel K. Title: Combating transnational organized crime by linking multiple large ivory seizures to the same dealer Summary: Rapid growth in world trade has enabled transnational criminal networks to conceal their contraband among the 1 billion containers shipped worldwide annually. Forensic methods are needed to identify the major cartels moving the contraband into transit. We combine DNA-based sample matching and geographic assignment of tusks to show that the two tusks from the same elephant are often shipped by the same trafficker in separate large consignments of ivory. The paired shipments occur close in time from the same initial place of export and have high overlap in the geographic origins of their tusks. Collectively, these paired shipments form a linked chain that reflects the sizes, interconnectedness, and places of operation of Africas largest ivory smuggling cartels. Details: Science Advances 19 Sep 2018: Vol. 4, no. 9. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2018 at: http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/9/eaat0625 Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/9/eaat0625 Shelf Number: 151656 Keywords: Animal Poaching Elephants Ivory Organized Crime SmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: Neumann, Vanessa Title: The many criminal heads of the Golden Hydra: How the Tri-Border Area's Interlocking Arcs of Crime Create LatAm's #1 International Fusion Center Summary: The Tri-Border Area ('TBA') that straddles the intersection of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil is considered the 'Golden Hydra,' as it is the lucrative regional entry point of many 'heads' of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) that all lead to the underworld of illicit trade for more than forty years. This is partly a consequence of its ethnic composition and open borders, set by a policy to facilitate immigration from the Middle East, and also the connecting infrastructure to facilitate cross-border trade. The TBA gained notoriety in the 1990s after the bombings of the Israeli embassy (1992) and the AMIA center (1994), both in Buenos Aires, by Lebanese Hezbollah militants. The money, operatives and bomb parts all moved through the TBA. After 9/11, it again became the target of US counter-terrorism surveillance, as a 'safe haven' for terrorists from groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas, in addition to Hezbollah. With the world's attention firmly focused on the Middle East since then, the TBA has grown into a mini-state that benefits a corrupt elite while maintaining a large and efficient money laundering center for the world's organized crime and terrorist groups, not just in the region, but throughout the world, yielding TCOs and FTOs an estimated US$ 43 billion a year. Illicit trade of all sorts (including the illicit trade in tobacco products, 'ITTP') has been growing rapidly in recent years, corrupting good governance in all three countries and exploiting the degrading security and economic situation in both Argentina and Brazil. The TBA has become a regional crime fusion center where corrupt politicians work with drug cartels from Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, as well as organized crime groups from China, in conjunction with a large Lebanese merchant community, part of which gives support to Hezbollah. Though illicit funding for Hezbollah is generally high on the US agenda, that is not the case for the countries of the TBA. For historical reasons, Hezbollah is on the political agenda of Argentina. Brazil, however, does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist group; it considers only three groups as terrorists: the Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS. Paraguay considers Lebanese Hezbollah a group that poses a problem for its neighbors Argentina and Brazil, but not for Paraguay. authorities and mandates, Paraguay is constitutionally structured for corruption and illicit trade. Despite its smaller population and economy, it is the source and economic driver of illicit trade and money laundering affecting the other two countries. At the heart is Paraguay's lame-duck president, Horacio Cartes, the architect of the region's ITTP; he is the owner of Tabesa tobacco company. Furthermore, the removal of Carts from the presidency and its assumption by his successor (and fellow party member) Mario Abdo Benitez , will not reduce this illicit trade: Cartes will continue to wield tremendous power as a senator; several of his close friends will also enter the Senate, and his party won the presidency in the April 2018 elections. Security is the highest-ranked agenda item in Brazil's upcoming presidential elections in October 2018. This is primarily because of the military operations in Rio's favelas, where the criminal group Comando Vermelho (CV) and its affiliates are so widespread and heavily-armed, they are challenging the state for supremacy. The CV is enabled and funded by drugs and weapons that come mainly from Paraguay. This growing illicit trade has also turned Brazil into a prime export point for narcotics from South America to North America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Because of the complexity of the TBA's organized crime cluster, as well as the weakness of regional counter-terrorist protocols, we recommend engaging international authorities with regional mandates over the core crimes of corruption, money laundering, and proceeds of crime, with the aim of dismantling the source from the fusion centre. These authorities include: the IMF, UNODC, UN CTED, and FATF. Given that the US is largely absent from the region, it is recommended to open pathways to the US and European enforcement communities and the aforementioned authorities through well-structured workshops in Washington, DC and other key cities to build awareness. The other way to influence regional ITTP is to become a larger stakeholder in the Paraguayan tobacco industry. Details: New York: Counter Terrorism Project, 2018. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Dec. 12, 2018 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/The%20Many%20Criminal%20Heads%20of%20the%20Golden%20Hydra%20%28May%202018%29.pdf Year: 2018 Country: South America URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/The%20Many%20Criminal%20Heads%20of%20the%20Golden%20Hydra%20%28May%202018%29.pdf Shelf Number: 154457 Keywords: Illicit TobaccoIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of CrimeSmugglingTerroristsTobacco |
Author: Greenpeace Title: How the illegal totoaba trade in Hong Kong is pushing Mexico's vaquita to the brink of extinction Summary: The vaquita, a small porpoise found only in the upper Gulf of California in Mexico, is one of the world's most endangered mammals. In the past three years, half of the vaquita population has been killed by fishing nets, many of them set illegally to capture an endangered fish called totoaba. The most recent scientific report published in Aug 2014 by the international Vaquita Recovery Team (CIRVA) estimated that there are only 97 vaquitas alive in the wild. They are expected to go extinct by 2018 unless drastic steps are taken immediately. Many vaquitas have died in nets set for totoaba, the giant endangered fish that can reach two metres in length and 100kg in weight. They are caught for their valuable swim bladders, which are largely believed to be smuggled out of Mexico, often through the United States, destined to Hong Kong and then China. While the Mexican government has placed a two-year ban on destructive gillnet fishing in the vaquita's habitat, more needs to be done to save the vaquita, particularly in relation to the illegal fishing and smuggling of totoaba swim bladders. Therefore, Greenpeace East Asia (hereafter 'Greenpeace') conducted two investigations in Hong Kong earlier this year in February and April to find out if totoaba swim bladders (CITES Appendix 1 species) were being sold and traded in Hong Kong, what would be the possible trade pattern and scale, and who would be the buyers and sellers if these smuggling activities were happening in Hong Kong. By getting a better understanding of the totoaba swim bladder's illegal trade, we would be able to push the concerned government parties (in Hong Kong, China, Mexico and US) to take concrete actions to address the issue. Details: Hong Kong: Greepeace East Asia, 2015. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2019 at: https://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/campaigns/Oceans/HK%20Totoaba%20Trade_Greenpeace%20Media%20Briefing.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Hong Kong URL: https://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/campaigns/Oceans/HK%20Totoaba%20Trade_Greenpeace%20Media%20Briefing.pdf Shelf Number: 155572 Keywords: Criminal Networks Endangered Species Environmental Crime Illegal Fishing Illegal Trade Marine Mammals Organized Crime SmugglingWildlife Crime |
Author: United Nations Environment Programme Title: Enforcement Strategies for Combating the Illegal Trade in HCFCs and Methyl Bromide Summary: The Path to Ozone Recovery: The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is widely considered to be the most successful international environmental agreement. Working together, the 197 Parties to the Montreal Protocol have reduced global production and consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODS) by over 97%, placing the ozone layer on the path to recovery. In addition to preventing millions of cases of skin cancer, cataracts and other human health, agricultural and ecosystem damage by preventing additional damage to the stratospheric ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol has also made a major contribution to climate protection because most ODS are also potent greenhouse gases with long atmospheric lifetimes. The Emergence of Illegal Trade in ODS: However, despite the overall success of the agreement, the path to ozone recovery has not been without bumps along the way. In the early 1990's, a burgeoning black market trade in chlorofuorocarbons (CFCs) and other ODS arose as an unintended result of Montreal Protocol controls. It is estimated that illegal materials accounted for as much as 15% of the world trade in CFCs by the mid-1990s. Thanks to the efforts of government, industry, academia and non-government organisations (NGOs), the illegal trade in CFCs and other ODS has declined signifcantly since the problem was frst discovered, and global awareness of the problem of illegal trade in ODS is at an all-time high. High Risk of Smuggling in HCFCs and Methyl Bromide: As Parties begin to implement phase-out schedules for hydrochlorofuorocarbons (HCFCs), they can work to avoid a similar threat. HCFCs became the frst generation of substitute chemicals for CFCs when production and consumption of CFCs were phased out under the Montreal Protocol (the phase-out was completed as of 1 January 2010, with certain exemptions). Current uses of HCFCs include refrigeration, foam, solvent, aerosol and frefghting sectors. They are also used as raw materials, or feedstock, in the production of other chemical products. The Parties to the Montreal Protocol: classifed HCFCs, with considerably lower ozone depleting potentials (ODP) than CFCs, as "transitional substances" that could be used to facilitate the prompt phase out of CFCs in applications where non-ODS options were not yet available, but ultimately HCFCs were also scheduled for phase out. Although having considerably lower ODP than CFCs, HCFCs pose a signifcant threat to the global climate. HCFCs have global warming potentials between 700 and 2,300 times that of carbon dioxide. Recognising the ozone and climate impact of the continued use of HCFCs, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed in 2007 to accelerate the phase out of these substances. HCFCs are to be completely phased out in developed countries by 2020 and in developing countries by 2030, with an initial freeze in 2013 and a 10% reduction step in 2015 (see table opposite). A number of countries, both developing and developed, have decided to phase out HCFCs faster than required by the Montreal Protocol and have introduced bans for selected uses. The limited supply creates demand for HCFCs in these countries, which in turn provides incentives for HCFC smuggling. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction/information/mmcfiles/7622-e-Enforcement_Strategies_Illegal_Trade_HCFCs.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.igsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Illegal_Trade_HCFCs_Methyl-Bromide.pdf Shelf Number: 156564 Keywords: Enforcement Environmental Crime Hazardous Waste HCFCs Illegal Trade in Waste Illegal Waste Illicit Trade Methyl Bromide Offenses Against the Environment Smuggling |
Author: Herbert, Matthew Title: 'La Mal Vie': The Routes, the Drivers and Politics of North African Irregular Migration Summary: Between 2016 and 2019 irregular migration by North Africans to Europe increased noticeably. The rising numbers are driven by economic pessimism, social frustration and structural inequality. Old routes, which stretch from North African to European shores, have resurged in popularity. While some North African migrants engage with smugglers to take them north, a growing number are opting to organise their trip themselves, buying boats and heading for Europe. This dynamic has changed the politics around migration for both North African governments and those European nations offering aid. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2019. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2019 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar-3-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.org/research/north-africa-report/la-mal-vie-the-routes-drivers-and-politics-of-north-african-irregular-migration Shelf Number: 158101 Keywords: Human Trafficking Irregular Migration Migrants Migration Smugglers Smuggling |