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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for smuggling of goods
11 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contraband Interdiction Efforts Summary: The Federal Bu reau of Prisons (BOP) faces the persistent problem of contraband smuggling. The introduction of contraband can pose grave dangers to BOP staff and the approximately 200,000 federal inmates in BOP custody, as well as to visitors and the public. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to examine the BOP's security procedures to interdict contraband. We also interviewed representatives from selected state prison systems regard ing their contraband interdiction strategies and staff search policies and procedures. Contraband is defined in 28 C.F.R. § SOO.l(h) as prohibited materials "which can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the security, safety, or good order of the institution." Such items include weapons, drugs, currency, tobacco, telephones, and electronic devices. According to BOP data, cell phones were the most common type of contraband recovered from fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2014. An inmate with a cell phone, particularly a smartphone, can carry out criminal activities undetected, including threatening and intimidating witnesses, victims, and public officials, and coordinate escape attempts. The BOP reports that over 8,700 cell phones were recovered during this period, 2,012 more than the next most common contraband type, weapons. The data shows that while cell phone recoveries decreased slightly during this period, recoveries of other contraband, such as weapons, narcotics, and tobacco, increased significantly. However, as described below, we have concerns about the completeness of the BOP's data. Results in Brief The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking Capability We found that the BOP lacks a comprehensive contraband tracking system, and current data collection methods impede its ability to effectively track contraband recoveries and analyze contraband trends. The BOP has taken steps to automate data collection on contraband recoveries, such as by implementing TRUINTEL, a data base for entering information associated with inmate investigations, including contraband recoveries. However, BOP staff told us TRUINTEL was not designed to be a comprehensive contraband tracking system. We found that TRUINTEL does not provide a complete picture of contraband recoveries because certain contraband may not be entered and multiple contraband items may be entered as only one item. We also found that automated log books used to document contraband recovered during unit searches are not linked to TRUINTEL. With regard to cell phones, TRUINTEL does not capture all data available through the other methods the BOP uses to track recovered cell phones, including both the BOP's unit log books and its "Cell Phones Recovered" reports. Unlike TRUINTEL, the "Cell Phones Recovered" reports include all phones confiscated, regard less of whether the phones are attributed to an inmate; however, these reports lack details that make duplicative entries in TRUINTEL unidentifiable. The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy to Deter Staff Introduction of Contraband In a January 2003 report, the OIG recommended that the BOP revise its staff search policy to require searches of staff and their property when entering institutions. After more than 10 years of negotiation with its union, the BOP implemented a new staff search policy in 2013. However, in June 2015, just prior to the completion of our fieldwork for this review, the Federal Labor Relations Authority ordered the BOP to cease and desist using the 2013 staff search policy following a union challenge to it. 1 The BOP then reinstated the policy on March 28, 2016 with minor changes not relevant to this review. As a result, more than 13 years after our 2003 report, the BOP still has no comprehensive and effective staff search policy. We found significant deficiencies with the 2013 policy and its implementation. The policy provided that all staff and their belongings could be searched randomly or based on reasonable suspicion when entering, reentering, or inside an institution or on its grounds. However, the policy did not prescribe any required frequency for conducting random pat searches, resulting in what we found to be infrequent staff pat searches of varying duration. It also allowed staff to possess and use within institutions items, such as tobacco, that are prohibited for inmates. Additionally, despite the BOP concurring in 2003 with the OIG's recommendation that it restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into institutions, the 2013 policy contained no such restrictions. The policy further permitted staff to return to their vehicles to store contraband that had been identified during front lobby screening procedures, unless doing so would jeopardize the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or public safety. Finally, the policy did not ensure that only trained and supervised staff was assigned to front lobby positions, and we found that at some institutions entry-level Information Receptionists were assigned to these positions. Our research also indicated that the staff search policies governing state prison systems are often more strict in many of these areas. The safety and security of staff and inmates will continue to be at risk until the BOP develops and implements a comprehensive and effective staff search policy. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-05: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Shelf Number: 145579 Keywords: Contraband GoodFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ContrabandSmuggling of Goods |
Author: Clague, Chris Title: The Illicit Trade Environment Index Summary: The nature of illicit trade makes its size hard to determine. Enabled by varying combinations of corruption, incompetence and indifference, it defies all but the broadest estimates. Yet, there's sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that the volume of counterfeit and mis-declared goods, drugs, weapons and other types of illicit trade moving across borders has been increasing and will continue to do so. History has shown that illicit trade tends to follow the same routes as its licit counterpart. As the Asian region continues to integrate through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the ASEAN Economic Community, there will be opportunities for more trade of both types. There is widespread agreement on the factors that together can create an environment where illicit trade flourishes. The Economist Intelligence Unit created the Illicit Trade Environment Index to score 17 economies in Asia on the extent to which they enable illicit trade. Economies with the best environment are those taking the most action on the issue while economies that do little score worst. Key findings from the research are: l Australia (85.2 out of 100) tops the overall rankings, with New Zealand (81.8) and Hong Kong (81.4) not far behind. l Although it scores well on customs environment, Singapore (69.8) does worse than might be expected overall, mainly due to low scores in the transparency and trade category. The bottom half of the rankings is comprised mainly of developing economies, with Myanmar (10.8), Laos (12.9), and Cambodia (23.9) performing the worst. China (61.6) scores better than its reputation would suggest on the strength of improving intellectual property protection and increasing transparency. While there have been encouraging signs that more is being done to combat illicit trade, many economies in the region - not all of them developing - clearly have more to do in this area. The Illicit Trade Environment Index and this paper are meant to stimulate discussion in these economies and elsewhere. Details: London: The Economist, Intelligence Unit, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2016 at: http://illicittradeindex.eiu.com/ECC%20Illicit%20trade%20paper%20V9_Oct12.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://illicittradeindex.eiu.com/ECC%20Illicit%20trade%20paper%20V9_Oct12.pdf Shelf Number: 146682 Keywords: Illegal TradeIllicit TradeSmuggling of Goods |
Author: FICCI Title: Socio-Economic Impact of Counterfeiting, Smuggling and Tax Evasion in Seven Key Indian Industry Sectors: Executive Summary Summary: This report is a first ever compilation of facts and figures on counterfeiting, smuggling and tax evasion in seven key industry sectors in India. This research has deployed a methodology which is by far the most comprehensive till date, at least in India. Lakhs of data points have been analyzed and 129 existing sources have been referred and relied upon. The data crunching was followed by a robust validation exercise with relevant stake holders. This qualitative element is the most significant part of the research that needs to be emphasized before this audience and all those who read and make use of it. Our industry and government is very concerned about weak intellectual property protection and enforcement in India. The exponential growth of intellectual property (IP) crime has been illustrated very clearly by various studies and information from a variety of sources as well as the media. While counterfeiting used to consist primarily of apparel and other such items, the high profitability and low risk involved has allowed criminals, including organized crime rings, to become very active, counterfeiting virtually everything including, for instance, pharmaceutical products, electrical products, software, movies, food, wine, personal care products, automobile parts and luxury goods. While IP crime can lack, for some, the social stigma of many other criminal offences, this illegal activity is a drain on the economy and is responsible for loss of employment, a reduction in tax revenues for governments, and poses serious consumer health and safety risks due to the poor quality of products and sometimes hazardous nature of the fakes. Virtually no industry escapes this illegal activity. Details: New Delhi: FICCI, 2012. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://ficcicascade.com/studies.php?adjacents=10&page=4 Year: 2012 Country: India URL: http://ficcicascade.com/studies.php?adjacents=10&page=4 Shelf Number: 146104 Keywords: Counterfeit GoodsCounterfeitingOrganized CrimeSmuggling of GoodsTax Evasion |
Author: Thought Arbitrage Research Institute Title: Invisible Enemy: A Threat to our National Interests Summary: Smuggling is defined as "the clandestine import of goods from one jurisdiction to another." According to the Customs Act, 1962 the term "smuggling" has vast connotations and means "any act or omission which will render such goods liable for confiscation under Sections 111 or 113 of the said Act." This report focuses on smuggling of legal goods (excluding prohibited goods) into Indian borders and which can be confiscated under the Customs Act 1962. Smuggling of Goods/ Products: Terms and Interpretations Outright smuggling as defined by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) is "the secret movement of goods across national borders to avoid customs duties or import or export restrictions." Non-declaration (where no product is declared at port of entry) as well as not being in possession of any legal import documentation can also be considered as outright smuggling. On the other hand, smuggling could take place through legal channels of trade by various means to evade customs duties and other taxes applicable on such goods and products. This is referred to as Technical smuggling and such goods are liable for confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act 1962. Ways and means of technical smuggling may classified into four categories based on seizure data of DRI: • Undervaluation • Mis-declaration • Misuse of End Use and Other Notifications • Other Means Smuggling and Its Impact on the Country The effects of smuggling are numerous and economically significant. Smuggling is a serious problem and its impacts are far reaching, affecting various stakeholders including Government, domestic industries and citizens of the country. Invisible Enemy - A Threat to our National Interests: Extent Causes and Remedies. which estimates the extent of smuggling of the top five key goods into India, namely: • Gold • Machinery and Parts • Cigarettes • Fabrics, Silk and Yarn • Electronic Items This report further attempts to highlight the key challenges posed by smuggling and the possible solutions needed to make compliance and processes more robust which will reduce the threat of smuggling. Details: New Delhi: FICCI Committee Against Smuggling and Counterfeiting Activities Destroying Economy (CASCADE), 2016. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://ficci.in/spdocument/20807/final-Smuggling-report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: India URL: http://ficci.in/spdocument/20807/final-Smuggling-report.pdf Shelf Number: 140764 Keywords: Cigarette SmugglingSmuggling of Goods |
Author: Thought Arbitrage Research Institute Title: Illicit Markets - A Threat to Our National Interests. The Alcoholic Beverages Industry Summary: Illicit markets have broad economy-wide effects on trade, investment, employment, innovation, criminality, environment, and most importantly, on the health and safety of the consumers. Over and above, it also has a negative impact on the brand image and loss of revenue for industry and governments. In the alcoholic beverage industry, the industry faces a twin problem. Firstly, the production of alcohol under non-standard conditions which are much more harmful, life threatening and, secondly, the smuggling of these products which escape state taxes and duties applicable to this sector. As alcoholic beverages industry is a state subject, manufacturers have to conform to regulations legislated by each state which vary from state to state and sometimes loopholes in such differences in regulations can fuel illicit trade. Given the thrust on "Make in India"; technology, invention, and innovation will play a key role in India's current economic development. However, counterfeits and fakes will threaten India's growth strategy. Hence, a proactive strategy should be in place to fight this serious menace to public health and safety, and to the state exchequer. This report has estimated the size of the illicit market; its adverse impact on innovation and investment in the alcoholic beverage industry. I am certain that the findings from this report would increase consumer awareness, drive support from policy makers in tax related reforms and step up the industry for greater investment in R&D and encourage innovation. Details: New Delhi: FICCI Cascade, 2016. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://tari.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Alcoholic-Beverages.pdf Year: 2016 Country: India URL: http://tari.co.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Alcoholic-Beverages.pdf Shelf Number: 144933 Keywords: Alcohol IndustryIllicit MarketsIllicit TradeSmuggling of Goods |
Author: World Customs Organization Title: Illicit Trade Report 2013 Summary: The 2013 edition of the WCO Illicit Trade Report continues a new paradigm set last year, where the results of the work undertaken by the global Customs community to fight cross-border crime are being released to the general public. The toxic and corrosive nature of illicit trade and organized transnational crime harms economic growth and job creation, challenges the rule of law, robs governments of needed revenue and threatens human rights and quality of life, and thus requires a strong, internationally coordinated response. This Report focuses on five major areas addressed by Customs enforcement on a daily basis: environmental crime and illegal trade in natural resources; intellectual property infringements and trade in substances that pose a threat to public health and safety; smuggling and counterfeiting of excisable goods, such as tobacco and alcohol, as well as illicit financial flows; trade in illegal drugs; and illegal trade in dangerous and prohibited goods. The Report Sections address these areas using a common methodology: Customs seizures recorded in the WCO Customs Enforcement Network are analysed to develop trends and patterns concerning the aforementioned areas of enforcement. The Report also contains information on the results of international enforcement programmes, projects and operations conducted in 2013 that were organized and coordinated by the WCO, its international partners and its Member administrations in the five enforcement areas covered in the Report. We are particularly pleased to note that in 2013 more WCO Members reported their seizures to the CEN than in 2012. While much work still needs to be done, this is an important step towards shedding more light on the parallel and underground economy, and it serves as tangible proof of the commitment of the global enforcement community to address these challenges. Knowing the importance of high-quality information for policymakers, the WCO will continue working with its Members to improve the quality of seizure data, and increase its input into CEN. More complete information will allow the WCO and the Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices to provide a better service to the global Customs community. This Report will contribute to the WCO's growing pool of knowledge that will support analysis of, and actions against illicit trade. Given that the current year has been designated as the WCO Year of Communication, we are delighted to be able to share with you the valuable information contained in this Report. Details: Brussels: World Customs Organization, 2014. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/illicit-trade-report/illicit-2013-_-en_lr2.pdf?db=web Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/illicit-trade-report/illicit-2013-_-en_lr2.pdf?db=web Shelf Number: 146008 Keywords: Counterfeiting of GoodsCustoms SeizurresEnvironmental CrimeIllegal Trade Intellectual PropertyNatural ResourcesSmuggling of Goods |
Author: United Nations Environment Programme Title: Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleting Substances: Asia and Pacific Region Summary: llegal trade has become one of the major obstacles in achieving efficient phase out of ozone depleting substances (ODS) in developing countries. Activities have been encouraged on a national, regional and global scale to improve the process of monitoring and control of ODS in order to prevent illegal trade. Enforcement of legislation dealing with ODS is needed through investment in customs resources, including training and equipment and emphasising the important role of cooperation between enforcement authorities at national and regional level. This is an assessment report on Illegal Trade in Ozone Depleting Substances in Asia and Pacific region. It analyses the smuggling reasons, routes and trends of ODS, and also presents the outcome of a desk study on trans-boundary movement of ODS in the region. It could assist customs officers, ozone officers and other enforcement officers in their work to control trade in ODS. Details: Bangkok, Thailand: UNEP, 2017. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction/information/mmcfiles/6075-e-illegal-trade-asia.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction/information/mmcfiles/6075-e-illegal-trade-asia.pdf Shelf Number: 146100 Keywords: Environmental Crime Illegal Trade Offenses Against the Environment Ozone Depletion Smuggling of Goods |
Author: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group - ESAAMLG Title: Typologies report on money laundering related to illicit dealings in and smuggling of motor vehicles in the ESAAMLG region Summary: Motor vehicles play a vital role in the economic and social growth of every country. However, motor vehicles have recently become instruments and a source of illegally obtained financial gains for criminal syndicates and individuals. This study was aimed at identifying vulnerabilities of money laundering and terrorist financing associated with illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling through case studies from the region in order to identify the trends and methods used to launder the proceeds generated from the illicit dealing in and smuggling of motor vehicles. The study further identifies gaps and efforts put in place by governments and other stakeholders to address illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling. The study also identifies the role played by those involved in the illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling and its economic and social impact thereof, the source and destination of smuggled vehicles, the licensing and supervision of motor vehicle dealers and the modus operandi. The study establishes how the illicit generated proceeds are or have previously been laundered and whether proceeds can be linked with the funding of other crimes including funding of terrorist activities. Based on the case studies, it is clear that bonded warehouses and Financial Institutions are being misused to facilitate money laundering activities with the real estate being the most vulnerable area where the proceeds are used. The study has also shown that insurance companies are widely affected by fraudulent claims made by motor vehicle owners who illegally export their vehicles and later report them stolen. Details: Dar es Salaam - United Republic of Tanzania: ESAAMLG, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Presented at the 24th Joaquim Chissano International Conference Centre ESAAMLG Task Force of Senior Officials Meeting 24 - 30 August 2012 Maputo, MozambiqueAccessed November 10, 2017 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Illicit%20Dealings%20in%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Motor%20Vehicles%20Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Illicit%20Dealings%20in%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Motor%20Vehicles%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 148125 Keywords: Automobile TheftMoney LaunderingSmuggling of GoodsTerrorist FinancingVehicle Theft |
Author: Akkerman, Mark Title: Expanding the Fortress: The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU's border externalisation programme Summary: The plight of the world's 66 million forcibly displaced persons tends to only trouble the European Union's conscience when the media spotlight turns on a tragedy at Europe's borders or when displacment is perceived to be en route to Europe. Only one European nation - Germany - is even in the top ten countries worldwide that receive refugees leaving the vast majority of forcibly displaced persons hosted by some of the world's poorest nations. The invisibility therefore is only broken when border communities such as Calais, Lampedusa, Lesvos become featured in the news as desperate people fleeing violence end up dead, detained or trapped. These tragedies aren't just unfortunate results of war or conflict elsewhere, they are also the direct result of Europe's policies on migration since the Schengen agreement in 1985. This approach has focused on fortifying borders, developing ever more sophisticated surveillance and tracking of people, and increasing deportations while providing ever fewer legal options for residency despite ever greater need. This has led many forcibly displaced persons unable to enter Europe legally and forced into ever more dangerous routes to escape violence and conflict. What is less well-known is that the same European-made tragedy plays out well beyond our borders in countries as far away as Senegal and Azerbaijan. This is due to another pillar of Europe's approach to migration, known as border externalisation. Since 1992 and even more aggressively since 2005, the EU has developed a policy of externalising Europe's border so that forcibly displaced people never get to Europe's borders in the first place. These policies involve agreements with Europe's neighbouring countries to accept deported persons and adopt the same policies of border control, improved tracking of people and fortified borders as Europe. In other words, these agreements have turned Europe's neighbours into Europe's new border guards. And because they are so far from Europe's shores and media, the impacts are almost completely invisible to EU citizens. This report seeks to shine a spotlight on the policies that underpin this externalisation of Europe's borders, the agreements that have been signed, the corporations and entities that profit, and the consequences for forcibly displaced people as well as the countries and populations that host them. It is the third in a series, Border Wars, that have examined Europe's border policies and shown how the arms and security industry has helped shape European border security policies and have then reaped the rewards for ever more border security measures and contracts. This report shows a significant growth in border externalisation measures and agreements since 2005 and a massive acceleration since the November 2015 Valletta Europe - Africa Summit. Using a plethora of new instruments, in particular the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Migration Partnership Framework and the Refugee Facility for Turkey, the European Union and individual member states are now providing millions of euros for an array of projects to stop migration of certain people from taking place on or across European territory. This includes collaboration with third countries in terms of accepting deported persons, training of their police and border officials, the development of extensive biometric systems, and donations of equipment including helicopters, patrol ships and vehicles, surveillance and monitoring equipment. While many projects are done through the European Commission, a number of individual member states, such as Spain, Italy and Germany also take a lead in funding and training through bilateral agreements with non-EU-countries. What makes this collaboration in the context of border externalisation particularly problematic is that many of the governments receiving the support are deeply authoritarian, and the support they are receiving is often going to precisely the state security organs most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. The European Union in all its policies has a fine rhetoric on the importance of human rights, democracy and rule of law, but there seems to be no limits to the EU's willingness to embrace dictatorial regimes as long as they commit to preventing 'irregular migration' reaching Europe's shores. As a result there have been EU agreements and funding provided to regimes as infamous as Chad, Niger, Belarus, Libya and Sudan. These policies therefore have far-reaching consequences for forcibly displaced persons, whose 'illegal' status already makes them vulnerable and more likely to face human rights abuses. Many end up in either exploitative working conditions, detention and/or get deported back to the countries they have fled from. Women refugees in particular face high risks of gender-based violence, sexual assault and exploitation. Violence and repression against forcibly displaced persons also pushes migration underground, reconfigures the business of smuggling and reinforces the power of criminal smuggling networks. As a result, many persons have been forced to look for other, often more dangerous routes and to rely on ever more unscrupulous traffickers. This leads to an even higher death toll. Moreover the strengthening of state security organs throughout the MENA, Maghreb, Sahel and Horn of Africa regions also threatens the human rights and democratic accountability of the region, particularly as it also diverts much needed resources from economic and social spending. Indeed, this report shows that Europe's obsession with preventing migrants is not only diverting resources, it is also distorting Europe's trade, aid and international relationships with the entire region. As many experts have pointed out, this is laying the ground for further instability and insecurity in the region and the likelihood of greater refugees in the future. There is however one group that have benefited greatly from the EU's border externalisation programmes. As the earlier Border Wars reports showed, it is the European military and security industry that have derived the most benefit for delivering much of the equipment and services for border security. They are accompanied by a number of intergovernmental and (semi-)public institutions that have grown significantly in recent years as they implement dozens of projects on border security and control in non-EU-countries. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute (TNI), 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2018 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf Shelf Number: 150748 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityDeportationImmigrantsImmigrationImmigration PolicyRefugeesSmuggling of Goods |
Author: Bate, Roger Title: Large Cigarette Tax Hikes, Illicit Producers, and Organized Crime: Lessons from Pakistan Summary: With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan's authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled. Details: Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2018 at: https://www.aei.org/publication/large-cigarette-tax-hikes-illicit-producers-and-organized-crime-lessons-from-pakistan/ Year: 2018 Country: Pakistan URL: https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Large-Cigarette-Tax-Hikes-Illicit-Producers-and-Organized-Crime.pdf Shelf Number: 151466 Keywords: CigarettesIllicit TradeOrganized CrimeSmugglingSmuggling of GoodsTobacco |
Author: Ollus, Natalia Title: Addressing Human Trafficking in the Baltic Sea: Nordic-Baltic Partnership with Passenger Ferry Companies to Counter Trafficking in Human Beings, Smuggling of Migrants and Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Baltic Sea Region Summary: The free movement of goods and passengers within the European Union makes travel in the Baltic Sea region relatively easy, and ferries are used both for leisure and business purposes. At the same time, global mobility is on the increase, with more labour migrants as well as asylum seekers and refugees moving from one country to another (IOM 2016). Because of global inequalities and increasingly restrictive immigration policies, migrants from developing regions, in particular, increasingly either intentionally use or end up in the hands of human traffickers, smugglers or other organized criminals assisting them in the crossing of borders (UNODC 2010). Details: Helsinki, Finland: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI), 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 31, 2019 at: https://eea.iom.int/publications/addressing-human-trafficking-baltic-sea-nordic-baltic-partnership-passenger-ferry Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://iom.fi/sites/default/files/news/HEUNI_IOM%20report.pdf Shelf Number: 156123 Keywords: Forced Labor Human Smuggling Human Trafficking Maritime Crime Migrant Labor Migrant Smuggling Organized Crime Smuggling of Goods |