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Results for stolen vehicles

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Author: Roberts, David J.

Title: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems: Policy and Operational Guidance for Law Enforcement

Summary: Law enforcement officers are often searching for vehicles that have been reported stolen, are suspected of being involved in criminal or terrorist activities, are owned by persons who are wanted by authorities, have failed to pay parking violations or maintain current vehicle license registration, and any of a number of other factors. Law enforcement agencies throughout the nation are increasingly adopting automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technologies, which function to automatically capture an image of the vehicle’s license plate, transform that image into alphanumeric characters, compare the plate number acquired to one or more databases of vehicles of interest, and alert the officer when a vehicle of interest has been observed, all within a matter of seconds This project was designed to assess ALPR implementation among law enforcement agencies in the United States, and to identify emerging implementation practices to provide operational and policy guidance to the field. A random sample of 444 local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies was surveyed. A total of 305 agencies responded to the initial survey (68.7%). Threequarters of respondents (235 agencies, 77.0%) indicated that they were not using ALPR, while 70 agencies (23.0%) responded that they were using ALPR. A longer, more detailed survey was sent to the 70 agencies who confirmed they were using ALPR, and 40 agencies (57.1%) responded. Survey respondents had typically implemented mobile ALPR systems (95%), and were primarily using ALPR for auto theft (69%), vehicle and traffic enforcement (28%), and investigations (25%). Agencies reported increases in stolen vehicle recoveries (68%), arrests (55%), and productivity (50%). Fewer than half (48%) had developed ALPR policies. Over half (53%) updated their ALPR hot lists wirelessly, and nearly half (43%) updated their hot lists once each day. A total of 40% of respondents retain ALPR data for six months or less (n=16). Five respondents (13%) indicated they retain ALPR data indefinitely, while two indicated that retention is based on the storage capacity of the equipment installed. ALPR technology is a significant tool in the arsenal of law enforcement and public safety agencies. Realizing the core business values that ALPR promises, however, can only be achieved through proper planning, implementation, training, deployment, use, and management of the technology and the information it provides. Like all tools and technologies available to law enforcement, ALPR must also be carefully managed. Policies must be developed and strictly enforced to ensure the quality of the data, the security of the system, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and the privacy of information gathered.

Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2012. 128p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239604.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: United States

URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239604.pdf

Shelf Number: 126737

Keywords:
Automated License Plate Scanning (U.S.)
Criminal Investigations
Motor Vehicle Theft
Stolen Vehicles
Surveillance Equipment

Author: Frontex

Title: Annual Risk Analysis 2013

Summary: Detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU’s external borders dropped sharply in 2012 to about 73 000, i.e. half the number reported in 2011. This was the first time since systematic data collection began in 2008 that annual detections have plunged under 100 000. In the Central Mediterranean area, the large number of detections in 2011, which suddenly increased following the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Libya, had been significantly reduced by the end of 2011. However, throughout 2012, detections steadily increased and by the end of the year they totalled more than 10 300. Starting from 2008, considerable numbers of migrants had been detected crossing illegally the border between Turkey and Greece, along the so-called Eastern Mediterranean route. The situation changed dramatically in August 2012 when the Greek authorities mobilised unprecedented resources at their land border with Turkey, including the deployment of 1 800 additional Greek police officers. The number of detected illegal border-crossings rapidly dropped from about 2 000 in the first week of August to below 10 per week in October 2012. The enhanced controls along the Greek-Turkish land border led to a moderate increase in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Aegean Sea and at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey, but simultaneous mitigation efforts in Turkey and Bulgaria have so far contained the displacements. There remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before they continue their journey towards Europe. Many migrants who cross the border illegally to Greece move on to other Member States, mostly through the land route across the Western Balkans. Contrary to the decrease at the Greek-Turkish land border, there was no decrease in detections of illegal border- crossing on the Western Balkan route (6 390, +37%). In 2012, in the Western Mediterranean area between North Africa and Spain, detections of illegal border-crossing decreased by nearly a quarter compared to 2011 but remained above the levels recorded in previous years (6 400, -24%). In 2012, Afghans remained the most detected nationality for illegal border-crossing at EU level, but their number considerably dropped compared to 2011. Syrians stand out, with large increases in detections of illegal bordercrossing and for using fraudulent documents compared to 2011. Most of the detected Syrians applied for asylum in the EU, fleeing the civil war in their country. There were large increases in refusals of entry at the Polish land border with Belarus and Ukraine. However, these increases were offset by a decrease in refusals of entry issued at other border sections, resulting in a stable total at EU level compared to 2011 (-3%, 115 000 refusals of entry). Detections of illegal stayers, which totalled about 350 000 in the EU in 2012, have shown a stable but slightly declining long-term trend since 2008. Most migrants detected illegally staying in the EU were from Afghanistan and Morocco. Despite a short-term increase of 10% between 2011 and 2012, the overall trend of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling since 2008, totalling about 7 700 in 2012. This long-term decline may be in part due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels (such as overstaying, abuse of visa-free regime, etc.) and document fraud, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously. In 2012, there were around 8 000 detections of migrants using fraudulent documents to enter the EU or Schengen area illegally. Preliminary data on asylum applications in 2012 indicate an overall increase of about 7% compared to the previous year. While Afghans continue to account for the largest share of applications, much of the increase was due to an increasing number of applications submitted by Syrian nationals. The number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by Western Balkan citizens, mostly those from Serbia, remained unabated in 2012. Consequently, following the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement with five Western Balkan countries that started at the end of 2009, there are now discussions in the EU about the possible reintroduction of the visa regime. In 2012, there was a steady trend of about 160 000 third-country nationals effectively returned to third countries. Greece reported the largest number of returns of a single nationality (Albanians), and effective returns in Greece increased markedly in the last quarter of 2012 following the launch of the Xenios Zeus operation. Looking ahead, the assessment of risks along the EU’s external borders shows that despite a sharp reduction in detections between 2011 and 2012, the risks associated with illegal border- crossing along the land and sea external borders remain among the highest, in particular in the southern section of the border of the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing along the land borders of the Eastern Mediterranean route, including the Greek and Bulgarian land border with Turkey, is assessed amongst the highest. This comes after several years of large numbers of migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey. Although the flow abruptly stopped in August 2012, there are reports of uncertainties related to the sustainability of the efforts and growing evidence that migrants are waiting in Turkey for the end of the operation. Increases at the neighbouring sea border (Aegean Sea), at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey and increases in detections of document fraud from Istanbul airports, although so far relatively small, indicate that alternatives to the Greek land border are being explored by facilitators. Many of the migrants who crossed illegally through the Eastern Mediterranean route are expected to continue making secondary movements across the Western Balkans and within the EU. The risk of illegal border-crossing across the Central Mediterranean area was also assessed amongst the highest due the continued volatile situation in countries of departure in North Africa. Crisis situations are still likely to arise at the southern border with thousands of people trying to cross the border illegally in the span of several weeks or months. Past experiences also show that these crises take their toll on human lives, and are very difficult to predict and quell without a coordinated response. Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU. These risks are also common to nearly all Member States, as they are associated with passenger flows and border checks, which are a specific expertise of bordercontrol authorities. Fraud is expected mostly among EU travel documents (e.g. passports, visas and ID cards). False pretence or deception is used to obtain a wide range of documents. The most common technique is to use fraudulent documents to obtain short-term visas. Most risks associated with the abuse of legal channels are assessed as high as they are common and widely spread phenomena. Based on currently available information, the risks associated with cross-border criminality are assessed as moderate, including the risks of trafficking in human beings, terrorism, smuggling of illicit drugs and exit of stolen vehicles.

Details: Warsaw, Poland: Frontex, 2013. 84p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf

Shelf Number: 128911

Keywords:
Border Control
Border Security
Drug Smuggling
Human Trafficking
Illegal Immigration
Risk Assessment (Europe)
Stolen Vehicles

Author: Gounev, Philip Martinov

Title: Backdoor Traders: Illicit entrepreneurs and legitimate markets

Summary: This dissertation examines the factors that determine the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs in legitimate markets. The particular aspect studied is how such entrepreneurs enter a new market when they immigrate into a new country (Chapter 1). The empirical focus of the thesis is the Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs involved in the sale of stolen cars. More specifically, the dissertation compares their market behaviour in Bulgaria and in Spain between the late 1990s and 2010. The empirical basis for the dissertation is a comprehensive analysis of summaries of 86 Spanish police investigations against organised crime networks, as well as fieldwork consisting of interviews with 79 offenders, law-enforcement officers, entrepreneurs, and car-dealers in Spain and Bulgaria (Chapter 2). To best understand the intertwining of criminal entrepreneurs and legitimate markets the thesis starts by examining the operations of the car markets in Spain and Bulgaria (Chapter 3). It goes on to explain the ‘car-theft industry’ – focusing on how criminal enterprises and networks are structured and operate (Chapter 4). The analysis then continues by comparing how stolen cars are sold by illegal entrepreneurs in Bulgaria and Spain, and the different ways in which ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ markets intertwine (Chapter 5). The conclusion of this analysis is that Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs failed to enter the market for used cars in Spain, and instead preferred to traffic and sell the stolen cars in Bulgaria. There are two sets of factors that explain the reasons behind this failure. The first one is the local socio-economic and historical legacies in Bulgaria, which explain how illegal entrepreneurs and buyers (typically part of local economic elites) are linked (Chapter 6), and the factors that fuel demand for stolen cars. The role of the Bulgarian immigrant community in Spain is also considered. The second set of factors, examined through the lenses of economic theories, includes the economic / business rationale that influences the illegal entrepreneurs’ behaviour when entering a market (Chapter 7). The thesis goes on to conclude (Chapter 8) that it is the first set, the complex socio-economic and historical factors that best explain the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs and their failure to sell stolen cars in Spain.

Details: London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011. 307p.

Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 7, 2013 at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/168/1/Gounev_Backdoor_traders.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: Bulgaria

URL: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/168/1/Gounev_Backdoor_traders.pdf

Shelf Number: 129261

Keywords:
Car Theft
Illegal Markets
Illegal Trade (Bulgaria)
Motor Vehicle Theft
Organized Crime
Stolen Goods
Stolen Vehicles

Author: Victoria Police

Title: Addressing profit-motivated vehicle theft in Victoria's separated parts and scrap metal industries

Summary: 1. The inter-agency Task Force Discover was established to examine how the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries may facilitate profit-motivated vehicle theft (PMVT). Led by Victoria Police Crime Command, the Task Force completed a state-wide regulatory audit of motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers to reconcile anecdotal evidence that regulatory non-compliance by these businesses creates opportunities for PMVT. The Task Force aimed to develop an objective understanding of the extent of regulatory compliance among motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers and consider how levels of non-compliance related to unrecovered stolen vehicles in Victoria. 2. PMVT is a significant problem in Victoria. Data from the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council demonstrates there were 2,562 unrecovered stolen passenger and light commercial (PLC) vehicles in Victoria in 2013. The number of unrecovered PLC vehicles in Victoria has increased 21 per cent over the last five years due to the ability of vehicle thieves to profit from the growing domestic and international demand for spare parts and scrap metal. This demand has led to an expansion in the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries1, which now comprise a variety of players displaying an equally diverse range of capital resources, experience and levels of compliance with the law. Vehicle thieves can subsequently exploit the noncompliant tiers of industry to off-load, launder and sell stolen vehicles for the value of their separated parts and left over scrap metal. 3. Between September 2013 and June 2014, Task Force Discover audited a total of 432 motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers, estimated to represent approximately 90 percent of all operators in Victoria. The Task Force audited all commercial practices supporting the trade in used vehicles, spare parts and scrap metal derived from vehicles in order to: - collect intelligence on compliant and non-compliant commercial practices; - complete an authoritative assessment on the overall extent of regulatory compliance and consider implications that levels of non-compliance have for levels of PMVT in Victoria; and - improve the understanding of issues associated with the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries, including occupational health and safety (OHS) and environmental protection issues. 4. The Task Force Discover audit focussed firstly on business licensing with a Motor Car Traders Licence (MCTL), business registration with Second-Hand Dealers Registration (SHDR) and record keeping practices for the trade in vehicles due to the implications that noncompliance in these areas has for PMVT. Secondly the audit focussed on occupational health and safety and environmental protection standards for the trade in parts and scrap due to the implications that non-compliance in these areas has for community harm. Task Force investigators (comprising Victoria Police detectives) made an assessment of the regulatory compliance of each business they attended. Of the 432 motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers audited: - 302 businesses or 70 per cent were assessed by Task Force investigators as either not holding the required authorisation to trade (i.e. the correct licence or registration) or being non-compliant to some degree with the conditions of their business licence or registration. This non-compliance included: - incomplete record keeping on customer identities and vehicle identifiers - failing to make notifications to the Written-Off Vehicles Register (WOVR) - failing to undertake criminal history checks and background screening of employees, and - failing to publicly display business licensing or registration details. - 199 businesses or 46 per cent were assessed as not holding the required authorisation to trade and of these: - 112 businesses operated without a MCTL or SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a MCTL - 12 businesses operated without a MCTL or SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a SHDR - 75 businesses traded only with a SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a MCTL. - 398 businesses or 92 per cent did not submit notifications to the WOVR. - 390 businesses or 90 per cent were assessed to be non-compliant to some degree with OHS and environmental protection regulations - 82 businesses or almost 20 per cent were referred for safety breaches deemed likely to cause injury; and - 41 businesses or 9 per cent were referred for moderate environmental breaches causing obvious and ongoing serious pollution to soil and waterways.

Details: Melbourne: Victoria Police, 2014. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBridgingPage&Media_ID=108408

Year: 2014

Country: Australia

URL: http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBridgingPage&Media_ID=108408

Shelf Number: 135419

Keywords:
Automobile Theft
Motor Vehicle Theft
Scrap Metal Theft
Stolen Vehicles

Author: Center for the Study of Democracy

Title: Financing of Organised Crime

Summary: Enhancing the knowledge of the financing of organised crime is an indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to prevention and investigation. Accessing capital is a significant constraint for some criminals when they seek to become big players in illicit markets for goods and services, yet the processes and structures involved in the financial investment of criminal markets are largely under-researched. Whilst there is general information available regarding the level of financing required for a criminal group's operations in specific illicit markets - for example, the illicit drugs market is relatively well documented and there is a reasonably sound understanding of the pricing available along the entire value chain of operations, from production prices, smuggling and wholesale prices, middle-level dealing, to retail distribution, as well as with costs of the business - this is not the case with a number of other illicit markets such as organised VAT fraud, illicit excisable goods, smuggling/trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money, payment card fraud, and trafficking in stolen vehicles, etc. To enter a criminal market at the wholesale level, organised criminals may need significant financial resources including, but not restricted to, credit facilities. Their need for financing concerns every level of organized crime. However, while millions (upfront and/or on credit) may be needed to enter the cocaine market at wholesale level, participation at the retail level requires only modest resources. The same applies to manifestations of organised crime that do not require entrepreneurial characteristics and are based on predatory activities. For example, small criminal groups may need only several tens of thousands of euros to launch an international banking fraud. The entry costs for many e-crimes are insignificant. Various financial mechanisms and opportunities are available for criminal actors to fund new or existing illicit activities. However, fairly little has been done in terms of systematically analysing or targeting individuals or processes that are mainly involved in the financing of criminal structures and organised criminal activities. The financing of organised crime is the type of horizontal issue that several analyses as well as threat and strategic assessments - analyses and assessments that have been previously criticised us unreliable sources of information on organized crime - often skip, focusing instead on the proceeds of crime, criminal assets and/or money laundering. Official and informal financial services may all be used to finance organised criminal operations in one way or another. Previous research has shown that financiers are often behind the financing of large-scale trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs. Yet despite the influence of these financiers, they remain outside the scope of analysis of organised crime being done at EU level, where such information is largely omitted. Although considerable research has been conducted on the proceeds of crime and the financial management of several organised criminal activities, the financing of terrorism and money laundering, little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting individuals, structures and processes that are involved in the "preceeds" of crime, especially on crimes unconnected with the financing of terrorism. Little has also been done in terms of analysing whether criminal entrepreneurs engage in a process that disguises a legitimate source of funds that are to be used for illegal purposes, a process that has been defined as "reverse money laundering." Following these observations, a number of academics and law-enforcement officials from across Europe were contacted in order to gather information regarding the respective situations in their countries. It was established that many faced a similar situation, where some operational knowledge on the issue existed, yet (excepting the Netherlands) analytical units had not given much specific attention to it. Therefore, an interest was expressed to gather this knowledge at the EU level, as well as to exchange knowledge and experiences with partner countries where this issue has been paid more attention.

Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 464p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317

Year: 2015

Country: Europe

URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317

Shelf Number: 136598

Keywords:
Human Trafficking
Illegal Markets
Organized Crime
Smuggling
Stolen Vehicles
Terrorist Financing

Author: DLA Piper

Title: Review of Regulation of Separated Parts Markets in Australia

Summary: This report examines the legislation that applies to the trade in separated motor vehicle parts throughout Australia. The report is prepared against a background of growing concern that existing regulatory arrangements are not optimally effective for combatting criminal involvement in the vehicle and vehicle parts trades. The current regulatory arrangements comprise a multiplicity of legislative schemes regulating motor car traders, vehicle repairers and second hand dealers. While other laws apply to the separated parts trades (including laws relating to written-off vehicles, and general consumer protection and criminal laws), the focus of this report is on the schemes that most closely regulate the conduct of persons carrying on business of buying and selling used vehicle parts. Most of these schemes are licensing schemes. Persons must hold the appropriate licences in order to carry on the business. To do so they must meet various criteria to show they are fit and proper persons. They must continue to meet those criteria, and comply with licence conditions and other requirements or risk having their licence suspended or cancelled. The basic model is similar in all jurisdictions. However, the legislation is far from being uniform or consistent. Different schemes have different regulatory objectives. The extent to which they apply to the trade in vehicle parts varies considerably. In some jurisdictions, persons dealing in vehicle parts are regulated as motor traders and in others as general second hand dealers. Licensing criteria differ, as do the conditions and requirements that apply to the conduct of the business. In some jurisdictions the trade in separated parts is subject to stringent and extensive regulatory controls while in others it is effectively unregulated. In summary, the position in each of the jurisdictions appears to be: - New South Wales is the only jurisdiction with legislation specifically targeting both vehicle repairers and motor traders operating as auto dismantlers and motor vehicle reconstructors. - Victoria. The trade in whole vehicles, including dismantled vehicle shells, is regulated under the motor dealer legislation while the trade in vehicle parts and accessories is regulated under the second hand dealers legislation. - Queensland. Persons who break up or re-assemble vehicles are required to be licensed as motor dealers while suppliers of separated parts are regulated as second hand dealers. - South Australia. Traders in complete and working vehicles are regulated under the motor dealers legislation while those involved in the trade in wrecked vehicles, vehicle shells and vehicle spares are regulated as second hand dealers. - Western Australia. Licensing requirements apply to persons who dismantle whole vehicles and to repairers who purchase separated parts for repair work. Persons who trade solely in separated vehicle parts appear to be unregulated. - Tasmania. Second hand motor dealers are required to be licensed as motor dealers and second-hand dealers. Vehicle dismantlers and parts sellers must notify police under the second-hand dealer legislation. - Australian Capital Territory. Vehicle dismantlers and constructors who sell, buy or exchange separated parts are licensed under motor repairer legislation, but intermediaries in the supply of separated vehicle parts appear to be unregulated. - Northern Territory. Persons trading in whole vehicles are required to hold a motor dealers licence, although motor wreckers appear not to be. Persons who buy, sell or exchange second hand parts are required to hold a second hand dealers licence. In this report we outline the main elements of the State and Territory schemes, based on a review of the relevant legislation. This analysis indicates that New South Wales has, particularly in its Motor Dealers Act 1974, the most robust licensing regime. Nevertheless, it is possible that the current uneven and inconsistent regulatory coverage is providing opportunities for criminal involvement in the separated parts trades. If that is so, there may be a case for nationally consistent regulatory reform. Further research is needed about the impact of the current patchwork approach, to assess whether there would be net benefits in a national regulatory approach. The report then considers the legislative mechanisms available to regulatory agencies under the present schemes. It looks at how the different legislative frameworks set out controls over the right to carry on second hand parts related businesses, the powers available for monitoring and overseeing those businesses, the penalties and sanctions available for operating outside the scheme and for breaching scheme requirements and the compliance and enforcement powers available to deal with breaches. Because the legislative schemes are very diverse, this analysis is necessarily high level. It also tends to focus on the provisions which appear to provide the most effective and robust set of regulatory controls, the majority of which are to be found in NSW legislation. The final part of the report looks at mechanisms in other regulatory environments that may be able to be adopted or adapted to improve the effectiveness of regulation of the separated parts market. This analysis proceeds from consideration of two key concepts which underpin many contemporary regulatory strategies: - an enforcement pyramid of progressively more severe interventions to enable regulators to take action that responds appropriately and cost effectively to non-compliant behaviour; and - a chain of responsibility liability model, which imposes a legal responsibility on all parties with the motive and/or capacity to influence compliance outcomes. In this context we describe a range of interventions and orders that may be applied to the regulation of the separated parts market, including civil penalties, administrative improvement and prohibition notices, court based directions and interventions, forfeiture and commercial benefits penalties, prohibition and industry exclusion and directors and officers liability for corporate fault. The focus of this discussion is on legislative compliance and enforcement measures. However, it must be recognised that these are only a part of an overall compliance framework. Co-operative engagement with the regulated entities, clearly articulated and consistently followed intervention policies and sufficient skilled and properly resourced enforcement personnel are also critical for effective regulation of any business activity.

Details: North Melbourne, VIC: National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council, 2013. 39p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2016 at: http://carsafe.com.au/assets/ModernisingRegulatoryRegimesDLAPiper.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Australia

URL: http://carsafe.com.au/assets/ModernisingRegulatoryRegimesDLAPiper.pdf

Shelf Number: 138789

Keywords:
Automobile Theft
Motor Vehicle Theft
Scrap Metal Theft
Stolen Vehicles

Author: Interpol

Title: Motor Vehicle Crime in Global Perspective. Analytical Report

Summary: The existence of transnational organized crime groups active in motor vehicle crime is acknowledged by the majority (89.8%) of member countries that replied to the questionnaire. Another majority of 82% of the member countries that replied to the questionnaire have special units in place that deal with motor vehicle crime or take part in regularly organized operations that focus on motor vehicle crime. There is no accurate standard, model or metric available to measure organized crime. At best, calculated estimates can be made using statistics, economic trade models and known financial flows in combination with seizures, arrests and convictions of perpetrators. Similarly, there are no comparable statistics available on the economic damage caused by Motor Vehicle Crime. Indications and estimations are made using statistics provided by insurance companies that supply vehiclerelated insurance policies. INTERPOL's Stolen Motor Vehicle database, in combination with the automated search facility, is a tool already in place to develop and standardize statistics with regard to transnational motor vehicle crime. Stakeholders that are affected by motor vehicle crime are car manufacturers, the vehicle owner, law enforcement agencies, registration authorities, insurance companies, legislative bodies, justice departments and vehicle related business such as rental companies and scrap yards. Legislation and the enforcement of laws with regard to, for example, vehicle-related insurance, technical status of the vehicle and import/export procedures varies greatly in different countries. This negatively influences international cooperation with regard to transnational motor vehicle crime. Targeted stolen vehicles can be divided into two categories. The majority is readily available and of a common car make and model (quantity). The second category of vehicles (quality) are those that are extra lucrative (Sport Utility Vehicles and luxury cars, for example) that are sometimes targeted especially. A majority of 59% of the member countries that replied to the questionnaire state that some level of violence is used in the theft of a motor vehicle with a wide range of violence levels. The modus operandi with regard to motor vehicle crime in South American countries seem to involve more violence and the use of psychotropic substance compared to other regions. A majority of 87.7% of member countries report that stolen vehicles as a whole or in parts are taken to their bordering countries. At present, there is no in-depth analysis on routes and the flux of routes available. A shared language and ethnicity as well as the homogeneous structure of organized crime groups are important factors to consider in the (facilitated) movement of illicit goods in general, and stolen motor vehicles in particular. Transnational organized Motor Vehicle Crime is often linked to other crime areas such as corruption, terrorism, robbery, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking and the illicit trade in weapons.

Details: Paris: Interpol, 2014. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2018 at: https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Vehicle-crime/Vehicle-crime

Year: 2014

Country: International

URL: https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Vehicle-crime/Vehicle-crime

Shelf Number: 148930

Keywords:
Automobile Theft
Motor Vehicle Crime
Organized Crime
Stolen Vehicles
Vehicle Crime

Author: Victoria Police

Title: Addressing Profit-Motivated Vehicle Theft in Victoria's Separated Parts and Scrap Metal Industries

Summary: BACKGROUND 1. The inter-agency Task Force Discover was established to examine how the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries may facilitate profit-motivated vehicle theft (PMVT). Led by Victoria Police Crime Command, the Task Force completed a state-wide regulatory audit of motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers to reconcile anecdotal evidence that regulatory non-compliance by these businesses creates opportunities for PMVT. The Task Force aimed to develop an objective understanding of the extent of regulatory compliance among motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers and consider how levels of non-compliance related to unrecovered stolen vehicles in Victoria. 2. PMVT is a significant problem in Victoria. Data from the National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council demonstrates there were 2,562 unrecovered stolen passenger and light commercial (PLC) vehicles in Victoria in 2013. The number of unrecovered PLC vehicles in Victoria has increased 21 per cent over the last five years due to the ability of vehicle thieves to profit from the growing domestic and international demand for spare parts and scrap metal. This demand has led to an expansion in the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries, which now comprise a variety of players displaying an equally diverse range of capital resources, experience and levels of compliance with the law. Vehicle thieves can subsequently exploit the noncompliant tiers of industry to off-load, launder and sell stolen vehicles for the value of their separated parts and left over scrap metal. 3. Between September 2013 and June 2014, Task Force Discover audited a total of 432 motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers, estimated to represent approximately 90 percent of all operators in Victoria. The Task Force audited all commercial practices supporting the trade in used vehicles, spare parts and scrap metal derived from vehicles in order to: - collect intelligence on compliant and non-compliant commercial practices; - complete an authoritative assessment on the overall extent of regulatory compliance and consider implications that levels of non-compliance have for levels of PMVT in Victoria; and - improve the understanding of issues associated with the motor wrecking and scrap metal industries, including occupational health and safety (OHS) and environmental protection issues. KEY FINDINGS 4. The Task Force Discover audit focussed firstly on business licensing with a Motor Car Traders Licence (MCTL), business registration with Second-Hand Dealers Registration (SHDR) and record keeping practices for the trade in vehicles due to the implications that noncompliance in these areas has for PMVT. Secondly the audit focussed on occupational health and safety and environmental protection standards for the trade in parts and scrap due to the implications that non-compliance in these areas has for community harm. Task Force investigators (comprising Victoria Police detectives) made an assessment of the regulatory compliance of each business they attended. Of the 432 motor wreckers and scrap metal dealers audited: - 302 businesses or 70 per cent were assessed by Task Force investigators as either not holding the required authorisation to trade (i.e. the correct licence or registration) or being non-compliant to some degree with the conditions of their business licence or registration. This non-compliance included: - incomplete record keeping on customer identities and vehicle identifiers - failing to make notifications to the Written-Off Vehicles Register (WOVR) - failing to undertake criminal history checks and background screening of employees, and - failing to publicly display business licensing or registration details. - 199 businesses or 46 per cent were assessed as not holding the required authorisation to trade and of these: - 112 businesses operated without a MCTL or SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a MCTL - 12 businesses operated without a MCTL or SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a SHDR - 75 businesses traded only with a SHDR, but were assessed as requiring a MCTL. - 398 businesses or 92 per cent did not submit notifications to the WOVR. - 390 businesses or 90 per cent were assessed to be non-compliant to some degree with OHS and environmental protection regulations - 82 businesses or almost 20 per cent were referred for safety breaches deemed likely to cause injury; and - 41 businesses or 9 per cent were referred for moderate environmental breaches causing obvious and ongoing serious pollution to soil and waterways.

Details: Melbourne: The Author, 2014. 41p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2019 at: https://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBridgingPage&Media_ID=108408

Year: 2014

Country: Australia

URL: https://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBridgingPage&Media_ID=108408

Shelf Number: 154602

Keywords:
Car Theft
Metal Theft
Motor-Vehicle Theft
Scrap Metal
Stolen Vehicles