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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for street gangs
21 results foundAuthor: Dudley, Steven S. Title: Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras Summary: This chapter is about drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Central America. It is broken down by theme rather than by country. It provides a brief history of DTO activity in the region; descriptions of who operates the DTOs, both locally and internationally, and their modus operandi; the use of street gangs in DTO activities; DTO penetration in government and security forces; local, regional and international efforts and challenges as they try and combat DTOs. The chapter is centered on the three countries where the problem of DTOs appears to be the most acute: Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute; San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Serieson U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations%20in%20Central%20America.%20Dudley.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Central America URL: http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Drug%20Trafficking%20Organizations%20in%20Central%20America.%20Dudley.pdf Shelf Number: 119707 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized CrimeStreet Gangs |
Author: Wortley, Scot Title: Identifying Street Gangs: Definitional Dilemmas and Their Policy Implications Summary: The study of gangs in general – and street gangs in particular – has been plagued by the lack of a common gang definition. Definitional issues have also had a negative impact on gang suppression and prevention activities. The various criteria used to define street gangs have included: (1) age (i.e., members must be adolescents or young adults); (2) the existence of a group name; (3) distinctive group symbols or defining insignia (tattoos, colours, etc.); (4) control of a specific territory or turf; (5) group organization (i.e., leaders and followers); (6) number of members (most definitions require at least three members); (7) durability or stability (must exist as a social entity for a specified period of time); (8) formal or informal gang rules; (9) initiation rituals for new gang members; (10) street orientation (gang activities are conducted away from the home, work or school); (11) regular and/or continuous group involvement in crime, violence or delinquency; and 12) common ethnic or racial background. Most experts agree that criminal behaviour should be a standard gang criterion. Agreement over other gang criteria has not been established. How gangs are defined will have a major impact on how many gangs, gang members and gang-related crimes are identified within specific communities. The larger the number of criteria that have to be met, the smaller the gang count is going to be. There is also a debate concerning how gangs and gang members should be identified. Some argue that only the police and other criminal justice experts have the necessary experience. Others have argued that we should only rely on information from self-identified gang members. Both arguments have their merits. Many people have argued that there is a need for a standard gang definition. Advocates claim that a standard definition would: (1) enable accurate national, provincial and municipal estimates of gang activity; (2) improve our ability to make regional comparisons; (3) help document the risk-factors associated with gang activity within specific jurisdictions; (4) help document the amount of public funding needed to tackle gang problems within specific jurisdictions; (5) enable law enforcement officials from different jurisdictions to communicate in the same “language” and produce a common understanding of gangs, gang members and gang-motivated crime; and (6) improve the quality of gang investigations that involve police services from different regions. It has also been argued that a standard gang definition would also help policy-makers determine the relative effectiveness of various law enforcement and gang prevention programs operating within different jurisdictions. The Eurogang consortium, unlike its North American counterparts, has already reached a consensus regarding the definition of a gang. The Eurogang consortium distinguish between “gang definers” and “gang descriptors.” Definers are the elements or criteria that characterize a group as a gang. Describers, on the other hand, are group characteristics or variables that can help distinguish one gang from another. According to the Eurogang philosophy, a gang definition should not be influenced by group characteristics that are only “descriptors.” Descriptors include things like the gender or ethnic composition of the gang, whether the group has a name, territory or turf, patterns of criminal activity, the presence or absence of gang symbols or colours, gang argot, the level of group organization, initiation rituals, etc. Taking the lead from the Eurogang example, this paper proposes the following gang definition: A gang is a group of three or more individuals that has existed for at least one month and engages in criminal activity on a regular basis. Gang-related crime can be conducted within the group context or by individual gang members in isolation -- as long as such criminal activity, directly or indirectly, benefits the gang. Details: Ottawa: Organized Crime Division, Law Enforcement and Policy Branch, Public Safety Canada, 2010. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 5, 2012 at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-115-2011-eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-115-2011-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 125474 Keywords: Street GangsYouth Gangs |
Author: City of Albany Gun Violence Task Force Title: Final Report to the Common Council Summary: With the enactment of an ordinance in July, 2007, the City of Albany’s Gun Violence Task Force was formed “to research and develop strategies to reduce gun violence.” The Task Force was comprised of thirteen voting members, whose work was to be completed within one year. The Task Force was specifically charged to: o prepare a report on the number and types of gun-related offenses, with as much detail as possible, in the City of Albany from the year 2000 to the present; o compare the number and types of incidents to at least five other municipalities of similar size; o research and report on programs used successfully by other municipalities to reduce gunrelated violence and the approximate cost of such programs. The Task Force itself specified a two-fold mission of assessment and recommendation. o To the end of assessment, it is our purpose: 1. to ascertain the root causes of gun violence; 2. to examine the manifestations of gun violence; and 3. to engage in dialogue with the people concerning gun violence. o To the end of recommendation, it is our purpose: 1. to identify resources to address gun violence; 2. to suggest a strategy to alleviate gun violence; and 3. to recommend programs to combat gun violence. With this report, the Task Force fulfills its mandates and completes its work, with the hope that the information offered herein will prove useful to the City as it formulates initiatives to reduce gun violence. The report includes four principal parts. First we summarize the organization of the Task Force and its work. Then we provide an overview of the gun violence problem, including a brief review of the causes of gun violence, a consideration of the role of street gangs in gun violence, and a discussion of the supply of crime guns. Third, we summarize information on gun violence in Albany. Finally, we offer recommendations that, as a set, are based on several strategies, and which include multiple programs, identifying existing and potential resources wherever we were able to do so. We have not included, nor were we asked to formulate, specific financing packages for recommended infrastructure or programming. The Task Force understood its role to be one of recommendation and not implementation. Decisions about the priority accorded to preventing and controlling gun violence, and the allocation of public resources, are properly those of the elected leadership of the City. Details: Albany, NY: City of Albany, 2009. 281p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2012 at: http://www.albanyny.gov/_files/Gun%20Violence%20Task%20Force%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.albanyny.gov/_files/Gun%20Violence%20Task%20Force%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 125819 Keywords: Gun Violence (New York)GunsStreet GangsViolent Crime |
Author: Chettleburgh, Michael C. Title: Evaluability Assessment Final Report: Breaking the Cycle Youth Gang Exit and Ambassador Leadership Program Summary: The issue of street gangs in Canada has generated considerable concern among criminal justice professionals and the general public. Because of the high level of criminal behaviour associated with street gangs, and the inherent dangers posed to youth who choose to participate in their activities, the value of prevention and intervention programs has taken on new importance. Specific programs that seek to help young people exit a gang are not yet commonplace in Canada, and those that do exist typically have not undergone formal evaluation to determine actual program effect. This study sought to assess the evaluability of one of Canada’s longest running street gang exit programs ‐ Breaking the Cycle, developed and managed by Toronto‐based Canadian Training Institute – that is, to answer the question “Is the Breaking the Cycle program at a suitable state of readiness for comprehensive process, impact and cost effectiveness evaluation?” Four key methods were used to show that subject to some modifications to identification of the appropriate target group, documentation and data collection practices, the Breaking the Cycle program can be accurately evaluated in the near future. Thus, the National Crime Prevention Centre or other organizations are encouraged to formally evaluate the program, and indeed, support it financially, because of the initial positive indicators demonstrated during the Evaluability Assessment. Details: Report to the National Criminal Prevention Centre of Public Safety Canada, 2008. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://www.cantraining.org/BTC%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Canada URL: http://www.cantraining.org/BTC%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 125971 Keywords: Gang PreventionJuvenile OffendersStreet GangsYouth Gangs (Canada) |
Author: Arciaga, Michelle Title: Street Outreach and the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model Summary: Since the early 19th century and the emergence of street gangs within urban population centers of the United States, community members have sought to reach out to these disenfranchised and criminally involved youth to reengage and redirect them to more pro-social activities. Over the years, these efforts have yielded mixed results. For instance, the detached gang worker programs of the 1950s and ’60s, while well-intentioned, delivered almost uniformly flat results and may actually have increased the cohesion of the gangs they served, thus accelerating gang offending (Klein, 1971). It seems intuitive that social intervention directed at gang members is necessary and vital as a response to gang violence. However, programmatic results, when these programs have been evaluated, suggest that street-level outreach, by itself, is not sufficient to create a reduction in gang-related crime. In 1987, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention launched the Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Research and Development Program, led by Dr. Irving Spergel at the University of Chicago. Spergel conducted a national assessment of agency and community responses to gangs. After reviewing multiple program models and existing programmatic evaluations, Spergel concluded: “neither a single minded suppression nor a single-minded social-intervention approach has demonstrated success in reducing gang crime, especially gang violence.” As a result of that assessment, Spergel and his colleagues created the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model (Spergel, 1995; Spergel et al., 1992; Spergel and Curry, 1993). The Spergel Model included a multidisciplinary Intervention Team, composed of law enforcement, probation, and outreach personnel who worked together to case manage gang intervention targets within the context of five interrelated strategies: social intervention, opportunities provision, community mobilization, suppression, and organizational change and development. The success of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project led to the creation of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model (Model). Since the 1990s, the Model has been tested in targeted sections of more than 20 different communities around the United States, from large cities (Los Angeles, California; Houston, Texas; Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin) to mid-sized cities (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; North Miami Beach, Florida) to small urban and rural communities (East Cleveland, Ohio; Mount Vernon, Illinois; Elk City, Oklahoma; Glenn County, California; Longview, Washington). (National Gang Center, 2010) This article provides an overview of best practices developed in these sites for street outreach in the context of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model. Details: Tallahassee, FL: National Gang Center, 2012. 10p. Source: National Gang Center Bulletin No. 7: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2012 at http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Street-Outreach-Comprehensive-Gang-Model.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Street-Outreach-Comprehensive-Gang-Model.pdf Shelf Number: 126639 Keywords: Crime Prevention ProgramsGang PreventionIntervention ProgramsJuvenile OffendersStreet Gangs |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2013 Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's 2013 Game Changers, where we have sought to highlight some of the year's most important and illustrative trends in the development of organized crime in the Americas. This year has been a year of contradictions. Large criminal groups that seemed untouchable appear to be on the ropes. Others waded through complicated peace and truce processes with incredible patience. Some of the more notable of these processes were initiated by the criminal groups themselves. At the same time, some dynamics in the underworld remained true to form and some new, ugly criminal economies have surged because of these dynamics. Amidst it all, weak states continued to face challenges from below and above, sometimes from those who simply feel they have no choice but to fight criminal groups on their own. These past 12 months could be termed the year of the negotiations. In Colombia, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued their historic talks with the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos. By many accounts, these talks are moving along well, but there is concern that even if the FARC leadership signs a deal, parts of the organization will desert and enter the criminal economy. In El Salvador, the truce between the country's two largest gangs showed severe signs of fraying, if not rupturing completely. Homicides surged at the end of the year, as the presidential campaign shifted into full gear. While the mediators claimed the candidates had sought gang support for their campaigns, the country's security minister sought to undermine the truce via public and private channels. Meanwhile, a few more lasting criminal "pacts" emerged, brokered, it appeared, by the criminals themselves. In Medellin, Colombia, remnants of the old guard, known as the Oficina de Envigado, brokered a cease fire with the now surging Urabenos criminal organization, bringing homicides to their lowest levels in 30 years. In Juarez and Tijuana, Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel's apparent dominance over those trafficking corridors led to equally dramatic drops in homicide rates and other criminal acts, such as car-jackings. The emergence of the Urabenos as the singular, monolithic criminal organization to survive the government's assault on the so-called Criminal Bands or "Bandas Criminales" (BACRIM) may be the biggest development in Latin America's underworld. The Urabenos have developed a sophisticated criminal model, which includes a huge variety of revenue streams. They appear to have overcome the loss of numerous top leaders and have an understanding of when to fight and when to make friends, as noted above. However, the Urabenos, and other groups like them, have also ushered in a new era of drug consumption in the region. The consumers are no longer just in Europe, the United States and Asia. They are in small cities and even rural areas throughout the region. They are poor; they are middle class; and they are the elite. And they are getting their drugs from the local criminal groups who are servicing the larger ones, like the Urabenos, throughout the distribution chain. From Brazil and Argentina, to Costa Rica and Mexico, this new, local criminal economy appears to be at the heart of much of the region's violence. It is this violence that pushed civilians to take up arms in places like Guerrero and Michoacan, two embattled Mexican states where so-called "self-defense" groups have surged to try to replace an inept, corrupted and co-opted state. These groups appear to have a wide range of backgrounds: from the poor peasant farmers to the sophisticated rival criminal groups. Yet, the government seems powerless to deal with them, to the point where many authorities have willingly allowed them to break the law in order to ensure others do not. A similar tension between maintaining the law and ensuring justice is also on the minds of the Bolivians as they try to keep some portions of their coca crop in the legal sphere and eliminate those deemed illegal. The challenge is monumental and, as we have seen this year, virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Bolivia's neighbor Peru, is coming to grips with the fact that it is the largest coca producing country in the world. That reality, which is a return to the 1990s status quo, has meant an influx of foreign criminal groups. Finally, for the second straight year, we need to note what is happening in Honduras. The country continues to open its doors to foreign criminal organizations, even while its homegrown groups continue to gain power. This includes one known as the Cachiros, which the US Treasury Department said had accumulated up to $800 million in assets, or roughly five percent of the country's GDP. A newly elected government, which takes power in January, seems to have little idea of how to combat these organizations, much less the resources. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/gamechangers/InsightCrimeGameChangers2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132877 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingGangsOrganized CrimeStreet GangsViolence |
Author: Barrick, Kelle Title: Assessing Crime, Resident Trust, and Police Effectiveness in Tegucigalpa, Honduras Summary: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Central American countries are faced with some of the highest homicide rates in the world (UNODC, 2007). With more than 87 homicides per 100,000 residents, Honduras is one of the region's most violent countries (Arce, 2012). Honduras's proximity to Mexico makes it highly susceptible to the influences of transnational drug trafficking organizations. Recent enforcement efforts in Mexico have disrupted and displaced drug trafficking patterns and Honduras is increasingly being utilized as a transshipment point for Andean cocaine. According to recent estimates, 42% of all cocaine entering the United States first passes through Central America (INL, 2012). Youth street gangs and concentrated levels of poverty are also assumed to be at the center of the country's ongoing struggle with crime (UNODC, 2007; Seelke, 2011). Moreover, there is evidence that the problems associated with violent crime are increasing in Honduras. Whereas violent crime has decreased in Colombia, a country notorious for its violence, in recent years Honduras has experienced a significant increase in homicides and now has the highest per capita homicide rate in the world (U.S. Department of State, 2012). To assist Honduras in addressing these public safety and security issues, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has provided funding to establish a Model Precinct in Tegucigalpa's San Miguel Police District. A review of documents provided by INL indicates that as part of the Model Precinct initiative, INL is working with the Polica Nacional de Honduras (PNH) to create a higher level of integrity in the national police force by vetting police officers using background checks and polygraph testing. Police officers will also be trained in management practices, community policing, public relations, report taking, and tactical operations. In addition, police departments will be provided with a variety of equipment, including vehicles, office equipment, tactical and technological equipment, database systems, and street surveillance cameras. INL initiatives are also attempting to prevent and reduce participation in local gangs by providing school-aged children and youth with training in the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programs. Collectively, these Model Precinct activities are intended to result in a number of benefits for the San Miguel target area in Tegucigalpa. These include reductions in crime and gang activity, enhanced crime fighting and crime prevention capabilities for the police, and improved community perceptions and trust of the police. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2013. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://rti.org/pubs/hte024_baseline_english_final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Honduras URL: http://rti.org/pubs/hte024_baseline_english_final.pdf Shelf Number: 132905 Keywords: Crime (Honduras)Drug TraffickingHomicidesPolice EffectivenessPolice-Community RelationsPolicingStreet GangsViolent Crime |
Author: Mississippi Analysis and Information Center Title: Gang Threat Assessment 2010 Summary: The following Gang Threat Assessment, prepared by the Mississippi Analysis and Information Center ({"MSAIC"), was produced to provide a general outlook of gang presence and criminal activity in the State of Mississippi. Data in this report was obtained from the Mississippi Department of Corrections ("MDOC") and provides statistics, research and key findings from corrections data, law enforcement reports as well as academic and open source research. This assessment is a follow-up from the Interim Gang Threat Assessment issued by MSAIC in September of 2010. The assessment contains crime-specific and corrections statistics attributed to the four most prevalent gangs ("core" gangs) in the state: Gangster Disciples, Simon City Royals, Vice Lords and Latin Kings. From the four core groups they are attributed to the higher affiliations which are Folk Nation (Gangster Disciples and Simon City Royals) and People Nation (Vice Lords and Latin Kings). The assessment also includes brief descriptions of other gangs including MS-13, Aryan Brotherhood and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. Gang members in Mississippi continue to be involved in a number of criminal activities, the primary goal of which is to make money. Most frequently, gang members are incarcerated for drug violations, burglary, larceny, robbery, and assault. Although the gangs present in Mississippi may use the same name as the highly-organized, Chicago-based gangs, they primarily operate independently in Mississippi and do not appear to be in the hierarchy or in the direct control of the Chicago-based gangs. However, because some of the early organizers of the most prolific street gangs in the country have roots in Mississippi, the state has a unique relationship with these groups, their senior leadership and families. KEY FINDINGS Prevalence - In 2008, gang membership in the United States was estimated at 1 Million individuals belonging to more than 20,000 criminally active gangs within all 50 states and the District of Columbia - this represents a 20% increase from the 2005 estimate. - In the four-year period from 2004 - 2008, reports of gang activity from local and state law enforcement agencies increased by 28%. - According to a 2001 Department of Justice survey, 20 % of students aged 12 through 18 reported gang presence at their school. More than a quarter (28%) of students in urban schools reported a street gang presence, and 18% of students in suburban schools and 13% in rural schools reported the presence of street gangs. Public schools reported a much higher percentage of gang presence than private schools. - As of December 31, 2010, the MDOC housed approximately 21,565 inmates, 3,015 or 14% of which are validated gang members. MDOC uses a Security Threat Group Validation Form (see addendum page 23) within their correctional facilities to identify gang members. Of those validated gang members, 2,611 or 87% were members of the core groups described in this report. - The increase use of social media has created a new outlet for gangs to recruit members. Younger members have posted their affiliation with gangs on websites such as MySpace, Bebo, and YouTube. - From 2008 - 2010; 6,122 validated gang members completed their sentences and were released. Demographics - The MDOC reports that the youngest incarcerated gang members are 16 years old (four Gangster Disciples and one Imperial Insane Vice Lord) and the oldest gang member is 76 and is affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan. Gang membership is broken down as follows: - 24.72% are 18-25 years of age; - 24.97% are 26-30 years of age; and - 23.97% are 31-35 years of age. - Eighty percent (80%) of the incarcerated gang members are African American; 20% are Caucasian and less than 1% are Spanish/Hispanic/Native American. Criminal Activity - According to law enforcement officials throughout the nation, criminal gangs commit as much as 80% of the crime in many communities and are the primary retail-level distributors of most illicit drugs the majority of the crack cocaine trade in Mississippi is controlled by members or affiliates of gangs. Details: Pearl, MS: Mississippi Analysis and Information Center, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://info.publicintelligence.net/MSAIC-GangsAssessment2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://info.publicintelligence.net/MSAIC-GangsAssessment2010.pdf Shelf Number: 133947 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangs (Mississippi)Prisons GangsStreet Gangs |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of the Organized Crime in the Americas: 2014 Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers for 2014, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year was one of dashed hopes. In the same year that Mexico celebrated the capture of the world's most wanted drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, it also had to accept the horror that came with a smaller, splinter criminal group executing 43 protesting students and burning their bodies to destroy the evidence. The group, known as the Guerreros Unidos, was believed to be acting in concert with the local police, a local mayor and his politically ambitious wife, in what is a blatant example of the regular collusion that exists between local authorities and criminal organizations throughout the region. The death of the students in Mexico shattered the facade created by the administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto that by capturing the country's most wanted figures -- which, in addition to El Chapo, included the heads of the Juarez Cartel and the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) -- and largely ignoring institutional reform, it could quell Mexico's criminal problem. Instead, the resulting atomization of large criminal organizations into smaller, more volatile groups that depend on local revenue streams, has led to bloody battles over the territory they need to keep the money flowing. The Guerreros Unidos, for instance, were once a part of the BLO. This fragmentation is a regional phenomenon. From Colombia to Brazil to Guatemala, large, hierarchical structures are now small, amorphous cells, working in networks, which are responsible for much of the violence that has made Latin America and the Caribbean the most homicidal region in the world. They are thriving, in part, because of the increase in the domestic consumption of illegal narcotics. The US market, while still the biggest consumer of drugs, is being challenged by growing drug use in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, to name but a few, and these new markets are giving birth to new criminal syndicates that are feeding this violence. Lastly, the Mexico case highlighted a stark reality about security forces: that they are at the heart of much of the violence. This has been a central feature of the Colombian civil conflict and the same is true in Brazil. Brazil continues to implement its once vaunted citizen security project, the UPP, although belief that the program is a panacea is now waning, especially amidst continuing concern over the police's repressive tactics. Not even cameras attached to the police's shirt pockets and fixed to the inside of official vehicles, it appears, can impede the police from doing what they have been doing for years: executing suspects. Brazil also fell under the spotlight this year as it hosted the World Cup. Lost in the pageantry and spectacular performances of the players was the fact that soccer remains central to organized crime. From owners of local teams in the smallest villages to the largest club teams and their most celebrated players, criminal groups use soccer, and the social and political capital it generates, to make huge profits and continue their illicit operations in relative impunity. Efforts to defuse conflicts with large political-criminal organizations also faltered this year. The peace process in Colombia between the government and the country's insurgencies stumbled, after guerrillas from the country's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), kidnapped an army general. The FARC, the region's oldest and arguably most criminalized insurgency, now seems to be splitting into pieces, some of which may adhere to their Secretariat's move towards peace and demilitarization, and some of which may break away and form their own criminal organizations. El Salvador's government-brokered truce with the two most powerful street gangs, the MS13 and the Barrio 18, also unraveled as a new administration took power and sidelined the efforts. For many who saw the truce as a farce and believe the gangs could develop into transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the death of the truce was a relief. But for those seeking a reprieve from the resurging violence in that country -- including an increasing number of attacks on security forces and a surge in unaccompanied minors to the United States -- there are few answers. The one silver lining can be found in the slow move towards a new drug policy paradigm, one that so far decriminalizes drug use while continuing to criminalize those who create illegal, dangerous and destabilizing criminal structures. The region is not exactly poised to overturn a century of international legal precedent, but it is taking steps to measure just what levers it can pull and push in order to slow the criminal dynamics that have helped make the Americas the most violent place on the planet. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2014. 197p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2015 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/game_changers_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/game_changers_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 134509 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug Trafficking (South America)Gangs Organized Crime Street Gangs |
Author: Human Impact Partners Title: Dignified & Just Policing: Health Impact Assessment of the Townsend Street Gang Injunction in Santa Ana, California Summary: A gang injunction is a controversial policing practice that essentially acts as a group restraining order against alleged gang members within a safety zone, a specific geographic area thought to be "controlled" by a gang. Since the 1980's, over 60 gang injunctions have been imposed in California in an attempt to curtail a historic spike in violent crime in the state (and in the nation) during the late 1980's and early 1990's, a topic we tackled in a previous blog post. The injunction in Santa Ana, the city's second, would prevent alleged gang members from associating with each other or carrying out certain illegal and legal activities within the safety zone. The injunction has stirred up heated debate in Santa Ana since June 2014, when it was first implemented, and has been a flashpoint for controversy more recently amidst allegations of police brutality. Supporters of the injunction say it will lead to decreased crime and violence for all residents, while opponents say the injunction fails to address the root causes of crime and may lead to increased police mistreatment of local youth. The HIA, which worked locally with SABHC, Chicanos Unidos de Orange County, KidWorks, Santa Ana Boys & Men of Color, Latino Health Access, UC Irvine's Community Knowledge and Community & Labor projects, and the Urban Peace Institute, examined the impact the gang injunction would have on crime, safety, community-police relationships, education and employment, and collected data on community safety through surveys, interviews and focus groups. The HIA focused on populations that may be disproportionately affected by the gang injunction, including youth, undocumented immigrants, transgender or queer-identified people, the homeless, and those with physical and mental disabilities. Members of these groups fear that increased police presence in the neighborhood will exacerbate the potential for profiling and discrimination. The HIA concluded that the injunction is unlikely to bring about significant and lasting reduction of serious crime, based on the outcomes of other gang injunctions and input gathered from residents, city officials, community organizations and police. On the contrary, the injunction could have negative effects on public safety, public health and public trust. The HIA found that: The evidence is insufficient that a gang injunction will reduce violent crime, gang activity or gang membership, or that it will improve community-police relationships. An injunction could make some in the community, particularly parents, feel more safe, but members of marginalized groups may, in contrast, feel more threatened by increased police presence. An injunction could lead to significant disruptions to education and employment opportunities for those named in the gang injunction, with immediate harm to their health and well-being and long-term harm to their chances in life. Young black and Latino men who experience repeated, unsubstantiated searches and other forms of suppression-based policing may experience higher levels of anxiety and depression than their peers. An injunction could divert funding from community programs that address the economic and social problems that are the root causes of much crime and a detriment to public health and well-being. In contrast to the mixed evidence on the effects of policing strategies on crime, there is solid evidence that correlates reductions in crime with environmental, educational and economic factors. Our findings led us to make specific recommendations for the police and other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, city officials and community organizations. Our partners plan to use the data from the HIA in their campaigns on healthy policing practices and in upcoming court proceedings to determine whether the gang injunction will be upheld or reversed. Details: Oakland, CA: Human Impact Partners, 2015. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: HealthImpactAssessmentoftheTownsendStreetGangInjunctioninSantaAna,California+ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: HealthImpactAssessmentoftheTownsendStreetGangInjunctioninSantaAna,California+ Shelf Number: 137017 Keywords: Gang PreventionGang ViolenceGangsInjunctionsStreet GangsViolent Crime |
Author: Lohmuller, Michael Title: El Salvador's Gangs & Prevailing Gang Paradigms in a Post-Truce Context Summary: This paper examines the relevance of prevailing gang paradigms as it relates to the case of El Salvador. It is particularly concerned with the concept of 'Third Generation Gangs,' which holds that Salvadoran street gangs are becoming sophisticated political actors seeking to maintain an international reach, and are increasingly capable of confronting the state. El Salvador is in the midst of a violent upheaval. In 2012, El Salvador's two main street gangs signed a truce, which was tacitly endorsed and facilitated by the government. However, following the breakdown of the truce, violence in El Salvador has rapidly escalated, with the gangs increasingly targeting security forces. This paper discusses whether this rising violence is indicative of the gangs' collective maturation process into a 'Third Generation Gang,' or, alternatively, if autonomous spasms of violence by individual gang factions as a means of self-preservation are being misinterpreted as a collective maturation process. Details: Washington, DC: Security Studies Program, George Washington University(?), 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/LohmullerElSalGangs.pdf Year: 2015 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/LohmullerElSalGangs.pdf Shelf Number: 137568 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGangsStreet GangsViolent Crime |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Gangs in Honduras Summary: In the last two decades, Honduras has seen a significant increase in gang membership, gang criminal activity, and gang-related violence. The uptick in violence has been particularly troubling. In 2014, Honduras was considered the most violent nation in the world that was not at war. Although high impunity rates and lack of reliable data make it difficult to assess how many of these murders are gang-related, it's clear that the gangs' use of violence -- against rivals, civilians, security forces and perceived transgressors within their own ranks -- has greatly contributed to these numbers. Among the areas hardest hit are the country's urban centers. Honduras' economic capital, San Pedro Sula, is, according to some, the world's most violent city, with a homicide rate of 142 for every 100,000 people. The political capital Tegucigalpa has a homicide rate of 81 per 100,000. The third largest city, La Ceiba, has a murder rate of 95 per 100,000. These are also the areas where the gangs, in particular the two most prominent, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Barrio 18, have the greatest presence and influence. The emergence of hyper-violent street gangs happened relatively quickly in Honduras. In the late 1990s, following legislation in the United States that led to increased deportation of ex-convicts, numerous MS13 and Barrio 18 members arrived in the country. By the early 2000s, these two gangs, along with several local groups, had begun a bloody battle for territory -- and the extortion revenue and drug markets that goes with it -- that continues to this day. The government responded by passing so-called "iron fist" legislation and arresting thousands of suspected gang members. Instead of slowing the growth of gangs, however, the policy allowed them to consolidate their leadership within the prison system, expand their economic portfolios and make contact with other criminal organizations. This report covers the current state of gangs in Honduras. Specifically, it examines the history, geographic presence, structure and modus operandi of Barrio 18 and MS13 in the country. It also analyzes how the gangs may be developing into more sophisticated criminal organizations. It looks closely at examples that illustrate how some parts of these two gangs are winning the support of the local communities in which they operate. Finally, it gives an overview of some of the other street gangs operating in Honduras. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2015. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/HondurasGangs.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/HondurasGangs.pdf Shelf Number: 137713 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesStreet Gangs |
Author: Disley, Emma Title: Local perspectives in Ending Gang and Youth Violence Areas. Perceptions of the Nature of Urban Street Gangs Summary: The aim of this study was to understand perceptions of the nature of urban street gangs and whether these gangs have changed in recent years in the 33 areas1 that make up the Government's Ending Gang and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme (HM Government, 2011a). The EGYV programme aims to improve the way that gangs are tackled locally through providing peer support to local areas to help prevent young people becoming involved in violence; providing exit routes for those already involved in gangs; and ensuring that appropriate enforcement responses are put in place to address challenges associated with gangs. The study was based on the perceptions of practitioners working on gang-related issues as well as individuals who were current or ex-gang members, or associated with, or affiliated to gangs (referred to throughout as gang associates). It investigated the extent to which there were perceived similarities or differences in the nature of street gangs in EGYV areas and whether or not gangs were thought to have changed in the last two years. It also explored the extent to which there were common or divergent trends in perceptions at national or local levels. It was not the purpose of this study to evaluate the effectiveness of the EGYV programme or local measures to address gang and youth violence. The findings, based largely on practitioners' perceptions, highlight issues and possible trends that could be more fully explored and investigated locally or nationally, using a wider range of evidence and information. Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 88: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491802/horr88.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491802/horr88.pdf Shelf Number: 137716 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceStreet GangsUrban Areas |
Author: Fox, Andrew Title: Examining Gang Social Network Structure and Criminal Behavior Summary: The current study examines the social structure of local street gangs in Glendale, Arizona. Literature on gang organization has come to different conclusions about gang organization, largely based on the methodology used. One consistent finding from qualitative gang research has been that understanding the social connections between gang members is important for understanding how gangs are organized. The current study examines gang social structure by recreating gang social networks using official police data. Data on documented gang members, arrest records, and field interview cards from a 5-year period from 2006 to 2010 were used. Details: Arizona State University, 2013. 156p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: https://cvpcs.asu.edu/products/examining-gang-social-network-structure-and-criminal-behavior Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://cvpcs.asu.edu/products/examining-gang-social-network-structure-and-criminal-behavior Shelf Number: 138177 Keywords: Gangs Street Gangs |
Author: Boogert, Laura van den Title: The securitization of street gangs in El Salvador: An analysis of anti-gang policies and the gang truce of 2012 Summary: Twenty-three years have passed since the peace accords were signed in El Salvador in 1992. Ever since, its authoritarian rule and bloody civil war has ended. However, the country is far from being peaceful nowadays. On the contrary, El Salvador is among the most violent countries in the world today (SICA 2014, UNODC 2014). In the last decade, crime and homicide rates have been skyrocketing and amongst the highest in the world. Levels of violence in the region are as high as, or even higher than during the state terror, insurgency and war of the 1970's and 1980's (Oettler 2011: 262). Much of the crime in El Salvador and its neighboring countries has been ascribed to youth gangs, also known as Maras or Pandillas (Rodgers and Muggah 2009; Savenije and Van der Borgh 2009; Cruz 2010; Wolf 2011; Aguilar 2012). In the first decade of the 21st century these gangs have been portrayed as a major security threat by the media, the public, and their respective governments (Hume 2007; Savenije and Van der Borgh 2009; Bruneau 2011; Peetz 2011). Security grew into the number one priority issue in the region and became the rationale for all of the policies formulated by political leaders in Central America (Bruneau 2011: 3). The Salvadoran administration started a 'war on gangs' and carried out severe and repressive anti-gang policies, also known as Mano Dura. The idea was that security could only be safeguarded if gangs were to be repressed and more penalties and tougher sanctions would dissuade criminals and reduce criminality (Apel & Nagin 2011). However, it soon became apparent that these security policies failed shortly after they were introduced and seemed counterproductive, with gang related activity and violence rates higher than ever (Hume 2007; Savenije and Van der Borgh 2009; Rodgers 2009; Cruz 2011, Gutierrez Rivera 2011). Note that in the last few years several authors do see a trend towards a more integrated gang policy (Jutersjonke et al. 2009) and there have been several experiments with prevention and rehabilitation programs. Nonetheless, these softer approaches were never fully implemented and remained underfunded (ibid). Despite some initiatives and changes of different governmental regimes, Mano Dura continued to be the preferred choice in gang policy in the last decade. However, March 2012 heralded an important event: a unique gang truce took place in El Salvador. The two biggest and most powerful rival gangs; the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio Dieciocho (M-18) signed a truce with each other, 'facilitated' by the government and brokered by the catholic church and a former guerrilla commander. Essentially, the truce entailed an agreement between the gangs, in which they pledged to stop killing each other and end attacks on police, military and prison staff (Cruz 2013). The Salvadoran Mara truce appeared to have a dramatic effect on violence levels. Especially in the months following the truce the murder rate dropped with a 50 percent; from an average of roughly 14 murders per day to 5.5 per day (Seelke 2014a: 11). The truce process however, is surrounded with ambiguity. Not only its level of success and its sustainability, but above all, the role the government played in it and its attitude towards it. Initially, authorities denied any involvement in the truce. Even when a Salvadoran newspaper broke the news that the truce was secretly facilitated by the Salvadoran government, the authorities kept on announcing different and contradictory stories of their role in the whole process. This generated strong criticism and enormous distrust among civil society, influential academic writers and political opponents, even within the government itself. The truce suggests that 'negotiated' solutions to counter a security problem are indeed possible (see also Farah 2013; Figueroa et al 2013; Peeters et al 2013; Seelke 2013; Van der Borgh et al 2015). The facilitation of the truce may be seen as a new 'dialogue centred' policy approach, and a step away from the government's repressive anti-gang strategies of the last decade. But the ambiguous attitude and contrasting stories of the Salvadoran government with regards to the cease-fire process, does not indicate an equivocal clear-cut and well-defined government plan, nor policy. The main aim of the thesis is to understand and explain the attitude of the Salvadoran government towards gangs and the recent gang truce. To achieve this, the thesis has a dual approach. Firstly, it seeks to investigate the development and framing of the anti-gang policies in the years preceding the gang truce (2003-2012), while uncovering the incentives and consequences behind the anti-gang policies. Secondly, this paper places a big emphasis on the gang truce of 2012 itself and the role and attitude of the government in this process. It analyzes the build-up to and implementation of the truce process, and tries to understand and explain the contradictory role of different governmental actors (proponents and opponents). In the years leading up to the truce the government had an equivocal anti-gang approach, advocated a Mano Dura gang policy and successfully 'securitized' the gang issue (Van der Borgh et al 2015). The truce could be seen as a different approach. Both government proponents and opponents of the truce framed the process and legitimized their actions in different ways. How and why did these 'securitizing actors' try to convince the public? The main question of the thesis is: "How and why did (different key actors within) the Salvadoran government frame gangs and relate to the gang truce of 2012?". To answer this question, one has to take a broader look at the government's anti-gang approach in the years preceding the truce in which the gangs were framed as a security threat. To explain and understand these policies, the research is built on the advancements of the securitization theory (Buzan, Waever 1998; Balzacq 2009). Details: Utrecht, NETH: Utrecht University, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 10. 2016 at: http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/327446/Thesis_LvdBoogert_Gangs_v2.def.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2015 Country: El Salvador URL: http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/327446/Thesis_LvdBoogert_Gangs_v2.def.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 139365 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsStreet Gangs |
Author: Gunnell, Daniel Title: Social Network Analysis of an Urban Street Gang Using Police Intelligence Data Summary: As part of the Home Office's Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme a commitment was made to help police forces better understand their local gang issues (HM Government, 2013). This research aims to meet this commitment by testing the use of social network analysis using police intelligence data, as a tool to more systematically understand gangs and to help direct law enforcement activities. As such, the report serves as one example of how social network analysis can be used, but the approach could also be applied to other types of crime and disorder to explore the networks of people involved (such as those connected to acquisitive crime or sexual abuse). The research was undertaken in partnership with Great Manchester Police and addresses two research questions: 1. What can social network analysis tell us about gangs? 2. How useful are the social network analysis outputs for the police? For this, five individuals living in Manchester and identified as having gang links were chosen as the starting point for the network analysis. Further details about how to conduct social network analysis can be found in the 'How to guide' published as an annex to this report. Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 89: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491578/horr89.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491578/horr89.pdf Shelf Number: 139825 Keywords: Crime AnalysisPolice IntelligenceSocial NetworksStreet GangsYouth Gangs |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2015. Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's Game Changers 2015, where we highlight the year's most important trends in organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. This year saw some potentially game changing developments related to government corruption, organized crime, and rising pressure to alter alliances between members of the state and criminal groups. It also saw important shifts in the criminal world, in particular related to street gangs and the realignment of large criminal enterprises. From Mexico to Brazil and numerous places in between, officials came under fire for establishing mafia-like schemes that defrauded their citizens and ensured impunity for government officials connected to criminal groups. The long-term results of the widespread outcry from multilateral bodies, non-governmental organizations, private sector, political organizations, and religious and civic groups designed to disrupt these criminal networks are not yet clear, but the short-term impact has been profound. In August, Guatemala's President Otto Perez Molina resigned. This came just three months after Guatemala's Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned. The two were accused of running a massive customs fraud scheme, which has been a mainstay of a criminal network run by current and ex-military officials for decades. Perez and Baldetti's departures came after the United Nations-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), working with the Attorney General's Office, began revealing a spate of corruption cases. These investigations touched the highest levels of congress, as well as government purveyors such as the social security institute and mayors' offices. All of these had set up criminal networks to embezzle money from the government coffers. The public outcry that followed hastened the officials' departures. In Mexico, the power and popularity of President Enrique Pena Nieto's government has eroded in large part due to its handling of several major security crises, some of which spilled over from 2014. These events include the disappearance and likely murder of 43 students at the hands of a criminal group with deep ties to the local government and police; the apparent massacre of at least 22 suspected criminals by the Mexican army; and the dramatic escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from a high security prison in June. Outside investigators from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) pilloried Mexico's Attorney General's Office for the numerous gaps, inconsistencies, and improbable explanations about what happened to the student teachers. In October, the government's own Human Rights Commission confirmed that the army extra-judicially executed at least 15 of the 22 suspected criminals in the so-called Tlatlaya massacre. And in September, the government arrested 13 officials - including the former head of the prison system - for allegedly assisting Guzman's flight to freedom via a one kilometer tunnel that ran from underneath the shower in his jail cell to a small farmhouse. Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2016 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/GameChangers2015.pdf Shelf Number: 140254 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal NetworksDrug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Organized Crime Street GangsViolence |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers: Tracking the Evolution of Organized Crime in the Americas: 2016. Summary: Welcome to InSight Crime's GameChangers 2016, where we highlight the most important trends in organized crime in the Americas. This year we put a spotlight on crime and corruption among the region's political elites, while reporting on government struggles to corral criminality fueled by street gangs, drug cartels and Marxist rebels alike. Top government officials spent much of the year fending off accusations of corruption and organized crime with varying degrees of success. At the center of the storm was Brazil, where government deals led to bribes and kickbacks that over time reached into the billions of dollars. The top casualty of the scandal was Dilma Rousseff who, ironically, was ousted from the presidency for misuse of funds, not corruption. In reality, it is her Worker's Party that more resembles a criminal organization than she does. Like a mafia, the party collected and distributed money to keep the wheels of political power moving and laundered that money through elaborate schemes involving construction companies and offshore accounts. Rousseff's mentor, the celebrated former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was charged with what appeared to be the type of routine payments all Brazilian politicians and ex-politicians get from the movement of state contracts. Indeed, those who ousted Rousseff are facing similar corruption allegations, illustrating just how institutionalized the problem appears to be. Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro is facing down a different type of crisis, one that includes an economic emergency, widespread corruption and rising crime rates at home, and an increasing number of current and ex-officials charged with drug trafficking abroad. The US government's case against the first lady's "Narco Nephews" got most of the headlines, but numerous other former military officials are revealing to US investigators just what the Venezuelan government looks like from the inside. It is a not a pretty picture, and Maduro's domestic and international issues appear to be pushing him into tighter alliances with the criminal elements in his government. Guatemala's Attorney General's Office and its United Nations-backed appendage, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG), continued to arrest and charge more suspects from the mafia state established under former President Otto Pérez Molina, his Vice President Roxana Baldetti and their Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota - PP). The most startling and revealing case was one they termed the "cooptación del estado," or the "Cooptation of the State," a scheme involving numerous campaign contributors whose return on investment was guaranteed once the PP took power in 2012. Among those arrested for the Cooptation of the State case was former Interior Minister Mauricio López Bonilla. Once a staunch US counter-drug ally and hero from that country's civil war, López Bonilla is also being investigated for his multiple shady deals with drug traffickers such as Marllory Chacón Rossell, to whom he provided a government protection service even after she was accused of money laundering by the US Treasury Department; and with Byron Lima, a former army captain who was killed in jail amidst a public squabble with the former interior minister. Potential corruption and organized crime cases continue to shake the foundations of Guatemala, including one that connects a now extradited drug trafficker to the current vice president and a corruption scandal connected to the current president's son and his brother. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime, 2016. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2017 at: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: South America URL: http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/GAMECHANGERS_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140596 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Networks Drug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Organized Crime Street Gangs Violence |
Author: Savenije, Wim Title: Políticas de seguridad en El Salvador (Security Policies in El Salvador) Summary: English Summary: This article analyzes the policies implemented in El Salvador with the aim of reducing violence and crimes related to street gangs between 2003 and 2013. After analyzing the central features of these policies, it concludes that despite the profound differences, In all cases of short-term measures, which sought instant solutions to complicated and long-term security problems - whether in a hard-hitting style or in the form of dialogue with gangs and facilitating a truce - have failed to improve the situation of insecurity. Far from it, they have strengthened the gangs and have caused a severe restriction of the opportunities of the young people not included in this type of organization. Details: Buenos Aires: Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities and Education Sciences. National University of La Plata, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Cuestiones de Sociología, nº 10; Accessed March 3, 2017 at: http://www.cuestionessociologia.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/article/view/CSn10a09/6073 Year: 2014 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.cuestionessociologia.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/article/view/CSn10a09/6073 Shelf Number: 141310 Keywords: Gang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsStreet Gangs |
Author: Coyne, John Title: 'Santa Muerte', are the Mexican cartels really coming? Summary: Whether in Mexico, the US or Australia, the image of the transnational serious and organised crime (OC) threat from 'Mexican cartels' used to construct policy doesn't appear to engage with the reality that there's no homogeneous Mexican cartel, cartels or OC group. In popular culture, the labels 'Mexican cartel' and 'street gang' conjure an image of a highly organised, hierarchically commanded and ultraviolent crime group. Even Mexico's infamous Sinaloa cartel, rumoured to have an increasingly ominous presence in Australia, is more an alliance of criminal figures than a hierarchical organisation. There should be little doubt that these groups, as a collective phenomenon, have consistently demonstrated a propensity to regularly use breathtakingly barbaric violence for revenge and intimidation. Unfortunately, popular characterisations of the structure and organisation of these groups does little justice to the complexity of the threat that they pose. These generalisations lack the necessary granularity to be useful in the development of disruption- and mitigation-focused strategies. For policymakers, it's convenient to conflate well-known US-based Mexican street gangs, transnational street gangs such as the 'Mexican Mafia' and transnational OC groups such as the 'Mexican cartels' into a singular homogeneous threat grouping or strategy: 'the cartels'. It's equally convenient to link all Mexican OC activity together with the cartel thread. With this kind of conflation, the seriousness of the threat at hand can clearly and concisely be communicated to government decision-makers in terms that will ensure funding and strategy responses. Frustration with the inability of law enforcement arrest and seizure strategies to undermine the drug trade and its associated OC has further complicated the policy decision-making in this space. In the US and Mexican governments' cases, it's likely that this frustration has underpinned government policy, thereby expanding the role of the military and intelligence agencies in the 'war on drugs'. Unfortunately, conflating these groups doesn't produce the kinds of policies and strategies that will result in operational activity that has long-term disruption impacts on the groups involved. Moreover, the current understanding arguably does not allow for the involvement and integration of enforcement operations with other whole-of-government social, economic and development strategies. This report argues that, for Australia and Asia, the menace of Mexican OC is no longer looming on the horizon; it has already arrived. However, the nature of the Mexican OC problem in Australia and Asia is not likely to be the same as that found in either the US or Mexico. To fully understand the implications of this development for Australia and the region, this threat needs to be viewed in context. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 2, 2018 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 149648 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceMexican CartelsOrganized CrimeStreet Gangs |
Author: InSight Crime Title: Game Changers 2017: What to Watch for in 2018 Summary: Organized crime thrives amid political corruption and uncertainty. There will be plenty of this in Latin America in 2018, helping organized crime deepen its roots across the region over the course of the year. This is the moment when we draw on our extensive research and experience to make our predictions for the coming year. And the panorama for 2018 is one of the bleakest that InSight Crime has faced in our nine years of studying criminal phenomena in Latin America and the Caribbean. Tackling organized crime requires stable governments with purpose, strategy, strong security forces, healthy democracy and transparency, along with international cooperation. These currently seem in short supply around the region. Political chaos, infighting and upheaval ensure that attention is occupied on survival and manipulation of democracy, not with tackling organized crime. State legitimacy has come into question in certain nations in the region, as political leaders are investigated for corruption or manipulation of power. Embattled political leaders will often cut backroom deals with criminal elements to ensure their survival. Moreover, several countries will see important elections in the coming year, contributing to political instability. Political Hangovers From 2017 As we wrote in our introduction to this GameChangers, 2017 saw corruption take hold at high levels in governments across the region. So we enter 2018 with several political hangovers, where we believe corruption will assume a still stronger grip: Venezuela, where the last fig leaf of democracy has fallen and a corrupt regime is entrenching itself in power. As oil revenue dries up, the government may further criminalize to survive. The disintegration of the Venezuelan state and its total corruption has far-reaching regional implications for criminal dynamics. These are most immediately impacting on neighbors like Colombia, Brazil and Caribbean nations (Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba and the Dominican Republic foremost among them), but the effects are spreading further afield. Honduras, where the re-election of President Juan Orlando Hernandez has been disputed amid claims of fraud and corruption. This has further undermined his already battered legitimacy. This Northern Triangle nation is of extraordinary importance for drugs moving from South America to the United States. Peru, which saw President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski narrowly avoid being removed from power amid accusations of corruption. He survived only by pardoning former President Alberto Fujimori, who was jailed for human rights abuses. The Fujimori family control one of the most powerful factions in Congress. Kuczynski has been fatally weakened and discredited. We expect to see major underworld activities such as cocaine, timber and gold trafficking strengthened as a result. Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, has manipulated the constitution and looks set to perpetuate himself in office by standing for a fourth term. Most checks on his power now seem to have been stripped away, even as the country plays a central role in South America's drug trade. Ecuador has seen its vice president removed after a conviction for corruption, while President Lenin Moreno find himself locked in a political war with former President Rafael Correa. Organized crime is far down the president's list of priorities, despite that the fact that we believe the port of Guayaquil to be one of the major departure points for cocaine shipments across the globe. Presidential Elections in 2018 To further feed the political uncertainty, there are elections in six important nations, which mean that political attention will be utterly focused on these and not on the fight against organized crime. Brazil has a president with around five percent approval rating universally seen as corrupt. The favorite to win this election, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, was convicted in July of accepting bribes from an engineering firm in exchange for public works contracts. Colombia, the world's foremost producer of cocaine, is struggling to implement a peace agreement with Marxist rebels and prevent a recycling of criminal actors. The enemies of peace seem stronger than its friends as the candidates line up. Costa Rica, sat astride the Central America route for cocaine heading towards the United States, has seen transnational organized crime take root and feed national criminal structures. Mexico has seen violence reach new heights and its current president, Enrique Peea Nieto, has provided few new strategies to tackle homicides or the organized crime that feeds them. New leadership is desperately needed, but no matter who wins the July elections no real changes in strategy are expected until the end of the year, when a new president will take office. Paraguay, South America's most prolific producer of marijuana already has a president associated with criminal activity in the form of cigarette smuggling. With Brazilian criminal groups projecting themselves into this landlocked nation, clear leadership is needed to contain rampant criminal activity. Venezuela is due to have presidential elections, but with President Nicolas Maduro now operating a dictatorship, there are no guarantees these will be held, much less that any real change will occur. Economic collapse is more likely to produce change than political challenge. Even in Cuba, dominated by the Castro brothers since 1959, change is coming as Raul Castro has promised to step down in 2018. And Nicaragua's president Daniel Ortega, in power since 2007, is tightening his grip on the levers of power and undermining democracy. Not since the days of the Cold War have democracy and good governance been under such threat in Latin America. These conditions have in part been created by organized crime and the corruption it feeds. And organized crime will continue to profit from the chaos. Cooperation is also key to fighting transnational organized crime and for good or ill, the United States has often provided coherency and leadership in the war on drugs and organized crime. That leadership is gone along with much US credibility in the region. All this simply gives yet more room for criminals to maneuver. More 'Plata' Than 'Plomo' There is another aspect of organized crime worth mentioning when we look to 2018. While corruption has always been one of the primary tools for organized crime, its flip side has been intimidation and violence. Pablo Escobar used to famously offer his victims two choices: "plata" ("silver," a bribe) or "plomo" ("lead," a bullet). What is becoming clear to the most sophisticated criminals is that bribery now gets you a lot further, a lot quicker, than violence. The expanding corruption scandals are evidence of this. While Mexico, Venezuela and much of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras register epidemic levels of homicides, Colombia is bucking the trend. Even as cocaine exports reach record levels, along with internal drug consumption, with other booming illegal economies such as gold mining and extortion, murders are falling. While this is in part due to the de-escalation of the civil conflict with the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), the other major factor is the development of a Pax Mafiosa. The first "mafia peace" was forged in Medellin, the capital of the cocaine trade, and expanded from there across the country. This means that our mission of exposing organized crime is getting harder here in our home base of Colombia. The criminal history of Latin America has been driven by criminal entrepreneurs, principally in the forms of the drug cartels. This is not the case in Africa, where criminal activity is often managed by elements within government. As Latin organized crime continues to fragment, and corruption becomes the preferred method of doing illicit business, Latin America may begin to look more like Africa. Criminality may not only be protected at the highest levels of government but perhaps run by these elements. This is a phenomena we have studied closely in our "Elites and Organized Crime" investigations. We will dedicate yet more resources to these kinds of investigations as we believe they point the way forward in terms of criminal evolution. SEE ALSO: InDepth Coverage of Elites and Organized Crime Transnational organized crime is the most agile business on the planet and adapts to changing conditions much faster than governments. When those governments become weakened, undermined and corrupted by transnational crime groups, the already uneven playing field become yet further skewed. This year is likely to be a year of further criminal entrenchment in the region, of further corruption of high levels of government or even state capture. Be ready, because we need to pay very close attention, if we are to see the hand of organized crime amid the political chaos Details: s.l.: InSight Crime, 2018. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf Year: 2018 Country: South America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GAMECHANGERS-2017-InSight-Crime-FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 150738 Keywords: CorruptionCriminal Networks Drug Trafficking (South America) Gangs Homicides Organized Crime Street GangsViolence |