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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:34 am
Time: 11:34 am
Results for suicide bombings
6 results foundAuthor: Title: Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon Summary: Involvement in violent campaigns against vice and religious deviance has become one pathway to terrorism in Indonesia. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon," the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the radicalisation of a group from Cirebon, West Java that was behind the 2011 suicide bombings of a mosque and a church. It argues that ideological and tactical lines within the radical community are blurring, making it harder to distinguish “terrorists” from hardline activists and religious vigilantes. “The Cirebon men moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns, and this may become the common pattern”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser. Poorly educated and underemployed, the Cirebon men represent a generational shift from the jihadists trained abroad or those who fought a decade ago in two major communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. They were radicalised through attending public lectures by radical clerics; most had taken part as well in attacks on stores selling liquor and anti-Ahmadiyah activities. They had been members of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an extremist organisation founded by well-known cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, but then left to form their even more militant group. The two suicide bombers, Mohamed Syarif, who blew himself up at a Cirebon mosque on 15 April 2011, and Ahmed Yosefa Hayat, who died in an attack on a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September, taught themselves bomb-making from the Internet and worked on their own. The others preferred targeted assassinations to suicide attacks and learned bomb-making from friends in a Solo-based group of vigilantes-turned-bombers. The briefing notes that the merging of vigilantes and jihadists has been facilitated by the proliferation of Islamist civil society organisations and the popularity of public taklim (religious lectures), as forums for spreading radical views. The government needs a strategy, consistent with democratic values, to counter clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or tyrants (thaghut), frequently meaning Indonesian officials and, especially, the police. The problem is that there is no agreement within the country’s political elite on the nature of the threat. If the radicalisation of groups like the Cirebon men is to be halted, the government needs to build a national consensus on what constitutes extremism; directly confront hate speech; and promote zero tolerance of religiously-inspired crimes, however minor, including in the course of anti-vice campaigns. “Expressions of shock and horror every time there is an incident of religiously-motivated violence as in Cirebon or Solo are not a substitute for prevention”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2012. 16p. Source: Update Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 132: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Shelf Number: 123846 Keywords: Extremist GroupsJihadismMale OffendersSuicide BombingsTerrorism (Indonesia)Vigilantism |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2016 Public Report on Terrorist Threat to Canada Summary: Threat Environment The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers - including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling - poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2015, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travelers who had returned to Canada. The National Terrorism Threat Level This Report, for the first time, includes a description of Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level system. The threat level has been unchanged since October 2014; it is MEDIUM, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level aims to ensure a consistent understanding across the Government of the general terrorism threat to Canada. The threat level serves as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism. The Global Environment The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada's borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. This past year also saw Daesh's expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as an Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment. Emerging Issues This Report includes a feature on emerging issues in terrorism. These issues - the role of technology in terrorism, the participation of women in terrorist activities, and use of chemical weapons by terrorist organizations - have been widely discussed in the media over the past year. They represent only a fraction of many evolving issues that make terrorism such a complex problem. Responding to the Threat Since 2002, 20 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Another 21 have been charged with terrorism-related offences (including 16 since January 2015) and are either awaiting trial or have warrants outstanding for their arrest. Canada is contributing in a robust way, with more than 60 other countries, to the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. This includes military initiatives and efforts to stem the flow of "foreign terrorist fighters," cut off Daesh's funding sources, support stabilization, and expose and counter Daesh's ideology. More broadly, Canada has maintained a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program as a key part of its terrorism prevention efforts. The Government of Canada's counter-terrorism efforts to address this evolving threat continue to be guided by the twin obligations to both keep Canadians safe and safeguard fundamental Canadian values and liberties. The Terrorist Threat to Canada In October 2014, Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by lone-actors who had been inspired by extremist ideologies and radicalized to the point of violence. The attacks, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa, left two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel dead. More recently, the RCMP, working in close collaboration with domestic and international partners, took action in Strathroy, Ontario, to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat and ensure public safety. These incidents reminded Canadians that Canada is not immune to terrorism. Canada remains the target of direct threats by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and al-Qaida, and by individuals inspired by the violent extremist ideologies of these groups. The United States of America (U.S.) and Western Europe experienced multiple attacks in 2015. Some notable incidents included, in the U.S., attacks on police officers in Boston (June, 2015), military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee (July, 2015) and an office party in San Bernardino, California (December, 2015). European incidents included attacks on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo and a grocery store in Paris (January, 2015), an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train (August, 2015) and coordinated attacks directed by Daesh at several public spaces in Paris (November, 2015). In 2014 and 2015, Australia experienced three attacks - two targeting law enforcement officers in Melbourne and Sydney (September 2014, October 2015) and another targeting civilians in Sydney (December 2014). Terrorist incidents continue to occur with terrible regularity. In June 2016, 49 people were killed and 53 injured when a gunman, who may have been inspired by Daesh, opened fire at an Orlando, Florida night club. In July, 85 people were killed and hundreds more were injured when an attacker drove a truck through a crowd in Nice. There have been other attacks in Western Europe as well, for example, in Brussels, Belgium and in Rouen, France. In Turkey this past June, suicide bombers believed to be affiliated with Daesh struck Istanbul's international airport, killing 45 and injuring over 200. Globally, a few countries bear the heaviest burden of attacks and casualties, particularly during civil conflicts or where terrorist groups have taken part in insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Database for 2015 shows that terrorist activities continue to be highly concentrated. Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria - sustained more than 55 per cent of all attacks that year, and five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - sustained 74 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities. This threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests. CAF personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of this year. In January 2016, an al-Qaida-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work. Current Threats The Principal Threat The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. Some individuals have engaged in terrorism-related activities such as promoting violence online, radicalizing peers, recruiting and fundraising. Others may consider travelling abroad to join a terrorist group or conducting terrorist attacks themselves. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140520 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Fajmonova, Veronika Title: Origin-group differences in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims: Reactions to the War on Terrorism Summary: This study compared opinions relating to the war on terrorism for six origin-groups in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S Muslims (each poll ~1000 participants). Origin-groups included Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, and sub-Saharan African countries, as well as African-American Muslims. Opinions changed little from 2007 to 2011 except for a massive increase in presidential approval (Obama vs. Bush). In each origin-group, nearly half of respondents continued to believe the U.S. war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, but approval of al-Qaida and suicide bombing in defense of Islam was less than ten percent. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born were older and less religious than other groups but had opinions similar to other U.S. Muslims. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were generally most negative about living as Muslims in the United States. Experience of discrimination did not predict opinion of al-Qaida or suicide bombing, nor were converts more extreme. Discussion emphasizes the need to understand why many U.S. Muslims are negative toward the war on terrorism and why a very few persist in radical opinions approving al-Qaida and suicide bombing. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144825 Keywords: Al-QaidaCounter-TerrorismMuslimsRadical GroupsSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Understanding the Rising Cult of the Suicide Bomber Summary: The sharp rise in the number of suicide bombings over the last few years is incontestable. 1982 - the year of the Hezbollah attack on the Tyre headquarters of the Israeli army - is often cited as the beginning of the 'modern age' of suicide bombings, but the relatively limited activities of the 80s and 90s cannot compare with the current scope of the problem. Before 2000, no year saw more than 22 suicide attacks worldwide. In 2015, there were at least 600. Over the last five years of AOAV's Explosive Weapons Monitoring Project (EWMP), which records data on explosive weapon usage worldwide according t0 English-language news sources, suicide bombings have consistently caused high levels of civilian harm. In total, 1,191 incidents were recorded across the 2011-2015 period, resulting in 31,589 civilian deaths and injuries. This is an average of 27 civilians killed or injured per incident. Of the ten worst incidents recorded by AOAV over the five-year period, five were suicide bombings - a figure only matched by airstrikes. In the same period, AOAV also recorded a worrisome overall trend of rising civilian deaths and injuries from suicide bombings, as well as ever-greater numbers of countries affected. In 2015, for example, suicide bombings were recorded in 21 countries - the highest number ever recorded by AOAV or by other datasets. Indeed, both 2015 and 2016 saw a considerable uptick in the overall lethality of suicide bombings. This was in spite of similar incident numbers to previous years. Suicide strikes in 2015 resulted in an average of 36 civilian deaths and injuries per incident, markedly higher than the five-year average of 28. In 2016 that figure has risen to 38. This rise can largely be attributed to an intensification of high-profile suicide bombings launched by Boko Haram and IS, but also by other armed groups involved in conflicts in Syria and Yemen, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP). In spite of the clear differences in scale and objectives between the 1980s and the post-9/11 world, this is largely not reflected in modern scholarship. Most studies on suicide bombings - even those emerging after the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Iraqi insurgency of the mid-2000s - focus on the relatively small-scale nationalist campaigns of the 80s and 90s. This is probably largely because of the comparatively large amounts of available data on these campaigns (such as the relatively comprehensive information on Palestinian suicide bombings, for example). Much of this scholarship into the drivers of suicide attacks has also focused at the individual level, ambitiously, searching for the magical last piece of the puzzle that will explain 'what makes a suicide bombe''. The overwhelming majority suicide bombers in recent years are, with a few exceptions, internationalist Islamists of a Salafi-Jihadist persuasion (or, more accurately, those who carry out bombings on behalf of such organisations). This should not be taken to mean that suicide bombing is a problem somehow 'stemming from Islam', unique to Islamists, or even particularly characteristic of Islamist political movements as a whole. What it does mean, is that these groups - rather than nationalist movements - should be the centre of current research, as well as policy and military discussions on reducing the current impact of suicide bombing. Another concern regarding recent scholarship is that most has focused on finding a single underlying cause for all uses of suicide bombing worldwide. Suicide bombing is a tactic that can be used in many different ways and for many different strategic objectives. It obviously emerges under specific conditions - but this does not mean its use will be limited to those conditions. The suicide bombing that killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 shares no more with a huge market truck bombing in 2015 Baghdad than the means of activation method. This report sets out to address the main factors that contribute significantly in creating the cult of suicide bombers in armed Salafi-Jihadi groups. Our research found that suicide bombers of Salafi-Jihadi groups blow themselves up for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the concept of martyrdom propagated by Salafi-Jihadi groups seems to appeal to many who have personal and individual desires pertaining to elevation of status. Such desires are often rooted in a sense of inferiority, whether it is socio-economic or social, and is often caused by (perceived or real) discrimination. The act is often justified as a defence of Islam, which gives the bomber both a sense of fulfilling a purpose and hero status among their peers. Religion often serves as the binding force, and usually becomes a factor towards the end of an individual's radicalisation process. These more 'ideological' motivations are, in general, most predominantly found in foreign fighter suicide bombers. Secondly, some bombers are merely motivated by the logic of the battlefield or by personal experience. For example, many Syrian suicide bombers have spent time as political prisoners or witnessed deaths caused by airstrikes, which may give them enough grievances to exert revenge. Suicide bombings might also be motivated by more pragmatic reasons, for example as a means to protect one's home community.Thirdly, the deterioration of conflict in Syria and Iraq, as well as the sectarian climate that has been developed as a result of these conflicts, has polarised the Muslim population and has undoubtedly eradicated some of the neutral positions in each conflict. This has paved the ground for more suicide attacks in the short run but also for jihadi sympathisation in the long run. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Shelf Number: 145312 Keywords: IslamRadicalizationSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers Summary: Introduction Since 2009, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram (formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, or more recently, the Islamic State's West Africa Province [ISWAP]) has ushered in a wave of violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, at the intersection of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Among other tactics that it has employed during its reign of terror, the group has been noted for its use of suicide bombers. While the prevalence of suicide bombings has been duly recognized, little remains known about the broader arc of their existence and efficacy: What strategic and operational trends underlie Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, and how effective have they been at achieving their objectives? Just who are Boko Haram's suicide bombers? Where are they deployed, what do they target, and how do diferent bomber demographics difer in their actions? More broadly, what does Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers reveal about the past, present, and future of the terrorist group? Methodology Drawing on analysis of an original dataset of all Boko Haram suicide bombings from their first deployment in April 2011 to June 2017, this report presents the fullest picture available to date that tracks and analyzes Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers. To do so, we investigate two main phenomena from our dataset: operational trends of bombers (longitudinal trends, lethality, injuries, geography, and targeting trends) and demographic trends of bombers (gender, age, and recruitment). From these trends, we assert that it is possible to categorize Boko Haram's suicide bombing eforts into four distinct historical phases. In light of our understanding of the group's past and present operational and demographic trends, we conclude by suggesting how the group might act in the future and how counter-terrorism efforts might best address its likely incarnations. Overall Findings In the main, we argue that Boko Haram's operational profile is noteworthy in that, despite the attention the group garners for its deployment of suicide bombers, it shows itself to be less effective than otherwise expected in using them. Concurrently, we argue that Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique in that it created novel uses for women and children in its suicide bombing efforts, rendering it distinctive among extant and historical terrorist groups. Our dataset reveals that from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 diferent targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women, and at least 81 bombers were specifically identified as children or teenagers. A more comprehensive overview follows. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Shelf Number: 146957 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Warner, Jason Title: Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab Summary: Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group that has been plaguing Somalia since 2006, was named the most deadly terror group in Africa in 2017 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). One tactic that al-Shabaab uses in its reign of terror is suicide bombing. Despite recognition of the seriousness of the threat that al-Shabaab's suicide bombers pose, very little is known about how, when, and why al-Shabaab elects to employ the tactic of suicide bombings. This report answers these questions. By analyzing a unique dataset compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that tracks all instances of al-Shabaab suicide bombings between the group's first suicide attack on September 18, 2006, to the end of our data collection in October 2017, the authors offer the most comprehensive account to date on the emergence, evolution, and efficacy on al-Shabaab's suicide bombers. They find that al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab's suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe. Their data also reveals information about just who serves as al-Shabaab's suicide bombers; where they target; al-Shabaab's suicide bombing delivery tendencies; and timing trends along months and days of the week. In conclusion, they offer suggestions about how to combat the group's suicide bombing efforts in the future. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149106 Keywords: Boko HaramIslamic StateSuicide BombersSuicide BombingsTerrorismTerrorists |