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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 12:17 pm
Time: 12:17 pm
Results for surveillance technology
3 results foundAuthor: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry Summary: Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security's effort to control unauthorized migration, with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as the lead agency along most of the border. Border enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when illegal immigration to the United States first registered as a serious national problem; and border security has received additional attention in the years since the terrorist attacks of 2001. Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy of "prevention through deterrence"-the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized aliens from attempting to enter the United States. Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat illegal migrant entries and disrupt migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain unauthorized aliens, a set of policies eventually described as "enforcement with consequences." Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to "high consequence" enforcement outcomes. Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology. In addition to increased resources, the USBP has implemented several strategies over the past several decades in an attempt to thwart illegal migration. Recently, the Obama Administration announced executive actions to "fix" the immigration system. These actions address numerous issues, including a revised security plan at the southern border. The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes; and this report describes trends in border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated got aways and turn backs. Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure illegal border flows or the degree to which the border is secured. Thus, the report also describes methods for estimating illegal border flows based on enforcement data and migrant surveys. Drawing on multiple data sources, the report suggests conclusions about the state of border security. Robust investments at the border were not associated with reduced illegal inflows during the 1980s and 1990s, but a range of evidence suggests a substantial drop in illegal inflows in 2007-2011, followed by a slight rise in 2012 and a more dramatic rise in 2013. Enforcement, along with the economic downturn in the United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown. Enhanced border enforcement also may have contributed to a number of secondary costs and benefits. To the extent that border enforcement successfully deters illegal entries, such enforcement may reduce border-area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that aliens are not deterred, the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to enter illegally and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: R42138: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf Shelf Number: 134497 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrationMigrationSurveillance Technology |
Author: U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies: Privacy Concerns and Recommendations Summary: Advances in emerging surveillance technologies like cell-site simulators – devices which transform a cell phone into a real-time tracking device – require careful evaluation to ensure their use is consistent with the protections afforded under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The United States' military and intelligence agencies have developed robust and sophisticated surveillance technologies for deployment in defense against threats from foreign actors. These technologies are essential to keeping America safe. Increasingly though, domestic law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels are using surveillance technologies in their every-day crime-fighting activities. In the case of cell-site simulators, this technology is being used to investigate a wide range of criminal activity, from human trafficking to narcotics trafficking, as well as kidnapping, and to assist in the apprehension of dangerous and violent fugitives. Law enforcement officers at all levels perform an incredibly difficult and important job and deserve our thanks and appreciation. While law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize technology as a tool to help officers be safe and accomplish their missions, absent proper oversight and safeguards, the domestic use of cell-site simulators may well infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the right to free association. Transparency and accountability are therefore critical to ensuring that when domestic law enforcement decide to use these devices on American citizens, the devices are used in a manner that meets the requirements and protections of the Constitution. After press reports alleged wide-spread use of cell-site simulation devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement, the Committee initiated a bipartisan investigation in April 2015. At the outset of the investigation, the use of these devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies was not well known, and in many instances, appeared to be shrouded in secrecy. This is partly due to the use of the technology by military and intelligence agencies and the need for sensitivity in national security matters. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, avoided disclosing not only its own use of the devices, but also its role in assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in obtaining and deploying these devices. Indeed, the Committee's investigation revealed that as part of the conditions for being able to sell cell-site simulators to state and local law enforcement, the manufacturers of these devices must first notify the FBI, and those agencies in turn must sign a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI that expressly prohibits them from publicly disclosing their use of this technology, even in prosecutions where the use of the technology was at issue. On April 24, 2015, the Committee sent letters to then-Attorney General Eric Holder and Homeland Security Director Jeh Johnson, requesting information about their agencies' use of cell-site simulators and the privacy concerns inherent with their use. During the course of the investigation, it became clear that the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement agencies was not governed by any uniform standards or policies. In an effort to determine how widespread this problem was, the Committee identified four cities of varying sizes and crime rates, along with two states, for the purpose of ascertaining the number and type of cell-site simulators in use, as well as the policies that were employed for their use. In particular, the Committee sent letters to the police departments in Washington, D.C.; Alexandria, Virginia; Sunrise, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation; and the Virginia State Police, requesting among other things, information regarding the number, the funding, and the use of these devices at the state and local level. Documents and information obtained by the Committee confirmed varying standards for employing cell-site simulation devices among federal, state, and local law enforcement. Notably, the documents and information revealed that when the Committee first began its investigation in April 2015, federal law enforcement entities could obtain a court’s authorization to use cell-site simulators by meeting a standard lower than probable cause — the standard to obtain a search warrant. On October 21, 2015 the Committee’s Subcommittee on Information Technology (the Subcommittee) held a public hearing on DOJ's and DHS’s use of cell-site simulators. 7 The hearing focused on the agencies’ policies and procedures for deploying cell-site simulation technology. In September 2015, five months into the Committee's investigation and with the hearing upcoming, DOJ announced a new policy for its use of cell-site simulation devices. Shortly thereafter, DHS followed suit with the announcement of a similar new policy. At the hearing, it became evident that prior to the Committee’s investigation, the component law enforcement entities of DHS and DOJ had different policies and procedures governing their use of this technology and the agencies were not always obtaining a probable cause based warrant prior to deploying these devices. The new policies substantially changed how the agencies obtain authorization to deploy cell-site simulation technology. The new policies also introduced a measure of uniformity to how the various component agencies of each department used cell-site simulators, and importantly, required the agencies to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause in the majority of situations. Details: Washington, DC: The Committee, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Shelf Number: 147302 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringSurveillance Technology |
Author: Diniz, Gustavo Title: Deconstructing Cyber Security in Brazil: Threats and Responses Summary: Brazil is doubling down on its cyber-security architecture while simultaneously consolidating its emerging power status. Although organized crime is one of the major threats to Brazilian cyberspace, resources are focused instead on military solutions better suited to the exceptional case of warfare. There is less emphasis on expanding law enforcement capabilities to identify and respond to cyber-crime and related digital malfeasance. Due to the absence of a unified government position on the issue or reliable data, Brazil has evolved an imbalanced approach to cyber-security. If Brazil is to re-balance its approach, it needs to fill knowledge gaps. At a minimum, policy makers require a better understanding of the strategies, tactics and resources of hackers and cyber-crime groups, the ways in which traditional crime is migrating online and the implications of new surveillance technologies. The government should also encourage a broad debate with a clear communications strategy about the requirements of cyber-security and what forms this might take. More critical reflection on the form and content of measured and efficient strategies to engage cyber threats is also needed. Improved coordination between state police forces to better anticipate and respond to cyber-crime is essential. If Brazil is to build a robust and effective cyber-security strategy, an informed debate must begin immediately. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Igarapé , 2014. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Paper 11: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Strategic-Paper-11-Cyber2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Strategic-Paper-11-Cyber2.pdf Shelf Number: 141328 Keywords: Computer CrimeCyber SecurityCybercrimeInternet CrimeSurveillance Technology |