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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 3:43 am
Time: 3:43 am
Results for taliban
5 results foundAuthor: Peters, Gretchen Title: How Opium Profits the Taliban Summary: In Afghanistan's poppy-rich southwest, a raging insurgency intersects a thriving opium trade. This study examines how the Taliban profit from narcotics, probes how traffickers influence the strategic goals of the insurgency, and considers the extent to which narcotics are changing the nature of the insurgency itself. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 39p. Source: Peaceworks No. 62 Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: Shelf Number: 115811 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug TraffickingNarcoticsOpiumTaliban |
Author: DuPée, Matthew C. Title: The Narcotics Emirate of Afghanistan: Armed Polities and Their Roles in Illicit Drug Production and Conflict 1980-2010 Summary: The production of illicit narcotics in low-intensity conflict environments remains a serious concern for U.S. policymakers. Afghanistan is a solid example where the intersection of crime, narcotics production and insurgency has successfully thwarted U.S. stabilization and security efforts despite a 10-year military engagement there. This study seeks to examine the role of crime better, particularly narcotics related criminal enterprise, and its effect on the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. This study explores political, economic and conflict related factors that facilitate the narcotics industry and forges cooperation between drug trafficking organizations and insurgent movements. A key argument of this study is that nontraditional participants in narcotics production, such as insurgent groups or state representatives and institutions, acquire more than just profit and resources. Participants stand to gain political leverage, the social and political legitimacy derived from “protecting” the livelihoods of rural farmers, as well as “freedom of action;” the ability to operate unimpeded within a given territory or space because of public support. This study also suggests that one additional factor, social control, is a key motivator for an actor’s participation in the narcotics industry. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 143p. Source: Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2012 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada536901.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada536901.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 124110 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug TraffickingNarcotics (Afghanistan) (Pakistan)OpiatesOrganized CrimeTaliban |
Author: Global Witness Title: War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth Summary: new investigation today reveals how Afghanistan's 6,500 year old lapis mines are driving corruption, conflict and extremism in the country. Global Witness has found that the Taliban and other armed groups are earning up to 20 million dollars per year from Afghanistan's lapis mines, the world's main source of the brilliant blue lapis lazuli stone, which is used in jewellery around the world. As a result, the Afghan lapis lazuli stone should now be classified as a conflict mineral. The lapis mines are in the Badakhshan region, once one of the more stable areas in Afghanistan, even at the height of Taliban control. However, violent competition for control of the lucrative mines and their revenue, between local strong men, local MPs and the Taliban has deeply destabilised the province and made it one of the hotbeds of the insurgency. With the Taliban on the outskirts of the mines themselves, as well as controlling key roads into the mining areas, there is now a real risk that the mines could fall into their hands. Global Witness' investigation also includes evidence that the Badakhshan mines are a strategic priority for the so-called Islamic State. Unless the Afghan government acts rapidly to regain control, the battle for the lapis mines is set to intensify and further destabilise the country, as well as fund extremism. The lapis mines in Afghanistan's Badakhshan region are a microcosm of a problem that is replicated across the country, where mining is the Taliban's second biggest source of income. Money from Afghanistan's mines should be an important source of wealth to fund essential services, including security, health and education. Afghanistan sits on over a trillion dollars' worth of mineral, oil and gas deposits, which could provide the government with over $2 billion in revenue a year, if developed properly. But rampant corruption and a failure to secure mining sites means that mines have been targeted by insurgent groups and are now a major contributor to conflict and extremism. The new Afghan mining law, which is currently being amended by the government, fails to include the actions needed to counter this threat, the report warns. Details: London: Global Witness, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Shelf Number: 139368 Keywords: Conflict MineralsPolitical CorruptionPrecious MineralsTalibanTerrorist Financing |
Author: Counter Extremism Project Title: Extremists and Online Propaganda Summary: Official propaganda materials produced by the media arms of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and al-Shabab are intentionally crafted to radicalize, inspire, and incite individuals to violence. These groups have produced propaganda in a myriad of textual, audio, and video forms - from music videos to glossy magazines - that have helped to convince individuals around the world to travel abroad to join extremist groups and to conduct deadly attacks in their home countries. At times, they have even offered specific guidance on how to do so. Abdirizak Warsame, who was arrested at the age of 19 for attempting to join ISIS abroad, stated that while watching violent ISIS execution videos on YouTube, he started to believe that he was "doing something for a greater cause --- for good" by supporting the group. Warsame was one of 57 individuals documented by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) who attempted to join an extremist group abroad, and one of 72 individuals who accessed explicitly violent propaganda materials. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev - who detonated two homemade bombs along with his brother, Tamerlan, at the April 2013 Boston Marathon - told investigators that he and his brother built the bombs using instructions from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s Inspire propaganda magazine. The Tsarnaev brothers were two of 26 individuals documented who successfully enacted an act of terror, and two of 25 individuals who accessed propaganda materials that provided instructions on how to prepare or execute violent terrorist acts. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice 2013, Slate, Foreign Policy, CBS News) Official extremist group propaganda materials are easily disseminated and accessed on the Internet. The individuals documented in this report accessed extremist group propaganda on a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, Paltalk, and WhatsApp. Several individuals also played a part in further propagating extremist propaganda materials. Of the 168 individuals documented by CEP, at least 51 disseminated propaganda materials either online, in person, or via mail, and 59 viewed or discussed propaganda materials with another individual. Even if extremist groups lose control over territory in their respective regions of operation, their ability to reach out and spread propaganda online will allow them to continue to attract support from across the globe. For example, even as ISIS steadily lost ground in Iraq and Syria throughout 2017, U.S. permanent resident Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov was still inspired by the group's propaganda videos to carry out a vehicular attack in New York City on October 31, 2017, that killed eight people. As long as extremist groups continue to produce compelling propaganda that plays a part in inspiring and inciting individuals to violence - and remains easily accessible online - terrorism in the name of these extremist groups will remain a threat worldwide. (Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2017) Details: New York, NY: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists-online-propaganda Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Extremists%20and%20Online%20Propaganda_040918.pdf Shelf Number: 154062 Keywords: al-Qaedaal-ShababCounter Extremism ProjectExtremismInternet ISISRadicalizationSocial MediaTalibanTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: From, James A Title: Policing in Afghanistan Reform that Respects Tradition: Need for a Strategic Shift Summary: Executive Summary With an intimidating geography that isolates communities, Afghanistan has historically had a decentralized system of government. The police and justice systems that are part of this form of government remain relatively simple, fragmented, and customary. Local communities have tailored policing and justice as an extension of the governance by tribal elders or other governing hierarchies. Such a system provides the necessary flexibility to respond to local conditions and needs. Its primary function is to preserve the local communities through reconciliation rather than retribution and to mitigate the threat of central government tyranny. To the average Afghan citizen the central government is remote, unloved, and mistrusted, hence any attempt to implement a centralized police and justice system will be fraught with difficulties. Today in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) approach to reconstructing the country and reforming its institutions is a Western, top-down one that emphasizes establishing a strong central government in Kabul as the dominant authority in the country - something no one has ever been able to do for any length of time. This strategic objective of centralized power cuts against the grain of Afghan experience, particularly because one of its centerpieces is an expansive plan to recruit, train, equip, and deploy a 160,000-man Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The role of the police, as described in the Police Law of 2005 of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, is akin to community policing and is at odds with the ISAF vision being implemented: one of regime protection, counter-insurgency, and counterterrorism. ISAF is attempting to construct a paramilitary forcegoal that ignores community policingpresumably with the expectation that as the security situation becomes more stable, the police will be able to play a more "conventional" role. The operating assumption appears to be that "security" should be defined only in terms of neutralizing armed groups; a condition that can be met only through military means, hence the rush to construct a vast and expensive force of thinly trained paramilitaries. For most Afghani citizens, however, as for most people in the world, security is a much more personal concern. State security is at best a secondary concern when compared with daily peril from unscrupulous neighbors and hardened criminals. This mismatch has resulted in muddled recruiting, training, and deployment with the result that the ANP is: - NOT effective as a paramilitary force, - NOT effective in community policing, and - NOT sustainable in the longer term. Study results show that: - The current strategy will not create an effective community policing force and has not created an effective paramilitary force. - The current top-down, nationalized approach is counter to Afghan culture in much of the country, ignores the customary security and justice systems serving 80 percent of the population, and is not financially sustainable by the Afghan government. - The ANP is the face of GIRoA to most Afghans; however, it is neither trusted nor welcomed in most communities because of its incompetence and corruption. - Development of the justice system (police, courts, corrections) has not been synchronized and thus does not support ANP enlargement proportionately. Hence, the JAWP team recommends that ISAF create a plan to sustain a force within the limits imposed by the available human capital and the realities of GIRoAs projected revenues: - Create a tailored, decentralized approach that forges links between the customary (largely rural) security and justice structures and the national (largely urban) structures. This will engage the population and be far less expensive in bringing security to the country than a formal, uniformed national police force. - Focus on quality over quantity and develop a "right-sized" and professional ANP. - Synchronize development of the formal justice system to provide a balanced emphasis on police, courts, and corrections. The ANP is presently a resource-intensive, top-down organization that supports the government and not the people. This needs to change fundamentally and to be restructured from the bottom-up, a situation where the police have direct ties with the population and the communities they serve and are selected and vetted by local elders. Unless ISAF basically restructures policing to meet the needs of rural communities, the Taliban will continue to gain influence and legitimacy in this critical periphery of Afghanistan. The strength of the bottom-up approach is that it would help ensure that the police meet the needs of both the people and the government and complement the top-down effort. As Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, who oversees the NATO training effort in Afghanistan, acknowledges, "If we don't get the police fixed, well never change the dynamics in the country. No matter how well we do clearing and holding, we will never build on that progress and sustain it without a police force. We have to get this right." Details: Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/ida-paper-p-4604.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/ida-paper-p-4604.pdf Shelf Number: 154114 Keywords: Afghan National Police Afghanistan Afghanistan Compact Decentralized Government Development Assistance International Security Assistance Force Justice Systems Paramilitaries Police State Security Taliban |