Date: November 22, 2024 Fri

Time: 12:18 pm

Results for terrorism

560 results found

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct Summary: Findings from the American Terrorism Study (NIJ grant #1999-IJCX-0005 and DHS/MIPT grant #lO6- 1 13-2000-064) reveal that unlike traditional criminality, terrorists are much less spontaneous, engage in substantial planning activities, and commit ancillary and preparatory crimes in advance of a terrorist incident. Building on these findings, the goals of the current project were to determine whether (1) sufficient open source data exists to examine the temporal and spatial relationships that exist in terrorist group planning, and (2) if such data do exist, can patterns of routinized preparatory conduct be identified. To accomplish these goals, subject matter experts were selected to identify terrorist groups incidents that operated or occurred within the United States from four major categories: international; and three types of domestic terrorism -- left-wing, rightwing, and single issue (which was limited to environmental and anti-abortion terrorism). Sixty-seven "cases" were selected for analysis. Of these sixty seven, sixty of the cases were sufficiently fertile to provide some data for analysis. These included 22 right-wing, 9 left-wing, 10 international, and 17 single issue cases. Information on some 200 terrorist "incidents" (right-wing, 41; left-wing, 51; international, 58; and single issue, 50) was extracted from open source data on these cases to create a relational database composed of 265 variables. Geospatial data was recorded on some 515 terrorists' residences, planning locations, preparatory activities, and target locations. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, analyses focused upon the identification of general temporal and spatial patterns of activity. On average, the terrorist groups studied existed for some 1,205 days from the date of the first known planning meeting to the date of the actuallplanned terrorist incident.' This figure, however, should not be taken as indicative of the average "lifespan" of terrorist groups. Some of the groups studied, such as the United Freedom Front and Omega 7, operated for several years, atypical for most terrorist groups. The planning process for specific acts began, on average, approximately 2-3 months prior to the commission of the terrorist incident. Planning and preparatory activities were intermingled during this period. However, on average, a lull in activities occurred during the last three to four weeks prior to the incident. Approximately two and one-half known planning and preparatory behaviors were recorded per incident and these varied by type of terrorist group. The spatial analysis revealed that terrorists typically live relatively close to the incident target. Nearly one-half of the terrorists resided within 30 miles of the target location. Similarly, approximately one-half of the terrorists engaged in their planning and preparatory activities within this distance of their residences. Finally, a similar percentage of preparatory behaviors took place within 30 miles of the eventual target of the terrorist incident. the terrorist incident. The implications for local law enforcement are extremely important. While terrorists may think globally, they act locally. Both preventative efforts and post-incident investigations should focus upon local events and persons as the primary source of information about terrorist activities. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center, Fullbright College, University of Arkansas, 2006. 540p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214217.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214217.pdf Shelf Number: 117132 Keywords: Spatial Analysis Terrorism Terrorist Targets Terrorists

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Audit Divison Title: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices Summary: The watchlist is used by frontline screening personnel at U.S. points of entry and by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials. The watchlist serves as a critical tool for these screening and law enforcement personnel by notifying the user of possible encounters with known or suspected terrorists and by providing instruction on how to respond to the encounter. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Deptartment of Justice, Office of the Interior General, Audit Division, 2009 Source: Audit Report 09-25 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113938 Keywords: Federal Bureau of Investigation Terrorism

Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida Summary: All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate that other groups and rarely achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase "war on terrorism" since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 111170 Keywords: Terrorism

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process Summary: Homegrown terrorists are of increasing concern to intelligence services in both the United States and the United Kingdom. This report addreses an identified gap in the literature on this topic through an empirical examination of behavioral manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown "jihadist" terrorists from both the U.S. and the U.K. Details: Washington, DC: FDD Press (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116212 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: United Nations. Office of Drugs and Crime. Independent Evaluation Unit Title: Thematic evaluation of the global project on strengthening the legal regime against terrorism Summary: This evaluation of the Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism is focused on the selected countries of Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama. The aim is to provide insights to help the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime increase the effectiveness and impact of its technical assistance to counter-terrorism efforts. Details: New York: 2008 Source: Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 115759 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism Summary: This handbook aims to provide law enforcement and criminal justice officials with an accessible guide to assist them in dealing with some of the key issues that they face in their efforts to respond to terrorist and related crimes. It reviews the many challenges encountered by the various components of the criminal justice system in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and detention of alleged or convicted perpetrators of terrorist crimes. It offers guidance based on international standards and generally accepted good practices. Details: New York: United Nations, 2009 Source: Criminal Justice Handbook Series Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116199 Keywords: Criminal Justice Policy Terrorism

Author: Victoria. Auditor-General Title: Preparedness to Respond to Terrorism Incidents: Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure Summary: The objective of this audit was to examine the state's preparedness to respond to terrorism incidents, relating to essential services and critical infrastructure. This audit examined the governance agreements established to assist operators of essential services and owners/operators of critical infrastructure to respond to terrorism incidents. The activities of selected Victorian government agencies with roles and responsibilites were examined, including how they consulted and interacted with owners/operators of critical infrastructure and operators of declared essential serivces. The audit also considere funding for counter-terrorism initiatives including for preventing, responding to and recovering from terrorist attacks. The activities of Victoria Police and seven Victorian government departments were examined. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 114814 Keywords: Criminal Justice Policy Terrorism

Author: Ford, Jolyon Title: Beyond the 'War on Terror': A Study of Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism in the Maghreb Summary: From the monograph: "[t]his monograph is a preliminary study of the extent to which three North African countries - Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia - have successfully implemented legal and institutional measures to address the threat of terrorism primarily through their national criminal justice systems, pursuant to internationally and regionally agreed obligations and in accordance with internationally accepted standards. This study is part of the multi-year project, "Strengthening the criminal justice capacity of African states to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of terrorism,' which started in 2008. The project is being implemented by the International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)." Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2009. 124p. Source: ISS Monograph 165: Accessed May 8, 2018 at: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/beyond-the-war-on-terror-a-study-of-criminal-justice-responses-to-terrorism-in-the-maghreb/ Year: 2009 Country: Africa URL: https://www.africaportal.org/publications/beyond-the-war-on-terror-a-study-of-criminal-justice-responses-to-terrorism-in-the-maghreb/ Shelf Number: 116681 Keywords: Algeria Law and Legislation Morocco Terrorism Tunisia

Author: Schanzer, David Title: Anti-terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans Summary: In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere around the world, a key counterterrorism concern is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in the United States. Yet, the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism. This project seeks to explain this encouraging result by identifying characteristics and practices in the Muslim-American community that are preventing radicalization and violence. Details: Durham, NC: Sanford School of Public Policy, 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117774 Keywords: Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Kundnani, Arun Title: Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: This report critically examines the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy, and suggests that it is counter-productive in reducing the risk of violent extremism. Details: London: Institute for Race Relations, 2009. 45p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117579 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism

Author: Gould, Eric D. Title: Terror and the Costs of Crime Summary: This paper argues that terrorism, beyond its immediate impact on innocent victims, also raises the costs of crime, and therefore, imposes a negative externality on potential criminals. Terrorism raises the costs of crime through two channels: (1) by increasing the presence and activity of the police force, and (2) causing more people to stay at home rather than going out for leisure activities. The analysis exploits a panel of 120 fatal terror attacks and all reported crimes for 17 districts throughout Israel between 2000 and 2005. After controlling for the fixed-effect of each district and for district-specific time trends, it shows that terror attacks reduce property crimes such as burglary, auto-theft, and thefts-from-cars. Terror also reduced assaults and aggravated assaults which occur in private homes, but increases incidents of trespassing and disrupting the police. Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with a stronger deterrence effect produced by an increased police presence after a terror attack. A higher level of policing is likely to catch more people trespassing, and at the same time, reduce the number of property crimes. The decline in crimes committed in private houses is likely an indication that the tendency for individuals to stay home after a terror attack further increases the costs of crime. Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2009. 48p. Source: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4347 Year: 2009 Country: Israel URL: Shelf Number: 116386 Keywords: Costs of Crime Terrorism

Author: Lindelauf, Roy Title: Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption Summary: This article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Details: Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University, 2009. 13p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117867 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Organized Crime Terror Networks Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Anti-money laundering: improved communication could enhance the support FinCEN provides to law enforcement Summary: Financial investigations are used to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, crimes that destablize national economies and threaten global security. This report examines the extent to which the law enforcement community finds FinCEN's support useful in its efforts to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009, 39p. Source: Internet Source Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 115337 Keywords: Global Security Money Laundering Terrorism

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism Summary: The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a process of radicalization. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies. This report is a summary of two years research examining the difference between violent and non-violent radicals in Europe and Canada. It represents a step toward a more nuanced understanding of behavior across radicalized individuals, the appeal of the al-Qaeda narrative, and the role of governments and communities in responding. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 70p. Source: Online Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Jackson, Brian A. Title: Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail Summary: This occasional paper examines the issue of why terrorist operations succeed or fail. Given the importance of this issue for security planning, there is a significant literature on the topic, and a variety of these contributions identify factors that can shape operations going well or poorly. This paper reacts to and responds to that literature and proposes an overarching framework for thinking through why attack options can have very different outcomes. In it, it is argued that such a framework is critical for security planning efforts because focusing on individual factors in isolation risks producing an overall picture that does not accurately describe terrorist behavior. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 29p. Source: Homeland Security Program; Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116319 Keywords: Security Operations Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector Summary: This report considers casinos with a physical presence and discusses related money laundering and terrorist financing methods, vulnerabilities, indicators to aid detection and deterrence, and international information exchange. The report considers vulnerabilities from gaps in domestic implementation of anti-money laundering to combating the financing of terrorism measures. Details: Paris: FATF, 2009. 77p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118343 Keywords: Casinos Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Borchgrave, Arnaud de Title: Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments from the Field Summary: These essays on Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, Burma, and Australian have a common thread: terrorism, like politics, is local. Yes, there is a superficial frame, which is shared by local terrorists, but the vicissitudes of violence vary according to local events. Except for training provided a decade earlier to some aspiring terrorists, al Qaeda is notably absent from the various accounts in the present collection. Indeed, the weak links to al Qaeda central, trumpeted in the West more than in Southeast Asia, obscure the local dynamics, showing an upsurge in the threat earlier in this decade and a general decline as time goes on. While the ideology is similar, local social conditions change, and law enforcement agencies learn to deal with their foes. As the essays show, the situation is improving in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. The situation is deteriorating in Thailand because violent Islamists wrapped themselves with separatist grievances, while the situation in the Philippines is so embedded in local politics that it is difficult to even analyze it in terms of terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. 87p. Source: A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 116190 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jacobson, Michael Title: Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left Summary: There is a growing recognition that capturing or killing every terrorist is not a realistic strategy and that we need to spend more time exploring the radicalization process - what motivates people to become extremists in the first place. Despite this, little study has been undertaken of the "flip side" - those who decide to leave terrorist and extremist organizations. This report is based on approximately twenty-five interviews with those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations. An analysis of the interviews reveals that individual dropout cases clearly show that no single overarching reason explains why individuals leave terrorist or extremist groups, just as no single reason leads to their radicalization in the first instance. Nonetheless, several patterns emerge that should give policymakers cause for optimism. First, it is clear that many of those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations have done so without being harmed or even threatened. And second, these organizations are often hid hard when leadership defections take place. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010. 34p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Focus #101 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117701 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Global Witness Title: For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda Moved Into the Diamond Trade Summary: This report examines whether the terrorist group, al Qaeda, has used, and is continuing to use, rough diamonds. The report presents evidence that confirms that al Qaeda have been involved in the rough diamond trade since the 1990s. First in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The report argues that there are several reasons why al Qaeda has used rough diamonds: 1) As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells; 2) To hide money targeted by financial sanctions; 3) To launder the profits of criminal activity; and 4) To convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily transportable. Details: London: Global Witness, 2003. 95p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2003 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118825 Keywords: al Qaeda Diamonds, Trade Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing Transnational Crime

Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Financing of Terrorism: Risks for Australia Summary: This paper examines the global environment in which the financing of terrorism occurs, particularly with responect ot eh activities of transnational, organized groups that may have an involvement with terrorist organizations. Consideration is then given to how the financing of terrorism occurs, first through the use of illegally obtained funds and then through financing derived from legitimate sources, sucha as charitable donations, which are diverted for use in terrorist activities. Evidence of the financing of terrorism in Australia is then examined and cases which have been detected and prosecuted in Australia than entail an element of terrorist financing are reviewed. Although the number of cases is small, they are indicative of the fact that Australia is not immune from terrorist activities that are being financed by Australian individuals and organizations. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource; Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 394 Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 118810 Keywords: Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorism, Financing Terrorist Financing

Author: Brynjar, Lia Title: Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature Summary: This report presents a critical survey of the academic literature on the causes of terrorism. The study focuses primarily on theories that seek to explain why some societies are more exposed to terrorism than others, i.e. theories on a national or societal level of analysis. It also examines theoretical frameworks for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis. The report underscores the importance of understanding terrorism in its political and societal contexts. By identifying the socio-economic conditions, political regime factors and international system characteristics that are more likely to generate high levels of terrorism, the study also provides useful tools for trend analysis and forecasting. Details: Kjeller, Normay: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005. 82p. Source: Internet Resource; FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307 Year: 2005 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119182 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Terrorism in the West 2008: A Guide to Terrorism Events and Landmark Cases Summary: This report describes that state of terrorism in Western countries over the course of 2008. It includes the following: 1) a comprehensive look at terrorism events in the West, including attacks, failed plots, and arrests; 2) a discussion of landmark terrorism prosecutions; 3) an assessment of broad trends in terrorist activity over the course of the year; and 4) expert commentary from Jeff Breinholt, Douglas Farah, Rohan Gunaratna, Andrew C. McCarthy, and Reuven Paz. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009. 105p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119218 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Title: What Perceptions Do the UK Public Have Concerning the Impact of Counter-terrorism Legislation Implemented Since 2000? Summary: This report presents the findings of a research study that looked into public perceptions of the impact of counter-terrorism legislation implemented in the UK since 2000. The study found that there was insufficient evidence on specific aspects of the legislation to draw conclusions that could lead to actionable outcomes for policy-makers. Details: London: Home Office, 2010. 68p. Source: Internet Resource; Occasional Paper 88 Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 117630 Keywords: Counter-terrorism (U.K.) Public Attitudes Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The handbook is a compilation of legal experiences relating to actual terrorist cases gained by high-ranking experts from several countries who have gathered at meetings organized by UNODC in Austria, Colombia and Italy. The experts share their experiences in dealing with terrorism cases, reflect on their positive and negative judicial experiences, and explain specific investigative and prosecutorial techniques used in these cases. Details: New York: UNODC, 2010. 129p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118731 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Countermeasures Assessment and Security Experts Title: Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers Summary: Worldwide terrorist activities create many security-related concerns for government leaders, security agencies, and transit agency managers. In response to these concerns, many transit agencies are assessing and introducing activities to reduce the risk of attacks on their systems. Most public transportation agencies have instituted security measures and continue to re-assess their situation as new threats are identified. One measure receiving more consideration is the introduction of passenger security inspections. However, there are many policy and logistical issues associated with implementing these inspections. Public transportation agencies could benefit from assistance in defining their options for conducting passenger security inspections. Apart from determining whether security inspections are feasible for one's agency, there is also a need to determine appropriate methodologies for implementing such measures. The objective of this guide is to provide guidance that a public transportation agency may use when considering whether, where, when, and how to introduce a passenger security inspection program into its operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource; TCRP Report 86; Public Transportation Security, Volume 13 Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119336 Keywords: Passenger Screening Terrorism Transit Crime Transportation Security

Author: Haveman, Jon D. Title: Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost Summary: This report "describes and analyzes what could happen if a terrorist attack on a port where to occur, what can be done to deter such and attack, the characteristics of U.S. port security programs, what factors stand in the way of an adequate port security policy, and some alternative methods for financing that policy." Details: San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2006. 271p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119379 Keywords: Harbors, Security Measures Marine Terminals, Security Measures Maritime Crime Port Security Terrorism

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Terrorist Attacks on Public Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis Summary: "This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public bus transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of December 17, 2009. Data include the frequency and lethality with which buses, bus stations, and bus stops are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against bus targets and the relationship between injuries and attacks against those targets; how often, relative to other surface transportation targets, buses are attacked, first with all weapons and then with only explosive and incendiary devices; the relative lethality of attacks; and the distribution of attacks. It then presents some preliminary observations drawn from those data that can help stakeholders—governments, transit managers, and employees—to focus on the ways the most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United States." Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose State University, 2010. 110p. Source: Internet Resource; MTI Report SP 09-01 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119381 Keywords: Public Transportation Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Transit Crime Transit Safety

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Security Practices at National Icons and Parks Summary: The September 11 terrorist attacks have heightened concerns about the security of the nation's icons and parks, which millions of people visit every year. The National Park Service (Park Service) within the Department of the Interior (Interior) is responsible for securing nearly 400 park units that include icons and other parks. In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices that include: allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information sharing and coordination, performance measurement and testing, and strategic management of human capital. As requested, GAO determined whether the Park Service's security efforts for national icons and parks reflected key practices. To meet this objective, GAO used its key practices as criteria, reviewed five icons and parks to gain firsthand knowledge, analyzed Interior documents, and interviewed Interior officials. The Park Service has implemented a range of security improvements since the September 11 terrorist attacks and has worked to integrate security into its primary mission to preserve national icons and parks for the public's enjoyment. For example, it has established a senior-level security manager position and taken steps to strengthen security at the icons, and is developing a risk management program for small parks. These efforts exhibit some aspects of the key protection practices, but GAO found limitations in each of the areas. The Park Service does not allocate resources using risk management servicewide or cost-effectively leverage technology. While the Park Service, with assistance from Interior, has conducted risk assessments and implemented countermeasures to enhance security at the icons, some critical vulnerabilities remain. Moreover, the Park Service has not advanced this risk management approach for icons to the rest of its national parks. Without a servicewide risk management approach, the Park Service lacks assurance that security efforts are focused where they are needed. Furthermore, while icons and parks may use a variety of security technologies and other countermeasures, they do not have guidance for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of these investments, thus limiting assurances of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Additionally, the Park Service faces limitations with sharing and coordinating information internally and lacks a servicewide approach for routine performance measurement and testing. Although the Park Service collaborates with external organizations, it lacks comparable arrangements for internal security communications and, as a result, parks are not equipped to share information with one another on common security problems and solutions. Furthermore, the Park Service has not established security performance measures and lacks an analysis tool that could be used to evaluate program effectiveness and inform an overall risk management strategy. Thus, icons and parks have little information on the status and performance of security that they can use to manage daily activities or that Park Service management can use to manage security throughout the organization. Finally, strategic human capital management is an area of concern because of the Park Service's lack of clearly defined security roles and a security training curriculum. For example, staff that are assigned security duties are generally not required to meet qualifications or undergo specialized training. Absent a security training curriculum, there is less assurance that staff are well-equipped to effectively identify and mitigate risks at national icons and parks. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 47p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-09-983 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119422 Keywords: Homeland Security Parks Recreation Areas Security Terrorism

Author: Neumann, Peter R. Title: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries Summary: The report identifies trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that will help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. Among the key findings and recommendations are: 1) The current emphasis on security and containment leads to missed opportunities to promote reform. Prison services should be more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches to facilitate extremists’ transition back into mainstream society; 2) Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to radicalisation. Badly run prisons make the detection of radicalisation difficult, and they also create the physical and ideological space in which extremist recruiters can operate at free will; 3) Religious conversion is not the same as radicalisation. Good counter-radicalisation policies – whether in or outside prison – never fail to distinguish between legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. Prison services should invest more in staff training, and consider sharing specialised resources; 4) Individual de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes – such as the ones in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries – can make a difference. Their positive and outward-looking approach should serve as an inspiration for governments and policymakers everywhere; 5) Even in the best circumstances, however, such programmes complement rather than replace other instruments in the fight against terrorism. They work best when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists or insurgents. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119428 Keywords: Prison Gangs Prisons Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Vignard, Kerstin Title: Maritime Security Summary: This issue focuses on maritime security — a multifaceted and complex topic that touches on some of the most critical security challenges of the moment. Armed non-state actors are exploiting busy shipping lanes for piracy and, some fear, for terrorist purposes. In this regard, there is rising concern about the security of sensitive materials in transit by sea. This issue of Disarmament Forum examines how these maritime security risks are being addressed. It explores efforts to minimize risks of WMD proliferation through regional and international cooperation at sea, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative. It considers the extent of the threat posed by pirates and other non-state actors at sea—with a particular emphasis on the security of maritime shipping of sensitive materials. Details: Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource; Disarmament Forum, No. 2 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119467 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy/Pirates Pirates Terrorism

Author: Nakanishi, Yuko, Consultant Title: Transit Security Update: A Synthesis of Transit Practice Summary: This report, an update of the original TCRP Synthesis of Transit Practice 21: Improving Transit Security (1997), addresses terrorism, which was not included in the original study along with ordinary crime. Counterterrorism and anticrime security measures and practices, crime and security incident trends, and other related issues are covered in this report. Major issues and obstacles to security and policing management, as well as further research needs, have been identified and presented. The key elements of this Synthesis study include a survey of 120 transit agencies, with a 38% response rate, case studies, and a literature review along with input from industry experts and National Transit Database (NTD) analysis. Since the publication of the last report in 1997, significant improvements have been made to mitigate ordinary crime, and significant progress has been made to secure transit systems from terrorism. After September 11, 2001 (9/11), securing public transportation systems against the terrorist threat became an important and complex issue for U.S. transit operators and continues to be a prime concern of both domestic and international transit operators. For many decades, transit systems outside of the United States have been a target of terrorist activity, which has resulted in significant losses of life, injuries, infrastructure damage, disruptions to transit service, and economic losses to the affected regions. Synthesis survey results revealed that the terrorist threats of primary concern to multimodal, rail-only, and ferry systems were explosives, chemical and biological threats, hijackings and shootings, and sabotage. The terrorist threats of primary concern to bus agencies were hijackings, shootings, explosives, and sabotage. Transit agencies are well aware of many other possible terrorist threats, such as radiological attacks, cyber crime, and transit vehicles used as weapons, but these threats are considered to be of secondary importance. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2009. 142p. Source: Internet Resource; TCRP Synthesis 80 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119465 Keywords: Public Transportation Terrorism Transit Crime Transit Safety Transit Security

Author: International Advisory Commission of the Commonweath Human Rights Initiative Title: Stamping Out Rights: The Impact of Anti-Terrorism Laws on Policing Summary: This report looks at the impact of anti-terrorism legislation on policing in the Commonwealth. The report examines: new counter-terrorism legislation and measures that have been adopted in the Commonwealth; how these measures are impacting policing on the ground; the compatibility of legislation and policing practices at international law; how anti-terrorism policing measures are impacting on police oversight and accountability mechanisms; and offers recommendations to Commonwealth heads of government, member states, heads of police, civil society and donors. Details: New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2007. 82p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 111693 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Legislation Terrorism

Author: Madzima, Jackson Title: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks in Botswana Summary: Botswana has a relatively good legal foundation to fight financial crime in general. With the second reading of the Financial Intelligence Bill and the regulation of non-financial institutions prone to money laundering, the legal framework will be remarkably enhanced. However, Botswana has not yet undertaken an assessment of its risks and vulnerabilities to money laundering and the financing of terrorism in terms of international requirements. Significantly, Botswana’s legal framework does not recognise the risk of money laundering in either limited- or high-risk situations. This is in spite of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) espousing a country-specific risk analysis and application of a regulative framework for all forms of business relationships. The rationale for adopting the risk-based approach is that a better understanding of the extent, form, production and disposal or use of the proceeds of crime helps to determine the appropriate interventions. Tentative steps towards establishing trends in money laundering and the financing of terrorism have been taken over the past few years. A team of World Bank experts visited Botswana at the end of 2006 to assess the implementation of the FATF anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML and CFT) standards. In early 2007 the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), in collaboration with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa, undertook research to establish trends in money laundering in Botswana. The findings are yet to be publicised. However, what is apparent is that these investigations were by no means exhaustive. This paper is a contribution to the discourse on money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Botswana. It provides an overview of Botswana’s AML/CFT regimes. This will follow a brief outline of the international regulatory regimes for curbing both money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Significantly, the paper subscribes to the view that both these activities exhibit the same characteristics and therefore that their analysis can and should broadly be made within the same framework. An analytical framework woven around the ‘three pillars’ of prevention, enforcement and international co-operation is used in this discussion. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 184: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER184.PDF Year: 2008 Country: Botswana URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER184.PDF Shelf Number: 119705 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Threat Assessment Summary: The Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment (GTA) report provides an assessment of the global systemic money laundering/terrorist financing threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimize the harms they can cause. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Shelf Number: 119711 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade Zones Summary: Free trade zones (FTZs) are designated areas within countries that offer a free trade environment with a minimum level of regulation. The number of FTZs have increased rapidly in recent years, today there are approximately 3,000 FTZs in 135 countries around the world. FTZs offer many incentives and benefits to the companies that operate within it, such as the exemption from duty and taxes and simplified administrative procedures. However, the absence of strict regulations and transparency of the FTZs which is beneficial for legitimate businesses, also make them highly attractive for illicit actors who take advantage of this relaxed oversight to launder the proceeds of crime and finance terrorism. Through a series of cases studies, this report aims to illustrate the ways in which FTZs can be misused for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Shelf Number: 119712 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Thiel, Darren Title: Policing Terrorism: A Review of the Evidence Summary: The London bombings in July 2005 have changed society and how it is policed. The Government has necessarily focused its efforts on passing new legislation to improve the security of the nation, but the longer term task of illuminating the causes of terrorism committed by British nationals and the role of effective community engagement in this also needs to be urgently addressed. Establishing and maintaining the right balance between security and liberty is crucial to the health of a democratic society and an independent assessment of the impact of the new anti-terrorism legislation needs to be undertaken. This report aims to identify what is known and what is not known about contemporary terrorism; Considers how to improve the exchange of information and intelligence between communities, local police and security services; and Assesses how the police could improve levels of trust and legitimacy in communities that may be characterised by high levels of tension and alienation, particularly with regard to relationships between the police and young British Muslim men. Details: London: Police Foundation, 2009. 73p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115292 Keywords: Policing Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society Summary: The U.K. Coalition Government has the opportunity to initiate a new era of counter terrorism policy. It has started well by signalling its commitment to ‘restore the rights of individuals in the face of encroaching state power’, including the introduction of a ‘Freedom Bill’, and a review of counter-terrorism legislation. This paper considers one aspect of that review, ‘home-grown’ terrorism, and the future of one specific type of response, prevention. It argues for an approach to prevention work that is consistent with the Coalition’s goal of creating a Big Society of active citizens and protecting civil liberties. That there has been no successful terrorist plot in the UK since 7/7 owes much to the skills of our policing and security services, as well as a sustained effort from Muslim communities to fight terrorism. But the threat of al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains, as does a sense of alienation and frustration among many British Muslims. Preventing terrorism before it takes place is a vital part of the counter-terrorism effort, particularly given the home-grown threat we face. This is known as ‘Prevent’, which is the second ‘P’ in the UK’s CONTEST II strategy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare). However, the five years since 7/7 have demonstrated how complicated prevention work is. Stopping a problem before it arises always poses ethical and practical questions; in counter-terrorism, it involves sensitive issues of theology, integration, and identity. And because the paths that people take into terrorism are varied, complicated, and unpredictable, it is difficult to know where and when ‘prevention’ should take place. A number of recent reports have been critical of the UK’s current prevention efforts, culminating in the House of Commons Select Committee Report into Preventing Violent Extremism, released in March 2010. It is widely believed that Prevent has alienated Muslim communities, increased intercommunity tensions, and threatens to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to community cohesion because of the link to counter terrorism. It is also extremely difficult to assess its effectiveness as the relationship between these programmes and countering terrorism is weak. Thus,in a time of tightening public sector budgets, the question of value for money is impossible to determine.Some of these criticisms have been based on misconceptions about what prevention is about but it is difficult to know how to overcome them. Some form of terrorism prevention work must remain. This paper sets out a new vision for how it could be reformed under a new government. It proposes replacing the current broad approach to prevention, which targets all Muslims, with a more precise focus on individuals that have the intent to commit criminal acts. Broader plans for cohesion are important, but should not be pursued directly or through the prism of security. Instead, Big Society initiatives can indirectly create a more cohesive society and address some of the root causes of terrorism. But a Big Society will mean disagreement, dissent, and extremism. Deciding the limits of free expression will be a defining question. Rather than vague notions of tackling extremism, we propose a liberal republican solution. This means that intolerance must be allowed a platform, but the onus falls on us to demolish it in argument. It also means intervening when certain types of extremism stop others leading a life of their own choosing. The recommendations contains a number of recommendations to enable the coalition government to create a cohesive society and address some of the causes of terrorism. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Shelf Number: 119743 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Hale, Geoffrey Title: In Search of Effective Border Management Summary: Effective border security is compatible with the efficient management of border processes to allow the free flow of low-risk people and goods for purposes of mutual benefit between countries. Recent economic shocks have demonstrated that neither Americans nor Canadians can take their prosperity and economic security for granted. The risks of external and domestic terror attacks increasingly resemble long-term challenges to effective security and border management such as organized criminal activity and unregulated migration, rather than the crisis atmosphere which marked initial responses to 9/11. Failure to consider border security and facilitation issues in this context is likely to result in sub-optimal security and economic outcomes. Details: Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: A Changing World: Canadian Foreign Policy Priorities, No. 3: Accessed September 6, 2010 at: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.onlinecic.org/research/research_areas/border_issues Shelf Number: 119750 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Smuggling Terrorism Trafficking

Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Summary: Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks — including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters — exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 185p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Shelf Number: 119759 Keywords: Counterinsurgency Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Summary: Conspiracy theories have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon. This paper considers the role they play in extremist groups and counterterrorism work. It presents the first ever analysis of conspiracy theories in the ideology and propaganda of fifty extremist groups: religious, far-right and left, eco, anarchic and cult-based. It is argued that conspiracy theories are a ‘radicalising multiplier', which feed back into the ideologies, internal dynamics and psychological processes of extremist groups in three ways. Firstly, they create demonologies of ‘the enemy’ that the group defines itself against. Secondly, they delegitimise voices of dissent and moderation. And thirdly, they encourage a group or individuals to turn to violence, because it acts as rhetorical devices to portray violence as necessary to ‘awaken’ the people from their acquiescent slumber. More broadly, conspiracy theories drive a wedge of distrust between governments and particular communities which can hinder community-level efforts to fight violent extremism. It is, however, difficult for government to tackle conspiracies. The paper calls for government institutions to be more open, investment to enable young people to think critically and recognise propaganda, and for civil society to play a proactive role. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Shelf Number: 119795 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Goldgof, Smitry B. Title: Evaluation of Smart Video for Transit Event Detection Summary: Transit agencies are increasingly using video cameras to fight crime and terrorism. As the volume of video data increases, the existing digital video surveillance systems provide the infrastructure only to capture, store and distribute video, while leaving the task of threat detection exclusively to human operators. The objective of this research project was to study and develop an evaluation framework for commercial video analytics systems. A state-of-the-art research literature survey was conducted. Identified strengths, weaknesses, future directions of research and state-of-the-art commercial video analytics products were surveyed. Product capabilities were identified by working together with vendors and analyzing the available literature offered by the providers. Use of analytic technology in transit agencies in Florida was analyzed. A technology survey among the largest agencies in the state indicates very low use of video analytics, significant skepticism, and poor general knowledge of the technology and its capabilities. Based on existing general evaluation frameworks, an evaluation framework for video analytics technology was developed, including annotation guidelines, scoring metrics, and implementation of the scoring metrics in the scoring software. Details: Tampa, FL: National Center for Transit Research, Center for Urban Transportation Research, University of South Florida, 2009. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2010 at: http://www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/77807.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/77807.pdf Shelf Number: 119820 Keywords: Crime Prevention Terrorism Transit Crime Transit Safety Transit Security Video Surveillance

Author: Bergen, Peter Title: Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group Summary: Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2010 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 119828 Keywords: National Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Merritt, Zina D. Title: Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed Summary: The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment. GAO recommends the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia to reinstate certain targets related to preventing financing of terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia. State agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-883: Accessed October 7, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Saudi Arabia URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Shelf Number: 116506 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed Summary: U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-337: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Shelf Number: 114343 Keywords: Homeland Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Terrorism Transportation Security

Author: de Andres, Amado Philip Title: West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security Summary: This paper provides an overview on the current situation in West Africa with regard to drug trafficking (cocaine, heroin and hashish), organized crime (from human trafficking to diamond trade and its link with terrorism financing) and terrorism. Details: Madrid: UNISCI, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: UNISCI Discussion Paper, No. 16: Accessed October 12, 2010 at: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Shelf Number: 119931 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Terrorist Financing Summary: Terrorist organisations vary widely, ranging from large, state-like organisations to small, decentralised and self-directed networks. Terrorists financing requirements reflect this diversity, varying greatly between organisations. Financing is required not just to fund specific terrorist operations, but to meet the broader organisational costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organisation and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities. The direct costs of mounting individual attacks have been low relative to the damage they can yield. However, maintaining a terrorist network, or a specific cell, to provide for recruitment, planning, and procurement between attacks represents a significant drain on resources. A significant infrastructure is required to sustain international terrorist networks and promote their goals over time. Organisations require significant funds to create and maintain an infrastructure of organisational support, to sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda, and to finance the ostensibly legitimate activities needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for terrorist organisations. Terrorists have shown adaptability and opportunism in meeting their funding requirements. Terrorist organisations raise funding from legitimate sources, including the abuse of charitable entities or legitimate businesses or self-financing by the terrorists themselves. Terrorists also derive funding from a variety of criminal activities ranging in scale and sophistication from low-level crime to organised fraud or narcotics smuggling, or from state sponsors and activities in failed states and other safe havens. Terrorists use a wide variety of methods to move money within and between organisations, including the financial sector, the physical movement of cash by couriers, and the movement of goods through the trade system. Charities and alternative remittance systems have also been used to disguise terrorist movement of funds. The adaptability and opportunism shown by terrorist organisations suggests that all the methods that exist to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk. Disrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, constraining overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their ability to execute attacks. Disrupting terrorist financing involves both systemic safeguards, which protect the financial system from criminal abuse, and targeted economic sanctions informed by counter-terrorism intelligence. The study highlights the links between financial tools and wider counter-terrorist activity: the effectiveness of authorities at both detecting and investigating terrorist activity is significantly enhanced when counter-terrorist intelligence and financial information are used together. Looking ahead the study identifies four areas which could be the focus of efforts to further strengthen counter-terrorist financing efforts: (1) action to address jurisdictional issues including safe havens and failed states, (2) outreach to the private sector to ensure the availability of information to detect terrorist financing, (3) building a better understanding across public and private sectors and (4) enhanced financial intelligence to exploit the value of financial investigation as a tool in fighting terrorism. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force/OECD, 2008. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Shelf Number: 119764 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas — and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority — continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad. This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress: Acceessed October 25, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 120066 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: National Research Council. Committee to Review the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis Title: Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis Summary: The events of September 11, 2001 changed perceptions, rearranged national priorities, and produced significant new government entities, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created in 2003. While the principal mission of DHS is to lead efforts to secure the nation against those forces that wish to do harm, the department also has responsibilities in regard to preparation for and response to other hazards and disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, and other "natural" disasters. Whether in the context of preparedness, response or recovery from terrorism, illegal entry to the country, or natural disasters, DHS is committed to processes and methods that feature risk assessment as a critical component for making better-informed decisions. Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis explores how DHS is building its capabilities in risk analysis to inform decision making. The department uses risk analysis to inform decisions ranging from high-level policy choices to fine-scale protocols that guide the minute-by-minute actions of DHS employees. Although DHS is responsible for mitigating a range of threats, natural disasters, and pandemics, its risk analysis efforts are weighted heavily toward terrorism. In addition to assessing the capability of DHS risk analysis methods to support decision-making, the book evaluates the quality of the current approach to estimating risk and discusses how to improve current risk analysis procedures. Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis recommends that DHS continue to build its integrated risk management framework. It also suggests that the department improve the way models are developed and used and follow time-tested scientific practices, among other recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12972 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12972 Shelf Number: 120156 Keywords: Homeland Security Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Gabelnick, Tamar Title: A Guide to the US Small Arms Market, Industry and Exports, 1998-2004 Summary: This report will be of interest to scholars, policy analysts, diplomats, and activists concerned about the global gun economy and/or the impact of firearms on society in the United States or the world at large. It presents a snapshot of what, precisely, is knowable — and what is not — about the world’s leading small arms maker and market. The report tracks US firearms production, imports, and domestic sales during 1998–2004 and provides insight into fluctuations in the civilian, military, and (to a limited extent) law enforcement markets. It surveys US small arms manufacturers and the special constraints under which they were operating during this period, and it highlights the increasing market share gained by imported weapons and foreign-owned producers. It also describes US shipments of small arms to other countries, particularly as part of the ‘war on terrorism’ initiated by the US government following the 9/11 terror attacks. A brief overview of the relevant US laws and policies governing firearms imports and exports is provided. Finally, the report provides a guide to further research and a template for more meaningful transparency around US weapons production, imports, exports, and domestic sales. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2006. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 19: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP19-US.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP19-US.pdf Shelf Number: 120267 Keywords: Gun Violence Guns Terrorism Weaspons

Author: Crone, Manni Title: Homegrown Terrorism in the West, 1989-2008 Summary: The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as "homegrown terrorism." This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term "homegrown," which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal - but not autonomous. Finally, we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Working Paper 2010:30: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2010/WP2010-30-homegrown-terrorism-web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2010/WP2010-30-homegrown-terrorism-web.pdf Shelf Number: 120304 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter R. Title: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries Summary: This report offers a wide-ranging analysis of the role prisons can play in radicalising people – and in reforming them. In doing so, it examines the policies and approaches of 15 countries, identifying trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that can help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. They are ‘places of vulnerability’ in which radicalisation takes place. Yet they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Much of the current discourse about prisons and radicalisation is negative. But prisons are not just a threat – they can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalisation and terrorism in society as a whole. Many of the examples in this report demonstrate how prisons can become net contributors to the fight against terrorism. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Shelf Number: 120329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Prisons Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security Summary: Ferries are a vital component of the U.S. transportation system and 2008 data show that U.S. ferries carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles. Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and have been terrorist targets overseas. GAO was asked to review ferry security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and what risks it identified; and (2) federal agencies, ferry and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect ferries and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements, analyzed 2006 through 2009 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at five domestic and one international locations with varying passenger volumes and relative risk profiles. Site visits provided information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. This is the public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. The Coast Guard assessed the risk--including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--to ferries in accordance with DHS guidance on risk assessment and, along with other maritime stakeholders, identified risks associated with explosive devices, among other things. Although in April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats identified against ferries and their facilities in at least the last 12 months, maritime intelligence officials have identified the presence of terrorist groups with the capability of attacking a ferry. Many of the Coast Guard, ferry system and law enforcement officials GAO spoke with generally believe ferries are vulnerable to passenger- or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, although not all ferry systems transport vehicles. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which could include possible loss of life and negative economic effects. In April 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that the relative risk to ferries is increasing, as evidenced by attacks against land-based mass transit and other targets overseas. Federal agencies--including the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--ferry operators, and law enforcement entities report that they have taken various actions to enhance the security of ferries and facilities and have implemented related laws, regulations, and guidance, but the Coast Guard may be missing opportunities to enhance ferry security. Security measures taken by the Coast Guard have included providing a security presence on ferries during transit. Coast Guard officials also reported that they are revising regulations to improve ferry operator training and developing guidance on screening. Ferry operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans and screening vehicles and passengers, among other things. However, the Coast Guard had not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all findings and recommendations resulting from five agency-contracted studies on ferry security completed in 2005 and 2006. Reports from these studies included several recommendations for standardizing and enhancing screening across ferry operators. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies should ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved, and that managers take action to evaluate and resolve matters identified in these audits and reviews. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated they planned to review the reports. Taking action to address the recommendations in these reports, if determined warranted by the Coast Guard's evaluation, could enhance ferry security. Furthermore, Coast Guard documents from 2004 state that the agency should reassess vehicle screening requirements pending the completion of the ferry security reports or if the threat changes. However, no specific plans were in place to reassess these requirements. By taking action to reassess its screening requirements, the agency would be better positioned to determine if changes are warranted. GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, after evaluating the completed studies on ferry security, reassess vehicle screening requirements and take further actions to enhance security, if determined warranted. DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2010. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-207: Accessed December 7, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11207.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11207.pdf Shelf Number: 120395 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Securitiy Terrorism

Author: Hussain, Syed Ejaz Title: Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns, Terrorists' Characteristics, and the Impact of Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism Summary: This dissertation, in a 3-paper format, uses three datasets to study three aspects of terrorism in Pakistan. In the first paper, using data from the GTD, I describe empirically the temporal and spatial patterns of terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 1974 to 2007. In addition, I also describe the patterns in target types, weapon types and terrorist types and the patterns prior to and following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysis methods include the univariate time series, descriptive statistics and the GIS. The study offers new insights on the measurement of terrorism, the cyclical nature of terrorism, the role of conflict, the choice of weapons, the sponsorship of terrorism, the selection of targets and the reactionary nature of terrorism. The second paper analyzes personal, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of arrested terrorists in Pakistan from 1990 to 2009. I analyze police data on 2,344 terrorists using the GIS, univariate and bivariate analyses. Significant group differences, as well as differences based on geography lead to the conclusion that a generic profile of terrorists is almost impossible. One factor universally present in the circumstances of almost all the terrorists is that they belong to some area of conflict. In the third paper, I test Sherman’s theory of defiance (1993) to discern how arrests of different terrorist types and terrorist arrest types result in different types of reactions—defiance, deterrence, or irrelevance. Terrorist types can be divided into hardcore terrorists and peripheral terrorists, and arrest types can be divided into ordinary arrests or arrests by killings. I use 20 years of data from eight regions of the Punjab. Using fixed-effects cross-sectional time series (long panel), instrumental variable approach and Poisson distribution, I conclude that: aggregated arrests, ordinary arrests, and arrests of hardcore terrorists, in the current period, are associated with higher expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism in the same six month period. Further, that as compared to peripheral arrests, hardcore arrests generate more defiance. Lags of arrests and ordinary arrests decrease the expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism, suggesting a possible decay in defiance after the first six months. Details: Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2010. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 7, 2010 at: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=edissertations Year: 2010 Country: Pakistan URL: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=edissertations Shelf Number: 120404 Keywords: Arrests Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Martin, Tony Title: Report on Foreign Fishing Vessel Security Issues in the Pacific Islands Region Summary: The threat of terrorist activity associated with foreign fishing vessels operating in the Pacific region is regarded as very low. These vessels do, however, represent a security risk in a number of areas: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, people smuggling, trafficking in persons, illegal immigration, smuggling of weapons and drugs, prostitution, money laundering and corruption. The extent of risk in each of these areas is difficult to quantify with any certainty because of the lack of reliable data. At the international, regional and sub-regional levels, fisheries management is the subject of a large number of international and regional regulatory instruments. This is not the case when it comes to fishing vessel safety, training and conditions of employment of crews and protection of the marine environment where there has been a marked reluctance internationally to adopt and enforce standards. In the Pacific region, there is a lack of understanding on the part of those responsible for fisheries management, maritime administration and border management issues, of the respective roles each plays and the issues they face. Communication and information sharing between these sectors occurs infrequently if at all. In this report, specific measures are proposed to mitigate the security risks posed by foreign fishing vessels including wider use of existing information for monitoring vessels’ locations and their activities and, in due course, an ILO-based system for seafarer identification. The measures, with some modification, reflect some of the provisions of the maritime security regime (the ISPS Code) for international merchant shipping that might usefully be applied to the fishing sector for border management control purposes. Details: Noumea, New Caledonia: Regional Maritime Programme, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2010 at: dns1.spc.int/coastfish/Reports/HOF5/FFVsecurity.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Asia URL: Shelf Number: 120441 Keywords: Fishing Industry Maritime Crime Maritime Security Offenses Against the Environment Terrorism

Author: Matei, Florina Cristiana Title: Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern Europe Collective Approaches Summary: The end of the Cold War triggered an inexorable bloom of democracy and freedom in a multifarious and perilous security environment. Post-Cold War security challenges and threats no longer come from organized, hierarchical state actors, but rather from non-state, easily adaptable, network-centric groups and organizations (such as terrorist, organized crime (OC), money laundering and human trafficking groups), which have progressively succeeded in altering the traditional geographic borders between countries, as well as between domestic and foreign threats. The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the terrorist attacks in the US (2001), Turkey (2003), Spain (2004) and London (2005), etc. have clearly illustrated how instability and war involving failing states, on the one hand, or specific ideologies and religious convictions of small groups of people (yet very well prepared and organized), on the other hand, can impact the peace and security of an entire region or continent. These developments have prompted governments and nations to investigate the dynamics of networked decision-making and adopt a more network-like behavior in order to better understand and tackle terrorism and organized crime networks. In addition, nations have deepened cooperation with countries with common and shared security goals by establishing “interagency cooperation” tools and mechanisms, developing and consolidating “partnerships”, and joining various “collective/cooperative security” organizations and alliances. South Eastern Europe (SEE) is no stranger to terrorism and organized crime. These menaces, along with poverty, political instability, corruption, isolation of minorities, pandemic disease, natural disasters and others, shape the spectrum of security threats to the South Eastern European region. In their search for effective responses, nations have gradually developed an array of bilateral, subregional and regional cooperation mechanisms and/or joined existing international cooperative organizations and alliances. One question remains: with all these instruments in place, has SEE shifted from the “Powder Keg of Europe” to a stable, terrorism- and organized crime-free region? This paper investigates South Eastern Europe’s developments with regard to combating terrorism and organized crime cooperation. Details: Athens, Greece: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), 2009. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 133: Accessed December 17, 2010 at: http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas133.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas133.pdf Shelf Number: 120540 Keywords: Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists Summary: Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants. Furthermore, a unique challenge posed by militant Islamist groups is that their ideology is rooted in a major world religion. An examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each program, finding that the best-designed programs leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another. They need to develop organically in a specific country and culture. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 214p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Shelf Number: 120548 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Moller, Bjorn Title: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strategy Summary: Piracy is an old problem which is now again attracting attention, mainly because of the surge of pirate attacks off the coasts of Somalia. Closer analysis shows the problem to be of quite modest proportions. The international naval protection of merchant shipping holds out some prospects of containing the problem, but it is most likely to solve itself. If international shipping opts for the route south of Africa, piracy will die out for a lack of targets. Maritime terrorism is, likewise, a problem of very limited proportions. It is often conflated with piracy, but there are significant differences between the two phenomena, the latter being undertaken for selfish reasons, the former for the sake of some higher cause. Whereas it is conceivable that maritime terrorists will gradually transform themselves into pirates, a transformation in the opposite direction is well nigh inconceivable. Besides the analysis of these two phenomena, the overlap between them and certain naval strategies are also briefly touched upon. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2009. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2009:02: Accessed December 21, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009-02_%20Piracy_maritime_terrorism_and_naval_strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 120561 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Pirates/Piracy Terrorism

Author: Ginsburg, Susan Title: Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy Summary: This report provides a blueprint for an integrated strategy to thwart terrorists by focusing on terrorist mobility. While all but the most recent government counterterrorism strategies since 9/11 omit mobility as a distinct element of terrorism requiring its own operational strategy, the report argues that terrorist mobility deserves comparable attention a nd resources to those devoted to terrorist finance and communications. She describes the elements of a terrorist mobility strategy that can use leads generated by terrorists' need to travel to counter their ability to enter, live in, or move within the United States and like-minded countries. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Shelf Number: 120652 Keywords: Border Security Homeland Defense Migration Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Raidt, John Title: Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain Summary: This report presents the analysis and recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center in cooperation with the On the Horizon Project to advance U.S. strategic interests in West Africa. Unaddressed problems of poor governance, severe poverty, widespread public corruption, and growing insecurity from the presence of criminal and militant enterprises engaged in theft, terrorism, trafficking, piracy, poaching, and pollution will continue to punish local populations and create conditions of instability that undermine public order from greater levels of armed confl ict and mass migration and threaten the reliable flow of oil from the region. As noted in a recent United Nations report, the “combination of coups from the top and insurgencies from below render West Africa in the opinion of the UN the least politically stable region in the world.” While this report focuses on the maritime domain, the Atlantic Council approaches the regional security challenges from a broad perspective. Security issues are holistic and must be addressed as such. The dynamics and consequences of insecurity in the maritime domain are part of a wider, more complex political and security dynamic encompassing rule of law, governance, public capacities, and economic and human development across geographic, societal, and national domains. Just as the causes, manifestations, and consequences of insecurity are comprehensive, so too must be the preventatives and remedies. This document provides a broad strategic-level analysis and corresponding recommendations for action that can, and we believe should, be supported and implemented by U.S. and allied policymakers, African leaders, and key stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2010. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Africa URL: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/advancing-us-african-global-interests-security-stability-west-africa-maritime-domain.pdf Shelf Number: 120632 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy/Pirates Poaching Terrorism Trafficking Transnational Crime

Author: New York City Police Department, Counterterrorism Bureau Title: Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation Summary: Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one attack to another. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In its definition, DHS notes that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has limited this definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others. The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, private security personnel should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD. Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the NYPD cannot put forward a single set of best-practices for private security response to such incidents. However, the NYPD has compiled a list of recommendations for building security personnel to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The recommendations draw on previous studies of active shooter attacks and are presented in Part II. The NYPD developed these recommendations based on a close analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 2010. This Compendium of cases, presented in the Appendix, includes 281 active shooter incidents. It is organized chronologically by type of facility targeted, including office buildings, open commercial areas, factories and warehouses, schools, and other settings. The NYPD performed a statistical analysis on a subset of these cases to identify common characteristics among active shooter attacks. This analysis is presented in Part III and the underlying methodology is presented in Part IV. The analysis found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution. Details: New York: New York City Police Department, 2011. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2011 at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter.pdf Shelf Number: 120664 Keywords: Policing Private Security Security Guards Shooting Terrorism Violent Crime Weapons

Author: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Title: Tobacco, Terrorism, and Illicit Trade: China, Paraguay, Ukraine: Inside the World's Top Smuggling Hubs; Taliban, al-qaeda, Other Terrorists Funded by Cigarette Black Markets Summary: The six-part series is part of Tobacco Underground, a year-long investigation by ICIJ into cigarette smuggling — featuring interactive maps, undercover video, online interviews with experts, and links to groups and documents worldwide. In addition to fueling corruption, organized crime, and terrorism, the illicit trafficking of tobacco robs governments of needed tax money and spurs addiction to a deadly product, the ICIJ series reports. “ICIJ shows again how the illicit trafficking of tobacco is out of control,” said Center Executive Director Bill Buzenberg. “Renegade factories, multinational companies, and weak enforcement all play a role in fueling this multi-billion dollar illegal trade, whose profits rival those of narcotics.” Experts believe that smuggled cigarettes — either untaxed legitimate brands or counterfeits — account for 12 percent of all cigarette sales, or about 657 billion “sticks” annually, making tobacco the world’s most widely smuggled legal substance. The cost to governments worldwide is massive: an estimated $40 billion to $50 billion in lost tax revenue each year. ICIJ first exposed the complicity of Big Tobacco in smuggling nine years ago, helping spark lawsuits and government crackdowns around the world. This report includes the following articles: (1) Terrorism and Tobacco: Extremists, Insurgents Turn to Cigarette Smuggling. Terrorists are increasingly turning to cigarette smuggling for funding. The move is part of a larger trend toward use of criminal rackets by terrorists, who find trafficking in cigarettes a high-profit, low-risk way to finance operations. Among the groups are Pakistan’s Taliban militias, for whom cigarettes are now second only to heroin as a funding source. (2)China’s Marlboro Country: A Massive Underground Industry Makes China the World Leader in Counterfeit Cigarettes. China now produces an unprecedented 400 billion counterfeit cigarettes annually. Cheap Chinese fakes are now sold in major cities worldwide, from New York delis to London storefronts. Officials believe China is the source of 99 percent of U.S. counterfeit cigarettes and up to 80 percent of those in the European Union. Lab tests reveal the Chinese counterfeits release 80 percent more nicotine and 130 percent more carbon monoxide than brand-name cigarettes, and have impurities that include insect eggs and human feces. (3) Smuggling Made Easy: Landlocked Paraguay Emerges as a Top Producer of Contraband Tobacco. Paraguay’s renegade factories produce more than 20 times what the country consumes, and are now responsible for 10 percent of the world’s contraband tobacco, experts estimate. The vast majority of the cigarettes — up to 90 percent of production, worth an estimated $1 billion— disappears into an often violent black market, law enforcement officials say. (4) Ukraine’s “Lost” Cigarettes Flood Europe: Big Tobacco’s Overproduction Feeds $2 Billion Black Market. Each year, the world’s four top multinational tobacco companies — Philip Morris International, Japan Tobacco International, Imperial Tobacco, and British American Tobacco — produce and import 30 billion cigarettes in Ukraine beyond what the country can consume, fueling a $2 billion black market that reaches across the European Union. Today, Ukraine is rivaled only by Russia as the top source of non-counterfeit cigarettes smuggled to Europe. Details: Washington, DC: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2009. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2011 at: http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/1534/ Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/1534/ Shelf Number: 119537 Keywords: Black Markets Counterfeit Products Illegal Tobacco Illicit Trade Smuggling Terrorism

Author: Barria Issa, Cecar A. Title: The Use of Terrorism by Drug Trafficking Organizations' Paramilitary Groups in Mexico Summary: "In the early 1990s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) created their own military arms that later evolved into sophisticated paramilitary groups, now engaged in an all-out war against the state and/or anyone who represents an obstacle for their criminal activities. Furthermore, they are not hesitating to use tactics of extreme violence as terrorism to psychologically impact their enemies and those civilians not supporting them. Historically, terrorism related to drugs is new in Mexico but not in Latin America. The illegal drug trade has funded terrorist groups in Peru and Colombia, empowered criminal organizations and caused them to challenge the state's authority. An objective comparison of these cases can teach important lessons and show new paths to follow in the solution of Mexico's costly conflict. This thesis will define: How, where and why are DTO's paramilitary groups opting for terrorism in Mexico. It will outline the proper mechanisms to counter that terrorism. There is a long way to go to win the war on drugs in Mexico, but in order to apply new long term, less direct, and more social-based strategies, it is urgent for the state to set the proper security conditions in the short term." Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Theses: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=136969&coll=limited Shelf Number: 120810 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico) Illegal Trade Paramilitary Groups Terrorism

Author: Sloan, Britt Title: Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats? Summary: Despite their diverging strategic objectives, terrorists, criminals, and insurgents appear increasingly to collaborate. The deep connections among terrorism, drug production, and insurgency in Afghanistan and Colombia are well known. In the Sahel, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is funded at least in part through the paid protection of trafficking routes and through criminal kidnapping campaigns. In southern Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) long has mixed oil bunkering, kidnapping, and ethnic rebellion, and it recently may have added terrorism to its repertoire. In Somalia, there is increasing concern about the possibility of Islamist militants taxing, controlling, or even investing in the piracy industry. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) made millions of dollars from sophisticated cybercrime, including extensive credit card fraud, and for years used its resulting military might to exercise de facto control over a large territory. Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labor and populations inured to and traumatized by violence, frequently represent sites of competitive advantage for terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and violent political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three —financing terrorism, protecting crime, and securing political control. The UN Security Council has gone so far as to suggest that such conjoined transnational threats may represent a threat to international peace and security. Yet, policymakers appear unclear about how to handle the confluence of these threats. This policy brief offers eight targeted policy recommendations for combating the convergence of terrorism, crime, and politics. Rather than simply warning about the potential for interaction and synergy among terrorist, criminal, and political actors, this policy brief aims to explore possibilities for exploiting their divergences. In particular, it emphasizes the need to grapple with the economic, political, and combat power that some terrorist groups enjoy through their involvement in crime and conflict. This requires an approach to counterterrorism that incorporates policy proscriptions from the criminological, conflict transformation, peacebuilding, development, and sociological arenas, while developing a coordinated interagency strategy for deploying common tools, such as macroeconomic reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts; security sector reform (SSR); improved border control; financial sector reform; and legal-institution capacity building. Above all, this approach requires taking the social power of violent organizations more seriously. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Shelf Number: 120928 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists Transnational Crime

Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes Summary: On 1 May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, tried to detonate a car bomb in the heart of New York’s Times Square. Thanks to the vigilance of local witnesses and to technical shortcomings, the bomb was detected and failed to explode. The investigation surrounding Shahzad’s case, like other, more recent cases, shows that the Internet played an important role in his violent radicalization and the planning and execution of the attempted attack. For example, he drew spiritual inspiration from lectures and videos circulated online by Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-Yemeni cleric, who helped to convince Shahzad to take up the cause of al-Qaida. Shahzad accessed Web sites for operational and planning purposes. He viewed “real-time video feeds of different areas of Times Square” to help determine which areas attract a large crowd and would result in a high casualty rate if attacked. Shahzad also used the Internet to discuss his plans with militants based in Pakistan. Terrorist operatives such as Shahzad often draw inspiration, reinforcement, support, and guidance from a variety of on- and off-line sources. Some clerics; experts; scholars, such as al-Awlaki; and virtual communities use the Internet to promote violent extremism on their blogs, social network pages, discussion forums, or through the streaming of videos on multimedia platforms such as YouTube. This brief provides an overview of challenges posed to stakeholders by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. It argues that the Internet is not the problem and that the online platform can be employed to counter terrorism efforts. Specifically, models of violent radicalization processes off-line offer an important and useful framework for the development and implementation of policies to counter online use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The brief concludes by offering multilateral institutions, states, civil society organizations, the media, and the private sector examples of how they can use the Internet more effectively as a counterterrorism tool to prevent and counter the use of the Internet for violent radicalization. Four intervention points are suggested: (1) weaken cult personalities, (2) challenge the extremist doctrine, (3) dispel the glory of the “terrorist lifestyle,” and (4) offer a street-smart and locally developed and communicated counternarrative. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 18, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Shelf Number: 121073 Keywords: Computer Crimes Counter-Terrorism Internet Crimes Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Theohary, Catherine A. Title: Terrorist Use of the Internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace Summary: The Internet is used by international insurgents, jihadists, and terrorist organizations as a tool for radicalization and recruitment, a method of propaganda distribution, a means of communication, and ground for training. Although there are no known reported incidents of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as acts of terror, this could potentially become a tactic in the future. There are several methods for countering terrorist and insurgent information operations on the Internet. The federal government has organizations that conduct strategic communications, counterpropaganda, and public diplomacy activities. The National Framework for Strategic Communication guides how interagency components are to integrate their activities. However, these organizations may be stovepiped within agencies, and competing agendas may be at stake. This report does not discuss technical and Internet architecture design solutions. Some may interpret the law to prevent federal agencies from conducting “propaganda” activities that may potentially reach domestic audiences. Others may wish to dismantle all websites that are seen to have malicious content or to facilitate acts of terror, while some may have a competing interest in keeping a site running and monitoring it for intelligence value. Key issues for Congress: • Although the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative addresses a federal cybersecurity strategy and departmental roles and responsibilities, overclassification, competing equities, and poor information sharing between agencies hinder implementation of a national cybersecurity strategy. (See “Federal Government Efforts to Address Cyberterrorism.”) • Federal agencies have interpreted the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. § 1461), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, as creating a “firewall” between foreign and domestic audiences, limiting U.S. government counterpropaganda activities on the Internet. (See “Institutional Constraints.”) • Some agencies favor monitoring and surveillance of potentially harmful websites, while others would shut them down entirely. (See “Intelligence Gain/Loss Calculus.”) • Different agency approaches to combating terrorists’ use of the Internet and different definitions and strategies for activities such as information operations (IO) and strategic communications (SC) create an oversight challenge for Congress. (See “Counterpropaganda: Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations.”) Cybersecurity proposals from the 111th Congress such as S. 3480, which contained controversial provisions labeled by the media as the Internet “Kill Switch,” are likely to be reintroduced in some form in the 112th Congress. (See “Congressional Activity.”) With growing interest in strategic communications and public diplomacy, there may also be an effort to revise the Smith- Mundt Act. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: R41674: Accessed March 22, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf Shelf Number: 121095 Keywords: Cybercrime Cybersecurity Internet Crimes Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency Summary: Protecting and ensuring the resiliency of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national program to achieve this goal. The NIPP framework supports the prioritization of protection and resiliency initiatives and investments across sectors to ensure that government and private sector resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other manmade and natural disasters. The NIPP risk management framework recognizes and builds on existing public and private sector protective programs and resiliency strategies in order to be cost-effective and to minimize the burden on CIKR owners and operators. Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their inter-connecting links. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as improving security protocols, hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing cybersecurity measures, training and exercises, business continuity planning, and restoration and recovery actions, among various others. Achieving the NIPP goal requires actions to address a series of objectives, which include:• Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards with CIKR partners; • Building partnerships to share information and implement CIKR protection programs; • Implementing a long-term risk management program; and • Maximizing the efficient use of resources for CIKR protection, restoration, and recovery. These objectives require a collaborative partnership among CIKR partners, including: the Federal Government; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; regional coalitions; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines a set of flexible processes and mechanisms that these CIKR partners will use to develop and implement the national program to protect CIKR across all sectors over the long term. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009. 188p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf Shelf Number: 119210 Keywords: Risk Assessment Risk Management Security Terrorism Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author: Ford, Jess T. Title: Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide Summary: Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas. ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-315: Accessed April 22, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Shelf Number: 121478 Keywords: Border Security Computer Security Homeland Security Immigration Terrorism Visa Security

Author: Hartwig, Robert P. Title: Terrorism Risk: A Reemergent Threat: Impacts for Property/Casualty Insurers Summary: The cost of terrorism still looms large in United States history. After nine attack-free years, the $32.5 billion in losses paid out by insurers for the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, places second in an Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.) ranking of the most costly U.S. catastrophes – after just Hurricane Katrina (2005). Nearly 10 years on, 9/11 also remains the worst terrorist act in terms of fatalities and insured property losses. With a new decade underway, a number of converging factors point to the fact that terrorism is a reemerging threat. Failure to focus on and prepare for this threat will come at an enormous cost to the millions of individuals and businesses who rely on insurance contracts to offset the overall economic impact of a terrorist attack. For property/casualty insurers, the increasing share of losses that they would have to fund in the event of a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil suggests that now is the time to take stock of their terrorism exposures. Details: New York: Insurance Information Institute, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 26, 2011 at: http://insurancemarketreport.com/Portals/131/TerrorismThreat_042010.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://insurancemarketreport.com/Portals/131/TerrorismThreat_042010.pdf Shelf Number: 121498 Keywords: Insurance Terrorism

Author: Papademetriou, Demetrios G. Title: A New Architecture for Border Management Summary: This report commissioned to inform the work of MPI’s Transatlantic Council on Migration for its meeting on “Restoring Trust in the Management of Migration and Borders” examines the emergence of a new border architecture resulting from the explosion in global travel and the dawning of the age of risk. This new border architecture must respond effectively to the seemingly competing demands of facilitating mobility while better managing the risks associated with cross-border travel (e.g. terrorism, the entry of unwanted migrants, and organized crime). The report examines the information-sharing agreements, technology innovations, and multilateral partnerships that have emerged as key components of the new architecture for border management, and discusses challenges and considerations for the future. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/borderarchitecture.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/borderarchitecture.pdf Shelf Number: 121571 Keywords: Border Security Illegal Aliens Immigration Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Padavan, Frank Title: The Golden Door: Illegal Immigration, Terrorism and the Underground Economy: With a Focus on the Counterfeit Goods Trade and Analysis of the 2000 Census Summary: In 1994, Senator Frank Padavan, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Cities, released "Our Teeming Shore," a report reflecting extensive research and public hearings on "federal immigration policy and its impact on the City and State of New York." That report concluded that New York State and its localities were spending over $5.6 billion annually as a result of federal immigration policy: $2.1 billion in social service costs; $270 million for criminal justice and corrections; and $3.3 billion in elementary and secondary education expenditures, all unreimbursed by the federal government. As a result of Senator Padavan's landmark research -- New York State was among the first in the nation to document the impact of federal immigration policy at the state and local level -- the Senate Majority Task Force on Immigration was created. A second report, a year later, confirmed the findings of the first. In "The Golden Door: Illegal Immigration, Terrorism and The Underground Economy," Senator Padavan updates the topics discussed in the earlier reports, with a focus on the counterfeit goods trade, its link to terrorism, and its cost to taxpayers. Details: Albany, NY: New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Immigration, 2005. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2011 at: http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocm64195701.htm Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocm64195701.htm Shelf Number: 121573 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigration Immigrants Immigration Policy Terrorism

Author: Padavan, Frank Title: The Counterfeit Connection : The Counterfeit Goods Trade, Intellectual Property Theft and Terrorist Financing: With a Discussion of Illegal Immigration, Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking Summary: This report focuses on the counterfeit goods trade and its connection to terrorism financing. The purpose of the report is to explore the connections between illegal immigration, including alien smuggling and human trafficking, and the counterfeit goods trade and terrorist financing. Details: Albany, NY: New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Immigration, 2005. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2011 at: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/xK6obNlwCS/NYSL/62700081/9 Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/xK6obNlwCS/NYSL/62700081/9 Shelf Number: 121574 Keywords: Counterfeit Goods Human Trafficking Illegal Aliens Illegal Trade Immigration Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism Summary: Efforts to promote “deradicalization,” or to rehabilitate detainees charged with terrorism-related offenses, have taken multiple forms in a wide range of countries, often as part of broader counter-radicalization strategies that seek to prevent the adoption of violent extremist ideologies or behaviors in the first place. This paper draws on recent insights from case studies of deradicalization initiatives in eight Muslim-majority countries and a variety of approaches adopted by countries in Europe and Asia. The paper makes recommendations concerning what role the United Nations might play in furthering such initiatives by states and facilitating broader international efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Shelf Number: 121610 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism Summary: A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country; increases in the skilled immigration quota may or may not raise terrorism against the developed country. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically augments its terrorism defenses and reduces its unskilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host country. The influence of leadership on the skilled immigration quota is more nuanced. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series; Working Paper 2011-012A: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Shelf Number: 121613 Keywords: Counterterrorism Economics Immigrants Immigration Policy Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Mueller, John Title: Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security Summary: The cumulative increase in expenditures on US domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. It is clearly time to examine these massive expenditures applying risk assessment and cost-benefit approaches that have been standard for decades. Thus far, officials do not seem to have done so and have engaged in various forms of probability neglect by focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, rather than multiplying, the probabilities; assessing relative, rather than absolute, risk; and inflating terrorist capacities and the importance of potential terrorist targets. We find that enhanced expenditures have been excessive: to be deemed cost-effective in analyses that substantially bias the consideration toward the opposite conclusion, they would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 1,667 otherwise successful Times-Square type attacks per year, or more than four per day. Although there are emotional and political pressures on the terrorism issue, this does not relieve politicians and bureaucrats of the fundamental responsibility of informing the public of the limited risk that terrorism presents and of seeking to expend funds wisely. Moreover, political concerns may be over-wrought: restrained reaction has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. Details: Paper Prepared for presentation at the panel, "Terror and the Economy: Which Institutions Help Mitigate the Damage?” at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF Shelf Number: 121664 Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis Homeland Security Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Manwaring, Max G. Title: A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies Summary: This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=940 Shelf Number: 121700 Keywords: Cartels Organized Crime Private Armies (Mexico) Privatization Security Terrorism Violence

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. This report provides background information on key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. It discusses • several enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided to the FBI through post-9/11 legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; the 2008 revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey Guidelines); and the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout the country; • intelligence reform within the FBI and concerns about the progress of those reform initiatives; • the FBI’s proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its terrorism investigations using preventative policing techniques such as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of agent provocateurs; and • the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventative policing techniques to combat terrorism. This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role. These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives. In addition, these issues will also be relevant during confirmation hearings for a new director. The statutory 10-year term of current FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III expires in September 2011. A new director will be subject to Senate confirmation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R41780: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Shelf Number: 121706 Keywords: Criminal Investigations Domestic Intelligence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bayer, Michael D. Title: The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence Summary: A fundamental doctrine of the United States is the system of checks and balances, a system wherein political power is dispersed among various governmental elements so that no particular interests or segments can dominate the government — or the people. One of the most strident criticisms of the former Bush-Cheney administration has been that in the time of crisis and immediately after, and in the years following the 9/11 terror attacks, executive (presidential) authority had been greatly expanded during the strategic response to those attacks and was, according to some, abused — thereby skewing our revered system of checks and balances. Certain segments of governments are acknowledged to be tools of political power — particularly subject to political influences. In the United States the military is exceptionally susceptible to the political designs of the President and the administration because he is their direct-line Commander in Chief. It is also widely acknowledged that intelligence services are part of the political epicenter of governments, because they too are a vitally important direct-line tool of national leadership. As it happened, these are the two segments of our government that benefited most, in terms of power, mission, and funding, from the prosecution of the United States’ Global War on Terrorism. In fact, it had been asserted by former Vice President Cheney on U.S. national television (FOX) that the war on terrorism was an effort to be waged by the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence services and not law enforcement. This book maps out how bureaucratic maneuvering in the aftermath of 9/11 led to the U.S. military/intelligence apparatus assuming primacy and garnering near exclusivity in the international aspect of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This ultimately resulted in the fundamental exclusion of some of the most powerful components of the vast international resources at the fingertips of U.S. law enforcement. The book argues that allowing this to happen was a big mistake — and an unnecessary one at that. The existing networks of international law enforcement are powerful in their own right, but globalization and concomitant worldwide reconfiguration of national sovereignty have greatly empowered inter-governmental networks (such as those of international law enforcement). This book asserts that law enforcement is especially conducive to the advantages aff orded to international networks because the “culture of the badge” provides an immediate basis of trust and commonality to build upon — a commonality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, ethnicity, and other categories of segregation. Furthermore, some international policing scholarship asserts that law enforcement entities seek their own autonomy away from centers of political power by striving to find better, more effi cient ways to serve the state and the public (corruption influences notwithstanding) and in so doing are given the leeway to do so. One way they do this is by engaging in informal means of doing business — seeking one-on-one interaction with foreign counterparts rather than going through multiple layers of bureaucracy and government. Those who work in international law enforcement understand implicitly and explicitly that using informal networks is how most international police business is accomplished — especially in this day and age of e-mail and cell phones. But it is not the power of the network alone that brings value added to transnational policing. It is the sheer volume of numbers of police that are dispersed throughout nearly every nation in the world — and who live and work at all levels of societies, from the back alleys and villages from where terrorism breeds to the wealthiest levels, from where political/religious terrorism is financed. It is the numbers of police combined with their mandates to gather and acquire information — whether for investigative or public security purposes. Police have always had a vested interest in gathering and tracking information about local troublemakers and criminal activity in order to maintain public order and, as such, are a natural resource of acquiring terrorism information — particularly in regard to cells which might be financing or otherwise supporting operations through criminal activity. It is the ability to conduct their business among multiple levels of societies and within populations at large which makes international law enforcement very likely the largest and most potent counterterrorism network on the face of the earth. Hence, the title of this work — The Blue Planet. The worldwide network of police is a formidable asset — made even more formidable by the investigative and arrest authorities bestowed upon U.S. law enforcement and its foreign counterparts. This book will demonstrate that the willful disregard of such a spectacularly valuable asset was not only foolhardy, but also served to deny the American public the measure of national security they would have been entitled had the process been honestly brokered and strategically considered. Instead, in spite of the best of intentions, the parochial interests of the most powerful agencies prevailed at the expense of our own citizens. Police can and do cooperate with one another internationally to combat transnational crime. Organizations such as Interpol and Europol exist for this purpose — but those organizations, while valuable, bring with them the burdens and inefficiencies of their own diplomatic formalities, rules, regulations, and procedures along with the accompanying bureaucracies of participating member governments. Informal policing has been around for even longer than formal arrangements, and evolved as an efficient means to deal with the internationalization of crime. Transnational terrorism is an extreme form of international crime, but it is very often supported by other types of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, weapons trading, and document fraud. One of the main objections from abroad of the U.S.’s conduct of the war on terrorism has been the perceived disregard for the “rule of law,” particularly among our European allies. While some critics might find the worldwide unification of law enforcement cause for concern, this work will argue that the potential for human rights abuses are far more likely under war conditions and intelligence operations than by globally enabled police. While the potential for human rights abuses certainly exists, national law enforcement elements respecting their own “rule of law” and the laws of counterpart nations will find the means to cooperate within existing legal frameworks. Th is work will also argue that international police cooperation is one way that weak nations can serve to build their own governmental infrastructures and contribute in a positive way to international relations. There will be those who will assert that the current manner in which the United States deals with gathering terrorism information from our present intelligence posture provides adequate worldwide coverage of the problem. But even a cursory analysis of the numbers of sources available to worldwide police networks versus rational estimates of intelligence assets will show those assertions to be implausible. There are also those who might argue that international police interaction is problematic because police are an instrument of force and are endowed with powers that can be abused. This concern is valid in that abuse of police powers can readily impact human rights. The idea of informal international police relationships that are unregulated and therefore lack accountability can seem a slippery slope. However, the trend since 9/11 has been to attempt to integrate law enforcement with functions of intelligence services — as what occurred in the United States with the FBI. This linkage is gaining acceptance and is being implemented throughout Europe but it is implicitly far more slippery. The intelligence service/law enforcement dichotomy is primarily one of legal versus extra-legal constructs. Intelligence services are extra-legal forces unconstrained by legality and matters of sovereignty — and they too can be, and often are, instruments of force. When the two are integrated, the idea of rule of law becomes moot because of the extra-legal prerogatives of intelligence services — “poisoning” the law enforcement function and therefore the rule of law. It is no coincidence that one of the hallmarks of a police state is the convergence of the legal policing and extra-legal intelligence functions. Law enforcement, on the other hand, is legally sanctioned and generally permitted to exercise its authorities for the benefit of the greater good. This work advocates solely for the legal and legitimate exercise of the rule of law through international police cooperation, whether through formal channels or through the much more powerful and effective informal networking. If a nation’s laws forbid informal police cooperation, so be it. But national governments should recognize the positive role that international police cooperation can serve — not the least of which is serving the right of the people (or the people of other nations) not to be exploited, molested, or harmed by external criminal forces. Eight years later we are still experiencing the after-eff ects of the 9/11 attacks. When the consequences can be nuclear, biological, or chemical, especially in these precarious times, can we afford to deny our public the benefits of such a powerful instrument of counterterrorism—the informal networks made available to U.S. law enforcement? Details: Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2010. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2011 at: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Shelf Number: 121720 Keywords: Intelligence Gathering International Cooperation International Law Enforcement International Policing National Security Policing Networks Rule of Law Terrorism

Author: Ungerer, Cari Title: Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian Prison Experience Summary: The issue of terrorist motivations and pathways towards violent extremism has been the subject of numerous studies in recent years. Much of that work, however, has focused on open source literature. Less attention has been given to understanding the individuals themselves and their personal experiences within terrorist organisations. To help address this gap, ASPI and the Centre of Excellence for National Security, a constituent research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, undertook a joint research project to conduct personal interviews with members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organisation who are serving or have served prison sentences in Indonesia. This project is the first detailed study of both the former leadership group and the foot soldiers of the JI organisation in prison. Interviews were conducted across four Indonesian prisons and detention centres with more than thirty convicted terrorists. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report Issue 40: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/Jihadists_in_jail.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/Jihadists_in_jail.pdf Shelf Number: 121754 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists (Indonesia)

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases Summary: The following is a timeline of criminal proceedings related to the terror activities of American Muslim extremists and other Americans involved in activities with terrorist organizations whose ideologies are rooted in radical interpretations of Islam. In addition to planning terrorist plots, Americans have also been convicted of raising funds and providing material goods to foreign terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The equally disturbing terror-related activities of Americans who subscribe to anti-government, white supremacist and other extremist ideologies are not reflected in the timeline. Similarly, the list does not include the activities and plots against targets in the U.S. conceived by non-Americans motivated by radical interpretations of Islam. In May 2010, for example, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen living in the U.S. illegally, pleaded guilty to attempting to detonate explosives at a Dallas skyscraper the previous September in order to “bring down the building”. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Shelf Number: 121766 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Silva, Romesh, Jasmine Marwaha & Jeff Klingner, Title: Violent Deaths and Enforced Disappearances During the Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India Romesh Silva Jasmine Marwaha Jeff Klingner A Preliminary Quantitative Analysis Summary: This report analyzes reported fatal violence across Punjab during a period of conflict from 1984 to 1995. This preliminary, descriptive statistical analysis uses systematic and verifiable quantitative research to interrogate the Indian government’s portrayal of the Punjab counterinsurgency as a successful campaign with isolated human rights violations. The empirical findings indicate that the intensification of coordinated counterinsurgency operations in the early 1990s was accompanied by a shift in state violence from targeted enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions to large-scale and systematic lethal human rights violations, accompanied by mass “illegal cremations.” Details: Palo Alto, CA: Benetech's Human Rights Data Analysis Group; Fremont, CA: Ensaaf, Inc., 2009. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2011 at: http://www.ensaaf.org/publications/reports/descriptiveanalysis/ Year: 2009 Country: India URL: http://www.ensaaf.org/publications/reports/descriptiveanalysis/ Shelf Number: 121774 Keywords: Disappearances Extrajudicial Executions Human Rights (India) Terrorism Violence

Author: Nasser-Eddine, Minerva Title: Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review Summary: This report consists of a literature review and analysis of the existing research concerning ‘countering violent extremism’. This multifaceted report demonstrates the complexity of understanding Violent Extremism and best strategies to Countering Violent Extremism. This has been undertaken with the broader analysis of radicalisation and social cohesion theories, models and government policies and how they may impact on or contribute to best practice and policy in countering violent extremism. Details: Edinburgh, South Australia: Australian Department of Defence, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, 2011. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/10122/1/DSTO-TR-2522%20PR.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/10122/1/DSTO-TR-2522%20PR.pdf Shelf Number: 121836 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups (Australia) Terrorism

Author: Belli, Roberta Title: Where Political Extremists and Greedy Criminals Meet: A Comparative Study of Financial Crimes and Criminal Networks in the United States Summary: Financial crime poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of legitimate businesses and institutions, and to the safety and prosperity of private citizens and communities. Experts argue that the profile of financial offenders is extremely diversified and includes individuals who may be motivated by greed or ideology. Islamic extremists increasingly resort to typical white-­‐collar crimes, like credit card and financial fraud, to raise funds for their missions. In the United States, the far-­‐right movement professes its anti-­‐government ideology by promoting and using a variety of anti-­‐tax strategies. There is evidence that ideologically motivated individuals who engage in financial crimes benefit from interactions with profit-­‐driven offenders and legitimate actors that provide resources for crime in the form of knowledge, skills, and suitable co-­‐offenders. This dissertation sheds light on the nexus between political extremism and profit-­‐driven crime by conducting a systematic study of financial crime cases involving Islamic extremists, domestic far-­‐rightists, and their non-­‐extremist accomplices prosecuted by federal courts in 2004. Attribute and relational data were extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which is the first open-­‐source relational database that provides information on all extremist crimes, violent and non-­‐violent, ideological and routine crimes, since 1990. A descriptive analysis was conducted comparing schemes, crimes, and techniques used by far-­‐rightists, Islamic extremists, and non-­‐extremists, before moving into an in-­‐depth social network analysis of their relational ties in co-­‐offending, business, and family networks. The descriptive findings revealed considerable differences in the modus operandi followed by far-­‐rightists and Islamic extremists as well as the prosecutorial strategies used against them. The subsequent exploratory and statistical network analyses, however, revealed interesting similarities, suggesting that financial schemes by political extremists occurred within similarly decentralized, self-­‐organizing structures that facilitated exchanges between individuals acting within close-­‐knit subsets regardless of their ideological affiliation. Meaningful interactions emerged between far-­‐rightists and non-­‐extremists involved in business ventures and within a tax avoidance scheme, indicating that the crime-­‐extremism nexus was more prevalent within far-­‐right settings compared to Islamic extremist ones. The findings were discussed in light of their implications for criminological theories, criminal justice and crime prevention policies, and methodological advances. Details: Dissertation, City University of New York, 2011. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Shelf Number: 121874 Keywords: Extremist Groups Financial Crimes Fraud Organized Crime Tax-Evasion Terrorism Terrorists White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Muhlhausen, David B. Title: Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and Domestic Terrorism Summary: A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, looking back is as important as looking forward in order to learn from the past and to examine the current and future threats facing the U.S. This survey aggregates international data on global and domestic terrorism from the past 40 years. Combined with new intelligence, this data can better inform U.S. counterterrorism decisions and continue the process of delineating enhanced homeland security policies for the future. From 1969 to 2009, almost 5,600 people lost their lives and more than 16,300 people suffered injuries due to international terrorism directed at the United States. The onus is now on the President and Congress to ensure that the U.S. continues to hone and sharpen its counterterrorism capabilities and adapt them to evolving 21st-century threats. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Shelf Number: 121937 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism

Author: Choudhury, Tufyal Title: The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities Summary: This report aims to develop and deepen understanding of the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on Muslim communities. Using in-depth interviews and focus groups, it finds that when it comes to experiences of counter-terrorism, Muslims and non-Muslims from the same local areas who took part in this research appear to live ‘parallel lives’. Many participants in the study, while not referring to specific laws or policies, feel that counterterrorism law and policy generally is contributing towards hostility to Muslims by treating Muslims as a ‘suspect group’, and creating a climate of fear and suspicion towards them. Details: Manchester, UK: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report 72: Accessed July 2, 2011 at: http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/counter-terrorism_research_report_72.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/counter-terrorism_research_report_72.pdf Shelf Number: 121958 Keywords: Counter-terrorism (U.K.) Human Rights Muslims Terrorism

Author: Frampton, Martyn Title: The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism Summary: Since the Belfast Friday Agreement of 1998, the security situation in Northern Ireland has improved immeasurably. The Provisional IRA and the main loyalist terrorist groups have called an end to their campaigns and their weapons have been decommissioned under an internationally monitored process. In recent years, however, dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland – such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, who continued to oppose the peace process – have grown stronger. Given the understandable focus on Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in recent years, much less attention has been given to such groups. However, in the government’s National Strategic Defence and Security Review, published in October 2010, ‘residual terrorism linked to Northern Ireland’ was identified as a Tier One risk to national security: ‘There is a calculated campaign of violence from small dissident republican groups. Despite continuing political progress, their activities have increased in the last 18 months and the security situation is unlikely to improve in the short-term. There have been 37 attacks this year, compared with 22 in all of 2009. The ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to Substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility.’ This report, the first of its kind in the public domain, analyses the origins and the nature of the threat posed by violent dissident republicans over the last two years. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2010. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 5, 2011 at: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1289498383ICSR_TheReturnoftheMilitantsReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1289498383ICSR_TheReturnoftheMilitantsReport.pdf Shelf Number: 121970 Keywords: Political Violence Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (Northern Ireland

Author: Archick, Kristin Title: U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism Summary: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security. As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to clamp down on terrorist financing and to improve aviation and transport security. Despite U.S.-EU strides to foster closer counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, some challenges remain. Data privacy has been and continues to be a key sticking point. In February 2010, the European Parliament (EP) rejected a U.S.-EU agreement—known as the SWIFT accord—that would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to financial data stored in Europe to help combat terrorism on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. Although the EP approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, some Members of the European Parliament—for many years and for similar reasons—have also challenged a U.S.-EU agreement permitting airlines to share passenger name record (PNR) data with U.S. authorities. U.S. and EU officials are currently negotiating revisions to the existing PNR accord in an effort to assuage EP concerns. Other issues that have led to periodic U.S.-EU tensions include terrorist detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing border security with legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and other homeland security issues. Congressional decisions related to improving border controls and transport security, in particular, may affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament’s growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape Parliament’s views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 112th Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: RS22030: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Shelf Number: 121982 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: D'Agostino, Davi M. Title: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness Summary: Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness — that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions — a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD’s corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-621: Accessed July 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11621.pdf Shelf Number: 122007 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Pirates/Piracy Terrorism

Author: Collett, Elizabeth Title: Emerging Transatlantic Security Dilemmas in Border Management Summary: The sheer volume of global travel, which has risen exponentially since the 1960s, puts border management systems under constant pressure. Beyond that growth, border management systems have had to contend with additional risks associated with these movements. Mass-casualty terrorist attacks, rising illegal immigration, and human trafficking have exposed weaknesses in states’ ability to manage their borders effectively. This policy memo examines the infrastructure and policy developments – and challenges – that have occurred in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic, discussing the differing nature and prioritization of those policy challenges. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/securitydilemmas-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/securitydilemmas-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 122040 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigrants Immigration Terrorism

Author: Clutterbuck, Lindsay Title: Exploring Patterns of Behaviour in Violent Jihadist Terrorists: An Analysis of Six Significant Terrorist Conspiracies in the UK Summary: The aim of this research was to see whether the groups/cells and their 38 core individuals who had taken part in the six most serious terrorist conspiracies and attacks in the UK between 2004 and 2007, all of which were driven by the ideology of violent Jihadism as espoused by Al Qaeda, exhibited any specific types of behaviour. In each case the terrorists successfully launched or unsuccessfully attempted an attack, or were arrested and convicted of conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack. The research provides a detailed examination of the behaviours exhibited by violent Jihadist groups/cells and the individuals within them. The report outlines the history and background before examining the organisation, characteristics and behaviour of the groups/cells involved. It also examines individual behaviours carried out on behalf of the group/cell and individual behaviour more broadly. It demonstrates there are certain distinctive behavioural characteristics displayed with their planning, preparation and implementation of an act of terrorism. The six UK case studies show three categories of behaviours, from "radicalisation" into "transition to violent Jihad" and finally to "terrorist attack planning and preparation". These findings open up the possibility of identifying through their behaviour individuals and groups engaged in the planning and preparation of a terrorist attack, thus allowing such attacks to be prevented or disrupted before they can be implemented. However, additional refinement and testing will be necessary to identify substantive "signal indicators" of potential use to police and security forces. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR923.sum.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR923.sum.pdf Shelf Number: 122105 Keywords: Jihadist Terrorists Terrorism Terrorists (U.K.)

Author: Hutchings, Alice Title: Review of Computer Chip Identification Systems Summary: This paper reviews the key literature relating to embedded computer chip identification systems such as those used in smartcards and ePassports. It identifies social, policy and legal issues associated with their use, particularly as they relate to the Australian context. Computer chip identification systems, while offering many benefits, may contain valuable personal data and/or provide access to restricted areas. Therefore, the use of this technology has potential implications for the commission of offences such as identity theft, identify fraud and even terrorism. Embedded computer chip identification systems are considered to be a countermeasure against identity theft as they include additional security measures compared to their predecessors (e.g. magnetic strip cards). However, due to the nature of the records that may be stored on the chip, including identification information and biometric data, they are valuable to offenders and breaches of their security may actually facilitate this type of offence. Choo, Smith and McCusker (2007, p. xiii) predict that “the future will also see new hardware devices and software programs that seek to compromise the quality of data-protection mechanisms used in smartcards”. This paper provides an overview of computer chip identification systems, discusses potential vulnerabilities relating to the misuse of this technology, and the regimes for data protection and privacy, including the technical standards that apply in Australia and internationally. Details: Nathan, QLD: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, 2010. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper, Issue 1: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/No_%201%20Alice%20Hutchings.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/No_%201%20Alice%20Hutchings.pdf Shelf Number: 122117 Keywords: Computer Crimes (Australia) Computer Security Identity Fraud Identity Theft Terrorism

Author: Legrand, Tim Title: Infrastructure Vulnerability and the Coordination of Government Responses Summary: The security of Australia’s national infrastructures is of critical importance to its continued economic prosperity and social well being. Yet, the volatility of Australia’s climates and the threat of terrorism present Australia’s national infrastructures with a set of challenges almost unique in the world. Within the past five years, Australia’s towns and cities have encountered tropical cyclones, droughts, catastrophic flooding and destructive bush fires. Into the future, Australia’s transport, energy, food, water, and communications systems (amongst many others) face severe and continuing natural and human-induced hazards. The Australian Government’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (2010) and the accompanying supplement sets out the Government’s ongoing commitment to maintaining and continuing to build partnerships with the owners and operators of critical national infrastructures. The Strategy documents outline existing challenges and articulate the importance of risk mitigation and resilience enhancement for infrastructures. Against this backdrop, The Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) coordinated and hosted a one-day workshop with partner organisations and researchers to identify joint research priorities for a stream of work strengthening the resilience of critical national infrastructures. Soon after the workshop, the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy documents were published. The objective of the workshop was to identify and agree areas where academic research could strengthen the knowledge and expertise on infrastructure vulnerability and the coordination of government responses. this briefing paper provides a synopsis of themes and research questions identified at the CEPS Research Workshop held in Canberra on the 14th May 2010 which drew together senior policy makers, practitioners and scholars to discuss resilience and vulnerable infrastructures. Details: Nathan, QLD: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Tim%20Legrand%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Tim%20Legrand%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 122118 Keywords: Critical Infrastructures (Australia) Terrorism

Author: O'Donnell, Kate Title: Infrastructure Vulnerability and the Coordination of Government Responses Information Technology Systems – Security and Risk Summary: Technological advances often outstrip governmental capacity to regulate, creating infrastructure vulnerabilities and opportunities for criminal exploitation and wrongdoing. These emerging threats and risks are compounded by the fact that new technologies (such as cloud computing) transcend borders. This environment poses serious challenges for policy makers and practitioners alike. On 30 June 2010, the Australian Government released its Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy which recognised ‘the importance of engaging with the research sector to ensure policies and approaches remain responsive to change and identify and mitigate knowledge gaps identified by critical infrastructure stakeholders. The Government will foster a stronger relationship between the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and the research community to ensure the research needs of critical infrastructure stakeholders on a range of security issues are being met.” This Briefing Paper profiles the CEPS workshop on Information Technology Systems – Security and Risk held in early 2011. stimulated a rich set of ideas, as well as forging new partnerships. Bringing together the public and private sectors in a discursive forum, the workshop identifed a range of emerging issues for the purpose of the framing future research agendas within CEPS. This Briefing Paper is a tangible outcome of that forum, and an example of new levels of engagement between the government, private and research sectors that will assist in deepening our knowledge of the risks to infrastructure, and identify effective strategies of promoting resilience and risk mitigation. Details: Nathan, QLD: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed July 20, 2011 at: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Information%20Technology%20Systems%20.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ceps.edu.au/files/file/Information%20Technology%20Systems%20.pdf Shelf Number: 122123 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption Summary: This typology originates from a practitioners‘ understanding that the fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with that against money laundering; that the stolen assets of a corrupt public official are useless unless they are placed, layered, and integrated into the global financial network in a manner that does not raise suspicion. In some ways, a public official (known as a politically exposed person, or ―PEP) who gathers vast sums of money through corrupt means is far more vulnerable than some other criminals. A narcotics trafficker may reliably depend on being able to remain anonymous with his vast amount of money; a public official begins to draw unwanted attention as soon as he is associated with significant sums from unknown sources. Thus, the corrupt PEP‘s vulnerability presents an opportunity for those authorities engaged in both anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and anti-corruption (AC) enforcement. This typology differs from other such typologies previously produced by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) because it draws from publicly available work undertaken by experts. The body of work the project team analyzed represents deep AML expertise possessed by individuals and organisations around the globe. Indeed, the objective was to understand these works to draw conclusions from them. Broadly stated, the goal was to stand on the shoulders of others in order to better understand corruption, its mechanisms and vulnerabilities, through an AML/CFT lens. Part of the mandate of the Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) is to identify new threats and vulnerabilities and conduct research on money laundering and terrorist financing methods and techniques. FATF typology reports typically reveal, describe, and explain the nature of ML/TF methods and threats, thus increasing global awareness and opportunities for earlier detection. In light of its mandate, the project team focused only on the methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption. It does not attempt to describe the methods by which bribery and other corruption are effectuated, concealed, or discovered; such a discussion would be outside of the scope of this paper. While there may be no internationally recognised legal definition of corruption, it is most commonly functionally defined as the use of public office for private gain. The United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe Conventions establish the offences for a range of corrupt behaviour. The conventions define international standards on the criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences rather than through a generic definition or offense of corruption. The offenses can range from petty or systemic corruption, in which public officials or employees receive money to perform (or refrain from performing) official acts, to ―grand corruption, in which those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families, and their associates. Because of time and resource limitations involved in this project, the project team restricted itself to an analysis of grand corruption. While there is no precise threshold -- by official rank or otherwise -- to distinguish grand from systemic corruption, the positions of the PEPs involved in the cases in our report ranged from senior legislators to governors to prime ministers and presidents. All of the cases examined involved behaviour that would constitute offenses falling under any of the relevant international AC conventions, as well as the generic definition described above. Where possible, the case studies identified the type of corrupt act from which the proceeds had been derived. The types of corruption involved bribe taking and kickbacks, of both foreign and domestic officials, but also embezzlement (in which money rightly belonging to the State was siphoned for personal use through a variety of means), extortion (in which the public official uses the threat of official power to receive money) and self dealing (in which the corrupt PEP has a personal financial interest in acts and decisions he makes in his official capacity). Details: Paris: FATF, 2011. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Shelf Number: 122313 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Political Offenses Terrorism

Author: Fishman, Shira Title: Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force Summary: Recently, a number of United States citizens have been charged with seeking oversees training for terrorist plots, sending money to fund terrorism or plotting to launch terrorist attacks within the United States. These actions underscore the need to prevent violent radicalization well before the immediate threat of an attack. This is an emerging research area, and far too little is known about what drives individuals to engage in violent radical behavior. In addition, the vast majority of past research has focused on case studies constructed after an attack or attempted attack, large-scale attitudinal surveys, or interviews with former terrorists. As with all research, these methods have limitations including lack of external validity (limiting ones’ ability to generalize from one individual to other cases), the reliance on finding and convincing individuals to grant interviews, and the ability of large-scale attitudinal surveys to capture extremist beliefs. Thus, the current project was launched to explore alternative research approaches that could be used to improve understanding of the processes surrounding violent radicalization. In particular, we sought to examine whether empirical research, using archival or institutional data at the community level, could provide new insights into factors that might leave individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Scholars from around the world with expertise in radicalization, communities in the United States and innovative methods from related fields, agreed to serve on a Task Force focused on these issues. The group was brought together for a day and a half to explore the potential relationship between community characteristics and susceptibility to radicalization. The Task Force began with the theoretical premise that some communities might possess certain characteristics that make the likelihood and/or rates of radicalization higher in those communities. Marginalized communities (including Diaspora groups), those that experience relative deprivation (of resources, both financial and otherwise), and communities that have experienced significant social disruption emerged as priority areas for future research. To conduct empirical research, three categories of dependent variables were identified by Task Force members as potential proxies for violent radicalization. The categories are: • The amount of terrorism – this variable could include the number of incidents, the number of casualties or an estimate of the damage caused by an attack. • The number of other severe (both violent and financial) ideologically motivated crimes – extremist crimes may well serve as a gateway to other ideologically motivated violence, thus, a community with other ideological crimes may well be a proxy for radicalization. • The number of attempted terrorist attacks –there is a need to consider not just successful attacks but attempts as well. Using thwarted and successful attacks is most likely a better indicator, both theoretically and statistically, of concentrations of radicalization. To test theories of radicalization, Task Force members suggested specific conditions under which radicalization may be more likely to emerge: • Marginalized communities – measuring the extent to which a subgroup, including Diaspora communities, feels included in or excluded from a larger community. o Economic measures – to assess the extent of economic distress felt by a community, including variables such as unemployment rates, median household income, income inequality, and data on participation in government assistance programs. o Social capital – the extent to which members of a community feel connected or trusting of neighbors and government, with lower levels of social capital being indicative of marginalization. Variables included here are family structure (divorce rates, single parent families), the number (or density) of social service organizations, civic organizations or arts/sports organizations, and voter turnout rates. o Political inclusion/exclusion – the extent to which members of a community feel included in local politics and political institutions. These variables include participation rates in local elections, active involvement in campaigns and the extent to which a members of a subgroup are elected or appointed to local offices. o Social support – the greater the amount of services available, the less vulnerable a community may be to radicalization. Measures of support include Head Start programs, number of children enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid, and, for Diaspora communities, number of organizations or individuals receiving money from state Offices of Refugee Resettlement. o Demographics of Diaspora community – the social structure of an immigrant community is vital to a community’s success. Such factors that may impact the prevalence of radicalization include the age at which immigrants arrive in the United States, the number of foreign language speakers or students in ESL classes and the extent to which the community establishes its own institutions such as banks and local media. • Ideology – the variables discussed previously were assumed to affect radicalization across ideologies. However, there should be some indicators that are ideology-specific . Extremist organizations are ideologically motivated and may serve as a gateway toward extremist violence. The link between such organizations and terrorism could be tested by tracking the organizations’ legal activities, the number of extremist organizations or the extent to which an organization attracts members of a community. In all, participants of the Task Force concluded that pursuing research using community-level archival or institutional data to study radicalization was a challenging but necessary task. Issues such as the marginalization or deprivation of certain communities, especially Diaspora communities, are increasingly important to study. To date, violent radicalization is still a fairly rare problem within the United States, thus, it may be possible that the community level is too broad to adequately give guidance on when, where or how individuals radicalize. However, if such research does prove successful then it may have a major impact on the way in which law enforcement deals with terrorism. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2010. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Shelf Number: 122354 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Organized Crime Organizations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results Summary: The financial means of international terror and organized crime organizations are analysed. First, some short remarks about the organization of international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is provided about the financing of terrorist and organized crime organizations, their sources and the various methods they use. Third, an attempt is made to estimate the financial means of terror organizations with the help of a latent estimation approach (MIMIC procedure). The figures show that Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have sufficient financial means. Fourth, some remarks are made about the negative effects of terror on the economy in highly developed countries and some strategies are presented to combat (the financing) of terrorism. Details: Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4860: Accessed August 12, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584191 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584191 Shelf Number: 122381 Keywords: Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: U.S. White House Title: Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: This strategy outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online. Most of all, this strategy reafirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts, As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we remember that al-Qa’ida tried to spark a conflict between faiths and divide us as Americans. But they failed. As this strategy makes clear, we will not waver in defense of our country or our communities. We will defeat a1-Qa’ida and its affiliates. We will uphold the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. And we will go forward together, as Americans, knowing that our rich diversity of backgrounds and faiths makes us stronger and is a key to our national security. Details: Washington, DC: The White House, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Shelf Number: 122386 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Schneider, Friedrich , Bruck, Tilman, Meierrieks, Daniel Title: The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II) Summary: This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe. Details: Berlin: Economics of Security, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Economics of Security Working Paper Series no. 45: Accessed August 16, 2011 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.372925.de/diw_econsec0045.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.372925.de/diw_econsec0045.pdf Shelf Number: 122411 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Economics of Crime Terrorism

Author: Mansfield, Charles T. Title: Modern Piracy: The Impact on Maritime Security Summary: Although acts of piracy are generally criminal as opposed to terrorist in nature, their unpredictable time and location of occurrence, the wide variety of vessels targeted, and their increasing frequency creates an opportunity for terrorists to use pirates' methods as a means to achieve their goals. This paper will provide a brief historical perspective on piracy, examine its modern dimensions, and analyze the impact of modern piracy on U.S. maritime security. The thesis examines the efforts that U.S. and foreign governments, military, business, and civilian organizations expend to combat the problem, and piracy's tangible costs in capital resources to combat. The sea, a largely unregulated space, is a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to act unopposed by military or law enforcement efforts. Although piracy is generally not politically motivated, it is invariably linked to prevailing political conditions and the proximity of weak or failed states. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the international community has been forced to assess the vulnerabilities of maritime security. In the post- 9/11 and USS Cole era, there has been a resurgence in worldwide piracy incidents. The increase in attacks has demanded the serious attention of global maritime trading partners. The possible use of a maritime vessel as a weapon is a real and credible threat. The United States and her maritime partners are constantly working to achieve a secure global maritime environment. The focus is on assisting failed and failing states to create functional governments that will develop their law enforcement and coast guard capabilities. Until these weak and lawless lands can maintain control of their territorial waters, the global maritime partners will be required to use their naval and law enforcement assets to patrol piracy hot spots to prevent a further escalation of robberies, violence, and potentially terrorist acts. Details: Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, Command and State College, 2008. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2011 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA490682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Shelf Number: 122431 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Pirates/Piracy Terrorism

Author: Jourde, Cedric Title: Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania Summary: Increasing narcotraffic and a more active al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are elevating concerns over instability in the Sahel. However, the region’s threats are more complex than what is observable on the surface. Rather, security concerns are typically characterized by multiple, competing, and fluctuating interests at the local, national, and regional levels. Effectively responding to these threats requires in-depth understanding of the multiple contextual layers in which illicit actors operate. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 15: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/AfricaBriefFinal_15.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mauritania URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/AfricaBriefFinal_15.pdf Shelf Number: 122629 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mauritania) Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation Security Counter-Terrorism Cyber Security Homeland Security (U.S.) Immigration Maritime Security Risk Management Terrorism Transportation Security

Author: Financial Action Task Force. Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group Title: Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have jointly assessed the implementation of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards in South Africa. Among its major findings were: • South Africa has made good progress in developing its system for combating money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT) since its last FATF mutual evaluation in 2003. • The money laundering offence is generally in line with the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, although a lack of comprehensive statistics made it difficult to assess effectiveness. Provisions criminalising the financing of terrorism are comprehensive, although they are not yet tested in practice. • The Financial Intelligence Centre (“the Centre”) is an effective financial intelligence unit. • The confiscation scheme is comprehensive and utilises effective civil forfeiture measures. Since 2003, South Africa has also adopted mechanisms to freeze terrorist-related assets. • The FIC Act imposes customer due diligence, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting and internal control requirements. It should be noted that, after the FIC Act came into force, South Africa implemented a program to re-identify all existing customers. The issue of beneficial ownership has not yet been addressed, however, and South Africa also needs to adopt measures dealing with politically exposed persons (PEPs) and correspondent banking. • The FIC Act covers some designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs); however, South Africa needs to broaden the legislation to cover dealers in precious metals and stones, company service providers, and more broadly cover accountants. • At the time of the on-site visit, there were not adequate powers to supervise and enforce compliance with AML/CFT provisions; however, amendments to FIC Act have been enacted, and when they enter into force this year they will significantly enhance the compliance regime. • South African authorities have established effective mechanisms to co-operate on operational matters to combat ML and FT. South Africa can also provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance, including the possibility to extradite its own nationals. Details: Paris: FATF-GAFI, 2009. 244p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/60/15/42432085.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/60/15/42432085.pdf Shelf Number: 122753 Keywords: Financial Crimes (South Africa Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Acharya, Arabinda Title: India’s States of Armed Violence Assessing the Human Cost and Political Priorities Summary: Some forms of violence get more attention than others. Terrorism and insurgency have effects which go far beyond the direct deaths and injuries that they cause, undermining security and economic development. But for sheer numbers of lives destroyed, criminal violence and suicide deserve more attention. All forms of armed violence require more attention, and more holistic policy. Institutional cooperation — between ministries, the central and state governments, and between government and civil society — is only beginning to occur. Details: New Delhi: India Armed Violence Assessment, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 1: Accessed September 21, 2011 at: http://www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB1-states-of-armed-violence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: India URL: http://www.india-ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB1-states-of-armed-violence.pdf Shelf Number: 122804 Keywords: Armed Violence Gun Violence Guns Homicides Terrorism Violence (India) Violent Crime

Author: Service Employees International Union Title: Homeland Insecurity: How the Wackenhut Corporation Is Compromising America's Nuclear Security Summary: Despite the high level of public concern over homeland security, the single largest supplier of security officers to sensitive U.S. nuclear facilities is a private firm that has overseen frightening security lapses, presided over training cutbacks, and tolerated lax security measures at multiple nuclear sites throughout the United States. The firm? The Wackenhut Corporation, a subsidiary of the Denmark-based, multi-national private security conglomerate Group 4 Falck A/S. Wackenhut, the single largest supplier of private contract security officers to U.S. nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities, provides security and other services at thirty nuclear power plants and seven U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites, including the U.S. Government’s principal nuclear weapons labs. While many of the individual nuclear security lapses and problems that have occurred under Wackenhut’s watch have been reported in the media or made available in public documents, there has not been, to date, a public focus on the fact that what many of these problem sites have in common is that Wackenhut provides their security. Furthermore, the U.S. Government or nuclear security watchdogs have not conducted or made public a comprehensive investigation to date into Wackenhut’s security practices at all its nuclear sites in the U.S. This report, “Homeland Insecurity: How The Wackenhut Corporation Is Compromising America’s Nuclear Security,” is the result of the first-ever comprehensive study of public documents, reports, news stories, and court filings related to nuclear security by America’s largest union of private security officers, SEIU (Service Employees International Union). The documents find the Wackenhut Corporation at the center of the swirling controversy over our nation’s nuclear security readiness and raise questions about the private firm’s fitness to provide adequate security at our nation’s most sensitive sites. Details: Washington, DC: SEIU International, 2004. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7B2FDAD06E-E7D3-4DE0-AEF2-0C787424C292%7D/uploads/%7B49FFC6A0-FECC-4DD5-A67B-20DEE438E2F3%7D.PDF Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7B2FDAD06E-E7D3-4DE0-AEF2-0C787424C292%7D/uploads/%7B49FFC6A0-FECC-4DD5-A67B-20DEE438E2F3%7D.PDF Shelf Number: 122913 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.) Nuclear Terrorism Private Security Terrorism

Author: Cornish, Paul Title: Cyber Security and the UK's Critical National Infrastructure Summary: Government cannot provide all the answers and guarantee national cyber security in all respects for all stakeholders. As a result, Critical National Infrastructure enterprises should seek to take on greater responsibilities and instil greater awareness across their organizations All organizations should look in more depth at their dependencies and vulnerabilities. Awareness and understanding of cyberspace should be 'normalised' and incorporated and embedded into standard management and business practices within and across government and the public and private sectors Cyber terminology should be clear and language proportionate to the threat. It should also encourage a clear distinction to be made between IT mishaps and genuine cyber attacks Research and investment in cyber security are essential to meeting and responding to the threat in a timely fashion. However, cyber security/protection should not be the preserve of IT departments but of senior executive boards, strategists and business leaders and it should be incorporated into all levels of an organization. Details: London: Chatham House, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/r0911cyber.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/r0911cyber.pdf Shelf Number: 122923 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Cybercrime Cybersecurity (U.K.) Terrorism

Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe Summary: Populist extremist parties (PEPs) present one of the most pressing challenges to European democracies, but their appeal and the profile of their supporters remain poorly understood. This report examines what is causing citizens across Europe to shift support behind populist extremists and recommends how mainstream political parties can respond to the challenge. PEPs have spent much of the past two decades exchanging strategies, ideas and best practice. This has enabled them to respond to new issues and events more innovatively and effectively than the established parties. Until the mainstream parties similarly begin to exchange lessons, root their responses in the evidence and address the actual anxieties of PEP voters, populist extremists will continue to rally support among a new generation of citizens. If politicians and policymakers are to meet this challenge, they need to radically rethink their current approach to populist extremism. Details: London: Chatham House, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 122924 Keywords: Radical Groups (Europe) Terrorism Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Szelp, Attila Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the EU and the USA, their Impact on Business Operations and Mutual Recognition with Focus on AEO and C-TPAT Summary: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a tremendous impact on international trade policy. The USA was the first country to introduce cargo security and facilitation measures as a counteraction. The EU and international organizations also established new security programs in order to better secure cargo movements across borders. This thesis gives an overview of security initiatives introduced by international organizations, the EU and the USA, with an emphasis on the trade facilitation programs Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and a comparison of them. The process towards mutual recognition of these programs is then described. Three case studies put the topic under the microscope: The perception as well as actual benefits and disadvantages from economic actors' points of view are presented and implementation and operational processes in companies are demonstrated. The case studies include port authorities, carriers and logistics providers. Finally, the author reflects on his findings. Details: Vienna: WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, 2010. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 21, 2011 at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/3013/1/Szelp.pdf Shelf Number: 123074 Keywords: Cargo Security Cargo Theft Maritime Security Stolen Goods Stolen Property Terrorism

Author: Parfomak, Paul W. Title: Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress Summary: Nearly half a million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids crisscross the United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread and vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno, CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have heightened congressional concern about pipeline risks and drawn criticism from the National Transportation Safety Board. Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, while many stakeholders agree that federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right track, the spate of recent pipeline incidents suggest there continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise, the threat of terrorist attack remains a concern. The federal pipeline safety program was authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and is currently operating under a continuing resolution. The 112th Congress is considering new legislation to reauthorize the program for four years and to improve the safety and security of the U.S. pipeline network. Legislative proposals include the Strengthening Pipeline Safety and Enforcement Act of 2011 (S. 234), the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act of 2011 (S. 275), the Clean Rivers Act of 2011 (S. 1502), the Pipeline Safety and Community Empowerment Act of 2011 (H.R. 22), the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (H.R. 2845), the Pipeline Modernization for Safety Act of 2011 (H.R. 2871), and the Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act of 2011 (H.R. 2937). Pipeline-related provisions are also found in a draft of the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 approved by the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security. The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (S. 1596) would appropriate federal pipeline safety funds for FY2012. The legislative proposals above contain a broad range of provisions addressing pipeline safety and security. Among the most significant are provisions that would increase the number of federal pipeline safety inspectors, would require automatic shutoff valves for transmission pipelines, would mandate internal inspections of transmission pipelines, would increase civil penalties for pipeline safety violations, and would mandate reviews of diluted bitumen pipeline regulation. S. 1502 and H.R. 2937 would mandate a review of federal safety regulations for pipelines crossing inland bodies of water. The Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 would mandate a study regarding the relative roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation with respect to pipeline security. As it debates reauthorization of the federal pipeline safety program and oversees the federal role in pipeline security, Congress may wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security fit together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: R41536: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41536.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41536.pdf Shelf Number: 123148 Keywords: Homeland Security Infrastructure Security (U.S.) Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of Offshore Energy Infrastructure Summary: Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure--facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements. The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the security of OCS facilities (that is, facilities regulated for security pursuant to 33 C.F.R. part 106), but could improve its process for managing security inspections. For example, the Coast Guard developed a security plan for the Gulf of Mexico, in which all 57 OCS facilities are located, and it reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of OCS facilities. It has also issued guidance, which states that Coast Guard personnel should conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but has conducted about one-third of these inspections from 2008 through 2010. Further, the Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to ensure that its field units conduct these inspections. Consequently, the Coast Guard may not be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. The Coast Guard also faces challenges in summarizing inspection results. Specifically, its database for storing inspection data has limitations that make it difficult to determine if security inspections were conducted. For example, there is no data field to identify OCS facilities, which makes it difficult to readily analyze whether required inspections were conducted. By addressing some of these challenges, Coast Guard managers could more easily use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to ensure the security of the four deepwater ports, but opportunities exist for improvement. The Coast Guard's actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. For example, Coast Guard security plans address security at deepwater ports, and the Coast Guard also reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of the deepwater ports. However, Coast Guard guidance for deepwater ports does not call for annual security inspections, and it has conducted only one security inspection at a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard plans to begin annual security inspections of deepwater ports in recognition of the risk of a transportation security incident. However, limitations in the Coast Guard's inspection database and lack of guidance available to database users may complicate the Coast Guard's management and oversight of inspections at deepwater ports. For example, the data field for deepwater ports has been incorrectly applied to other types of infrastructure and some deepwater ports are recorded under multiple names. Unless the Coast Guard addresses these database limitations and issues updated guidance to database users, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to verify that the deepwater ports are complying with applicable maritime security requirements. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard is taking action, though, to gain a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs by conducting a study to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-37: Accessed October 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1237.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1237.pdf Shelf Number: 123185 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Maritime Crime Maritime Security (U.S.) Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Veiter, Daniela Title: Cargo Security Initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their Effect on Trade in the NAFTA Region Summary: Cross-border trade today is an essential driver of nations’ prosperity. A prolonged disruption in a supply chain has an enormous impact on a country’s as well as the global economy. The international transportation network and its long supply chains are very fragile and vulnerable to terrorist abuse or similar attacks. The high number of agents add another level of risk. The products, factories, supply chain facilities and supply chain partners, carriers, people and information could all present danger to the supply chain. Globalization turned the market place into a competitive environment where companies seek to hire the most affordable workers as well as choose the cheapest suppliers or service providers. This trend spreads business practices out all over the world and increases the need for transportation while adding complexity to a company’s value chain. The most effective way is a worldwide cooperation of countries on securing the global trade system without hindering the trade flow. A global partnership involving all agents along a supply chain with harmonised and compatible systems, both for customs work and for the exchange of information would be the perfect solution. And collaboration and coordinated work reduces the risk of disruptions and is more cost-effective too. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington DC, the international trade community has dedicated more time and money on the issue of security. The U.S. government, the Canadian government and the Mexican government have established a multi-layered defense strategy to protect their people and country. International cargo that is being shipped to certain target countries poses a significant security risk. In particular, cargo containers can be abused to carry weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other dangerous items. Those containers are particularly vulnerable to changes from their legitimate commercial purpose due to the numerous transfers within the transport chain they are subject to. Those very same internationally moving containers, though, are of utter importance to global commerce as they ship about 95% of the world’s international cargo, in terms of value. Over 48 million containers are being shipped between seaports around the world. Intermodal transport has enabled trucks and trains to move goods around continents in the ocean containers. Any terrorist actions can have largescale damage to a country’s society and economy and thus it is essential to have systems in place that can prevent such events from happening beforehand. The United States of America was the first country to start introducing plans to identify high risk cargo shipments and soon Canada and Mexico followed. The initiatives seek to ensure security over different levels. There are three main areas of risk that these security initiatives seek to address. First, the security of vital cargo information relating to the contents and destination of the shipment must be accessible by customs authorities. This also includes IT security. Then there is the level of physical control through inspections and screening. The last level covers the entire supply chain through screening and background checks of every agent involved in the process. This includes all groups between the manufacturer and the final destination of the product. This thesis talks about cargo security initiatives in the NAFTA countries of the United States, Canada and Mexico for any shipments crossing borders between those countries by either road, sea, air or rail. It shows the development and intensification of those security regulations over the last years, analyses their purpose and recommends how to best deal with them if you are a business located in this area. Details: Vienna: Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2009. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/1/document.pdf Shelf Number: 123240 Keywords: Cargo Security (U.S., Canada, Mexico) Cargo Theft Maritime Crime Stolen Goods Stolen Property Supply Chains Terrorism

Author: Bart, Elias Title: Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress Summary: The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft overseas has heightened concerns over the potential use of air cargo shipments to bomb passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The incidents have renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and have prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. With respect to protecting passenger airliners from explosives placed in cargo, policy debate has focused on whether risk-based targeting strategies and methods should be used to identify those shipments requiring additional scrutiny or whether all or most shipments should be subject to more intensive physical screening. While the air cargo industry and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have argued for the implementation of risk-based approaches, Congress mandated 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft using approved methods by August 2010 (see P.L. 110-53). While 100% of domestic air cargo now undergoes physical screening in compliance with this mandate, not all inbound international cargo shipments carried on passenger airplanes are scrutinized in this manner. TSA is working with international air cargo operators to increase the share of cargo placed on passenger flights that is screened, but 100% screening may not be achieved until August 2013. In the interim, TSA, along with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and international partners, is relying on risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo, particularly shipments deemed to be high risk. Amid renewed congressional interest on air cargo security, a number of policy issues may arise regarding • the desirability of risk-based strategies as alternatives to 100% cargo screening and inspection; • the adequacy of off-airport screening under the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) in conjunction with various supply chain and air cargo facility security measures; • the costs and benefits of requiring blast resistant cargo containers to protect aircraft from in-flight explosions in cargo holds; • the desirability of having air cargo screened by employees of private firms rather than TSA and CBP employees; and • cooperative efforts with international partners and stakeholders to improve the security of international air cargo operations. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: R41515: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41515.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41515.pdf Shelf Number: 123242 Keywords: Air Cargo Airports Cargo Security Terrorism

Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Risk Management Fundamentals Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine Summary: This doctrine, Risk Management Fundamentals, serves as an authoritative statement regarding the principles and process of homeland security risk management and what they mean to homeland security planning and execution. It is intended as the capstone doctrine on risk management for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Furthermore, Risk Management Fundamentals serves as a foundational document supporting DHS risk management efforts in partnership with the homeland security enterprise. Risk Management Fundamentals is intended to help homeland security leaders, supporting staffs, program managers, analysts, and operational personnel develop a framework to make risk management an integral part of planning, preparing, and executing organizational missions. The development of homeland security risk management doctrine is an essential element in promoting a risk-informed culture enabling training, capability development, and integration across DHS to strengthen and improve the Nation’s security. Risk Management Fundamentals articulates a desired end-state that DHS aspires to achieve in promoting risk management. This doctrine is not a substitute for independent thought or innovation in applying these principles and concepts. Simply reading the doctrine will not make one adept in managing risks, nor will attempting to follow the ideas herein as if they were a checklist; rather, doctrine serves to shape how one thinks about the issues that you are considering and should be applied based on the operating environment. Homeland security practitioners should compare the doctrine herein against their own experience and think about why, when, and how it applies to their situation and area of responsibility. The purpose of this document is to:  Promote a common understanding of, and approach to, risk management;  Establish organizational practices that should be followed by DHS Components;  Provide a foundation for conducting risk assessments and evaluating risk management options;  Set the doctrinal underpinning for institutionalizing a risk management culture through consistent application and training on risk management principles and practices; and  Educate and inform homeland security stakeholders in risk management applications, including the assessment of capability, program, and operational performance, and the use of such assessments for resource and policy decisions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Shelf Number: 123245 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.) Risk Assessment Risk Management Terrorism

Author: Bouhana, Noemie Title: Al Qa'ida-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory: Scientific Report Summary: This paper presents findings from research into the causes of Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation. It looks to understand vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa‘ida influenced violent extremism; and distinguishes between indicators and causal factors of criminal and violent behaviour. It also explores what transferable knowledge can be applied from youth gangs, new religious movements and violent radical activism. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 97: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123274 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Munton, Tony Title: Understanding Vulnerability and Resilience in Individuals to the Influence of Al Qa’ida Violent Extremism Summary: In the absence of a mature empirical evidence base it explores what transferrable knowledge can be taken from the more developed literature on other types of violent activity e.g. other terrorist activity, gangs, cults, etc. This report presents the findings of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of open source empirical studies that seek to answer two key questions: • What factors, social, psychological and physical, make a person more vulnerable to participation in Al Qa’ida (AQ)-influenced violent extremism? • What factors enable vulnerable individuals to resist the influence of AQ-influenced violent extremism? This report also presents the findings from a second targeted REA on other relevant types of violent activity, including: • other (non-AQ-influenced) types of terrorist activity; • animal rights activism; • cults; • gangs; • right-wing extremism; and • youth crime. The report discusses learning from these other areas and how far lessons learned can be applied to the study of AQ-influenced violent extremism. Both REAs involved systematic searches of relevant electronic databases and hand searches of academic journals and websites. Additional relevant literature was identified by topic experts, peer reviewers, specific websites, and through backward and forward citation chasing. Studies were included if they were based on empirical research, were relevant to the REAs’ questions and were assessed to be of high scientific quality. The empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more vulnerable to AQ-influenced violent extremism is weak. Even less is known about why certain individuals resort to violence, when other individuals from the same community, with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity. The following conclusions are based on the limited empirical evidence base identified by the two REAs. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 98: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 123275 Keywords: Extremist Groups Gang Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Violent Crime

Author: Disley, Emma Title: Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism Summary: This paper looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and whether there are intervention practices to learn from. It also explores transferable knowledge from the literature on street gangs, religious cults, right-wing groups and organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper No. 99: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123276 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Desistance Extremist Groups Gangs Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Armstrong, Nicholas J. Title: Securing America's Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges and Future Solutions Summary: Homeland security research and recent transnational terrorist trends lend credibility to the prediction that the next major terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland could be on a mass transit transportation system. Mass transit systems remain an easy target even for the terrorists with modest levels of reconnaissance and surveillance training. London, Madrid, Mumbai, Tokyo and other cities have experienced terrorist attacks on their public transportation systems. For the United States, it is only a matter of time. Mass transit security requires a different approach than airport security. Unlike airports, mass transit systems are open with flexible schedules and multiple points of entry for a much larger number of daily passengers (3.8 billion passenger trips in 20071). Consequently, mass transit security often comes at the expense of operational efficiency. For example, implementing single-entry choke points for 100 percent passenger screening at Grand Central Station during rush hour – as employed by airports – would cause crippling operational delays. Furthermore, mass transit authorities receive a sub-optimal allocation of homeland security funding with respect to risk, leaving vulnerable systems open to an attack. The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of domestic and international mass transit screening strategies, current and future screening technologies, and governmental challenges to and cost-benefits of enhancing rail security while maintaining as open a system as possible. In addition to discussing these critical topics and providing recommendations in the following section, this report highlights the following themes: • A layered, system-of-systems approach to screening is most effective in a mass transit environment. The principal challenge of quick and efficient screening is in screening carry-on baggage, not passengers. • Current technologies such as biometrics and intelligent video offer the ability to enhance current security systems in the short-term, while the advent of new technologies like Portable Explosive Detection Devices and Passive Millimeter Wave Screening will provide additional layers of security as they become more cost-effective and efficient over time. • Federal grant funding for rail security has increased substantially, particularly in the FY 2008 Transit Security Grant Program; however, allocation of those funds are somewhat less than proportional to the risk among the recipient agencies. • Coordination is both the problem and solution to effective rail security implementation. Local, regional, and state governments are the implementing authorities for rail security projects; it is the responsibility of the federal government to foster coordination through incentives, best practices, and supportive policies. • A centralized clearinghouse for transit security research and best practices does not exist and U.S. government representation within international clearinghouses is weak. Details: Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 2008. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Workshop%20Project%202008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Workshop%20Project%202008.pdf Shelf Number: 119338 Keywords: Mass Transit (U.S.) Passenger Security Terrorism Trains Transit Crime Transit Safety

Author: Schreier, Fred Title: Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations Summary: This paper discusses the role of intelligence, intelligence services and intelligence-led operations as crucial components of the efforts to counter the new risks, dangers and threats to states and their population. The end of the Cold War and globalisation has not only brought a multiplication of actors, sources of conflict and means to fight. Indeed, globalisation, accelerating techno-logical innovation, growing interdependence and vulnerability of modern states has dramatically enhanced the number and diversity of risks, dangers and threats. The fact that these are increasingly transnational in nature, originate more and more often from non-state actors and appear and mutate ever more quickly, renders the fight against them more difficult. This is particularly true for the unholy trinity of transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational organised crime (TOC) that have become the pre-eminent security challenges confronting the world and the new intelligence priorities. TOC is growing in volume, geographic reach and profitability, and is well positioned for further growth because it does, in many ways, have the most to gain from globalization. Growth and spread of TOC increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and, with it, of catastrophic transnational terrorism as proliferants and terrorists collude ever more symbiotically with TOC groups to move money, men and materials around the globe. The more the international order is threatened by asymmetric warfare of Islamistic terror networks, the more the threat perception will become multifaceted and chaotic if more actors can acquire WMD. These developments not only diminish the predictability of risks and dangers. The more diffuse and unpredictable the situation and the threat perception, the more difficult it will become to clearly distinguish between external and internal, civilian and military threats to a country, and between the strategic, operational or tactical levels of risks and dangers. More than ever before intelligence is the pre-requisite for all measures that aim at the effective prevention, disruption and suppression of these threats. But countering the pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors that operate clandestinely requires more than just intelligence services. These threats can only be effectively counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and prevented when the operations of all security sector organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven or intelligence-led. This requires a paradigm shift in national security strategy that not only entails a ‘whole of government’ approach and multilateral engagement, but a radical new approach with more intensive collaboration, interaction and information exchange by these organisations with the agencies of the intelligence community. This paper (1) sketches the main threats currently confronting all states. Part (2) elaborates what intelligence is and explains why intelligence is key to counter the expanding array of threats more effectively. Part (3) shows the application of intelligence and the contributions of intelligence-led operations to the fight against the pre-eminent threats. Part (4) explores patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. In part (5) some of the implications which intelligence-led operations may have for democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability are indicated. The paper ends with a list of key recommendations. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: DCAF Occasional Paper – No. 16: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://www.dcaf.ch/DCAF-Migration/KMS/Publications/Fighting-the-Pre-eminent-Threats-with-Intelligence-led-Operations Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/DCAF-Migration/KMS/Publications/Fighting-the-Pre-eminent-Threats-with-Intelligence-led-Operations Shelf Number: 123349 Keywords: Intelligence Gathering Organized Crime Terrorism Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author: Andres, Amado Philip de Title: West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism as the New Threats to Global Security Summary: Drug trafficking in West and Central Africa is nothing more that the most visible symptom of a much deeper and destabilizing disease which is slowly but progressively affecting the bodies of African states and institutions. This paper provides an overview on the current situation in West Africa with regard to drug trafficking (cocaine, heroin and hashish), organized crime (from human trafficking to diamond trade and its link with terrorism financing) and terrorism. Details: UNISCI, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 16: Accessed November 19, 2011 at: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2016%20-%20Andres.pdf Shelf Number: 123398 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (West Africa) Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Rights Working Group Title: Reclaiming Our Rights: Reflections on Racial Profiling in a Post-9/11 America Summary: In the summer of 2001, racial justice advocates were in the midst of a flurry of exciting developments. After years of work by advocates to fight back against the racially discriminatory impact of the “war on drugs,” the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) had been introduced in both houses of Congress. An August hearing in the Senate encouraged hopes for passage within the year. In the private sector, giant corporations Xerox and Microsoft were being sued for racial and gender discrimination, and Coca Cola had just reached, in 2000, a record $192 million settlement in a racial bias case brought by African American employees. The Third World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was held in early September in Durban, South Africa, to celebrate the end of apartheid and a new global commitment to fighting racial injustice. Then, on September 11th, the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., changed the nation in a single day. The loss of human life was staggering — there were nearly 3,000 victims killed by the attacks including nationals of more than 70 countries of every race and religion. Not only did all of the passengers on the planes used in the attacks die, but thousands more were killed in the crash sites of the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and the field in Pennsylvania, and hundreds of rescue workers, fire fighters and police officers also gave their lives. Many more residents and rescue workers became ill and some also died in the months and years after the attacks, as debris and dust from the collapsed buildings were proven to be toxic for nearly one year after the attacks. In addition to these terrible losses, another significant loss occurred — the loss of civil liberties and human rights protections for many communities in the U.S. In particular, the problem of racial and religious profiling expanded dramatically under a number of new or revised government policies and programs. The decision in 2001-2002 by the Bush Administration to detain men of Arab, South Asian, or Muslim backgrounds as suspects in the new “war on terrorism” resulted in the arbitrary detention of more than 1,200 individuals. It coincided with a dramatic increase in harassment of and hate crimes against people in those communities. The newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) devoted new and expanded resources toward the detention and deportation of immigrants, increasingly encouraging local police to enforce federal immigration laws and raising concerns about the racial profiling of Latino communities. DHS also joined forces with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies to dramatically expand surveillance and information-sharing activities through such initiatives as fusion centers and suspicious activity reporting. These activities have led to allegations of racial profiling of Arab, South Asian, Muslim, and Latino communities by federal agencies. Many state governments joined their federal counterparts in implementing racial profiling as a law enforcement technique. In 2007, the Los Angeles Police Department was forced to cancel a mapping program designed to identify potential extremists in Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim communities in Los Angeles after residents protested the plan. In the last two years, a number of states have claimed new authority to enforce federal immigration laws, enacting “papers please” legislation and mandating that local police ask individuals about their immigration or citizenship status. The infamous law enacted in Arizona in 2010—SB 1070—has now been copied and passed in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah, with Pennsylvania holding legislative hearings on similar legislation. Ten years later, the Rights Working Group (RWG) coalition sees the anniversary of these events as a chance to pause and remember — to reflect on our losses since September 11th and to reclaim those rights lost in the aftermath of the attacks. This collection of essays, from public offi cials, policy advocates, grassroots organizers, law enforcement offi cials, and community leaders, shares personal reflections of the struggle to overcome the pervasive human rights problem of racial profiling. Their stories and suggestions are insightful views into the challenges of the work but also the signifi cance of the struggle. Congressman John Conyers, Jr., who first introduced ERPA in 2001, offers an introduction for this collection of essays, noting why the legislation is needed today more than ever. Karen K. Narasaki reminds us that racial profiling is not new, and that we must remember the historical lessons from World War II and the internment of Japanese Americans in order to avoid making the same errors of targeting a particular community out of fear. Laura W. Murphy shares her personal recollections of the encounters her African American family had with law enforcement, and how her experience drove her and others at the ACLU to promote ERPA as an important response to biased policing. Monami Maulik describes her work as a community organizer who was overwhelmed by the racial and religious profiling targeting her community after September 11th and the steps she took to fight back. Shahid Buttar notes that September 11th was used to justify new government powers of surveillance and information-sharing that have resulted in further racial profiling of Muslim, Arab, South Asian, and other immigrant communities. Nadia Tonova and Christian Ramirez discuss the pervasive use of racial profiling on the northern and southern borders of the United States, where border communities increasingly fear contact with both the police and Customs and Border Protection officers. Pramila Jayapal offers insight into the expansion of immigration enforcement programs that have led to racial profiling of Latino and other immigrant communities across the country, impacting community safety and residents’ trust in the police. Former Police Chief Art Venegas highlights the importance of law enforcement officers taking steps to combat racial profiling within their own departments in order to be effective at promoting community safety. In the concluding essay, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin explains his commitment to reintroducing ERPA later this year, noting that racial profiling is not only an ineffective law enforcement technique but also a violation of our constitutional rights. Rights Working Group is grateful to all of them for contributing to this effort. In considering where we go next in the fight against racial profiling, Rights Working Group has provided a list of recommendations at the end of the report, including urging policymakers and community members to join the RWG Racial Profiling: Face the Truth campaign. Dr. Tracie Keesee has graciously contributed recommendations to law enforcement officers working to end racial profiling within their departments. Details: Washington, DC: Rights Working Group, 2011. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 19, 2011 at: http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/RWG_911AnnivReport_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/RWG_911AnnivReport_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 123406 Keywords: Bias in Law Enforcement Human Rights Immigrants Racial Discrimination Racial Profiling (U.S.) Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Criminal Justice Response to Support Victims of Acts of Terrorism Summary: The handbook draws on the national experiences of a broad range of geographically representative criminal justice experts regarding programmes of assistance and support for victims of acts of terrorism. This handbook is intended to share experiences related to support mechanisms for victims of terrorism, and to give policymakers and criminal justice officials practical insights into challenges faced, and good practices developed, by their counterparts at the national and regional level. Our hope is that this handbook will aid Member States in the development and implementation of programmes of assistance and support for victims of acts of terrorism within their respective criminal justice systems. Details: Vienna, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2011 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Victims_Rights_E-Book_EN.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Victims_Rights_E-Book_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 123493 Keywords: Terrorism Victim Services Victims of Crime

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Criminal Justice Response to Support Victims of Acts of Terrorism Summary: The handbook draws on the national experiences of a broad range of geographically representative criminal justice experts regarding programmes of assistance and support for victims of acts of terrorism. This handbook is intended to share experiences related to support mechanisms for victims of terrorism, and to give policymakers and criminal justice officials practical insights into challenges faced, and good practices developed, by their counterparts at the national and regional level. Our hope is that this handbook will aid Member States in the development and implementation of programmes of assistance and support for victims of acts of terrorism within their respective criminal justice systems. Victims have long played a secondary, and mostly silent, role in criminal trials. UNODC recognizes the importance of representing victims’ interests in criminal proceedings and the relevance of developing comprehensive programmes that effectively provide adequate treatment to victims of acts of terrorism. Effective criminal prosecution of alleged perpetrators is a crucial factor in reducing the perception of victimization and of impunity for terrorist acts. Granting victims equal and effective access to justice is also essential. In order to further integrate the perspective of victims into UNODC’s capacity-building activities addressing the criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism, the role of victims and their surviving family members in criminal proceedings needs to be emphasized. The publication of this handbook comes at a moment of great sorrow for UNODC and for the entire United Nations. On 26 August 2011, the United Nations office in Abuja, Nigeria, was the target of a terrorist attack that shocked the world and drew global condemnation. The car bomb that was detonated cut short the lives of twenty-four friends and colleagues working for the betterment of humanity. The attack targeted not only the United Nations presence in Nigeria, but also its universal values and global missions of peace. In the face of such heinous acts, we have responded with strengthened resolve to fight against terrorism and build a safer, more just and peaceful world for all. We dedicate this publication to our colleagues who lost their lives in Abuja, and in the increasing number of terrorist attacks on United Nations’ premises in recent years, as well as to all victims of terrorist acts worldwide. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 10, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Victims_Rights_E-Book_EN.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Victims_Rights_E-Book_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 123547 Keywords: Terrorism Victim Services Victims of Terrorism

Author: U.S. General Accounting Office Title: Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure That Officers Are Fully Trained Summary: Recent incidents involving potential terrorists attempting to enter the country highlight the need for a vigilant and well-trained workforce at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency in charge of inspecting travelers and goods for admission into the United States. About 20,000 CBP officers play a central role in ensuring that CBP accomplishes its mission of securing the border while also facilitating the movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which CBP has (1) revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with training standards and (2) identified and addressed the training needs of incumbent CBP officers. GAO analyzed data and documentation related to the agency’s training efforts, such as its covert test program and its training records. GAO also interviewed CBP officials and CBP officers. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. To improve CBP training efforts, GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course; analyze covert test results; establish a policy for training responsibilities, including oversight of training records; and, conduct a training needs assessment. CBP concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-269: Accessed January 10, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Shelf Number: 123548 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Custom Enforcement Immigration Terrorism Terrorists Training, Border Personnel

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress Summary: The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Two of the efforts undertaken since 2001 to tackle these issues included • Congress mandating the creation of an information-sharing environment (commonly known as the “ISE”) that would provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. • States and major urban areas establishing intelligence fusion centers to coordinate the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism intelligence and analysis. The imperative for the exchange of terrorism-related intelligence information among law enforcement and security officials at all levels of government is founded on three propositions. The first is that any terrorist attack in the homeland will necessarily occur in a community within a state or tribal area, and the initial response to it will be by state, local, and tribal emergency responders and law enforcement officials. Second, the plotting and preparation for a terrorist attack within the United States (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities. Third, “[i]nformation acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.” Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain information about criminal activity that may also reveal terrorist pre-operational planning. Many believe that the sharing of SARs among all levels of government and the fusing of these reports with other intelligence information will help uncover terrorist plots within the United States. The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) is an effort to have most federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, and analyzing terrorism-related SARs. The NSI is designed to respond to the mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), for a “decentralized, distributed, and coordinated [information sharing] environment ... with ‘applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.’” This report describes the NSI, the rationale for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines the privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by the initiative and identifies other oversight issues for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R40901: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf Shelf Number: 123560 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence Fusion Centers Information Sharing Terrorism

Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Small Vessel Security Strategy Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists within the framework of other security strategies. It does not replace any of the current strategies or relevant documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes directions from related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, private and international stakeholders in the maritime domain. This strategy’s purpose is to address the risk that small vessels1 might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a means of a direct attack with a WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to manage because small vessels are not centrally registered, operators have not always demonstrated proficiency in small vessel operations, and the ability to screen or detect vessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. There is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among the large population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. This strategy also describes the small vessel community and the environment in which it operates. It discusses and identifies the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences resulting from four key risk scenarios. Understanding the relationship of the threat, risk, vulnerability, and consequence of a small vessel terrorist attack on the United States will help to reduce the risk of such an attack. The guiding principles and overall goals of this strategy complement existing solutions for large vessels. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 123566 Keywords: Homeland Security Maritime Crime Shipping, Security Measures Terrorism

Author: Berrebi, Claude Title: Earthquakes, Hurricanes, and Terrorism: Do Natural Disasters Incite Terror? Summary: A novel and important issue in contemporary security policy is the impact of natural disasters on terrorism. Natural disasters can strain a society and its government, creating vulnerabilities which terrorist groups might exploit. Using a structured methodology and detailed data on terrorism, disasters, and other relevant controls for 167 countries between 1970 and 2007, we find a strong positive impact of disaster-related deaths on subsequent terrorism deaths and incidence. We find that, on average, an increase in deaths from natural disasters of 25,000 leads to an increase in the following year of approximately 33 percent in the number of deaths from terrorism, an increase of approximately 22 percent in the number of terrorist attacks, and an increase of approximately 16 percent in the number wounded in terrorist attacks, holding all other factors constant. Furthermore, the effects differ by disaster types and country characteristics. Results were consistently significant and robust across a multitude of disaster and terrorism measures for a diverse set of model specifications. The results have strong implications for both disaster and terrorism mitigation policy. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper W876: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/RAND_WR876.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/RAND_WR876.pdf Shelf Number: 123608 Keywords: Natural Disasters Terrorism

Author: Erez, Edna Title: Jihad, Crime, and the Internet - Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions Summary: The study’s findings indicate that most Jihadist on-line forum discussions are brief, involve a small number of participants from among the registered forum members, and include few entries and pages. Forum participants often refer viewers to approved web site and share authentic Jihadist multimedia. References and quotes from religious sources are common. Just over one-third of the discussions include calls for Jihad, and 3 percent of the communications discussed non-terrorist illegal activities, particularly computer-related and software-related offenses. Content analysis of the forum discussions identified four categories of content: information dissemination, religious preaching, instruction or training, and social interactions. These content categories support three core activities of the terrorist organization: ideological foundation, organizational structure, and operational means. Based on these findings the study offers a number of policy recommendations. First, analyze the forum discussions to determine the current status of Jihadist attention and interest. Second, respond to threats by adding interference at any touch point along the communication process. Third, mitigate the harm posed by exposure of Web site viewers to violent imagery. Fourth, the content of forum discussions could increase understanding of the context of the Arab, Muslim, and Jihadist milieu in which the forum social interactions occur. Recommendations for further research are offered. The peer reviews seriously challenge the study’s methodology and conclusions. One of the core criticisms among peer reviewers is that sweeping generalizations are frequently made with little, if any, documented evidence to validate them. Extensive references from a literature review. Details: Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2011. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf Shelf Number: 123756 Keywords: Computers Information Technology Internet Jihadism Terrorism

Author: Bezkorovainiy, Volodymyr Title: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Disorder at Sea: The View from Ukraine Summary: This English version of the Ukrainian paper, offers data and analysis on the growth of piracy and maritime terrorism, with a special emphasis on the Ukranian perspective. Details: London: The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College London, 2012. 21p. Source: Corbett Paper No. 8: Internet Resource Accessed on January 29, 2012 at http://maritimesecurity.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corbett%20Paper%20No8%20MaritimeSecurity.Asia.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Ukraine URL: http://maritimesecurity.asia/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Corbett%20Paper%20No8%20MaritimeSecurity.Asia.pdf Shelf Number: 123868 Keywords: Maritime Crime Piracy Terrorism Ukraine

Author: LaFree, Gary Title: Hot Spots of Terrorism and Other Crimes in the United States, 1970 to 2008 Summary: While efforts are increasingly aimed at understanding and identifying “hot spots” of ordinary crime, little is known about the geographic concentration of terrorist attacks. What areas are most prone to terrorism? Does the geographic concentration of attacks change over time? Do specific ideologies motivate and concentrate terrorist attacks? Moreover, what factors increase the risk that an attack will occur in a particular area? Using recently released data from the Global Terrorism Database, we address these gaps in our knowledge by examining county-level trends in terrorist attacks in the United States from 1970 through 2008. This research was motivated by issues related to three research areas: geographic concentration of terrorist attacks, terrorism and ordinary crime, and predicting geographic concentrations of terrorist attacks. Like ordinary crime, terrorism hot spots are predominately located in large, metropolitan areas. While some locales remain targets of terrorist attacks, to a large extent hot spots of terrorist attacks demonstrate a significant amount of variability over time. Moreover, we find significant variability in the ideologies motivating terrorist attacks across decades. Terrorism and ordinary crime occur in many of the same areas. We find that while some traditional predictors of ordinary crime also predict terrorist attacks, many robust correlates of ordinary crime do not. These data were limited in some respects; much more work in this area is needed to fully understand the linkages between terrorism and ordinary crime. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 36p. Source: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Science Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2012 at http://start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/LaFree_Bersani_HotSpotsOfUSTerrorism.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/LaFree_Bersani_HotSpotsOfUSTerrorism.pdf Shelf Number: 123973 Keywords: Crime Data Crime Statistics Geographic Distribution of Crime Geographic Studies Hot Spots Terrorism Uniform Crime Reports

Author: Arslan, Hasan T. Title: The Social and Operational Intersections of Environmental Extremism in North America and Europe Summary: The radical environmental and animal rights movement (REARM) have been responsible for thousands acts of terrorism and extremist activities in the name of the environment and animal rights since 1980s. The perceived escalation of "direct actions" in recent years has led the law enforcement communities in the United States and the United Kingdom to focus investigatory efforts on the groups and individuals perpetrating these actions, resulting in several high profile arrests and prosecutions. While previous studies of environmental extremism have focused solely on single regions or countries such as North America, Europe, and/or United States, this dissertation aims to provide a comparative analysis of both regions, Europe and North America. Using a comprehensive dataset from 1982 and 2007 compiled by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, this dissertation analyzes similarities and differences of the animal liberation movement and environment groups with regard to their tactics, targets, and procedures (TTP) using VAR time series analysis and Chi-Square technique. One thing can be said based on this study; eco terrorism is on the rise and the frustration is mounting among members of the REARM. This study also established that animal rights groups in the U.K. influence the groups in the U.S. Details: Houston, TX: Sam Houston State University, 2008. 224p. Source: Dissertation: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2012 at http://blogdev.isvg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/out.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://blogdev.isvg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/out.pdf Shelf Number: 124020 Keywords: Environmental Extremism (North America) (Europe) Terrorism

Author: Garza, V. Title: Vulnerabilities of the National Border Security Strategy on the U.S. Border Patrol Summary: This report analyzes critical issues within the United States Border Patrol that have led to high attrition rates within the agency and an all-time low in morale among Border Patrol agents. A broadcast of Lou Dobbs Tonight reported, "Customs and border protection agents' hands are tied because their job no longer includes enforcement. Instead they have to man their posts 8-10 hours a day to serve as a deterrent, part of a bureaucratic decision that critics say is jeopardizing our national security.”1 The United States Border Patrol, a critical agency within the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, is responsible for defending our borders between ports of entry. But when they are told to stand down and not do their job, who will? In June 2004, the Border Patrol station in Temecula, California, formed a special Mobile Patrol Group that conducted a series of illegal alien sweeps in the communities of Norco, Corona, Escondido. The 12-man group made more than 450 arrests resulting in both approval and contempt. Latino activists were enraged, accusing the Border Patrol of violating their civil rights. Asa Hutchinson, then Undersecretary of Homeland Security, announced that while the sweeps were not illegal, they did breach policy and the chain of command. Robert Bonner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner, issued that same month an order that all future enforcement operations within the surrounding areas of checkpoints must first be approved by Border Patrol Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Morale at the Temecula border patrol station sank to its lowest level. “We don't know which way to turn – for once, we were doing our job, what the government pays us to do," said Ron Zermeno, shop steward for the National Border Patrol Council at the Temecula station.2 The purpose of this report is to raise significant problems within the National Border Patrol Strategy and how these problems affect the mission of the U.S. Border Patrol. This report is divided into three main parts. The first looks at the different risks and vulnerabilities that have shaped Border Patrol strategies at the northern and southwest borders. The second part focuses on Border Patrol operations: the history of Border Patrol, priorities pre and post 9/11, budget obligations and resources, and cooperation with land management agencies on federal borderlands. The last section analyzes the effects of problems internal to Border Patrol agents on national security. Areas focused on include inadequate staffing, insufficient technology, and attrition rates. A solution for a long-term Border Patrol strategy is beyond the scope of this report. Follow-up work should include possible assessments to determine the optimal number of personnel needed to secure the border. An evaluation of the proper technology necessary to deploy to the northern and southern border is also critical. It is essential that the Department of Homeland Security develop a long-term National Border Security Strategy based on a risk and vulnerability assessment. Details: Los Angeles, CA: CREATE - Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, 2005. 36p. Source: Report #05-022: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2012 at http://create.usc.edu/research/50792.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://create.usc.edu/research/50792.pdf Shelf Number: 124023 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.) Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Lanzante, Joseph A. Title: The Relationship between Criminal and Terrorist Organizations and Human Smuggling Summary: This thesis sought to expand on the literature that has been written on the possibility and impact of a relationship forming between criminal and terrorist organizations in terms of human smuggling. These entities could form a strategic alliance and leverage existing narcotics, weapons, and human smuggling corridors that exist south of the U.S./Mexico border to smuggle terrorist operatives into the U.S. thereby threatening U.S. interests and national security. The analysis of the scholarly literature, interview data, and case studies point to a relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations and the fact that they have worked together to smuggle terrorists into the U.S. Additionally, corruption efforts by these organizations places a weak link in U.S. border security that can be exploited for nefarious purposes. Enhanced information sharing between law enforcement entities may be the single best way to detect the relationship between criminal and terrorist organizations and prevent them from smuggling a terrorist operative into the U.S. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 14, 2012 at: http://www.thecre.com/ccsf/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Lanzante.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.thecre.com/ccsf/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Lanzante.pdf Shelf Number: 124131 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking (U.S.) Human Smuggling Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Kurzman, Charles Title: Muslim-American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11 Summary: Almost 200 Muslim-Americans have been involved in violent plots of terrorism over this decade, and more than 400 Muslim-Americans have been indicted or convicted for supporting terrorism. In 2011, the numbers dropped in both categories, and the severity of the cases also appeared to lessen: Muslim- American terrorist plots led to no fatalities in the United States, and the year’s four indictments for terrorist financing indictments involved relatively small amounts of money. As in previous years, non-Muslims were also involved in domestic terrorism, proving once again that Muslims do not have a monopoly on violence. This study has not attempted to analyze those cases. The limited scale of Muslim-American terrorism in 2011 runs counter to the fears that many Americans shared in the days and months after 9/11, that domestic Muslim-American terrorism would escalate. The spike in terrorism cases in 2009 renewed these concerns, as have repeated warnings from U.S. government officials about a possible surge in homegrown Islamic terrorism. The predicted surge has not materialized. Repeated alerts by government officials may be issued as a precaution, even when the underlying threat is uncertain. Officials may be concerned about how they would look if an attack did take place and subsequent investigations showed that officials had failed to warn the public. But a byproduct of these alerts is a sense of heightened tension that is out of proportion to the actual number of terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11. This study’s findings challenge Americans to be vigilant against the threat of homegrown terrorism while maintaining a responsible sense of proportion. Details: Durham, North Carolina: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2012. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2012 at http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf Shelf Number: 124177 Keywords: Crime Statistics Muslims Terrorism

Author: Canada. Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity Financing Watch: October-December 2009 Summary: The Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity Financing Watch presents a quarterly review of news articles summarizing relevant group-based, activity-based and country-based money laundering and terrorist activity financing issues and alerts readers to new financial mechanisms or technologies that could possibly be exploited for money laundering or terrorist activity financing purposes in Canada. The content presented herein is a summary of news articles and does not include any FINTRAC analysis. The views expressed are those of the original authors. References are provided to the respective articles at the end of this document. Details: Canada: Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, 2009. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/watch-regard/2010-03-eng.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/watch-regard/2010-03-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 124227 Keywords: Money Laundering (Canada) Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Liang, Christina Schori Title: Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organised Crime Summary: Key Points: there are growing links between terrorist and organised crime groups who are sharing expertise and are cooperating in kidnapping, arms, drugs and human trafficking, as well as drug production, cigarette smuggling, extortion and fraud; The growing nexus of shared tactics and methods of terror and crime groups is due to four major developments: globalization, the communication revolution through the Internet, the end of the Cold War, and the global "war on terror"; Both terrorist and organised crime groups are leveraging the Internet for recruitment, planning, psychological operations, logistics, and fundraising. The Internet has become the platform for both organised crime and terrorists to conduct cybercrimes ranging from video piracy, credit card fraud, selling drugs, extortion, money laundering and pornography; The growing nexus has facilitated terrorists to access automatic weapons, including stand-off weapons and explosive devices, empowering them to challenge police, land and naval forces with the latest sophisticated weaponry and intelligence; The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime is exacerbating efforts in war-fighting and peacemaking in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, West Africa in general and the Sahel in particular have become a dangerous new trafficking hub uniting both terrorists and organised crime cartels across a wide and mostly ungoverned land mass; The growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime groups is challenging international and national security by weakening democratic institutions, compromising government institutions, damaging the credibility of financial institutions and by infiltrating the formal economy, leading to increased crime and human security challenges. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011. 6p. Source: GCSP Policy Paper No. 20: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://gcsp.ch/content/download/6607/61163/download Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://gcsp.ch/content/download/6607/61163/download Shelf Number: 124228 Keywords: Internet Organized Crime Terrorism Transnational Crime Violence Weapons

Author: Kleinig, John Title: Security and Privacy: Global Standards for Ethical Identity Management in Contemporary Liberal Democratic States Summary: This study is principally concerned with the ethical dimensions of identity management technology – electronic surveillance, the mining of personal data, and profiling – in the context of transnational crime and global terrorism. The ethical challenge at the heart of this study is to establish an acceptable and sustainable equilibrium between two central moral values in contemporary liberal democracies, namely, security and privacy. Both values are essential to individual liberty but they come into conflict in times when civil order is threatened, as has been the case from late in the twentieth century, with the advent of global terrorism and transnational crime. We seek to articulate legally sustainable, politically possible and technologically feasible global ethical standards1 for identity management technology and policies in liberal democracies in the contemporary global security context. Although the standards in question are to be understood as global ethical standards potentially to be adopted not only by the United States (US) but also by the European Union (EU), India, Australasia and other contemporary liberal democratic states, we take as our primary focus the tensions that have arisen between the US and the EU. This tension provides a good example of the kinds of challenges involved in developing global standards. It is exemplified by the 2006 disclosure concerning the US government’s access to SWIFT transactions and the controversy that has followed it, as well as the earlier and ongoing controversy over the 2004 US–EU Passenger Names Records (PNR) agreement. It also makes itself known in the ongoing debate over national identity cards. The first two conflicts make it clear that, however difficult it may be to develop global standards for the management of personal data, such standards are needed and that every effort should be made to develop them or at least to implement procedures for addressing conflicts among them. Naturally, authoritarian states do not share the liberal values underlying this project – values such as individual autonomy and privacy. Nevertheless, to the extent that such authoritarian states are evolving or are likely to evolve toward some form of liberal democracy, the results of this study will also be relevant to these states. Our purpose is to articulate standards and institutional initiatives that are sufficiently specific to determine – or at least substantially constrain – the requisite detailed security and privacy policies and prescriptions in national as well as international and transnational jurisdictions. The project distinguishes itself from other work in this field in two major respects. Firstly, the multi-disciplinary team of experts brought together for this project has enabled the integration of: (a) ethical principles, (b) national and international legal considerations, (c) effective law enforcement practices, (d) oversight and accountability concerns and (e) knowledge of existing and emerging technology, such as database mining and knowledge discovery technology, in the development of a framework of determinate and feasible ethical standards for identity management technology in the global security context. Secondly, the study has drawn on an international team of experts and focuses on common international standards and solutions, as befits the trans-jurisdictional and transnational nature of the problems to be addressed. Specifically, the project involves not only US personnel and institutions but also EU, Indian, and Australasian expertise. Details: Canberra: ANU E Press, The Australian National University, 2011. 291p. Source: Internet Resource: Practical Ethics and Public Policy Monograph 2: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/Security+and+Privacy%3A+Global+Standards+for+Ethical+Identity+Management+in+Contemporary+Liberal+Democratic+States/8021/Text/cover.html Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://epress.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/Security+and+Privacy%3A+Global+Standards+for+Ethical+Identity+Management+in+Contemporary+Liberal+Democratic+States/8021/Text/cover.html Shelf Number: 124293 Keywords: Privacy and Ethics Surveillance Terrorism Transnational Crime

Author: The NYU Review of Law and Security Title: Are We Safer? In New York City? In our states? In the country at large? Summary: Strolling down the street, sitting in traffic, listening to campaign slogans, one hears the question daily: “Are We Safer?” Whether we want to or not, we cannot help but bend our ear in the direction of the voice that promises an answer. Rarely is the answer firm or reassuring. Always, it seems these days to be partisan or driven by political concerns. “Yes, we are safer,” the Republicans tell us, except when they want to encourage fear as a basis of support for continuity in the White House or for the war in Iraq. “No,” the Democrats tell us, figuring the image of the Republicans as insufficient protectors cannot but help the Democrats in the coming election. Citizens line up accordingly. But the question of the nation’s safety is only partly a matter of conjecture; it is also a matter of fact. Since September 11, the country has taken numerous steps legislatively, judicially, militarily and in the Oval Office to ameliorate weaknesses in our security system. Some of these measures have proven effective, some have not. Policymakers continue to scrutinize the efficacy of our border control, our information gathering and other counterterrorism measures in the hopes of assessing these measures. But in the heated political atmosphere, the conclusions on both sides have become suspect. The relationship between safety and the legitimacy of authoritative analysis is not something to be overlooked. The respect for language is a sign of the authenticity of the relationship between citizen and state. It is, in that sense, fundamental to a functioning democracy. Education, as envisioned by Jefferson and the founding fathers, was first and foremost education of the citizen and at the heart of that education was the proper and learned use of language. In the context of American society, religious doctrine reinforces in theory the sanctity of impeccably used language. If language is an inviolable basis of the social (and personal) contract, it is also the first tool in the battle for power. As language goes, so goes politics. George Orwell insisted that there is a direct correlation between the integrity of politics and the honesty with which those in power use language. So, too, for the obverse. “Corrupt language leads to corrupt politics.” Consider, in this context, the use of language by President George W. Bush and his administration. On the one hand, we have the President who displays a disregard for the word so much so that it has become a trademark of sorts. “Nucular,” not nuclear, “subliminable” not subliminal, “embetter” not improve, “resignate,” instead of resonate. More, he relishes the colloquial, in his case, the slang of American Westerns. When it comes to Osama, his goal is to “Smoke ‘em out,” and when it comes to the insurgents in Iraq, he dares, “Bring ‘em on.” But while George Bush downplays language as something to respect and pay too much attention to, his administration is busy lobbing terms of great import at the American public. In the battle for the hearts and minds of Americans, Bush’s circle of advisors has created a lexicon of terms aimed at persuading the American mind with the word itself. The terminology which labels the multiplicity of changes on behalf of national security and the war on terror are full of examples: Homeland Security, the Patriot Act, and the Citizens Corps. Not to mention the use of value statements as strategic euphemisms designed to quell further thought, as if to say that he who first labels the situation, wins the battle of interpretation. Take, for example, the word ‘coalition,’ which in reality consists of U.S. troops with comparably negligible troops from England and a few small countries; or the statement that the U.S. is “bringing democracy and freedom” to the Middle East. This use of words as “euphemism, question begging and sheer cloudy vagueness,” Orwell’s description of politically slanted speech, is a basic technique of language misconstrued for political ends: “liberation” instead of occupation, “military justice” instead of incommunicado detention, “unlawful combatant” instead of prisoner of war, “collateral damage” instead of civilian deaths, “enabling interrogation” instead of torture, and so on. American policymakers are eminently aware of the firepower of linguistic ammunition and of the importance of George W. Bush seeming like a confused, lost communicator. It is part of the process of spinning the nation. If Orwell were around, he might want, in the case of President Bush and his entourage, to add a new category for the current state of affairs: posing. How could someone as clueless and full of human foibles have an evil plan? He’s just a regular guy, with a regular guy’s language. What he says must be right. It’s just down-home, simple fact. Criticism of the government is treason, lack of support for the President is a lack of support for the troops, spending American lives and money abroad at the rate of 20 million dollars a day is patriotism and love of country. Yet in contradistinction to the signs of verbal laxity on the part of Bush, the careful selection of words, coordinated at the executive level, to launch the war in Iraq and by extension the war on terror at home, has been a strong and unflagging tactic of the Bush Administration as they have tackled the Axis of Evil and the possibility of unknown terrorists among us. They understand, as the political philosopher Hannah Arendt once wrote that the misuse of facts, the use of “deliberate falsehood,” is “clearly an attempt to change the record, and as such, it is a form of action.” Powell’s insistence before the U.N. that there was “evidence, not conjecture” of WMD’s in Iraq, and that his facts were “true” and “well-documented” has turned into the admission that there did not seem to be weapons of mass destruction. The public denial of any knowledge of torture practices and the subsequent release of documents sanctioning torture would be another case of the use of misinformation as action. The duplicity was intensified by the attack on those who questioned the initial assertions of the government. Rumsfeld, members of Congress and others attacked the media for “hurting our chances,” by “dwelling upon the mistakes, the ambushes, the soldiers killed, the wounded,” rather than the signs of progress. And what of the Democrats? It seems they have lost their dictionaries and have ceded to the Republicans the role of wordsmiths, as if one of the perks of power is the right to control language. One can only assume either that they agree with the Republicans on some level, or that they are scared. The Republicans, they know, will label their words propagandistic and they want to avoid that, it seems, at all costs. But what about taking an oath to use language simply as it is used in the dictionary? Killing is killing, whether it is by a terrorist or an American soldier. From that, they could graduate to facts. The numbers of dollars spent and Americans killed is not an abstraction; it is not a matter of debate. It is a fact. As is the relationship between the Saudis and the Bush family, whether harmful or benign. And so on. The press has not always been helpful. They have helped spread the factual errors of the Bush Administration by refusing to fact-check, as if unwilling to put themselves in the position of pointing to errors of fact. There was no yellow cake uranium sent to Niger. There were no weapons of mass destruction. There was little to no chance that the oil in Iraq would be able to be sold on the market until after a complete rehaul costing vast sums of time and money reengineered them for producing crude oil. The fact is that Democrats and Republicans alike have ceded to the Bush Administration’s unspoken conviction that all words, all use of facts are ideology. In this, there is tremendous victory. No words are valuable; no facts, it seems, are without spin. Everything, it is agreed, is opinion. How do we find a language of honesty? Vaclav Havel had some advice. The first premise is to look at the facts. The U.S. invaded Iraq, for example. For what reasons it did so is interpretation. What we should do now is a matter of conjecture. And so on. If we start with the facts and keep listing facts, self-consciously and with restraint, perhaps we will eventually have a firmer, less ideological ground upon which to make judgments. “Conceptually we may call truth what we cannot change. Metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us,” wrote Hannah Arendt. This issue represents an attempt to look at the facts as stepping stones to grounded conclusions, or at least as windows of information rather than opinion for inclusion in our store of opinions. We have included the debates on the safety of the country, on the Patriot Act and on Homeland Security but we have tried to present these within the context of knowledge about the terms used, the statistics available and the goals achieved or missed. In acknowledging the degree to which language has become the prisoner of ideology, the issue is an attempt to return to basics: first the information, later the interpretation. Perhaps in answer to the question, “Are We Safer?” we should be asking, “Do We Feel Safer?” The answer is apparently no. It is hard to feel safer when we know at heart that we are proceeding along the lines of duplicity in our means of communicating and assessing our current status. The hope is that eventually more knowledge will yield more trust. When we trust that there are facts without spin, perhaps then we can make some conclusions. First the ground, then the sky. Details: New York: The Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law, 2004. 52p. Source: Issue No. 3: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2012 at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/Quarterly/fall04.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/Quarterly/fall04.pdf Shelf Number: 124375 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.) Patriot Act Terrorism

Author: Greenberg, Karen J., ed. Title: Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 - September 11, 2011 Summary: Ten years after Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the federal government’s record on terrorism prosecutions is relatively easy to summarize: a heavy reliance on preventive law enforcement, an increasingly aggressive use of material support statutes, and a high conviction rate. Strikingly, during the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency, the annual number of prosecutions for jihadist-related terrorism doubled. The nature of the threat has assumed relatively clear contours, as completed or intended terrorist acts aimed against domestic U.S. targets fall into stable and recognizable patterns. The terrorism challenge facing U.S. law enforcement reflects a mixture of domestic and internationally-inspired threats, including a small but not insignificant number of serious terrorist plots. The strategy of prosecuting terrorism-related crimes has evolved in important ways over the course of the decade. Increasingly, the Department of Justice has focused on cases with high level charges, rather than expending scarce resources on document fraud and other low-level crimes that had absorbed an inordinate amount of prosecutorial attention during the early years of the war on terror. Approximately 300 prosecutions, from 2001 to 2011, resulted in indictments related to jihadist terror or national security charges. Of the several hundred resolved cases in this category, 87% resulted in convictions, roughly the same conviction rate that we find for all federal criminal indictments. The indictments remained relatively steady from 2003-2007, during the Bush years, with an average of 27 per year. During 2009 and 2010, as mentioned, the numbers of indictments per year nearly doubled. So, too, the proportion of serious charges increased appreciably. In 2009 and 2010 (and thus far in 2011), a significant majority of charges brought against defendants for jihadist-related offenses were for national security or terrorism crimes, which include conspiracy to commit terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) possession and training, and providing material support to terrorist groups. Details: New York: The Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2012 at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf Shelf Number: 124376 Keywords: Court Procedures (U.S.) Prosecution (U.S.) Terrorism

Author: Ungerer, Carl Title: Beyond bin Laden: Future trends in terrorism Summary: This Strategy report examines the shifting patterns of global terrorism. It provides a comprehensive assessment of the geographic, operational and ideological trends that are driving the current wave of jihadist terrorism around the world. In the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, those trends point to the increasing diversification of the threat, as a new generation of terrorist leaders in South Asia, North Africa and the Arabian peninsula adapt and reinterpret al-Qaeda’s ideology. The report argues that with or without al-Qaeda as a coherent organisation at the forefront of the global Islamist movement, religiously-motivated terrorism is set to continue for many decades to come. Despite the obvious splintering and factionalisation within al-Qaeda and between al-Qaeda and its various franchises and affiliates around the world, there is little evidence that ‘al-Qaedaism’ as a motivating ideology is going to dissolve any time soon. Although many contemporary jihadist groups, especially in Southeast Asia, reject al-Qaeda’s methods, and most appear disconnected from the current Egyptian- and Saudi-dominated al-Qaeda leadership, the local and global manifestations of Islamist terrorism are in fact converging. For Australia, these trends will require a more agile and effective counter-terrorism response. In particular, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation strategies will need to focus more closely on those areas at home that are most at risk from the spread of ‘al-Qaedaism’—individuals, institutions and the internet. Details: Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2011. 52p. Source: ASPI Strategy: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2012 at Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 124424 Keywords: al Qaeda Counterterrorism (Australia) Crime Trends Jihadism Terrorism Transnational Crime

Author: Goslin, Charles Title: Maritime and Port Security: White Paper Summary: Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their associated facilities and infrastructure collectively represent one of the single greatest unaddressed challenges to the security of nations and the global economy today. The reason that ports and shipping activity are so difficult to secure lies primarily in their topography. Ports are typically large, asymmetrical activities dispersed over hundreds of acres of land and water so that they can simultaneously accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum product/liquid offload, storage or piping, and container storage. The movement of freight, cargo (solid or liquid), and transport through a port is generally on a “queuing” system, meaning that any delay snarls all operations1. Whether or not delays are related to security, security generally falls by the wayside in the interest of time management or convenience. Globally, there are very few uniform standards for point-to-point control of security on containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port’s security in one nation remains very much at the mercy of a port’s security, or lack thereof, in another nation. Organized crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority of them still do not require background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse employees. Most ports lease large portions of their facility to private terminal operating companies, who are responsible for their own security. The result of this is a “balkanized”, uneven system of port security and operations management as a whole. In spite of awareness by public policymakers that ports remain critically vulnerable, funding and government-led efforts to harden port facilities worldwide is moving at a glacial pace. Terrorists, in particular, are aware of this unaddressed vulnerability. As outlined below, the threats to the maritime industry are very real. Unfortunately, the question of whether terrorists will act to exploit the weaknesses in port facilities is, unfortunately, not a matter of “if” they will, but “when” they will. Details: Jacksonville, FL: duostechnologies International, 2008 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2012 at: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf Shelf Number: 124796 Keywords: Cargo Security Maritime Crime Maritime Security Port Security Terrorism

Author: Metaparti, Satya Prakash Title: Risk Management Initiatives for Post 9/11 Maritime Security Summary: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, there has been a major worldwide focus on the threat of terrorism to trade, transportation and critical infrastructures. One area that has received particular attention is maritime trade and international shipping. The relative vulnerability of ports, ships, containers, and other maritime facilities worldwide combined with the importance of maritime trade to the global economy have resulted in several international and national measures to manage security risks in this area. Among these, the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code by the United Nations, and domestic legislations of the United States such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) have an international effect and are of particular significance. Despite the emergence of strong security responses, concerns about their adequacy and cost-effectiveness remain. Differing threat perceptions and erosion of sovereignty also impede effective implementation of these security measures. Based on these perceptions, this study questions whether the post 9/11 maritime security measures resulted from a sound application of the principles of risk management or were excessively politicized. This study also examines in detail the intrinsic factors within the shipping industry that contribute to its vulnerability or resilience, the underlying dynamics security responses, as well as their cost and effectiveness. Gaps in the effectiveness of these security measures are identified and possible remedial measures are suggested. This multidisciplinary study is based on the concepts of securitization from the political science domain and risk management principles from business studies, and is an attempt at reaching across disciplines to examine this important topic of contemporary interest. Qualitative inputs for this study were obtained through interviews with seafarers, industry experts and government/port officials and quantitatively backed by a user perception survey on the ISPS Code. Findings indicate that post 9/11 maritime security measures have enhanced the overall security of shipping. However, large gaps remain. Further, at a strategic level, there are differences among various stakeholders with regards to threat perceptions and the cost effectiveness of security. At an operational level, the study findings show excessive reliance on paper work, bureaucratization and restrictions on movement of goods and personnel. Recommendations at a strategic level include wider international cooperation and a decision making process that aims for broader consensus among all stakeholders. At a tactical/operational level, this study recommends better information sharing, reduced paperwork and integration of various shipboard sub-processes, such as those for safety, environment, quality, and security - which are currently separate - into a unified process that optimizes the available resources and reduces conflicting requirements. Details: Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2009. 334p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2012 at: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/56504 Shelf Number: 125344 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: Larance, Eileen R. Title: Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts Summary: The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 exposed weaknesses in how the federal government nominated individuals to the terrorist watchlist and gaps in how agencies used the list to screen individuals to determine if they posed a security threat. In response, the President tasked agencies to take corrective actions. GAO was asked to assess (1) government actions since the incident to strengthen the nominations process, (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed based on these actions, and (3) how agencies are addressing gaps in screening processes. GAO analyzed government reports, the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist, data on the volumes of nominations from January 2009 through May 2011, the composition of the list, and the outcomes of screening agency programs. GAO also interviewed officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies to discuss changes to policies, guidance, and processes and related impacts on agency operations and the traveling public, among other things. This report is a public version of the classified report that GAO issued in December 2011 and omits certain information, such as details on the nominations guidance and the specific outcomes of screening processes. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the outcomes and impacts of agencies’ actions to strengthen nominations and screening processes are routinely assessed. Technical comments were provided and incorporated. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-476: Accessed June 27, 2012 at: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Shelf Number: 125421 Keywords: Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism Summary: East Africa and the Horn face a number of transnational security threats, including terrorism, transnational crime, and piracy. In recent years, particularly following the July 2010 attacks in Kampala, al-Shabaab has been increasingly viewed as a threat not only to Somalia, but to the greater subregion. Tourism has declined and shipping costs have risen due to the threat of piracy from Somalia. Lawless pockets where government reach is weak, together with rampant corruption, have turned the region into a major transit point for black market financial flows and various forms of illicit trafficking. Terrorism and transnational crime increasingly threaten security in the subregion of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Because of their transnational nature, no individual IGAD member state will single-handedly be able to deal effectively with these threats. As the IGAD Security Strategy adopted in December 2010 makes clear, effective cooperation will be crucial to winning the struggle against terrorism and to ensuring that other forms of transnational crime do not similarly jeopardize the IGAD subregion’s growth, prosperity, and stability. Details: New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2012. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2012 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/TaskForce_Report_May2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/TaskForce_Report_May2012.pdf Shelf Number: 125426 Keywords: Corruption Piracy Terrorism Trafficking Transnational Crime

Author: Freeman, Michael Title: Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Summary: In a discussion at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, it became apparent that there were many similarities between insurgent behavior and gang behavior – similarities that would make a more rigorous analysis worthwhile. With this theme in mind, the faculty of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, experts in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, were enlisted to address these similarities and to share their theories, models, and ideas from their own disciplines of political science, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and more. This collection of short papers is the result. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2011/NPS-DA-11-001.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2011/NPS-DA-11-001.pdf Shelf Number: 125465 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Counterinsurgency Gangs Terrorism

Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines Summary: The tri-border area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia has been identified as a key hub of terrorist and related criminal activity in Southeast Asia. This geographical space is a well-known transit zone for weapons, explosives, and personnel, as well as a principal logistical corridor for local and transnational terrorist groups. The U.S. government has devoted considerable resources to promoting maritime security initiatives in this region and, through a variety of capacity-building efforts, has been at the forefront of underwriting initiatives in each of the three countries. This approach has necessarily been country-specific, with an eye toward developing solutions that uniquely fit each nation. However, the ultimate goal has been to encourage cooperation and interoperability, both among the recipient states and with the United States. One of the most interesting collaborative initiatives is the evolving Coast Watch System (CWS) in the Philippines. Originally designed to improve maritime domain awareness in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, the concept has now been extended to cover the entire Philippine archipelago. This occasional paper analyzes the security environment in the TBA; evaluates the CWS and the challenges it has yet to overcome; and considers the prospects for an initiative to eventually form the basis of an integrated system of maritime security that would tie together the three states that converge in the TBA—Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The main purpose of this document is to act as a building block to guide further work on how best to establish an effective and viable system of regional maritime security architecture in this sensitive but understudied part of the world. Further analysis on maritime domain awareness (MDA) efforts by Malaysia and Indonesia would usefully complement this study. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 5, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf Shelf Number: 125481 Keywords: Maritime Crime (Philippines) Maritime Security Terrorism

Author: Title: How Indonesian Extremists Regroup Summary: Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country’s violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisa­tion programs. The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role. Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done. Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country’s largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers. Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the “enemy” – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder. There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 228: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Shelf Number: 125628 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists (Indonesia) Violent Extremism

Author: Rohlich, Nina Title: Exploring the Effectiveness of Transit Security Awareness Campaigns in the San Francisco Bay Area Summary: Public involvement in alerting officials of suspicious and potentially harmful activity is critical to the overall security of a transit system. As part of an effort to get passengers and the public involved, many transit agencies have security awareness campaigns. The objective of this research is to learn how transit agencies seek to make security awareness campaigns effective and explore how they measure the effectiveness of such campaigns, if at all. This research project includes data from case studies of five major agencies that provide transit service in the San Francisco Bay Area region. The case study data are comprised of descriptions of the types of security awareness campaigns the agencies have implemented, the goals of the campaigns, and how they seek to make their campaigns effective, as well as whether and how these agencies measure and determine the effectiveness of their campaigns. A positive finding of this research is the consistency with which Bay Area transit organizations address the need for passenger awareness as part of their overall security program. However, none of the five agencies analyzed for this study measures the effectiveness of their campaigns. Whereas they all have a similar goal—to increase passenger awareness about security issues—little evidence exists confirming to what extent they are achieving this goal. The paper concludes with suggestions for using outcome measurements to provide a reasonable indication of a campaign’s effectiveness by capturing the public’s response to a campaign. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 09-19: Accessed July 17, 2012 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2914_09-19.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/2914_09-19.pdf Shelf Number: 125656 Keywords: Media Campaigns Public Transportation (California) Publicity Campaigns Terrorism Transportation Security

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority Summary: The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes the understanding of these new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the “Empire.” The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal,” whom Chávez has called a true visionary. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1117 Shelf Number: 126258 Keywords: Criminal Networks Human Rrafficking Money Laundering National Security Organized Crime (Latin America) Terrorism Transnational Crime Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author: Finlay, Brian Title: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Summary: As a direct result of globalization and expanded economic opportunity, the last half century has yielded the most remarkable exodus from poverty in human history. Yet despite this remarkable improvement in the human condition, not everyone has benefitted equally. While much advancement has been witnessed across the Andean region-Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru-these countries continue to face significant security and development threats that threaten the foundations of progress, including the intersecting challenges of lack of public health capacity, illicit trafficking in arms and drugs, and terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center and The Stanley Foundation, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2012 at: Beyond Boundaries in the Andean Region: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance Year: 2012 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 126391 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Arms Organized Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: The Constitution Project Title: Recommendations for Fusion Centers: Preserving Privacy & Civil Liberties while Protecting Against Crime & Terrorism Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and state governments embarked on a far-ranging effort to detect and defend against potential terrorist threats. One of the central components of this effort has been the creation of a network of state and regionally-based fusion centers that share information among law enforcement and some intelligence agencies. Today at least 77 fusion centers are active in the United States. While these state entities have received substantial support from Congress and the Executive Branch, their roles and missions vary widely and are still being developed. Run properly, fusion centers could play an important role in addressing terrorist and other criminal threats. Yet fusion centers can also pose serious risks to civil liberties, including rights of free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, racial and religious equality, privacy, and the right to be free from unnecessary government intrusion. Several fusion centers have issued bulletins that characterize a wide variety of religious and political groups as threats to national security. In some instances, state law enforcement agencies that funnel information to fusion centers have improperly monitored and infiltrated anti-war and environmental organizations. Moreover, the manner in which fusion centers amass and distribute personal information raises the concern that they are keeping files—perhaps containing information that is sensitive or concerns constitutionally protected activities—on people in the United States without proper justification. For these reasons, we, the members of The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee endorsing this report, have undertaken this examination of fusion centers, and offer a set of recommendations to assist policymakers to ensure that fusion centers operate effectively while respecting civil liberties and constitutional values. Part II of this report provides an overview of the structure of fusion centers and the institutional framework within which they operate. Parts III, IV and V identify specific concerns raised by fusion center data collection, data storage and use, and accountability and governance mechanisms. Part VI outlines our specific recommendations for reforms that address civil liberties concerns. We hope that these recommendations will facilitate the development of sound rules and best practices to ensure respect for constitutional rights and values. Indeed, fusion centers themselves seek concrete guidance on the practical application of constitutional principles to daily threat assessment. We also hope that they will encourage further consideration of the proper role and mission of fusion centers within the nation’s law enforcement and anti-terrorism framework. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 23, 2012 at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf Shelf Number: 126403 Keywords: Civil Liberties Criminal Intelligence Fusion Centers Information Sharing Privacy Terrorism

Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Title: Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity: Key Research Findings from Literature Review, Household Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews Summary: In January 2011, three cleanup workers notified law enforcement of a suspicious backpack they found on a bench along the route of a parade honoring Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Spokane, Washington. The backpack contained a live radio-controlled pipe bomb. Thanks to the timely report, law enforcement officers and bomb specialists were able to reroute the parade and neutralize the bomb before anyone was injured. This is just one of many examples that demonstrate the importance of the public’s awareness and willingness to report suspicious activity. Members of the public have long served as the “eyes and ears” of the communities in which they reside and work. Community members have a vested interest in keeping their neighborhoods safe and are critical to support law enforcement’s duty to prevent and investigate crime and terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies are already implementing local programs to enhance their community’s awareness of reporting suspicious activity, yet there is little guidance or research regarding best practices to improve citizen reporting. Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity: Key Research Findings presents research-based fi ndings that can inform local officials in developing education and awareness campaigns. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2012 at: http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/SARKeyResearchFindings_508.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/SARKeyResearchFindings_508.pdf Shelf Number: 126448 Keywords: Homeland Security Publicity Campaigns Terrorism

Author: Abbas, Hassan Title: Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success Summary: It is a globally recognized fact that a state’s police and law enforcement agencies play a critical role as the first line of defense against the threats of terrorism and insurgencies. An informative RAND study titled How Terrorist Groups End provides evidence that effective police and intelligence work, rather than the use of military force, deliver better counterterrorism results. Based on this conclusion, the report suggested to U.S. policymakers that they stop using the phrase “war on terrorism,” because there is no battlefield solution to defeating terrorists. Another valuable study analyzing the police role in counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Cyprus concluded that nearly all major twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns relied heavily on indigenous police as well as military forces. Both studies are very relevant to the terrorism and insurgency crisis faced by Pakistan today. Many security experts rightfully contend that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are facing a growing Taliban insurgency in the Pak-Afghan tribal belt – some even call it a Pashtun insurgency. According to Kelev I. Sepp’s Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, which closely studied seventeen insurgencies, the role of the police is always central to any successful counterinsurgency measures. His recommended measures for insurgency hit areas emphasize “police in the lead” with the military providing backup support and strengthening the police with diversified training capabilities to help meet the security needs of the at-risk population. Since 9/11 and the consequent US/NATO military action in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s troubled northwestern frontier has come under increasing pressure from militant and terrorist organizations operating in the area. Pakistan’s deficient and flawed law enforcement capacity in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the adjacent North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have helped Pakistani Taliban and other terrorist groups expand their influence and strongly challenge the state’s writ. Outgunned and outfinanced, on average 400 police officers have been killed every year in terrorist attacks since 2005. Controversial and haphazard Pakistani military action in the area has led to more instability, and limited resistance in FATA has now become a growing ethnic insurgency. As is clear from the turmoil in the NWFP’s Swat district, any army action can provide no more than a breathing space to the state; only police and law enforcement actions can help the state reestablish its writ and stabilize the area. A timely police action can be more effective in quelling emergent insurgencies. My research into the 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) crisis in Islamabad, where a strong military operation led to hundreds of deaths and dozens of retaliatory suicide attacks, also indicates that: (a) an effective police action in time (2004-05) could have avoided the later bloody clash and (b) the police lacked authority and the permission of the state and its important institutions to legally pursue the rebel clerics in the mosque (during the 2004-07 timeframe). The police infrastructure is one of Pakistan’s most poorly managed organizations. It is aptly described as ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized, and chronically corrupt. It has performed well in certain operations; overall, however, that is a rare phenomenon. Arguably, the primary reason for this state of affairs is the government’s persistent failure to invest in law enforcement reform and modernization. It is ironic that despite frequent internal crises since its inception in 1947, ranging from ethnic confrontations and sectarian battles to a sharp rise in criminal activity and growing insurgencies, both political and military policymakers have never given this sector top priority. Hence, poor police performance in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not surprising. The fact that the police successfully challenged some militant religious groups in Punjab and tackled an insurgency-like situation in Karachi in the late 1990s shows that they do have the potential to deliver the desired results when political support is present and resources are provided. Clearly, better policing standards and performance will add to the government’s credibility and establish its writ more effectively in areas that are currently slipping out of its hands. Learning lessons from what transpired in the NWFP in recent years especially in order to plan for any preemptive law enforcement actions in South Punjab, where banned local militant groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are resurgent, is the need of the hour. This policy paper makes the case for international support for police reform in Pakistan to enhance its law enforcement and counterinsurgency capacities. The Obama administration's proposed $1.5 billion annual aid package for Pakistan for the next five years must also include sufficient resources for this sector. To build schools and hospitals, create jobs and spur economic development, security environment in Pakistan has to improve significantly. Police and civilian law enforcement agencies are the most appropriate institutions to spearhead that effort countrywide. Rule of law besides requiring requiring an effective criminal justice system and independent judiciary also needs a competent law enforcement infrastructure. If U.S. funds will make all that happen, it will correspondingly lead to its better image in Pakistan. Democratic institutions in turn will also benefit as their dependence on military for internal law and order duties will lesson. Details: Clinton, MI: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2012 at: http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 126468 Keywords: Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Police Reform Policing (Pakistan) Terrorism

Author: Burress, George W. Title: Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to Big-City Peers Summary: Over the last decade, local law enforcement agencies have developed a more robust capacity to respond to homeland security incidents. This trend was initiated in response to the 9/11 terror attacks, though myriad other criminal events (shootings on college campuses) and non-criminal incidents (weather-related disasters) have contributed to this rallying cry. The main focus of the current discussion is on the need for agencies to develop an “all hazards” approach to homeland security that will increase prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery to a broad range of critical events, whether related to terrorism or not. Much of the dialog and attention has been focused on the largest agencies and metropolitan areas in the country, yet smaller jurisdictions also play a key role in developing and sustaining a homeland security network. It is the smallest agencies that are perhaps the least understood actors in the advances of the past decade. While training and funding opportunities have been extended to departments of all sizes, far less is known about the extent to which homeland security innovations have diffused into these small organizations, which represent the majority of all American law enforcement agencies. Prior work by this study’s authors in the state of Illinois suggests that smaller jurisdictions were not as prepared as their larger counterparts. This research suggested, but did not directly assess, the extent to which intragroup variation among small agencies was possibly a function of proximity. Were small agencies that were “closer” to large peers (in terms of physical distance and/or level of interaction) taking more preparatory measures and did they perceive they were more capable of an effective response to a homeland security event? The study described in this report sought to address these and related research questions. A stratified national sampling strategy was used to identify small municipal agencies (employing 25 or fewer full-time sworn officers) positioned across a variety of metropolitan and non-metropolitan contexts. Agency respondents (typically the chief executive officer) were asked to report a number of data points for their organization: assessments of the risk the jurisdiction would experience terrorist or non-terrorist homeland security incidents; preparedness measures taken by the agency; perceived efficacy of the agency’s response capacity across various salient domains (i.e., communication networks, policies, staffing, training, etc.); extent to which the responding agency monitors and emulates peers and best practices in the field; and, level of interactions between respondents and the nearest large municipal agency (employing 250+ full-time sworn officers). Project findings would tend to support organizational theory expectations regarding the diffusion of homeland security innovation. Agencies that perceived a greater risk of experiencing terrorism-related events reported greater levels of preparedness. Likewise, agencies that were more integrated into professional networks and paid more attention to respected peers and trends in the policing profession had engaged in more preparedness activities. Confirming the relevance of proximity to large agencies, respondents who engaged in more interactions with their closest large agency peer reported greater levels of preparedness. Agency size and position in more metropolitan areas also contributed to the level of reported preparedness. In addition, agencies that reported engaging in more preparatory measures perceived a greater level of efficacy should a homeland security incident occur. The results confirm that, while small agencies have been found less prepared in contrast to their larger peers, intragroup variation exists. While this variation is partially a function of the proximity between small jurisdictions and their larger peers, it also is influenced by the extent to which small agencies are connected to broader trends, practices, and peers within the profession. The results hold important implications for how future homeland security innovations might effectively be diffused into the smallest agencies in America’s policing system. This is a vital issue considering that over three-quarters of municipal agencies meet the definition of small used in this study. Details: Carbondale, IL: Dept. of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois University, 2012. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf Shelf Number: 126490 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.) Law Enforcement Agencies Terrorism

Author: U.S. Senate. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Title: Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Summary: Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism. Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations. Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with Federal funds, have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS’s support for and involvement with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed ability to strengthen Federal counterterrorism efforts. Under the leadership of Senator Coburn, Ranking Subcommittee Member, the Subcommittee has spent two years examining Federal support of fusion centers and evaluating the resulting counterterrorism intelligence. The Subcommittee’s investigative efforts included interviewing dozens of current and former Federal, state and local officials, reviewing more than a year’s worth of intelligence reporting from centers, conducting a nationwide survey of fusion centers, and examining thousands of pages of financial records and grant documentation. The investigation identified problems with nearly every significant aspect of DHS’s involvement with fusion centers. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work by the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner. Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010 assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found widespread deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. DHS did not share that report with Congress or discuss its findings publicly. When the Subcommittee requested the assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy. In 2011, DHS conducted its own, less rigorous assessment of fusion centers. While its resulting findings were more positive, they too indicated ongoing weaknesses at the fusion centers. The findings of both the 2010 and 2011 assessments contradict public statements by DHS officials who have described fusion centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy,”2 and “a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”3 Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such fusion center reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. Instead, the investigation found: The Subcommittee investigation found that the fusion centers often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever. • Nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections. • In 2009, DHS instituted a lengthy privacy and civil liberties review process which kept most of the troubling reports from being released outside of DHS; however, it also slowed reporting down by months, and DHS continued to store troubling intelligence reports from fusion centers on U.S. persons, possibly in violation of the Privacy Act. • During the period reviewed, DHS intelligence reporting suffered from a significant backlog. At some points, hundreds of draft intelligence reports sat for months before DHS officials made a decision about whether to release them to the intelligence community. DHS published many reports so late – typically months late, but sometimes nearly a year after they were filed – that many were considered “obsolete” by the time they were released. • Most reporting was not about terrorists or possible terrorist plots, but about criminal activity, largely arrest reports pertaining to drug, cash or human smuggling. • Some terrorism-related “intelligence” reporting was based on older news releases or media accounts. • Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of information shared with the National Counter Terrorism Center through a much quicker process run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center. In interviews, current and former DHS officials involved in the fusion center reporting process stated they were aware that “a lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless information,” as one DHS official put it.4 A former reporting branch chief said that while he was sometimes proud of the intelligence his unit produced, “There were times when it was, ‘what a bunch of crap is coming through.’”5 The Subcommittee investigation also examined DHS’s management of the fusion center counterterrorism intelligence reporting process. The investigation discovered: • DHS required only a week of training for intelligence officials before sending them to state and local fusion centers to report sensitive domestic intelligence, largely concerning U.S. persons. • Officials who routinely authored useless or potentially illegal fusion center intelligence reports faced no sanction or reprimand. The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of DHS, distributed hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to support state and local fusion centers. DHS revealed that it was unable to provide an accurate tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion centers efforts, instead producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS failed to adequately police how states and municipalities used the money intended for fusion centers. The investigation found that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it has spent on specific fusion centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were spent, nor has it examined the effectiveness of those grant dollars. The Subcommittee conducted a more detailed case study review of expenditures of DHS grant funds at five fusion centers, all of which lacked basic, “must-have” intelligence capabilities, according to assessments conducted by and for DHS. The Subcommittee investigation found that the state and local agencies used some of the Federal grant money to purchase: • dozens of flat-screen TVs; • Sport Utility Vehicles they then gave away to other local agencies; and • hidden “shirt button” cameras, cell phone tracking devices, and other surveillance equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a fusion center. All of those expenditures were allowed under FEMA’s rules and guidance, DHS officials told the Subcommittee. Yet none of them appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in the centers’ basic information analysis and sharing capabilities, so they could better contribute to Federal counterterrorism efforts. Every day, tens of thousands of DHS employees go to work dedicated to keeping America safe from terrorism; Federal funding of fusion centers was intended to advance that Federal objective. Fusion centers may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism, such as contributions to traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster response and recovery efforts. In this investigation, the Subcommittee confined its work to examining the Federal return on its extensive support of state and local fusion centers, using the counterterrorism objectives established by law, Executive strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments. The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’s own operations. But DHS and the centers do not shoulder sole responsibility for the fusion centers’ counterterrorism intelligence failures. Congress has played a role, as well. Since Congress created DHS in 2003, dozens of committees and subcommittees in both Houses have claimed jurisdiction over various aspects of the Department. DHS officials annually participate in hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits for Members of Congress and their staffs. At Congress’ request, the Department annually produces thousands of pages of updates, assessments and other reports. Yet amid all the Congressional oversight, some of the worst problems plaguing the Department’s fusion center efforts have gone largely undisclosed and unexamined. At its conclusion, this Report offers several recommendations to clarify DHS’s role with respect to state and local fusion centers. The Report recommends that Congress and DHS revisit the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers, in light of the investigation’s findings. It also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126564 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centers Homeland Security (U.S.) Intelligence Gathering Terrorism

Author: Romaniuk, Peter Title: From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs Summary: In the years following 9/11, threat assessments necessarily focused on the dangers posed by al-Qaida, its affiliates, and those inspired by its ideology. There are signs, however, that the threat today is more complex and diffuse, comprising extremists from all parts of the ideological spectrum who may act in small “self-starter” groups or, in some cases, as “lone wolves.” The paths to extremism are more varied than ever before, and as our understanding of contemporary patterns of radicalization has advanced, terrorism prevention initiatives have become more prevalent in the counterterrorism repertoire at the national and multilateral levels. As many states have elaborated terrorism prevention strategies in recent years, they have begun to confront similar challenges. Among these is the challenge of program evaluation. Is the turn toward prevention an effective response to the diverse extremist threats that states face today? How can the effectiveness of prevention policies be measured? What approaches have states advanced in evaluating the impact of terrorism prevention initiatives? In responding to this challenge, can lessons be gleaned from efforts to evaluate programs in related policy domains? This policy report provides an initial discussion of these questions. It draws on the discussions during a meeting entitled “Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism Programming” and held in Ottawa on 9–10 February 2012, as well as discussions with experts, government officials, and an initial desktop literature review. Details: New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Shelf Number: 126571 Keywords: Crime Prevention Crime Prevention Programs Evaluative Studies Extremist Groups Lone Wolves Terrorism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Davis, Ian S. Title: A Theory of Dark Network Design Summary: This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose. A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state. The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work determine the dark network’s design state. These factors yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc. Each configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark network’s directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity. If a dark network’s configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 177p. Source: Iinternet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Dec/10Dec_Davis_Ian.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Dec/10Dec_Davis_Ian.pdf Shelf Number: 126650 Keywords: Criminal Networks Criminal Syndicates Hezbollah Mara Salvatrucha-13 Network Analysis Provisional Irish Republican Army Terrorism

Author: DiGiacomo, Richard J. Title: Prostitution as a Possible Funding Mechanism for Terrorism Summary: An essential component of defeating terrorist is targeting their financing and fundraising mechanisms. Successfully targeting terrorist financing may disrupt an organization’s existence, prevent an attack, or reduce the harm produced by an attack. As a result of these efforts, al Qaeda faces financial challenges they have not experienced in a decade. Whether in response to these efforts, or as a deliberate strategic shift, terrorist organizations have been extremely adaptive and creative in adjusting their fundraising efforts; specifically turning to criminal enterprises. While there is still debate regarding the level of cooperation between criminal and terrorist organizations, it is generally agreed that terrorist organizations and their affiliates are increasingly relying on criminal enterprises to fund their operations. This thesis will examine whether prostitution is funding terrorism, and if it is logical and reasonable to conclude that a highly adaptable terrorist organization would fund their operations using prostitution. Prostitution is a highly profitable business requiring no specialized skill set and very little cost to entry. The business opportunities are unlimited, and it is business that law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts do not consider as a serious crime, but rather a harmless vice voluntarily entered into by all parties. A failure to seriously consider prostitution as a funding mechanism demonstrates a potentially fatal lack of imagination. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=20517 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=20517 Shelf Number: 126651 Keywords: Organized Crime Prostitution Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Lonsdale, Mark V. Title: Criminal Activity in an Insurgent Environment and Counterinsurgency Summary: This paper looks at the criminal component of insurgency in Afghanistan and the inseparable influences of history, geography, culture, governance, and security. It also addresses the closely related issues of the on-going insurgency, terrorism, corruption, and deficiencies in government and military counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Beginning as a focused study of criminal activity in an insurgent environment, this paper grew to include a broader discussion of modern insurgency, terrorism, Islamic militancy, and traditionalist resistance, and how these have been perpetuated by ill-conceived and poorly executed counterinsurgency policies and practices. The reemergence, growth, and continued activity of these various militant groups also had to be viewed in context with the lack of security in Afghanistan, weak governance, slow progress in political, judicial and social reforms, and the often counterproductive effects of U.S. and NATO military operations. Glaring deficiencies in these processes, compounded by an ad hoc approach to counterinsurgency and half-hearted efforts by some donor nations, have fueled the insurgency while facilitating widespread corruption and criminal activity. With the above in mind, this paper addresses a number of questions: 1. What is the current criminal environment in Afghanistan and how have criminal networks and insurgents benefited from the instability? 2. Are the Taliban the only active insurgents or does the insurgency involve traditionalists, nationalists, and malcontents? 3. Is there a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign and has it been successful to date? 4. Why are conventional military forces unsuited to counterinsurgency? 5. Why are the U.S. efforts handicapped by an institutionalized conventional big-war mindset and a resistance to change? 6. Why are the token ISAF forces from several NATO troop-donors largely ineffective? 7. How is the counterinsurgency campaign hindered by a shortage of competent Foreign Service officers and civil-political advisors? 8. Why does the Coalition continue to tolerate rampant corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government and ministries? 9. Are narcotics funding the insurgency and why are the U.S. counter-narcotics policies unacceptable to their NATO allies? 10. How do the Afghans view the U.S. and Coalition forces, the Karzai government, local officials, and the national police? 11. What is the way forward for Afghanistan? 12. With all that we have learned from recent history, how should the counterinsurgency campaign be prosecuted in Afghanistan? Counterinsurgency requires patience, determination, innovation, an acceptance of risk, coupled to a long-term commitment, supported by adequate funding, the appropriate resources, and an unconventional mindset. Unfortunately, while built and trained for full-spectrum attrition and maneuver warfare, conventional brigade combat teams (BCT) are not structured, manned, or equipped for unconventional COIN operations. Nor can they effectively identify, target, and attack criminal-insurgent enterprises. The non-kinetic components of the COIN effort are further hindered by timid civilian administrations, as seen with several NATO contributors and the State Department’s lack of commitment, resources, and competent Foreign Service officers. This paper takes the reader through the full range of criminal and insurgent activities occurring on the ground in Afghanistan; points out deficiencies in current governance, security and military operations; and then offers suggestions on how to better prepare military units, national security forces, and civilian authorities for counterinsurgency and security sector reform. Details: Paris: Department de Recherche sur les Menaces Criminelles Contemporaines Universite Pantheon-Assas, Paris II, 2008. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 15, 2012 at: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.drmcc.org/IMG/pdf/COIN_MCC_Lonsdale_18_AUG_2008-2.pdf Shelf Number: 126729 Keywords: Corruption Criminal Violence (Afghanistan) Insurgency Military Groups Terrorism

Author: Dietz, Rebekah K. Title: Illicit Networks: Targeting the Nexus Between Terrorists, Proliferators, and Narcotraffickers Summary: Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile ground for the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and businesses have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global commerce, so have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international security. These illicit networks are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under the guise of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human life. They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of three main types of illicit networks: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. Using Jemaah Islamiyah, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the Medellín drug ‘cartel’ as case studies, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics, and sources and patterns of funding. It examines if and how illicit networks overlap, with special attention to intra-network (e.g., terrorist networks with other terrorist networks) and inter-network (e.g., terrorist networks with narcotics networks) overlap. It then explores how this information can inform U.S. counter-network activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Shelf Number: 126752 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Illicit Networks Medellin Cartel Social Network Analysis Terrorism Terrorist Networks

Author: Amnesty International Title: Left in the Dark: The Use of Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom Summary: Over the past decade, there has been an ever increasing reliance on secret evidence by the UK government in the name of national security. Amnesty International believes that this growing resort to secrecy undermines basic standards of fairness and open justice, can result in violations of the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy for victims of human rights violations, as well as contributing to failures by the UK to meet its obligations to hold those responsible for human rights violations to account and to refrain from sending people to a real risk of serious human rights violations at the hands of another state. This report examines the increased use of what is described as a “closed material procedure”, which allows the government to rely on secret evidence presented to the court behind closed doors, in a range of non-criminal judicial proceedings in the UK. Closed material procedures are usually invoked in cases involving persons suspected of terrorismrelated activity. Such a procedure allows a court or tribunal to sit in a closed (i.e. secret) hearing in order to consider material presented by UK authorities. Closed material is information that the government claims would be damaging to national security or otherwise harmful to the public interest if it were to be disclosed. This material is withheld for the entire case (and indeed perhaps forever) from the individual(s) whose interests are at stake in the case, her/his lawyer of choice, and the public, none of whom has access to the closed hearing.1 As a result of their exclusion from the closed hearing, they do not know the content of that material, even though the court can rely on it to determine the facts and outcome of the case. “Closed material” is essentially a form of secret evidence and marks a radical departure from what traditionally are understood to be basic requirements of fairness in civil and criminal procedures. Details: London: Amnesty International Publications, 2012. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/014/2012/en/546a2059-db83-4888-93ba-8b90cc32a2de/eur450142012en.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/014/2012/en/546a2059-db83-4888-93ba-8b90cc32a2de/eur450142012en.pdf Shelf Number: 126758 Keywords: Evidence (U.K.) National Security Terrorism Trials

Author: Ahokas, Juha Title: Assuring Supply Chain Continuity in Industrial Supply Chains and Complying with Authorised Economical Operator AEO Europe. Final Version Summary: Secure and reliable supply chains and networks enable companies to utilize global markets and resources. Outsourcing and globalization have enabled enterprises to extent their operations to new areas and benefit from economies of scale. Global logistic chains have turned out to be effective platform for the delivery of materials, semi-products and goods between the different economic areas and markets. The development has been beneficial to international companies and economic welfare has increased in several countries. On the other side, dynamic and complex supply chains enable opportunities for criminal action. They create platform for terrorism, crime and illegal competition. Some transnational and poly-crime oriented organized crime groups are aiming at controlling the whole production and distribution processes of entire criminal markets, optimizing profits and cutting out local and minor competitors, on a very rational way. To reach their goal they exploit transportation and financial sector, hire illicit labour to run and manage the supply chain, engage in money laundry, identity frauds and document forgery. International supply chains have turned out to be vulnerable for any crime actions and crime concerns have increased in companies and governments. Especially organized crime and terrorism pose threats to security and safety, to public health, to the environment or to consumers. Traditionally different companies and authorities have concentrated on securing their own operations and sphere of responsibilities. However, supply chain crimes are intertwined in supply chain operations, which transmit forward and reverse goods, services, cash and information. Relying only on inspections or border controls has proven to be always costly leaving doubts concerning the adequate inspection rate. Enterprises have very limited possibilities to self-acquire information related to the backgrounds of their business partners and prospect employees. Generally, crime is recognized to devastate social structures and fair competition. Additionally, private and political interest have emphasized crime preventive approach instead of post-crime measures, thus different kind of customs-government-trade partnerships are endorsed with mutual interest. The terrorist attacks in 2001 formed culmination point to concerns and approaches how to deal with terrorism and crime in supply chains. Since April 2002 several voluntary supply chain security programs and regulations have been established in global trade. The aim of the programs is simply to increase security in international supply chains. The companies fulfilling the security and safety criteria are considered to be secure and safe partners in the supply chain. The reliable traders respecting high standard security criteria benefit from trade facilitation measures: reduced data set for summary declarations, fewer physical and document-based controls, and priority treatment if selected for control. Supply chain security programs can be regarded as good international policy and practices when aiming at better secure supply chains against an intended posed crime act (theft, pilferage, money laundry, currency counterfeiting, industrial espionage, commodity counterfeiting, documents counterfeiting, malicious damage etc.). Additionally, implementation of programs have enabled several companies to gain collateral benefits, including better visibility to the supply chain, swifter response in case of any type of disruptions and lower insurance premiums. However, between security measures and benefits stands a black box, which makes unclear how security programs should be managed to maximize benefits. This publication aims at revealing the inner-side of the black-box. The guide presents and applies practices and procedures, which are approved in a sister discipline that is criminology. Rational choice and situational crime prevention are well-known approaches, which bring criminology down to earth in daily practices and decisions. Rational choice approach takes into consideration a variation and composition of potential crime offenders‘ motivations and capabilities to commit crimes. It supports security efforts and decisions concerning the strategic supply chain and operational design. Situational crime prevention approach provides tools to reduce the opportunities to commit crime and increase the risk of detection if deterrence fails. It focuses on crime opportunities in daily operations and resembles total quality management approach, which is well-known, proved and tried in supply chain and operational management. At last, situational crime prevention approach and total quality management approach are combined in new conceptual model for crime prevention in supply chains. AEO-programs are not self-explaining and self-executing programs. Quite the contrary, they just build a framework, where the compliance with requirements can be attained in several ways. We introduce an implementation model, which is based on teacher-learning cycle aiming at the most cost-efficient implementation in different companies and business units in various cultural conditions. Additionally, it supports government-private partnerships. The model is based on continuous improvement cycle. This guide has 10 chapters with following aims: Chapter 1 elucidates the background of supply chain security programs by presenting World Customs Organization‘s SAFE-program. Chapter 2 works as an incentive to start implementing AEO-supply chain security program. It lists potential benefits, which can be used as financial targets in implementation process. The list of benefits is based on comprehensive literature study. Chapter 3 describes how security issues are included in daily operations. Crime prevention and operational management practices are programmed in same conceptual framework. Chapter 4 elucidates AEO-requirements and appropriate security measures based on available security standards. Chapter 5 suggest methods allocate security resources in an efficient manner. Besides traditional risk assessment approach we emphasize inner-organizational co-operation and efficient communication when tracing crime related problems. Chapter 6 presents an implementation model based on continuous improvement and teaching-learning cycle. Chapter 7 presents customs AEO -audit approach. We give advises how the process could be conducted in an efficient way. Chapter 8 suggest an activity based cost management model, which makes security cost more transparent and traceable. Chapter 9 gives a short description concerning supply chain security technologies. Chapter 10 presents a short summary. Details: Helsinki: Aalto University, School of Science and Technology, BIT Research Centre, 2012. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://legacy-tuta.hut.fi/logistics/publications/Assuring_SC_Continuity.pdf Shelf Number: 126764 Keywords: Cargo Security Criminal Networks National Security Ports-of-Entry, Security Rational Choice Theory Situational Crime Prevention Supply Chains Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) brought together senior criminal justice experts—including Attorney-Generals and Chief Prosecutors—to share experiences and good practices on how to deal with terrorism cases. The outcome is this Digest of Terrorist Cases, giving policymakers and criminal justice officials practical ideas and expert insights on how to deal with a relatively new field of jurisprudence. It complements other UNODC tools that provide guidance on how to address acts of terrorism within a legal framework, like legislative guides. The judicial cases featured in this Digest cover relevant aspects of the international legal regime against terrorism. It provides a comparative analysis of national statutory frameworks for terrorism prosecutions, and it identifies legal issues and pitfalls encountered in investigating and adjudicating relevant offences. In addition, it identifies practices related to specialized investigative and prosecutorial techniques. It also addresses the links between terrorism and other forms of crime (like organized crime, the trafficking of drugs, people and arms), as well as how to disrupt terrorist financing. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Shelf Number: 126803 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Prosecution, Terrorist Cases Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes Summary: The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon, requiring a proactive and coordinated response from Member States. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plays a key role in providing assistance to Member States, in furtherance of its mandate to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice systems to implement the provisions of the international legal instruments against terrorism, and does so in compliance with the principles of rule of law and international human rights standards. In particular, in 2011, the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/178, reaffirmed the mandate of UNODC to continue to develop specialized legal knowledge in the area of counter-terrorism and pertinent thematic areas, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Despite increasing international recognition of the threat posed by terrorists’ use of the Internet in recent years, there is currently no universal instrument specifically addressing this pervasive facet of terrorist activity. Moreover, there is limited specialized training available on the legal and practical aspects of the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases involving the use of the Internet. The present publication complements the existing resources developed by UNODC in the areas of counter-terrorism, cybercrime and rule of law. It also addresses the importance of developing integrated, specialized knowledge to respond to the technical assistance needs of Member States in combating this continually evolving threat. UNODC is deeply grateful for the generous support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which made the publication of that work possible. The publication, which is intended for use both as a stand-alone resource and in support of the capacity-building initiatives of UNODC, is aimed at providing guidance regarding current legal frameworks and practice at the national and international levels relating to the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the Internet. Terrorism, in all its manifestations, affects us all. The use of the Internet to further terrorist purposes disregards national borders, amplifying the potential impact on victims. By highlighting cases and best practices that respond to this unique challenge, the present publication has two aims: first, to promote a better understanding of the ways in which communications technologies may be misused in furtherance of acts of terrorism and, second, to increase collaboration among Member States, so that effective criminal justice responses to this transnational challenge can be developed. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2012. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf Shelf Number: 126804 Keywords: Computer Crimes Counter-Terrorism Internet Crimes Terrorism

Author: Rollins, John Title: Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress Summary: This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government’s perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options. In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns. • Partnership Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations. • Appropriation of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. • Organizational Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda’s affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah. To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources sufficiently respond to the combined crimeterrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R41004: Accessed November 9, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Shelf Number: 126913 Keywords: Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Transnational Crime

Author: Manning, John D. Title: Dark Networks Summary: he world today operates in a state of persistent conflict on a sliding scale. The conflicts in question are not traditionally military in nature and often involve nonstate actors. These conflicts present problems for the nation-state, because its historical methods for dealing with conflicts do not work in this case. To manage these conflicts, nation-states and global organizations will have to develop mechanisms to deal with "dark networks." These are networks made up of illicit traffickers, organized crime members, urban gangs, terrorists, pirates, insurgents, and other nefarious characters. The purpose of this paper is to examine the environment that feeds these dark networks, the characters who make up the networks, the networks themselves, and the policy and strategy issues related to defeating dark networks. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010. 28p. Source: Strategy Research Project: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2012 at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518125 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518125 Shelf Number: 126920 Keywords: Armed Conflict Criminal Networks Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes. The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality. DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. Details: Wshington, DC: GAO, 2012. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-79: Accessed November 20, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Shelf Number: 126940 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Training Extremist Group Homeland Security (U.S.) Police Training Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C: Citizzen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links Between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union Summary: The study presents a qualitative analysis of the linkages between Organised Crime (OC) and terrorism with specific reference to the European Union. A conceptual basis of the links between OC and terrorism is outlined, and systematically used to identify how these two phenomena come together in the European theatre. The study also considers developments regarding the relationship between OC and terrorism in regions outside the E.U., that have a direct impact on how the nexus is evolving in E.U. member-states. It reveals that certain linkages between OC and terrorism exist in the E.U. Trends suggest that these linkages will continue to develop. The study concludes by assessing the impact of OC-terrorism linkages on the E.U., and providing recommendations on how to address it. It points out that the effective fight against OC and terrorism depends on an integrated approach that involves all stakeholders at both national and E.U. levels. Details: Brussels: European Parliment, 2012. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 27, 2012 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/nov/ep-study-crime-terrorism.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/nov/ep-study-crime-terrorism.pdf Shelf Number: 127010 Keywords: Crime-Terror Nexus Organized Crime (Europe) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement. 2nd edition Summary: The sovereign citizen movement is an extreme anti-government movement whose members believe the government has no authority over them. It began a resurgence of activity, including criminal activity, in 2009 that has shown no signs of stopping. In 2012, the sovereign citizen movement is currently one of the most problematic domestic extremist movements in the United States. Sovereign citizen criminal activity includes violent acts, exemplified recently by the brutal murder of two West Memphis police officers at the hands of a father and son pair of sovereign citizens in May 2010. More violent encounters have occurred between police and sovereign citizens since then. Spontaneous sovereign citizen violence, especially during traffic stops and visits to residences, poses a significant risk to law enforcement officers and public officials. More widespread than violence is a set of tactics known as "paper terrorism," in which sovereign citizens use legal filings to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against public officials, law enforcement officers, and others. Most common is the filing of bogus liens on the property of perceived enemies. Though a number of laws were passed in the 1990s to deal with this problem, sovereign citizens remain undeterred and continue to file such harassing liens in large numbers. Self-appointed "gurus" in the sovereign citizen movement have actively been exploiting the foreclosure crisis, crisscrossing the country promoting schemes and scams to desperate homeowners, while falsely claiming that such schemes can save people's homes. Other sovereign citizens are even brazenly seizing homes left empty because of foreclosures and claiming the homes for their own. As a result of imprisoned sovereign citizens continuing to recruit and teach their ideology while behind bars, a growing number of federal and state prisoners are becoming sovereign citizens or using the "paper terrorism" tactics of the movement to retaliate against judges, prosecutors and others involved in their case. Prison officials have so far had little luck in stemming the growth of this movement in prisons. Though the sovereign citizen movement is still largely white (and contains some white supremacist members), in recent years a growing African- American offshoot of the sovereign citizen movement, often called the "Moorish" movement, has been gaining strength, teaching sovereign citizen ideas and tactics to a new pool of potential recruits. Details: Atlanta, GA: ADL, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2012 at: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Shelf Number: 127019 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Hate Crimes (U.S.) Radical Groups Sovereign Citizen Movement Terrorism

Author: Camilleri, Raphaelle Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report Summary: This report aims to provide an overview of French counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies, and assess their potential impact on the Muslim community in France. Part One focuses on the demographic composition and socioeconomic profile of the French Muslim community; the largest such community in the European Union. It finds that the Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in socioeconomic terms in relation to the mainstream French population, and that Muslims frequently report higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in France. This broad finding helps inform subsequent sections, which look specifically at perceived discrimination by French police and security services on the basis of racial or ethnic origin. Part Two focuses on the legal framework within which French counter-terrorism policy is anchored. It reviews the development of counter-terrorist legislation since the mid-1980s, and explains how French legislation has evolved in recent years to tackle the new challenges posed by novel forms of terrorism. This section of the report also outlines the key pieces of legislation governing the operation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in the fight against terrorism in France. It concludes by providing an overview of the main constitutional and institutional mechanisms which place checks and balances on the operation of the police agencies responsible for implementing counter-terrorist policies. Part Three of the report focuses on the law-enforcement agencies responsible for enacting counterterrorist policies ‘on the ground’. It provides a comprehensive list of the key government departments, as well as policing and intelligence agencies, involved in the fight against terrorism, and assesses the nature of their (often troubled) relationship with affected communities. Although more research is needed in this area, initial findings seem to suggest that Muslim communities generally perceive themselves to be unfairly targeted by the police on the basis of their ethnic or religious background. In light of these circumstances, In light of these circumstances, this section of the report also outlines official guidelines on non-discrimination and lists the various governmental and non-governmental institutions charged with protecting the rights of citizens. Part Four of the report looks at the broader security context within which counter-terrorist policies and legislation have been formulated in France. It critically assesses the extent of the terrorist threat in France, both in real and perceived terms. Two significant findings emerge. Firstly, despite the focus on religiouslymotivated Islamist terrorism since 2001, separatism terrorism carried out by Basque and Corsican nationalist groups continues to be the most pressing threat posed to the French state. Secondly, despite the initial trauma caused by Mohammed Merah’s killing spree, French public opinion nevertheless deems the terrorist threat to be quite low, suggesting that the French public does not regard terrorism as a pressing threat. Part Five builds on these initial observations by focusing on the way in which French political parties have framed the terrorist threat (particularly that emanating from suspected Islamists) especially in the aftermath of the Toulouse and Montauban shootings. It examines the impact of the shootings on the presidential race, but finds little evidence that they had any bearing on the final outcome of the election. Nevertheless, the strong performance of the far-right movement of Marine Le Pen (Front National) at the polls is underlined, but it is balanced against the conciliatory tone recently adopted by the left-wing government of François Hollande on security issues. Throughout this report, existing research by academic institutions, think tanks and government bodies on the impact of counter-terrorism policies on the Muslim community is referenced when relevant. Notable gaps in the literature are also highlighted, along with recommendations for further research. A full bibliography is provided for reference at the end of the document, as is an exhaustive list of academics, researchers, policymakers and civil society organisations, which may make a substantial contribution to future research in this area. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: France URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 127033 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (France) Minorities Muslims Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorism

Author: Whitfield, Nathan S. Title: Traveling the Terror Highway: Infiltration of Terror Operatives across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border security and immigration have received increased attention. Public and political scrutiny have elevated and changed the priority of border security and immigration enforcement; from migrant workers seeking employment to counter-terrorism. However, the question remains: if United States law enforcement and security agencies are unable to stop the smuggling of drugs and illegal migrants across the southwestern border between the U.S. and Mexico, is it possible to prevent terrorists from gaining unauthorized and unaccountable entry into the heartland of the U.S.? A corollary question is: given attempts to restructure the immigration enforcement policy and infrastructure to deter illegal entry of terrorists, will it still be possible and lucrative for terrorists to attempt to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border? This research seeks to explore existing conditions that may facilitate or increase the likelihood that terrorists would seek to infiltrate personnel across the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127037 Keywords: Border Security Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigrants Immigration (U.S. - Mexico) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Title: A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border. A Majority Report Summary: The first edition of A Line in the Sand, released in 2006, (hereafter “first edition”) exposed the rising threat of Mexican drug cartels and the vulnerabilities of our porous Southwest border. The horrific violence perpetrated by Mexican drug cartels continues to grow and, in many cases documented in this report, spills into the United States. The cartels now have a presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities and dominate the wholesale illicit drug trade by controlling the movement of most of the foreign-produced drug supply across the Southwest border. This report documents the increased operational control of the cartels inside the United States, their strategy to move illegal drugs, and the bloody turf wars that have taken place between rival cartels, as they struggle to control valuable trafficking corridors. Collectively, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) maintain firm control of drug and human smuggling routes across the U.S.- Mexico border creating safe entry for anyone willing to pay the price. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in its most recent assessment, asserts it can control only 44 percent of our border with Mexico. Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations. The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter. One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Shelf Number: 127109 Keywords: Border Security Domestic Terrorism Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking (Mexico-U.S) Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Horowitz, Jonathan Title: Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup Bombing and Beyond Summary: East Africa has emerged in recent years as a focus of both transnational terrorism and Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Governments have a responsibility to combat terrorism in a lawful manner. But as this report documents, counterterrorism tactics and operations in East Africa have led to a variety of human rights violations. Governments in the region have cited the need to fight terrorism as a pretext to crack down on political opposition, human rights defenders, and lawful expressions of dissent. This report looks at how the governments of Kenya, Uganda, the United States, and the United Kingdom responded to the 2010 World Cup bombing in Kampala, Uganda. The counterterrorism actions that followed the bombing were characterized by human rights violations, including allegations of arbitrary detention, unlawful renditions, physical abuse, and denial of due process rights. In examining these abuses and the parties responsible for them, the report argues that Kenya, Uganda, and the Western countries that support them must thoroughly investigate the alleged abuses, and must pursue counterterrorism activities that do not entail human rights violations. Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2012. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-human-rights-abuses-kenya-uganda-20121127.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-human-rights-abuses-kenya-uganda-20121127.pdf Shelf Number: 127142 Keywords: Counterterrorism Human Rights Abuses (Kenya and Uganda) Terrorism World Cup Bombing

Author: Choudhury, Tufyal Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report Summary: This report provides a background context to the United Kingdom to support discussion of potential research into the impact of counter-terrorism measures on minority communities. While recognising that the focus of anti-terrorism policies and policing in the UK has, until recently, related to political violence in Northern Ireland and Irish communities in Britain, this report focuses on ethno-cultural minorities, in particular Muslim communities, that have, since 9/11, been the focus of counter-terrorism policies and policing responding to Al Qaeda (AQ) related or inspired terrorism. Key sections of this report develop and build on the Equality and Human Rights Commission research report, The Impact of Counter Terrorism Measures on Muslim communities in Britain (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011). Part One provides an overview of the community context. It outlines the demographic and socioeconomic profile of Muslims and minority ethnic groups that are the focus of recent anti-terrorism policing. Their low socio-economic position is noted as important, since communities and individuals that experience social marginalisation are more likely to be concerned about increased state policing powers. It also notes a number of civil society campaigns challenging the increase and use of counterterrorism powers. Some have been led by mainstream human rights organisations, while others have been led by Muslim organisations. Despite such campaigns, analysis of polling evidence shows broad public support for a wide range of counter-terrorism powers and measures. The section notes a number of specific mechanisms that have been created for cooperation and dialogue between the state and Muslim organisations and communities. Part Two outlines the legal framework within which counter-terrorism law and policy operates. The starting point for this is the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000). The provisions of this Act have, however, been amended and added to by new legislation passed in six out the last ten years. The broad definition of terrorism in the TA 2000 remains a central issue. The section outlines changes in the legal powers to stop and search individuals in the streets and at ports and airports. Immediately after 2001, additional legislation and policy focused on threats from foreign nationals. However, after 2005, new measures responded to the involvement of British citizens in AQ-related terrorism. New offences were created that allowed individuals to be charged at earlier points in time before an attack was underway. The new offences included acts preparatory to terrorism, attending a place used for training for terrorism, and the indirect encouragement of terrorism. Part Three outlines the wider policy and policing context of counter-terrorism. Details are given of the four strands to the overarching counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Anti-radicalisation policy falls largely in the Prevent strand of CONTEST. The paper outlines the roles and relationships between the different government departments and policing structures that have responsibility for overseeing and implementing counter-terrorism policy and policing. It then sets out the mechanisms for individuals or communities to seek cooperation, dialogue and accountability. Any exploration of the impact of counter-terrorism measures needs to be placed in the context of the threat from terrorism; this is explored in Part Four. This includes assessment of the level of threat from terrorism made by the government and security agencies, as well as the evidence of the threat from the number of individuals that have been arrested, charged and convicted of terrorism-related offences. The section also notes a number of high-profile policing operations relating to counter-terrorism that also influence public discussion and assessment of the threat level. Counter-terrorism policies are not encountered or developed in a policy vacuum, but are influenced by, and in turn shape, the wider political and policy discourse. Part Five therefore explores the wider political context. In particular, it explores the interplay with debates on multiculturalism, integration and immigration and identity. Finally, Part Six outlines some of the existing academic and policy research on the impact of counterterrorism policing and policy Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2012 at http://www.strategicdialogue.org/UK_paper_SF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/UK_paper_SF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 127226 Keywords: Counter-terrorism (U.K.) Human Rights Minority Communities Terrorism

Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace Summary: This report presents some of the results of a fiscal year 2011 RAND Project AIR FORCE study on the integration of kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, “U.S. and Threat Non-Kinetic Capabilities.” It discusses the management of cybercrises throughout the spectrum from precrisis to crisis to conflict. The basic message is simple: Crisis and escalation in cyberspace can be managed as long as policymakers understand the key differences between nonkinetic conflict in cyberspace and kinetic conflict in the physical world. Among these differences are the tremendous scope that cyberdefense affords; the near impossibility and thus the pointlessness of trying to disarm an adversary’s ability to carry out cyberwar; and the great ambiguity associated with cyberoperations—notably, the broad disjunction between the attacker’s intent, the actual effect, and the target’s perception of what happened. Thus, strategies should concentrate on (1) recognizing that crisis instability in cyberspace arises largely from misperception, (2) promulgating norms that might modulate crisis reactions, (3) knowing when and how to defuse inadvertent crises stemming from incidents, (4) supporting actions with narrative rather than signaling, (5) bolstering defenses to the point at which potential adversaries no longer believe that cyberattacks (penetrating and disrupting or corrupting information systems, as opposed to cyberespionage) can alter the balance of forces, and (6) calibrating the use of offensive cyberoperations with an assessment of their escalation potential. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 24, 2013 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf Shelf Number: 127383 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyberattacks Cybercrime (U.S.) National Security Terrorism

Author: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia Title: The Bolivia Country Program 2010-2015. Capacity Building in Response to Drugs, Organized Crime, Terrorism, Corruption, and Economic Crime Threats in Bolivia Summary: Bolivia is located in the center of South America and shares borders with Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru. Extending across 1,098,581 km (424,160 sq miles), it has an estimated population of 10 million inhabitants (2009), 66% of whom live in urban areas. According to the Constitution, Bolivia is a Social, Unitary State of Plurinational Communitarian Law, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized and with autonomies. It was founded on political, economic, judicial, cultural and linguistic plurality and pluralism, within the integrative process of the country. In 2005, approximately 59% of the population was living without their basic needs satisfied, and 37% lived in extreme poverty. In 2007, the estimated per capita income was US $1,363 a year. The life expectancy rate is 63 years, while the infant mortality rate for this same period was defined at 61 for every 1000 live births. After a long period characterized by political instability and social conflicts, in 2005 indigenous leader Evo Morales was elected President of what is now the Plurinational State of Bolivia, marking the beginning of a period of profound political and socioeconomic change. A Constitutional Assembly was summoned to enact these changes, and at the end of 2008 a new constitutional text was approved, which enabled all institutional structures to be adapted to the new ethno-cultural and regional plurality of the country. The New Political State Constitution incorporates important advances and changes in citizen rights, gender, natural resources and administration of justice. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has shifted from a neoliberal development model to a mixed economy, where the State plays a greater role in the economy. In so doing, the State has taken control of the principal source of income in the country: hydrocarbons, namely natural gas, and is promoting other important industrial development projects in the fields of metallurgy, construction, food and paper. The surplus generated from natural gas exportation to neighboring countries contributes to income redistribution policies, in addition to boosting the national petroleum company. In this way, the past few years have witnessed the creation of wealth redistribution mechanisms aimed at reversing the existing conditions of poverty and inequality, such as the Dignity Payment for senior citizens, the Juancito Pinto Bond for the student population and the Juana Azurduy Bond for pregnant women. The principal macroeconomic indicators show that the Bolivian economy has improved. From 2006-2009, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.8%, the inflation was 0.3% at the end of this period and the fiscal surplus was 2.5% of the GDP. Private foreign inversion recovered in 2006, at US $278 million, topping off at US $370 million in 2008. Exportations in 2008 reached US $4,846 million, resulting in a positive trade balance of US $1,223 million. In 2009 the external public debt increased to US $2,583 million, following an important reduction in previous years. These indicators show a generally positive economic performance within a framework of both internal and external macroeconomic stability, providing greater strength to the Bolivian State´s fight against poverty. The Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, encouraged by the U.N., is making important efforts to reach the Millennium Goals. Bolivia has been declared the third country in the region free of illiteracy, with the backing of UNESCO. Likewise, gender gaps in primary education and infant and maternal mortality rates have been reduced, and basic sanitary services have reached a considerable proportion of the rural population. In Bolivia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been working since the end of the 1980s on alternative development projects in coca growing regions, including the construction of infrastructure for social and productive uses, improving agricultural production, encouraging forestry and agroforestry development, promoting the microbusiness sector and job skills training. The UNODC also implemented drug prevention programs within the educational system, as well as strengthening the government entities related to controlling drug use and related crimes, including the implementation of informational systems for monitoring coca plantations, alternative development and illegal drug use. Technical cooperation activities have been reduced in the past few years, from an annual portfolio of US $5.4 million in 2002 to US $1.6 million in 2009. As a result, in April of 2009, the UNODC representative finalized his/her mission in the country and decided to reduce office personnel, as the reduced volume of activities no longer justified a Representation Office in Bolivia. As of June of 2009, development program activities were administered with the aid of the Latin America and the Caribbean Unit (LACU/DO) of UNODC, based in Vienna. In June of 2009, the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia requested that the Executive Director of the UNODC maintain Office Representation status in the country and continue providing technical assistance. They also asked the European Commission to reinforce the UNODC´s financial cooperation program in the country. In response to this request, the UNODC sent a programming mission headed by the Head of the Latin American and the Caribbean Unit to the country in October of 2009. The objectives of the mission were: i) Prepare a Country Program 2010- 2015 document in direct collaboration with State institutions and international organizations; ii) Exchange criteria with the Government authorities of the Plurinational State of Bolivia about the reestablishment of an active/functional Office of Representation; and iii) Support the implementation of the profile of projects currently in process. In order for the Country Program to be prepared with accurate information, the agenda of the mission included a workshop with participants from governmental institutions and international organizations. The participants analyzed the current status of the fight against drugs, organized crime and corruption. They also identified priority areas where the UNODC could provide technical assistance. Sixty three representatives of 12 different State institutions working in drug and crime prevention were present at the workshop, as well as 19 counterparts from international organizations. The workshop´s success was a result of the participants´ interest in the topic, the high level of discussion generated and the quality of proposals which were produced. This UNODC Bolivia Country Program (2010-2015) reflects the primary conclusions and recommendations which came out of the workshop, as well as information obtained in interviews with the participating institutions. Details: La Paz, Bolivia: Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2013 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Bolivia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/bolivia//proyectos_bolivia/The_UNODC_Bolivia_Country_Program_2010-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 127529 Keywords: Corruption Drug Abuse and Crime Drug Trafficking (Bolivia) Economic Crime Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Markedonov, Sergey Title: The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga Region Summary: In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Terrorist bombings and acts of sabotage in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya are perceived as somehow intrinsic to the region. But a recent tragedy in the Volga region suggests that this sort of violence—and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it—may not be confined to the Caucasus. On the morning of July 19, 2012, simultaneous terrorist attacks wounded the Tatarstan chief mufti, Ildis Faizov, and killed Valiulla Yakupov, the former deputy chairman of the Tatarstan Spiritual Board of Muslims (TSBM), a well-known Islamic theologian and public figure and one of the most consistent opponents of what Russian politicians and media refer to as Wahhabism. For the first time, official Islamic religious leaders from outside the North Caucasus became victims of Islamist terrorism. Three months later, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced it had prevented a large-scale terrorist attack in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, planned for the eve of the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. Two people killed in the counterterrorist operation had been suspected of the attacks on Faizov and Yakupov as well as other illegal activity. With these attacks and counterattacks, the problem of inter-Islamic tensions in the Volga region suddenly became real. To examine this increasingly serious situation, this report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements, as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russia security cooperation agenda. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 127603 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Russia) Islam Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Chana, Rajinder Title: The Prevent Initiative: A Review of Local and National Prevent Work. What Can Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region Learn? Summary: Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region has been responsible for supervising offenders convicted under the Terrorism Act (TACT) or for terrorist related offences. It is predicted that these numbers will potentially increase as will the number of offenders on the Trust’s caseload that may be at risk of radicalisation. A recent evaluation (Harris, 2010) looked at the training, consultancy, and support work developed and offered to assist Offender Managers at West Yorkshire Probation Trust (WYPT). Staff feedback from the evaluation found that they felt more confident in such work. The purpose of the current research is to assess what work is being developed and undertaken, both locally and nationally, with radicalised offenders on probation and those identified as susceptible to radicalisation. The key research questions are: 1. What work is currently undertaken nationally and locally with radicalised offenders on probation and those susceptible to radicalisation? Does this differ across areas? 2. What does the literature suggest as to what makes an individual become radicalised or susceptible to radicalisation? 3. What interventions have been or are being developed for such individuals locally and nationally? Does this differ across areas? 4. Are there any emerging trends or evidence since the initiative began of what can be applied to such individuals for what we can prescribe as an intervention? 5. Are there any issues relating to the new risk assessment tool1 that is being piloted by NOMS? The research will be used to inform the development of interventions within Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region. Details: Wakefield, UK: West Yorkshire Probation Trust, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2013 at: www.westyorksprobation.org.uk Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 127817 Keywords: Probation Probationers Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (U.K.)

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida understand that they can now wield influence as effectively with a video camera and an Internet connection as with an improvised explosive device. Such groups also invest heavily in their marketing capabilities. They have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at this form of strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Al-Qaida’s call to arms, for example, is a globally resonant expression of its outlook, grievances, agenda, and demands and has a proven ability to turn passive observers into active participants in violent extremism. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report is the result of a study, undertaken as part of a broader effort on the part of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation to enhance multilateral capacities to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, that aims to examine how this message has been perceived and received by three key stakeholder communities around the United Nations: its own staff (at headquarters, in specialized agencies, and in the field); member states; and the broader public, collectively considered the “UN community.” Three main objectives underpin this project. 1. To identify the core message of the United Nations on countering terrorism and violent extremism and how this message shapes counterterrorism policy and practice 2. To examine whether and how this message informs and impacts three key audiences: (a) the UN system, including field missions and specialized agencies; (b) UN member states; and (c) the broader public 3. To explore how strategic communication can be used to enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism and contribute to national and regional efforts to address terrorism and diminish radicalization and recruitment that bolster extremist groups This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication tools can amplify and enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, through the United Nations’ own initiatives as well as by supporting member states. The first two sections offer an overview of counterterrorism practice and the shift toward prevention, as well as the parallel shift at the United Nations, where the focus on preventive diplomacy, mediation, and conflict prevention has increased over the past decade. Section three examines the evaluation of strategic communication in practice and how it has been adopted by governments, civil society, and extremist groups. Sections four and five offer an analysis of UN counterterrorism communication and how it is perceived by internal and external audiences. Section six sets out some key lessons learned regarding the practice of strategic communication; although this study focuses on the United Nations, these principles may also be applicable to national and civil society actors. The last section offers a set of practical recommendations for consideration by UN actors, ranging from the macro to the micro level, in many instances considering how these ideas may be initiated within the existing counterterrorism architecture at the United Nations. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Shelf Number: 127841 Keywords: Counterrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland Summary: The greater Horn of Africa subregion faces a number of security and development challenges. These are further amplified by conditions of endemic sociopolitical and economic marginalization, political instability, and weak institutional capacity. The history of violent conflict in the subregion has offered an enabling environment for numerous domestic and subnational militant groups, many of which have engaged in acts of terrorism throughout the subregion for more than a half-century. Over the past few years, the international community has increasingly sought to develop effective measures and on-the-ground programming to prevent terrorism and counter violent extremism. Some multilateral organizations and donor countries have prioritized providing support for countering violent extremism (CVE) to certain developing countries and regions and their respective diasporas, which are perceived as being particularly vulnerable to violent radicalization and terrorist sympathies, support, or recruitment. In light of the general state of underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the subregion, ongoing instability in Somalia, and heightened concern over the threat posed by the al-Qaida–affiliated, Somali-based terrorist group al-Shabaab, the greater Horn of Africa subregion has come to be a main geographic focus of such assistance. ABOUT THIS PROJECT This report presents the findings of a pilot demonstration project of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) titled “Assessing Community Attitudes Towards Violent Extremism and the Impact of International Prevention Programming,” undertaken in Kenya and Somaliland. In accordance with the core objectives of the project, this report offers insight into understanding • how local community members perceive relevant international actors and their interventions in coastal Kenya and Somaliland, • how these community members perceive the extent and impact of violent extremism, and • how relevant international actors are contributing or can best contribute to context-sensitive CVE programming in partnership with local communities. The pilot demonstration project was designed and implemented throughout 2012. It was led by the CGCC East Africa team, based in New York, along with researchers from Integrity Research and Consultancy; the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), an independent nonprofit organization based in Nairobi that works to empower youth across Kenya through capacity building, community dialogue, and civic development; and the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), an independent academic institution based in Hargeisa, Somalia, that conducts research, analysis, and community training on issues of safety and security. As part of this pilot project, the project team spoke with a variety of community stakeholders in parts of Kenya and Somaliland to capture firsthand their perspectives on security and insecurity, including violent extremism and terrorism. The views expressed over the course of this project were compiled into a “perceptions mapping.” Additionally, the project team compiled a short film portraying local anecdotal perceptions on violent extremism in Kenya. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coopoeration, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 7, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Jan2013_MPVE_PliotStuday.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Jan2013_MPVE_PliotStuday.pdf Shelf Number: 127858 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Kenya, Somaliland, Africa) Terrorism Violent Violent Crime

Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation Summary: This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically. After providing definitions of capacity and capacity building, this brief outlines the five basic principles of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as they relate to capacity development. The discussion then turns to how criminal justice and rule of law capacity building can contribute to countering terrorism and to mitigating conditions conducive to violent extremism by enhancing the capacity of weak state institutions to deliver equitable security and justice to all. It concludes by offering guidance based on best practices and lessons learned from past and ongoing capacity-building efforts in accordance with key themes presented over the course of the brief. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: www.globalct.org Year: 2012 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128208 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Rule of Law Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Mesoy, Atle Title: Poverty and Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: A Causal Link? Summary: The consensus in past research into terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) is that generally there is no link between poverty and radicalisation, and if such a link exists, it is a weak one. However, insufficient attention has been paid to how terrorism has changed over the last few years to become a phenomenon that frequently occurs in weak, conflict-ridden states. In these states, poverty seems to play an essential role especially with regard to the motivation of suicide bombers. In the case of Pakistan, a current hotbed of terrorism, little research has been done on this issue and what little research that has been conducted points in opposite directions. However, more recent research has concluded that RVE and terrorism have to be researched in each country/area where terrorism exists and conclusions cannot be generalised to all countries. There is reason to believe that there is a causal link between poverty and RVE, especially in countries such as Pakistan, where there are high levels of poverty and militant groups both recruit and supply social services, and where poverty-stricken young men have few livelihood options other than that of joining a militant group. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2013. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: NOREF Expert Analysis: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Shelf Number: 128212 Keywords: Economic Conditions and Crime Poverty Radical Groups (Pakistan) Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Klimburg, Alexander, ed. Title: National Cyber Security Framework Manual Summary: As stated in the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of November 2010, NATO Member States have recognised that malicious cyber activities ‘can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability’.1 In order to assure the security of NATO’s territory and populations, the Alliance has committed to continue fulfilling its essential core tasks, inter alia, to deter and to defend against emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats.2 The revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence of 8 June 2011 focuses NATO on the protection of its own communication and information systems in order to perform the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence and crisis management.3 However, as cyber threats transcend State borders and organisational boundaries, the policy also stresses the need for cooperation of the Alliance with NATO partner countries, private sector and academia.4 NATO Member States reinforced the importance of international cooperation by stating in the Chicago Summit Declaration of May 2012 t hat ‘[t]o address the cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage with relevant partner countries on a case-by-case basis and with international organisations [...] in order to increase concrete cooperation.’5 Against this background, it is of paramount importance to increase the level of protection against cyber threats and to steadily improve the abilities to appropriately address cyber threats by Allies and NATO’s partner countries. The ‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ addresses national cyber security stakeholders in NATO Member States or NATO partner countries, including leaders, legislators, regulators and Internet Service Providers. It will serve as a guide to develop, improve or confirm national policies, laws and regulations, decisionmaking processes and other aspects relevant to national cyber security. Hence, this Manual will support NATO’s goal of enhancing the ‘common security’ with regard to ‘cyber security threats’, as expressed by the Allies in the aforementioned Chicago Summit Declaration. The implementation, maintenance and improvement of national cyber security comprises a range of elements. These can address strategic documents of political nature, laws, regulations, organisational and administrative measures, such as communication and crisis management procedures within a State, but also purely technical protection measures. Furthermore, awareness raising, training, education, exercises and international cooperation are important features of national cyber security. Thus, the aspects to be considered reach from the strategic through the administrative or operational to the tactical level. This Manual addresses all of those levels in the various sections, shows different possibilities of approaches to national cyber security, and highlights good practices within national cyber security strategies and techniques. This approach is based on the reasoning that States have different features and prerequisites with regard to their legal framework, historical and political contexts, governmental structure, organisational structures, crisis management processes, and mentality. Therefore, this Manual cannot provide a ‘blueprint’ which would be feasible and useful for all States, but rather shows diverse aspects and possibilities to be considered in the course of drafting a national cyber security strategy. Due to its rather academic approach – although being of practical use – and the incorporation of military aspects, the Manual differs from publications with a similar goal and target audience. Details: Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012. 253p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2013 at: http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf Shelf Number: 128289 Keywords: Cybercrime Cybersecurity Internet Crime Terrorism

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication principles can strengthen international efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism. The report examines the evolution of the challenge and draws on discussions with officials, diplomats, and experts to offer a series of recommendations for enhancing strategic communications on counterterrorism. While this study focuses on the United Nations, the key principles and recommendations may also be applicable to governments and international organizations confronting this complex transnational threat. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Shelf Number: 128312 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists Groups

Author: Sullivan, Mark P. Title: Latin America: Terrorism Issues Summary: U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional cooperation. In its 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in July 2012), the State Department maintained that the threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere. It reported that the majority of terrorist attacks in the hemisphere were committed by two Colombian terrorist groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and other radical groups in the Andean region. With regard to Mexico, the report asserted that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups, and no evidence “that these criminal organizations had aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity.” Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and potential support for Colombian terrorist groups, although improved Venezuelan-Colombian relations have resulted in closer cooperation on antiterrorism and counter-narcotics efforts and border security. Over the past several years, policymakers have been concerned about Iran’s increasing activities in Latin America. Concerns center on Iran’s attempts to circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as on its ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah. Both Iran and Hezbollah are reported to be linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. As in past years, the State Department 2011 terrorism report maintains that there are no known operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere, but noted that “ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: RS21049: Accessed April 12, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Shelf Number: 128342 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorists (Latin America)

Author: Hartelius, Jonas Title: Narcoterrorism Summary: The concept of “narcoterrorism” was introduced in 1983 by the Peruvian President Belaunde Terry to designate terrorist‐like attacks against his country’s drug enforcement police. Drug criminals utilized methods from political assailants to influence the politics of the country by causing terror and obstructing justice. Later, ideology-driven terrorist organizations took up illegal drug trade as a source of income. Over the years, several definitions of “narcoterrorism” have been introduced. The widest definition is given by the Oxford dictionary (1999): “Terrorism associated with the trade in illicit drugs”. It does not indicate whether ideological and political or, criminal and commercial motives are the main driving factors. The simplest way of describing narcoterrorism is, perhaps, as a part of an illegal complex of drugs, violence and power, where the illegal drug trade and the illegal exercise of power have become aggregated in such a way that they threaten democracy and the rule of law. The manifestations of narcoterrorism are manifold and far reaching: increased drug production; wide spread abuse of drugs; serious drug-related crime; threats to the rule of law, public security, and public health; money laundering; infiltration of the legal economy; and financing of terrorism. It has been estimated that the FARC guerilla of Colombia has a net profit from drugrelated crime (including the “taxation” and “protection” of the illegal cocaine trade) of at least 300 million USD every year. The annual total income from the drug trade for movements such as al‐Qaeda has been estimated by the U.N. to be 2.4 billion USD. Twelve of the 28 organizations, which in October 2001 were listed as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department, were stated to be involved in the illegal drug trade, ranging from Sendero Luminoso of Peru to the “Tamil Tigers” of Sri Lanka. Narcoterrorism represents another step in the development of organized drug crime in the postwar period. It surpasses the traditional drug syndicates and drug cartels in being much more autonomous and having paramilitary strength. Yet another step is represented by “narcostates”. A narcostate is a state (or region), where the operators of the drug trade through their economic, political and paramilitary strength influence the exercise of power by the central government. Current examples are Afghanistan and Colombia. The debate on countermeasures against narcoterrorism is parallel to the debate on countermeasures against the global illegal drug trade. The consumer countries, who are mainly industrial or post-industrial countries, locate the problem with the producer countries and their production and distribution of illegal drugs. They call for elimination of the problem “at source”, e.g. by crop replacement or by police and customs action against the illegal production and distribution of drugs. The producer countries, who mainly are developing countries, point to the demand in the consumer countries as the driving force for the illegal trade. They call for the consumer countries to reduce their demand in order to dry up the industry, e.g. by prevention, treatment and local drug enforcement. Details: New York: EastWest Institute; Stockholm, Swedish Carnegie Institute, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper 3/2008: Accessed April 16, 2013 at: mercury.ethz.ch Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128380 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug Trafficking Control Illegal Drug Trade Narcoterrorism Terrorism

Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing pose an ongoing challenge for countries in the greater Horn of Africa and the international community as a whole. In addition to negatively affecting the integrity and stability of national financial systems, they also threaten national security and undermine economic development. The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report builds upon an assessment conducted in early 2012 for a baseline study on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) in East Africa. This second assessment report identifies key areas of progress, limitations and challenges to, and opportunities for the ongoing development of Ethiopia’s AML/CFT regime. It also outlines recommended entry points to further strengthen and expedite AML/CFT efforts in compliance with regional and international standards. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ethiopia URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 128408 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Money Laundering (Ethiopia) Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism Summary: Following the intervention of the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia in October 2011 in reaction to the increase in kidnappings on the Kenyan coast, the threat of terrorism in Kenya increased considerably. Initially the perception was that the threat originated from Somalia and that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans consequently committed attacks in Kenya. As arrests were made, Kenya was confronted with the reality that Kenyan nationals were responsible for the majority of these attacks. This sparked introspection and the need to understand where this threat originated. This paper aims to provide an overview of the threat of terrorism in Kenya; to consider the drivers of radicalisation, especially among the youth; and to propose counter-strategies that policymakers and security officials might adopt to prevent and counter radicalisation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 245: Accessed May 3, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Kenya URL: Shelf Number: 128615 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Youthful Offenders (Kenya)

Author: Smith, David Michael Title: Immigrants and Counterterrorism Policy: A comparative study of the United States and Britain Summary: This project examines the political mechanisms through which foreign nationals are perceived as security threats and, as a consequence, disproportionately targeted by counterterrorism policies. Evidence suggests that domestic security strategies that unduly discriminate against non-citizens or national minorities are counterproductive; such strategies lead to a loss of state legitimacy, they complicate the gathering of intelligence, and they serve as a potential source of radicalization. At the same time, discriminatory counterterrorism policies represent a significant break from liberal democratic ideals by legitimizing unfair treatment of targeted groups. If discriminatory counterterrorism policies are counterproductive and undemocratic, why do policymakers support such strategies in the first place? By what means do these types of policies and related administrative measures gain traction in the political system? How do these measures operate in practice, and what accounts for variations in their implementation over time? To answer these questions, a policy process model is used that distinguishes between the problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, and policy implementation phases of policymaking. The American government’s handling of the First Red Scare (1919-1920), the American response to 9/11, and the British response to 9/11 are examined to provide a comparative perspective on these issues. Policy outputs across these three cases were remarkably similar. The rights of noncitizens were curtailed to a much greater extent than were the rights of citizens. These similarities are attributed to the ways in which notions of national identity influence problem definition and policy legitimation. In particular, concepts that were prevalent in nationalist narratives about the Other were incorporated into dominant policy narratives about terrorism. The nationalist Other became indistinguishable from the terrorist Other, thereby contributing to the translation of group-neutral policies into a group-specific practice of counterterrorism. The greatest variation, within and between cases, was observed in the implementation of counterterrorism policy. Each instance of implementation represented a unique trajectory, and both American cases displayed a much more vigorous and public set of counterterrorism activities than the British case. These differences are traced to variations in other institutional (domestic and international) and political variables that were found to be influential in each case. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, 2013. 263p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Shelf Number: 128779 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Security Homeland Security Immigrants (U.S. and U.K.) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Sharp, Vincent H. Title: Faded Colors: From the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Summary: After the events of 9/11, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) established the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to provide a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and the American people. Under HSAS, threat levels were raised or lowered 16 times, but never below Threat Level Yellow (Elevated Condition). HSAS should have been straightforward and easy to understand. What evolved was confusion over alerts, lack of specific threat information, concerns over costs to institute and maintain protective measures, and questions regarding what was expected of citizens. Government agencies, the private sector, and the general population became immune with the threat level remaining at or above Yellow. HSAS was woefully misunderstood not just by the general population, but also within federal, state, and local governments. Ridiculed by comedians, HSAS gradually began to disappear, to the point where it was necessary to search to find the current threat level, whereas it had once been prominently posted. The purpose of this thesis is to review HSAS and the associated problems, look at comparable international systems, and present an alternative recommendation to provide timely and informative warnings of terrorist threats, and restore credibility by merging HSAS with the already existing DoD force protection conditions. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32899/13Mar_Sharp_Vincent.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/32899/13Mar_Sharp_Vincent.pdf Shelf Number: 128782 Keywords: National Security (U.S.) Terrorism Terrorist Warnings Threat Alerts

Author: Asian Centre for Human Rights Title: India’s Child Soldiers: Government defends officially designated terror groups’ record on the recruitment of child soldiers before the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Summary: This report is the first comprehensive report on the recruitment and involvement of children in India’s burgeoning internal armed conflicts which currently afflicts 197 out of 640 districts. It has been prepared for submission as a shadow report to the Periodic Report of the Government of India on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. India had submitted its Periodic Report in 2011 and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is scheduled to consider it during its 66th pre-sessional working group to be held in Geneva from 7-11 October 2013. Apart from the field research, this report has been prepared based on the “Technical Seminar on Preparation of the Shadow Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” organised by Asian Centre for Human Rights on 23-24 March 2013 in New Delhi. The participants included mainly activists from the conflict affected areas and their names are being kept confidential as disclosure may put them at risk of reprisals from the armed opposition groups (AOGs) which have been recruiting children. This report also includes India’s periodic report, proceedings before the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) on recruitment of children as boy orderlies under the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation, India’s surrender and rehabilitation policies on the AOGs, and finally, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict for awareness raising in India. Details: New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/JJ-IndiasChildSoldiers2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: India URL: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/JJ-IndiasChildSoldiers2013.pdf Shelf Number: 128857 Keywords: Child Protection Child Soldiers (India) Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Krouse, William J. Title: Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms Summary: The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual’s firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of firearms background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law. Similarly, the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was possibly entered into the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC’s) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As a consequence, he was possibly watch-listed in the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center’s Terrorist Screening Database—the U.S. government’s master watchlist of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, on April 18, 2013, both alleged perpetrators—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are further alleged to have shot and killed a police officer, high-jacked an automobile and taken its owner hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing a pistol recovered at the scene of the shootout. If the watch-listed brother, Tamerlan, had acquired the pistol from a federally licensed gun dealer, it might have generated a terrorist watchlist hit through NICS. Critics could argue that watchlist hits through NICS, or border and aviation security screening systems, might have prompted federal investigators to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travels and activities more closely prior to the bombing. As described in this report, moreover, a NICS-generated watchlist match might have prevented him from acquiring the pistol. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government reevaluated its terrorist screening procedures. As part of this process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI modified the Brady background check procedures and recalibrated NICS to query an additional file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) that included terrorist watchlist records. Since February 2004, information related to the subjects of NICS-generated terrorist watchlist matches have been passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and special agents in the field, who are usually members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These FBI agents, in turn, verify the match between the individual and the watchlist record, and they check for information that would prohibit that individual, the prospective transferee, licensee, or permittee, from possessing firearms or explosives (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status). While the modified NICS procedures initially generated little public opposition, those procedures called three possible issues into question. One, should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the firearms- and explosives-related background check processes? Two, given certain statutory prohibitions related to prohibiting a firearms registry, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations have obtained firearms? Three, should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? Since the 109th Congress, several related legislative proposals have been introduced. Several of those bills would have addressed the retention of firearms-related transfer records. Another proposal would have prohibited persons watch-listed as terrorists for aviation security purposes on the “No Fly” list from firearms transfer or possession eligibility. In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to “dangerous terrorists” (S. 1237/H.R. 2074). In the 111th Congress, they reintroduced this bill (S. 1317/H.R. 2159), which supporters dubbed the “Terror Gap” proposal. In the 112th Congress, they introduced similar bills (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). And, in the 113th Congress they reintroduced their bills (S. 34 and H.R. 720) once more. When the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649) in April 2013, Senator Lautenberg also filed an amendment (S.Amdt. 734) to that bill, which is nearly identical to S. 34. While the Senate leadership set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734. In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members’ Gun Safety Act of 2013 (H.R. 21). The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress. One, should the Attorney General notify watch-listed individuals who have been deemed to be “dangerous terrorists” for the purposes of gun control? Two, what form of redress and/or remedy would be provided to individuals wrongfully denied a firearm transfer because they were misidentified, or improperly watch-listed, and then deemed to be a “dangerous terrorist”? Three, if enacted, would such a law draw unwanted attention to related terrorist screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of these procedures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: R42336: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Shelf Number: 128858 Keywords: Background Checks Firearms Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Mullins, Samuel J. Title: Australian Jihad: Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Summary: This ARI summarises the findings from an-depth empirical study of all publicly-confirmed cases of Islamist terrorism involving Australians. The domestic situation of Australian Muslims is briefly described, followed by an overview of Islamist terrorism cases to date, including the number and location of cases and the level of threat they have presented, both domestically and internationally. The background characteristics of offenders and details of radicalisation are discussed, followed by an examination of the national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, with a focus upon counter-radicalisation initiatives. Current CT tactics appear to be appropriate to the nature of the threat; however, it will be important to closely monitor preventive measures in order to avoid a potential backlash similar to that in the UK, and to make sure that they are appropriately targeted. Details: Analisis of the Real Instituto Elcano, 2011. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Shelf Number: 128888 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Islamists Radical Groups Terrorism Violence (Australia) Violent Extremism

Author: Jehangir, Ahmad Ishaque Title: Challenges to Policing Terrorism in Pakistan Summary: In this paper, Ahmad Ishaque Jehangir, Deputy Inspector General of the Police Service of Pakistan, and a 2012-13 Humphrey Fellow, describes the range of challenges facing Pakistan's domestic security. Pakistan’s police force is underresourced, poorly trained, badly paid, low in morale, and viewed with suspicion. Terrorist attacks have escalated in the last decade, and law enforcement in Pakistan needs significant reform in order to effectively counter the increasing terrorism and insurgency that is gripping the nation. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/pftest1.drupalgardens.com/files/201305/Challenges%20to%20Policing%20Terrorism%20in%20Pakistan%20PF%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/pftest1.drupalgardens.com/files/201305/Challenges%20to%20Policing%20Terrorism%20in%20Pakistan%20PF%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 128893 Keywords: Policing (Pakistan) Terrorism

Author: Perito, Robert M. Title: Empowering the Pakistan Police Summary: Summary •In Pakistan’s struggle against violent extremism, Pakistani police officers have sacrificed their lives to save others. Yet these acts of heroism have done little to alter the fact that most Pakistanis fear the police and seek their assistance as a last resort. •The origins of abusive police behavior are found in Pakistan’s colonial past. The basic police law and the organization of the police date from the period of British rule, as do the attitudes of police toward the public. •Pakistan’s initial response to violent extremism has been to create heavily armed antiterrorist units. The relationship between public support for the police and improved police effectiveness against terrorism has received less attention than it deserves. •Fortunately, the Police Service of Pakistan includes a group of talented senior officers who recognize that improving police-public relations is essential to halting extremist violence. These officers took innovative steps in their districts that brought increased public support. Unfortunately, these initiatives ended when the officers were transferred. •Institutionalizing successful innovations offers a means of improving police effectiveness against terrorism and criminal violence within existing legal authority and available resources. Such an effort would be an appropriate focus for international donor support. Details: Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace, 2013. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 332: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: Shelf Number: 128896 Keywords: Criminal Violence Policing (Pakistan) Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Heyman, Josiah McC. Title: Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to Border Security Summary: The external borders of the United States matter to security, but how and in what ways is neither automatic nor obvious. The current assumption is that borders defend the national interior against all harms, which are understood as consistently coming from outside—and that security is always obtained in the same way, whatever the issue. Some security policies correctly use borders as tools to increase safety, but border policy does not protect us from all harms. The 9/11 terrorists came through airports with visas, thus crossing a border inspection system without being stopped. They did not cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Future terrorists would not necessarily cross a land border. U.S. citizens and residents, and nationals of Western Europe, also represent an important element of the terrorist threat, and they have unimpeded or easy passage through U.S. borders. Fortified borders cannot protect us from all security threats or sources of harm. Moreover, not all border crossers pose security concerns, even ones who violate national laws. The hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border each year have not posed a threat of political terrorism, and external terrorists have not traveled through this border. Enforcement of laws against unauthorized immigration is, in the vast majority of cases, a resource- and attention-wasting distraction from sensible national security measures. That does not mean the U.S.-Mexico border is free from risk of harm, such as increasingly violent drug trafficking organizations operating nearby in Mexico. But that issue needs to be addressed in different ways than current enforcement policy does. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Shelf Number: 128897 Keywords: Border Security (Mexico, U.S.) Drug Trafficking Homeland Security Illegal Immigrants Terrorism

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector Summary: This joint CGCC and United Nations report summarizes the outcomes of a multiyear project led by the UN and aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter the risk of terrorism financing through the nonprofit sector, protecting the sector and preventing terrorist abuse of nonprofit organizations. The project included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings. More than 50 states and 80 nonprofit organizations participated in the meetings, in addition to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies, and the financial sector. Details: Washington, DC: , 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Shelf Number: 129018 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Financial Crimes Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Kundnani, Arun Title: Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe Summary: This paper discusses the challenges of countering far‐Right political violence in the wake of the terrorist attack carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in July 2011. With brief case studies of Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, it argues that classic neo‐Nazi groups are being supplemented by new ‘counter‐jihadist’ far‐Right movements, which use various modes of political action, including participation in elections, street‐based activism and terrorist violence. Building on recent interest among scholars and practitioners in the role of narratives and performativity in counter‐terrorism, this paper argues that official security discourses tend to hinder efforts to counter far‐Right violence and can unwittingly provide opportunities for counter‐jihadists to advance their own narratives. When leaders and officials of Western European governments narrate issues of multiculturalism and radical Islamism in ways that overlap with counter‐jihadist ideology, it suggests a need for reflection on the unintended side‐effects of their security discourse. The paper concludes with a discussion of how governments can rework their security narratives to oppose far‐Right violence. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter‐Terrorism (ICCT), 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, June 2012: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 129196 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Political Vioelnce Terrorism

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: International Best Practices: Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 6) Summary: FATF Recommendation 6 requires countries to implement the targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing, such as UNSCR 1267(1999) and its successor resolutions, and UNSCR 1373(2001). Efforts to combat terrorist financing are greatly undermined if countries do not freeze the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities quickly and effectively. This updated best practices paper reflects the latest relevant UNSCRs in response to challenges faced by countries in the implementation of Recommendation 6. The paper provides best practices that could help countries in their implementation of the targeted financial sanctions to prevent and suppress terrorist financing in accordance with the relevant UNSCRs. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Shelf Number: 129272 Keywords: Financial Crimes Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Arianti, V. Title: Indonesian Terrorism Financing: Resorting To Robberies Summary: SINCE 2010, there have been dozens of bank heists conducted by numerous terrorist cells, some of them linked to Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia or MIT). Led by Santoso, MIT is currently the most dangerous terrorist group in Indonesia and is responsible for a string of deadly attacks against police. Besides banks, the terrorists have also robbed gold shops, mobile phone shops, post offices, money changers, internet cafes, grocery stores, and construction material shops. In the first half of 2013 alone, MIT’s funding arm, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (Mujahidin of Western Indonesia or MIB) led by Abu Roban, reaped a total of Rp 1.8 billion (US$180,000) from a series of bank heists. While in the past, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its splinter cells had conducted robberies to supplement their funding for terrorist attacks, two factors may explain the significant increase in the number of heists since 2010. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2013. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Commentaries: Accessed August 7, 2013 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1422013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1422013.pdf Shelf Number: 129571 Keywords: Robbery Terrorism Terrorist Financing (Indonesia)

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress Summary: As the threat from terrorism becomes more diffuse, networked, and transnational, with newly emerging lone terrorists or small groups, so too have the tools of counterterrorism continued to evolve. Policymakers and practitioners are focusing more on preventing and countering radicalization and recruitment and improving the resilience of individuals and communities against the appeal of violent extremism. Reflective of these trends, efforts on countering violent extremism (CVE)1 have emerged in a relatively short period as an increasingly important instrument in the counterterrorism tool kit as an integral part of their wider strategic objectives on countering terrorism. States are more attentive to the development of CVE strategies and are supporting initiatives that move beyond policy development and into implementation. Additionally, multilateral counterterrorism actors, such as the European Union and United Nations, have expanded their interest in CVE activities. Of particular note in this regard is the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an informal, multilateral counterterrorism body comprising 29 countries plus the European Union that was launched in September 2011.2 The GCTF serves as a platform for identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs and mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. In December 2012, the Hedayah International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism was launched as an initiative of the GCTF in Abu Dhabi to assist governments and stakeholders in their efforts.3 Furthermore, regional organizations and civil society actors are becoming increasingly engaged in the development and implementation of CVE programming. This shift toward a more proactive approach to terrorism and the resulting proliferation of CVE programming have raised questions and concerns about its effectiveness. Challenges exist not only in designing preventive programs but also in developing tools for measuring and evaluating their impact. For example, developing a CVE intervention requires that a number of questions be addressed: How does radicalization occur, and at what stage in the radicalization process is an intervention warranted? Should CVE programs target all who are sympathetic to the causes espoused by militant groups or only those who have provided active support? Do programs that address some of the grievances often associated with violent extremism, such as underdevelopment, inequality, or sociopolitical marginalization, merit being tagged with a CVE label? What kind of added value can be provided by CVE programs that are not included within development, education, or conflict mitigation and peace-building efforts? The responses to these questions are important for establishing the scope and parameters of the program and in contributing to the development of indicators against which success can be measured, which should ideally be embedded in program design from the outset. Once the intervention has been designed, however, a number of obstacles remain in measuring its impact. These challenges include (1) determining the scope of the evaluation; (2) attributing causality where the desired outcome is a nonevent, i.e., “measuring the negative”; and (3) obtaining resources and technical expertise to conduct an evaluation.4 To a large extent, the answers to these questions will vary across regions and contexts and be determined by lessons learned from past practices. Reflecting the prevalence of CVE programs, there is now greater acceptance of the need to invest in program evaluation in order to address the questions and concerns about preventive interventions. It is no longer a question of whether, but how to conduct these evaluations. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129612 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremists Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism ( International)

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mightier than the Sword? The Role of the Media in Addressing Violence and Terrorism in South Asia Summary: The media plays an important role in terrorism and counterterrorism. Because of its capacity to relay information, frame narratives, shape public opinion, and inform both politics and policymaking, the media is a critical vehicle to convey ideas that legitimize or delegitimize terrorists and violent extremist groups and narratives. Violent extremist groups have used the media, particularly the Internet, to link local grievances to global narratives, and to radicalize and mobilize supporters. South Asia has a long history of confronting violence and extremism, particularly from groups espousing a wide variety of ideologies, including ethno-national, separatist, right and left wing, and religious (or sectarian) causes. Within this environment, South Asia's vibrant and diverse media has often been at the forefront of a rich cultural and political discourse and plays an important role in framing and informing public opinion, and in challenging extremist ideas and acts. However, there have also been concerns about the use of the media to incite violence and perpetuate tensions between different communities. This report analyzes the media's important role in contemporary terrorism and argues for greater focus on the role of the media in countering violent extremism (CVE), both as a platform for communication and as a professional body that can shape perceptions, offer balanced information, and create protected spaces for critical debate and dialogue. The publication draws on a desktop literature review, discussions held during a workshop on "The Role of the Media in Addressing Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia" at the Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore, and extensive dialogue with practitioners, experts, and government officials. This report offers a set of recommendations for actors at the national, regional, and international levels to consider when engaging with the media for CVE purposes in South Asia. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2014 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013Oct_CGCC_MightierThanTheSword_Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013Oct_CGCC_MightierThanTheSword_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 131832 Keywords: Journalists Media Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Howard, Russell D. Title: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? Summary: In a globalized and increasingly interconnected world, the transfer of information, expertise, and relationships are becoming more complex and more commonplace. The interconnectedness of criminal organizations that span not only countries but across regions of the globe is troubling. However, more troubling is the possibility of the linking of transnational criminal organizations with insurgent and terrorist organizations as addressed in this work by Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard and Ms. Colleen Traughber. The radical ideologies propagating politically motivated violence now have the opportunity to leverage and participate in traditionally criminal enterprises. This melding of form and function provides criminals with new networks and violent extremists with new funding sources and potential smuggling opportunities. General Howard and Ms. Traughber delve into the nexus between violent extremist elements and transnational criminal elements by first clarifying whether a real problem exists, and if so, what is the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in confronting it. The authors bring rigor to the subject matter by dissecting the issue of intention and opportunities of criminal organization and violent extremists. The question is confounded by the authors who note the wide variance in the motivations and opportunities of both different criminal organizations and extremist organizations. What the authors do make clear is that the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and contraband (HWDC) is a natural way for the criminals and extremists to cooperate. To bring the issue into focus, the authors systematically examine case studies dealing with the nexus between specific organizations and HWDC trafficking opportunities. Human trafficking in Europe and the former Soviet Union; weapons trafficking in the Far East, Asia, and South America for money; the narcotics trade by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia; Hezbollah and Kurdistan Workers' Party, as well as contraband smuggling of cigarettes, are all used to examine the extremist/criminal nexus. The connections become clear as the authors discuss each of the HWDC issues within the nexus; what is also clear is that often the nexus is a simple marriage of convenience. General Howard and Ms. Traughber transition from the vignettes to how this nexus will impact SOF and interagency partners. Most importantly, the authors recognized a need for SOF to expand their mission set, and authorities to more appropriately address criminality in support of extremist groups. The authors identify issues for SOF including the traditional delineation between law enforcement activities and military activities. The findings, therefore, make a case that as SOF move into the future and are required to confront the nexus between extremists and criminals, a new definition and some deep thought need to be given to expanding SOF roles and authorities. Details: MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 13-6: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 131881 Keywords: Cigarette Smuggling Extremist Groups Human Trafficking Smuggling Terrorism Weapons Smuggling

Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: An Analysis of Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists Summary: This paper reviews current literature on the recent and growing phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism. It aims to add data to this subject by analyzing trends and developments using a dataset created using RAND, START, and LexisNexis Academic databases. Analysis of the dataset clarifies five (5) finding trends: 1. increased number of countries targeted by lone wolf terrorists, 2. increased number of fatalities and injuries caused by lone wolves, 3. increased success rate of United States law enforcement to apprehend lone wolves before they can carry out their attacks, 4. high prevalence and success rate of loners over Pantucci's other three types of lone wolf terrorists, and 5. increased targeting of military personnel. To complement these findings, five case studies from the dataset are examined in-depth. These were chosen for their significance in terms of high rates of fatality or injury. The case studies are shown to be consistent with previous research themes, including psychopathology, social ineptitude, the facilitating role of the Internet, and a combined motivation of personal grievances and broader radical Islamic goals in the process of Islamic self-radicalization. Details: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 14, 2014 at: http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qAv1zIPJlGE%3D&tabid=66 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qAv1zIPJlGE%3D&tabid=66 Shelf Number: 131922 Keywords: Islam Lone Wolf Terrorism Terrorism

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts Summary: On August 26, 1995, the Saturday of the final and busiest weekend of France's summer holiday season, terrorists attempted to derail the TGV (Train a Grande Vitesse) between Lyon and Paris by planting a bomb. Fortunately, their crude triggering mechanism failed to detonate the bomb, and subsequent analysis indicates that even had the bomb gone off, the explosion would not have derailed the train. The TGV episode, one of a continuing series of case studies by the Mineta Transportation Institute, points to a continuing problem: Since 1995, terrorists have attempted to derail trains on at least 144 occasions. Because of the expansion of high-speed rail systems in Europe, Asia, and North America, where 15 high-speed rail projects are in preparation or under way in the United States alone, this case study has been expanded to include a chronology and statistical analysis of attempted derailments worldwide. This analysis examines the geographic distribution of the attempts, the methods used by the saboteurs, and the outcomes. Although based on a small universe of events, it underscores both the attractiveness to terrorists of attacking transportation systems-a successful attack can result in high body counts, significant disruption, dramatic images, and enormous publicity, all things sought by terrorists-and the difficulties of achieving success. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 09-12: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Shelf Number: 132014 Keywords: Bombings Railroads Terrorism Trains Transit Crime Transportation Security

Author: Donald, Jennifer S. Title: The Use of Social Media Networks and Mobile Phone Applications for Reporting Suspicious and Criminal Activities on Mass Transit Summary: The threat of terrorism remains in the forefront daily, and public transportation systems remain a preferred target for terrorist attacks. Mass transit customers have long served as the "eyes and ears" of the public transportation environment. In support of the Department of Homeland Security's See It Say It campaign, mass transit customers contribute to this effort by reporting suspicious and criminal activities on subways and buses. The use of social media networks and mobile phone applications by mass transit law enforcement is slowly evolving as a tool for reporting suspicious and criminal activities on subways and buses. By reviewing the data and current use of social media networks and smartphone applications such as by mass transit law enforcement agencies, this thesis demonstrates that citizens want to play a role in assisting law enforcement in solving crimes. Mass transit law enforcement agencies can leverage community involvement and reduce crime by providing customers with an anonymous means for reporting suspicious and criminal activities. However, whether the use of social media networks and smartphone applications have resulted in an increase in reporting suspicious and criminal activities and a reduction in crime is unresolved, warranting future study in this area. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750162 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750162 Shelf Number: 132018 Keywords: Public Transportation Social Media Networks Terrorism Transit Crime Transit Safety

Author: Leonard, Herman B. Dutch Title: Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing Summary: On April 15, 2013, at 2:49 pm, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Three people died, and more than 260 others needed hospital care, many having lost limbs or suffered horrific wounds. Those explosions began about 100 hours of intense drama that riveted the attention of the nation. The response by emergency medical, emergency management, and law enforcement agencies and by the public at large has now become known colloquially as �Boston Strong.� This report, through analysis of selected aspects of the Marathon events, seeks lessons that can help response organizations in Boston and other locales improve preparation both for emergencies that may occur at �fixed� events like the Marathon and for �no notice� events like those that began with the murder of Officer Collier at MIT and concluded the next day with the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators in Watertown. The report is primarily based on a series of intensive interviews conducted in the summer and fall of 2013 with senior leaders of major law enforcement, emergency management, and emergency medical organizations who candidly shared their experiences in and insights about these events.Viewed as a whole, the events following the Marathon bombing posed enormous challenges. The response spanned geographic boundaries, levels of government (local, state, and federal), professional disciplines, and the public and private sectors, bringing together in both well-planned and spontaneous ways organizations with widely varying operating norms, procedures, cultures, sources of authority, perspectives, and interests. The research points strongly to the fact that the emergency response following the bombing in Boston and the events in Cambridge and Watertown at the end of the week were shaped to a substantial degree by the multi-dimensional preparedness of the region. Response organizations have undertaken detailed and careful planning for the many fixed events like the Marathon that are staged annually in the Boston area. They have seen to the development of both institutional and personal relationships among response organizations and their senior commanders, ensured the adoption of formal coordination practices, regularly held intra- and cross-organization drills and exercises, and generated experience during actual events. Importantly, the senior commanders of these organizations seem to have internalized the �mindset� of strategic and operational coordination. The research also suggests that the major contributing factors to much of what went well � and to some of what went less well � were command and coordination structures, relationships, and processes through which responding organizations were deployed and managed. The response organizations � particularly at senior levels � demonstrated effective utilization of the spirit and core principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), mandated by Congress in 2002 but still a work in progress in many areas of the country. But the many highly positive dimensions of inter-organizational collaboration in the Boston response are juxtaposed with some notable difficulties in what might be termed �micro-command,� i.e., the leadership and coordination at the street level when individuals and small teams from different organizations suddenly come together and need to operate in concert. The integration of NIMS into the practices and cultures of emergency response agencies is a work in progress � very promising but still incomplete, particularly at the tactical level of operations. Details: Boston: Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Crisis Leadership, 2014. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2014 at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/crisis-leadership/WhyWasBostonStrong.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/crisis-leadership/WhyWasBostonStrong.pdf Shelf Number: 132099 Keywords: Boston Marathon Bombing Crisis Management Disasters Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Terrorism

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border Summary: Federally led law enforcement task forces and intelligence information sharing centers are ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism, white-collar crime, public corruption, even intelligence sharing. This report focuses on those task forces and information sharing efforts that respond to federal counterdrug and counterterrorism priorities in the Southwest border region. More generally, the report also offers context for examining law enforcement coordination. It delineates how this coordination is vital to 21st century federal policing and traces some of the roots of recent cooperative police endeavors. Policy makers interested in federal law enforcement task force operations may confront a number of fundamental issues. Many of these can be captured under three simple questions: 1. When should task forces be born? 2. When should they die? 3. What overarching metrics should be used to evaluate their lives? Task forces are born out of a number of realities that foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts. These realities are particularly evident at the Southwest border. Namely, official boundaries often enhance criminal schemes but can constrain law enforcement efforts. Criminals use geography to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. At the same time, police have to stop at their own jurisdictional boundaries. Globalization may aggravate such geographical influences. In response, task forces ideally leverage expertise and resources-including money and manpower to confront such challenges. Identifying instances where geography, globalization, and criminal threat come together to merit the creation of task forces is arguably a process best left to informed experts. Thus, police and policy makers can be involved in highlighting important law enforcement issues warranting the creation of task forces. Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative policing efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two, and they can die through these same channels. While some clarity exists regarding the circumstances governing the creation of task forces, it is less clear when they should die and how their performance should be measured. Two basic difficulties muddy any evaluation of the life cycles of law enforcement task forces. First, and in the simplest of terms, at the federal level no one officially and publicly tallies task force numbers. The lack of an interagency "task force census" creates a cascading set of conceptual problems. - Without such information, it is challenging, if not impossible, to measure how much cooperation is occurring, let alone how much cooperation on a particular threat is necessary. - Concurrently, it may be difficult to establish when specific task forces should be disbanded or when funding for a particular class of task forces (e.g., violent crime, drug trafficking, counterterrorism) should be scaled back. - Additionally, how can policy makers ascertain whether task force programs run by different agencies duplicate each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category of criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? For example, do the violent crime task forces led by one agency complement, compete with, or duplicate the work of another's? To give a very broad sense of federal task force activity in one geographic area, CRS compiled a list of task forces and fusion centers operating along the Southwest border, which are geographically depicted in this report. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included. Second, there is no general framework to understand the life trajectory of any given task force or class of task forces. What key milestones mark the development and decline of task forces? (Can such a set of milestones even be produced?) How many task forces outlive their supposed value because no thresholds regarding their productivity are established? Though federal law enforcement has embraced the task force concept, it has not agreed on the breadth or duration of such cooperation. Such lack of accord extends to measuring the work of task forces. This report suggests a way of conceptualizing these matters by framing task force efforts and federal strategies tied to them in terms of input, output, and outcome-core ideas that can be used to study all sorts of organizations and programs, including those in law enforcement. An official task force census coupled with a conceptual framework for understanding and potentially measuring their operations across agencies could greatly assist policy making tied to federal policing throughout the country, and particularly along the Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R43583: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Shelf Number: 132554 Keywords: Border Security Drug Trafficking Fusion Centers Intelligence Gathering Organized Crime Partnerships Terrorism

Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market Summary: There is a general perception that there is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as intelligence. Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation's networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals - with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage; and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition of "cybersecurity professionals" to unearth skills differentiation as relevant to this study. In general, we support the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in the longer run. Increases in educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw more workers into the profession over time. Cybersecurity professionals take time to reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years. By then, the current concern over cybersecurity could easily abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national needs in other vocations. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html Shelf Number: 132617 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyberattacks Cybercrime (U.S.) Cybersecurity Internet Crime National Security Terrorism

Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: 'External Stresses' and Violence Mitigation in Fragile Contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy Analysis Summary: Following on from the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on conflict, security and development, a debate has emerged about the role of so-called 'external stresses' in generating 'new' forms of violence and insecurity in poor and fragile countries. The Bank posits that the combination of internal stresses (e.g. low income levels, high youth unemployment) and external stresses (e.g. cross-border conflict spillovers, illicit drug trafficking) heightens the risk of different forms of violence, which are not confined to inter-state and civil war but range from communal conflicts to criminal violence and terrorism. This perspective is useful in as much as it makes explicit that instability and political disorder are not only related to domestic weaknesses of fragile states, but are also conditioned by outside forces. Yet the binary internal-external/fragility-vulnerability model that underpins the World Bank's analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to inform strategies to address the challenges that arise from pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, price and resource shocks, and cross-border conflict spillovers. A more comprehensive and nuanced framework for policy analysis is called for, based on the recognition that external stresses: (a) tend to involve external, internal as well as transnational actors and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create both losers and winners, and can promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside of the country or world region under 'stress'; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact on states and societies in terms of generating violence. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute Of Development Studies, 2013. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Evidence Report No. 36: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ER36FinalOnline.pdf Shelf Number: 132645 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism Violence Violence Prevention

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing Summary: This report summarizes the discussions at a seminar organized and hosted by the RAND Corporation at which a group of acting and former senior government and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and experts examined domestic intelligence operations and information sharing as these relate to terrorist threats. The collective experience of the participants spanned the breadth of the homeland security apparatus. The participants included officials who have served or are serving in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DoD), state and local law enforcement agencies, first-responder organizations, and state-level homeland security agencies. A similar group met three years ago to discuss lessons learned from avoiding terrorist attacks at home, the role of DHS's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and the value and focus of fusion centers. One of the goals of the meeting reported here was to measure how much progress was being made (or not made, as the case may be) in several critical areas of homeland security. The seminar was conducted within RAND's continuing program of self-initiated research. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Shelf Number: 111284 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Homeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism

Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Socioeconomic Conditions Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Cohen, Jay Title: Making Public-Private Security Cooperation More Efficient, Effective and Sustainable. Recommendations of the Task Force Summary: A global economy has empowered criminals and terrorists on a global scale. Embedded across far-flung production, trade and investment networks, illicit trafficking in high-tech data and equipment, narcotics, arms and counterfeit goods has laid bare the weaknesses of topdown government controls. The challenges of preventing illicit transshipment and other misappropriations of sensitive technologies have never been more urgent. In this report, Stimson's Partners in Prevention Task Force presents its final recommendations to US government and industry stakeholders for combating these threats through public-private partnerships that more effectively harness the power of decentralized, market-based incentives. Individually actionable but collectively diverse, these seven targeted proposals follow an 18-month Stimson collaboration with hundreds of industry partners spanning high-tech manufacturers and service providers, transport and logistics firms, and insurance providers. With the rise of a global marketplace, finding more innovative ways to leverage the resources, agility and expertise of the private sector is essential - and not just for "security," narrowly understood. It will also go far in shaping the future of US global influence and leadership. The Task Force proposals connect that strategic imperative with pragmatic steps forward. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/pip_public-private_security_task_force_recs.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/pip_public-private_security_task_force_recs.pdf Shelf Number: 132673 Keywords: Crime Prevention Private Security Public-Private Partnerships Security Terrorism Trafficking

Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Homeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion Centers Homeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink Summary: The IPAC report, Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink, says that prevention programs of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme) have not been as effective as hoped. At the same time, many local communities, some of them inspired by an anti-salafi backlash, are taking action themselves against extremist preachers and radical media, while some prisoners are deciding on their own to move away from violence. "The trick is to understand when, why and how individuals and communities decide to resist extremism and then to design interventions that can replicate the process," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. BNPT's prevention programs could usefully benefit from more research on how radicalisation takes place and how local communities fight back. For example, it is planning to train administrators and imams of some 90 mosques across thirteen provinces and provide funding to strengthen their capacity to resist extremist donors. But the case dossiers of the hundreds of convicted terrorists, which contained detailed information on the mosques where they became radicalised in the first place, do not appear to have been used to compile a list of mosques to be targeted. The IPAC report contains a case study of one such mosque, Mesjid Muhammad Ramadhan in South Bekasi, just outside Jakarta, where dozens of men later convicted of terrorism took part in radical discussion groups. In April 2014, the local government, working with community leaders, expelled the extremists, exploiting an internal rift in the mosque administration; the fact that the city owned the land on which the mosque was built; and resentment of influential local religious leaders over chararacterisation of their traditional practices as incorrect or idolatrous. The Bekasi takeover benefited from a particularly good local police chief and subdistrict head (camat), but it is only one of many such incidents across the country. If BNPT could collect such cases and analyse what tactics have been successful, it could make the proposed training of mosque administrators far more effective. The report also examines government programs aimed at prisons and at the media and concludes that much more could be done to target them more effectively. It suggests that a new government taking office later this year might consider a restructuring of BNPT to ensure that the prevention division is better integrated with the division responsible for intelligence and operations. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 11: Accessed July 19, 2014 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 132717 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions Summary: Since September 11, 2001, the US government has prosecuted more than 500 people for alleged terrorism-related offenses in the United States. Many prosecutions have properly targeted individuals engaged in planning or financing terrorist acts under US law. However, in other cases, the individuals seem to have been targeted by US law enforcement because of their religious or ethnic background, and many appear to have engaged in unlawful activity only after the government started investigating them. In Illusion of Justice, Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute examine 27 federal terrorism-related prosecutions against American Muslims since 2001 that raise serious human rights concerns. While the government maintains its actions are intended to prevent future attacks, in practice US law enforcement has effectively participated in developing and furthering terrorism plots. As a judge said in one case, the government "came up with the crime, provided the means, and removed all relevant obstacles," and in the process, made a terrorist out of a man "whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in scope." Other concerns include the use of overly broad material support charges, prosecutorial tactics that may violate fair trial rights, and disproportionately harsh conditions of confinement. US counterterrorism policies call for building strong relationships with American Muslim communities. Yet many of the practices employed are alienating those communities and diverting resources from other, more effective, ways of responding to the threat of terrorism. The US government should focus its resources on a rights-respecting approach to terrorism prosecutions, one that that protects security while strengthening the government's relationship with communities most affected by abusive counterterrorism policies. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 212p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132735 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Human Rights Abuses (U.S.) Muslims Prosecutions Terrorism Terrorists

Author: White, Gentry Title: Modelling the Effectiveness of Counter-terrorism Interventions Summary: This paper models the connection between the rate of terrorist events and the occurrence of counter-terrorism interventions in order to examine the relative effectiveness of the interventions. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database and information on interventions collected by the authors, model results show that for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, reactive types of interventions, such as arrests, indictments, imprisonments, assassinations and other operational activities show the strongest association with the rate of terrorism incidents over time. Maximum effectiveness - as measured by the number of days after an intervention exhibits its full inhibitory effect on the risk of subsequent terrorist attacks - was found to be greatest in Indonesia and the Philippines (11 days and 8 days respectively) and least effective in Thailand (impacting only on the day the intervention occurred). This paper also examines the number of days after an intervention that the response was able to maintain a high level of effectiveness - 17 days in Indonesia, 13 days in the Philippines and one day in Thailand. There were significant differences across these three countries and these results highlight a new approach to conceptualising the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 475: Accessed August 12, 2014 at: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi475.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Asia URL: http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi475.pdf Shelf Number: 133016 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Interventions Terrorism

Author: Winkler, Carol K., ed. Title: Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment Summary: Visual images have been a central component of propaganda for as long as propaganda has been produced. But recent developments in communication and information technologies have given terrorist and extremist groups options and abilities they never would have been able to come close to even 5 or 10 years ago. There are terrorist groups who, with very little initial investment, are making videos that are coming so close to the quality of BBC or CNN broadcasts that the difference is meaningless, and with access to the web they have instantaneous access to a global audience. Given the broad social science consensus on the power of visual images relative to that of words, the strategic implications of these groups' sophistication in the use of images in the online environment is carefully considered in a variety of contexts by the authors in this collection. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014. 256p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Shelf Number: 133295 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Online Communication Online Victimization Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government? Summary: It is now recognised that violent extremists have made effective use of the Internet and social media to advance their aims, whether through engagement, propaganda, radicalisation or recruitment. While the quality of their output varies, a growing proportion is professional, well produced, contains compelling messages and is delivered by charismatic individuals. In short, it appeals to the new YouTube generation, which expects high-end products that are well-timed and effective. These extremist groups and networks are also transitioning from their own standalone websites and forums towards social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to take their messages to a much wider audience. Governments are interested in understanding what can be done to counter this content, both illegal and legal, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence. Much of the emphasis to date has been placed on restrictive measures, such as takedowns and filtering. While it is important for governments to enforce the law - and be seen to be doing so - there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies. More recently, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to the problem. One such potential solution is provided by 'counter-narratives'; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, through a range of online and offline means. Counter-narrative has become a catch-all term for a wide range of activities with different aims and tactics, everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by government, to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists. In order to make sense of the complex range of actions and initiatives described as 'counter-narratives', the report sets out a 'counter-messaging spectrum', which is comprised of three main types of activities: government strategic communications, alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The counter-messaging spectrum is summarised in the table overleaf. This report was commissioned by Public Safety Canada. It aims to review the state of knowledge about efforts to counter narratives of violent extremism and make recommendations for governments, such as the Canadian government, to guide their emerging work in this sensitive area of policy. It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in its infancy. While community and civil society groups have been conducting this work for many years, governments are new to the issue and the private sector is feeling its way with extreme caution. This means that there are only a small number of case studies to draw upon. For this reason, as well as the limited scope of the project, the recommendations for government are tentative. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Shelf Number: 133316 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Jetter, Michael Title: Terrorism and the Media Summary: This paper systematically analyzes media attention devoted to terrorist attacks worldwide between 1998 and 2012. Several aspects are related to predicting media attention. First, suicide missions receive significantly more coverage, which could explain their increased popularity among terrorist groups. This result is further supported by Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, suggesting that it is not the particular characteristics of suicide attacks (e.g., more casualties) that are driving heightened media attention. Second, less attention is devoted to attacks in countries located further away from the US. Third, acts of terror in countries governed by leftist administrations draw more coverage. However, this finding is not confirmed for suicide attacks conducted in countries ruled by leftist administrations. Fourth, the more a country trades with the US, the more media coverage an attack in that country receives. Finally, media attention of any terror attack is both predictive of the likelihood of another strike in the affected country within seven days' time and of a reduced interval until the next attack Details: Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2014. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8497: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8497.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp8497.pdf Shelf Number: 134226 Keywords: Media Newspapers Suicide Attacks Terrorism

Author: Lacher, Wolfram Title: Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel Summary: The rise of extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region from 2005 onwards has gone in parallel with the growth of drug trafficking networks across the area. But are these two developments related - and if so, how? The alleged involvement of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in drug smuggling is being taken for granted by many media outlets. Malian and French government officials have increasingly resorted to dismissing their adversaries in northern Mali as 'narco-jihadists'. This paper reviews the evidence for the links between drug smuggling and extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region. While it demonstrates that such links clearly exist, the paper argues that the widespread talk of a drug-terror nexus in the Sahel is misleading, for several reasons. First, much of the evidence presented as basis for such claims can either be easily debunked, or is impossible to verify. Second, rather than the two extremist groups as such, involvement in drug trafficking appears to concern individuals and groups close to, or within, MUJAO and AQIM: within both groups, members are driven by multiple and, at times, conflicting motivations. Third, numerous other actors are playing an equally or more important role in drug smuggling, including members of the political and business establishment in northern Mali, Niger and the region's capitals, as well as leaders of supposedly 'secular' armed groups. Fourth, the emphasis on links between drug trafficking and terrorism in the Sahel serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption in allowing organized crime to grow. Fifth, the profits derived from kidnap-for-ransom played a much more significant role in the rise of AQIM and MUJAO. Details: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No. 4: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Shelf Number: 133595 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Africa) Drug-Terror Nexus Extremist Groups Organized Crime Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Carter, David Title: Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes Summary: The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic ways. One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government. Despite clear evidence of significant changes, very little research exists that examines issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies. Important questions on the nature of the issues that impact SLT intelligence practices remain. While there is some uncertainty among SLT law enforcement about current terrorism threats, there is certainty that these threats evolve in a largely unpredictable pattern. As a result there is an ongoing need for consistent and effective information collection, analysis and sharing. Little information is known about perceptions of how information is being shared between agencies and whether technologies have improved or hurt information sharing, and little is known about whether agencies think they are currently prepared for a terrorist attack, and the key factors distinguishing those that think they are compared to those who do not. This study was designed to address these issues, and a better understanding of these issues could significantly enhance intelligence practices and enhance public safety. To develop a better understanding of perceptions about terrorist threats that SLT agencies face and their efforts to prevent terrorism, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two separate groups of law enforcement personnel. Development of the survey involved several preliminary drafts. Feedback was sought from SLT intelligence workers about question content and coverage, and specifically whether questions were ambiguous or difficult to answer. After making revisions, the final Institutional Review Board approved instrument had 48 structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions. The survey, despite its length, enabled respondents to share information about issues such as perceptions of terrorist threats, inter-agency interactions, information sharing, intelligence training, and agency preparedness. Additional questions asked about characteristics of the respondent and the respondent's agency. There are three findings that are quite interesting. First, law enforcement perceptions about what is a serious threat in their community has changed significantly over time. Law enforcement is much more concerned about sovereign citizens, Islamic extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the fringe groups of the far right, including Christian Identity believers, reconstructed traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., survivalists), and members of doomsday cults. In fact, sovereign citizens were the top concern of law enforcement, but the concern about whether most groups were a serious terrorist threat actually declined for most groups (e.g., the KKK; Christian Identity; Neo-Nazis; Racist Skinheads; Extremist Environmentalists; Extreme Animal Rights Extremists). Second, when examining whether the respondents thought that various agencies and sources were useful in their counterterrorism efforts, the agencies that appear to be most useful to SLT law enforcement include state/local fusion centers, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force(s), the FBI, and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Overall, the internet and the use of open source materials, human intelligence sources, and the media were perceived as providing the most useful information. Security clearances, adequate personnel, adequate training, adequate resources, adequate time, or the organizational culture were all perceived as barriers for the sharing of intelligence and information across agencies. Third, several factors impacted whether an agency was prepared for a terrorist attack. Agencies with satisfied working relationships with state organizations were twice as likely to be prepared, agencies that produce threat assessments and risk assessments more frequently are three-and-a-half times more likely to be prepared than agencies who create them less frequently, and the creation of vulnerability assessments also appears to be a predictor of preparedness as they more than quadruple an agency's preparedness likelihood. In addition, as agencies experience problems related to personnel, training, and resources, the likelihood they will consider themselves prepared is reduced by approximately three-fold. Agencies that felt they were not prepared highlighted problems with resources, training, and quality of working relationships with other organizations. Particularly for practitioners, the most important aspect of this research may not be the findings on the variable analyses, per se, but on the benchmarks identified in trends found in the data. Some clear trends emerged which indicate programmatic successes for information sharing and intelligence, as well as areas where problems remain. When considering these findings in the context of research on organizational development, it is clear that organizational leadership is an important factor for organizational successes in information sharing as well as for preparedness. If the leadership of a law enforcement agency is willing to expend the effort to train personnel, develop partnerships, and participate in state, regional and national information sharing initiatives, then greater levels of success will be achieved. While one would intuitively assume this, the data empirically supports it. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133952 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence (U.S.) Extremist Groups Intelligence Gathering Intelligence-Led Policing Law Enforcement Terrorism

Author: Eck, John E. Title: Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers Summary: before the attack - that is, for failing to detect a pattern in the scattered items of information about the hijackers that had come to the attention of various federal and state agencies. The resulting calls for intelligence reform were at first confined to the nation's security agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Soon police leaders began to argue that their agencies, too, had a vital role in addressing terrorism and that they must be included in the loop. Terrorism may have raised the profile of police intelligence, but it is not the main reason for improving its use. Police intelligence has a far wider role in public safety, crime reduction, and order maintenance. This wider role is explored throughout this manual. Unfortunately, the word "intelligence" also raises public fears that secretly collected police information will be used to subvert individual liberties and democratic institutions. We will touch on these concerns later; here, we should explain why we wrote the manual, who it is for, and what it covers. What is this manual about and who is it for? As we discuss in Step 1, intelligence analysis is "a process for making sense of a diverse array of information about crime problems created by offender groups, with the goal of reducing crime." Numerous books and manuals for crime analysts are available that describe how to process data to guide police anti-crime tactics and strategies. In contrast, most writing on police intelligence focuses on data gathering and sharing, administration, and legal requirements. These are all important topics, but they do not help the analyst analyze, i.e., make sense of the data in order to glimpse behind the veil of a criminal enterprise. Our manual fills this gap by providing a practical guide to intelligence analysis, much like our earlier manual on crime analysis written for the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. In writing this manual, it soon became clear that police intelligence has a much larger mission than simply finding out who is up to no good, who they hang out with, what they are about to do, and where they can be found. These are the sorts of questions we normally expect police intelligence to address. However, there are other questions that intelligence analysis can effectively address, such as: How do offenders commit their crimes? What circumstances help them commit their crimes? And, what countermeasures might prevent them from doing so? In short, we look beyond the "who" to address "how," "when," "where," and "what." This manual fuses aspects of intelligence analysis with Problem-Oriented Policing. The links between the two have been ignored in the past, with the exception of Jerry Ratcliffe's book referenced below. However, knowing how intelligence analysis can help solve problems and how problem solving can improve the effectiveness of intelligence analysis will aid any police practitioner interested in reducing crime or disorder. This manual is not intended to serve the entire law enforcement community. Nor does it describe all facets of intelligence. Rather it focuses on the analysis of intelligence, and we wrote it for three groups in local policing agencies: (1) intelligence officers and analysts, (2) crime analysts who might need to use intelligence information and, (3) police managers who supervise crime and intelligence analysts. If you are such a manager, and you find that the work of analysts is something of a mystery, then we hope this manual can demystify their work and help you make better use of your analysts. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; Madison, WI: Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2013. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/Intell-Analysis-for-ProbSolvers.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/Intell-Analysis-for-ProbSolvers.pdf Shelf Number: 133627 Keywords: Crime Analysis Intelligence Analysis Police Intelligence Gathering (U.S.) Problem Solving Analysis Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting-or intercepting-nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities-including nuclear and radiological testing-covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies. OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders. Why GAO Did This Study Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-826: Accessed October 15, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Shelf Number: 133922 Keywords: Border Security Homeland SEcurity Nuclear Smuggling (U.S.) Terrorism

Author: Jones, Derek Title: Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations Summary: Lieutenant Colonel Derek Jones wrote this School of Advanced Military Studies award-winning comprehensive study of clandestine cellular networks and the effect on counterinsurgency operations in 2008 while a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Consequently, his monograph, although timeless in its discussion and analysis of clandestine cellular networks, was drafted years before the May 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden that resulted in his death. Therefore, the paper does not address the impact on such organizations from the death of its most charismatic leader. His monograph does provide, however, a theoretical, doctrinal, and operational understanding of the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks resulting in valuable insight and understanding of the complex nature of these organizations. As the world s societies have migrated into the urban areas, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, the urban guerrilla, underground, and auxiliaries, all operating as clandestine cellular networks, have become increasingly important, especially the core members of the movement within the underground. His analysis presents the problem from a Western military, and especially the counterinsurgent perspective pointing out that the primary components of these networks, the underground and auxiliary elements and the urban guerrillas, exist among and are drawn from the local population. As such, thus, they continually frustrate counterinsurgent operations. Any misapplication of force by the counterinsurgent, in LTC Jones s view, automatically delegitimizes the government s efforts. LTC Jones answered the primary research question what is the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks? Although each insurgency is unique, underground clandestine cellular networks as the foundation of insurgent organizations are not, nor are their form, function, and logic. Details: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 139p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-3: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Shelf Number: 131728 Keywords: Counterterrorism Criminal Networks Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Constitution Project Title: The Report of the Constitution Project's Task Force on Detainee Treatment Summary: The Constitution Project's independent, bipartisan, blue-ribbon Task Force on Detainee Treatment examined the federal government's policies and actions related to the capture, detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists in U.S. custody during the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. Created late in 2010, the goal of the Task Force was to provide the American people with a broad understanding of what is known-and what may still be unknown-about the past and current treatment of suspected terrorists detained by the U.S. government. The Task Force identified detention policies and practices that will help America to better comply with the nation's legal obligations, foreign policy objectives and democratic values. Details: Washington, DC: The Constitution Project, 2013. 560p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 30, 2014 at:http://detaineetaskforce.org/report/ Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://detaineetaskforce.org/report/ Shelf Number: 133872 Keywords: Detainees Terrorism Terrorist Detention Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband Summary: The report makes four main points that run counter to previous conceptions of crime-terror connectivity and the global illicit network. 1) Rather than operating in numerous smaller networks, the criminals and terrorists in our study are largely subsumed (98%) in a single network of 2,700 individuals with 15,000 relationships. Connectivity among actors within the illicit marketplace is relatively high. This should not be construed to say that the network is a cohesive organizational entity. Rather, the phenomenon observed and documented here is a self-organizing complex system built through social connections from the bottom up. 2) By most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers. The transnational nature of some terrorist actors allows them to link disparate criminal groups. Importantly our study does not provide evidence that terrorists are shunned by criminal actors because of their ideological motivations. 3) The conventional wisdom that explains crime-terror connectivity as a product of failed or economically poor states is challenged here. Generally speaking, connectivity between terrorists and criminals is highest in resource-rich countries that have little incentive to support substate actors (comparative advantage theory) and resource-poor countries that are incentivized to support criminal or terrorist groups (augment state capabilities theory). 4) Despite the interest surrounding big data and data science, the results of data acquisition and utilization often falls short of their potential. A growing number of data sources and tools offer an opportunity to conduct analyses addressing global challenges like the crime-terror "nexus." Advancing this agenda requires asking questions in unique ways and pursuing creative approaches and partnerships to aggregating and analyzing data. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Shelf Number: 134009 Keywords: Contraband Criminal Networks Illicit Goods Smuggling Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Perliger, Arie Title: The Rationale of Political Assassinations Summary: The current study aims to improve our understanding of the causes and implications of political assassinations by employing quantitative analyses on a comprehensive data set. The findings illustrate the trends that characterize the phenomenon and challenge some of the existing conventions about political assassinations and their impact. This study puts forth the rationale that the logic of political assassinations is different from that of other manifestations of political violence. Hence, it is important to understand the unique factors that may encourage or discourage violent groups or individuals from engaging in political assassinations. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that these factors vary among different types of assassinations, because in most cases the characteristics of the targeted individual shape the nature and objectives of the assassination. Indeed, this study establishes that different processes trigger different types of assassinations, and that different types of assassinations generate distinct effects on the political and social arenas. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2015. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2015 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rationale-of-political-assassinations Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rationale-of-political-assassinations Shelf Number: 134617 Keywords: Political Assassinations Political Violence Terrorism

Author: Ramirez, Debbie A. Title: Developing partnerships between law enforcement and American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities: a promising practices guide Summary: The Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative (PfP) grew out of a series of conversations among American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities, and among federal, state, and local law enforcement leaders, that began in the fall of 2001. After the attacks of September 11th, leaders in the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities realized a critical need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all Americans, had every desire to help prevent another terrorist attack. It was, as many have noted, their time in history. However, these communities also had the added burden of both guarding their civil liberties from heightened security measures and protecting their children, their homes, and their places of worship from hate crimes and hate incidents. To achieve these goals these communities began to prioritize law enforcement outreach efforts. At the same time law enforcement recognized that the tools used prior to September 11th were inadequate to the new post-September 11th task. Although traditional investigative tools had been useful in achieving a quick and thorough response to September 11th, law enforcement needed enhanced tools to effectively prevent future acts of terror. Specifically, September 11th reinforced the idea that for law enforcement agencies to effectively prevent future acts of terrorism, it would require the cooperation and assistance of the American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. Embedded within these communities are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build the bridges required for effective communication with these groups. In the fall of 2002, members of the future PfP research team came together at Northeastern University to pursue mechanisms for moving this discussion about institutionalizing partnerships forward into action. In order to assist with the development of partnerships, the team decided to research 1) the benefits of these proposed partnerships; 2) the challenges posed by this partnership model; 3) case studies of these partnerships in action; and, ultimately, 4) the "promising practices" that can be utilized by sites interested in pursuing this model. The PfP research was conducted from May 2003 to May 2004 and was based on three sites: Southeastern Michigan, Southern California, and Greater Boston. Guidance and input from national partners in Washington, DC was another critical piece of the research plan. These research sites were chosen because of their experience in developing preliminary partnerships between communities and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, the presence of major terrorism or hate crime investigations, and/or because significant numbers of Arab, Muslim and Sikh community members indicated an interest in participating in the study. These communities were chosen because both law enforcement and the perpetrators of hate crimes were (and in some cases still are) focused on individuals who share or are perceived to share1 characteristics with the September 11th hijackers. Specific research participants were initially identified through national organizations. Local chapters of these organizations then directed the team toward other interested community members, who were also asked to participate. On the law enforcement side, key federal, state, and local agencies were contacted in each of the three sites. Over the course of the year, PfP visited the three sites and conducted numerous focus groups, personal interviews, and discussions with community and law enforcement members. After these visits, the team continued to communicate with project participants through emails, letters, faxes, and phone calls. All project participants were given the opportunity to review a draft version of the relevant section of the report to help ensure its accuracy. As a culmination of this research, the Promising Practices Guide aims to demonstrate the research findings that: 1) The goals of the American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities and law enforcement are not in conflict and can in fact be achieved simultaneously; 2) The most effective model for simultaneously addressing community and law enforcement concerns is through institutionalized partnerships; and 3) While there are significant challenges to achieving these partnerships, they are not only possible but also necessary for both community safety and terrorism prevention. While this work is by no means comprehensive, it does reflect the experience of a wide range of community and law enforcement representatives. Both in terms of studying additional sites and contacting more community organizations and law enforcement entities, there is still much work in this arena to be done. The hope is that this guide will serve as the beginning of an ongoing dialogue and the catalyst for new programming and training focused on the initiation, development, and strengthening of partnerships. This research will continue and can be followed by accessing PfP's website at www.ace.neu.edu/pfp. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Partnering for Prevention & Community Safety Initiative, 2004. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 11, 2015 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=pfp_pubs Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=pfp_pubs Shelf Number: 134905 Keywords: Community Crime Prevention Community Participation Community-Oriented Programs Crime Prevention Programs (U.S.) Minority Groups Partnerships Police-Citizen Interactions Police-Community Relations Terrorism

Author: Ramirez, Debbie A. Title: The greater London experience: essential lessons learned in law enforcement - community partnerships and terrorism prevention Summary: Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, United States law enforcement has feared the sleeper cell - a small group of individuals sent from abroad by a foreign terrorist organization to live quietly in Muslim neighborhoods in the United States and wait for the signal to initiate pre-planned terrorist attacks. More recently, in large part as a result of the July 7, 2005 London attacks, United States law enforcement has recognized that similar dangers may arise from homegrown militants who are either born or raised in the United States, and who operate with little or no support from foreign terrorist organizations. Information that would likely be most helpful to exposing these potential dangers lies in Muslim communities in a small number of United States cities. United States law enforcement, however, has been slow to reach out to them for assistance and guidance and develop meaningful relationships with them. Our research has shown that a significant reason for this disconnect is that United States law enforcement does not appear to know how to effectively connect with these communities. British law enforcement is far ahead of the United States both in thinking creatively about building bridges to its Muslim communities and implementing community policing programs that produce constructive interactions between these communities and various branches of law enforcement. Because they began their efforts well before the July 7, 2005 London bombings, British law enforcement was able to see firsthand how their connections with the Muslim community, particularly in the Bradford/Leeds area of England, helped them quickly identify the bombers and develop leads that were critical to their investigation. In the wake of those bombings, British law enforcement has worked even harder to expand their community policing efforts with their Muslim communities. These efforts have proven fruitful on multiple fronts, including in August 2006, when a tip from the Muslim community helped British police thwart a terrorist plot to detonate bombs on international flights departing from London's Heathrow Airport. In short, British law enforcement is far ahead of our own in connecting with Muslim communities, even though Muslim communities in Great Britain are significantly less prosperous and more alienated from the mainstream than Muslim communities in the United States. The premise of this paper is that we have much to learn from what they have begun. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Partnering for Prevention & Community Safety Initiative, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Partnering for Prevention & Community Safety Initiative Publications Paper no. 5: Accessed March 11, 2015 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=pfp_pubs Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=pfp_pubs Shelf Number: 134906 Keywords: Crime Prevention Minority Groups Muslims Partnerships Police-Community Relations Terrorism

Author: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Title: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach Summary: Terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE. The OSCE participating States are determined to combat all acts of terrorism, without exception, as most serious crimes. States, through their police agencies in particular, have a duty to protect all individuals within their jurisdictions from terrorism, as part of their human rights obligations to guarantee the right to life, the right to security and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. This requires that they adopt a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), while upholding human rights and the rule of law. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's actions against terrorism will be undermined if the state, through any of its agencies, uses its power in violation of international human rights standards. As the police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial that the police be held accountable for their actions in order to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, people advocating the abolition of slavery or who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion or ethnicity. Countering VERLT requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There are many issues, relevant but not specific to terrorism that need to be genuinely addressed, in their own right and without undue security bias. The police have a key role in the criminal-justice response to VERLT, but their role should be limited in proactive prevention efforts. The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon. OSCE participating States have acknowledged the usefulness of such joint efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in countering terrorism. There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Details: Vienna: OSCE, 2014. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Shelf Number: 134917 Keywords: Community-Policing Counter-terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists (Europe) Violent Extremism

Author: Cigar, Norman Title: Tribal Militias: An effective tool to counter Al-Qaida and its affiliates? Summary: Despite over a decade of open war, dealing with Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Middle East is likely to remain a concern for the foreseeable future and will pose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that is likely to be effective in meeting the threat. Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida has operated in the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001, have a predominantly tribal character or at least have a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools to counter Al-Qaida's continuing presence in that social environment, therefore, is a priority and requires understanding Al-Qaida's critical vulnerabilities when it operates in those societies and developing the means to counter Al-Qaida's efforts. This monograph addresses the role of tribal militias in the context of the fight against Al-Qaida. The intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify options for future operations by focusing on past experience in order to identify the positive and negative aspects related to the use of such militias. The focus in this monograph is on Iraq and Yemen. However, many of the lessons learned may be applied more broadly. The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-based militias provide may be one of the most efficient, cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, such militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S. Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground in significant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias can reduce the need for a U.S. commitment on the ground in environments that might present unfavorable conditions for a significant U.S. Landpower footprint. At the same time, given the complexity of the local political environment, tribal militias are no panacea, but can be a two-edged sword. Like any weapon, the use of tribal militias has to be understood and wielded with caution and skill in order to avoid unintended consequences. This discussion includes two models for the tribal militias based on the nature of their patron. In Model 1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model 2, the national government is the patron (although an outside entity may provide ancillary support). The first case study deals with a Model 1 situation, where a foreign patron - the United States - acted in that role in Iraq beginning in late-2006 and lasting through the hand-over to Iraqi authorities during the period from December 2008 to April 2009. The second case study deals with two ongoing Model 2 situations, again with Iraq, but taking place after the national government's assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in 2009. This case study is especially useful for comparative purposes with the first case study. The third case study deals with Yemen, where the local government has acted as the militia patron since 2012. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Shelf Number: 134967 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Militia Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cole, Jared P. Title: Terrorist Databases and the No Fly List: Procedural Due Process and Hurdles to Litigation Summary: In order to protect national security, the government maintains various terrorist watchlists, including the "No Fly" list, which contains the names of individuals to be denied boarding on commercial airline flights. Travelers on the No Fly list are not permitted to board an American airline or any flight on a foreign air carrier that lands or departs from U.S. territory or flies over U.S. airspace. Some persons have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. As a result, various legal challenges to placement on the list have been brought in court. The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Accordingly, when a person has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the government must follow certain procedures. Several courts have found that placement on the No Fly list may impair constitutionally protected interests, including the right to travel internationally, and the government's redress procedures must therefore satisfy due process. Typically, due process requires that the government provide a person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. However, the requirements of due process are not fixed, and can vary according to relevant factors. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts employ the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interests affected against the government's interest. Courts applying this balancing test might consider several factors, including the severity of the deprivation involved in placement on the No Fly list. In addition, courts may examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Finally, courts may inquire into the government's interest in preserving the status quo, including the danger of permitting plaintiffs to access sensitive national security information. Resolution of the issue is currently pending as at least two federal courts have ruled that the government's redress procedures for travelers challenging placement on the No Fly list violate due process. The government is currently revising this process, although the precise details of what the new program will entail are unclear. Litigation is further complicated by several legal hurdles, such as the state secrets privilege, that can bar plaintiffs from accessing certain information during litigation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43730: Accessed April 15, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Shelf Number: 135235 Keywords: Due Process Homeland Security National Security Terrorism Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Tracking Progress: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: Money laundering and terrorism financing pose a significant threat to security and developmental efforts worldwide and increasingly undermine the integrity of the global financial system and its long-term stability. Many states in the Greater Horn of Africa region are experiencing rapid economic growth and have increasing access to global markets. With predominantly informal and cash-based economies, these states are particularly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing activities. This vulnerability is further enhanced by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms as well as limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to respond to violations. Poverty, weak governance, corruption, porous borders, and political instability all contribute to the enabling environment for transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups in the Greater Horn region. Although overarching regulatory frameworks and institutional capacities remain low, political interest and technical attention and resourcing is growing in the region. In particular, a willingness to engage on these issues at the national level is rising. This report provides a new assessment of developments related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/ CFT) efforts in East Africa and the Greater Horn region and offers a review and analysis of 10 countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. It builds on the 2012 baseline study, titled "ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion," and includes two additional countries, Tanzania and Yemen, because of the geographical and strategic importance of these two countries to the cross-border risks shared among Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states and these non-IGAD members. This report combined desk research and analysis with limited in-country visits. To the extent possible, each country's assessment covers similar areas, including a recap of the findings from the 2012 baseline study and a summary of findings and recommendations to date; a broad economic snapshot of the country and relevant political context; progress on AML/ CFT efforts, such as the national legal framework and the operationalization of a financial intelligence unit; ongoing risks and vulnerabilities, largely focused on sectoral risks and concrete implementation of legal frameworks; and emergent entry points for action and further development. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 135379 Keywords: Financial Crime Money Laundering (Africa) Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Hoffman, Bruce Title: (U) The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century Summary: (U) The FBI 9/11 Review Commission was established in January 2014 pursuant to a congressional mandate. The United States Congress directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or the "Bureau") to create a commission with the expertise and scope to conduct a "comprehensive external review of the implementation of the recommendations related to the FBI that were proposed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission)." The Review Commission was tasked specifically to report on: 1. An assessment of the progress made, and challenges in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are related to the FBI. 2. An analysis of the FBI's response to trends of domestic terror attacks since September 11, 2001, including the influence of domestic radicalization. 3. An assessment of any evidence not known to the FBI that was not considered by the 9/11 Commission related to any factors that contributed in any manner to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 4. Any additional recommendations with regard to FBI intelligence sharing and counterterrorism policy. (U) The Review Commission was funded Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Shelf Number: 135549 Keywords: Domestic Terrrorism Federal Bureau of Investigation Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is mandated to provide assistance to requesting countries in the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its Terrorism Prevention Branch is leading this assistance delivery, primarily by assisting countries to ratify the international legal instruments against terrorism, incorporate their provisions in national legislation and build the capacity of the national criminal justice system to implement those provisions effectively, in accordance with the rule of law, including human rights. The Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum is one of the tools developed by the Branch for transferring the knowledge and expertise needed to strengthen the capacity of national criminal justice officials to put the universal legal framework against terrorism into practice. This knowledge transfer is pursued through: - Direct training of criminal justice officials - Train-the-trainers activities - Supporting national training institutions of criminal justice officials (schools of judges and prosecutors, law enforcement academies and other relevant institutions) to develop/ incorporate counter-terrorism elements in their curricula The Curriculum consists of several modules, each dealing with specific thematic areas of the legal and criminal justice aspects of countering terrorism. Its first five modules are: - Module 1. Counter-Terrorism in the International Legal Context (under preparation) - Module 2. The Universal Legal Framework Against Terrorism (issued) - Module 3. International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Counter-Terrorism (issued) - Module 4. Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (this issue) - Module 5. Transport related (civil aviation and maritime) Terrorism Offences (being issued) Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 222p. Source: Internet Resource: Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum MODULE 4 Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Human_Rights/Module_HR_and_CJ_responses_to_terrorism_ebook.pdf Shelf Number: 135623 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Human Rights National Security Terrorism

Author: Eby, Charles A. Title: The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11 Summary: Lone-wolf terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States throughout the country's history. Attempted attacks from individual terrorists unaffiliated with terrorist groups may be becoming more prevalent. Both the general public and government officials acknowledge the presence and importance of these attacks; however, relatively little literature exists on the subject compared to group terrorism. Much of the information on lone wolves has been established by case study, inference, and known characteristics of group terrorism. The purpose of this study is to analyze the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism through formal statistical models. The study then synthesizes data with case study and existing literature to formulate a base of knowledge for lone-wolf terrorism. This study demonstrates that no single dispositional profile of a lone-wolf terrorist exists. The individuals who engage in the tactic of lone-wolf terrorism form a unique ideology that combines personal grievances with common terrorist goals. Still, many lone-wolf cases exhibit certain characteristics. This thesis analyzes these characteristics and their relationship with successful attacks. These data on characteristics, goals, and motivations of lone wolves purport policies to increase engagement between the community and curb lone-wolf terrorism and its effects. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 13, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 135629 Keywords: Lone Wolf Terrorist National Security Terrorism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe Summary: In response to the recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorist activities, several agencies in the U.S. government have begun devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. In doing so, they are following the lead of certain European countries that have invested significant human, financial, and political capital in counter-radicalization programs. The challenges European authorities have had to face are similar to those their U.S. counterparts are expected to confront, and several lessons are at hand from the European experience. Summary The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. - authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of - various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible approaches when trying to combat it. The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside - ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. Policymakers need to determine whether a counter-radicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy. Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counter-radicalization program. - In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counter-radicalization efforts could be perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Shelf Number: 135633 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Homeland Security Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Transport-related (civil aviation and maritime) Terrorism Offences Summary: The present Counter-Terrorism Legal Module focuses on transport-related (civil aviation and maritime navigation) terrorist offences. It was prepared by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Its purpose is to assist practitioners and policymakers to identify, understand, and effectively incorporate and implement a set of international legal tools into national legislation. These legal tools are found in conventions and protocols developed to combat transport-related terrorism since the 1960s. The module introduces the relevant instruments, places them in their context so they can be correctly understood, analyses their content and explains their use. Training tools and aids are interspersed with the explanatory text so that the structure, terminology and practical application of the relevant instruments will be clear. The increasing ease and availability of international travel resulted in increased risks to aviation security in the 1960s and 1970s. Violent groups seeking international publicity for their political, ideological or other goals focused on international air travel as a vulnerable target, attacks on which produced immediate and intense publicity. Continuing into the 1980s terrorist groups seized or bombed international flights, murdered passengers, crew members and persons in airports and destroyed multiple aircraft. These actions were designed to gain visibility for the causes to which the various groups were dedicated, to intimidate and to coerce compliance with those groups' demands. Maritime transportation also became a target in the 1980s. A body of international law has been developed over the decades since 1963 to deal with these threats to the travelling public and the transport industry, both with regard to aviation and maritime transportation. Details: New York: UNODC, 2014. 151p. Source: Internet Resource: Counter-Terrorism Legal Training Curriculum Module 5: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Transport/13-89032_Ebook_from_DM_9-9-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Module_on_Transport/13-89032_Ebook_from_DM_9-9-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 135649 Keywords: Aviation Security Aviation Terrorism Counter-Terrorism Programs Maritime Crime Maritime Safety Maritime Terrorism Terrorism Transportation

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention Summary: Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of 'the enemy', and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the 'rise of the far right' remains confused in many ways. Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two? Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Although the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural environments that inform them. For example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot "simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture." Despite this, by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135685 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for policy makers Summary: Several recent events have focused attention on the growing dangers posed by the far right in Europe. In October 2013, Ukrainian born Pavlo Lapshyn was convicted of racially-motivated murder and for plotting a campaign of terror against mosques in the UK. In May 2013 commenced the trial of Beate Zschape, the only surviving member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a far-right terrorist group which has been linked to a series of murders of immigrants, the murder of a policewoman and the attempted murder of her colleague, the 2001 and 2004 Cologne bombings and 14 bank robberies. In August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was convicted for the murder of 77 people in twin terrorist attacks in Norway. Security agencies such as Europol have documented heightened levels of right-wing extremist activity across a number of countries in Europe. While such high-profile and high impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, intimidation and bullying by extremists targeting minority communities. The dichotomy between national security and community safety means that, as a result, far-right extremism tends to be relegated to a second tier security threat, even though its impact is felt on a daily basis by individuals and communities across Europe. Far-right extremism takes a number of forms. There are four main types of agents: youth gangs, white power and skinhead groups; terrorist cells and lone actors; political movements and paramilitary groups; and nativist, identitarian and anti-Islam movements. They engage in a wide range of activities: spontaneous hate crime, vandalism and hooliganism; street demonstrations; shock tactics; hate speech and incitement; and planned hate crime and terrorism. Though often rooted in its local context, far-right extremism has impacts across borders. Groups and methods in one country are often mirrored elsewhere, and online connectivity is making this more common. There is also evidence of cooperation between national groups and the pooling of knowledge and expertise. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135686 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2015 at: https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/530/european-counter-radicalisation-and-de-radicalisation-a-comparative-evaluation-of-approaches-in-the-netherlands-sweden-denmark-and-germany Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/530/european-counter-radicalisation-and-de-radicalisation-a-comparative-evaluation-of-approaches-in-the-netherlands-sweden-denmark-and-germany Shelf Number: 135708 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation Title: The FBI Story Summary: For the FBI and its partners, 2012 was a year that reminded us once again of the seriousness of the security threats facing our nation. During the year, extremists plotted to attack-unsuccessfully, thanks to the work of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces-the U.S. Capitol, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and other landmarks on U.S. soil. Tragically, on the 11th anniversary of 9/11, a hateful attack in Benghazi took the lives of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans. In the cyber realm, a rising tide of hackers took electronic aim at global cyber infrastructure, causing untold damages. High-dollar white-collar crimes of all kinds also continued to siphon significant sums from the pocketbooks of consumers. And in Newtown, Connecticut, 20 young children and six adults lost their lives in one of the worst mass shootings in American history, ending a year of violence that saw similar tragedies around the country. Working with its colleagues around the globe, the FBI is committed to taking a leadership role in protecting the nation. As you can see from this book-an annual compilation of stories from the FBI's public website that provides a snapshot of Bureau milestones, activities, and accomplishments-we used the full range of our intelligence, investigative, and operational skills to address major threats during the year. We helped avert terrorist attacks and derail terrorist supporters, put cyber criminals and fraudsters behind bars, and dismantled violent gangs and organized crime groups. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Shelf Number: 129962 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation Homeland Security Terrorism

Author: Soldz, Stephen Title: All the President's Psychologists: The American Psychological Association's Secret Complicity with the White House and US Intelligence Community in Support of the CIA's Summary: When considering the analysis presented here, it is important to be mindful of the fundamental principles that define and inform the behavior of all health professionals and professional associations. A profession is characterized by a specialized body of knowledge applied in the service of the individual patient and society. It is incumbent upon a profession to disseminate and expand such knowledge, to abide by codes of ethics worthy of the designation of "profession," including the responsibility to self regulate. The APA is the largest association of professional psychologists in the United States, and, indeed, the world. As such it plays a major role in setting standards for psychological research, practice, and education. Those standards are a primary mechanism that international standards for health professionals, including such international instruments as the Convention against Torture, become integrated into the practice and standards of US psychologists. Further, APA's standards and positions exert influence on psychological professionals and associations around the world. The APA lobbies on behalf of funding for psychological research and practice, credentials graduate training programs and internships, and is responsible to protect the interests of psychology as a profession. The APA created and periodically revises a code of ethics that governs the ethical behavior of members and is integrated into or forms the basis of most state licensing requirements for psychologists. That code, like that of other health professions, is based on principles of avoiding harm and improving people's lives. These principles undergird the basis of trust in the profession necessary for psychologists being able to help people with some of the most difficult and intimate of life's problems. Federal regulations require that professional psychologists in the employ of the US government, including those in the military, be licensed by a state and follow the state's ethics code. The APA's complicity in the CIA torture program, by allowing psychologists to administer and calibrate permitted harm, undermines the fundamental ethical standards of the profession. If not carefully understood and rejected by the profession, this may portend a fundamental shift in the profession's relationship with the people it serves. Details: s.l., 2015. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2015 at: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135812 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Prisoner Interrogation Terrorism Terrorists Torture

Author: Willebois, Emile Van der Does de Title: Nonprofit Organizations and the Combatting of Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response Summary: One of the ways in which terrorist organisations raise and transfer funds, is by using non-profit organisations (NPOs). Ever since the adoption of the Special Recommendation VIII on the abuse of NPOs for Terrorism Financing purposes by the FATF in 2001, countries have struggled to find a proper way to address this potential terrorism financing risk. In many important ways however, the work of NPOs deal with the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, so it is essential that in trying to address one aspect of the terrorist threat - terrorism financing - we do not inadvertently diminish the impact of other ways of tackling the issue. This article argues that in discussing the threat and how to address it, policy-makers need to be specific, not tainting the whole sector with the same brush. Virtually all governments already interact with the NPO sector and those avenues should be used for dealing with this issue - it is inefficient and ultimately counterproductive to devise an entirely new regulatory framework. The ultimate objective is to enhance the transparency of the sector- the people in charge of NPOs, their sources of funds and particularly the way those funds are spent. That aim serves a much wider purpose than just countering terrorism financing and touches on many aspects of civil society good governance that the sector itself and others have been debating for a long time. When devising public policy on this issue the contribution of the NPO sector to fighting terrorism be recognized and used to its full advantage. Moreover the sector's own stake in being "clean" and being so regarded by others should be acknowledged, thus making them an indispensable partner in drawing up such policies. For the same reason, self-regulation should be considered. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8547-0 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8547-0 Shelf Number: 135992 Keywords: Counter-Terrorist Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Behr, Ines von Title: Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Summary: This paper presents the results from exploratory primary research into the role of the internet in the radicalisation of 15 terrorists and extremists in the UK. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners and the academic community have begun to examine how the internet influences the process of radicalisation: how a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism associated with terrorism. This study advances the evidence base in the field by drawing on primary data from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations. The 15 cases were identified by the research team together with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and UK Counter Terrorism Units (CTU). The research team gathered primary data relating to five extremist cases (the individuals were part of the Channel programme, a UK government intervention aimed at individuals identified by the police as vulnerable to violent extremism), and ten terrorist cases (convicted in the UK), all of which were anonymised. Our research supports the suggestion that the internet may enhance opportunities to become radicalised and provide a greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs. However, our evidence does not necessarily support the suggestion that the internet accelerates radicalisation or replaces the need for individuals to meet in person during their radicalisation process. Finally, we didn't find any supporting evidence for the concept of self-radicalisation through the internet. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Shelf Number: 136018 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Crime Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Khanna, Gaurav Title: Guns and Butter? Fighting Violence with the Promise of Development Summary: There is growing awareness that development-oriented government policies may be an important counterinsurgency strategy, but existing papers are usually unable to disentangle various mechanisms. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we analyze the impact of one of the world's largest anti-poverty programs, India's NREGS, on the intensity of Maoist conflict. We find short-run increases of insurgency-related violence, police-initiated attacks, and insurgent attacks on civilians. We discuss how these results relate to established theories in the literature. The main mechanism consistent with the empirical patterns is that NREGS induces civilians to share more information with the state, improving police effectiveness. Details: Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor, 2015. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper no. 9160: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9160.pdf Year: 2015 Country: India URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9160.pdf Shelf Number: 136053 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Economic Development Police Effectiveness Poverty Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism

Author: Ross, Cameron Title: It's All About Money: Crime in the Caribbean and Its Impact on Canada Summary: For most Canadians, the Caribbean is a place to take an idyllic break from winter. Sandy beaches and warm temperatures lure Canadians to the islands. Interaction with the local population is mostly limited to those who work in hotels and bars. What actually happens in the local communities is generally lost on the average Canadian. Appreciating the large Caribbean diaspora in Toronto and Montreal, the connections are dynamic between those sun-baked Caribbean communities and Canadian society. While those linkages are generally positive, there are disturbing trends in crime in the Caribbean. Herculean efforts are being made by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the regional Caribbean Development Bank to build regional capacity in governance and criminal justice systems. There is, however, a lack of political will by some Caribbean leaders to implement recommendations that would greatly improve citizen security and national institutions. Scholarly and professional studies have made recommendations for the security sector that are achievable, but the political will in many countries has been lagging. The Caribbean drug trade has long held the spotlight, but money laundering is increasingly a concern, especially with evidence of linkages between terrorist groups resident in Central America and Venezuela, which have close proximity to the Caribbean Windward Islands. Post-9/11 financial tools, utilized under the U.S. Patriot Act, have been effective in dealing with rogue governments, corrupt officials, and transnational criminal gangs. However, the use of the Internet for financial transactions and the emergence of digital currencies have made regulatory control challenging. This is significant considering the Canadian tourism, banking, and resource development in the region that have caused steady flows of Canadians, money and expertise to the Caribbean. This paper reviews Caribbean crime and its trends and impacts on Canada, money-laundering trends, and highlights policies that could be reinforced to better curb these trends. Crime is a societal problem for which solutions are found within communities. This applies equally to the Caribbean and to Canada. It is in Canada's best interest to accelerate efforts to aid the region, especially in the area of citizen security and reforms of the criminal justice system. Multi-lateral programs aimed at building regional capacities in governance and criminal justice systems are the areas in which Canada can play an important role. The creation of a Canada-Caribbean institute would go a long way in conducting scholarly graduate-level research in fields of security-sector reform. Details: Calgary: University of Calgary, School of Public Policy, 2014. 23p. Source: SPP Research Papers, Vol. 7, issue 19: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Caribbean URL: http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/ross-caribbeancrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136072 Keywords: Corruption Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Terrorism

Author: Amirault, Joanna Elizabeth Title: Criminalizing Terrorism: The Impact of Context and Cohort Effects on the Sentencing Outcomes of Terrorist Offenders Summary: Despite the recent criminalization of terrorism specific offenses little is known about the legal processing of terrorist offenders, and even less is known about how the context that terrorist offenders are adjudicated in impact sentencing outcomes. Collectively, this dissertation explores how changing contextual environments related to legal responses, the timing of an offender' adjudication and perceptions of threat impact the sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders by utilizing a sample of terrorist offenders convicted both recently, and historically, in Canada (n = 153), and by further employing a sample of terrorist offenders recently adjudicated in the United Kingdom (n = 156). Across studies the context that offenders are sanctioned in impact sentencing outcomes, and cohort effects are uncovered. Terrorism specific offenses are readily utilized, and the criminalization of terrorism offenses appear to have provided law enforcement with legal measures that assist in the proactive prevention of terrorist incidents. However, general criminal provisions still have a significant role to play in the adjudication of terrorist offenders as offenders sanctioned of general criminal provisions only, or both general and terrorism specific offenses, are sentenced more severely than offenders convicted of terrorism specific offenses alone. The timing of an offender's adjudication also impacts sentencing outcomes as offenders sanctioned in the latter stages of a terrorist campaign are generally sentenced more severely than offenders adjudicated at the onset for similar crimes, while variability in the sentence outcomes achieved throughout a terrorist campaign are characterized by cohort effects. Furthermore, being sanctioned in proximity to major terrorist incidents is found to affect sentencing outcomes as offenders sentenced following these events are punished less severely. Finally, offenders who are characterized by factors that are associated with increased perceptions of threat receive harsher punishments; however the impact of perceptions of threat on sentencing outcomes can be limited to specific time periods. Details: Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2014. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14456 Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14456 Shelf Number: 136226 Keywords: Sentencing Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Ellis, Clare, ed. Title: Disrupting Organised Crime: Developing the Evidence Base to Understand Effective Action Summary: Organised crime is a threat to national security. Indeed, the National Security Strategy has identified it as a tier two priority risk. Organised crime undermines the integrity of our financial system and threatens our economic prosperity; human trafficking challenges the security of our borders, while various forms of organised criminality directly facilitate terrorist activity. Organised crime is equally a serious concern for local policing. A previous conference in this series highlighted the ways in which extremism undermines community cohesion; organised crime has a similar impact, causing significant harm to the communities it touches. The importance of tackling organised crime is clear, but without the means to analyse our impact, it is difficult to determine which policies, strategies or operational tactics are effective. The scale and complexity of this challenge is further amplified by the focus of the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy on 'relentless disruption', meaning that any metric must be able to measure the impact of a diverse range of tactics. Without this evidence base, how can we allocate increasingly scarce resources efficiently? These fundamental issues were the driving force behind this conference. The challenge is complex, but the era of Big Data analytics offers new opportunities that are worth exploring. Details: Swindon: Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) and London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2014. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: ST FC/RUSI Conference Series No. 5: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201411_STFC_Serious_Organised_Crime_Web_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201411_STFC_Serious_Organised_Crime_Web_final.pdf Shelf Number: 136233 Keywords: Human Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-684: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Shelf Number: 136242 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Walther, Olivier J. Title: Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa Summary: This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate transnationally. Details: Sonderborg, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Department of Border Region Studies Working Paper No. 04/15: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Shelf Number: 136293 Keywords: Border Security Extremist Groups Social Networks Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Haahr, Kathryn Title: Addressing the Concerns of the Oil Industry: Security Challenges in Northeastern Mexico and Government Responses Summary: This case study analyzes the Mexican Government's response to recent threats to and attacks against energy infrastructure and personnel in Tamaulipas and Veracruz. The government is addressing the issue of cartel-induced violence in Tamaulipas and Veracruz by mobilizing security frameworks for newly established and existing state law enforcement entities and the Military. The security arrangements, that include policing of major ports and protecting Pemex facilities and operations, should help the oil and gas industry to better absorb the financial risks to its business operations. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Addressing%20the%20Concerns%20of%20the%20Oil%20Industry_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Addressing%20the%20Concerns%20of%20the%20Oil%20Industry_0.pdf Shelf Number: 136309 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug-Related Violence Infrastructure Security Oil Industry Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: European Interdisciplinary Analysis Project Title: Criminal Money Management as a Cutting Edge between Profit Oriented Crime and Terrorism. Summary: The strategic orientation of the LKA NRW is adjusted to the future. In this concept it is essential, in particular with respect to the fight against organised criminal groups and terror organisations to act jointly and across national borders - with newest methods like the so-called scenario-technique, to come to a better "pre-thinking" of the criminal future. Once more the LKA NRW sets an initiative in this direction. Beginning in December 2005, the LKA NRW, in cooperation with EUROPOL, the University of Ghent and Turkish National Police (TNP) conducted the inter-disciplinary analysis project EDGE with financial support of the EU `AGIS` funding. In the project, on the one hand the scenario method was examined regarding its usability as an instrument for future oriented strategic planning on the field of law enforcement. On the other hand, the field of `Criminal Money Management` as a cutting EDGE between profit oriented crime and terror-ism was chosen as a relevant topic to conduct this examination. As a result, future scenarios and future robust strategic recommendations were developed. The unique collection and analysis of actual international money flows with an illegal background in Europe and Turkey and the interdisciplinary cooperation of experts from the banking sector, criminological science and law enforcement with a harmonized result have, among others, to be regarded as the relevant outputs of the project. Details: Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy, 2005. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/Countries/Germany/EDGE_Final_Results.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/Countries/Germany/EDGE_Final_Results.pdf Shelf Number: 136331 Keywords: Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 136368 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Exxtremism

Author: Kavanagh, Camino Title: Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in Developing Countries Summary: Tackling organized crime is listed as a priority for the UK Government under its National Security Council and Strategic Defense and Security Review. It is, first, a clear domestic threat to the UK, causing economic and social costs of between L20 and L40 billion per year. It also impacts the UK's development assistance as many sources suggest that organized crime has a significantly detrimental impact on governance in many developing countries. In some states, circumstantial evidence suggests deep interdependent links between organized crime, politics, and the public sector, fostering, in some cases, a form of symbiosis between the state and criminal organizations, and in more extreme cases, both deep or transitory links between crime, terror, and militant groups. Despite these disconcerting signs, investment in academic research on the effects of organized crime on governance remains limited. There is a wide range of criminological literature, and some relevant work on the fringes of the governance and conflict field, but few, policy-oriented studies specifically examining the impact of organized crime on governance exist. The World Bank's World Development Report 2011 cited organized crime as one factor linked to post-conflict violence in fragile states and hinted at the role weak institutions and corruption play in this regard, but did not provide any detailed analysis of these links. This report presents an overview of the research team's findings and is divided into four parts: Section I presents the main Policy Summary. Section II presents the main findings and lays out five areas for targeted action as the basis of an 'organized crime-sensitive' programming framework. Section III provides donors with options for assessing when to engage on organized crime-related issues and, depending on the nature of relations between organized crime and political and governance institutions, an analysis framework to help determine what specifically within the five areas of action to focus on. The final section provides concluding remarks and a suggested programming framework, combining elements of sections II and III. Details: New York: New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2013, 242p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_report_w_annexes.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_report_w_annexes.pdf Shelf Number: 131146 Keywords: Developing Countries Organized Crime Political Corruption Terrorism

Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? Summary: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies. Summary - Afghanistan's population is among the world's youngest and fastest growing: half its population is under eighteen and more than three-quarters under forty. - The need is dire for strategies and policies to respond to the largest and fastest-growing segment of the population and to enable these citizens to meaningfully engage in their country's affairs. - Many young men are frustrated with real and perceived injustice, regular and observable impunity and corruption, and lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities. - All those who want to learn more about radical and violent extremist ideologies do not necessarily become violent extremists. - Violent extremist groups such as the Taliban use traditional and modern media tools and platforms to lure youth into jihad. - Being proactively opposed to extremism not only undermines the appeal of such messages but also offers alternative narratives. - To address grievances appropriately, the international community must continue to provide assistance to the Afghan state on fundamental issues, such as corruption and rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief No. 188: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Shelf Number: 136458 Keywords: Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Responding to cyber jihad: towards an effective counter narrative Summary: "Who is in control of the narrative?" is the mantra that now echoes in the hallways of the EU's headquarters in Brussels. Spurred in part by large-scale jihadist propaganda, approximately 20,000 people from 50 countries have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria. So far, authorities in their countries of origin have not been able to address the jihadist radicalisation messages transmitted via the internet and social media. Many new initiatives were recently announced, however, including the establishment of a European counter-narrative centre in Brussels. In this research paper, ICCT Research Fellow Dr. Bibi van Ginkel analyses the role of the internet and social media in processes of radicalisation. It offers an outline of the various aspects of the jihadist narrative, in order better to understand what message needs to be countered. The counter-actions against this cyber jihad can take different forms. Parallel to the way in which advertisement campaigns are tailored to sell products to a certain target group, strategic communication should take into account how a number of recurring elements play a role in the counter-messaging. The understanding of who the target group is, what jihadist narrative is used and how that message can be countered, who the credible messenger should be, and what medium can best be used to deliver the message are all relevant questions that can only be answered in a context-specific manner. The report concludes with several recommendations on how the recently announced new European counter-narrative centre can effectively contribute to the already diverse landscape of counter-narrative initiatives. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136490 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Statewatch Title: Countering Terrorism or Constraining Civil Society? The impact of Financial Action Task Force recommendations on non-profit organisations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Summary: The Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 galvanised 'pro-democracy- governments in the West into a reaffirmation of their commitment to supporting civil society organisations (CSOs) working under repressive and authoritarian regimes. The US State Department launched a Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society in 2011, and two years later President Obama launched the Stand with Civil Society campaign, "a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society amid a rising tide of restrictions on its operations globally". The European Union (EU) established the European Endowment for Democracy and committed to "a more strategic engagement with CSOs" and the mainstreaming of CSO dialogue across "all external instruments and programmes and in all areas of cooperation". The United Nations is also committed to the "enabling environment for civil society" which it views as central to the realisation of its Millennium Development Goals. Running counter to (and part of the reason for) this recent affirmation of support for the "enabling environment" is the spread of restrictive civil society laws around the world. These laws can prohibit or impede the formation of CSOs, restrict their access to domestic and international funding and hinder their day-to-day operations. The trend toward restriction is demonstrated by reports from the International Centre for Non-profit Law (among others), which has documented the introduction of such laws in more than 50 countries, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. It is a trend that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently described as "global", "lasting" and intimately related to "fundamental changes in international politics". Paradoxically, the changes in international politics cited by Carnegie include international counter-terrorism standards, devised by democratic states after 9/11, which provide a justification for less democratic and repressive governments to introduce restrictive laws and regulatory environments for CSOs. The standards in question, which are explained in the following section, advance the hypothesis that non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable to abuse or exploitation by terrorist groups. Concomitant to this perceived risk is the requirement that all states ensure that they have robust laws and procedures in place to combat the "threat". This problem was first examined in detail in a report we published in 2012 entitled "Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society". In this follow-up report we revisit the report's core assumption - that these standards are a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive CSO laws - by examining their implementation in 17 countries in central and eastern Europe and central Asia. Details: London: Statewatch, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/fatf-countering-terrorism-or-constraining-civil-society.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/fatf-countering-terrorism-or-constraining-civil-society.pdf Shelf Number: 136498 Keywords: Privacy Surveillance Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Keen, David Title: Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding. A discussion paper Summary: Security threats defined as stemming from 'terrorism' or 'rogue regimes' have significant public profile, and have led to responses from different branches of government. In tackling these threats - through counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding - a 'mainstream' approach has evolved, which involves defining conflicts in a way that designates some actors as 'spoiler(s)' (i.e. 'terrorists', 'radicalised groups', etc.) and proceeds to address such conflicts by opposing 'spoilers' in partnership with whatever allies can be found. The paper begins from the assumption that counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches - while distinct from each other, and different in different contexts - are linked in important ways, and have followed a discernible pattern in recent decades as part of what we describe here as the 'mainstream' approach. This typically involves use of military force, generally combined with - or followed by - some kind of 'stabilisation' or 'statebuilding' effort. This can involve negotiating a pragmatic 'deal' with influential actors (with a willingness to overlook the limitations of allies), which reinforces those actors included in the deal while continuing to use force against 'spoilers'. However, as the recent past illustrates, this approach has not proven to have had sustainable success; here we examine the drawbacks of this position and propose alternatives to the mainstream. In this paper, David Keen and Larry Attree discuss how the international community has tried to counter terror, achieve stability, build states and foster peace around the world. It examines whether these objectives and approaches are being pursued effectively and coherently and whether there are contradictions between them. It is based on a review of relevant literature, is not exhaustive in scope, and is intended to stimulate debate among the policy actors and practitioners engaged in these approaches. Details: London: Saferworld, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/875-dilemmas-of-counter-terror-stabilisation-and-statebuilding Year: 2015 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 136504 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Shelala, Robert M., II Title: Maritime Security in the Middle East and North Africa: A Strategic Assessment Summary: The waterways of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) are among the most important in the world. They facilitate the export of large volumes of oil and natural gas from the region, while also bridging traders in the Eastern and Western worlds through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. While political tensions in the region have at times played out in these waterways since the mid- 20th century, their vulnerability has been exasperated in recent years by the failure of bordering governments to promote internal stability, the lack of adequate maritime security capabilities of nearby states, and the potential naval threats posed by the government of Iran. The purpose of this study is to identify key threats to maritime security posed by state and nonstate actors in the MENA region, to assess what actions have been taken by stakeholders to promote security, and to explore what further steps could be taken by those stakeholders to close the gap between threats and capabilities. These threats will be addressed in broader strategic context, with the hope of mitigating threats and capability shortcomings that impact a variety of stakeholders. Three waterways in the MENA region are at particularly high risk and will be the focus of this assessment: the Suez Canal, the Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden. In the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden, maritime commerce is threatened by a severe lack of stability in the environment around the waterways. In Egypt, the repeated coups in Cairo have led to security dilemmas in which an uprising driven at least in part by radical Islamists has threatened the military government - and the canal by extension. The situation in the Gulf Aden bears similarities, as the poor economic and security conditions in Somalia have led to the development of piracy enterprises that target commercial traffic in the Gulf and broader Indian Ocean. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24808/uploads Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24808/uploads Shelf Number: 136597 Keywords: Maritime Crime Terrorism

Author: Michel, Steve Title: Use of Programs and Interventions with Canada's Federally Sentenced Radicalized Offenders Summary: What it means By examining the institutional and community-based interventions which the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has utilized with radicalized offenders and the congruence of these interventions with identified needs, CSC achieves a more comprehensive understanding of how past and current intervention options address the needs of radicalized offenders. This knowledge can be used to inform any future intervention referrals for radicalized offenders, identify limitations in current intervention options, and highlight opportunities for adaptation of existing or new interventions for this group. What we found The three most commonly attended interventions by radicalized offenders were identified as institutional employment, education, and psychological services. When examining core correctional programming specifically, radicalized offenders were most likely to participate in living skills, violent offender, personal development, and substance abuse programming, however this involvement was much less frequently identified than participation in other institutional interventions such as social programs or chaplaincy. Those with an identified need in the education and employment domain were the most likely to participate in at least one intervention that addressed the education and employment domain. The next most common need domain addressed was community functioning (for those assessed by the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis, or DFIA) and personal/emotional needs (for those assessed by both the DFIA and its revised version DFIA-R). Least likely to be addressed were needs related to the marital/family domain; however this was a need area that was not frequently identified as problematic for radicalized offenders. Why we did this study Since 1989, CSC has applied the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principle in order to identify and address the risks and criminogenic needs of the federally sentenced offender population. The effectiveness of this approach has been empirically assessed and validated on offender populations in general. However, to date, there has not been research to demonstrate the applicability of the RNR principle with radicalized offenders. This paper identifies the interventions in which radicalized offenders participated in relation to their identified criminogenic and violent extremist needs. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report No. R-345: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-0345-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136628 Keywords: Correctional Programs Counter-terrorism Radicalization Radicalized offenders Rehabilitation Risk Assessment Terrorism

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Tahiri, Hussein Title: Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia Summary: Community and Radicalisation: an Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia was a year-long national study designed and conducted as a qualitative research project through a partnership between Victoria Police, Victoria University and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The key aims of the study were: - To identify how communities understand the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism. - To explore community perceptions of the underlying drivers for radicalization and extremism. - To explore perceptions of the impact of radicalization and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion. - To solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism in Australia. - To provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies and strategies to counter radicalisation and extremism in Australia. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University and Victoria Police, 2013. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 136689 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Violent Extremists in Federal Institutions: Estimating Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization in the Federal Offender Population Summary: There is a growing recognition of the need to understand and address violent extremist threats in Western countries. Given that the majority of research in this area has been conducted on nonoffender populations outside of Canada, there is a need to better understand the scope, nature, and process of radicalization in Canada. In recognition of the fact that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is in a position to contribute to addressing this gap, Public Safety Canada entered into a Letter of Agreement with the CSC to produce a report focused on CSC's data holdings on and estimation of violent extremism. This report summarizes the data holdings and gaps in the area, as well as the results of three studies focused on the examination and estimation of radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization of offenders under CSC's jurisdiction. The first study was a qualitative examination of the unique characteristics of offenders who are radicalized and who are susceptible to radicalization, from the perspective of operational staff. Based on data collected at a total of 10 focus groups involving institutional and community security and front-line staff from each of CSC's five regions, a number of themes emerged. Participants recognized the complex, multi-faceted nature of radicalization, and identified a wide range of behaviours indicative of radicalization or susceptibility to radicalization. In most cases, responses (e.g., vocalization of shared grievance, changes in religion) were consistent with the literature, though staff also suggested unique responses. Staff also drew attention to areas of possible improvement. The second study was a quantitative examination of differences between radicalized and nonradicalized offenders. Informed by literature and by the results of study 1, radicalized and nonradicalized offenders were compared on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data. There were many areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders, including ethnicity and citizenship, education and employment, substance abuse history, previous contact with the criminal justice system, and characteristics of their offence(s). The data suggested that, in some ways, radicalized offenders may be more similar to radicalized individuals in the community than to other offenders. The third study involved a theory-drive attempt to identify constructs associated with susceptibility to radicalization. Based on a literature and data review, frequency analysis of variables, and principle component analysis, nine constructs were identified and explored. Though considerable additional work is required to confirm the role and nature of these constructs in influencing susceptibility, this study represents an important first step in this endeavour. Together, the three studies have allowed the CSC to contribute to the evidence base surrounding violent extremism in Canada. The results of these studies may also inform institutional operations and policies at CSC. They consistently demonstrate the need for additional research focused on population management for radicalized offenders, with a particular need for research focused on effective interventions for this group. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. R-313: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136785 Keywords: Extremist Groups Inmates Prisoners Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Strengthening the Case: Good Criminal Justice Practices to Counter Terrorism Summary: The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector elaborates guidance on 15 good practices that promote rule of law-based criminal justice responses to terrorism. The GCTF encourages all countries to consider the Rabat Memorandum as a source of guidance and its members and partners have been working both bilateral and multilaterally to promote its implementation national and regional contexts. In support of these efforts, the US Department of State Counterterrorism Bureau commissioned the Global Center to undertake a stocktaking of national efforts to implement rule of law-based criminal justice measures to counter terrorism in selection of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report presents the core findings of the stocktaking project. It highlights trends, challenges, and opportunities for implementing the good practices of the Rabat Memorandum and for leveraging these practices to more effectively counter terrorism while promoting and protecting human rights. As noted in the introduction of the Rabat Memorandum, compliance with international law and human rights standards in national criminal justice responses to terrorism is not isolated to the mere existence of certain legal tools, or to the skills of specialized practitioners alone. Rather, it recognizes that "states should in the first instance have a modern, fair and efficient criminal justice system that forms the basis for a robust criminal justice response to terrorism." While the Global Center's report highlights examples of a wide range of good practices being implemented in national jurisdictions, it also calls attention to diverse legal and institutional, organizational, and operational challenges that seriously undermine rule of law-based criminal justice across all countries examined. As stated in the Rabat Memorandum, criminal justice efforts to counter terrorism "must be built on a functional criminal justice system that is capable of handling ordinary criminal offenses while protecting the human rights of the accused." The findings suggest that core criminal justice sector development efforts are essential for strengthening national implementation of rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism. The report concludes with a series of cross-cutting recommendations to support the ongoing efforts of the GCTF's Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 22, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Strengthening-the-case-high-res.pdf Shelf Number: 136852 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Rule of Law Terrorism

Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice Summary: This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Conference was also sponsored in part by the European Commission and the United States Department of State. The event was attended by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of its kind in the region, the 2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE. The intention for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of cutting-edge CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers on a global scale. Details: Perth, WA, AUS: Curtin University, 2015. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Shelf Number: 136857 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremists Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Maguire, Tom Title: An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa Summary: A number of myths and misperceptions have grown alongside the illegal ivory trade - none more troubling than the alleged participation of terrorist groups. In East Africa, the Somali terror group Al-Shabaab has supposedly received up to 40 per cent of its running costs through the illegal ivory trade alone. This is a powerful narrative, espoused by some politicians, policy-makers and practitioners. But it is largely wrong. Evidence for Al-Shabaab involvement in poaching and trafficking remains extremely limited and controversial. Briefings given to policy-makers on terrorism and the illegal ivory trade continue to refer to unverified sources. This is a cause for concern: such a narrative risks diverting attention from the trade's main facilitators and, counter-intuitively, from Al-Shabaab's known funding sources. To address these misconceptions, this report explores the complex ecosystems of terrorism, poaching and ivory trafficking in East Africa. Its key findings are that: - Highly networked organised crime groups (OCGs), brokers and corrupt government officials continue to drive the illegal ivory trade across East Africa. Weak legislation and enforcement by security agencies provides a benign environment for their activities - The OCGs, brokers and corrupt officials involved - and the routes and methods used - likely overlap with other forms of organised crime (such as the trafficking of drugs, humans and small arms) - The majority of ivory that transits East Africa comes from source areas on the Tanzania-Mozambique border and in central Tanzania. These are far removed from Al-Shabaab territory - Few, if any, elephants are present directly within Al-Shabaab's area of influence in south-central Somalia and northeastern Kenya. The majority of elephants in Kenya roam at significant distances from the border - There is little evidence of large ivory flows transiting Somalia; established Kenyan and Tanzanian ports remain the primary points for export. This makes the assertion that Al-Shabaab's monthly ivory revenues total $200,000-$600,000 highly unlikely - Estimates of the proportion of Al-Shabaab funds raised from ivory trafficking rely on flawed sums. A range of other sources (including the taxation of charcoal and sugar) are more important to the terrorist organisation - Any Al-Shabaab involvement in the ivory trade to date is likely to have been opportunistic, ad hoc and small-scale. These findings suggest that the illusion of a terrorism - ivory trade nexus distracts policy-makers and law-enforcement agencies from effectively managing limited resources to tackle both terrorist financing and the illegal ivory trade. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201509_An_Illusion_of_Complicity.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201509_An_Illusion_of_Complicity.pdf Shelf Number: 136892 Keywords: Animal Poaching Illegal Wildlife Trade Ivory Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing Wildlife Crime

Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: Counterterrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Plant, Jeremy F. Title: Securing and Protecting America's Railroad System: U.S. Railroad and Opportunities for Terrorist Threats Summary: On any given day, thousands of trains move across the American landscape. Each one of them presents a potential threat to the safety of individuals and families, to the continued functioning of our communities and our economy, and to the life of our great cities. Whether carrying millions of workers to and from their jobs, or providing the safest means of transporting hazardous materials, or bringing food and agricultural necessities to consumers, railroads pose an inviting target to would-be terrorists. Yet no significant act of terrorism has been directed against U. S. railroads, and we lack hard information on the nature of the terrorist risks involved in rail transport. This report highlights the potential threats, examines the response of government and the rail industry to the post-9/11 security responsibilities, and suggests ways in which public policy and rail operations can be better directed to meet the challenges of security in an age of terrorist activity. Efforts to secure the nation's rail system have been undertaken by federal, state, and local government agencies and by private rail operators. These activities differ fundamentally between the passenger and freight modes. Driven by events such as the Madrid and London rail attacks, and by the assumption that since the 9/11/01 events all passenger modes of travel in the U.S. constitute potential terrorist targets, passenger rail security has been largely entrusted to the public sector, albeit with less attention and fewer resources granted for passenger rail security than for aviation. Freight rail security has also been driven by events but has been guided by the private sector rail industry. Resources currently directed to rail security are inadequate, given the potential for catastrophic loss of life or economic disruption from attacks on the rail system. The growing use of rail systems for work-related passenger travel and the critical role played by freight railroads in U.S. and global commerce makes insuring their security a matter of urgent public concern. While the efforts to secure the system led by the Department of Homeland Security represent a good start in tackling the issues, legislation specifically dealing with rail security is needed to identify the threats, clarify the roles of the various public and private actors, and establish a level of funding commensurate with the importance of the rail system and the potential loss of life and economic damage that might result from terrorist attacks. In addition to prevention, the rail system plays or can play an important role in mitigation and recovery efforts after man-made or natural disasters. Details: Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania State University Harrisburg, 2007. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2015 at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Shelf Number: 136985 Keywords: Homeland Security Railroads Terrorism Transit Crime Transit Safety Transportation Security

Author: Great Britain. HM Treasury Title: UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing Summary: This is the UK's first money laundering and terrorist financing national risk assessment (NRA). In conducting this assessment the aim is to identify, understand and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced by the UK. Money laundering can undermine the integrity and stability of our financial markets and institutions. It is a global problem. The European Commission's 2013 impact assessment of the EU anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing legislative framework points to global criminal proceeds potentially amounting to some 3.6% of GDP; around US$2.1 trillion in 2009. The best available international estimate of amounts laundered globally would be equivalent to some 2.7% of global GDP or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. Both money laundering itself, and the criminality which drives the need to launder money, present a significant risk to the UK. The laundering of proceeds of overseas corruption into or through the UK fuels political instability in key partner countries. The NCA judges that billions of pounds of suspected proceeds of corruption are laundered through the UK each year. Money laundering is also a key enabler of serious and organised crime, the social and economic costs of which are estimated to be $24 billion a year. Taken as a whole, money laundering represents a significant threat to the UK's national security. The government's 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy set out plans to make it harder for criminals to move, hide and use the proceeds of crime. There is a marked overlap between money laundering and terrorist financing - both criminals and terrorists use similar methods to store and move funds. However, the motive for generating and moving funds differs. Terrorists ultimately need money to commit terrorist attacks. Unlike criminal gangs, terrorist groups involve disparate individuals coming together through a shared motivation and ideology. Finance is an essential aspect of enabling terrorist groups to function, recruit and commit terrorist acts. A lack of funds can have a direct effect on the ability of terrorist organisations and individuals to operate and to mount attacks. There is evidence of terrorist financing activity in the UK and terrorist financing poses a significant threat to the UK's national security. The UK recognises that countering terrorist financing is important in protecting national security. Countering terrorist financing forms a key part of the UK's CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy with the aim being to reduce the terrorist threat to the UK and its interests overseas by depriving terrorists and violent extremists of the financial resources and systems required for terrorism-related activity. Details: London: HM Treasury and Home Office, 2015. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136990 Keywords: Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 137893 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Shelf Number: 137180 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Criminal Networks Drug Trafficking Illicit Networks Kidnapping Organized Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Convergence of Crime and Terror: Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils Summary: The Convergence of Crime and Terror: Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils provides an analysis of the increasingly important link between traditional criminal activities and terrorism. By cataloging a number of relevant cases, the authors have illustrated that terrorists routinely resort to "traditional" crimes, from drug trafficking to financial scams, to further their objectives. As a result, terror prosecutions must find inspiration from historical government efforts to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate notorious violent criminals such as Al Capone on relatively minor charges such as tax evasion. The aggressive prosecution of such relatively minor offenses can serve to disrupt grander malevolent schemes. As the authors suggest, the rise of terrorism means that the traditional, reactive law enforcement model must change. We cannot afford to wait until after a successful terrorist attack occurs to investigate and prosecute. The examples from Europe included in this paper provide a sobering explanation for why that is so. Law enforcement officials must consider disruptive investigations and prosecutions that may not ultimately lead to a criminal trial on terrorism charges but that will stop potential terror plots before they are put into motion. We face a decentralized, networked, and self-sufficient enemy. Independent cells are increasingly purchasing that self-sufficiency with the proceeds of criminal enterprises. This hard reality provides yet another justification for transforming state and local first responders into first preventers of crime and terror. Details: New York: Manhattan Institute, Center for Policing Terrorism, 2007. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ptr_01.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ptr_01.pdf Shelf Number: 137223 Keywords: Prosecution Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Sharma, Saswot Raj Title: Terrorist, White Collar and Organized Crime Financing Case Study and Forensic Audit Summary: Terrorism, white collar crime and organized crime usually are inevitable fact and black truth on human civilization. They need funds for operation and all the illicit money gathered cannot be used for operation until and unless it is cleaned by the means on Money laundering. Money laundering usually occurs in three steps: Placement is the transfer of illegal activities' proceeds into financial systems without attracting the attention of financial institutions and government authorities. Money launderers accomplish this by dividing their tainted cash into small sums and executing transactions that fall beneath banks' regulatory reporting levels. Layering is the process of generating a series of transactions in order to distance the proceeds from their illegal source and to obfuscate the audit trail. Common layering techniques include outbound electronic funds transfers, usually directly or subsequently into a - bank secrecy haven,- or a jurisdiction with lax recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and withdrawals of already placed deposits in the form of highly liquid monetary instruments, such as money orders or travelers checks. Integration, the final money laundering stage, is the unnoticed reinsertion of successfully laundered, untraceable proceeds into an economy. This is accomplished through a variety of spending, investing and lending techniques and cross-border, seemingly legitimate transactions. Independent auditors have a responsibility under SAS no. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, to be aware of the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred, indirectly affecting amounts recorded in an entity's financial statements. If an accountant believes the consequences of the money laundering have not been properly accounted for or disclosed on the financial statements, SAS 54 states that the auditor should Criminal Financing Forensic Audit 5 Saswot Raj Sharma /ICAI/ Feb 14 express a qualified or adverse opinion on the financial statements. If the client refuses to accept the auditor's modified report, the auditor should resign. Punishment: Generally internationally the punishment is usually as follows: (a) A person who finances in terrorist activities shall be punished by an imprisonment up to five years and a fine equal to the amount used in offence and where such amount is not identified up to five hundred thousand rupees. (b) A person who commits money laundering offence under Chapter-2 of the AMLA except one mentioned in Sub-Section (1) shall be punished by an imprisonment between one and four years and a fine equal to the amount used in the offence. (c) An additional punishment of ten percent shall be awarded where a public official or the chief or official of a bank, financial institution or non-financial institution is involved in the offence. Details: Kirtipur, Nepal: Tribhuvan University, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Shelf Number: 137580 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing White-Collar Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. Mexico Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering In South America (GAFISUD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have jointly conducted an assessment of the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards in Mexico. - Mexico has made good progress in developing its system for combating ML and TF since its last assessment by the FATF in 2004. The laws criminalising ML and TF do not however fully meet international standards, and there is scope to significantly improve their implementation. - Laws and procedures do not adequately provide for the freezing without delay of terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. - Co-ordination arrangements amongst relevant government authorities have been strengthened recently but need to be further developed. Further resources are needed for some authorities. - The FIU has strengthened its financial intelligence infrastructure and capacity. It does not currently have direct access to criminal records and the number of staff is low relative to its tasks. - AML/CFT preventive measures are comprehensive, contain risk-based elements, and are being implemented across principal sectors of the financial system. Nonetheless, AML/CFT regulations are still evolving, particularly in non-deposit taking sectors. - All supervisory authorities are implementing fairly comprehensive on-site AML/CFT supervision, though this could benefit from more risk-based processes. - Trust services are the only DNFBP for which AML/CFT measures are in place. Also, no review has been conducted of the non-profit sector to support adoption of measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons for ML and TF. - Mexican authorities have been co-operating effectively with other countries, particularly in the area of mutual legal assistance and extradition involving ML and related crimes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2008. 338p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Shelf Number: 137228 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money-Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Pickering, Sharon Title: Counter-Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities: Final Report Summary: This Report is the culmination of a three-year research partnership between Monash University and Victoria Police. The focus of the Report, Counter-Terrorism Policing in Culturally Diverse Communities, gives voice to a growing recognition that the world is changing in ways that presage the development of new approaches to criminal justice and social cohesion. Against the background of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and subsequent terrorist strikes in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and London, among other places, the study focuses on the challenge posed by terrorism in culturally diverse communities. More specifically, it is an investigation into how counterterrorism policing in Victoria, one of the most multicultural regions in the world, is perceived and experienced by both practitioners and members of different ethnic and cultural communities. To this end the study was divided into four distinct streams focusing respectively on policing, community attitudes, Commonwealth and state legislation, and the influence of the media, and how these four areas intersect to shape the way in which counter-terrorism policing occurs within Victoria. From a longer-term perspective, the study was inspired by a commitment to the principles that underpin community oriented policing and to ensure that these principles remain relevant in a world where the threat of terrorist violence has taken on a new significance. As such, a core assumption that has guided research throughout this project is that to be effective in the immediate and longer terms, counter-terrorism policing needs to enhance both social cohesion and police legitimacy. The originality of the project lies in two areas in particular. First, it lies in the access that was given to researchers to a wide array of culturally diverse voices across Victoria through a series of consultations and focus groups in metropolitan and regional areas. Second, it rests also on the willingness of serving members of Victoria Police to participate in a series of interviews and surveys on counter-terrorism policing. This report is therefore built on the trust and commitment to dialogue of over 1000 Victorians who served as research participants. Finally, the research was undertaken in an enduring spirit of cooperation and shared visions, qualities reflected not only in the enthusiasm of research participants but also in the regular meetings held between Monash University researchers and members of the Victoria Police Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Unit, who met at least bimonthly for the three-year duration of the project. At the very least this spirit of cooperation provides a rebuttal of those who would claim that the innate sensitivities of terrorism preclude the possibility of cooperative and fruitful research and dialogue. In brief, the Report identifies: - Key issues in the perceptions and experiences of community and counter-terrorism policing from both police members and members of culturally diverse communities in Victoria. - Factors that are critical in the operation of counter-terrorism legislation and policy in Victoria. - Key issues in media reporting of counter-terrorism and terrorism in Victoria (will be published as an additional volume to this report). - Recommendations for consideration based on these findings. More generally, it confirms that Victoria Police has been able to capitalise upon the investments in promoting social cohesion and cultural diversity made by successive Victorian governments stretching back several decades to position itself as a national and international leader in the value it places on social cohesion. The findings of this research also indicate that Victoria Police is well placed to further integrate community-policing approaches into its counter-terrorism strategies. However, the findings also indicate the precariousness of police-community relationships when put under pressure through processes of alienation and social exclusion. It has taken many years of hard work on the part of governments, police and communities to build the uniquely harmonious multicultural environment that prevails in Victoria, but this work can unravel quickly if circumstances allow. The recommendations contained in this Report reflect the research team's assessment on what needs to be done to protect this investment in social cohesion against a background of growing uncertainty, and occasional social tension, unleashed by threatened or actual terrorist violence at home or abroad. Details: Clayton, VIC, AUS: Monash University, 2007. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/gtrec/files/2012/08/counterterrorreport-07.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Australia URL: http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/gtrec/files/2012/08/counterterrorreport-07.pdf Shelf Number: 137368 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism policing Police-Community Relations Terrorism

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks Summary: The Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks' report, the result of the call for further research into terrorist financing, provides an overview of the various financing mechanisms and financial management practices used by terrorists and terrorist organisations. It explores the emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), fundraising through social media, new payment products and services, and the exploitation of natural resources. The terrorist financing risks identified in the FATF's 2008 Terrorist Financing report, while still evolving, are as relevant today, as they were back then. However, developments since 2008 have created new terrorist financing risks. The issue of FTFs is not a new phenomenon, but the recent scale of the issue in relation to the conflict in Syria and Iraq is disturbing. FTFs are now considered one of the main forms of material support to terrorist groups. This report sets out the funding needs, sources and methods of FTFs and the challenges associated with combatting them. New technologies have also introduced new terrorist financing vulnerabilities. The broad reach and anonymity associated with social media and new payment methods could make these attractive tools for terrorists and terrorist organisations to use in their financial activities. All terrorists and terrorist groups, particularly large terrorist organisations, will require a financial management strategy to allow them to obtain, move, store and use their assets. Understanding these financial management strategies is essential in developing effective measures counter terrorist financing. This report is not a comprehensive study but rather, aims to provide a snapshot of current terrorist financing risks to raise awareness among FATF members and the private sector. Many of the issues raised in this report require further in-depth research. The report highlights the importance of genuine private/public partnerships to enhance awareness of, and responses to, emerging terrorist financing risks. Such a partnership will facilitate the identification of FTFs and their facilitation networks. Accurate and forward-looking guidance to the private sector, will further improve their monitoring and screening processes and reporting-time on sensitive transactions which may relate to terrorist financing. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf Shelf Number: 137284 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index: 2015. Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socioeconomic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism. In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries - Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon. While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year. Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State)as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens. The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries. The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally, Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137333 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. By virtue of its large number of supporters and highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers and more recently, the immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while using social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks. Although much ink has been spilled on the topic of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions remain unanswered, including such fundamental issues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who they are, and how many of those supporters take part in its highly organized online activities. Previous efforts to answer these questions have relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS social network. Because of the small, cellular nature of that network, the examination of particular subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small numbers, may create misleading conclusions. The information vacuum extends to - and is particularly acute within - the sometimes heated discussion of how the West should respond to this online campaign. While there are legitimate debates about the bounds of free speech and the complex relationship between private companies and the public interest, some have argued against suspending terrorist social media accounts on the basis that suspensions are not effective at impeding extremist activity online. These arguments that are usually predicated on very small samples of potentially misleading data, when data is proffered at all. We set out to answer some of these important questions using innovative techniques to create a large, representative sample of accounts that can be clearly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to define the boundaries of ISIS's online social network. The goals of the project included: - Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter using a very large and accurate sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper). - Outline a methodology for discovering and defining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for future research using consistent comparison data (section 3). - Create preliminary data and a path to further investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspended by Twitter and the effects of suspensions (section 2.5). Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, include: - From September through December 2014, we estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. - The 46,000 figure is our most conservative estimate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; however, we believe the truth is closer to the low end of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). - Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization's territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded (section 1.4). - Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). - ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users (section 2). - Much of ISIS's social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume (section 2.1). - A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended (section 2.5.1). - At the time our data collection launched in September 2014, Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this prevented us from creating a pre-suspension dataset, we were able to gather information on how the removal of accounts affected the overall network (section 2.5.4). - Account suspensions do have concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on social media. They do not, at the current level of implementation, eliminate those activities, and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any balanced evaluation of current levels of suspension activity clearly demonstrates that total interdiction is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over how suspensions affect the performance of the network and whether a different level of pressure might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions in a manner that would be far more devastating to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an approach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). - The process of suspension does create certain new risks. Most importantly, while suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS's social network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization (section 4.3). - Further study is required to evaluate the unintended consequences of suspension campaigns and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). - Social media companies and the U.S government must work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Although discussions of this issue often frame government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures of how suspensions are applied (section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis Paper No. 20: Accessed November 27, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Shelf Number: 137342 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State (ISIS) Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: El-Enany, Nadine Title: Justice, Resistance and Solidarity: Race and Policing in England and Wales Summary: This edition of Perspectives focuses on racism and policing in Britain. It brings together academics, practitioners and activists to examine, and offer their outlook on, the state of policing and its effects on black and minority ethnic communities in Britain today. In recent years the US has been in the spotlight for police killings of black men and women, including the 2014 killings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Tanisha Anderson in Cleveland, Ohio, and Eric Garner in New York, as well as the protest movements which have followed. Britain is no stranger to racialised police violence. Following these and other fatal police shootings, solidarity protests with the "BlackLivesMatter" movement drew attention to the long list of unaccounted-for deaths of black men and women in Britain. Systemic and institutional racism persists in policing despite its recognition in the Macpherson Report more than fifteen years ago. In Britain, black and minority ethnic people are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system at every level, from arrests to stop and search, to imprisonment, to deaths in custody. Successive governments' counter-terrorism policies have resulted in racial profiling and over-policing of Muslim and Asian communities, and have fed a pervasive Islamophobia now affecting British and other European societies. Contributors to this collection have tackled these issues head on from multiple perspectives, incorporating the voices of those affected by racialised policing and those who campaign on their behalf, together with scholars in the field. Each of their short contributions seeks to provoke critical reflection and forward-thinking on key issues where race and policing intersect. The collection is organised into three parts. The first, Taking Stock - The State of Policing, sets out the key contemporary issues in race and policing within a historical context. The second part, Racism and Counter-Terrorism, examines the racial and religious profiling that is at the heart of counter-terror policing in Britain and examines the impact this is having on Asian and Muslim communities in particular. The final part, Considering a Way Forward, brings together accounts from grassroots and community organisations of their experiences and strategies when taking up the challenge of scrutinising and seeking accountability for police actions. Included in this part are comparative perspectives on practice and policy from across Europe. Details: London: Runnymede, 2015. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Runnymede Perspectives: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Race%20and%20Policing%20v4.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Race%20and%20Policing%20v4.pdf Shelf Number: 137350 Keywords: Minority Communities Police Accountability Police Reform Policing Racial Profiling Racial Profiling in Policing Racism Terrorism

Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The State of the Art 2015: A literature review of social media intelligence capabilities for counter-terrorism Summary: This paper is a review of how information and insight can be drawn from open social media sources. It focuses on the specific research techniques that have emerged, the capabilities they provide, the possible insights they offer, and the ethical and legal questions they raise. These techniques are considered relevant and valuable in so far as they can help to maintain public safety by preventing terrorism, preparing for it, protecting the public from it and pursuing its perpetrators. The report also considers how far this can be achieved against the backdrop of radically changing technology and public attitudes towards surveillance. This is an updated version of a 2013 report paper on the same subject, State of the Art. Since 2013, there have been significant changes in social media, how it is used by terrorist groups, and the methods being developed to make sense of it. In particular, the context in which this research took place has changed in a number of significant ways. First, there have been continuing concerns about internet surveillance and privacy following the revelations of NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Second, and partly as a result, there have been changes in the way that people use social media, and indeed in social media companies and platforms themselves. Third, so-called Islamic State (IS) made social media a central component of their modus operandi - particularly for propagandistic purposes. Finally, the methods and software used to make sense of social media have continued to improve. Social media research has emerged as a practice, but is still not yet a coherent academic discipline or distinctive intelligence tradecraft. It is neither a distinct area of study, nor driven by a united research community. It is conducted across the public, private and academic sectors, spanning disciplines from the computer sciences and ethnography to advertising and brand management. Its aims range from understanding the topography of social networks comprising millions of individuals to the deep, textured knowledge of the social worlds of individuals and small groups. As such, techniques and approaches often reflect specific disciplinary traditions and rarely refer to those found elsewhere. Social media research is also fragmented by platform. There is already a distinct nascent discipline surrounding Twitter, driven by free access to millions of tweets, an easily available Application Programming Interface (API) and fewer concerns about privacy and intrusion. Since 2008, the corpus of work on 'Twitterology' has grown from a handful to hundreds of research papers, covering everything from topic identification to event detection and political forecasting. Details: London: Demos, 2015. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2015 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf?1442411063 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf?1442411063 Shelf Number: 137369 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Social Media Surveillance Terrorism

Author: Bergin, Anthony Title: Gen Y Jihadists: Preventing Radicalisation in Australia Summary: In September 2014 the terrorism threat level was raised from 'medium' to 'high' - the first change in 13 years. This year, the government estimated that the number of high risk terrorist threats being monitored by security agencies had doubled and that more than 100 Australians were fighting for groups in Syria and Iraq. A team of ASPI analysts has examined the scope and nature of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism in Australia through a comprehensive database of the high-profile Australians identified as foreign fighters and those that have come to the attention of authorities in Australia. Based on the findings from this research, the paper assesses the policy responses by the government to date and offers recommendations. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Shelf Number: 137449 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Chalk, Peter Title: Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia Summary: Although the prime focus of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been on establishing a state - a caliphate - in the Middle East, it has also sought to gain a presence beyond that area. Southeast Asia is one region that's now receiving increased attention as a potential beachhead for the group. Most concern has focused on Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the Malay Muslim provinces of Thailand. The paper considers how these nations are responding to the threat. Beyond Southeast Asia, ISIL is showing a growing influence in Australia. The measures the Australian Government are taking have been generally well received. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the pace and nature of Australia's emergent counterterrorist strategy and their implications for the nation's democratic character. The paper puts forward national priorities and suggests that regionally greater emphasis needs to be given to formalising genuine counterterrorist cooperation. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137451 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2015 Summary: When it came to domestic terrorism and extremism, the year 2015 was a grisly one for the United States. In the past twelve months, the names of a number of American cities became unwelcome shorthand for the carnage that extremist killers wreaked in them: Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, San Bernardino. Each of these cities became scenes of tragedy and death, thanks to the cold-hearted ideological motivations of angry killers. It is thus no surprise that these and other domestic extremist killers have collectively amassed a higher number of victims in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing. Preliminary tallies by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism indicate that a minimum of 52 people in the United States were killed by adherents of domestic extremist movement in the past 12 months. This number is bound to grow further still, as extremist connections to some murders often take years to be revealed - and there are likely still other murders whose extremist connections may never see the light of day. Still, the 52 people known to have died at the hands of domestic extremists are disturbing enough, more than the numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 put together. The victims included police officers, government workers, service members, and civilians from all walks of life. Key Findings of Report - In 2015, the 52 deaths came at the hands of adherents of four domestic extremist movements: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, domestic Islamic extremists, and anti-abortion extremists. - As has been the case every year since 1995, white supremacists have been responsible for the largest number of deaths, at 20. One incident, the June 17 mass shooting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, which killed nine, was responsible for almost half of these deaths. - Usually, right-wing anti-government extremists account for the next highest number of murders each year, but in 2015, in a disturbing development, domestic Islamic extremists were responsible for 19 deaths, virtually the same as white supremacists. All of these deaths stemmed from two shooting rampages: the July 16 attacks by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on military targets in Chattanooga and the December 2 rampage by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. - The 52 murders occurred in 17 separate incidents, with nine of the incidents involving multiple murders. This is unusual, in that most extremist-related examples of murder involve a single victim. - Ideology played a primary or substantial role in 10 of the 17 incidents in 2015, accounting for 34 of the 52 victims. Non-ideological killings by extremists, which accounted for the remainder, tend to involve group-related killings (such as killing a suspected informant or a rival gang member) or traditional criminal violent activity (in which extremists also often engage). - Overwhelmingly the extremist weapon of choice in 2015 - as in virtually every year - was firearms. In fact, 48 of the 52 victims were killed by firearms. The other four victims were killed by a variety of means, including two stabbings, a blunt instrument killing, and a motor vehicle incident. All of the multiple murder incidents involved the use of one or more firearms. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Shelf Number: 137452 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Gun Violence Homicides Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crime

Author: Hassan, Riaz Title: Islamophobia, social distance and fear of terrorism in Australia: A preliminary report Summary: Immigration and the accompanying ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity are the building blocks of modern Australian society. Australia's democratic political system has provided the vital and enduring framework for its development as a prosperous, politically inclusive and socially cohesive society which leads the world on many aspects of social development. An important feature of Australia's political culture is its reliance on objective and reliable information about its social structures in order to frame and develop appropriate public policies for the economic and social advancement of its people. In this regard public institutions such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian universities and the media play a vital and critical role. Australia's democratic system is committed to freedom of membership of religious, ethnic and cultural groups. For many groups, ethnic, cultural and religious group memberships have also been central to the experience of disadvantage in Australia as demonstrated in the case of Indigenous Australians. This report deals with the experience of Australian Muslims. The contact between Muslim fishermen from Indonesia's Sulawesi region and Indigenous Australians dates back to the early eighteenth century but the arrival of Muslims in large numbers is a recent phenomenon. In the past two decades the Muslim population has increased significantly due to immigration and natural increase. According to the 2011 Australian Census there were 476,290 Muslims in Australia of whom about 40 per cent were born in Australia and the rest came from 183 countries, making them one of most ethnically and nationally heterogeneous religious communities. With 2.2 per cent of the Australian population, Islam is now the third largest religion in Australia. According to recent Pew Research Centre demographic projections, by 2050 the number of Australian Muslims will increase to 1.4 million or 5 per cent of the population, making Islam the second largest religion. A number of studies have noted that migrant status and membership of minority religious and cultural groups is central to understanding the experiences of disadvantage in Australia. Muslims are a particularly striking example of how a growing cultural subpopulation experience disadvantage. As noted in a previous report of the International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding (2015),Australian Muslims are educationally high achievers, but underemployed and underpaid (Australian Muslims: A Demographic, Social and Economic Profile of Muslims in Australia 2015). This is a preliminary report on the findings of a survey of the perceptions of key religious and cultural groups, with a special focus on Muslims, by a representative sample of 1000 Australian adults. It focuses on their perceptions of Muslims and other religious and ethnic groups with special reference to Islamophobia, social distance and terrorism and how these vary by key demographics, respondent's direct experience with the other groups and other variables. A more detailed report of the findings will follow. This report offers a new metric of social distance that can be applied to key religious and ethnic groups. In relation to Australian Muslims it explores the pattern of Islamophobia and worries about terrorism. This study offers a methodological framework for future larger studies of religious and ethnic relations in Australia and their impact in terms of social and economic disadvantage for subpopulations. Details: Adelaide: International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding, University of South Australia, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: http://www.unisa.edu.au/Global/EASS/MnM/Publications/Islamophobia_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.unisa.edu.au/Global/EASS/MnM/Publications/Islamophobia_report.pdf Shelf Number: 137664 Keywords: Ethnic Groups Fear of Crime Immigrants Islamophobia Muslims Religion Terrorism

Author: Schanzer, David Title: The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety Summary: More than four years ago, the White House issued a national strategy calling for the development of partnerships between police and communities to counter violent extremism. This report contains the results of a comprehensive assessment of the challenges and promise of this strategic approach to preventing violent extremism. It is based on a nationwide survey of law enforcement agencies and hundreds of hours of interviews and site visits with police departments and community members around the country. Based on this research, we reached two fundamental conclusions. First, policing agencies face multiple obstacles to creating community partnerships focused on preventing acts of violent extremism. But, second, some policing agencies are following a set of promising practices which, if applied effectively, can result in increasing trust between the police and the communities they serve. These trusting relationships can serve as a platform for addressing many public safety threats, including, but not limited to, violent extremism. Policing agencies are unlikely to be successful in creating partnerships to address violent extremism until they establish trusting relationships with the communities they serve. This is especially true with respect to Muslim American communities, which have experienced significant trauma since 9/11 and have deep concerns about how they are treated by the government. Police outreach and engagement efforts are viewed with some suspicion by Muslim Americans for a number of reasons. First, Muslim Americans perceive they are being unfairly assigned a collective responsibility to attempt to curb violent extremism inspired by al Qaeda, ISIS, and other likeminded groups, but other communities are not being asked to address anti-government, racist, and other forms of extremism. Our research confirmed that while many policing agencies have robust efforts to conduct outreach with Muslim Americans, they do not have organized, overt efforts to reach out to non-Muslim communities that may be targeted for recruitment by anti-government, racist, or other extremist movements. Second, some Muslim Americans believe that policing outreach and engagement initiatives may be linked with efforts to conduct surveillance on Muslim American individuals and organizations. Third, even though most Muslim Americans have favorable impressions of local law enforcement, they see outreach and engagement efforts as part of a federal counter-terrorism program. Their unpleasant experiences with federal agencies, especially with respect to airport security and immigration control, taint their support for partnerships with policing agencies. We also found that willingness to develop partnerships with the police depends on how effectively the police address other, non-terrorism related, public safety concerns of the community. Some Muslim American communities believe that their public safety concerns are not being fully addressed by the police and therefore are not interested in engaging on other issues. Finally, developing effective community outreach and engagement programs is also difficult for the police because the programs absorb significant resources and may detract from other police priorities. Community policing programs require staffing, specialized training, and interpreters or intensive language classes for officers - all at a time when many police departments around the country are experiencing budgetary stress. Furthermore, we found that preventing violent extremism, while a pressing national issue, is not a top priority for local police that must address violent crime, drugs, gangs, and a host of other public safety concerns. Details: Durham, NC: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 2016. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Shelf Number: 137690 Keywords: Community Participation Community Policing Extremist Groups Muslims Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Macdonald, Geoffrey Title: Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh Summary: Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that has shaped its political culture. Since the early 2000s, it has experienced a renewal of violent extremism and an increasingly polarized political climate. By addressing the relationship between radicalization and institutional dysfunctions, this Peace Brief examines how Bangladesh can help undermine the issues that bolster radicalization efforts by strengthening political and social institutions and making them more inclusive. Summary - The role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and current violence. - The polarized political climate and institutionalized repression of Islamic parties appear to enhance radicalization dynamics. - The current environment in Bangladesh presents an opportunity to prevent violent extremism before it fully manifests itself. - Measures to improve democratic governance and inclusive politics could help mitigate the risk of violent extremism in Bangladesh, while also reducing political violence levels. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 200: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 137697 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islam Political Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Miller, Erin Title: Mass-Fatality, Coordinated Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in France Summary: On November 13, 2015, assailants carried out a series of coordinated attacks at locations in Paris, France, including a theater where a concert was being held, several restaurants, and a sporting event. These attacks reportedly killed more than 120 people and wounded more than 350 others. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attack. To provide contextual information on coordinated, mass-fatality attacks, as well as terrorism in France and the attack patterns of ISIL, START has compiled the following information from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The report, "Mass-Fatality, Coordinated Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in France," is available on START's website and includes details such as: - Between 1970 and 2014, there have been 176 occasions on which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people (excluding perpetrators), in a particular country on a particular day. - Between 2000 and 2014, there were 83 days on which more than 100 people were killed by terrorist attacks in a single country. These attacks took place in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; however, they were especially concentrated in Iraq and Nigeria. - Preliminary data from 2015 suggest that the unusual frequency of mass casualty terrorist attacks in 2014 has continued. Between January and June 2015 there were 11 occasions in which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people in a single country on a single day. - ISIL, under its current incarnation, carried out more than 750 coordinated attacks from 2000-2014 - specifically in 2013 and 2014. However, this is a conservative assessment because the Global Terrorism Database records the names of perpetrator organizations at the time of the attack. Thus, it is important to note that al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), ISIL's predecessor, carried out at least 400 coordinated attacks as well. Also, 25 coordinated attacks were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another identity previously assumed by ISIL, and several other coordinated attacks were carried out by provinces of the Islamic State, including the Sinai Province and the Tripoli Province. Details: College Park, MD: START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), 2015. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Background Report: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ParisMassCasualtyCoordinatedAttack_Nov2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: France URL: Shelf Number: 137703 Keywords: Islamic State of Iraq Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Groenewald, Hesta Title: "Hammering the Bread and the Nail": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Afghanistan Summary: The international intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was in many respects a watershed for the country and for the global agenda on combating terrorism. The decision to react to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with a military-led response was intended to close down al-Qaeda's operational space in Afghanistan, which the Taliban regime refused to challenge. Yet, the country was also in ongoing civil conflict and the actions of the Taliban regime were as much targeted against the Afghan population as they were causing insecurity for Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Focusing the international intervention on the narrow counter-terrorism aims of defeating al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power meant missing early opportunities to support political transition, development progress and long-term peacebuilding. This research report reviews international engagement in Afghanistan with a view to identifying lessons and recommendations regarding statebuilding, peacebuilding and counterterrorism in the country and elsewhere. Based mostly on existing literature, the report focuses in particular on US, UK and EU involvement. While providing an overview of the key dilemmas, the analysis generates important recommendations for future support to Afghanistan, and also aims to inform ongoing policy debates about international engagement with 'terrorism-generating' contexts. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Shelf Number: 137727 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Human Rights Abuses Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Suri, Sunil Title: "Barbed Wire on Our Heads": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia Summary: Since 2007 the US, UK and EU have provided significant funds to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional actors aimed at militarily defeating al-Shabaab. These resources have been provided despite questions about the objectives of regional actors and evidence that their actions have undermined efforts to build peace in Somalia. The US, UK and EU have all been prominent backers of the stabilisation and statebuilding agendas in Somalia - the latter of which is enshrined in the Somali Compact - and have been particularly active in political processes to form interim regional administrations and the creation of a federal system. These approaches have wrested much territory from al-Shabaab control, particularly since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. However, these territorial gains remain both relative and fragile, and have both caused harm and created risks for longer-term stability. With the mandate of the FGS coming to an end in 2016, the US, UK and EU have the opportunity to reflect upon the lessons of over twenty years of involvement and adjust their policies in the country. This report, informed by field research in Somalia and Kenya, aims to inform this debate about the impact of US, UK and EU counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches in the southern and central areas of Somalia since 2001. Assessing the impact of their engagement on Somali conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective, it argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 66p., bibliography Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Shelf Number: 137728 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Attree, Larry Title: Blown back: Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Yemen Summary: Since serious terror threats emerged in Yemen in 2000, the West has invested significantly in counter-terror and stabilisation. Alongside direct military action to assassinate key militants (by the US), Western actors backed the Government of Yemen to fight, prosecute or punish terrorists, and gave capacity-building support to institutions, hoping to address the weakness of a willing but fragile state. The Western approach reflects a domestic discourse in the West in which Yemen has been defined primarily as a 'threat' - an unstable context that plays host to al-Qaeda and other dangerous groups, which must be defeated by backing the state at all costs. This report analyses external actors' approaches to Yemen and their impacts on its conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective. It argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Year: 2016 Country: Yemen URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Shelf Number: 137729 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport Security Border Security Extremists Homeland Security Radicals Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses Summary: The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years. In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Cafe siege1 and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters. On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the Australian Police Journal estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadis took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries. This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/72ABFCEDB075A6A1CA257F4C0011969F/$File/Radicalisation+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: .https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 137747 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Grantham, David Title: Shutting Down ISIS' Antiquities Trade Summary: The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, reminded the world that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is at war with western civilization. The U.S. government desperately needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating this threat than simply drone warfare and piecemeal deployments of "specialized expeditionary targeting forces." And a top priority of a new, broader campaign should be the destruction of ISIS' financial networks. ISIS and Antiquities. ISIS poses a national security threat to the United States primarily because of the resources it commands. The organization boasts an impressive network of revenue streams, ranging from oil proceeds and racketeering profits to money seized from local banks. But ISIS also profits from its lucrative trade in pilfered Roman, Greek, and other antiquities found in Syria and northern Iraq. This lucrative operation presents a national security dilemma because it helps fund ISIS's international war machine. The U.S. government and international bodies have tried in the past to undermine the global trade in looted antiquities by international conventions that disallow signatory countries from participating in the theft and transportation of looted antiquities. But the illegal antiquities market remains notoriously difficult to regulate. Moreover, officials often treat the illegal antiquities trade as a victimless crime run by criminal organizations. Few acknowledge the definitive links between illegal antiquities and terrorism. The challenges of enforcement and lack of attention keeps the market for illicit antiquities strong. This Is Not a Recent Phenomenon. During World War II, Nazis looted public and private collections from across Europe. Looters reaffirmed the importance of the antiquities market by ransacking regional museums in Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War. Between the end of the war in 1991, and 1994, eleven museums lost 3,000 artifacts and 484 manuscripts to theft. A majority have yet to be recovered. Years later, the Taliban earned a reputation as a broker of Afghan antiquities, even though it spent enormous time and energy destroying historical landmarks throughout the country. Al Qaeda was also involved in the trade. In 1999, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the plane that crashed into Tower Two of the World Trade Center, tried to sell Afghan antiquities to a German university professor. Atta "claimed that he was selling artifacts in order to purchase an airplane." The Iraqi museums looted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 only reiterated the national security implications surrounding unprotected antiquities. As of 2008, authorities have only recovered about 6,000 of the 15,000 items stolen. Experts fear that Al-Qaeda offshoots like ISIS are today selling some of the unaccounted for antiquities to fund their terrorist operations. Details: Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 185: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Shelf Number: 137760 Keywords: Antiquities Illegal Trade ISIS Islamic State National Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: National Counter Terrorism Security Office Title: Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events Summary: This guide is intended to give protective security advice to those who are responsible for organising major events and event security, irrespective of size and capacity and is not specific to any particular type of event. It is aimed at those events where there may be a risk of a terrorist attack either because of the nature of the event or the number or nature of the people who host or attend it. It highlights the vital part you can play in the UK counter terrorism strategy. Details: London: National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375117/Major_Events_Reviewed.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375117/Major_Events_Reviewed.pdf Shelf Number: 137789 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Public Events Security Sporting Events Sports Facilities, Security Terrorism

Author: European Commission. Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs Title: Europeans' Attitudes Towards Security Summary: Overall perception of security - Around 90% of people say that their immediate neighbourhood and their city, town or village are safe places to live. - Around 80% say that their own country and the EU are secure places to live. - Respect for fundamental rights and freedoms is thought to have the most positive impact on one's personal sense of security - 42% of respondents say this. Perceived threats and challenges - Terrorism is seen as the EU's most important security challenge, with half of all respondents describing it as important. - However, the level of concern varies considerably from country to country: 62% of people in Malta, but only 22% in Latvia, think terrorism is an important challenge. - Since 2011, the proportion of people identifying terrorism and religious extremism as important challenges has increased substantially. Fewer people now think that economic and financial crises are the most important challenge to security. - 65% of people think that terrorism is a very important internal security challenge for the EU, and 92% think it is important. - Over two-thirds of people think that the threat of terrorism is likely to increase over the next three years, with over half also saying that cybercrime and organised crime will increase. - Over eight out of ten respondents think that extremist ideologies, war and political instability, and poverty and social exclusion, are potential sources of threats to EU security. - Only seven out of ten people see climate change and pollution as a potential source of security threats. Responses to address security challenges - The police and the judicial system are seen as being chiefly responsible for ensuring the security of citizens: around nine out of ten respondents say this. - The police are seen as the organisation with the biggest role in ensuring the security of citizens in all but five Member States, where the judicial system is listed first. - Over half of the respondents think the police are doing enough to fight terrorism and drug trafficking, but less than half say enough is being done to fight other crimes. - A majority of respondents think that citizens' rights and freedoms have been restricted for reasons related to fighting terrorism and crime. - People are generally positive about the impact of new technologies, but a quarter think they will have a negative impact on the security of citizens. Details: Luxembourg: The Commission, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf Shelf Number: 137809 Keywords: Cybercrime Extremist Groups Organized Crime Police Effectiveness Public Safety Security Terrorism

Author: Denmark. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs Title: The Challenge of Extremism: Examples of Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programmes in the EU Summary: In January 2010 a survey on deradicalisation and disengagement was initiated. In this survey five respondent countries have described specific deradicalisation and/or disengagement programmes targeted towards individuals. These five countries are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. This report focuses on these intervention programmes, because the main objective of the survey is to map such programmes. The main objectives of the survey were: - To map the practical experiences in EU member states with policies and programmes on deradicalisation and disengagement, focusing on how to intervene when individuals have been attracted to extremism. - To support the exchange of experience and good practice among the EU member states in the further efforts to address the challenges of extremism and radicalisation. The questionnaire was sent to all 27 EU member states. 18 EU member states replied extensively by giving descriptions of their overall strategies on prevention of extremism. All but one of the 18 countries have developed, or are developing, strategies to prevent radicalisation and extremism. Accordingly most of the strategies are broad initiatives on early prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The implementing partners in the strategies are often a mix of different authorities and organisations on a national, regional and local level. Out of 18 countries, 13 countries have experienced problems with right-wing extremism, 12 countries have experienced problems with left-wing extremism, 10 countries have experienced problems with militant Islamism, and seven countries have experienced problems with separatist movements, animal right groups and/or other groups. In most countries right-wing extremism and militant Islamism are assessed as the biggest threats. Details: Copenhagen: The Ministry, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2016 at: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137813 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Simcox, Robin Title: The Presumption of Innocence: Difficulties in bringing Suspected Terrorists to Trial Summary: The Presumption of Innocence, by Henry Jackson Society Research Fellow Robin Simcox, looks at the variety of reasons why the state has not always been able to try terror suspects. The main finding of the report is that, in an era of mass casualty terrorism, the notion that all such individuals can be tried in court is outdated The report demonstrates how prosecutions are just one aspect of a much broader strategy of stopping terrorism and not always necessary in order to prove the existence of a specific threat. The report goes on to call on Western governments - particularly those in Europe - to be clearer in explaining exactly why the state is forced to apply a broad series of measures in combating international terrorism. Partially based on field research undertaken at Guantanamo Bay, the report also argues that: - The majority of those detained at Guantanamo Bay will not be tried. Detention during a time of war takes place to prevent a perceived immediate threat; not as a prelude to trial for a criminal offence. - The operational counter-terrorism tactics of intelligence agencies and law enforcement can diverge significantly. Intelligence agencies' priority is disruption and prevention, not assembling information that can be used in court. - Prosecution of suspected terrorists is not always in the public interest. They risk disclosing classified information in court that hinders ongoing investigations, revealing sensitive sources, or exposing intelligence-gathering methods. - As al Qaeda often operates in ungoverned mountainous regions, the U.S. and its allies have limited access to capturing fighters based there. This has led to the increased use of armed drones and targeted killing, a tactic that will continue in the future. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2013. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/ Shelf Number: 137846 Keywords: Islam Prosecution Terrorism Terrorist Detention Terrorists

Author: Simcox, Robin Title: "We Will Conquer Your Rome": A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West Summary: The Islamic State (IS) presently controls significant amounts of land throughout Iraq and Syria. However, its ambitions are not restricted to this territory. Within days of announcing its 'Caliphat', the self-appointed 'Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowed that IS would eventually "conquer Rome". IS precursor groups and the individuals which have trained alongside them have displayed an interest in attacking the West for years. However, an audio message released on 21 September 2014, saw Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an IS spokesman, attempt to ratchet up the threat. He instructed IS supporters to carry out attacks in the West - no matter how crude. There has subsequently been an increase in IS-linked plots that have emerged in the West. "We Will Conquer Your Rome:" A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West by research fellow Robin Simcox studies all those that have been reported since the declaration of the 'Caliphate', and attempts to draw conclusions about any trends that may be developing. The report studies over a year's worth of Islamic State plots. It examines which countries were most commonly targeted; the age; nationality; background; terrorist training and combat experience of the perpetrators; relevance of the Internet; which sectors are most commonly targeted for attack; and assesses the extent to which the Islamic State directed, assisted or simply just inspired these plots. It concludes that since the declaration of IS's 'Caliphate', there have been, on average, over two plots related to IS that either are foiled or take place in the West every month. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Shelf Number: 137847 Keywords: Cyber Security Internet Crimes Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Stuart, Hannah Title: Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford Summary: Since the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, police forces nationally have implemented successive counter-radicalisation policies. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism, based on a series of interviews with senior police officers from the West Yorkshire Police and the North East Counter-Terrorism Unit, provides a practical perspective on the challenges of delivering preventative work at grassroots level as well as on policy debates about the remit of counter-extremism in a free society. Key findings include: ◾The police advocate building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; and recognise the need to be representative and to respond to changing community dynamics; ◾A focus on successful community policing and "quality of life issues" allows the police to proactively create resilient partnerships rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; ◾A strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism; helps isolate extremists; and promotes dialogue around other controversial issues, such as grooming; ◾Promoting safe giving is a key response to the religious injunction for charity within Muslim communities, which can increase vulnerability to fundraising for criminal or terrorist intent and to intimidating styles of fundraising that take advantage of a generous and permissive cultural attitude towards giving; ◾Police forces are well-placed to identify grievances and negative perceptions within communities. Successful work around education, internet safety and grooming demonstrates the value of promoting counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding issue rather than simply as a counter-terrorism tool; ◾Among the biggest challenges anticipated for 2015 is ensuring consistency in relation to freedom of speech and the thresholds used to measure extremism, particularly as it manifests either online or in public situations, for example at universities and during political protests. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper No. 4: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137850 Keywords: Community Policing Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hussain, Ghaffar Title: Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it Summary: Online extremism and the role the Internet plays in the radicalisation process is currently being debated and discussed by journalists, academics, technologists and government officials alike. This report demystifies the topic of extremist content online and exposes the manner in which online tools are being used by Islamist extremist organisations and individuals to recruit and propagandise. Current measures to tackle online extremism are also assessed and critiqued, after which the report details a practical strategy for countering extremism online and making the Internet a less hospitable domain for extremists. The research conducted for this report focuses on 30 Islamist extremist groups operating in the UK and France, mapping their use of the Internet and what they hope to achieve through their online activities. Popular online platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter as well as chat rooms, discussion forums and static websites are analysed with a view to assessing the role online extremist messaging plays in the radicalisation process. The report also addresses the issue of censorship, assessing the effectiveness of current filtering methods available and their overall efficacy. Research for this report was based on original data collection and analyses as well as interviews with a range of experts, mentors and target audiences. Key findings in this report: - With the Internet often being accused of producing radicalisation in isolation of other factors, this report found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. In other words, the Internet does not radicalise in isolation of other factors and should not be targeted as the 'cause' of radicalisation. As such, the Internet's role is less about initiating the radicalisation process; rather it acts as a facilitator and catalyst for the radicalisation process by 1) indoctrinating, 2) educating and 3) socialising individuals. - Although governments are increasingly relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism, this report found that negative measures, or censorship in general, was not only ineffective and costly but also potentially counter-productive. - Positive measures, such as developing counter-extremist efforts through online counter-speech content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism are much more effective in challenging extremist ideologies. However, there are currently not enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to monopolise certain issues. - We found that results from search engines rarely, if ever, provide links to content that supported Islamist extremism. It was equally rare to find content countering extremist narratives. - Research also found that available Islamist extremist content websites were most successful if they provided more subtle, non-illegal information platforms with links to active social media platforms for users. Available static websites served primarily to 1) propagate the Islamist narrative through specific interpretations of scriptures, 2) promote martyrdom and 3) solidify a 'self versus other' allegiance to Muslims, rejecting non-Muslims. This report seeks to differentiate itself from previous reports on online extremism in two ways; firstly the research itself is much more in-depth and diverse, combining qualitative and quantitative data to reach conclusions. Secondly, this report offers a comprehensive and practical list of recommendations which, if implemented fully, could unleash a new wave of online activism that will take the fight to extremists online, breaking the current monopoly they hold over certain socio-political issues. Recommendations to public, private and third party sectors based on our findings: - Establishing a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so. - Improving digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities. - Encouraging the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda. - A mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence. - Establishing a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter-extremism initiatives. - More research into how the far right is using the Internet to propagandise giving a broader view of 'extremism online'. The findings and recommendations of this report suggest a clearer understanding of the role the Internet plays in radicalisation process and an appreciation of the dangers of relying on illiberal censorship can contribute towards the development of a more holistic approach to tackling extremism online. Relying on the cultivation of grassroots initiatives to develop and promote counter-speech online, as opposed to censorship, could help turn the tide against current extremist efforts. However, co-operation and regular communication between stakeholders from key sectors is vital in order for the above vision to be realised and, thus, the establishment of a forum that allows this to take place is also important. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137854 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Internet Islamists Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Blanchard, Christopher M. Title: The Islamic State and U.S. Policy Summary: The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has adherents in several other countries, and disrupts regional and international security with violence and terrorism. A series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group outside of Iraq and Syria has demonstrated IS supporters' ability to threaten societies in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States, including in countries with sophisticated and capable intelligence and security forces. The U.S.-led campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) appears to be entering a new phase in early 2016, as Administration officials implement planned changes in military strategy and tactics, pursue new diplomatic and coalition building initiatives, and consider alternative proposals. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria remain focal points in this regard, but a series of terrorist attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, creating a more global sense of urgency about combatting the group and reversing its spread. The group has stated its intent to attack inside the United States, and the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, have been attributed to IS supporters who did not have apparent links to the organization but were praised by the group. Debate continues over whether IS elements overseas have the capability to direct, support, and/or carry out further attacks in the United States. The group's statements suggest it seeks to provoke reactions from targeted populations and spur confrontations between various Muslim sects and between Muslims and non-Muslims. The interdependent nature of the conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where IS fighters operate complicate efforts to address and eliminate the IS threat. President Obama has stated that the goals of U.S. strategy are to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State using various means including U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. U.S. military operations against the group and its adherents in several countries, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to reconcile Syrian and Iraqi factions, are ongoing. Parallel U.S. political and security efforts in North Africa, West Africa, and South Asia also seek to mitigate local IS-related threats. This report provides background on the Islamic State organization, discussing its goals, operations, and affiliates, as well as analyzing related U.S. legislative and policy debates. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R43612: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Shelf Number: 137859 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Law Enforcement Lone Wolf Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Cohen, Katie Title: Who Will Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet Summary: Solo actor terrorism, also known as lone wolf terrorism, is a growing threat against civil security, partly due to the fact that Internet access makes it easier than ever to engage in study and dissemination of extremist views. A large variation regarding factors such as ideology, social background, psychopathology and personality type means there is no clear profile for lone wolf terrorists. An assessment of which individuals from a population of political extremists that will go on to commit acts of terrorism can therefore not only be based on factors such as individual experiences or personality traits. A threat assessment should rather be based on the potential perpetrator's behaviour during the time closely preceding the attack. Hence, behaviours that have been empirically proven to precede terrorist attacks and other incidents of planned violence, such as mass murder or school shootings, so called warning behaviours, can have an important role in assessing lone wolf terrorist threats. Warning behaviours often precede terrorist acts and are in their turn preceded by a radicalisation process, where an individual gradually enters a state of mind characterised by a proneness to premeditated violence with the purpose of advancing an ideology. Most lone wolf terrorists have gone through a process of self-radicalisation, wherein media has had a crucial role. Internet is indisputably the medium that has had the greatest influence on the radicalisation process during the last decade. However, while it has facilitated the process, the Internet has also created new possibilities of discovering warning behaviours prior to an actual terrorist attack. From an existing typology of eight different warning behaviours, the three that can most easily be inferred from the subject's Internet communication will be discussed in the following report: (1) Leakage, when the subject, more or less specifically and more or less intentionally, informs a third party about an intent to perpetrate a terrorist attack, (2) fixation, which expresses an extreme preoccupation with a person or cause or extensive gathering of facts about a target, and (3) identification, which comprises a self-image characterised by fantasies about being a hero or warrior and/or a strong interest in weapons and military paraphernalia, as well as a strong influence from other radical proponents of lone wolf terrorism. The aim of the following report is firstly, to shed light on different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind self-radicalisation and the interaction between the individual and the environment during the radicalisation process, and secondly, to examine the possibility of using semi-automatic techniques for text analysis of the subjects Internet communication to discover warning behaviours. Details: Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2015 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Shelf Number: 137887 Keywords: Lone Wolf Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Threat Assessment

Author: Marlatt, Greta E. Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism -- A Brief Bibliography Summary: This bibliography, compiled by Greta E. Marlatt at the Naval Postgraduate School, contains a list of resources related to lone wolf terrorism. Resources include both books and periodicals. The list is organized alphabetically and links to resources are provided when available electronically. This bibliography was last updated February 2015. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Dudley Knox Library, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=727224 Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=727224 Shelf Number: 137889 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Coultas, Bryan T. Title: Crowdsourcing intelligence to combat terrorism: Harnessing bottom-up collection to prevent lone-wolf terror attacks Summary: U.S. officials have acknowledged that attackers of the lone-wolf and isolated-cell organizational type are on the rise and now pose a greater threat than major coordinated actions. Traditional intelligence methods, using a top-down approach with an emphasis on signals intelligence, are ill-equipped to identify and prevent terrorists using lone-wolf tactics. Crowdsourcing, as a problem-solving technique, is a relatively new idea but has shown great promise in tackling issues similar to the identification of lone-wolf terrorists. At its core, crowdsourcing is a method for thousands or even millions of people to contribute their knowledge, expertise, or skills towards a unified task. Done correctly, it has produced results unachievable by traditional tasking of humans or computers. This thesis identifies how the signals surrounding lone-wolf attacks are different and more subtle in nature from those mounted by organized terror groups. In turn, the thesis examines the potential benefits of crowdsourcing intelligence in order to strengthen the U.S. intelligence community's ability to approach this emerging problem of lone-wolf terrorism. In short, this thesis proposes that the U.S. intelligence community harness the power of U.S. citizens to help prevent identify the subtle indictors presented by lone-wolf terrorists in order to prevent lone-wolf terrorist attacks. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library, 2015. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45174/15Mar_Coultas_Bryan.pdf?sequence=3 Shelf Number: 137891 Keywords: Domestic Intelligence Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review Summary: This paper is the first publication in the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project, which aims to improve understanding of, and responses to, the phenomenon of (potentially) violent lone actors through analysis of comprehensive data on cases from across Europe. Despite recent depictions within the media, lone-actor terrorism is not a new phenomenon; however, research suggests the threat is increasing as pressure from security services forces a tactical adaptation and groups - including Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) - call on those who share their ideology to act alone without direction or support. This paper examines the current state of knowledge surrounding the phenomenon, assessing the limitations of the literature and identifying where further research should focus to add real value to countering the threat. Three recommendations are made: first, increased methodological rigour in empirical research; second, focus on process as well as perpetrators; and third, specific examination of the confluence between returning foreign fighters, domestic Daesh supporters, and the lone-actor threat. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 1: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137894 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Islamic State Islamists Jihad Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Springer, Nathan R. Title: Patterns of radicalization indentifying the markers and warning signs of domestic lone wolf terrorists in our midst Summary: This thesis will scrutinize the histories of our nation's three most prolific domestic lone wolf terrorists: Tim McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Eric Rudolph. It will establish a chronological pattern to their radicalization and reveal that their communal ideological beliefs, psychology, attributes, traits, and training take place along a common chronological timeline. Their pattern of radicalization can be used as an indicator of lone wolf terrorist radicalization development in future cases. This thesis establishes a strikingly similar chronological pattern of radicalization that was present in each terrorist's biography. This pattern can identify future lone wolf terrorist radicalization activity upstream. It can provide a valuable portent to apply in the analysis of potential lone terrorists, potentially enabling law enforcement to prevent tragedies emerging from the identified population through psychological assistance, evaluation, training, or, in the worst case, detention. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 24, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4340/09Dec_Springer.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4340/09Dec_Springer.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 137958 Keywords: Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Terrorist Chatter: Understanding what terrorists talk about Summary: Since the early 2000s the Internet has become particularly crucial for the global jihadist movement. Nowhere has the Internet been more important in the movement's development than in the West. While dynamics differ from case to case, it is fair to state that almost all recent cases of radicalization in the West involve at least some digital footprint. Jihadists, whether structured groups or unaffiliated sympathizers, have long understood the importance of the Internet in general and social media, in particular. Zachary Chesser, one of the individuals studied in this report, fittingly describes social media as "simply the most dynamic and convenient form of media there is." As the trend is likely to increase, understanding how individuals make the leap to actual militancy is critically important. This study is based on the analysis of the online activities of seven individuals. They share several key traits. All seven were born or raised in the United States. All seven were active in online and offline jihadist scene around the same time (mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s). All seven were either convicted for terrorism- related offenses (or, in the case of two of the seven, were killed in terrorism- related incidents.) The intended usefulness of this study is not in making the case for monitoring online social media for intelligence purpose - an effort for which authorities throughout the West need little encouragement. Rather, the report is meant to provide potentially useful pointers in the field of counter- radicalization. Over the past ten years many Western countries have devised more or less extensive strategies aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radical ideas or de- radicalizing (or favoring the disengagement) of committed militants. (Canada is also in the process of establishing its own counter- radicalization strategy.) Radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. It is no surprise then that counter-radicalization initiatives are equally complex. Even among the seven subjects in this project there are only limited commonalities in terms of interests and views. While all seven subjects share a common background, based on the evidence of their online activities, their interests, views and approaches remain highly diverse. Some are focused mostly on religion; others are more interested in political issues. Some immediately adopt a jihadist mindset; others seem to undergo a long radicalizing trajectory. Given this diversity, it becomes obvious that any counter- radicalization needs to be tailored to the specifics of the case. Flexibility is the name of the game. Another key finding is that, at least in the beginning of their trajectories, the individuals studied here are all avid seekers of knowledge and information on religion. All refer to religious concepts and frames throughout their posts. Jihadism is a complex ideology that mixes religion and politics. But this study confirms the importance of its religious aspect for many of those who embrace violence - a fact some studies have dismissed. Any counter-radicalization effort, while not ignoring other aspects, should take into consideration the centrality of religious issues for those embracing jihadism. While for legal, political and cultural reasons it might be difficult to replicate in the West some of the religion-based counter- radicalization efforts adopted in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Singapore, the religious aspect should take a central role. The study also shows that those interested in religion are extremely inquisitive during the first stages of their radicalization trajectories. In the first months or even years of their posting life, in fact, these individuals constantly engage with fellow posters for sources and opinions on religious matters. They seem to be constantly searching for validation of their opinions. Over time, this openness seemed to slowly decrease, and by the end of the posting trajectory, there are only limited traces of questions. In the late stages, instead of questions, statements appear, often filled with confident pronouncements of their own knowledge. This attitude provides an enormous opportunity for counter- radicalization. It is arguable that it is in this phase that any kind of intervention might be more likely to succeed. Details: Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: NPSIA Working Paper Series: Working Paper No. 03, 2015: Accessed February 26, 2016 at: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Shelf Number: 137979 Keywords: Internet Jihadism Online Communications Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Summary: The mandate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was expanded in 2001 to address the funding of terrorists acts and terrorist organisations. Since that time, combatting terrorist financing (TF) has been a very significant challenge. Important work was done in 2008 to identify a wide variety of TF methods terrorists use to raise, move and use funds. That study addressed the terrorist requirement for funds to include direct costs associated with specific operations and broader organisational costs to maintain infrastructure and promote ideology for the terrorist organisation. Given the rapid development of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there is a need to understand those funding requirements and associated TF risk. This study represents a snapshot of the revenue sources and financial activities of ISIL been identified to date. However, gaps remain and more work is needed to develop the full picture of ISIL's financial activities and to identify the most effective countermeasures to prevent ISIL from using accumulated funds and disrupting sources of funding. ISIL financing is a constantly changing picture and a very difficult and complicated area to address given the operational situation on the ground. It should be emphasized that terrorism and those who support terrorism can never be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group. ISIL represents a new form of terrorist organisation where funding is central and critical to its activities. This report identifies ISIL's primary sources of revenue which are mainly derived from illicit proceeds from its occupation of territory. These sources include bank looting and extortion, control of oil fields and refineries and robbery of economic assets. Other sources include the donors who abuse Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) and cash smuggling (areas where FATF has conducted in-depth research), to new and emerging typologies which have not yet been addressed by the FATF, such as the extortion of goods and cash transiting territory where ISIL operates and grass-root funding strategies. A number of unique and diverse "case studies" have been provided by countries which describe how ISIL obtains funding and economic support as well as describing mechanisms to utilize these funds. The need for vast funds to meet organisational and governance requirements represents a vulnerability to ISIL's infrastructure. In order to maintain its financial management and expenditures in areas where it operates, ISIL must be able to seize additional territory in order to exploit resources. It is unclear if ISIL's revenue collection through the illicit proceeds it earns from occupation of territory, including extortion and theft, will be sustainable over time. Cutting off these vast revenue streams is both a challenge and opportunity for the global community to defeat this terrorist organisation. While insight into ISIL's oil-related activities is limited, this report provides a snapshot of ISIL's control of gas and oil reservoirs. While this revenue stream was significant after ISIL's initial control of numerous oil fields, their ability to efficiently extract oil, refine it and sell petroleum products have significantly diminished ISIL's earnings. This is need for refined crude and declining oil prices. There have been efforts to suppress the sale of ISIL oil and oil products on regional markets, such as enhanced counter smuggling efforts of the Turkish authorities in the past two years, as well as recent steps taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi Government authorities to seize suspected ISIL-related shipments of oil and oil products. This has reduced oil's importance relative to other sources of revenue. There is still a need to better identify the origin, middlemen, buyers, carriers, traders and routes through which oil produced in ISIL-held territory is trafficked. This report provides limited insight into the role of financial institutions and Money and Value Transfer Services (MVTS) in ISIL-held territory as well as the role of the larger international financial sector. However, a significant portion of the data related to this subject is of a sensitive nature and could not be included in this public report. There is a risk that MVTS companies in ISIL held territory continue to maintain connections to regional counterparts through which ISIL could conduct funds transfers. At the same time, both the Iraqi government and many major global financial institutions have taken steps to prevent banks in ISIL-held territory from accessing the international financial system.due to coalition air strikes, ISIL. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137994 Keywords: Islamic State Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Khan, Khalida Title: Preventing Violence Extremism (PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community Summary: The vast majority of Muslims are against violent extremism and terrorism and would like to help to counteract it. They are as appalled by violent extremism as anyone else and reject any justification that it can be condoned by Islamic teachings. However, the government's approach to dealing with terrorism by targeting the whole Muslim community as 'potential terrorists' in its Prevent Strategy is flawed and fraught with perils. We believe that rather than creating community cohesion and eliminating terrorism it has the potential to create discord and inflame community tensions. Furthermore, we believe this unprecedented strategy constitutes an infringement of civil liberties and human rights. There is a danger that PVE is becoming a well-funded industry with vested interests. Our concern is that political considerations and frictions that have nothing to do with the Muslim community or the hundreds of people who, like us, have been working on the ground for decades are obstructing the vital work of producing communities at peace with themselves and each other. As an organisation with extensive experience of working for the welfare of Muslim families we are seriously concerned about the implications of the Prevent strategy and how it is impacting in local Muslim communities. In this paper we intend to highlight why we believe the government's approach towards its Muslim community is flawed and will offer constructive recommendations as to what the government should be doing. Details: London: An-Nisa Society, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Shelf Number: 137995 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Italy. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted an assessment of Italy's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) system, based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and using the 2013 Methodology. The assessment is a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of Italy's AML/CFT system and its level of compliance with the FATF Recommendations. Italy has a strong legal and institutional framework to fight ML and TF. Authorities have a good understanding of the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks the country faces. There is generally good policy cooperation, coordination, and financial intelligence gathering and use. The authorities are able to successfully undertake large and complex money laundering and terrorist financing investigations and prosecutions, and beneficial ownership information is generally accessible to authorities. There are areas where improvements are needed. Italy should enhance its ML investigative and prosecutorial action on risks associated with self-laundering, stand-alone money laundering, and foreign predicate offenses, and the abuse of legal persons. Italy should enhance the accessibility of relevant information and dissemination of analysis by its FIU, strengthen sanctions, and improve financial sectors' and DNFBPs' understanding and implementation of requirements for beneficial ownership identification Details: Paris: FATF, 2016. 230p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 137998 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 1: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the first of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. This paper focuses on the personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists, resulting in a number of policy recommendations. The analysis specifically outlines the importance of benchmarking and looking at different sub-groups. It further identifies the importance of trust and openness, and of multi-agency co-operation. These factors might be the basis of formulating an effective response to the challenge of lone-actor terrorism Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism series No. 5: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138003 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone-Wolf Terrorists Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Palombi, Simon Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the second of four policy papers in the CLAT series, published by RUSI on behalf of Chatham House. The CLAT project identified a need to understand the factors underlying the attack methodology and logistics of lone-actor terrorists. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the key variables of the data set. The results are then used to develop a more nuanced understanding of the lone-actor terrorism threat in Europe. Details: London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 6: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138006 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Smith, Melanie Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the third of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Preventing every single instance of lone-actor terrorism is impossible. This is particularly true in countries where freedom of thought, speech and privacy are highly valued and must be protected. The recommendations stemming from this paper's analysis provide practical suggestions for preventing instances of lone-actor terrorism - based on findings relating to motivations, political engagement and online activity - that adhere to these principles. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 7: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Shelf Number: 138004 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Social Media Terrorism

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities Summary: This is the fourth and final policy paper in the CLAT series. It outlines the policy implications of analysis in relation to changes in perpetrator behaviour, 'leakage' of extreme views or intention to act, and interactions with public authorities in the time leading up to an attack. It provides a series of practical policy recommendations in order to develop an effective response to various lone-actor threats. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 8: Accessed march 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Shelf Number: 138005 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone-Wolf Terrorists Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Miklaucic, Michael Title: Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization Summary: Acceleration. Magnification. Diffusion. Entropy. Empowerment. The global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity. A consensus is emerging among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners that recent sweeping developments in information technology, communication, transportation, demographics, and conflict are making global governance more challenging. Some argue these developments have transformed our international system, making it more vulnerable than ever to the predations of terrorists and This view continues to dominate mindsets within the U.S. national security community. It fails to fully appreciate the growing power of nonstate actors and adversaries, or the magnitude of the threat they pose and the harm they impose on the international system itself. It underappreciates the possibility - indeed likelihood - of the convergence, whether for convenience or growing ambition, of criminal, terrorist, and even insurgent networks. More important even than insufficient recognition of the efficacy of these adversaries is the absence of a plan to counter the threat they pose to both national security and the international state system. In short, this view does not see the big picture - the long view of the declining robustness and resilience of the global system of nation-states that has been dominant for centuries, and the unprecedented attacks on that system. The failure of that system - in which we and so many have prospered beyond belief or precedent in history - would be a catastrophic and existential loss. Global trends and developments - including dramatically increased trade volumes and velocity, the growth of cyberspace, and population growth, among others - have facilitated the growth of violent nonstate actors, the strengthening of organized crime, and the emergence of a new set of transcontinental supply chains as well as the expansion of existing illicit markets. The resourcefulness, adaptability, innovativeness, and ability of illicit networks to circumvent countermeasures make them formidable foes for national governments and international organizations alike. Their increasing convergence gives them ever-improved ability to evade official countermeasures and overcome logistical challenges as well as ever better tools for exploiting weaknesses and opportunities within the state system, and attacking that system. Since illicit actors have expanded their activities throughout the global commons, in the land, sea, air, and cyber domains, nations must devise comprehensive and multidimensional strategies and policies to combat the complex transnational threats posed by these illicit networks. This book is an attempt to map the terrain of this emerging battlespace; it describes the scope of the security threat confronting the United States and the international community from transnational criminal organizations and what is being done to combat that threat - from the strategic level with the release, in July 2011, of the U.S. Government's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security and, in April 2011, of the Department of Defense (DOD) Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy - to the operational level with increased regional partnerships and dialogues. criminals. Others argue that despite this significant evolution, organized crime, transnational terrorism, and nonstate networks have been endemic if unpleasant features of human society throughout history, that they represent nothing new, and that our traditional means of countering them - primarily conventional law enforcement - are adequate. Even among those who perceive substantial differences in the contemporary manifestations of these persistent maladies, they are viewed as major nuisances not adding up to a significant national or international security threat, much less an existential threat. Details: Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013. 304p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf Shelf Number: 131162 Keywords: Criminal Networks Illegal Trade Illicit Markets Illicit Trade National Security Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing Summary: The majority of this report was written as part of Quilliam's evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (HASC) inquiry on Countering Extremism. In addition to the analysis of the Islamist narrative and the strategic framework required to counter it, this strategic briefing includes three case studies of counter-narratives put together by Quilliam (not included in the HASC submission), and recommendations based on experience, expertise and these case studies for future counter-narrative approaches. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 138130 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Brennan, Mark Title: Youth Pathways from Extremism Summary: Recommendation Summary I. Understanding the phenomenon of youth radicalization and de-radicalization is bolstered, available, and widely disseminated and used by young people and youth stakeholders to develop new narratives and improve national/local policies and actions; 1. Empower youth as researchers. Supporting youth to lead on research projects positively contributes to their development, enhancing their skill set, and empowering them to investigate issues that can be used as a launching pad to drive change. They are much more likely to be in touch with the mechanisms and structures that facilitate and discourage extremism recruitment. 2. Research into online and other resources that have a proven history of improving outcomes for youth substance abuse, suicide, and violence in similar at risk communities (Aboriginal youth, extremist youth) to address cultural despair. 3. Research and development of a variety of virtual, graphic, and narrative superheroes that can form alternatives to extremist, colonialist, and gender-biased models of leadership. 4. Research into understanding the differential motivations of male and female youth in their involvement in extremist groups. 5. Seek both age cohort but also intergenerational resources for building and maintaining a sense of cultural stability (but not superiority) in youth at risk for extremist alliances, which goes along with building intercultural communication. Building intercultural communication may well fail if those taking part have a sense of cultural insecurity/inadequacy/despair with no remedy for that experience of cultural "emptiness". 6. Ensure that all programs and policies are shared among major UN agencies and NGOs. Coordination of consistent programming and messages across UN entities. Details: London: Quilliam, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: White Paper for UNESCO and the United Nations Community: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-youth-led-pathways-from-extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-youth-led-pathways-from-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 138132 Keywords: Deradicalization Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Cedros, Christopher R. Title: Lone-wolf terrorist radicalization and the prisoner's dilemma: ensuring mutual cooperation between at-risk Muslim Americans and local communities Summary: While scholars study the radicalization process that produces lone-wolf terrorists in America, news stories regularly report on Muslim Americans leaving their local communities to join terrorist organizations. Currently, radicalizing individuals to act as lone wolves is the most successful method of Islamist attack on the American homeland. A novel approach to analyzing radicalization is employment of the prisoner's dilemma, which examines the motivations behind individual decision-making. The prisoner's dilemma is used by game theorists and international-relations scholars to demonstrate how persons who might ordinarily be expected to cooperate may actually work against each other and defect from previous agreements or understandings. Because lone-wolf attacks will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the U.S. homeland, it is imperative to learn how potential homegrown terrorists can be encouraged to identify with their local communities rather than defect from the social bonds of church, school, neighborhood, and workplace. This thesis explores how the prisoner's dilemma may reveal ways to discourage radicalism in at-risk Muslim Americans. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47237/15Sep_Cedros_Christopher.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138134 Keywords: Homeland Securitiy Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Muslims Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Terrorism, Trade and Welfare: Some Paradoxes and a Policy Conundrum Summary: We present a standard trade model and show that terrorism can be trade inducing, starting from autarky. In addition, terrorism can be shown to be welfare augmenting for a group of nations. Finally, we present some qualitative conditions that identify when a nation's trade volume may rise (or fall) in response to a greater incidence of terrorism. Our trade and welfare results point to potential difficulties in international coordination of counterterrorism policy because of terrorism's differential impact across nations. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2016. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2016-2 : Accessed march 9, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2744529 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2744529 Shelf Number: 138149 Keywords: Terrorism Welfare

Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Trade and Terrorism: A Disaggregated Approach Summary: This paper constructs a model of trade consequences of terrorism, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from two distinct types of terrorist risks - domestic and transnational. Using dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test these predictions for terrorism's effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufacturing goods. The latter is also decomposed by skill intensities. In general, the detrimental impact of transnational terrorism on various classes of traded commodities is twice that of domestic terrorism. As a general rule, terrorism's negative influence on trade is greater on imports than on exports. There is also a marked tendency for medium-skilled and high skilled manufacturing sectors to sustain a greater harm from terrorism than labor-intensive or low skilled manufacturing sectors. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Research Bank of St. Louis, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2016-1 : Accessed March 9, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737808 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737808 Shelf Number: 138150 Keywords: International Trade Terrorism

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Summary: This report illuminates the strategic thinking behind Islamic State's propaganda machine. Building on the theoretical framework established in 'The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy', the following analysis is based upon an exhaustive 30-day survey of Islamic State's media output. At 24 hour intervals from 17 July to 15 August 2015, the Islamic month of Shawwal, all media output from Islamic State's official outlets, from the provincial offices to the central foundations, was compiled for aggregated analysis. A total of 1146 separate events - discrete batches of propaganda - were recorded in the data collection period: a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on. After the data collection period had ended, the archive was translated and refined, as events were grouped according to their primary narrative and, if applicable, sub-narratives. Following this, the data was rigorously tested against a number of variables to determine inconsistencies and anomalies. Then, the archive was broken down into its various narrative groupings, which were qualitatively assessed both in isolation of, and respect to, each other. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Shelf Number: 138172 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Rafiq, Haras Title: Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State Summary: The following report discusses the appeal of the Islamic Sate 'caliphate' to women. To do this, the authors have embarked upon a close analysis of Islamic State's official propaganda and unofficial proselytisers. In the process, four promises "empowerment, deliverance, participation and piety" are identified as the organisation's key pull factors. -The promise of empowerment conveyed by Islamic State's official and unofficial propaganda encourages women to understand joining the organisation as a means to reverse the ills that they face in life outside the 'caliphate'. By joining Islamic State, the line goes, women can defiantly take charge of their lives in the same way that men can: through living in Islamic State's "caliphate" and supporting its jihad by marrying a fighter, women are led to believe that they can emancipate themselves from kufr (disbelief). - The deliverance promise focuses on the idea that, by joining Islamic State, grievances that women suffer in the West are immediately resolved. Women can be freed from daily degradations and disbelief, and are instead assimilated into a tight-knit collective sisterhood that will provide them with a network of support and friendship. Reflective of this, the ideas of redemption and deliverance tend to be directed to females by females. - The participation promise incentivizes women to join Islamic State even though their role is strictly non-military. It conveys a sense that there is more to the 'caliphate's' jihad than fighting and that, for women, there is a specific state-building role. A constant theme in Islamic State propaganda is that supporting the 'caliphate', making it grow and flourish, is the job of everyone. For women, this takes the role of providing, maintaining and educating its 'cubs', the next generation of fighters, as well as supporting their soldier spouses. - The last promise of Islamic State's women-orientated propaganda is piety, something built up the theological imperative to join the group. The alleged pristine nature of an 'Islamic existence' in the "caliphate" is a means of justifying each stress and sacrifice and also acts as a means for recruiters to exert peer pressure to push others to make hijra (migrating). - These four themes alone do not cause female supporters of Islamic State in the West to make hijra. However, when combined with the group's copious amounts of audio-visual propaganda, they play a crucial role in the rhetorical armoury of the 'caliphate's' recruiters. �-The discussion on the radicalisation of women is overly gendered and, all too often, predicated on misconceptions. In reality, when it comes to joining violent extremist causes, women are susceptible to the very same processes as men: narratives, ideology, grievances, and various push and pull factors. Reflecting this, the last part of this report delivers policy recommendations on how we must reappraise our attempts to counter the twin processes of female radicalisation and recruitment, in line with general counter-radicalisation, but using women as specific entry points. The four promises used in Islamic State propaganda, and cited in this report, are not exhaustive. There are a multitude of factors that contribute to an individual's radicalisation, of which propaganda can play an important part. As such, research into the key narratives employed by the 'caliphate' can shine an important individual's journey to jihad. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Shelf Number: 138173 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Terrorism De-radicalization Islamic State Media Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State�s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anderson, Wesley J.L. Title: Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations Summary: Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2008. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 08-3: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138198 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Ochsner, Christian Title: Migrating Extremists Summary: We show that migrating extremists shape political landscapes toward their ideology in the long run. We exploit the unexpected division of the state of Upper Austria into a US and a Soviet occupation zone after WWII. Zoning prompts large-scale Nazi migration to US occupied regions. Regions that witnessed a Nazi influx exhibit significantly higher voting shares for the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) throughout the entire post-WWII period, but not before WWII. We can exclude other channels that may have affected post-war elections, including differences in US and Soviet denazification and occupation policies, bomb attacks, Volksdeutsche refugees and suppression by other political parties. We show that extremism is transmitted through family ties and local party branches. We find that the surnames of FPO local election candidates in 2015 in the former US zone are more prevalent in 1942 phonebook data (Reichstelefonbuch) of the former Soviet zone compared to other parties. Details: Dresden, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 5799: Accessed march 16, 2016 at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Year: 2016 Country: Austria URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Shelf Number: 138259 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Shatz, Howard J. Title: The Islamic State We Knew: Insights Before the Resurgence and Their Implications Summary: The group calling itself the Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the region more broadly and to the United States and its global coalition partners. A deadly and adaptive foe, the Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qa'ida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq. The wealth of publicly available information about the group indicates that the Islamic State's reemergence in 2014, and especially its methods and goals, should not have come as a surprise, although the strength and scope of that reemergence were rightfully shocking. The history considered in this report provides information known by the end of 2011 about the group's origins, finances, organization, methods of establishing control over territory, and response to airpower. Now that the Islamic State has reemerged, countering it can rely, in part, on the great deal of accumulated knowledge available. Because Iraqis and coalition forces routed the group once, the group's history can inform four components of a successful strategy against the Islamic State: degrading the group's finances, eliminating its leadership and potential leadership, creating a better strategy to hold recaptured territory, and making use of airpower. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Shelf Number: 138326 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles, and Opportunities Summary: A consensus is building that violent extremism and terrorism are both international security and development issues. It is well documented that economic and social development are better attained in the absence of violent conflict. Furthermore, although poverty does not have a direct causal relationship with violent extremism and terrorism, poorer countries are the most affected by terrorism. Beyond socioeconomic challenges, a lack of hope and future prospects, real or perceived marginalization and sociopolitical exclusion, and weak governance and rule of law are considered conducive to the spread of terrorism and challenging to sustainable development. Indeed, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)16, one of the United Nations - supported set of targets related to international development, focuses on the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and the building of effective, accountable, and representative institutions at all levels. Moreover, violent extremism and terrorism are direct threats to development as they impact economic stability, tourism, and the human security and freedom of citizens, including their freedom from physical threat, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Lastly, violent extremism is increasingly part of the context in which development organizations operate, with violent extremist groups impeding, endangering, and diverting the delivery of development assistance and aid services. In certain cases, terrorism and violent extremism are the primary factors contributing to the need for continued assistance. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Brief: Accessed March 24, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 138408 Keywords: Development Assistance Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Fellman, Philip V. Title: Disrupting Terrorist Networks - A Dynamic Fitness Landscape Approach Summary: The study of terrorist networks as well as the study of how to impede their successful functioning has been the topic of considerable attention since the odious event of the 2001 World Trade Center disaster. While serious students of terrorism were indeed engaged in the subject prior to this time, a far more general concern has arisen subsequently. Nonetheless, much of the subject remains shrouded in obscurity, not the least because of difficulties with language and the representation or translation of names, and the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the subject matter. One of the most fruitful scientific approaches to the study of terrorism has been network analysis (Krebs, 2002; Carley, 2002a; Carley and Dombroski, 2002; Butts, 2003a; Sageman, 2004, etc.) As has been argued elsewhere, this approach may be particularly useful, when properly applied, for disrupting the flow of communications (C4I) between levels of terrorist organizations (Carley, Krackhardt and Lee, 2001; Carley, 2002b; Fellman and Wright, 2003; Fellman and Strathern, 2004; Carley et al, 2003; 2004). In the present paper we examine a recent paper by Ghemawat and Levinthal, (2000) applying Stuart Kauffman's NK-Boolean fitness landscape approach to the formal mechanics of decision theory. Using their generalized NK-simulation approach, we suggest some ways in which optimal decision-making for terrorist networks might be constrained and following our earlier analysis, suggest ways in which the forced compartmentation of terrorist organizations by counter-terrorist security organizations might be more likely to impact the quality of terrorist organizations' decision-making and command execution. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2007. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf Shelf Number: 138424 Keywords: Criminal Networks Decision Making Network Analysis Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Patterns of Intervention in Federal Terrorism cases: Interim Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Summary: America's response to terrorism has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. Changes have included everything from the way in which terrorism is portrayed politically, to the manner in which terrorists are investigated, prosecuted, and punished. Modifications to governmental interventions also have affected the manner in which terrorists plan and conduct terrorist activities as well as the manner in which they defend themselves in court. Although it would be difficult to address all of these changes in a single paper, the purpose of the current manuscript is to provide an overview of the most significant events that evoked changes in the manner in which terrorists are portrayed, pursued, and prosecuted as well as the way in which terrorists and their defenders have responded to federal prosecutorial efforts. The specific ways in which federal agencies respond to terrorism, however, are rooted in much larger political and social issues. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Shelf Number: 138441 Keywords: Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Brett, Julian Title: The Evaluation Study: Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts Summary: This evaluation study collates lessons being learned from Danish efforts and those of other development actors on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) that can inform evidence based policy making and increase shared understanding on CVE-related programming in development contexts. The study is based on the premise that CVE concerns policies and actions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social cultural and religious ideologies and groups. As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism. The study notes that, while violent extremism is clearly a global problem, it is developing countries that bear the brunt of its social and economic costs. In the countries most affected, it increases insecurity, has links to organised crime, lowers investment and increases the costs of economic activity, destroys infrastructure, and can cause significant human displacement and migration. The foreign fighter phenomenon, whereby nationals from one country join extremist movements in another, is a significant factor fuelling conflict. With many of these individuals coming from developing countries, preventing and mitigating radicalisation and violent extremism is becoming a development priority. The study provides an overview of current thinking on CVE and the key challenges being faced. The central feature of this is that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. Push factors are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. Pull factors are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social status. Enabling factors relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that, to be successful, CVE initiatives need to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk. In non-permissive environments, this is likely to be particularly challenging. Details: Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Shelf Number: 138466 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Phillips, Peter J. Title: Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory Summary: This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This approach permits a computable opportunity set within a risk-reward or mean-variance framework. Optimal choices can be determined using the Markowitz quadratic programming technique. The framework may provide a useful foundation for an economic perspective on 'offender profiling' applied within a terrorism context. Mapping attack methods into mean-variance space provides a more definitive categorisation of the riskiness of attack methods from the terrorist's perspective and suggests the possibility of identifying the terrorist's revealed risk preference. Inferences about the unknown offender may be drawn that complement other aspects of the investigative process. One of the key challenges of law enforcement is drawing inferences about the offender's location and the location of potential targets. Superimposing a game theoretical payoff matrix over a geographic location where payoffs are partially informed by the terrorist's choices and risk preference may contribute another, economic, perspective to this part of the law enforcement process. Prospect theory may also contribute useful insights into the geographical profiling problem. Details: Toowoomba, QLD: University of Southern Queensland - Faculty of Business, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Shelf Number: 138469 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Geographic Profiling Lone Wolf Terrorists Offender Profiling Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Great Britain. Ministry of Defence Title: The UK national strategy for maritime security Summary: 1.1 The UK considers 'maritime security' to be the advancement and protection of the UK's national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK's prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world. 1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain in context and explains why it matters to the UK. It sets out our approach and the objectives we wish to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines the governance structure which will allow us to deliver effective and efficient maritime security. Details: London: HM Government, 2014. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf Shelf Number: 138484 Keywords: Maritime Crime Maritime Security Terrorism

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process Summary: Research on terrorism prior to 2010 had been described as too descriptive and atheoretical. To partially address this deficiency, the current project is anchored theoretically and empirically in two of the most widely cited perspectives on social movements and the process of radicalization: role identity theory and framing theory (Snow and Machalek, 1983; Snow and McAdam, 2000; Snow, 2004; Stryker 1980). Drawing on these two overlapping perspectives, we contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey. Typically, this journey begins with a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, and moves toward a more radical identity and corresponding orientation. This process enhances the likelihood of employing targeted forms of violence because the prospect of desired change is seen as laying outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena. As implied, a key component of the process is the adoption or evolution of a radical identity. Five key concepts associated with the identity and framing perspectives are central to the analyses and findings: identity salience and pervasiveness, identity work, and diagnostic and prognostic framing. Identity salience is premised on the observation that identities are arrayed in a hierarchy, with those at the top, or most salient, in a given situation being most likely to be called on or invoked. Pervasiveness extends the notion of salience from one situation to multiple situations or encounters, such that the identity is in play in numerous situations. Identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987; Snow and McAdam 2000) encompasses a range of activities individuals and groups engage in that give meaning to themselves and others by presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with individuals or group interests. Five types of identity work have been identified: (1) Engagement in group relevant demonstration acts or events, such as engaging in activities preparatory for the commission of violence; (2) arrangement and display of physical settings and props, such as flying or posting the confederate flag; (3) arrangement of appearance, such as engagement in cosmetic face work or body work; (4) selective association with other individuals and groups; and (5) identity talk, which involves not only the avowal and/or attribution of identities, but also talk relevant to framing. The two key framing concepts - diagnostic and prognostic framing - direct attention to the ways in which some issue or grievance is problematized and blame is attributed and to the call or plan for dealing with the problem. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, University of Arkansas, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 30, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Shelf Number: 138501 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. House of Commons. Defence Committee Title: Deterrence in the twenty-first century Summary: This inquiry is the fourth of a series which have evolved from our inquiry Towards the next Defence and Security Review. These cover a number of significant strands which the Committee believe would benefit from further Defence Committee consideration. The context in which deterrence must operate has changed in recent years with the diminution in some former threats and the emergence of new ones, but in its widest sense the concept of deterrence remains as important as ever. The Committee will examine: The concept of deterrence Definitions Where deterrence sits in the continuum stretching from influence to intervention The climate in which deterrence must operate and how it has changed The targets of deterrence Is every threat potentially deterrable? The different levels of deterrence, when each might be appropriate, and the likely efficacy of each nuclear deterrence deterrence though conventional forces the link between the two The significance of Ballistic Missile Deterrence deterrence by protection of potential targets The cyber dimension The importance of credibility The sufficiency of the means The sufficiency of the will and of the ways in which it is expressed Communication of the message, including to the target How the UK Armed Forces currently contribute to deterrence and how this contribution can be improved How deterrence can be expected to change in future Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2014. 2 vols. Source: Internet Resource: HC 1066: Accessed April 2, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/fence/1066/1066.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/fence/1066/1066.pdf Shelf Number: 138612 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Cybercrime Terrorism

Author: Sondergaard, Susanne Title: TACTICS: Policy and strategic impacts, implications and recommendations Summary: In recent years the threat of terrorism in urban environments has become an important issue, emphasised by several successfully carried out terrorist attacks (New York, Madrid, London, Copenhagen and Paris are just some examples). When security forces are alerted to a specific terrorist threat, their main goal is to prevent an actual attack. On the other hand, if prevention fails and the attack is carried out, independent of the degree of success, security forces become responsible for stopping it and mitigating its consequences. In both cases, the efficiency and effectiveness of the response relies on three key pillars: 1. Ability to respond quickly, without bias in decisionmaking, enabled by specific and precise requests for information and clearly issued orders. 2. Ability to decompose threats into observable terrorist behaviours specific for urban environments to enable an increased level of preparedness by security forces. 3. Ability to efficiently and effectively manage capabilities. TACTICS is an FP7 project commissioned by the European Commission in 2012 to develop low technology readiness level (TRL) decision support technology to assist security forces in countering terrorist threats in urban environments. The system that was developed as part of this project brings an innovative approach built around the three core capabilities described above. The acronym stands for Tactical Approach to Counter Terrorists in Cities. Conceptually, it can be defined as a counterterrorism decision support technology designed to facilitate a clearer understanding of both the threat and the capabilities available to counteract it, enabling a faster, more efficient and effective security force response. Technology has played, and will continue to play, a central role in counterterrorism policy, strategy and operations. Recent years have seen rapid innovation and the development of new technological applications, such as facial recognition and biometrics, counter-IED, communications interception, airport security, explosive and weapon detection, and so on. This report analyses eight case studies of counterterrorist technology implementation in order to extract lessons that can be applied in the context of deploying a TACTICS-like system in Europe. Furthermore, it presents a series of lessons extracted from relevant case law. There are a number of challenges that policymakers face today in the ever-increasing reliance on technology for countering terrorism in Europe today. These include: The level of engagement with the communities affected by the technology implementation; The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; The resources dedicated to counterterrorism; Achieving an appropriate balance between privacy and security; Data sharing challenges; and Respect for criteria of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1287/RAND_RR1287.pdf Shelf Number: 138567 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Information Sharing Law Enforcement Technology Terrorism Urban Security

Author: Hofmann, David Title: Warriors and Prophets: The Role of Charismatic Authority in the Radicalization Towards Violence and Strategic Operation of Terrorist Groups Summary: In the past four decades, there has been increased multi-disciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. However, there is little systematic theoretical and empirical examination of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of charismatic leaders in the formation, operation, and demise of terrorist groups. This dissertation seeks to re-orient and stimulate future scholarship through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between charismatic authority, the radicalization towards violence, and strategic operation of terrorist groups. The introductory chapter grounds the subsequent research by providing working definitions of core concepts, reviewing the current literature on terrorist leadership, discussing methods to improve future analyses of terrorist leadership, before ending with a brief consideration of methods, data, and research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of how the current terrorism literature misuses the social-scientific concepts of charisma and charismatic authority. After examining where and how the literature has fallen short, it provides a synthesis of the available multi-disciplinary social-scientific research on charismatic authority, identifies the three common ways in which the concept of charisma is commonly misused in terrorism studies, and explores several challenges and opportunities for future research. Building upon this foundational analysis, chapter 3 contributes to future research by presenting and justifying a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups based upon Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic leadership in new religious movements. This framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between the presence of charismatic authority and the radicalization towards violence within the far-right terrorist group 'The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord'. Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of the relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority, choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices), and results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. The concluding chapter provides a synthetic summary of the findings, discusses the contributions of the dissertation to the literature, makes several policy-relevant suggestions, considers study limitations, and outlines avenues for future research. Details: Waterloo, ONT: University of Waterloo, 2015. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138583 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy Summary: This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS' growth model, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS' direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS' global propaganda efforts. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138589 Keywords: Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border Security Counter-Terrorism Cybercrime Data Protection Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Information Sharing Money Laundering Partnerships Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Kavanagh, Jennifer E. Title: The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses. Summary: Existing literature does not explain why protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are sometimes characterized by escalating, tit-for-tat retaliation, but exhibit little responsive violence at other points. I argue that the expectations of local constituents and local political dynamics are primary determinants of conflict escalation and de-escalation. State and non-state constituents form expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to a protracted conflict through Retrospective Projection, which combines evaluations of the past, present, and future. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected benefits of a military (militant)-based strategy exceed confidence in existing political alternatives. Demands for retaliation by local publics create incentives for state and non-state actors to use violence as a tool of Constituent Service. I evaluate the argument with extended case studies of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the Second Intifada, supplemented by four qualitative cases: Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The extended case studies combine qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) to empirically describe dynamic associations between violence and political attitudes. Consistent with the argument, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political alternatives influence the timing of demands for retaliation, and demands for violence determine the timing and form of armed retaliation by state and non-state actors. Demands for violence occur where military-based strategies appear more effective than political alternatives, prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada and in the 1970s during the 'Troubles,' and retaliatory violence is most likely in these same periods. Military failures and political alternatives that weaken constituent support for violence encourage de-escalation. Effective counterterror policies are those that shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism, constraining violence by reducing demands for violence. There is a place for military-based counterterrorism, but the case studies underscore the benefits of strategies that encourage confidence in political alternatives. Law-enforcement counterterrorism and influence operations appear especially valuable because they erode support for violence and shape attitudes towards political compromise at the local level. Local political dynamics and constituent expectations must inform counterterror policy applied in regional protracted terror conflicts and used against transnational terrorist threats Details: Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2011. 430p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 11, 2015 at: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Shelf Number: 138622 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Serious Crime Prevention Orders Summary: On 22 March 2016, in his role as Minister for Justice and Police, Deputy Premier Troy Grant MP introduced into the NSW Parliament two pieces of legislation designed to crack down on organised crime. The Criminal Legislation Amendment (Organised Crime and Public Safety) Bill amends existing laws to enhance asset confiscation powers, and creates Public Safety Orders, which are issued by police to prohibit a person from being present at a public event or premises if their presence poses a serious risk to public safety or security. The second Bill, the Crimes (Serious Crime Prevention Orders) Bill 2016, introduces a Serious Crime Prevention Order (SCPO) regime into NSW. SCPOs are control orders that could be made by the NSW Supreme and District courts against certain individuals or organisations in order to prevent, restrict or disrupt their involvement in serious crime-related activities and terrorism offences. The proposed SCPO regime is influenced by measures introduced in the United Kingdom through the Serious Crimes Act 2007, which has recently been expanded into Scotland. This e-brief focuses on the second Bill. It summarises existing organised crime laws in NSW. It then outlines the proposed SCPO regime in NSW, including the process for making orders, restrictions that can be placed on offenders, and penalties for breaches, as well as a comparison with the UK's SCPO regime. The paper also details criticism of the UK regime, and comments by the Government in support of its effectiveness. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief 3/2016: Accessed April 15, 2016 at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/6583AE828126BFA9CA257F92001E9803/$File/Serious+Crime+Prevention+Orders+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/6583AE828126BFA9CA257F92001E9803/$File/Serious+Crime+Prevention+Orders+eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 138684 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime Serious Crimes Terrorism

Author: Human Rights First Title: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Countering Antisemitism and Extremism in France Summary: The deadly terrorist attacks on November 13 in Paris, coming less than a year after the killings at Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket, have focused long overdue attention on the resurgence of antisemitism and extremism in France. France has both the largest Jewish and one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe. With the rise of the xenophobic far-right National Front party, this situation is a tinderbox. "Antisemitism is unacceptable no matter where it comes from," said the Chief Rabbi of France, Haim Korsia, in July 2015. "When there is a Republic with strong values - liberty, equality, fraternity, which we often forget - we have security and serenity for everyone, including Jews." Violence targeting Jews and Jewish sites has led to a heightened sense of insecurity, and an increasing number of Jews are relocating in or outside of France for security reasons. Some observers have drawn comparisons to Europe in the 1930s. While that dark history continues to cast a cautionary shadow, as it should, the comparison is inapt. Nonetheless, antisemitism is a grave threat to human rights, and its resurgence in France should be of great concern to the French government and its allies, including the United States. Antisemitic violence harms not only its direct victims but entire Jewish communities, preventing them from being able to exercise their fundamental rights. And the potential damage is even greater: Left unchecked, antisemitism leads to the persecution of other minorities, and to an overall increase in repression and intolerance. An increase in antisemitism is a harbinger of societal breakdown. This report analyzes the nature and extent of antisemitism in France and presents recommendations for combating it by promoting tolerance and inclusiveness. Based on public information and interviews with a range of government officials, civil society representatives, and academic experts, the report examines this problem within broader and interrelated phenomena, including the ascendancy of the far-right party the National Front, mounting anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment, the spread of Islamic extremism, and the increasing alienation of many Muslims in France. While the report assesses spikes in antisemitic incidents related to developments in the Middle East, it focuses on France and the domestic dynamics contributing to this problem. However, we see France as a test case for the plight of Jews on the continent because the pertinent trends there also exist in other European countries. Details: New York: Human Rights First, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2016 at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Breaking-the-Cycle-final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: France URL: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Breaking-the-Cycle-final.pdf Shelf Number: 138697 Keywords: Bias-Motivated Crimes Extremism Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Human Rights Abuses Terrorism

Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail Summary: This report contains an analysis of over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group primarily between early 2013 and late 2014. The importance of this data for understanding the Islamic State and, in particular, the foreign fighter flow, cannot be overstated. To put it simply, it is the largest cache of primary source documents produced by the Islamic State available in the open-source as of this date. These particular documents were acquired by NBC News from an Islamic State defector and subsequently provided to the CTC (and other entities). This report provides a window into the organization's global workforce, revealing information about foreign fighters' countries of origin, citizenship, points of entry into Syria, marital status, skills and previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, fighting role preferences in the group, and previous jihadist experience. In addition to analyzing the data at the macro-level, the report also highlights numerous anecdotes of individual fighters. Taken together, the analysis in this report reveals an organization that is attempting to vet new members, manage talent effectively within the organization, and deal with an incredibly diverse pool of recruits. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Shelf Number: 138704 Keywords: Caliphates ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Disley, Emma Title: Using Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements to manage and supervise terrorist offenders: Findings from an exploratory study Summary: Since 2000 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) have been used to manage violent and sexual offenders on release from prison. Under these arrangements, offenders are identified, assessed and subject to supervision and monitoring in order to protect the public. Central to MAPPA is that key agencies - including police, probation, housing, social services, education and health - are under a statutory duty to share information and cooperate. In 2009 these arrangements were extended to cover those convicted of terrorist offenders. RAND Europe conducted an exploratory study in 2011 to examine potential challenges in applying MAPPA to terrorist offenders and the readiness of those involved to do so. The research aimed to identify priorities for further attention by policymakers and researchers looking at the effectiveness of post-release supervision of terrorist offenders. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR441/RAND_RR441.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR441/RAND_RR441.pdf Shelf Number: 138705 Keywords: Offender Supervision Prisoner Reentry Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? Initial Observations from a Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Europe from 1970 to 2013 Summary: Major terrorist events in the United States and Europe generate fear among the public and prompt swifter responses from public officials, reflecting a belief that terrorist attacks occur in clusters. If there is one attack, the concern is that others will soon follow. That presumption leads to two analytical questions: Does a significant terrorist attack somehow inspire other terrorist attacks, and can terrorist attacks be anticipated statistically? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examine the historical record of terrorism in the United States and Europe between 1970 and the end of 2013. Using the Global Terrorism Database, the researchers find an absence of clustering for terrorist events around trigger events since 1994, no increases in terrorism on significant dates, and a decline of terrorism in the West since the 1970s, suggesting that the threat of terrorism should not affect individuals' behavior and decisions in the United States and Western Europe - not even in the wake of a significant terrorist event. However, heightened security may be justified. It may enable authorities to respond quickly to increased reports of suspicious activity and hoaxes that terrorist events inspire. Increased police presence also permits authorities to diagnose and intervene more rapidly if there are further incidents. Moreover, temporary security increases may be warranted as a precautionary measure, even if only to reassure an alarmed public that it is safe. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspectives: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Shelf Number: 138706 Keywords: Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists Threat Assessment

Author: Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson Title: The European Study of Youth Mobilisation Report : Listening to Radicals: Attitudes and Motivations of Young People Engaged in Political and Social Movements Outside of the Mainstream in Central and Nordic Europe Summary: The Report relays the findings and methodology of the three year European Study of Youth Mobilisation which interviewed more than 800 youth activists in five Central European cities (Bratislava, Brno, Budapest, Krakow and Warsaw), and brought together 200 practitioners and academic researchers in expert panel discussions in three Nordic cities (Copenhagen, Helsinki, and Stockholm) to discuss the attitudes and motivations of young people involved in political and social movements outside of the mainstream. The most important findings related to the wide-scale lack of trust in political institutions and that the perception of the legitimacy of violence was dependent on group membership, and not other factors including gender. Details: Hungary: British Council, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/1838/British_Council_ESYM_Report_March_2011_.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/1838/British_Council_ESYM_Report_March_2011_.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 1387819 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Langley, Brandon R. Title: A randomised control trial comparing the effects of procedural justice to experienced utility theories in airport security stops Summary: Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a controversial border security power. During a recent national consultation it was perceived amongst several public rights organisations to be one of the most important factors eroding the legitimacy of the police amongst the public. But there was little scientific evidence. This study is the first ever randomised field trial within the real life setting of an international airport that compared the effects of procedural justice and experienced utility theories on levels of police legitimacy. Over 24 weeks, 781 passengers were randomly assigned to bespoke procedural justice checklist or newly invented experienced utility interventions. Research data was obtained through a validated telephone survey with a 52% response rate. The research findings confirmed that the difference between the procedural justice checklist and experienced utility interventions on the police legitimacy dependent variable was statistically significant (p< 0.1) with an overall average effect size in favour of the procedural justice checklist. The findings also confirmed a direct causal relationship between the procedural justice checklist and higher levels of public willingness to co-operate with the police in countering terrorism than experienced utility. These findings reaffirm, although at a much higher level of methodological rigour, previous findings within general operational policing. The results substantiate that passenger assessments of legitimate policing will be enhanced by policing strategies that embed the routine application of procedural justice approaches during public encounters. This research argues for the routine adoption of a procedural justice checklist within an airport security stops setting. Details: Cambridge, UK: Wolfson College, 2014. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed April 25, 2016 at: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Langley,%20B.%20A%20randomised%20control%20trial%20comparing%20the%20effects%20of%20procedural%20justice%20to%20experienced%20utility%20theories%20in%20airport%20security%20stops.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Langley,%20B.%20A%20randomised%20control%20trial%20comparing%20the%20effects%20of%20procedural%20justice%20to%20experienced%20utility%20theories%20in%20airport%20security%20stops.pdf Shelf Number: 138806 Keywords: Airport Security Police Legitimacy Procedural Justice Terrorism

Author: Deutschmann, Emanuel Title: Between Collaboration and Disobedience: The behavior of the Guantanomo Detainees and its Consequences Summary: The Guantanamo detainees find themselves in a prisoner-s-dilemma-like situation characterized by uncertainty where they may incriminate others, remain silent, or disobey. We examine their behavior under these conditions and how it influences their chances of getting a release recommendation. We use JTF-GTMO-authored memoranda on 765 detainees to create a social network of the accusations between detainees and an attribute dataset, which we analyze using multivariate regression and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. We find that the distribution of incriminating statements obeys a power law. Yemenites and Saudi Arabians heavily over-contribute in terms of incriminating statements and disobedient actions, whereas Afghans and Pakistanis under-contribute. Disobedient behaviour does not affect the likelihood of getting released, except for hunger strike, which has a negative effect. By releasing information on others, detainees do not improve their own situation but impair that of those they talk about. Details: Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2012. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Sociology Working Papers Paper Number 2013-02: Accessed May 6, 2016 at: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2013-02.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2013-02.pdf Shelf Number: 138962 Keywords: Detainees Guantanamo Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Grimwood, Gabrielle Garton Title: Radicalisation in Prisons in England and Wales Summary: Many prisoners enter prison with a faith and others find one while in prison. Few of these prisoners will be "radicalized" or become involved in extremism or terrorist activity, although (obviously) those that do present huge challenges to the authorities. This Commons Library briefing describes how the Government is seeking to tackle extremism and, in particular, radicalisation in prisons. It examines -The difference between faith and radicalisation -Why people become radicalised -What is happening within prisons -How radicalisation is being countered in prisons and -Whether the National Offender Management Service is doing enough. Details: London: Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper no. 07487: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Shelf Number: 139055 Keywords: Prisoner Radicalization Prisoners Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses Summary: This report is part of a program implemented by the Global Center, supported by the U.S. Department of State, and aimed at understanding and strengthening capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It focuses on a subset of countries in the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In short, this report aims to - provide an easily accessible overview of the Greater Horn's regional and national trends and drivers of violent extremism and related sources of insecurity - identify relevant actors and describe their responses aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, and - highlight entry points for developing holistic strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) inclusive of governmental and civil society actors that promote good governance and community-based responses to violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Shelf Number: 139346 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Allan, Harriet Title: Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review Summary: Violent extremism is multi-factorial and extremely diverse: it cannot be predicted by one variable alone. For violent extremist movements to develop, and for individuals to join them, requires an alignment of situational, social/cultural, and individual factors. It is useful to conceptualise these factors in three levels, with situational factors working at the macro level (i.e. country or community-wide), social/cultural at the meso-level (i.e. affecting smaller communities or identity groups), and individual factors at the micro level. Interventions can also be conceptualised using a three-tier model, with development working at the macro level, countering violent extremism (CVE) at the meso-level, and law enforcement and specialist interventions at the micro level. While the effect of political factors - governance deficit, state failure, and grievances - is significant, social/psychological factors concerning group and individual identity are also recognised as important. Although the evidence is mixed, on balance the literature shows that blocked participation can create grievances which may be harnessed to promote extremist violence. Civil society may be crucial in countering extremism. However, under oppression some organisations may also be drawn to violent responses. Religion and ethnicity have been recognised as powerful expressions of individual and group identity. There is robust evidence that radicalisation is a social process and that identity is a key factor in why individuals become involved in violent movements. Psychological research is beginning to examine how identity formation can become 'maladaptive' and whether certain cognitive 'propensities' can combine to create a 'mindset' that presents a higher risk. Although most violent extremists are young men, there is little convincing research to suggest that ideals of masculinity and honour play a significant role in causing violent extremism. More generally, gender issues do not appear to be significant. Education has a minor and/or largely unsubstantiated influence, and there is little evidence that certain types of education (e.g. faith-based) increase the risk of radicalisation, and research shows that the problem of madrassa-based radicalisation has been significantly overstated. Indeed, some research suggests that religious training can be a protective factor. The findings on the relationship between education, employment, poverty and radicalisation are mixed. However, in a departure from earlier studies which identified the absence of any causal or statistical relationship between poverty and transnational terrorism, this study recognises the relevance of economic factors in the context of broad-based violent extremist groups. In conflict situations involving violent extremist groups (as opposed to terrorism directed against the West), socio-economic discrimination and marginalisation do appear to partly explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers. However, because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism. In a number of contexts, extremist groups have proven able to deliver services through which they gain support and legitimacy. While the failure of the state to provide security and justice may not be a necessary factor in the development of violent extremism, failed and failing states are often breeding grounds for extremist activity. The perceived victimisation of fellow Muslims can be instrumentalised by leaders of Islamist violent extremist groups as a justification for extremist violence, although the use of a narrative of oppression to justify violence and recruit and motivate supporters is near-universal among violent extremist groups. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Shelf Number: 139347 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Radicalism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Hallowell, Beth Title: Mixed Messages: How the Media Covers "Violent Extremism" and What You Can Do About It Summary: Every day, the U.S. news consumer is bombarded with images of spectacular extremist violence and increasingly aggressive and bellicose rhetoric from politicians and pundits. This coverage warrants a close look, as public discourse sinks to new lows in justifying violence against entire racial and religious groups. In this public conversation, the stakes are high; lives are on the line. How is the media helping or hurting our public discussion about political violence? What are they covering when they cover extremism? Ninety percent of the time they also mention Islam, even when it's not part of the events covered, and three-quarters of the time journalists report on violent responses to conflict. And they also amplify voices promoting and stories depicting military intervention far more than peace building or nonviolent resistance to violent extremism - solutions to conflict that research has shown are more effective. How can the U.S. public be expected to do anything but support further military intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries, given this framework for covering violent extremism? In Mixed Messages, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) shares the results of its original content analysis of three months of media coverage of extremism sampled from 20 U.S. news outlets. We sampled articles from 15 national media outlets as well as five major "influencer" outlets that reach a high-level audience of policymakers and government staff. Details: Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 139388 Keywords: Discrimination Extremist Groups Media Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Final Report Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the final report in the CLAT series. It aims to synthesise key aspects of the project, bringing together insights from the literature, details of the project's methodology and key findings, along with suggestions for further research. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 11: Accessed June 11, 2016: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_clat_final_report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_clat_final_report.pdf Shelf Number: 139389 Keywords: Lone-Actor Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspectives Summary: This Research Paper by Dr. Alex P. Schmid opens with a brief exposition of the foreign (terrorist) fighter (FTF) phenomenon, concentrating on Salafist jihadists and their astonishing growth after the Caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014. The author then discusses various definitions of FTFs. Subsequently, Dr. Schmid seeks to bring structure and order into the widely diverging estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters. He then identifies problems posed by foreign fighters for European democracies with Muslim diasporas, focusing on the range of motivations driving vulnerable young men and women - mainly second generation immigrants and recent converts to Islam - to join the so-called "Islamic State". Having identified push and pull as well as resilience factors that facilitate or inhibit young Muslims joining ISIS, he argues that stopping them from departing to Syria is not enough; political solutions have to be sought. Details: The Hague: international Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139408 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Lone-Wolf Terrorism Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Shelf Number: 139409 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Coolsaet, Rik Title: 'All Radicalisation is Local': The Genesis and Drawbacks of an Elusive Concept Summary: The concept of 'radicalisation' is now firmly entrenched at the heart of European and global counterterrorism. But 12 years after its introduction, it remains ill-defined, complex and controversial. It is thus time to assess its added value Details: Brussels: Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Egmont Paper 84: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ep84.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ep84.pdf Shelf Number: 139410 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Netherlands. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Title: Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Summary: The murder of film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 deeply shocked Dutch society. People began to realise that the ideology of violent jihad against the West, which explicitly manifested itself in the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, had also established a foothold in the Netherlands. Since the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the threat of a terrorist attack on European soil had loomed over a number of European countries. The murder of Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 proved that the Netherlands as well had become a scene of terrorist violence. Although it was an individual assassination rather than the large-scale attack feared in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, its background, motives and justification suggested a type of religious- inspired terrorism as propounded by Al-Qaeda since the late 20th century. It ensued that the murderer, and most other members of the extremist network to which he belonged, were young Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands. While on 11 September 2001 New York was hit by an enemy from abroad and the Madrid attacks were perpetrated by a group of North African migrants, the Netherlands had to face the fact that a group of indigenous Muslims had metamorphosed into (potential) terrorists within a short period of time. At an international level, the murder of Van Gogh thrust the Netherlands into the limelight as a country which had now - after years of ethnic and religious tolerance - produced its own jihadists. The attacks on public transport in London in July 2005 by British-Pakistani Muslims, however, have shown that the Dutch situation is by no means unique and that a new phase in the threat from Islamist terrorism appears to have set in. This phase, in which the threat emanates principally from extremist European Muslims who are prepared to commit attacks in their own country, is hereinafter referred to as European jihad. This new phase is in line with developments in Islamist terrorism during recent years. In December 2002 the AIVD pointed out that the future threat would manifest itself in and emanate from the West, and that it would possess a more endogenous character. There were indications that radical Muslims brought up in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for jihad and that they might proceed to perpetrating localised terrorist attacks. The attacks in Madrid, London and Amsterdam confirmed these fears. Increasing numbers of migrants' children with an Islamic background are going through a radicalisation process in Europe, which in some cases leads them to use violence. Young jihadists justify this violence by referring to the Koran - often on the basis of interpretations by radical ideologists - and view themselves as prospective martyrs. In addition to the acute threat of possible terrorist attacks, the problems involved in Islamist radicalism and terrorism also represent a long-term threat, as a polarization between various ethnic-religious population groups may undermine social cohesion. In the long term this may have an undesirable effect on the democratic order in the Netherlands. The murder of Van Gogh inflamed certain interethnic and social issues in the Netherlands. The murder set in motion processes involving both positive and negative aspects as regards the threat assessment in the immediate future, the consequences of which are as yet unpredictable. One negative development is the intensification of radicalisation tendencies among sections of ethnic minorities and the indigenous population, which poses an increasing risk that groups or individuals will resort to violence. It is alarming that certain youth groups among the younger generation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only appear receptive to radicalisation, but perceive violent jihad as positive and 'cool'. A positive aspect, however, is the fact that a process of political and social consciousness-raising has set in, involving a cautious mobilisation of moderate forces in society - also among ethnic minorities - who are prepared to counteract radical and extremist tendencies. The complexity of the problem as well as the lack of organization within certain communities account partly for this initial reluctance. The shortcomings of certain spokespersons also play a part. Furthermore, fear for lack of support from the rest of Dutch society as well as uncertainty about possible repercussions which might ensue as a result of clearly establishing their position within their ethnic group, as well as in regard to their supporters, can delay or impede such initiatives. This paper describes how the threat from Islamist terrorism currently manifests itself in the Netherlands. It attempts, for instance, to answer the question of why young people born and bred in the Netherlands turn their backs on society to propagate and commit acts of violence in the name of Islam. Another question is, to what extent the situation in the Netherlands differs from that in neighbouring countries. Details: The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2006. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Netherlands URL: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Shelf Number: 139419 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Jihad

Author: Johnston, Patrick B. Title: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 Summary: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 draws from more than 140 recently declassified documents to present a comprehensive examination of the organization, territorial designs, management, personnel policies, and finances of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), both predecessors of the Islamic State. These records paint a clear picture of ISI practices and standard operating procedures. Leadership consciously designed the organization not just to fight but also to build an Islamic state governed by the laws dictated by its strict Islamist ideology. ISI was a vertically integrated organization with a central management structure and functional bureaus. It sought to replicate these structures at multiple lower geographic levels across territory. Each geographic unit had substantial autonomy to pursue the group's strategic objectives but was required to send frequent reports to the group's leadership; the central organization used these reports to inform decisions and provide strategic guidance. ISI paid its personnel a wage that would draw true believers rather than opportunists; trained and allocated its membership with an eye toward group effectiveness; raised revenues locally through diversified sources; and was able to maintain itself, albeit at much reduced strength, in the face of a withering counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy put in place by its opponents, starting in late 2006. An analysis of the Islamic State predecessor groups is more than a historical recounting. The lessons from examining the group's history are useful for setting expectations about the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic State and its ability to combat its opponents, designing a coordinated and effective campaign against it, and understanding why it might be able to survive such an effort and sustain itself in the future, albeit perhaps at a lower level of threat. Defeating the Islamic State will require persistence. The record of counter-ISI operations from 2006 through 2010 shows that military action and political accommodation can work together to degrade the group substantially, if not defeat it. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Shelf Number: 139437 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic Extremists Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Horgan, John Title: Across the Universe? A Comparative Analysis of Violent Radicalization Across Three Offender Types With Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education Summary: Using a series of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses, this study compared demographic, psychological, and offense-related behavioral variables across and between 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers. The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring. Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf Shelf Number: 139625 Keywords: Extremists Lone Actor Terrorists Mass Murderers Police Education and Training Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Tallis, Joshua Title: Muddy Waters: Framing Littoral Maritime Security through the Lens of the Broken Windows Theory Summary: This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative) - the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature. Details: Fife, Scotland: University of St.Andrews, 2016. 311p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 20, 2016 at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9028 Shelf Number: 139719 Keywords: Broken Windows Theory Maritime Crime Maritime Security Piracy Smuggling Terrorism

Author: Schuurman, Bart Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139817 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremists Jihad Muslims Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Turhal, Tugrul Title: Organizational Structure of PKK and Non-PKK-Linked Turkish Drug Trafficking Organizations: The Influence of Social bonds Summary: Drugs and drug related crime problems pose major threats to societies around the world in terms of their negative consequences at both individual and societal levels. Turkish drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) have ethnic, social, geographic, and economic ties with Turkey's eastern neighbors, the Balkan Region, and Europe, and are considered to play major roles in the drug trade. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has also had a longstanding presence in the drug trade in this region. The goals of this research are (1) to identify the social and demographic characteristics of people in drug-trafficking organizations in Turkey; (2) to elucidate the differences, if any, of the social and structural characteristics in PKK-related and non-PKK-related drug organizations; and (3) to analyze the impact of social bonds on the Turkish drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), their networks and relationships. The data used in this study are official Turkish Police records of drug trafficking cases between 1984 and 2010. Several statistical techniques were used to analyze the data; relationship analysis, analysis of difference, and social network analysis to address the research questions. An analysis of these relationships at both the individual and network level was conducted using original data on 773 members from 100 drug-trafficking organizations (50 of them PKK linked and 50 of them non-PKK linked). The results indicate that while there are some similarities with PKK and non-PKK linked organizations there are also distinct differences in their individual and organizational characteristics, structure, role distribution, nationality, and social ties and bonds. In addition, the study found important evidence connecting the terrorist organization (PKK) with several non-PKK organizations. These connections are quite strong for a portion of the networks. This study significantly contributes to the related literature; it provides a general overview of drug and drug related crime problems and their connection to terrorist organizations throughout the world particularly for those located in Turkey and the Middle Eastern regions. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2015. 258p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Turkey URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 139834 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Drug-Related Violence Social Bonds Terrorism

Author: Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, ed. Title: Violence in Nigeria: A qualitative and quantitative analysis Summary: Most of the academic literature on violence in Nigeria is qualitative. It rarely relies on quantitative data because police crime statistics are not reliable, or not available, or not even published. Moreover, the training of Nigerian social scientists often focuses on qualitative, cultural, and political issues. There is thus a need to bridge the qualitative and quantitative approaches of conflict studies. This book represents an innovation and fills a gap in this regard. It is the first to introduce a discussion on such issues in a coherent manner, relying on a database that fills the lacunae in data from the security forces. The authors underline the necessity of a trend analysis to decipher the patterns and the complexity of violence in very different fields: from oil production to cattle breeding, radical Islam to motor accidents, land conflicts to witchcraft, and so on. In addition, they argue for empirical investigation and a complementary approach using both qualitative and quantitative data. The book is therefore organized into two parts, with a focus first on statistical studies, then on fieldwork. The book is a co-publication of the ASCL and IFRA (Institut Francais de Recherche en Afrique). Details: Leiden: African Studies Center, 2016. 218p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2016 at: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/violence-nigeria-qualitative-and-quantitative-analysis Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/violence-nigeria-qualitative-and-quantitative-analysis Shelf Number: 139893 Keywords: Cattle Raiding Crime Statistics Oil Terrorism Violent Crime

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Tunisia. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: This MENAFATF report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML) / counter-terrorist financing (CFT) measures in place in Tunisia. The report provides recommendations on how Tunisia's AML/CFT system could be strengthened. The findings of this assessment have also been reviewed and endorsed by the FATF. Details: Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain: FATF, 2016. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/Tunisia_MER_2016_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Tunisia URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/Tunisia_MER_2016_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 139945 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Financial Action Task Force of Latin America Title: Analysis of Regional Threats on Money Laundering Summary: The XXX GAFILAT Plenary approved the implementation of a regional study of threats on money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) of the member countries of the Financial Action Task Force on Latin America with the financial support of the European Union. The pursued objective is for countries to achieve greater effectiveness in mitigating risks and that the resources allocated for this purpose are used more efficiently. Details: s.l.: Cocaine Route Program, European Union, 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: The European Union's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace: The Cocaine Route Programme: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Shelf Number: 139951 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Meitz, Eric Title: What About the Women? Understanding and Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans Summary: In many ways, female recruits, both from the Western Balkans and other regions, are attracted to the Islamic State for the exact same reasons as men, highlights BCSP guest researcher Eric Mietz. This policy paper aims to bring attention to an oft-neglected security problem in the Western Balkans: women being recruited by and migrating to the Islamic State. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism (CVE) policymaking. The first part of the paper looks at the numbers of women leaving from the Western Balkans to Islamic State-held territory, the profiles of women who migrate, and the roles they take on in the Islamic State. To explain why women are influenced to migrate, the second part examines the "push" and "pull" factors of Islamic State recruitment. The last part focuses on the efforts of Western Balkans governments to criminalize participation in or support of the Islamic State and the disadvantages of relying solely on this policy Details: Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Shelf Number: 140145 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radicalization Recruitment, Women Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign Fighters Homeland Security ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Gold, Zack Title: Salafi Jihadist Violence in Egypt's North Sinai: From Local Insurgency to Islamic State Province Summary: Militancy in Egypt's North Sinai governorate-a serious problem since that country's January 2011 uprising - was compounded in November 2014 when Ansar Bayt al Maqdis ("Supporters of Jerusalem", ABM), the main salafi jihadist organisation in Sinai, swore allegiance to the group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS). This Research Paper closely inspects ABM/Wilayat Sinai and ways in which the group changed over three phases of its existence: from the 2011 uprising to Morsi's 2013 ouster, from that point until the group's pledge to IS in 2014, and since the emergence of Islamic State affiliate Wilayat Sinai. This in-depth documentation is meant to serve as a case study of the impact that affiliating with IS has on local salafi jihadist groups. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Egypt URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147915 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Jihadists Terrorism

Author: Braziel, Rick Title: Bringing Calm to Chaos: A critical incident review of the San Bernardino public safety response to the December 2, 2015 terrorist shooting incident at the Inland Regional Center Summary: In December 2015, two terrorists attacked a training session and holiday party for San Bernardino County employees, killing 14 and wounding 24 including two police officers. Further losses were averted by the response of the police department, sheriff's office, emergency services, and FBI, who came together to prevent additional deaths and injuries. This Critical Incident review provides a detailed overview of the incident response; lessons learned to improve responding agencies' policies, procedures, tactics, systems, culture, and relationships; and guidance to other agencies and first responders as they prepare for responses to terrorist, active shooter or other hostile events, and mass casualty incidents. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2016. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bringing-Calm-to-Chaos-Final-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bringing-Calm-to-Chaos-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140272 Keywords: Critical Incident Review Police Response Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Liang, Christina Schori Title: The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing Summary: Terrorism is proving to be an enduring global security threat. Since the late 1990s terrorist groups have become more lethal, networked, and technologically savvy. The world is currently dealing with two global terrorist groups - al-Qaeda and IS - that have recruited affiliates across the globe. In 2014 the lives lost due to terrorism around the world increased by 80 per cent compared to the previous year. Several terrorist groups currently have the ability to control land and hold entire cities hostage. The growing power of terrorist groups is linked to their ability to generate revenue from numerous criminal activities with almost complete impunity. Without funding, terrorist groups can neither function nor carry out attacks. To strip terrorists of their power, world leaders and the international community must work together to combat related crime and to implement and enforce global mechanisms for preventing terrorist financing. This paper provides a snapshot of how modern terrorist groups finance their organisations and operations. It will identify the key issues that are driving the growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime. The paper will also explore the various working relationships between terrorist and criminal groups, outlining under what conditions and to what extent they cooperate. This will help to identify existing and potentially new countermeasures to dry up terrorist funding, and to dismantle and destroy terrorist-criminal networks in the future. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Security Analysis, no. 10: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing Shelf Number: 147742 Keywords: Criminal Networks Jihadist Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Millar, Alistair Title: Blue Sky II: Taking UN Counterterrorism Efforts in The Next Decade From Plans to Action Summary: This report includes a critical analysis of the outcomes of deliberations around the 2016 review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and reflects on implementation efforts going forward. The study is informed by research on current threats and organizational responses; interviews and consultations with UN officials, member state representatives, academics, and practitioners through bilateral discussions; small-group events; and a tailored survey open to governments, UN officials, and civil society. Details: Washington, DC: Global center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Blue-Sky-III_low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 147860 Keywords: Counterterrorism Terrorism

Author: Frost, Jenna R. Title: The Nexus Between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition Summary: This dissertation reveals relationships between criminal and extremist groups in Latin America to determine which relationships enable extremists to acquire unconventional weapons or weapons material using criminal network pathways. The research is based on a holistic approach to examine proliferation pathways enabled through networked relationships. Social network analysis is used as the methodological approach to identify key relationships in the network. Data collected for the study were obtained from journal articles, congressional testimony, U.S. government reports, U.N. documents, and news sources for the time frame covered in the dissertation 1998-2013. This research shows the importance of understanding the ramifications of relationships between criminal and extremist groups in Latin America and their impact on security issues for the United States Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2014. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/8856/Frost_gmu_0883E_10632.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/8856/Frost_gmu_0883E_10632.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 140371 Keywords: Criminal Networks Extremism Extremist Groups Organized Crime Radical Groups Social Network Analysis Terrorism Weapons

Author: Libicki, Martin C. Title: The Defender's Dilemma: Charting a Course Toward Cybersecurity Summary: Cybersecurity is a constant, and, by all accounts growing, challenge. Although software products are gradually becoming more secure and novel approaches to cybersecurity are being developed, hackers are becoming more adept, their tools are better, and their markets are flourishing. The rising tide of network intrusions has focused organizations' attention on how to protect themselves better. This report, the second in a multiphase study on the future of cybersecurity, reveals perspectives and perceptions from chief information security officers; examines the development of network defense measures � and the countermeasures that attackers create to subvert those measures; and explores the role of software vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses. A heuristic model was developed to demonstrate the various cybersecurity levers that organizations can control, as well as exogenous factors that organizations cannot control. Among the report's findings were that cybersecurity experts are at least as focused on preserving their organizations' reputations as protecting actual property. Researchers also found that organizational size and software quality play significant roles in the strategies that defenders may adopt. Finally, those who secure networks will have to pay increasing attention to the role that smart devices might otherwise play in allowing hackers in. Organizations could benefit from better understanding their risk posture from various actors (threats), protection needs (vulnerabilities), and assets (impact). Policy recommendations include better defining the role of government, and exploring information sharing responsibilities. Key Findings Common Knowledge Confirmed Security postures are highly specific to company type, size, etc.; and there often aren't good solutions for smaller businesses. Quarantining certain parts of an organization offline can be a useful option. Responding to the desire of employees to bring their own devices and connect them to the network creates growing dilemmas. Chief information security officers (CISOs) feel that attackers have the upper hand, and will continue to have it. Reasonable Suppositions Validated Customers look to extant tools for solutions even though they do not necessarily know what they need and are certain no magic wand exists. CISOs want information on the motives and methods of specific attackers, but there is no consensus on how such information could be used. Current cyberinsurance offerings are often seen as more hassle than benefit, only useful in specific scenarios, and providing little return. Surprising Findings A cyberattack's effect on reputation (rather than more direct costs) is the biggest cause of concern for CISOs. The actual intellectual property or data that might be affected matters less than the fact that any intellectual property or data is at risk. In general, loss estimation processes are not particularly comprehensive. The ability to understand and articulate an organization's risk arising from network penetrations in a standard and consistent matter does not exist and will not exist for a long time. Recommendations Know what needs protecting, and how badly protection is needed. It was striking how frequently reputation was cited by CISOs as a prime cause for cybersecurity spending, as opposed to protecting actual intellectual property. Knowing what machines are on the network, what applications they are running, what privileges have been established, and with what state of security is also crucial. The advent of smart phones, tablets, and so forth compounds the problem. Know where to devote effort to protect the organization. A core choice for companies is how much defense to commit to the perimeter and how much to internal workings. Consider the potential for adversaries to employ countermeasures. As defenses are installed, organizations must realize they are dealing with a thinking adversary and that measures installed to thwart hackers tend to induce countermeasures as hackers probe for ways around or through new defenses. Government efforts aren't high on CISO's lists, but governments should be prepared to play a role. By and large, CISOs we interviewed did not express much interest in government efforts to improve cybersecurity, other than a willingness to cooperate after an attack. Yet it seems likely that government should be able to play a useful role. One option is to build a body of knowledge on how systems fail (a necessary prerequisite to preventing failure), and then share that information. A community that is prepared to share what went wrong and what could be done better next time could produce higher levels of cybersecurity. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1024/RAND_RR1024.pdf Shelf Number: 140475 Keywords: Computer Crime Cyberattacks Cybercrime (U.S.) Cybersecurity Internet Crime National Security Terrorism

Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab Summary: This report analyzes the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia, examines what steps have been most successful against the group, and identifies potential recommendations. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict. This study finds that a tailored engagement strategy - which involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations - was key in degrading al Shabaab. Still, progress in Somalia is reversible in the absence of continued and consistent pressure and political, economic, and social reforms. Today's terrorism and insurgency landscape defies easy solutions, with challenges from the Islamic State, al Qa'ida, and other groups across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. While there has been a significant focus on how and why the U.S. and other Western governments have failed to degrade terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and other countries, there has been far less attention on successful efforts to degrade groups. In Somalia, there has been limited progress. The challenge will be preventing a reversal. Key Findings A Tailored Engagement Strategy Was Key to Degrading al Shabaab This involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations. There were several other factors that weakened al Shabaab, such as internal friction among al Shabaab's senior cadre caused by poor leadership, battlefield losses, personality clashes, clan dynamics, and ideological disputes. Without Continued and Consistent Pressure and Reform, Progress in Somalia Can Slip Al Shabaab has not given up its ambition to control greater Somalia, and it retains the ability to retake territory, particularly if the United States and its allies fail to effectively deal with the challenges outlined in this report. Numerous challenges are posed in this region that can hinder progress, such as the weak Somali government, a poorly trained Somali National Army force, and the use of clan militias by the African Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM) following al Shabaab's withdrawal. The United States and other Western governments have not committed enough resources and attention to address Somalia's political, economic, and governance challenges that are at the heart of the conflict. Recommendations Reopen the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu. Increase economic assistance to Somalia. Augment U.S. military train, advise, assist, and accompany efforts. Aid Somalia's neighbors and support continuation of the African Union Mission to Somali (AMISOM). Continue limited U.S. direct action operations. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html Shelf Number: 140507 Keywords: Al Qaida Counter-Terrorism Terrorism

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2016 Public Report on Terrorist Threat to Canada Summary: Threat Environment The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers - including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling - poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2015, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travelers who had returned to Canada. The National Terrorism Threat Level This Report, for the first time, includes a description of Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level system. The threat level has been unchanged since October 2014; it is MEDIUM, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level aims to ensure a consistent understanding across the Government of the general terrorism threat to Canada. The threat level serves as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism. The Global Environment The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada's borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. This past year also saw Daesh's expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as an Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment. Emerging Issues This Report includes a feature on emerging issues in terrorism. These issues - the role of technology in terrorism, the participation of women in terrorist activities, and use of chemical weapons by terrorist organizations - have been widely discussed in the media over the past year. They represent only a fraction of many evolving issues that make terrorism such a complex problem. Responding to the Threat Since 2002, 20 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Another 21 have been charged with terrorism-related offences (including 16 since January 2015) and are either awaiting trial or have warrants outstanding for their arrest. Canada is contributing in a robust way, with more than 60 other countries, to the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. This includes military initiatives and efforts to stem the flow of "foreign terrorist fighters," cut off Daesh's funding sources, support stabilization, and expose and counter Daesh's ideology. More broadly, Canada has maintained a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program as a key part of its terrorism prevention efforts. The Government of Canada's counter-terrorism efforts to address this evolving threat continue to be guided by the twin obligations to both keep Canadians safe and safeguard fundamental Canadian values and liberties. The Terrorist Threat to Canada In October 2014, Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by lone-actors who had been inspired by extremist ideologies and radicalized to the point of violence. The attacks, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa, left two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel dead. More recently, the RCMP, working in close collaboration with domestic and international partners, took action in Strathroy, Ontario, to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat and ensure public safety. These incidents reminded Canadians that Canada is not immune to terrorism. Canada remains the target of direct threats by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and al-Qaida, and by individuals inspired by the violent extremist ideologies of these groups. The United States of America (U.S.) and Western Europe experienced multiple attacks in 2015. Some notable incidents included, in the U.S., attacks on police officers in Boston (June, 2015), military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee (July, 2015) and an office party in San Bernardino, California (December, 2015). European incidents included attacks on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo and a grocery store in Paris (January, 2015), an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train (August, 2015) and coordinated attacks directed by Daesh at several public spaces in Paris (November, 2015). In 2014 and 2015, Australia experienced three attacks - two targeting law enforcement officers in Melbourne and Sydney (September 2014, October 2015) and another targeting civilians in Sydney (December 2014). Terrorist incidents continue to occur with terrible regularity. In June 2016, 49 people were killed and 53 injured when a gunman, who may have been inspired by Daesh, opened fire at an Orlando, Florida night club. In July, 85 people were killed and hundreds more were injured when an attacker drove a truck through a crowd in Nice. There have been other attacks in Western Europe as well, for example, in Brussels, Belgium and in Rouen, France. In Turkey this past June, suicide bombers believed to be affiliated with Daesh struck Istanbul's international airport, killing 45 and injuring over 200. Globally, a few countries bear the heaviest burden of attacks and casualties, particularly during civil conflicts or where terrorist groups have taken part in insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Database for 2015 shows that terrorist activities continue to be highly concentrated. Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria - sustained more than 55 per cent of all attacks that year, and five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - sustained 74 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities. This threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests. CAF personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of this year. In January 2016, an al-Qaida-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work. Current Threats The Principal Threat The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. Some individuals have engaged in terrorism-related activities such as promoting violence online, radicalizing peers, recruiting and fundraising. Others may consider travelling abroad to join a terrorist group or conducting terrorist attacks themselves. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140520 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2015-16 Evaluation of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative: Final Report Summary: Program evaluations support accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. They also support deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the expected outcomes efficiently and cost-effectively. Program evaluations support policy and program improvements by helping identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined This evaluation examined the relevance and performance of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative, a $10-million, five-year initiative established in 2011, to address gaps in understanding of terrorism in Canada and the way it manifests itself in Canadian communities. The Initiative has several components, including a grants and contributions component that is designed to fund research studies and support direct engagement with researchers. Given that the Initiative includes a grants and contributions component, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the design, delivery and administration of this component of the Initiative conformed to the requirements of the Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Why it is important Terrorism is considered a threat to Canada's national interest and security. In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents has been increasing steadily, both in Canada and around the world. Many countries, including Canada, are facing radicalization to violence, particularly of youth. More than 180 Canadians are known to have gone abroad to take part in foreign armed conflicts. Preventing, detecting, denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities and responding to these developments are among the Government of Canada's, and by extension, the Department of Public Safety's highest priorities. The Initiative plays an important role in creating networks across sectors, generating knowledge for decision-makers, and increasing Canadians' understanding of terrorism and counter-radicalization to violence, which is increasingly needed to contribute to building a safe and resilient Canada. What we found Relevance The raison d'etre of the Initiative was to invest in research on pressing questions to enable Canada to better understand what terrorism meant in the Canadian context and what could be done to support effective policies and programs to counter-terrorism and violent extremism in Canada. Despite its contribution to date, there is still a continued need for the Initiative to shed more light on these issues. The Initiative is well aligned with the federal government and PS's priorities, as ensuring the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad continues to be among the top priorities of the government. The emphasis on the need for further research communicated as part of the Government's commitment to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization attests to the relevance of the Initiative and ongoing need for similar activities. Performance To a large extent, the Initiative has contributed to the achievement of its expected outcomes: It has supported the creation of various networks and other mechanisms for ongoing dialogue across different sectors on terrorism and counter radicalization; through funding research studies and other mechanisms, the Initiative has facilitated the generation of knowledge and tools to ensure that Canadian policy and decision-makers, as well as frontline officers and other practitioners have access to more relevant and timely information to do their work; and researchers affiliated with the Initiative have more resources and support at their disposal to conduct research and to study the identified priority areas. The Department has put in place a robust governance framework to oversee the delivery of the Initiative. For the most part, the Initiative was delivered efficiently and economically. The design, delivery and administration of the grants and contribution components of the Initiative were found to generally conform to the requirements of Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Notwithstanding the above achievements, the evaluation identified a few opportunities for improvement. The following recommendations are provided in the spirit of continuous improvement. Recommendations The ADM of the Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch and/or the future Senior Departmental Officer responsible for the Office for Community Outreach and Countering Radicalization to Violence should ensure that: 1. Kanishka-related research findings are better communicated to policy and decision makers and the general public. In collaboration with the Assistant Deputy Minister Corporate Management Branch ensure that: 2. funding recipients' reporting requirements are proportionate to their current risk profile. Management Response and Action Plan Management accepts all recommendations and will implement an action plan. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: 2016-06-28: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140524 Keywords: Counter-radicalization Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Corrales Compagnucci, Hugo Title: Armed Groups and Violence in Paraguay Summary: Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner's (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people's power, as represented by "Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo" (or, the Paraguayan People's Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepcion, San Pedro, Canindeyu y Caazapa, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as "campanas" (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. Paper 31. Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Paraguay URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 140539 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Homicides Inequality Kidnappings Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism Violence

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish Speaking Latin America Summary: Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi'ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran - a designated State-sponsor of terrorism - , its nuclear program, Hezbollah and the "D Bolivarian revolution" led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi'ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chavez' Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new converts, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Shelf Number: 140597 Keywords: Cyber Networks Islamist Networks Law Enforcement Intelligence Radical Groups Radicalization Social Networks Terrorism

Author: Cassim Cachalia, Raesah Title: The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence Summary: Youth radicalisation towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability. This paper reviews the evidence on the factors that may contribute to the dynamics of youth radicalisation. Available findings from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, and North Africa are used to understand the dynamics that may contribute to radicalisation and, potentially, to violent extremism. Many factors emerge including political, economic, social and individual factors. Religion, identity and gender also arise as topics for further analysis. Youth radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that cannot be attributed to any one explanation or set of factors. This paper recognises these complexities, offers recommendations and identifies additional issues that should be explored further. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 296: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140598 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Johnson, Kirk A. Title: The longue duree: Indonesia's response to the threat of jihadist terrorism 1998-2016 Summary: This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian government's response to the threat of transnational jihadism and addresses the debate over the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism policy. It poses the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups? By examining the three periods since Indonesia's transition to democracy - 1998- 2001, 2002-2008, and 2009-present - the prominent political and social issues considered by politicians and counter-terrorist specialists can be seen through the lenses of the threats facing Indonesia and the state's response. Through these means, the evolution and effectiveness of Indonesian counter-terrorism may be further measured against the context and interplay of three factors: counter-terrorism policies chosen, changing nature and evolution of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled state capacity and the implementation of a criminal justice counter-terrorism approach effectively implementing "hard" and "soft" methods. With continued implementation of this approach, Indonesia may be positioned to combat the re-emergent transnationally influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in this thesis may assist countries like Indonesia in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and application. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49499/16Jun_Johnson_Kirk.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49499/16Jun_Johnson_Kirk.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145370 Keywords: al-Qaeda Counter-terrorism Jihadists Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point Summary: Key Facts - 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned. - Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010. - The UK's annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from L594 million in 2015-16 to L670 million for 2016-17. - The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 36,500 requests per year. - The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed. - Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were linked to terrorists. Google removed over 14 million videos globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse. - Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of themselves as British - a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities effectively. - Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. Details: London: House of Commons, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 135: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Shelf Number: 140678 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Milton, Daniel Title: Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts Summary: This report breaks down the Islamic State's media activities through a two-fold approach. First, it examines a small number of declassified documents captured from the group's predecessors to provide a baseline understanding its present-day media structure and operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles. A number of findings emerge from these analyses. First, the Islamic State's media network is adaptive and complex. Second, the group publishes products on a variety of themes, only one of which has to do with the violence for which the group is so well-known. Third, the frequency of the group's products has declined significantly since its high-point in the summer of 2015. Fourth, the Islamic State's provincial media bureaus are not all equal in terms of their production content. Finally, although advances have been made in limiting the group's media activities, there is still more than can be done to limit the group's outreach efforts. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Shelf Number: 145442 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Acheson, Ian Title: Summary of main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice Summary: 1. This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations. 2. In September 2015 the then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a departmental review, supported by external expertise, to:  assess the threat which Islamist Extremism (IE) and the radicalisation which sustains it pose to prisons and probation services; and  assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to manage that threat. 3. The review team submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations to the then Secretary of State on 17 March 2016. 4. Given the nature of its content, and implications for public safety and security, the review is in the form of a classified report to the then Secretary of State. The subject matter is complex, with significant policy implications. The main findings of the review have been summarised below. 5. The then Secretary of State welcomed the review as a vital element of the MoJ's overall approach to addressing the threat presented by extremism and radicalisation in prisons and probation. Its findings will inform future policy development and operational practice, about which more will be said in the coming months. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140760 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Wesseling, Mara Title: An EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System Summary: The idea for a European equivalent to the US's Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) - an investigative tool for tracing and linking international financial transactions in order to detect terrorist plots and networks - was first proposed by members of the European Parliament and certain EU member states during the 2010 negotiations on the EU-US TFTP Agreement. Under this arrangement, the EU is not allowed direct access to the US system but may submit search requests. Critically, transactions conducted under the auspices of the EU's own pan-European payments initiative, the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which enables bank-to-bank payments within the Eurozone, are excluded from the TFTP, an omission that some refer to as 'the SEPA data gap'. SEPA is the EU-wide single market for payments made in euros that has been progressively established with adoption of the Payment Services Directive (PSD) of 5 December 2007 to facilitate cross-border payments. It refers to both a geographic space and a legal framework, providing a standardised payment format for credit transfers, debits, (credit) card payments and money remittance, as well as mobile and online payments. Financial services providers had to migrate to the SEPA format before 1 February 2014, while non-EU SEPA countries must comply with the SEPA framework by the end of 2016. Article 11 of the EU-US TFTP Agreement specifies that the possibility of introducing a socalled 'EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System (EU TFTS)' would be investigated and that the US would provide assistance and advice in establishing such a system, should this be the result of the investigation. The first impact assessment, produced in November 2013 and detailing the options towards this end, was not taken forward. Nevertheless, a renewed interest in a European system for tracking terrorist finance emerged after the terrorist attacks on the Paris offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and further Paris attacks in November of the same year. The latest EU 'Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Terrorist Financing', published on 2 February 2016, demanded that by December 20165 the European Commission should undertake a new assessment of a possible EU TFTS, which would complement the existing EU-US TFTP Agreement. This paper is structured around two key issues. First, it studies past debates and negotiations concerning the US TFTP in order to highlight those issues of importance should an EU TFTS be created. Second, it examines previous and current proposals, as well as debates, concerning the creation of an EU TFTS, drawing out the differences between previous iterations and current demands. This paper is concerned with identifying the lessons that can be learned from previous experiences and with the analysis of past and current debates on the creation of an EU TFTS. The last section offers further food for thought regarding the possible creation of an EU TFTS. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Shelf Number: 140775 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Parvez, Tariq Title: The Islamic State in Pakistan Summary: - The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nearby areas in January 2015. - There is currently no evidence of Daesh's central leadership directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks to demonstrate their support. - Daesh's far-reaching ideology -- which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate - can make it appealing to both existing and potential militants in Pakistan. - A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter Daesh's dangerous ideology. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 2013: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 145074 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Islamist State Radical Group Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Nakao, Keisuke Title: Transnational Policing: Preemption and Deterrence against Elusive Perpetrators Summary: Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy's three advantages: (a) Proxy can convince Perpetrators of punishments more credibly than Defender (communicative advantage); (b) Proxy is more likely to identify Perpetrators and detect what they hold dear (informational advantage); (c) Proxy can cripple and punish Perpetrators more effectively (offensive advantage). On the other hand, the delegation may cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy's choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g., Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each's own domain (Interpol, Budapest Convention). Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808474 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808474 Shelf Number: 144872 Keywords: Cybercrime Deterrence Intellectual Piracy Terrorism

Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit Trade Illicit Networks ISIS National Security Organized Crime Smuggling Terrorism Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Assessment of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program Summary: The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996 to provide counterterrorism training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel. The authors of this report assess the nature and value of the SLATT Program. The authors reviewed the current terrorism threat, both foreign and domestic, to gauge the need for the type of training that SLATT provides; examined how SLATT training is planned and operates; conducted a survey of participants of five SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops and train-the-trainer workshops; and conducted an analysis of the costs and benefits of SLATT to training participants based on results of a choice experiment that was part of the survey to identify what program features participants valued most. The authors conclude with suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program. Key Findings Terrorism Threat Assessment Analysis While the United States has not suffered an attack in the past 15 years as catastrophic as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there appears to be no significant abatement of attack attempts or attack planning since 2011. There is an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receives training in this area. Assessment of SLATT Workshops A majority of trainees have counterterrorism as a major responsibility of their position. Overall, 6 out of 10 workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international terrorist or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years. Assessment of Costs of SLATT to Law Enforcement Participants SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement, though law enforcement agencies incur some modest costs in terms of sending officers to a training and backfilling the positions of those sent, and the agencies that host the SLATT trainings incur some costs in terms of working to plan, market, and support the event. Assessing Features and the Value of SLATT to Participants Across the two types of workshop participants, participants most valued training that was three days in duration and that was less than 100 miles away. Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they valued having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Shelf Number: 145313 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Domestic Terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism

Author: Svenonius, Ola Title: Sensitising Urban Transport Security: Surveillance and Policing in Berlin, Stockholm, and Warsaw Summary: he city as a focal point of both domestic and international security policy is characteristic of the 21st century security landscape in Europe. Amidst the 'War on Terror' and the pan-European battle against organised crime, the city is the location where global processes are actually taking place. Urban security is the local policy response both to such global threats as terrorism and local ones, such as violent crime. Public transport systems in particular came under threat after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005. This doctoral thesis studies security policy in three public transport systems – Berlin, Stockholm, and Warsaw – from a comparative perspective focusing on the conditions that made new and very specific understandings of security possible. The study argues that urban transport security has undergone radical changes during the last ten years. While transport authorities and the police used to conceive security as related solely to crime rates, today the focus of security practices consists of passengers' perceptions. The study shows how this shift is paralleled by a new discourse of 'security as emotion', and how it came into being. It concentrates specifically on the central role that surveillance and private policing assumes as the security policy shifts objectives to the inner life of the passengers. Today, complex governance networks of both public and private actors manage security in the three cities. The analysis shows how passengers are constructed in the urban security policy as children, consumers, and citizens. These different 'roles' constitute the passenger in the eye of urban security governance characterised by technocracy, 'friendly security', and individual responsibility. The introduction of new governance models for public administration, the legacy of European communist regimes, and rising fear of crime are central conditions for this new, sensitised urban transport security. Details: Stockholm : Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 2011. 354p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 11, 2016 at: https://bibl.sh.se/skriftserier/hogskolans_skriftserier/Sensitising_Urban_Transport_Security/diva2_480462.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: https://bibl.sh.se/skriftserier/hogskolans_skriftserier/Sensitising_Urban_Transport_Security/diva2_480462.aspx Shelf Number: 130136 Keywords: Public Transport Terrorism Transportation Transportation Security Urban Transport

Author: Rassler, Don Title: Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology Summary: In mid-August 2016, the Shiite militant group Hezbollah reportedly dropped two small bombs from what is believed to have been a modified, commercially available drone that it was flying over rebel positions in Syria. While terrorist groups have long had a fascination with drones and experimented with their use, the incident was a first for a terror group, and it potentially represents the leading edge of a wave of similar incidents that could follow in the months, years and decades ahead. Much has been made of the threat of terror use of drones (also known as "uninhabited aircraft systems," or UASs), but little empirical and historical work has been done to support our understanding of this phenomenon and its evolution. This report seeks to address this gap by providing a review of, and framework to situate, cases in which terrorist entities have either shown a substantive interest in drones or have used them. It evaluates both individual use cases and the activity of groups that have used drones frequently enough to constitute their having a "program." These cases are then complemented by a review of the creative ways that private citizens have used drones, in order to provide decision-makers with a firmer baseline of both demonstrated terror capability and what lies within the immediate realm of possibility, given what has already been achieved by others. This report also includes an overview of new technologies that are likely to further complicate the scope of this developing threat. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, 2016. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Drones-Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Drones-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 147851 Keywords: Drones Terrorism

Author: Thornton, Amy Elise Title: Understanding Radicalisation Summary: Given the considerable amount of effort and public resources invested in countering radicalisation, achieving a clearer understanding of what radicalisation is and of its causes is arguably a worthwhile and necessary endeavour. This thesis argues that such an understanding is lacking at present. Up until recently, researchers have relied upon interviews with current or former radicals in order to try and tease out those factors which might have contributed to radicalisation. As a result of the methodological approach, the focus has been upon individuals who are radicalised and their personal backgrounds, rather than on causal factors and mechanisms which might have been at work at other levels of analysis. Utilising and developing a tripartite theory of radicalisation by Bouhana and Wikström 2011, this thesis focuses on the emergence of radicalising settings. The role of so-called macro-level, or systemic, factors, which would affect the broader ecology and explain why settings propitious to radicalisation do or do not emerge in particular environments (e.g. communities) at particular times has been largely overlooked. One explanation is that such factors are rarely accessible through interviews conducted with those who commit terrorist acts. By using a relatively new methodology in the field, agent-based modelling, simulation experiments were conducted to examine the impact of collective efficacy and social disorganisation upon the emergence and maintenance of radicalisation within a setting. Systematic reviews were conducted in order to elucidate existing data for modelling parameters, while interviews with former radicals and current deradicalisation experts were carried out in order to provide new data for the model and add to a field in which this primary data is still limited. Agent-based modelling is shown to provide the field of radicalisation studies with a methodology in which to test and refine theory, scientifically examine current hypothesis and generate more by investigating potentially unexpected results from simulation experiments. This could be of great help to practitioners who seek to understand the impact of their interventions when conducting counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation work in the future. Details: London: University College London, 2015. 241p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Shelf Number: 147912 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization De-Radicalization Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra‚ of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147308 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Violence Extremists Human Rights Abuses ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Green, Shannon N. Title: Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way. Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians. The spread of extremist ideologies and increasingly frequent terrorist attacks are stoking anxiety and fear across the globe. According to a survey conducted by the Commission, people are willing to try just about anything to stop the bloodshed: from military action to stronger border controls and mandatory identification cards to relinquishing privacy and accepting constraints on speech. The increasing potency and reach of terrorist groups—and a sense that governments’ response to the threat has been inadequate—is creating deep political divisions and fueling support for populist solutions. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Neither troops nor police nor economic sanctions alone can address this threat. We cannot close our borders and hope that the problem goes away. And we cannot abandon our commitment to human rights and freedom of expression in an attempt to quell violent extremism. Diminishing the appeal of extremist ideologies will require a long-term, generational struggle. The United States and its allies must combat extremists' hostile and apocalyptic world view with the same level of commitment that we apply to dealing with its violent manifestations. We urgently need a new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism—one that is resolute, rests in soft and hard power, and galvanizes key allies and partners from government, civil society, and the private sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Shelf Number: 147863 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo Title: Terrorist murder, cycles of violence, and terrorist attacks in New York City during the last two centuries Summary: I apply the Beveridge-Nelson business cycle decomposition method to the time series of murder of New York City – NYC (1797-2005). Separating out "permanent" from "cyclical" murder, I hypothesize that the cyclical part coincides with documented waves of organized crime, internal tensions, breakdowns in social order, crime legislation, social, and political unrest, and recently with the periodic terrorist attacks in the city. The estimated cyclical terrorist murder component warns that terrorist attacks in New York City from 1826 to 2005, historically occur in the estimated turning point dates, of whether a declining, or ascending cycle, and so, it must be used in future research to construct a model for explaining the causal reasons for its movement across time, and for forecasting terrorist murder and attacks for New York City. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2007. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 4200: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4200/1/MPRA_paper_4200.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4200/1/MPRA_paper_4200.pdf Shelf Number: 147950 Keywords: Cycles of Violence Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crimes

Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria Summary: The consequence of violent extremism on rural livelihoods has received less attention in academic literature. This paper addresses three fundamental questions: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent religious movements? What is the root cause of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria? And what are the consequences of Boko Haram's violence on rural livelihoods? Based on a review of the literature and current studies in Nigeria, this paper contends that violent extremism has a correlation with the socio-economic conditions in Northeast Nigeria, and there are direct and indirect impacts of extremism on rural livelihoods. The paper concludes with a suggestion of further studies on the drivers of violent extremism, and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with extremist activities in Nigeria. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 227: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Shelf Number: 148136 Keywords: Extremists Groups Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorism Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Ingram, Haroro J. Title: A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners Summary: This Policy Brief outlines a "linkage-based" approach to combating militant Islamist propaganda tailored for practitioners. It argues for a two-tiered approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications that addresses a spectrum of target audience motivations: antis, curious, engaged, tacit supporters and active supporters. The first tier undermines the key arguments at the heart of militant Islamist narratives and offers alternative narratives. This approach is designed to dismantle the "systems of meaning" at the heart of militant Islamist propaganda via the deployment of pragmatic- and identity-choice messages tailored to dissolve the linkages violent extremists draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. The second tier uses strategies of network disruption and disengagement strategies to catalyse behavioural changes in target audiences away from joining or acting on behalf of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or so-called Islamic State (IS). These tiers are mutually reinforcing: the first degrades the appeal of violent extremist messaging in an effort to constrict those who may become engaged in or even supporters of violent extremists while the second disturbs the trajectory of individuals from tacit to active supporters. The framework is designed to not only assist practitioners with synchronising campaign planning and message design but provides a way to categorise messaging and facilitate metric collection for better informed decision-making. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed December 13, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146040 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Islamic State Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Whiteside, Craig Title: Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016) Summary: The media products of the revolutionary movement known as the Islamic State (also IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) have received a significant amount of attention from analysts and journalists alike. While extremely helpful, most of this effort is focused at performing content analysis of fairly recent products. As part of the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) project's effort to better understand propaganda messaging in the 21st century, the author of this Research Paper examined primary documents and other media published by the Islamic State movement during its entire existence in order to develop a history of the media department since 2003. The framework for analysis focused on the interaction between key media leaders, the ever-expanding structure and institutions, and the process of innovation used to experiment with different media techniques in different phases of the group's evolution. Based on this history, the paper presents six observations about the media department and its role in the larger movement – in the hopes that this knowledge will be helpful in efforts to combat this particular group and its inevitable imitators in the future. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 144914 Keywords: Counter-terrorism ISIS Islamic State Media Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: Then and Now: Comparing the Flow of Foreign Fighters to AQI and the Islamic State Summary: Using two different sets of data derived from internal, bureaucratic documents produced by the Islamic State (and its predecessor group) during two distinct periods of time (2006-2007 and 2011-2014), this report evaluates how the make-up, scale, and scope of the Iraq- and Syria-bound foreign fighter problem has changed over the last decade. It does so across three dimensions. First, it outlines the similarities and differences that exist in the backgrounds of the foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State during separate blocks of time. Second, it provides insight into the local travel and flow of foreign fighters across time as well as the mobilization infrastructure that the Islamic State had in place to facilitate the travel of recruits into Syria or Iraq. Third, it details changes in the preferences of foreign fighters, as reflected by the roles they wanted to fill within the organization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Then-and-Now.pdf Shelf Number: 144885 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Terrorism

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating, or Preventing? Summary: Summary • Women’s role in violent extremism has too often been simplified to a binary: either victim of the choices of men or deviant anomaly. • Women play a diverse range of roles in violent extremism in Afghanistan—as they do around the world—not only as peacebuilders but also as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and preventers. • Roles and motivations vary, but what is clear is that the construct of disempowered victims simply does not hold true for all women involved. • Women’s roles in violent extremism and the underlying reasons behind those roles need to be fully understood and appropriately reflected in policy and practice. • Women’s rights and place in society are central to the narratives of violent extremist groups, and these narratives are the terrain on which women in Afghanistan fight to establish their rights. • Women have the potential, whether through their own involvement or as family members of those who are involved, to counter radicalization dynamics. • Countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming needs to include women as specific target groups, be engendered more generally, and address the underlying issues of women’s status and agency. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 396: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146123 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: Strengthening Regional Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South Asia. What Role for Civil Society? Summary: Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat. This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Shelf Number: 146118 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Sullivan, Mark P. Title: Latin America: Terrorism Issues Summary: Compared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most countries in Latin America. Most terrorist acts occur in the Andean region of South America, committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and one Peruvian guerrilla group, the Shining Path (SL). All three of these groups have been designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The FARC, however, has been engaged in peace negotiations with the Colombian government since 2012, culminating in a peace accord signed in September 2016. Although the accord was narrowly rejected by a national plebiscite in early October, both sides hammered out a new peace accord in November 2016, which was ratified by Colombia’s Congress at the end of that month. Negotiations between the Colombian government and the smaller ELN had several false starts in 2016, although to date formal talks with the government have not started. The Shining Path has been significantly diminished because of Peruvian military operations. For a number of years, there has also been U.S. concern about Iran's increasing activities in the region as well as those of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with close ties to Iran. Both are reported to be linked to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people in Buenos Aires. More recently, U.S. concerns have included financial and ideological support in South America and the Caribbean for the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), including the issue of individuals from the region leaving to fight with the Islamic State. The United States employs various policy tools to counter terrorism in the region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to sanctions against U.S.-designated FTOs in the region, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela since 2006 because the Department of State has determined that Venezuela is not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The United States has also imposed sanctions on several current and former Venezuelan officials for assisting the FARC and on numerous individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Cuba had been on the State Department's so-called list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, but in May 2015, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba’s designation as part of its overall policy shift on Cuba. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: RS21049: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf Shelf Number: 147300 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Terrorism

Author: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Title: Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat Summary: Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiiin, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa, has long been perceived as a Somali organisation – albeit one that represents a security threat to the wider region. But since at least 2010, Al-Shabaab has aspired to become a truly regional organisation, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. In 2010 the group staged its first major external operation, in Kampala, Uganda, and issued its first propaganda video in the Swahili language. Since then, Al- Shabaab has become active in no less than six countries of the region, striking five of them with terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response. This determined expansion of Al-Shabaab’s ambitions and operational reach is in large part the result of the strategic direction adopted by Al-Shabaab's former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye, who currently heads the movement. In late 2013, Godane re-organised Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. While the latter formation has yet to mount an effective operation on Ethiopian soil, the Jaysh Ayman launched a series of cross-border attacks into Kenya in 2014 and, despite a Kenyan counter-offensive in late 2015, the group remains a serious threat to the country's national security. In 2013, Godane also gave instructions for Al-Shabaab’s special operations wing, the Amniyaad, to step up attacks against neighbouring countries, notably those contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This resulted in a spate of attacks between 2013 and 2015 in Kenya that claimed over 350 lives, an attempted suicide bombing of a football match in Addis Ababa in October 2013, and the suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. In October 2014, Al-Shabaab again attempted a suicide bombing in Addis Ababa, this time apparently targeting a busy shopping mall, but the plot was detected and foiled. Al-Shabaab-affiliated networks in Kenya also continued to plan terror attacks during this period, but less successfully than Jaysh Ayman. Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, experienced growing pressure from the security services, and suffered a steady attrition of its leadership. As a result, Al-Hijra cadres withdrew from major hubs of activity in Nairobi and Mombasa, dispersing their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout the country – notably within the prison system. Al-Hijra operatives and recruits – including a growing proportion of women – continued to travel back and forth to Somalia, typically receiving training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations. Kenya also witnessed increasing activity among Al-Shabaab sympathisers, organising themselves spontaneously online via social media and mobile applications. While many of these individuals remain purely aspirational, some have gone on to plan operations, reaching out to members of Al-Shabaab or Al-Hijra for guidance and support. Others have sought advice concerning travel to Somalia or Syria. Confronted by the evolving threat, regional states are exploring ways to strengthen their common response to Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, whose forces are drawn mainly from IGAD countries, continues to support the efforts of the Somali Federal Government and emerging federal member states to confront Al-Shabaab militarily, steadily driving the jihadists out of the last remaining strongholds and helping to build the capacity of Somali security forces. Outside Somalia, IGAD Member States have devoted greater efforts to monitoring and disrupting Al-Shabaab activities within their borders. The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services (HISS) of the member countries of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) met twice in 2015 to deepen security cooperation and harmonise efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In August 2015, a two-day experts’ meeting in Djibouti took the first steps towards the establishment of a Centre of Excellence to Counter Violent Extremism for the IGAD region. In addition, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) launched a new Transnational Security Threats (TST) Initiative to promote security cooperation between member states: the initiative under which this report has been commission and published. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for further action, including: • Enhanced security cooperation in countering Al-Shabaab, including a joint review to identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities in strengthening cooperation to combat Al-Shabaab, such as the types of information to be shared and the processes for doing so; more joint activities to confront Al- Shabaab; and inviting Tanzania to participate in any IGAD-led efforts to counter this threat. • Better understanding of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and possible counter-measures, including appropriate Counter-IED (C-IED) strategies, enhanced technical capabilities for post-blast investigation and analysis, and improved information sharing within the region. • Adaptation to evolving patterns of radicalisation and recruitment, such as the shifting of extremist activities away from former hubs, such as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, to new geographic areas; sensitisation and training of public officials, in order to help them identify and react appropriately to potential threats; enhance surveillance of terrorism suspects and networks inside the prison system and put in place appropriate responses; and undertake additional research and analysis into current trends of radicalisation and recruitment among young women, in order to formulate appropriate responses. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Shelf Number: 147782 Keywords: Al-Qaeda Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: U.S. House. Committee on Financial Services Title: Stopping Terror Finance: Securing the U.S. Financial Sector Summary: Terrorist financing describes a form of financial crime in which an individual or entity solicits, collects, or provides funds "with the intention that [these funds] may be used to support terrorist acts or organizations." While terrorists can benefit from big donations of deep-pocketed financiers sympathetic to their cause, terrorist financing often involves relatively small-dollar amounts and itself is just a subset melting into the larger stream of all financial crime occurring in the international financial system. The threat to national security from terrorist financiers is real, so while U.S. policymakers have long recognized the idea that "following the money" through the retail banking system can help combat terrorism and related forms of illicit finance, new financing technologies have arisen since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks that require constant renewal of detection and disruption methods. In December 2015, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warned that "further concerted action urgently needs to be taken … to combat the financing of … serious terrorist threats...." Two months later, in February 2016, FATF noted that the scope and nature of terrorist threats had "globally intensified considerably." According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department), these threats collectively represent a source of risk generally to the United States, and to the financial system in particular. Specifically, Treasury concludes: [t]he central role of the U.S. financial system within the international financial system and the sheer volume and diversity of international financial transactions that in some way pass through U.S. financial institutions expose the U.S. financial system to TF [terrorist financing] risks that other financial systems may not face. The bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing of the Financial Services Committee (Task Force) was authorized for two six-month terms during the 114th Congress to probe the growing terrorist financing problem. The Task Force held eleven hearings, and its 21 Members systematically examined how select terror groups and actors acquire and move funds illicitly. The hearings featured expert testimony from current and former U.S. government employees, with witnesses from both the U.S. and overseas, on a wide range of topics. The Task Force recently concluded its work with two wrap-up hearings, one of which featured testimony from two senior Treasury Department officials on how the agency is coordinating its efforts to fight terrorist financing. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 2016. 191p. Source: Internet Resources: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147795 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Mehra, Tanya Title: Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics and Policy Responses Summary: This paper, which was developed for the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group, takes stock of the current trends and dynamics related to the FTF phenomenon and identifies some of the gaps that still need to be addressed. The distinction between home-grown terrorists and (returning) FTFs is fading, the difference between ISIL/Da’esh inspired or directed terrorist attacks is becoming more fluid and the nexus between terrorism and crime is more prominent, which clearly indicates that terrorism can manifest itself in many different ways. The involvement of returning FTFs in some terrorist attacks is a stark reminder of the potential threat returning FTFs pose. The data also indicate a demographic change with a more prominent role of female FTFs and children being recruited and used in hostilities or involved in terrorist attacks. The current trends underline the need for a comprehensive, tailored and multidisciplinary approach including the involvement of stakeholders at the local level to adequately address the evolving aspects of the FTF phenomenon. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, (ICCT), 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed January 26, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Shelf Number: 145432 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Keatinge, Tom Title: Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance? Summary: As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play. Efforts to disrupt the funding of Daesh have taken up a significant amount of the time and resources of policymakers, law enforcement and the military. These efforts have also involved mobilising the private sector, particularly banks, oil companies and antiquities dealers. However, little attention has been paid to understanding and addressing the financing associated with the plots (whether successful, failed or disrupted) of lone actors and small cells that have acted beyond Daesh-controlled territory. This paper seeks to provide insight into the financing connected with a sample of 63 lone-actor and small cell terrorist plots in Great Britain and France since 2000, including those that are religiously inspired, right wing, nationalist, and single issue. The aim is to inform thinking and raise awareness among those charged with tackling this threat. The report also draws on a similar study by Australia's financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, thereby providing an overview of lone-actor and small cell terrorist finance from the perspective of three countries, each with individual and distinct experiences. What is clear from both studies is that the simplicity and spontaneity of these attacks, particularly those attempted by a lone assailant as opposed to a dyad or triad, means that assailants are often able to make use of their own funding resources, offering limited opportunities for traditional counter-terrorist financing (CTF) approaches to reveal financial indications of plans prior to their execution. Despite this challenge, the research conducted for this paper has highlighted a number of key themes that it is hoped can contribute to the approaches taken by law enforcement and security authorities as they adapt their CTF response to the evolving threat posed by such terrorists: While there has been an undoubted need to focus on disrupting the significant financing accrued by Daesh over the past two years, a comprehensive CTF strategy should not lose sight of the fact that lone actors and small cells operating at home present a considerably more immediate threat to citizens than Daesh, given that the latter mainly operates in Iraq and Syria. Although it has traditionally been the case in many countries that terrorist financing has been addressed separately from broader financial crime, the increasing intersection of lone actors and small cells with low-level criminality suggests that this separation needs to be reconsidered. Investigations need to at least acknowledge this emerging connection and create dedicated inter-agency links to combat it. Attacks undertaken with knives have certainly resulted in casualties; however, the use of firearms (particularly automatic weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far greater scale. As such, increased focus should be placed on identifying and disrupting financial flows related to the trade in illicit firearms. Information about the financial tools employed by lone actors and small cells must be more widely disseminated to raise awareness among those agencies and actors = in both the public and private sectors - who are less familiar with terrorist financing techniques. These might include certain types of retailer, payday lenders and student loan companies, as well as online payment systems that may increasingly be the target of terrorist-related fraud. Closer monitoring of the welfare system is also advised, in light of cases identified where benefits were used to fund terrorist plots. The financial patterns of lone actors and small cell operators are often indistinguishable from legitimate financial behaviour, and proactive identification of these individuals through financial reporting remains challenging. National financial intelligence units must therefore act as a critical bridge between national security and law enforcement agencies (that identify subjects of interest via non-financial means) and the private sector, to allow financial institutions to conduct more targeted monitoring. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Shelf Number: 145541 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorism Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Fajmonova, Veronika Title: Origin-group differences in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims: Reactions to the War on Terrorism Summary: This study compared opinions relating to the war on terrorism for six origin-groups in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S Muslims (each poll ~1000 participants). Origin-groups included Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, and sub-Saharan African countries, as well as African-American Muslims. Opinions changed little from 2007 to 2011 except for a massive increase in presidential approval (Obama vs. Bush). In each origin-group, nearly half of respondents continued to believe the U.S. war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, but approval of al-Qaida and suicide bombing in defense of Islam was less than ten percent. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born were older and less religious than other groups but had opinions similar to other U.S. Muslims. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were generally most negative about living as Muslims in the United States. Experience of discrimination did not predict opinion of al-Qaida or suicide bombing, nor were converts more extreme. Discussion emphasizes the need to understand why many U.S. Muslims are negative toward the war on terrorism and why a very few persist in radical opinions approving al-Qaida and suicide bombing. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144825 Keywords: Al-Qaida Counter-Terrorism Muslims Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Pape, Robert Title: The American face of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-related terrorism in the US: March 2014-August 2016 Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is mobilising sympathisers in the US at rates much higher than seen for previous terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. To understand this new American face of ISIS, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) study examined 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated ISIS-related offences, were indicted by the US Justice Department for such offences, or both, in the US between March 2014 and August 2016. This is the first comprehensive analysis of ISIS-related cases to examine the profiles of indictees overall, as well as to identify characteristics associated with each of the offence types. The findings are striking, and provide a valuable contribution to understanding the contemporary face of ISIS-related terrorism in the US. Details: Barton ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Shelf Number: 145772 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gyles, Roger Title: Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism Summary: This report is to review the operation, effectiveness, and implications, of the relevant legislation, including consideration as to whether it: contains appropriate safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals; remains proportionate to the threat of terrorism, or threat to national security, or both; and remains necessary. Assessment as to whether the legislation is being used for matters unrelated to terrorism and national security is required. I must have regard to Australia's obligations under international agreements and to the arrangements agreed from time to time between the Commonwealth, the States, and the Territories, to ensure a national approach to countering terrorism. A review of div 3 of pt III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) and any other provision of that Act as far as it relates to that division, pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) (INSLM Act) is required to be completed by 7 September 2017. That division provides the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) with special powers relating to terrorism offences, being questioning warrants (QWs), and questioning and detention warrants (QDWs), and related matters. That time limit requires that the review take place notwithstanding s 9 of the INSLM Act. A review of pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) is also one of the functions of the office. That part provides for the detention (and questioning) of persons arrested for Commonwealth offences. Subdivision B of div 2 deals with terrorism offences. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (formerly the Australian Crime Commission) (ACIC) has compulsory questioning powers. The arrangements that are in place mean that those powers apply to certain terrorism offences, and to that extent, may be reviewed pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the INSLM Act. Combining those reviews provides a better perspective than separate reviews and is the best use of limited resources. The existence and exercise of other powers relating to counter-terrorism and national security vested in federal and state bodies form part of the backdrop to this review and report. The previous Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Mr Bret Walker SC, reviewed and made recommendations about ASIO QWs, and QDWs, in chs IV and V of his 2012 Annual Report. He dealt with police powers of questioning post-arrest and pre-charge in Appendix F of the same report, but made no recommendations as to them. He touched on pre-emptive detention for questioning by the then Australian Crime Commission, and the New South Wales Crime Commission, in ch V of that report. The principal recommendation was that QDWs be abolished by repeal of the relevant statutory provisions. That recommendation has not been acted on. Several changes to the QW procedures were recommended, some based on the assumption that QDWs would be abolished. Only some have been adopted. These powers are revisited in this report in light of experience over recent years and the current security situation. This review has involved public and private written submissions, public and private hearings, private consultations, and the voluntary and compulsory provision of information. As much material as possible has been published on the INSLM website. The submissions published there give a comprehensive account of the considerations and arguments that have been advanced and taken into account. It is unnecessary to reproduce all of that information in this report. An account of the review process may be found at Appendix 1. Details: Sydney: Australian Government, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 2016. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Shelf Number: 145788 Keywords: National Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Assanvo, William Title: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Summary: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue 10: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Shelf Number: 146970 Keywords: Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Ellis, B. Heidi Title: Understanding Pathways to and Away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees Summary: The overall objective of the proposed project was to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali immigrants: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as civic engagement? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? In this project we empirically examined the principle of multi-finality, or pathways leading from a shared refugee experience to multiple outcomes. Understanding these different trajectories, and the factors that shape an individual's progress towards diverse outcomes, provides critical information to local and state government agencies as they respond to the potential threat of domestic radicalization. Somalis in North America offer a window into the remarkable potential that can be realized by refugees/immigrants despite experiences of severe adversity as well as the challenges some subgroups encounter when adjusting to life in a new country. Somalia has endured one of the longest and most brutal wars of the past 30 years. Civil war broke out in 1991 and the nation has existed in what has been described as a "perpetual anarchy" to this day (Agbiboa 2014). This enduring conflict has led to millions of Somalis being dispersed as refugees across the globe. As refugees with limited resources, many Somalis in North America are resettled in poor urban neighborhoods where they are visibly different, not only because of race or ethnicity but also because of dress, especially for women who wear a Muslim head covering. Somali refugees have also found themselves inserted into the unfamiliar black and white dichotomy that dominates American racial discourse (Kusow 2006). In this regard, though Somalis came to North America to escape the horrors of war, they often find themselves facing new problems, such as lack of jobs, loss of status, high levels of neighborhood violence, and racial and ethnic discrimination (Betancourt et al. 2014; Abdi 2015). In addition, the community has been plagued by violence. For example, in Minneapolis, MN, where the greatest number of Somali refugees in the US has settled, the community has faced gang violence and the threat of youth radicalizing simultaneously. In the two-year period between December 2007 and January 2010, eleven Somali American youth were killed in gang violence in the twin cities and twenty left to join Al-Shabaab (Yuen 2010). More recently, nine Somali youth have been arrested and have been sentenced or are awaiting sentences for their attempts to join (Yuen, Ibrahim, and Aslanian 2015;Yuen, Ibrahim, & Xaykaothao, 2016). While the number of Somali American youth joining these groups are small and while the majority of Somali Americans are law-abiding citizens, the terrorist groups' ability to recruit these youth and to convince some of them to engage in violent acts is concerning not only to policymakers and law enforcement but also to the Somali community's which fears losing more youth to violence or having the community reputation sullied by being associated with terrorism. While some of the social and cultural factors affecting Somalis are unique to that ethnic group, they also share experiences common to many immigrants - navigating identity development and duality as they move between home and host cultures, contending with discrimination as religious, racial and ethnic minorities, and striving to achieve their dreams while struggling to gain socioeconomic stability. Thus understanding their developmental trajectories may inform our understanding of other immigrant and refugee groups as well. Details: Boston: Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Shelf Number: 146650 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Refugees Somali Immigrants Terrorism Violent Radicalization

Author: Barrett, Richard Title: The Islamic State Summary: The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory. But ultimately, its impact will flow as much from its challenge to established concepts of government, national sovereignty, and national identity. The Islamic State is most notable for the violence with which it asserts control, but its ruthless tactics will likely prevent the group from ruling effectively and building broader support beyond the front line fighters who protect its security and the authoritarian killers who patrol its streets. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards proto-statehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground. As a result, this paper relies on the group's own publications, the observations of defectors, and analysis by others who take an interest in its progress, despite the paucity of information. Nonetheless, The Soufan Group believes that enough is available to draw a useful picture of the evolution of the State, its structure and its operations, even though it may lack clarity and detail. The paper refers throughout to the organization as The Islamic State, being the name it uses to describe itself. The only alternative would be to call it by its Arabic acronym, commonly transliterated as Da'ish or Daesh (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham). Clearly, the use of its full name does not imply any endorsement or recognition of its self-description. Details: New York: Soufan Group, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Shelf Number: 141177 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Parker, Tony C. Title: Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization Summary: Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America's homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144858 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Deradicalization Extremism Homeland Security Prisoners Prisons Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department Title: Counter-terrorism cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood Summary: Since the EU adopted its Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2005, it has focused on forging closer ties with third countries in the fight against terrorism. Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood in this field is particularly important. Every single country within this region is affected by terrorism to different degrees and terrorist attacks on European soil are increasingly linked with the Middle East and North Africa. The EU adopted a wide-ranging counter-terrorism approach in the South including actions that go beyond the strictly military and security interpretations of counter-terrorism. In line with the UN's 4-pillar approach, the EU’s counter-terrorism measures can be broadly subdivided into four fields: (i) building state capacity (particularly in the areas of border control, criminal investigation and prosecution, and countering the financing of terrorism); (ii) strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; (iii) fostering regional cooperation; and (iv) preventing and combating terrorism. This study outlines and contextualises current counter-terrorism activities in the region. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578013/EXPO_IDA(2017)578013_EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578013/EXPO_IDA(2017)578013_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 141255 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism

Author: Snair, Justin Title: Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop Summary: Countering violent extremism consists of various prevention and intervention approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to radicalization toward violent extremism, to provide nonviolent avenues for expressing grievances, and to educate communities about the threat of recruitment and radicalization to violence. To explore the application of health approaches in community-level strategies to countering violent extremism and radicalization, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a public workshop in September 2016. Participants explored the evolving threat of violent extremism and radicalization within communities across America, traditional versus health-centered approaches to countering violent extremism and radicalization, and opportunities for cross-sector and interdisciplinary collaboration and learning among domestic and international stakeholders and organizations. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Shelf Number: 141257 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Public Health Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko Haram Citizen Attitudes Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures in North and West Africa Summary: The Islamic State (referred to in this report as ISIL) has seen its prospects in North and West Africa grow increasingly dim since early 2015. ISIL has experienced significant losses in North Africa in the past year, especially in Libya, which was once ISIL's most valuable territory outside of Syria and Iraq, and was home to the group’s unofficial African capital. Meanwhile, the Nigerian militant group popularly known as Boko Haram, which is ISIL's West Africa Province (ISWAP), has experienced major internal schisms, as different factions vie for resources, compete for the attention of ISIL's senior leadership, and renew longstanding personal, ideological and strategic disputes. But despite these setbacks, ISIL continues to pose a threat to North and West Africa, and is capable of mounting high-profile terrorist attacks in the region and beyond. Additionally, continued political instability and conflict in countries like Mali and Libya could undermine counter-ISIL efforts, and provide the group an opportunity to rebuild its networks and mount a resurgence. Indeed, two recent occurrences – the reemergence of ISIL in northern Mali and the group's temporary takeover of the town of Qandala in Puntland (a region in northeastern Somalia) – illustrate ISIL's ability to exploit ungoverned spaces and fragile states. It is possible that ISIL's global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from combatting ISIL to other seemingly more urgent issues, giving ISIL the breathing room it needs to regenerate. Several factors will have a fundamental impact on ISIL’s future trajectory in North and West Africa: 1. The future of ISIL’s Sirte network: In order to survive and rebuild in North and West Africa, ISIL will likely need to preserve at least some of the militant infrastructure it developed during its year-plus in control of the Libyan city of Sirte. The Sirte network has been a key bridge between ISIL's Syria-Iraq leadership and its African allies, and ISIL has relied heavily on the Sirte network to maintain its patronage of its provinces (as ISIL refers to its affiliates) in the region. While ISIL has lost its foothold in Sirte, the group may be able to preserve some of the jihadist apparatus that had ruled and administered the city. 2. ISWAP's organizational dynamics: ISWAP's internal schisms threaten to cripple the group and weaken, if not sever, its ties to ISIL. The loss of its Nigerian province would be a major blow to ISIL's expansion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and would further tarnish the group’s brand. Conversely, if ISWAP remains in ISIL's orbit, ISWAP could provide ISIL with a vehicle through which to expand its presence into other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal and Mali. 3. The resilience of ISIL in northern Mali: ISIL's recent resurgence in northern Mali gives the group a new foothold at a time when it is struggling elsewhere in the region, and across the globe. But ISIL's presence in Mali remains tenuous, as both regional and French security forces, as well as rival al-Qaeda militants, will likely target ISIL. 4. Political stability in North Africa: ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria’s political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 141325 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIL Islamic State Radical Groups Radical Violence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Heissner, Stefan Title: Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State's Financial Fortunes Summary: About this Study • The so-called Islamic State has often been described as the richest terrorist organization in the world. • This estimate of Islamic State revenues for the years 2014–2016 results from a collaboration between EY and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London. It is based on a systematic review of open source information about the finances of Islamic State in its core territory in Syria and Iraq. Key Findings • Estimates vary widely. It remains impossible to say exactly how much money Islamic State has at its disposal. • The group's most significant sources of revenue are closely tied to its territory. They are: (1) taxes and fees; (2) oil; and (3) looting, confiscations, and fines. We have found no hard evidence that foreign donations continue to be significant. Similarly, revenues from the sale of antiquities and kidnap for ransom, while difficult to quantify, are unlikely to have been major sources of income. • In the years since 2014, Islamic State’s annual revenue has more than halved: from up to $1.9b in 2014 to a maximum of $870m in 2016. There are no signs yet that the group has created significant new funding streams that would make up for recent losses. With current trends continuing, the Islamic State’s "business model" will soon fail. Assessment • Evaluating Islamic State finances through traditional approaches towards "countering terrorist finance" leads to serious misconceptions. Islamic State is fundamentally different because of the large territory it controls and the unique opportunities this offers for generating income. • Conversely, its reliance on population and territory helps to explain the group's current financial troubles. According to figures provided by the Global Coalition, by November 2016 Islamic State had lost 62 per cent of its mid-2014 "peak" territory in Iraq, and 30 per cent in Syria. From a revenue perspective, this means fewer people and businesses to tax and less control over natural resources such as oil fields. Prospects • There are good reasons to believe that Islamic State revenues will further decline. In particular, capturing Mosul, the Caliphate's "commercial capital", will have a significant detrimental effect on Islamic State finances. • Nevertheless, Islamic State, and its Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) predecessor, have repeatedly demonstrated that financial and military setbacks can be overcome. • Moreover, the decline in revenues may not have an immediate effect on the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside its territory. While hurting Islamic State finances puts pressure on the organization and its state-building project, wider efforts will continue to be necessary to ultimately defeat it. Details: London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London: 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Shelf Number: 141335 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS Summary: This Research Paper seeks to explore what 'sympathy' and 'support' actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 141336 Keywords: al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Extremists Groups Islamic State Jihadists Public Opinion Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Jetter, Michael Title: Terror Per Capita Summary: Usually, studies analyzing terrorism focus on the total number of casualties or attacks in a given county. However, per capita rates of terrorism are more likely to matter for individual welfare. Analyzing 214 countries from 1970 - 2014, we show that three stylized findings are overturned in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance when investigating terror per capita. Democracy, previously associated with more casualties, emerges as a marginally negative predictor of terror per capita. A larger share of Muslims in society is, if anything, associated with less terrorism. Similar conclusions apply to language fractionalization. Details: Munich, Germany: CESifo, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 6335: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6335.html Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6335.html Shelf Number: 141338 Keywords: Islam Muslims Terrorism

Author: Rueppel, Patrick Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe Summary: Countering violent extremism and terrorism has been a top priority of governments in Asia and Europe for many years. Terrorist cells posed a severe threat to home security, even before the emergence of Daesh. However, as a consequence of Asian and European citizens joining Daesh, terrorists have been able to establish networks among fighters from both regions. It has thus become imperative that governments from Asia and Europe enhance their collaboration and coordination in all dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper, no. 4: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Shelf Number: 145585 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: Boko Haram's rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women's economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 242: Accessed march 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 141379 Keywords: Boko Haram Female Terrorists Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violence Against Women, Girls

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram Summary: Vigilante groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad play a major role in the fight against Boko Haram, but their presence raises concerns. They make military operations less blunt and more effective and have reconnected these states somewhat with many of their local communities, but they have also committed abuses and become involved in the war economy. In Nigeria in particular, vigilantism did much to turn an anti-state insurgency into a bloodier civil war, pitting Boko Haram against communities and leading to drastic increases in violence. As the conflict continues to evolve, so will vigilantes. They are enmeshed with high politics, especially in Nigeria, and in local intercommunal relations, business operations and chiefdoms. Their belief that they should be rewarded will need to be addressed, and it is also important for the Lake Chad basin states to address the common gap in community policing, particularly in rural areas. To ensure vigilantes are not a future source of insecurity, these states will each need to devise their own mix of slowly disbanding and formalising and regulating them. Vigilantism, the recourse to non-state actors to enforce law and order (of a sort), has a history in the Lake Chad region. Colonial powers there relied, to a substantial degree, on local traditional chiefs and their retinues. The multi-faceted crisis in governance and decline in services among the Lake Chad states since the 1980s gave rise to new vigilante groups. The law and order challenges vigilantes tried to address were a factor in the formation and growth of Boko Haram, itself an attempt to provide regulation and guidance. The vigilante fight against Boko Haram started in 2013, in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the insurgency's epicentre, under the twin pressure of mounting jihadist violence and security force retaliation. The Joint Task Force (JTF), led by the Nigerian army, quickly realised the vigilantes’ potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower and set out to help organise it, with the assistance of local and traditional authorities. Operating under the unofficial but revealing name of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), vigilantes were essential in flushing Boko Haram out of the city, then began replicating throughout the state. The official use of vigilantes to fight the movement spread further in Nigeria, then to Cameroon in 2014 and Chad in 2015, where the groups are known as comités de vigilance. Niger has been more cautious, partly because of past struggles with armed groups and because it has not needed them as much. Vigilantes have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in Niger to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in Nigeria. For the region’s overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. They have made the military response more targeted and more efficient, but their mobilisation also provoked retribution by Boko Haram against their communities and contributed to the massive levels of civilian casualties in 2014 and 2015. Paradoxically, this, too, has favoured regional governments’ strategy of pushing civilians away from the jihadists. As the insurgency splinters and falls back on more discrete guerrilla operations and terror attacks, however, the time has come to measure the risks posed by such a massive mobilisation of vigilantes (they claim to be about 26,000 in Borno state alone). Their compensation demands will have to be addressed, especially if authorities consider offering deals to Boko Haram militants to lay down their weapons. In the longer term, vigilantes may become political foot soldiers, turn to organised crime or feed communal violence. Vigilantism can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 244: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Chad URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Shelf Number: 141380 Keywords: Boko Haram Jihadists Terrorism Vigilantes Vigilantism

Author: Marks, Monica Title: ISIS and Nusra in Turkey: Jihadist recruitment and Ankara's response Summary: Turkey's commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has come under scrutiny since the group’s rise in early 2014. Critics, including senior members of the United States and European Union administrations, have alleged Ankara adopted an open door policy to jihadists, making the country a "jihadist highway" through which foreign fighters flowed easily into and out of Iraq and Syria.1 In 2015 the US and EU acknowledged improvement in Turkish cooperation against ISIS.2 Yet both actors continue to doubt if Ankara’s will to fight ISIS matches its determination to subdue the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or its commitment to constitutionally enshrine the presidential system sought by president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.In the midst of these conversations, comparatively few studies have examined jihadist recruitment within Turkey – the push and pull factors spurring Turkish citizens to join jihadist extremist groups in Iraq and Syria or Ankara's attempts to dissuade them. These are critical issues: Turkish citizens claiming ISIS membership perpetrated three of the five major attacks linked to ISIS in Turkey, killing nearly 150 and injuring approximately 650 persons since 2015.3 Turkish citizens may have provided logistical aid to Russian, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz ISIS members who perpetrated the June 28, 2016 attack at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport, which killed another forty-five and injured over 230 persons. Beyond local sleeper cells potentially supporting Turkish and foreign jihadists, veterans of jihad are likely to be more lethal operatives.4 This means Turkey may face increasingly dangerous blowback as ISIS positions are squeezed in Iraq and Syria and Turkish fighters return home. This report highlights core contours of jihadist recruitment in Turkey and unpacks key push-pull factors that motivate individuals to fight with jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. It concludes by offering insight into how Turkey's government is framing the problem. The report draws on leading research about Turkish fighter recruitment, first-hand examination of Turkish language jihadist propaganda from relevant groups, and face-to-face conversations with representatives of the Turkish government. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2017 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ISDJ4677_Turkey_R1_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Turkey URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ISDJ4677_Turkey_R1_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 144449 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Jihadist Recruitment Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Barzegar, Abbas Title: Civic Approaches to Confronting Violent Extremism: Sector Recommendations and Best Practices Summary: Given the continued rise of transnational and domestic terrorism, countering the appeal of extremist ideologies and organizations is increasingly becoming a top policy priority for governments around the world. Crucial to challenging extremist ideology and violence is the role of civil society organizations that are operating in this highly contested ideational and social space. After years of unfruitful government-led strategic communications campaigns, policymakers are now focusing on empowering credible voices at the grassroots level to expand their communications reach among individuals and communities vulnerable to the appeal of violent extremism. Yet, while U.S. and European governments shift towards prioritizing a surrogate strategy for combatting extremist propaganda, there is very little understanding of the efficacy of counter-ideological civil society initiatives already operating in this space. As concerns about violent extremism grow, there is a troubling knowledge gap between those operating at the grassroots, community level and in government and law enforcement agencies. This report aims to fill that gap by highlighting best practices and identifying areas of vulnerability in CSO and private sector campaigns against extremism. We have convened major non-governmental, civil society groups and private sector actors operating in the anti-extremist violence and propaganda space to identify and scope current best practices and expertise in the areas of (a) building resilience amongst communities to deflect the rise of extremism and (b) developing counter-narratives, alternative narratives and strategic communications. The closed-door workshops and follow up interviews helped to map the sector, facilitating clarity regarding best practices, shared challenges, and sector and policy-specific recommendations. The findings outline successful ideological efforts to counter extremist ideology, while identifying current gaps, potential future developments, and opportunities for collaboration across regions and sectors. The enclosed organizational profiles and findings outline a range of counter-ideological programs, projects and activities operating across both Europe and the US. Technological platforms have become a crucial space for both extremist and alternative messaging, operating in between civil society, extremists and governments. This report also includes input from industry stakeholders operating in this space, as they play a crucial role in negotiating how content is accessed and delivered in the global public sphere. By way of conclusion, specific sector and policy recommendations are offered to move towards a holistic, civil society-led, multi-sector approach to confronting violent extremism. Details: London: Institute for Security Dialogue, 2016. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2017 at: http://tcv.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Civic-Approaches-Sept-8-2016-Digital-Release.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://tcv.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Civic-Approaches-Sept-8-2016-Digital-Release.pdf Shelf Number: 144453 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Title: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2017 Summary: his yearbook looks at those areas around the world where terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) are in greatest focus. Each chapter examines CT developments in 2016, including the terrorist threat being faced and how governments and others have approached CT through both policy and operations. Countries and regions covered include Australia, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Turkey, UK, USA, Canada, Africa, Russia and China. Through this first Counterterrorism Yearbook, in what will be an annual publication, we aim to promote understanding and contribute to shared knowledge of CT. The authors of individual pieces are Anthony Bergin, Jacinta Carroll, Colin Clarke, Michael Clarke, Virginia Comolli, Greg Fealy, Fadi Hakura, Peter Jennings, Shashank Joshi, Lydia Khalil, Joseph Chinyong Liow, Olga Oliker, Raffaello Pantucci, Thomas Renard, Vern White, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institiute: ASPI, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/counterterrorism-yearbook-2017/ASPI-Counterterrorism-YB2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144681 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism National Security Terrorism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts Summary: Why GAO Did This Study - Violent extremism - generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically - motivated acts of violence - has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi-agency efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-300: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Shelf Number: 144734 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Schomerus, Mareike Title: Countering violent extremism: Topic guide Summary: Definitions and concepts There is no consensus on what violent extremism is and how best to prevent or counter it. The term 'violent extremism' has become a catch-all for a number of phenomena, and there is considerable variation in how terminology is used. Radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism are often used interchangeably, even though they describe different processes. The term violent extremism conflates belief and use of force. Critics also see the use of 'extremist' as always politically motivated: it can be used to denounce those that threaten the political status quo. Its use to describe primarily Islamist groups has obscured the fact that extremist beliefs and support for violence are found across different cultures, religions, and political situations. More attention is now being paid to, for example, right-wing or left-wing violent extremism. The breadth of definitions and debate may offer an opportunity for more creative policy and programme engagement. However, it can also encourage ad hoc policymaking. What we know about violent extremism Rigorous empirical research that would allow conclusive statements on violent extremism is rare, so extremist violence tends to be explained through untested theories. Political interests may also inform an explanation or definition. Causes of violent extremism are often divided into 'push' and 'pull' factors. This overlooks links between them, however, and can lead to over-generalisation. 'Individual' and 'community' factors are more useful categories - though still interconnected. Factors at the individual level include:  Personal relationships: These are important in spreading or reinforcing extremist ideas, and a radicalising peer group can provide a sense of belonging.  Beliefs, values and convictions: Extremist beliefs can be religious, spiritual, moral, or political and tend to express the conviction that a group, a way of life, or a political system needs to be challenged or destroyed. The perception of being denied recognition at a collective and personal level is considered critical.  Manipulation: Manipulation by extremist groups happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors. Whether there is a causal relationship between access to information (including to social media) and extremism is under-researched. This also challenges counter-approaches that use media strategies.  Trauma and humiliation: How emotions of humiliation and betrayal result in the reproduction of violence is a topic in urgent need of research. Factors at the community level include:  History and narratives: Legacies of oppression, subjugation, and interference by dominant powers matter. Sharing an oppression narrative with a community can create a sense of belonging in a marginalised situation.  Rejection of an external system: Externally imposed or international systems that are associated with injustice and humiliation can create resistance that can turn violent.  Governance: Poor/unjust governance can promote acceptance of an extremist group. Failure of a government to deliver services may enable violent extremists to establish safe havens.  Business and crime: Commercial interests can drive violent behaviour. Some extremist groups act as credit institutions where no others are available.  Marginalisation and lack of choices: Violence can be seen as a way of gaining more choices, an audible political voice, or a stronger economic position. Those who join violent extremist groups come from diverse backgrounds and arrive via different paths. Violent extremism is not the consequence of a long-term political or religious 'maturation'. There is no straightforward link between violent extremism and religious faith or specific practices. Many of those radicalising have only a faint grasp of the holy texts of the religion they are purportedly defending. This highlights that a belief - which can be a strong driver of violence - is not to be equated with a religious faith based on the interpretation of scriptures. A large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan found neither religious practice nor support for political Islam was related to support for violent extremist groups. A direct link between education and specific attitudes has not been established: lack of education does not cause extremist views. Neither radicalisation nor state collapse necessarily leads to violent extremism. Some scholars argue that in a situation of collapse it is in fact more difficult for extremist ideologies to gain traction. Violent extremism involves local, regional and international dimensions, so strategies to tackle it are needed at different levels. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 144892 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Sayigh, Yezid Title: Dilemmas of Reform: Policing in Arab Transitions Summary: Struggles over the security sector have been central to the politics of every Arab state that has undergone transition in the wake of armed conflict or political upheaval since the early 1990s. And wherever pre-transition elite coalitions have been neither forged anew nor replaced, security sectors no longer clearly serve a dominant political, social, and economic order. In these contexts, generic Western models of security sector reform cannot adequately resolve the dilemmas revealed by Arab states in transition and can do no more than alter these sectors superficially. Systemic change is needed, but the political and institutional brittleness of Arab states in transition presents a significant obstacle. Dilemmas of Policing in Arab States in Transition - Constitutional frameworks in these states are degraded and politics are polarized, which prevents the effective governance of security sectors. -State capacity is in decline, undermining the ability of policing to help uphold the social order and moral economy. - These governments' renewed emphasis on counterterrorism has intensified long-standing patterns of violent behavior and impunity in the security sector, reinforcing the sector's resistance to reform while prompting the public to acquiesce to the restoration of authoritarian practices. - Declining state resources, increasingly informal economies, and deepening illegality have raised the costs of reforming and professionalizing security sectors. These trends have also incentivized security sectors' implication in corruption and collusion with criminal networks and armed actors, stiffening the sectors' resistance to reform. - Growing numbers of citizens have turned to alternative forms of community policing and mechanisms based on customary law, but these systems are eroding, often giving way to hybrid, militia-based structures. Challenging Future - Security sector reform cannot take place unless political elites and leading institutional actors see a shared interest in it. In the absence of this, security sectors have fractured along sectarian, ethnic, and partisan lines, or have asserted their complete autonomy in pursuit of their own agendas. - Generic transparency rules and oversight frameworks recommended in conventional reform approaches cannot tackle corruption or illegal economic activity in the security sector. Arab states in transition are especially unwilling to undertake necessary but risky reforms or to impose accountability. - The rehabilitation and reform of security sectors requires a nonpartisan approach and depends on reaching a reasonable consensus on the components of the social order and the principles of an acceptable moral economy. Without this, the technical assistance and training routinely offered in conventional reform programs will be of little value. Details: Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Beirut, Lebanon: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2016. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CMEC61_Sayigh_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CMEC61_Sayigh_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145050 Keywords: Informal Economy Law Enforcement Police Reform Policing Security Forces Terrorism

Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Jihadists Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Dreher, Axel Title: The Effect of Migration on Terror - Made at Home or Imported from Abroad? Summary: We investigate whether the stock of foreigners residing in a country leads to a larger number of terrorist attacks on that country. Our instrument for the stock of foreigners relies on the interaction of two sets of variables. Variation across host-origin-dyads results from structural characteristics between the country of origin and the host, while variation over time makes use of changes in push and pull factors between host and origin countries resulting from natural disasters. Controlling for the levels of these variables themselves and fixed effects for dyads and years, the interaction provides a powerful and excludable instrument. Using data for 20 OECD host countries and 187 countries of origin over the 1980-2010 period we show that the probability of a terrorist attack increases with a larger number of foreigners living in a country. However, this scale effect is not larger than the effect domestic populations have on domestic terror. We find some evidence that terror is systematically imported from countries with large Muslim populations. A larger number of attacks against foreigners in the host country increases the risk of terror from foreigners there. We find that host country policies relating to integration and the rights of foreigners are key to fight terror - stricter policies that exclude foreigners already living in a country increase the risk of terror. High-skilled migrants are associated with a significantly lower risk of terror compared to low-skilled ones, while there is no significant difference between male and female migrants. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper Series: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6441 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6441 Shelf Number: 145310 Keywords: Migration and Crime Migration Policy Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Understanding the Rising Cult of the Suicide Bomber Summary: The sharp rise in the number of suicide bombings over the last few years is incontestable. 1982 - the year of the Hezbollah attack on the Tyre headquarters of the Israeli army - is often cited as the beginning of the 'modern age' of suicide bombings, but the relatively limited activities of the 80s and 90s cannot compare with the current scope of the problem. Before 2000, no year saw more than 22 suicide attacks worldwide. In 2015, there were at least 600. Over the last five years of AOAV's Explosive Weapons Monitoring Project (EWMP), which records data on explosive weapon usage worldwide according t0 English-language news sources, suicide bombings have consistently caused high levels of civilian harm. In total, 1,191 incidents were recorded across the 2011-2015 period, resulting in 31,589 civilian deaths and injuries. This is an average of 27 civilians killed or injured per incident. Of the ten worst incidents recorded by AOAV over the five-year period, five were suicide bombings - a figure only matched by airstrikes. In the same period, AOAV also recorded a worrisome overall trend of rising civilian deaths and injuries from suicide bombings, as well as ever-greater numbers of countries affected. In 2015, for example, suicide bombings were recorded in 21 countries - the highest number ever recorded by AOAV or by other datasets. Indeed, both 2015 and 2016 saw a considerable uptick in the overall lethality of suicide bombings. This was in spite of similar incident numbers to previous years. Suicide strikes in 2015 resulted in an average of 36 civilian deaths and injuries per incident, markedly higher than the five-year average of 28. In 2016 that figure has risen to 38. This rise can largely be attributed to an intensification of high-profile suicide bombings launched by Boko Haram and IS, but also by other armed groups involved in conflicts in Syria and Yemen, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP). In spite of the clear differences in scale and objectives between the 1980s and the post-9/11 world, this is largely not reflected in modern scholarship. Most studies on suicide bombings - even those emerging after the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Iraqi insurgency of the mid-2000s - focus on the relatively small-scale nationalist campaigns of the 80s and 90s. This is probably largely because of the comparatively large amounts of available data on these campaigns (such as the relatively comprehensive information on Palestinian suicide bombings, for example). Much of this scholarship into the drivers of suicide attacks has also focused at the individual level, ambitiously, searching for the magical last piece of the puzzle that will explain 'what makes a suicide bombe''. The overwhelming majority suicide bombers in recent years are, with a few exceptions, internationalist Islamists of a Salafi-Jihadist persuasion (or, more accurately, those who carry out bombings on behalf of such organisations). This should not be taken to mean that suicide bombing is a problem somehow 'stemming from Islam', unique to Islamists, or even particularly characteristic of Islamist political movements as a whole. What it does mean, is that these groups - rather than nationalist movements - should be the centre of current research, as well as policy and military discussions on reducing the current impact of suicide bombing. Another concern regarding recent scholarship is that most has focused on finding a single underlying cause for all uses of suicide bombing worldwide. Suicide bombing is a tactic that can be used in many different ways and for many different strategic objectives. It obviously emerges under specific conditions - but this does not mean its use will be limited to those conditions. The suicide bombing that killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 shares no more with a huge market truck bombing in 2015 Baghdad than the means of activation method. This report sets out to address the main factors that contribute significantly in creating the cult of suicide bombers in armed Salafi-Jihadi groups. Our research found that suicide bombers of Salafi-Jihadi groups blow themselves up for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the concept of martyrdom propagated by Salafi-Jihadi groups seems to appeal to many who have personal and individual desires pertaining to elevation of status. Such desires are often rooted in a sense of inferiority, whether it is socio-economic or social, and is often caused by (perceived or real) discrimination. The act is often justified as a defence of Islam, which gives the bomber both a sense of fulfilling a purpose and hero status among their peers. Religion often serves as the binding force, and usually becomes a factor towards the end of an individual's radicalisation process. These more 'ideological' motivations are, in general, most predominantly found in foreign fighter suicide bombers. Secondly, some bombers are merely motivated by the logic of the battlefield or by personal experience. For example, many Syrian suicide bombers have spent time as political prisoners or witnessed deaths caused by airstrikes, which may give them enough grievances to exert revenge. Suicide bombings might also be motivated by more pragmatic reasons, for example as a means to protect one's home community.Thirdly, the deterioration of conflict in Syria and Iraq, as well as the sectarian climate that has been developed as a result of these conflicts, has polarised the Muslim population and has undoubtedly eradicated some of the neutral positions in each conflict. This has paved the ground for more suicide attacks in the short run but also for jihadi sympathisation in the long run. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Shelf Number: 145312 Keywords: Islam Radicalization Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schouwstra, Robert Title: Strengthening the security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain Summary: In its resolution 2013/38 entitled "Combating transnational organized crime and its possible links to illicit trafficking in precious metals," the Economic and Social Council calls upon the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) to conduct a comprehensive study on the possible links between transnational organized crime, other criminal activities and illicit trafficking in precious metals. UNICRI has developed a programme to promote an international strategy to combat illicit trafficking in precious metals, in which the comprehensive study requested in ECOSOC resolution 2013/38 is the major component of an Assessment Phase to be followed by an Operational Phase. An Expert Meeting on "Promoting an international strategy to combat illicit trafficking in precious metals," organised by UNICRI in September 2015 in Turin (Italy), allowed the collection of experts' views on the issues and challenges that needed to be addressed and emphasized in the study. The present technical report aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the current trends related to precious metals trafficking, in particular it focuses on the precious metals supply chain, the different threats and challenges hanging over this market - including the involvement of organised crime groups and associated criminal activities - as well as the regulatory frameworks and initiatives in place to guarantee the integrity of the supply chain. The knowledge acquired throughout this report is used to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to address the challenges. A series of recommendations concerning the implementation of an international strategy to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in precious metals are included in the assessment. The report is intended to address the following research questions and sub-questions: - What is the extent of illicit trafficking in precious metals? - Is illicit trafficking in precious metals linked to transnational organized crime and other associated criminal activities? - Is illicit trafficking in precious metals linked to terrorist activities? - What are the vulnerabilities of the precious metals supply chain? - How can illicit trafficking in precious metals be prevented and countered? - What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing initiatives? Details: Torino - Italy: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2016. 123p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 6, 2017 at: http://files.unicri.it/PM_draft_onlinev.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://files.unicri.it/PM_draft_onlinev.pdf Shelf Number: 145328 Keywords: Illicit Trafficking Natural Resources Organized Crime Precious Metals Supply Chain Security Supply Chains Terrorism Trafficking in Metals

Author: Zakaria, Rafia Title: Hate and Incriminate: The U.S. Election, Social Media, and American Muslims Summary: In the grim days following the mass shooting in Orlando, Florida, news commentator and retired Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters appeared on Fox News, saying: "Not all Muslims are terrorists, but virtually all terrorists are Muslim." Peters's statement represents the sort of venomous rhetoric that has emerged all too often this election. Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has put an immigration ban on Muslims at the core of his nativist pitch to voters, alleging that American Muslims and mosques are knowingly harboring terrorists. While many Americans, including President Obama, have spoken out against Trump's characterization of American Muslims as terrorists, there has been little opposition to the premise that all terrorists are Muslims. The prevalence of Islamophobia has been coupled with a selective definition of terror under US law, contributing to the belief that all terrorists are Muslims and hence that all Muslims be viewed with suspicion, justifiably hated, excoriated, and even banned. At the same time, amplification by social media reinforces hostile political rhetoric, making legislative reform that protects Muslims as effectively as the rest of the population more difficult. This paper dissects the premise that terror is a particularly Muslim problem and analyzes the key role that social media is playing in this issue. The paper begins with a quantitative snapshot of both antiMuslim and anti-Islamophobic Google searches and statements made on social media. It then moves to a qualitative analysis of the low rates of reporting and prosecution of hate crimes against Muslims, paying particular attention to differing standards of proof required for these prosecutions. The second section looks at terror prosecutions of Muslims, noting how speech - and especially online speech - is treated very differently by courts when it involves Muslim American defendants and the mere possibility of terror connections. In paying particular attention to prosecutions under the Material Support for Terrorism Statute, we note how concerns raised in the prosecutorial context of hate crimes (such as requirements of intent and purposefulness) are summarily discarded when they arise in relation to terrorism cases. Details: New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism Columbia Journalism School, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/US%20Election%2C%20Social%20Media%2C%20and%20American%20Muslims%20%28Zakaria%29.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/US%20Election%2C%20Social%20Media%2C%20and%20American%20Muslims%20%28Zakaria%29.pdf Shelf Number: 145455 Keywords: Discrimination Hate Crimes Media Muslims Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Wazir, Burhan Title: Fear and the Ballot Box: How Political and Media Responses to Terrorism Influence Elections Summary: Cities like New York, Madrid, London, Paris, and Mumbai have long been home to protests, riots, and wars. As recent terrorist attacks have shown, cities can also turn into theaters of violence and high-profile targets of terrorist actions. These events exert pressure on both the media - who must quickly report on the incidents while providing accuracy, context, and analysis - and politicians, who are bound to enact new laws and security measures. And now, as social media has become pervasive, citizens across the world are active participants in the media when these acts occur, not just a passively consuming audience. The purpose of this paper is to examine how actions taken by politicians and members of the media have shaped recent elections in the wake of acts of terrorism and how the growth of social media platforms and web-based news has become part of the picture. One disturbing aspect of the current fight against terrorism is the disintegration of previously defined margins separating times of war from times of peace and civilians from combatants. While civilians have previously been frequently killed in wars - the bombing of Dresden in 1945 is just one example - they are usually nominally protected. Terrorism, on the other hand, deliberately exhibits no prohibition against the intentional targeting of civilians. The evolving, real-time nature of a terrorist attack also has an undeniable effect on the media, which finds itself acting as both filter and participant in the face of such violence, especially in an era when social media platforms have become a dominant new source of information for audience and journalist alike - and indeed sometimes even the attackers themselves. In the following report, I will examine four key elections - those which took place in Israel in 1996, the United States and Spain in 2004, and India in 2009 -to explore the relationship between terrorism and how it is portrayed in the media. Three of these elections took place in the wake of unique terror incidents: the 2008 siege of Mumbai, carried out by terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba; the 2004 Madrid bombings, which bore the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda; and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, which was conducted by an Israeli extremist disillusioned with the recently signed Oslo Accords. The fourth case, the 2004 election in the United States, was fought around the theme of security - the first American presidential election held since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The release of a videotaped statement directed at the American public by Al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden - known as an "October surprise" in US political shorthand - left an indelible impression on the election. Details: New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia Journalism School, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/Political%20and%20Media%20Responses%20to%20Terrorism%20%28Wazir%29.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/Political%20and%20Media%20Responses%20to%20Terrorism%20%28Wazir%29.pdf Shelf Number: 145456 Keywords: Journalism Media Politics Social Media Terrorism Voting

Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide Summary: The aim of this compendium is to provide guidance and insight for practitioners, policymakers, governments and civil society organizations in South East Asia that are interested in developing counter-narratives and alternative narratives to the messaging produced by violent extremists. The compendium will draw on international good practice and lessons learned to inform and inspire these actors to utilize the most effective methods and strategies. The compendium begins with a step-by-step approach to counter-narratives, with clear examples from South East Asia. The compendium then dives deeper into several case studies, highlighting elements of good practice from the region before presenting a detailed annex of 80 existing counter-narratives from South East Asia (Annex 3). It should be noted that the narratives and subsequent analysis of the narratives and counter-narratives contained in this report mostly focus on violent extremism of groups that claim to be Islamic, primarily because the majority of the threats posed by violent extremist groups in South East Asia fall under this category. However, this is not to say that violent extremism only relates to the above category, and there are case examples from other non-Islamic forms of violent extremism. For a more robust assessment of the threats of violent extremism in the region, refer to Annex 2: Violent Extremism in South East Asia. It is important to establish the terminology that has been adopted throughout the compendium. The term "narrative" generally refers to the story or recruitment pitch of violent extremists, whereas "counter-narrative" generally refers to the story or counter-argument utilized to reduce the appeal of violent extremism. Counter-narratives include counter-arguments as well as positive, alternative narratives and government strategic communications. The contents of this compendium rely on a number of sources: 1) research on the academic and policy literature conducted by the author; 2) an expert workshop on "South East Asia Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)" hosted by Hedayah and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia in March 2016 and the subsequent report;1 and 3) a consultation process on draft versions of the compendium with regional experts and policymakers from the region. Details: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Hedayah Center, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Shelf Number: 145466 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Buchanan-Clarke, Stephan Title: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn Summary: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns - the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE. 1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present. Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups: 1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) 2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali). 3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism. Details: Afrobarometer, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Shelf Number: 145467 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Countering-Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Women and Violent Radicalization: Research Report Summary: Highlights - Women are victims of all forms of violent radicalism, but can also be participants, or active accomplices, of violence in the name of an ideology. - Pursuant to the mandate in the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan, Radicalization in Quebec: Act, Prevent, Detect and Live Together, the Secretariat a la condition feminine (SCF) and the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) were asked to collaborate in defining the angle and scope of the present study, whose purpose is to document the differentiated radicalization factors among women and men in Quebec. The CSF and SCF also drew on the expertise of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) for empirical information. - Radicalization leading to violence is a complex process whereby people adopt a system of extreme beliefs and a willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence, to promote an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation. - Throughout history, women have been involved in violent radicalism, whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia. The violent radicalization of women is not a new phenomenon. - Despite the historical presence of women in violent extremist movements, and episodes of political violence perpetrated by them, violent radicalism is a marginal phenomenon among women in comparison to men. - Often viewed through the distorting lens of gender stereotypes and a presumption of passivity, women who join radical groups, or who engage directly in political violence, should not be thought of exclusively as victims, since they are also active participants. To understand their choices, we must explore the particular paths they have taken. The scholarly literature and most media reports have long seen radical women as manipulated and subservient to men, who are seen as the "true" drivers and actors of violent radical movements. - The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated, controlled by romantic urges, dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency. It also contributes to the belief that women who are recent immigrants are by definition more submissive toward men than women who are not. In contrast, a postcolonial approach avoids this simplistic, erroneous view of immigrant women by considering the perspective of those directly concerned. Details: Montreal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Shelf Number: 145556 Keywords: Extremist Groups Immigrant Women Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Exit Strategies Summary: This approach involves setting up de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation), or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the very best of prevention efforts, some individuals still go on to become (violent) extremists. While en route to that stage, they may fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and - in some cases - of judicial and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual - perhaps after finishing a prison sentence, or when he or she is tired of the movement or is pushed by loved ones to change - needs to be re-integrated into society. For successful re-integration into society it is important to offer de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to prisoners charged with violent extremist offences . But "Exit" programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different advanced stages of the radicalisation process: from those that have strong views and legitimise the use of violence, those aligned with extremist groups but who have not yet undertaken violent extremist activities, to those that have themselves executed violent extremist or even terrorist attacks. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145563 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Family support Summary: This approach aims to support families vulnerable to and dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism. The role of families in the process or radicalisation has become central to the debate on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Many believe that one of the keys to stopping the process at an early stage lies behind the door of the family home. Proponents of this approach believe that building resilience and creating awareness for parents and other family members will mean that young people are better protected from extremist influences. In reality, families may be both helpful and harmful in radicalisation processes. A distinction should be made between families' intentions and their behaviour. Family members may sometimes do more harm than good because they are unsure how to talk to a relative who they may fear is becoming radicalised. Family members may also explicitly encourage a relative to take an extremist path, as they believe this is the right direction. Families can however also be the key to creating a safety net and be instrumental in helping someone leave an extremist movement and mind-set. Each scenario and family's involvement will be different and requires tailored solutions. Although we talk about families as a whole, the dynamics within families and the roles of each family member will impact radicalisation processes differently. It is therefore important to understand who constitutes the family? Who is part of this group or network of people that considers itself a family? This may differ quite substantially across different cultural backgrounds. Honorary culture within families might also play an important role in both directions. Once there is an understanding as to who is part of the family, dynamics between these individuals can be observed and analysed. For this to happen, a family's cooperation is of utmost importance. Without a family's commitment it will be very difficult for 'outsiders', whether police, family counsellors, social workers or other actors, to build trust and help build resilient family engagement. A family's connection to the wider environment (other families, the community they are part of, institutions) is also a crucial element in family support. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145567 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremism Family Engagement Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Feldstein, Michelle Title: Into the Fold: Evaluating Different Countries' Programs to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists Summary: Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country's efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state's level of repression affects that country's level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state's official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious reeducation or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country's de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country's level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country's de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state's religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists-as a practice and concept-is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2015. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145667 Keywords: De-radicalization Islamist Terrorist Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: State Coroner of New South Wales Title: Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Cafe siege: Findings and recommendations Summary: The inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Cafe siege examined the circumstances surrounding, and issues arising in relation to, the deaths of Tori Johnson, Katrina Dawson and Man Haron Monis in December 2014. The New South Wales Coroner has delivered his findings into the Lindt Cafe siege which took place in December 2014, and resulted in the deaths of three people, including the hostage-taker. The report examines the actions of the police, the interactions and exchange of information between state and federal agencies, differences between domestic sieges and terrorist sieges, hostage negotiation, use of experts such as psychiatrists and psychologists, police command and operational structures and communications system. Details: Glebe, NSW: Coroners Court of New South Wales, 2017. 495p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf Shelf Number: 145765 Keywords: Hostage Negotiations Information Sharing Police Procedures Terrorism

Author: Gaub, Florence Title: The Crime-Terrorism Nexus Summary: That there is a link between terrorism and crime is common knowledge: terrorism itself is a crime, often funded by organised criminal activity. But in the case of Daesh, the link goes much further. The organisation recruits more former criminals, and funds itself more through petty - not organised - criminal activities than other groups. Yet this also offers law enforcement officials an opportunity to pursue it from another angle beyond the usual radicalisation narrative. This requires a zeroing in on hitherto neglected petty criminals, however. Details: Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief Issue no. 10: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pdf Shelf Number: 145827 Keywords: Financing Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim Title: Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat Summary: Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60-100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to South Africa and the government's response to this challenge. Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress' National Conference in Manguang. Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around violent extremism in South Africa and the state's capacity to respond. While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups. This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa's post-apartheid experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa. Details: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, 2017: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Shelf Number: 145835 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Carroll, Jacinta Title: Manchester Arena bombing, 22 May 2017 Summary: On 22 March 2017, 52-year-old Khalid Masood (born Adrian Elms, with multiple AKAs) drove a hire car onto London's Westminster Bridge, mounted the vehicle onto the pavement and accelerated into pedestrians. Masood then drove the vehicle around permanent bollards at the end of the bridge before remounting the pavement and crashing the car. Masood abandoned the vehicle and proceeded on foot into the Houses of Parliament complex. The attack lasted 82 seconds and resulted in six deaths, including Masood's, and 49 people injured. This CT Quick Look paper highlights the key issues and assesses the relevance for affected stakeholders and Australia. It provides recommendations for government. Details: Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: CT Quick Look: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Shelf Number: 145842 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Idris, Iffat Title: Women and countering violent extremism Summary: There is no consensus on the definition of countering violent extremism (CVE), in part because there is no consensus on the definition of violent extremism (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016; Striegher, 2015). The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (UN, 2015) does not provide one because consensus could not be reached due to the political sensitivities involved. A working definition cited in Foreign Affairs that encompasses the key concepts is: 'the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives'. The idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means, but the structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled (Frazer & Nunlist, 2015). Prevention is a major aspect of CVE, aiming to get at the root causes and factors that contribute to extremism and terrorism, by engaging with individuals, communities and others. 'It is not enough to counter violent extremism - we need to prevent it' (UNESCO2). This review looks at the role that women can play in CVE, lessons from programmes on women and CVE, donor policy guidance and programming approaches, and networks supporting women and CVE. Note that 'women' refers to women and girls: this is consistent with concepts of gender equality, gender violence, and so on, which all encompass both women and girls. (Moreover perceptions of when womanhood starts vary across cultures, with some considering puberty as the point at which a girl becomes a woman.) The available literature largely comprised of government and donor agency reports, think-tank papers and grey literature. Note that some literature refers to just women and CVE, and some to women and preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For each source, the review uses the term (CVE or P/CVE) used in that source. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Helpdesk Research Report: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Shelf Number: 145907 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Romaniuk, Peter Title: Does CVE Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism Summary: As a field of policy and practice, countering violent extremism (CVE) has emerged rapidly in recent years and represents the most significant development in counterterrorism over that time. Ideologically driven violent extremists are a primary threat to national and human security in the developed and developing worlds, suggesting that, in some form or other, CVE will remain on the counterterrorism agenda in the short and medium terms. CVE stands at something of a fulcrum point. There is enough experience in "doing CVE" to expect that data about its effects and effectiveness can be gathered and analyzed; in turn, such analyses ought to inform future developments if policy is to be evidence based. This report advances this objective by asking, "Does CVE work?" It responds in four ways. First, in light of the common observation that CVE lacks coherence as a field, this report offers a brief primer on CVE, providing a definition, a typology of CVE measures, and an ideal-type policy cycle. Regularizing understanding of the field is a necessary step in improving outcomes and enhancing the ability to determine what works. Second, this report reviews publicly available evaluation research on CVE to derive lessons from CVE efforts. On the basis of the data on hand, these lessons pertain to initial efforts by governments to engage communities for the purpose of CVE. They are know your audience; avoid stigmatizing communities; send clear messages (e.g., so that "soft power" CVE measures are not conflated with or impacted by more traditional counterterrorism tools); and engage broadly and partner strategically. In part, practitioners learned these lessons through evaluation; but other mechanisms of policy learning, especially professional contacts, were likely more important. Third, this report finds that governments have begun to integrate knowledge from their initial forays into the CVE space. A cluster of governments have completed the "CVE policy cycle" formally or informally, and this report distinguishes "first wave" and "second wave" CVE initiatives on this basis. Second-wave measures converge around a series of refined initiatives at the community level, alongside a stronger focus on individual-level interventions. Also, second-wave programs are more likely to target those most at risk of committing extremist violence and not simply those that may be sympathetic to extremist ideas-a welcome development. Yet, second-wave programs present a range of challenges; and this report recommends that practitioners-governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)-develop ways to institutionalize policy learning on CVE, including through committing to evaluation research. In particular, development of horizontal networks for NGO CVE practitioners should be a priority. Fourth, this report surveys the state of play regarding the process of evaluating CVE measures. In a broadly defined field, there is some diversity within the modest body of completed, publicly available evaluation research. Practitioners increasingly exhibit an awareness of the importance of evaluation, and as a result, long-standing rhetorical support for CVE evaluation is beginning to translate into practice. Ideally, future evaluation research will be publicly available to facilitate comparison and analysis. In sum, this report reflects critically on a field that has risen to prominence in a manner disproportional to its achievements. Practitioners in government and NGOs, among others, should use it to inform their understanding of CVE and guide their responses in a systematic and evidence-based fashion. The record offers some pointers for more effective programming going forward but commends moderate expectations overall. Among this report's key findings: 1. More precision and specificity are needed when defining CVE and classifying and evaluating CVE programming. 2. Contextualized assessments and stakeholder consultations are critical to effective programming but remain underutilized. Ongoing investments in gathering and analyzing data need to be sustained and increased. 3. Community engagement on CVE can yield negative unintended consequences. To succeed, it requires integrative, broad-based state-civil society relationships in which governments and NGOs engage broadly and partner strategically. 4. Networks among CVE-relevant NGO partners need more investment and nurturing. NGOs face several barriers in self-initiating CVE measures, including resource constraints and knowledge gaps, and peer-to-peer contacts on this issue are underdeveloped. 5. On evaluation, although there is an absence of an elegant, agreed-on set of metrics, practitioners should build measurement opportunities into programming cycles. As much as possible, future evaluation research should be publicly available to facilitate comparison and analysis. 6. CVE has emerged very quickly but is maturing, and it will be here in some form for the foreseeable future. Resources allocated to CVE are modest compared to other, more traditional counterterrorism tools, such as military force and law enforcement. Experience with CVE commends moderate expectations. For CVE to be sustainable and effective, practitioners should integrate past lessons into current and future programming. Details: Goshen, Indiana: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145941 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States Summary: In March 2017, a white supremacist from Maryland, James Harris Jackson, traveled to New York City with the alleged intention of launching a series of violent attacks on black men to discourage white women from having relationships with black men. After several days, Jackson chose his first victim, a 66-year old black homeless man, Timothy Caughman. Jackson later allegedly admitted that he had stabbed Caughman with a small sword he had brought with him, describing the murder as a "practice run." Right Wing Terror Incident 1993-2017 by Movement However, after the killing, Jackson's angry energy dissipated and he turned himself over to the authorities. A week later, New York prosecutors announced that they were charging him with second-degree murder as a hate crime and also with a state charge of terrorism. Jackson's aborted killing spree was a shocking example of right-wing terror in the United States but it was unfortunately far from an isolated example. For over a century and a half, since 'burning Kansas' of the 1850s and the Ku Klux Klan of the 1860s, right-wing terrorism has been an unwelcome feature of the American landscape. Yet today, many people are barely aware that it exists and most people don't recognize its frequency or scope. Far more attention in recent years has been given to the threat of homegrown radical Islamic terror - a danger that has generated such horrific acts as the Orlando and San Bernardino shooting sprees. Yet the very real specter of radical Islamic terror in the United States has existed alongside an equally serious threat of terror from right-wing extremist groups and individuals. Both movements have generated shooting sprees, bombings, and a wide variety of plots and conspiracies. Both pose threats so significant that to ignore either would be to invite tragedy. To illustrate the threat of right-wing terrorism in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism has compiled a list of 150 right-wing terrorist acts, attempted acts, plots and conspiracies from the past 25 years (1993-2017). These include terrorist incidents from a wide variety of white supremacists, from neo-Nazis to Klansmen to racist skinheads, as well as incidents connected to anti-government extremists such as militia groups, sovereign citizens and tax protesters. The list also includes incidents of anti-abortion terror as well as from other, smaller right-wing extremist movements. AD's Center on Extremism defines terrorism as a pre-planned act or attempted act of significant violence by one or more non-state actors in order to further an ideological, social or religious cause, or to harm perceived opponents of such causes. Significant violent acts can include bombings or use of other weapons of mass destruction, assassinations and targeted killings, shooting sprees, arsons and firebombings, kidnappings and hostage situations and, in some cases, armed robberies. Domestic terrorism consists of acts or attempted acts of terrorism in which the perpetrators are citizens or permanent residents of the country in which the act takes place. The right-wing terrorist incidents in ADL's list include those that best fit the above criteria. They are drawn from the much larger pool of violent and criminal acts that American right-wing extremists engage in every year, from hate crimes to deadly encounters with law enforcement. Right-wing extremists annually murder a number of Americans, but only some of those murders occur in connection with terrorist acts. There are, after all, hundreds of thousands of adherents of right-wing extremist movements in the United States and all such movements have some degree of association with criminal activity. No one should think, therefore, that the incidents listed here represent the breadth of right-wing violence in the U.S. But, as acts of terrorism, they do show right-wing movements at their most vicious and ambitious. Details: New York: ADL, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR_5154_25YRS%20RightWing%20Terrorism_V5.pdf Shelf Number: 145981 Keywords: Extremist Violence Extremists Islamic Terrorism Radicalism Terrorism Violence

Author: Shtuni, Adrian Title: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo Summary: What started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the Syrian regime escalated in the five years that followed into an intractable sectarian war that has engulfed both Syria and Iraq, drawn in a suite of regional actors and world powers, and attracted an unprecedented number of volunteer combatants from more than a hundred countries. Although so-called foreign fighters have been a common feature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and Dagestan, Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, their flow to Syria and Iraq is the largest influx of its kind in recent history. More than 36,500 individuals, including at least 6,600 from Western countries, are estimated to have traveled to the conflict theater since 2012, mostly to join designated terrorist organizations operating in the region. Not long after the bloody secessionist wars that brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western Balkans became a prime source of foreign fighters for the Syrian conflict. More than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012. The significance of this number becomes apparent in the context of the combined population across these small countries of less than nineteen million. Rates of mobilization relative to the population size - particularly in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia - are far higher than in western European countries most afflicted by the phenomenon. Now that the flow of those traveling to the conflict theater has subsided - for a variety of reasons - and about 37 percent of all Kosovan nationals estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq have returned home, the task of understanding the dynamics of their radicalization has become even more critical. This is not only in regard to managing the security challenge associated with their return but also to adopting effective strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This report explores the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, focusing on the flow of foreign fighters as the most prominent symptom of a multifaceted religious militancy problem facing the country. It is important to emphasize from the outset that though the number of foreign fighters in itself represents a quasi-insignificant minority of the Kosovan society, it also constitutes merely a fraction of an extensive network of like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks. This report shines some light on that less well-understood part of the supply chain of violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Shelf Number: 146019 Keywords: Foreign Fighters Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: McCullough, Aoife Title: Understanding trajectories of radicalisation in Agadez Summary: This research aimed to examine how trajectories of radicalisation happen in Niger. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is implementing the Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI) in three areas in Niger: Agadez, Tillaberi and Diffa. An integral component of this programme involves identifying and working with youth 'at risk' of radicalisation and extremism. When thinking about a 'trajectory of radicalisation', an assessment of risk commonly plays a prominent part. This is because the most common image of radicalisation is that of linear progression. According to this perspective, certain risk factors make people vulnerable to ever-narrowing and increasingly extreme beliefs and ideologies, which then leads to support for or participation in violent extremism. Scholarship on radicalisation indicates that linearity may not be a useful way to understand trajectories of radicalisation. The literature shows that following radical ideologies does not necessarily mean that someone supports violence. Despite the lack of evidence supporting the idea that people who adopt extreme beliefs and ideologies are more likely to participate in violent extremism, the notion of the inevitable and linear progression from certain beliefs to violence remains strong. To understand progressions in beliefs, which actions actors are prepared to take to support their beliefs, and how OTI's strategy ought to respond, research was carried out in Agadez in northern Niger in October 2016. In this study, radicalisation was imagined as a dynamic process where individual and structural factors interact to produce the potential for radicalisation and violent extremism. 'Structural factors' are defined as systems of socioeconomic stratification (that is, how wealth and power are distributed), and other patterns in the relations between groups, such as how citizens relate to the state. Relations between large social groups are constantly changing, but narratives about the 'other' can establish a particular dynamic. For this reason, we examined not only the relationships between different social groups in the Agadez region but also the narratives that are produced and consumed to understand how these dynamics may evolve. To test the possibility that individual factors can predispose people to adopting radical beliefs and supporting violent extremism, we examined individual factors commonly assumed by Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes in Niger to be associated with vulnerability to radicalisation and violent extremism. These factors included age (youth), ethnicity, (un) employment, education level, degree of debt, and degree of exposure to other societies. As this is a qualitative, rather than a representative study, we can speak only about the links or their absence among the people we interviewed. To identify interviewees, researchers followed networks of influence in groups that were thought to include people who would be sympathetic to, or support, radical causes. Using such a network-based approach is useful in seeking to understand how members of defined networks influence what each believes and what type of thinking is disseminated. The networks were selected based on consultation with CVE actors and researchers in Niger and included Touareg ex-rebels, a Salafist movement (Izala), traffickers/transporters of migrants, traders (particularly those trading with Libya), youth groups (fadas) with unemployed members, civil society activists and prisoners. A Sufist network was also followed to enable comparisons with the Salafist network. We also explored what local people understood as 'radicalisation' and 'violent extremism'. Scholarship on the link between violence and beliefs is rapidly developing. For example, the perception that one's culture is under threat can narrow beliefs towards more extreme viewpoints. In the Sahel, contrasts are often drawn between what are seen as Western/secular/democratic and Islamic systems of government, with many perceiving the Western system as dominant. In the Agadez region, we sought to understand different viewpoints in relation to the concept of a 'just society', Western governance system in comparison with an Islamic system of governance and whether certain beliefs were associated with more extreme viewpoints. In the Agadez region, as in any society, there are movements that challenge the status quo by offering an alternative vision of an ideal society. Such movements could thus be called radical. Currently, the best-organized and most proactive radical movement in Agadez is the Izala religious movement, which seeks to avoid innovation in the practice of Islam and promotes a vision of society based on sharia. Details: London: Overseas Development Institute, 2017. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11404.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger URL: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11404.pdf Shelf Number: 146098 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Title: Culture in Crisis: Preserving Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones Summary: There is nothing new about the looting and destruction of cultural property. The Roman Emperor Titus looted and then razed the Jewish temple in Jerusalem, Napoleon shipped art taken during his conquests back to the Louvre, the Nazis and Soviets emptied museums and private collections, their fellow Americans have looted Native American sites. Even in peacetime, monuments like the Elgin marbles and the Pergamon Altar have found their way into foreign hands, often claiming to provide protection. The monuments and works of art that remain intact and in place from prior civilizations are only those that happened to survive. Twenty-first-century technology has, however, changed the scale and quality of the looting and destruction. When the Islamic State took over a large part of Syria and Iraq in 2014, it organized a massive effort to loot artifacts that could be transported and destroyed what it could of the rest. The objective was two-fold: to demonstrate disdain for the culture that preceded Islam and to enrich the Islamic State's financial resources. Modern technology, including high explosives and earth-moving equipment, and global transportation networks made this possible on a scale not previously attempted. Many thousands of sites were looted and their artifacts sold into a world market, major monuments were destroyed, and many millions of dollars flowed into Islamic State coffers. This appalling contemporary evolution of an age-old practice has attracted a good deal of public attention in the United States, Europe, and beyond. The 2001 Taliban destruction of the Bamian Buddhas and the looting of the Baghdad Museum after the 2004 invasion had sensitized Europeans and Americans, but they were still unprepared for the systematic, high-profile destruction that the Islamic State indulges in. The desire to "do something" was immediate and compelling. What to do is far less clear. That was the issue the Antiquities Coalition raised in December 2015 with six master's students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) enrolled in a practicum on "cultural racketeering and cleansing." Antiquities Coalition wanted to know about best practices for law and law enforcement in the fight against the illicit antiquities trade, including what is done that works for nature conservation and historical preservation. Could easements or buying land be used to protect archaeological sites? How does the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) compare with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property? How can the UNESCO Convention be improved and strengthened? For those of us who live and work in the U.S., American government policy is an area of particular concern. Through the use of bilateral agreements, the U.S. has imposed import restrictions on archaeological material from 16 countries, in an effort to reduce the incentive for pillage by discouraging trade in undocumented cultural objects. What effect have these memoranda of understanding had on the antiquities market? On imports into the U.S.? The U.S. has not designated a lead agency for combatting the illicit antiquities trade. Duties currently fall variously to the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, and others. How can the government develop an internal reporting structure to better address interagency coordination - especially as antiquities trafficking relates to terrorist financing? International peacekeeping forces, whether through the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations like NATO, could do more to protect cultural resources in times of instability. Have archaeological sites, museums, or other heritage sites ever been included in a peacekeeping mandate? Are there parallels for the protection of natural resources or even similar economic resources? What is the process for inclusion? The SAIS students divvied up these issues and worked through the spring 2016 semester to elucidate them, with guidance from their Antiquities Coalition "client." This small volume contains the results of their work, which was presented both to the Antiquities Coalition and publicly at SAIS in April 2016. We plan some further work in spring 2017 on these and related issues, in a practicum devoted to the broader issue of "Dealing With Extremists." The already ongoing implosion of the Islamic State and its control of territory should not lull us into forgetting the cultural destruction it has wrought. We should do what we can to beef up efforts to counter cultural racketeering and cleansing. The trade will continue with objects already looted and no doubt grow with the next insurgent onslaught. "Never Again" is a motto all too often observed in the breach. There will be a next time. We need to be ready for it. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University; and The Antiquities Coalition, 2017. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Shelf Number: 146167 Keywords: Antiquities Archaeological Sites Conflict Zones Cultural Property Extremist Groups Islamic State Looting Pillaging Terrorism

Author: U.S. Office of the Director of National Intellilgence Title: Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Summary: This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. The process began with meetings and resulted in many conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic is very complex and often characterized differently by the various participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the "as is," or current picture, of the operating environment for the IC's key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The next step-one that may be even more complex and challenging - is to move beyond the "as is" descriptions and work toward a vision of the "should be." Challenges aside, we owe it to the American people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Shelf Number: 146176 Keywords: Homeland Security National Intelligence National Security Terrorism

Author: Robinson, Eric Title: What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen? Summary: Why do some individuals become terrorists? Why do some choose to travel overseas to become foreign fighters and others remain home to engage in political violence? More than academic, the answers to these questions inform a central component of U.S. national security strategy: countering violent extremism. This report addresses the topic of radicalization - or individual motivations to engage in political violence-in Yemen. This report uses data from focus groups and a national survey conducted during the spring of 2016. Yemen is in the midst of a civil war. In the wake of the collapse of the government of Tunisia in 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets in major cities to protest the reelection of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After protracted negotiations by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was Saleh's vice president, took over the presidency in February 2012. By then, the internal strife had gained momentum. The Houthis, who had fought several wars against Saleh's forces, had used the unrest to expand from their stronghold in the Sa'ada governorate. They eventually seized the capital of Sana'a in September 2014. President Hadi and his forces retreated to Aden and southern Yemen, but the Houthis pushed south and assaulted Aden's international airport in March 2015. The civil war had begun. More than 10,000 people have died in Yemen's civil war. Nearly 2.2 million-out of a total population of 27 million-are internally displaced and an additional 200,000 are refugees overseas. Various nonstate armed groups exist. Some fight with the aforementioned Houthi movement. Others have joined the local al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Still, others are associated with the Islamic State. These armed groups fight against one another as well as the Yemeni military forces and those of the Arab coalition. With such a widespread conflict, it would be easy to understand the motivations of those who are sympathetic to, or become involved in, political violence. But rather than focus on support for political violence per se, the report looks at the other side of the coin - why individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen. It argues that the more effective approach to countering violent extremism is to reinforce a propensity toward nonviolence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Shelf Number: 146245 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Islamic Radicalization in Belgium Summary: Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile a ground for Islamic radicalization? This paper points to the low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community. These poor demographic realities of the Belgian Muslim community might be significant in providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic parties and organizations to influence and recruit. This paper analyzes Islamic radicalization in Belgium. The first part of this paper examines Belgian-Muslim demographics, including population, integration, political participation, and organization. Then, Belgian Islamic radicalization is examined through the theoretical frameworks of both McCauley and Moskalenko and Social Movement Theory. To conclude, this paper considers governmental responses and recommendations for future preventative actions. Details: Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Shelf Number: 146257 Keywords: Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Fainberg, Alisa Title: Spread the Word: Russia Social Media on the Service of Jihad Summary: The phenomenon of terrorists using the Internet for their purposes is not new: online activity of terrorist groups and terrorist individuals is registered since the late 1990s and thereafter underwent essential changes. Such an interest is caused first of all by those apparent advantages terrorists gained from the Internet: freedom from traditional media limitations, decentralization and safety, access to wider audience, etc. The engagement with cyberspace also changed the basic principles of communication within terrorist groups: from chain network to "all to all" communication, which in turn influenced many aspects of terrorist activity, such as propaganda, fundraising, etc. At the beginning, terrorist groups dealt with websites, and later on expanded their presence to forums and chatrooms, which, despite their effectiveness, still remained limited in reaching wide audiences, since were not highly publicized, and on the contrary, were frequently password-protected and used for inner communication. Nevertheless, there are online communication tools which were (and are) used by Al-Qaeda while planning the 9/11 terror attack and others. Also, Ayman al-Zawahiri, a successor of Osama bin Laden, places high emphasis on electronic warfare and "jihad of the bayan" (message). Today, due to such factors such as technological development and radical changes in the core of online communications, one can observe two main trends in terrorist online activity: grasping of popular social media networks and the dark web. While the dark web (as well as password-protected websites and forums) are used by terrorists mainly as a safe haven and for inner communication, mainstream websites and social media networks allow terrorist groups and individuals to turn their activities into borderless and cosmopolitan ones within the cyberspace and to get unparalleled tools for reaching out to as wide an audience as possible. Communication technologies used for planning and coordinating jihadists' actions, form the basis for a transition to a less organized structures and enhance the capacity of small terrorist groups, which are able to carry out their operations in a decentralized manner. Social media networks have become an integral part of jihadi groups' modus operandi and are used for the following purposes: offensive activities (gathering information on potential targets, threats of attacks, cyber attacks, etc.) operational uses (inner and outer communication, propaganda, radicalization, recruitment, fundraising, etc.) Despite the fact that the Islamic State group (ISIS) was obviously not the first terror organization to employ social media networks, the rise of ISIS has definitely highlighted the phenomenon, and tens (if not hundreds) of academic and media analytic papers were written on this subject. Indeed, without any doubts one may claim that it was the Islamic State (ISIS) group, who made the quantum leap and propelled jihadi involvement in online communication to the next level. Not least thanks to using internet technologies, ISIS has changed the very patterns of jihadi propaganda, and the full impact of these changes is still to be assessed. The group had developed a multidivisional media empire, which includes various divisions with certain specializations, such as al-Furkan Foundation, al-Hayat Media Center, al-Bayan Radio, etc., as well as smaller media groups targeting specific audiences in local languages. Social media networks became an essential part of that empire. Among other features characterizing ISIS' propaganda are wide coverage of audience, high diversity of propaganda materials, and active use of the most popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., which led to unprecedented ISIS expansion in the virtual world. For example, in just one month, from 17 September 2014 to 17 October 2014, the acronym "ISIS" was mentioned in Twitter about 4,000,000 times. Advantages terrorist groups gain from social media networks stem from their very nature. Each network is used according its general dedication: YouTube for uploading video materials (statements, footage, video games announcements, etc.), Twitter for real time updating, hashtags, and, for instance, for targeting Western news media in order to receive from them immediate reaction, etc. Moreover, democratic and dialogue-oriented, social media not just pushed the limits of propaganda distribution, but contributed to creation of a new form of jihadi propaganda - a public one, which is created, developed and distributed not by the official media centers of a particular terrorist group, but by its remote followers and supporters, who act at their own discretions. Seeking to expand their presence in social media for further advantages, ISIS media centers started to search for additional local social media platforms, and in 2013 put their attention to popular Russian social media networks: VKontakte (In Contact) and Odnoklassniki (Classmates), and for a relatively short period (compared to its presence on Facebook and Twitter) "occupied" these two with its propaganda activities. There are a number of pull factors which could explain such an attention of ISIS to the Runet (the Russian segment of Internet). First of all, Russian foreign fighters comprise a significant part of jihadists combating in Syria, and consequently are significant targets of ISIS propaganda. Secondly, until a certain point in 2014, Russian social media were hardly censored and security services did not initiate any measures against jihadi online activity in Vkontakte (VK) and Odnoklassniki (OK), which became another pulling factor for ISIS to turn its attention towards the Russian internet. This paper will examine the development of jihadist usage of Russian social media in the context of the branched system of ISIS' Russian-language media, the specifics of the message oriented toward Russian-speaking audience and translated through the platforms, as well as countering actions made by both government and private companies for a better understanding of the phenomenon. Details: Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1987/russia-social-media-on-the-service-of-jihad Year: 2017 Country: Russia URL: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1987/russia-social-media-on-the-service-of-jihad Shelf Number: 146266 Keywords: Islamist STate Jihadist Groups Social Media Social Networks Terrorism Terrorist Propaganda

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Addressing the Threat Posed by IEDS: National, Regional and Global Initiatives Summary: This report seeks to respond to the threat posed by IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by investigating the C-IED (Counter-IED) initiatives that are being conducted around the world. We specifically focus on three of the most-impacted regions: the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. The paper also identifies Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia and Pakistan as four additional countries that are highly impacted by IEDs and therefore warrant examination. The research was conducted over ten months and examined 39 countries in total. 227 actors engaged in C-IED throughout the regions are included in the report, whilst over 300 were examined globally in total during the course of this research. This makes this report the largest study of C-IED actors in these regions. Our research finds that C-IED initiatives vary greatly from country to country. Not only were the typical 'destroy the device', 'train the force' and 'attack the network' approaches found, but efforts that fall under the banner of counterterrorism, demining and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) featured as well. Such efforts have the ability to greatly reduce IED usage, as well as serving to disrupt the networks that use them, and consequently were essential to incorporate. As part of this research, questionnaires were sent out to actors within the C-IED field. Phone interviews were also conducted in order to understand the role of the various actors in the field and the situation in the countries in which they operate. Through the responses received, key challenges to C-IED operations were identified. These include inadequate resources, lack of awareness, lack of victim assistance programmes, and a general resistance to information sharing. The IED threat and C-IED work in these regions were examined country-by-country. The national, bilateral, regional, and international C-IED initiatives that the state was involved in, or that were seen to be operating in the state, were assessed, as well as the NGOs and private actors working on such operations in the countries. The research conducted on C-IED capacity in the Middle East showed that, whilst many of the states had received training focused on military and law enforcement, many were under-resourced. This effectively means that many states lack the equipment to adequately tackle their respective IED threat. For less-impacted states in the region, border security was understandably a top priority. Efforts to implement better border security often focused on a person-centric approach, which left customs vulnerable and allowed dual-use materials (such as fertiliser) to end up more easily in IEDs. Similarly, North Africa's C-IED efforts predominantly focused on military-based initiatives, whilst also leaving countries too under-resourced to carry out C-IED effectively. Unlike many other regions, there were some initiatives working on psychological victim assistance, an area of C-IED which often remains ignored. Other preventative measures such as terrorism financing and investigations were found to need more assistance in North Africa. Countries in the Sahel region seem to be heavily reliant on external assistance from other nation states, international actors and NGOs. However, Sahelian states also, in general, seem to embrace support and utilise resources that other regions did not. For example, they were more welcoming of assistance from neighbour states and better at integrating C-IED strategies into communities than countries in the other regions examined. The last group of nations examined included highly impacted states. Some of these nations have been impacted by IEDs for a long time, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cooperation is essential between these states to prevent the use of the weapons in both countries. Knowing this, Afghanistan has been a strong advocate for cooperative techniques to tackle IED harm, not just in relation to the national problem but also on the international stage. In Kenya and Somalia, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IED threat is one that needs a trans-border cooperative effort as the threat chiefly stems from al-Shabaab cells in both states. However, it is clear that Kenya has far greater capacity to combat IEDs on their side of border. Kenya also provides assistance to Somalia through the African Union's military mission in Somalia, AMISOM. After examining the various countries and regions, this report explores some of the leading regional C-IED initiatives, including regional military efforts (such as the Multinational Joint Task Force) as well as data collection and information sharing efforts. Regional efforts also sought to build regional capacity through training and cooperation. This section draws upon some of the initiatives already partially explored within the nationally focused section. Lastly, this report reflects on the C-IED progress made on the global stage. Emphasis is initially placed on UN initiatives due to the recent successes of these programmes. Other initiatives of importance are also reflected upon to reveal the steps taken to generate a more rounded approach, highlighting the success of some of these initiatives, as well as emphasising where challenges remain. Information sharing is identified as one such area. In conclusion, there are still many challenges that need to be addressed in the battle to combat the rising tide of IEDs. These include the provision of resources and equipment, victim assistance and information sharing. The report, to support this need, highlights past successes that might give insight on how to best meet these challenges. The paper also draws on the expertise of influential C-IED actors, and notes that many see greater information sharing as an important leap to be taken, as has been acknowledged throughout the report. The conclusion also recognises passages of progress where C-IED initiatives are building on lessons learnt to reinvigorate C-IED efforts internationally. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Addressing-the-threat-posed-by-IEDs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Addressing-the-threat-posed-by-IEDs.pdf Shelf Number: 146365 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Explosive Devices Terrorism Terrorist Bombings

Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: On June 17, 2015, nine people were shot and killed in Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, reportedly hoped that his act of violence would spark a race war. In November 2015, Robert Dear left three people dead and four wounded after he opened fire on a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At a court appearance following his arrest, Dear referred to himself as a "warrior for the babies." Two weeks later, 14 people were killed and 22 wounded in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The assailants, a married couple named Syed Riawan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were self-identified supporters of the Islamic State (ISIL). Malik even proclaimed her loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on Facebook as their attack was under way. Acts of violence inspired by extremist ideologies are a real threat with which communities across the country are increasingly contending. In the wake of each of these attacks, our nation and others have been left to grapple with why they occurred and how they can be prevented. Increasingly, solutions for addressing these types of attacks have been found in partnerships among various types of government service providers-such as between the police and health and human services departments - as well as between government service providers and members of the community. The aims of these partnerships are to strengthen social cohesion within the community and to provide assistance to community members at risk of radicalization to violent extremism, diverting them from the path to violence. Violent extremism is not a problem that law enforcement agencies can solve through arrests and prosecutions alone. At a 2015 National Institute of Justice conference, called "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.," researchers identified issues with identity, a desire for belonging, past trauma, personal connections to violent extremists and extremist narratives, and mental illness among some of the potential risk factors for radicalizing to violence. These are issues that police can address more effectively in cooperation with community leaders, social service providers, and other non-law enforcement stakeholders. To explore these issues, on September 18, 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) held a forum on Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism. This forum, which took place in Minneapolis in partnership with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, and the Saint Paul Police Department, brought together police leaders and community partners from across the country to share their recommendations for how to build successful partnerships to prevent violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2017. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2017 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 146441 Keywords: Extremist Groups Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Cordesman, Anthony H. Title: Global Trends in Terrorism: 1970-2016 Summary: Terrorism has become one of the dominating national security threats of the 21st century. It is also one of the most complex - mixing the actions of states, extremists, and other non-state actors in a wide range of threats and types of conflicts. Terrorists range from individuals carrying out scattered terrorist acts, to international terrorist networks of non-state actors, to state terrorism including the use of conventional forces and poison gas to terrorize portions of a civil population. Terrorism has also become a key aspect of civil war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare, as well as ideological, ethnic, and religious warfare. There is no easy way to categorize the resulting patterns of violence, to measure their rise, or to set national security priorities. For more than a decade, the U.S. has focused on the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has dealt increasingly with the expansion of the threat into North Africa, other parts of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of the world. Key warfighting threats like the Islamic State and its affiliates, and the Taliban and Haqqani Network, are only a comparatively small part of the rising threat in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. It is clear from the current trends in other regions that the threat of religious extremism may soon expand rapidly into the rest of Asia, and there are many other causes of terrorism in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the United States. Terrorism is often heavily driven by ideology, but it also is often a reaction to major shifts in population, ethnic and sectarian tensions, failed and corrupt governance, and the failure to broadly develop a given economy and offer employment and a future. No area is immune to the threat, and internal instability can drive terrorism anywhere in the world. The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a this report to provide a graphic overview of these trends from 1970 to the end of 2016. Each section first traces the patterns since 1970, and then focuses on the period from 2011-2016 - the years since the sudden rise of massive political instability and extremism in the MENA region. Finally. it covers global, regional, and key national trends and compares different estimates and sources for 2015 and 2016. The report draws primarily on reporting in the START database, but uses other reporting from sources like EU/Europol, IHS Jane's, and the IEP to illustrate different estimates, different perspectives, and the uncertainties in the data. The Contents of the Report The report shows key trends largely in graphic and metric form. It does not attempt to provide the supporting narrative that is critical to fully understanding these trends, nor to list all the many qualifications made by the sources used regarding the limits of their models and data. These are areas where the reader must consult the original sources directly - along with a wide range of narrative material and other sources - to fully understand the trends that are displayed. Even so, the report is necessarily complex. The report does show that there is value in looking at global trends, but makes it clear that many key trends are largely regional, and must be examined on a regional basis. It also provides key country-by-country breaks out to show that the driving factors shaping the nature of terrorism in any given case are usually national. International networks certainly play a key role, as do factors like religion and culture, but the forms terrorism take normally differ sharply even between neighboring countries. The report also must be detailed to highlight the differences and uncertainties in much of the data. There often are sharp differences in the most basic summary data, even between two highly respected sources like START and IHS Jane's. These differences do not reflect failures in the analytic efforts of the sources shown. They reflect differences that are inevitable in their need to rely on open source material, the lack of any clear definition of terrorism, the problems in measuring and displaying uncertainty, and the need to guess and extrapolate where key data are missing. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017. 351p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Draft: Accessed August 30. 2017 at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170810_terrorism_trends_2016_report.pdf?20ItBY0su_GEhfyAoCYkS9bszjcOqX7i Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170810_terrorism_trends_2016_report.pdf?20ItBY0su_GEhfyAoCYkS9bszjcOqX7i Shelf Number: 146951 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremists Extremists Groups Islamic Extremism Islamic Extremists National Security Terrorism

Author: Warner, Jason Title: Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers Summary: Introduction Since 2009, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram (formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, or more recently, the Islamic State's West Africa Province [ISWAP]) has ushered in a wave of violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, at the intersection of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Among other tactics that it has employed during its reign of terror, the group has been noted for its use of suicide bombers. While the prevalence of suicide bombings has been duly recognized, little remains known about the broader arc of their existence and efficacy: What strategic and operational trends underlie Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, and how effective have they been at achieving their objectives? Just who are Boko Haram's suicide bombers? Where are they deployed, what do they target, and how do diferent bomber demographics difer in their actions? More broadly, what does Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers reveal about the past, present, and future of the terrorist group? Methodology Drawing on analysis of an original dataset of all Boko Haram suicide bombings from their first deployment in April 2011 to June 2017, this report presents the fullest picture available to date that tracks and analyzes Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers. To do so, we investigate two main phenomena from our dataset: operational trends of bombers (longitudinal trends, lethality, injuries, geography, and targeting trends) and demographic trends of bombers (gender, age, and recruitment). From these trends, we assert that it is possible to categorize Boko Haram's suicide bombing eforts into four distinct historical phases. In light of our understanding of the group's past and present operational and demographic trends, we conclude by suggesting how the group might act in the future and how counter-terrorism efforts might best address its likely incarnations. Overall Findings In the main, we argue that Boko Haram's operational profile is noteworthy in that, despite the attention the group garners for its deployment of suicide bombers, it shows itself to be less effective than otherwise expected in using them. Concurrently, we argue that Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique in that it created novel uses for women and children in its suicide bombing efforts, rendering it distinctive among extant and historical terrorist groups. Our dataset reveals that from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 diferent targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women, and at least 81 bombers were specifically identified as children or teenagers. A more comprehensive overview follows. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Shelf Number: 146957 Keywords: Boko Haram Islamic State Suicide Bombers Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Carrera, Sergio Title: Reflections on the Terrorism Attacks in Barcelona: Constructing a principled and trust-based EU approach to countering terrorism Summary: This Policy Insight examines EU counter-terrorism policies in the aftermath of the recent terrorist attacks of 18 August 2017 in Catalonia and explores what more the EU can do to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of those policies. To this end, it puts forward two policy recommendations: The EU should construct and progressively develop a principled and trust-based policy approach to countering terrorism. Such an approach would consist of an evaluation (fitness check) and regular reappraisal of the effectiveness and efficiency of current EU policies and their priorities - particularly those related to information exchange (and interoperability) and countering radicalisation. The authors argue that the EU's present policy is based on two long-standing (mis)conceptions, namely that existing priorities and instruments are effective in preventing, investigating and prosecuting terrorist crimes and that EU principles and fundamental rights act as obstacles to efficient law enforcement. They examine these two conceptions and call for them to be reconsidered in light of existing research and evidence, explaining how they have led to what may be called the "EU liberal paradox". This paradox relates not only to the deleterious impact that counter-terrorism policies have on the EU and national constitutional principles, which terrorism seeks to destroy, but also the questionable extent to which the objectives pursued in EU security policies and tools are efficiently met in their implementation and practical uses. If EU policies aimed at tackling terrorism are not properly informed and tested, and their societal impacts and ethical implications rigorously assessed, the result will be a lack of mutual confidence between EU and state law enforcement authorities and judicial practitioners, as well as social mistrust on the part of citizens and communities. The conclusions outline a set of recommendations for the next phases of the European Agenda on Security aimed at implementing a principled and trust-based EU approach in countering terrorism. Details: Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2017. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Insights No. 2017-32: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reflections-terrorist-attacks-barcelona-constructing-principled-and-trust-based-eu Year: 2017 Country: Spain URL: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reflections-terrorist-attacks-barcelona-constructing-principled-and-trust-based-eu Shelf Number: 147206 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Terrorism

Author: Greenberg, Karen J., ed. Title: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States: The ISIS Cases Summary: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States - The ISIS Cases is the third in a series of reports issued by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School on federal prosecutions of individuals accused of ISIS-related crimes. Notably, this report reveals several new trends since the Center's last report was published. 2016 was a year of growing concern about the threat ISIS posed within the United States. In addition to a record number of terrorism arrests carried out since 9/11, there had been several attacks that resulted in deaths, including the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando - the latter particularly noteworthy because it doubled the casualties resulting from jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks that had occurred cumulatively between 9/11 and 2015. By contrast, 2017 has shown a decline in incidents of ISIS-related terrorist attacks and attempted attacks. At the same time, there has been a significant decrease in the number of federal indictments for ISIS-related crimes. The 2017 edition of Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States examines these and other trends in an effort to glean insight concerning both the individual defendants accused of ISIS-related crimes and the dispositions of the criminal cases against them in federal court. This report has several new features meant to illustrate these developments. First, the charts include illustrations of changes over time. In addition, this edition of our ongoing study on terrorism includes, where possible, comparisons between terrorism prosecutions and U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. The findings contained in this year's report are summarized as follows: Finding No. 1: Although the federal courts have shown a capacity to handle these cases, the dispositions of these cases differ markedly from those of U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. ISIS cases are more likely to go to trial than federal cases generally. Those terrorism prosecutions that have been resolved have proceeded more quickly through the courts than the average case. ISIS defendants are granted pre-trial release with much less frequency than criminal defendants overall. Every case that has been resolved has resulted in conviction, in contrast to the national average conviction rate of 92.5%. Sentences are comparatively higher in these cases, exceeding the national average by 10 years. In fact, the average ISIS sentence of 14.5 years more than triples the average federal sentence of 3.75 years. Finding No. 2: ISIS-related prosecutions rely increasingly on the use of FBI undercover agents or informants. The use of informants, a controversial strategy challenged by civil liberties groups, has continued to rise in ISIS prosecutions. In 2014, 33% of the ISIS-related cases involved government informants or undercover agents. However, the share of ISIS prosecutions involving FBI undercover agents or informants has since increased to 65%. For the new cases in 2017, it is even higher- 83%. Finding No. 3: The personal details of the individual defendants differ from those of non-terrorism defendants generally. Terrorism defendants are significantly younger than typical criminal defendants. They are more frequently American citizens. They are less likely to have spent prior time in prison than their criminal justice counterparts overall. Finding No. 4: ISIS-related defendants are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam than Muslim by birth. This year's findings show Muslim defendants in ISIS-related cases are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam. In addition, there were fewer allegations of interfamilial coconspirators, and fewer incidences of romantic ties among and between co-conspirators. In sum, federal terrorism prosecutions in the 16 years since 9/11 are still not normalized in terms of their disposition. The use of material support statutes that are relied upon in the majority of these cases, as well as the terrorism enhancements available in sentencing guidelines, have provided the legal framework for this trend, while the details of investigation, prosecution, and litigation have, as this report shows, solidified the harsh practices evident for terrorism cases. Nor are terrorism prosecutions trending towards normalization. Instead, it seems, the federal courts have made an exception - one that maximizes the punitive aspect of criminal justice - for these cases, and continue to do so. More than a decade and a half since the Sept. 11 attacks, this report suggests that it's time to acknowledge that terrorism cases have evolved from the prosecutions of complex, sophisticated, trained networks of individuals towards individual actors in search of purpose and attention. As such, normalization of these criminal proceedings might appropriately lie on the horizon. Details: New York: Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Shelf Number: 147247 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Prosecutions Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Terrorism: An Overview Summary: The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists - people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements - have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist "threats." These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion. The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights - one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346). This report is intended as a primer on the issue, and four discussion topics in it may help explain domestic terrorism's relevance for policymakers: - Level of Activity. Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating numerous incidents since 9/11. - Use of Nontraditional Tactics. A large number of domestic terrorists do not necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, for example. - Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists - much like their jihadist analogues - are often Internet and social-media savvy and use such platforms to share ideas and as resources for their operations. - Decentralized Nature of the Threat. Many domestic terrorists rely on the concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology - engaging in protected speech. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44921: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Shelf Number: 147336 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Domestic Terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism

Author: Jones, Chris Title: Market Forces: The development of the EU Security-Industrial Complex Summary: Despite the economic crisis, EU funding for new security tools and technologies will double in the 2014-20 period compared to the previous 6 years. The biggest winners have been the "homeland security" industry whose influence on European policy continues to grow, constructing an ever more militarised and security-focused Europe. While the European Union project has faltered in recent years, afflicted by the fall-out of the economic crisis, the rise of anti-EU parties and the Brexit vote, there is one area where it has not only continued apace but made significant advances: Europe's security policies have not only gained political support from across its Member States but growing budgets and resources too. The increased securitisation of the European Union has relevance not only for its Member States but for the world which will be affected by the measures, technologies and strategies being developed, sold and deployed. The emergence of 'security' as the EU's increasingly default response to complex social and ecological crises is also significant given the current political context of rising authoritarian parties and governments all-too-willing to use the latest security tools to maintain and extend power. This report digs deep into the EU's funding of its security strategy. It shows that between 2014 and 2020, a total of at least L11 billion has been allocated to budgets directed towards security measures - L3.8 billion to the Internal Security Fund (ISF), L1.7 billion to the European Security Research Programme, L3.1 billion to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (which has numerous uses in the context of security policy) and some L2.4 billion for EU home affairs agencies such as Europol and Frontex. While still a small amount in comparison to the EU's total budget of "1 trillion between 2014 and 2020, it is a significant development given that a decade ago the bloc had no dedicated budgets for security, justice or home affairs. The report's investigation of the different budgets also draws out the big picture of where the funding is going and what it is helping to construct: an all-encompassing vision of security that seeks to combat a seemingly limitless number of "threats" ranging from terrorism to petty crime, and which displays a marked tendency of treating the entire population (European and especially non-European) as potential objects of suspicion that must be surveyed and if necessary detained, obstructed or even killed. This vision has been propelled by military and security corporations whose profits depend on a world of suspicions, fears and threats - and who have not only been major beneficiaries of EU security spending, but have also been given an unprecedented role in designing the security research programme. In a 2009 report by Statewatch and TNI, we warned that EU's security, research and development policies were "coalescing around a high-tech blueprint for a new kind of security". We summed up the vision in the title of the report, NeoConOpticon, to capture the metaphor of an all-seeing prison combined with the increasingly neoconservative, corporate-led vision of the EU's security and defence policies. It warned that we were "turning a blind eye to the start of a new kind of arms race, one in which all the weapons are pointing inwards". That report examined the early years of EU security strategies, from 2003 to 2008, and focused on the beginnings of the European Security Research Programme (ESRP) and the 85 projects it had funded up to that point. Market Forces focuses on the development of EU security policies and budgets through the 2007-13 period and their successors, which were launched in 2014 and will run until 2020. These include the ESRP, which funds research to develop new technologies for law enforcement, border control, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection and leans heavily towards technologies and techniques initially deployed or favoured by military forces: drones, data-mining tools, large-scale surveillance systems, biometric recognition and automated behaviour analysis tools. It also explicitly seeks to develop "dual-use" technologies for both civil and military use. The report also analyses the Internal Security Fund (ISF), distributed to EU Member States to enhance the powers of law enforcement and border control agencies (including through numerous new surveillance and analysis systems). The aim - albeit not yet realised - is that EU funds pay for both the development of new technologies and their subsequent purchase at EU or national level, creating a self-fulfilling loop of supply and demand. Despite warnings and public concerns over the direction of the EU's security strategy, the journey towards a world of ubiquitous public-private surveillance and control systems continues, for the time being, largely unabated. The report is divided into three sections: the first provides a summary of the early development of the European Security Research Programme, its incorporation into the EU's formal research agenda, and the concurrent development and implementation of EU policies and budgets in the area of justice and home affairs from 2007 to 2013. The second section looks at the institutions, corporations and organisations involved in the development and ongoing implementation of the EU's security research agenda and security policies, and the ways in which private interests have long-managed to successfully shape the public policy and research agenda. The third section looks at current EU security policies and budgets. It seeks to provide a general overview of aims and objectives of current policies, the funds available for implementing them, and which organisations have so far been the chief beneficiaries. The EU's security agenda is now so sprawling and complex that no one report can cover every aspect of it, but there are a few key themes that are worth drawing out here. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2017. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2017 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Shelf Number: 147371 Keywords: Border Security Cybersecurity Homeland Security Law Enforcement Technology Security Policy Surveillance Terrorism

Author: Tyler, Stacey Title: Evaluating Security Communication Failures at a United States Commercial Airport Summary: Organizational communication impacts service efficiency and productivity. An increase in federal funding to strengthen communication within the airport stakeholders has failed to deliver expected results. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore whether overall communication among TSA stakeholders is effective, and to identify where potential breakdowns in communication may occur in order to improve communications about the implementation of airport security policies. Using Weick's organizational information theory, this study's central research question focused on the degree to which miscommunication between the stakeholders regarding prohibited items at security checkpoints impeded the effective execution of federal law regarding carryon luggage on commercial aircraft. A purposive sample of 13 private airline employees and 7 airport employees at a large U.S. commercial airport participated in the study. Data were collected via semi structured interview questions, and then coded and analyzed following an inductive coding strategy. According to study results, there was little evidence of mis-communications between government and airline stakeholders regarding policy changes and expectations related to security procedures. However, there was evidence that miscommunication about the same policy changes to consumers confuses travelers, which may explain incidences of prohibited items at the security checkpoints. This study may assist policy makers in clarifying language to better inform travelers about security changes and prohibited items, which will promote safer flying experiences, reduce the potential for harm, and expedite traveling, thereby contributing to positive social change. Details: Minneapolis, MN: Walden University, 2014. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 19, 2017 at: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1562523110/abstract/932BE08993F4738PQ/1?accountid=13626 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1562523110/abstract/932BE08993F4738PQ/1?accountid=13626 Shelf Number: 147410 Keywords: Airport Security Homeland Security Terrorism Transportation Security

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2016 Summary: ONE WORD LOOMS OVER THE LANDSCAPE of deadly extremism and terrorism in the United States in 2016: Orlando. The June 2016 shooting spree at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, by Omar Mateen - who killed 49 people and wounded 53 more - dwarfed in its lethality all other extremist-related murders this past year. Mateen, who claimed his attack in the name of ISIS, though there are no known connections between him and that terror organization, achieved the dubious distinction of being the deadliest domestic terrorist since Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Last year, the Anti-Defamation League reported that, in 2015, domestic extremists had killed more people than in any previous year since 1995. Largely because of Mateen's attack, 2016 now supplants 2015 in its deadly toll. ADL's preliminary tally of extremist-related deaths at the end of 2015 was 52. However, information that has emerged since then has now brought the 2015 total to 65 deaths at the hands of extremists, as it can sometimes take months or years for an extremist connection to a death to come to light. ADL's preliminary tally for 2016 is already at 69, a figure that includes the 49 killed by Mateen as well as 20 other murders committed by white supremacists, anti-government extremists such as sovereign citizens, and black nationalists. This grisly toll puts 2016 as the second deadliest year for domestic extremist-related deaths in the United States since 1970, the earliest year for which ADL maintains such statistics. The number will inevitably grow higher still as more 2016 murders turn out to have extremist ties. Were it not for the Orlando shootings, 2016 might have been considered a "mild" year for extremist-related deaths. Including Orlando, there were only 11 lethal incidents in the U.S. in 2016 that can be connected to extremism, compared to 29 incidents in 2015. Moreover, the number of incidents involving multiple fatalities in 2016 was only five, half the number of such incidents in 2015. Leaving out the Orlando shootings, one would have to go back all the way to 2006 to find a number of people killed by extremists smaller than that in 2016. The Pulse massacre was a single event so egregious in its casualty tolls that it can actually distort statistics and perceptions surrounding the extremist landscape. It is important to note that the number of Americans killed by domestic extremists is small compared to the total number of murders in the United States or even the number of those who die from gun violence each year. But these deaths represent merely the tip of a pyramid of extremist violence and crime in this country. For every person killed at the hands of an extremist, many more are wounded or injured in attempted murders and assaults. Every year, police uncover and prevent a wide variety of extremist plots and conspiracies with lethal intentions. And extremists engage in a wide variety of other crimes related to their causes, from threats and harassment to white collar crime. To give just one other measure of extremist violence as an example, for the five years from 2012-2016, at least 56 shooting incidents between police and domestic extremists occurred (the vast majority of them shootouts or incidents in which extremists shot at police). During these encounters, extremists shot 69 police officers, 18 fatally. Additionally, compared to many other types of violence, extremist-related violence has the power to shock or spread fear within an entire community - or an entire nation - as the Orlando shootings so tragically demonstrated this past year. The enormity of the attack in Orlando shocked and frightened all Americans, but it was a particular blow to the LGBT community in the United States, as the Pulse nightclub was a gay bar and dance club and most of the victims were gay, lesbian, or transgender. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147425 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homicides Terrorism White Supremacists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Correcting the Course: Advancing Juvenile Justice Principles for Children Convicted of Violent Extremist Offenses Summary: Children have always been among the most vulnerable victims of violence and, at times, some of its brutal purveyors. They have played various roles in furthering violent extremism and participating in acts of violence, ranging from inciting propaganda online to carrying out deadly attacks. Rather than exceptionalizing these children, their treatment under the criminal justice system should be grounded in juvenile justice standards. To advance the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the government of Australia commissioned the Global Center and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT) to prepare a report and accompanying policy brief putting forward guiding principles, recommendations, and considerations for the detention, rehabilitation, and reintegration of juveniles convicted of terrorism and violent extremism offenses. Together, they advance a juvenile justice approach for authorities responsible for their care and support the notion that national security interests and juvenile justice imperatives are compatible and mutually reinforcing in preventing and countering violent extremism. Responding to a call from the GCTF Neuchatel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context to collect and collate information on children engaged in terrorism-related activity, the report takes stock of theory, policies, and practice globally. The recommendations draw from international juvenile justice standards, the emerging body of principles and practices in the detention of adult violent extremist offenders, and the national experiences in demobilizing and reintegrating child combatants and members of organized criminal groups. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security; The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Shelf Number: 147499 Keywords: Child Combatants Counter-terrorism Juvenile Justice Juvenile Offenders Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Munchow, Sebastian von Title: Aftermath of the Terror Attack on Breitscheid Platz Christmas Market: Germany's Security Architecture and Parliamentary Inquiries Summary: On December 19th 2016, Anis Amri, a Tunisian citizen, hijacked a truck and crashed into a Christmas market at Breitscheid Platz in Berlin. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, which resulted in twelve deaths and fifty additional casualties. Amri escaped the crime scene and travelled through Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to Northern Italy where police officers killed him near Milan three days later. This assault was the first major terrorist event in Germany for decades. Prior to this event, the most recent attacks were the Red Army Faction plots in the 1970s, the Olympics hostage-taking in 1972, and the right-wing motivated attack on Munich's Oktoberfest in 1980. This attack, in which a vehicle rammed into a crowded Christmas market in the center of Berlin, not only sparked a debate about Berlin's migration policy at large, but also focused the conversation on specific questions. How could Amri be seeking asylum in Germany despite his criminal record in Italy? How did he operate inside Germany using fourteen different identities? Did he rely on a network of supporters? How did he manage to travel through half of Europe before his life ended? Some political voices called for security-related reforms aimed at improving video surveillance, data exchange, and deportation processes, while others demanded a thorough parliamentary investigation of the plot. This paper will briefly touch upon those parliamentary attempts on state and federal level to explore the plot. It will then revisit federal inquiries into matters related to the security architecture over the past twenty-seven years as well as the coverage of these inquiries in the media. Finally, this study will conclude with some thoughts about whether a federal parliamentary inquiry should have been used to investigate what happened before, during, and after the attack. Details: Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2017. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper Series, No. 28: Accessed October 10, 2017 at: http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_28-en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Germany URL: http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_28-en.pdf Shelf Number: 147653 Keywords: Homeland Security Security Terrorism

Author: The Sentry Title: The Terrorists' Treasury: How a Bank Linked to Congo's President Enabled Hezbollah Financiers to Bust U.S. Sanctions. Summary: The same banks used by kleptocratic governments to divert state assets can also be used by terrorist financing networks. This is what has taken place at one prominent bank in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Individuals and entities subject to U.S. sanctions, in connection with Hezbollah, used the bank to move money through the international banking system, despite several warnings from bank employees that doing so could violate U.S. sanctions. This was not just any bank. BGFIBank DRC, the institution that processed the transactions, is run by President Joseph Kabila's brother and has been mentioned in a recent scandal in Congo involving the alleged diversion of public funds from state-owned mining companies and the national electoral commission. As set out in this report, in 2011 bank employees at BGFIBank DRC raised the alarm with senior officials at the bank, in writing, about a series of transactions. The concern was that the transactions involved companies linked to financiers of Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based terrorist group and political party. The main entities in question were subsidiaries of Kinshasa-based business conglomerate Congo Futur, a company under U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions. Among the recipients of the warnings was Francis Selemani Mtwale, the bank's CEO and brother of President Joseph Kabila. But the bank's relationship with Hezbollah-linked companies continued. BGFIBank DRC even went so far as to request that certain transactions be unblocked by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) after other banks refused to process them. And BGFIBank DRC continued to engage in correspondence with Congo Futur-affiliated company representatives in 2016. This raises major questions about the bank's ability and willingness to fulfill its sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance obligations. BGFIBank DRC has been reported to have been used to divert significant public funds in Congo, including millions of dollars in withdrawals by Congo's electoral commission, and transfers of $8 million in cash in irregular "tax advances" from Congo's largest state-owned mining company, Gecamines. Published reports raise serious questions about the bank's regulatory and compliance regime. Inadequate anti-money laundering compliance and sanctions enforcement standards at banks can empower a wide range of criminal groups and corrupt actors�and ultimately undermine governance and contribute to instability in Congo and elsewhere. Members of civil society have suggested that business interests could be part of the reason Kabila, who has sparked a violent nationwide political crisis by recently overstaying his presidential term limits, has maintained an iron grip on the presidency. In the example profiled in this report, BGFIBank DRC's approach to enforcing sanctions has allowed Kassim Tajideen - described by the U.S. government as "an important financial contributor" who "has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah" - and his network to maintain access to the global financial system despite being placed under U.S. sanctions in 2009 and 2010. The documents reviewed by The Sentry also show links between Congo Futur and other firms under Kassim Tajideen's control. These documents indicate that Congo Futur subsidiaries used BGFIBank DRC to operate accounts and make wire transfers after both Congo Futur and Kassim were placed under U.S. sanctions, despite warnings from bank employees that the bank should not do so. This is despite repeated public assertions from both Kassim and one of his brothers who is not under U.S. sanctions, Congo Futur General Manager Ahmed Tajideen, that the Kinshasa-based conglomerate had no links to any of the Tajideens under U.S. sanctions. Congo Futur has continued to thrive in Congo despite U.S. sanctions; it even maintains financial ties to the Congolese government and has received government contracts. These continued relations raise serious questions about the Congolese government's reliability in the fight against global terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit finance. Congo Futur has risen and remained prominent despite facing sanctions and the Kabila regime's decreasing legitimacy. BGFIBank DRC has been used to facilitate Congo Futur's access to the U.S. financial system, despite sanctions. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentry Project, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2017 at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/TerroristsTreasury_TheSentry_October2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: Shelf Number: 148095 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Conway, Maura Title: Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts Summary: This report seeks to contribute to public and policy debates on the value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. We look in particular at aggressive account and content takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts. Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for Islamic State (IS) accounts and communities to flourish, although IS continues to distribute propaganda through this channel. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS's and other jihadists' online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter. Twitter is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. We describe and discuss this, and supply some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this area. Details: Dublin, Ireland: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2017 at: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting-DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf Shelf Number: 148131 Keywords: Daesh Internet Islamic State Jihadists Social Media Terrorism

Author: Sheppard, Jill Title: Attitudes to National Security: Balancing Safety and Privacy Summary: The most recent ANUpoll explores Australians' willingness to trade off their personal rights and freedoms for national security. Government responses to the threat of terrorism often incur a cost to citizens, by way of reductions in privacy, freedom of movement, and other individual rights and civil liberties. Such a 'trade-off' approach, where the respect for fundamental liberal rights and values is reconciled with the need for communal security, according to the threat level, is meant to strike an appropriate balance between these two cornerstones of liberalism. Sacrificing some freedoms to protect the Australian community is therefore presented by governments as a necessary cost, but one that is proportionate to the need for safety. Yet this trade-off between increased security and the reduction in some civil liberties also presents a dilemma to democratic societies: namely, the extent to which the risk of terrorist attacks can actually be contained without compromising the defining principles of Australia's liberal order. While in theory the idea of finding an appropriate balance seems straightforward, in practice it can be difficult to determine how much weight should be attached to the respective values of security versus privacy. When examining attitudes towards safety and privacy, it is consequently important to understand national security in terms of not only preventing terrorist violence, but also considering the political consequences any such measures have for our democratic societies. This is why this survey took particular interest in how the public views this increased need for surveillance with regard to the Muslim population, who are commonly perceived as being at a higher risk of radicalization and of being susceptible to violent extremist ideologies. The survey of 1200 Australians finds widespread support for current counter-terrorism measures, such as retention of telecommunications metadata, strict border control policies, revocation of citizenship of 'foreign fighters' with more than one nationality, and bans on travel to sites of certain international conflicts. Even when posed as a trade-off between an individual's rights and the protection of national security, the Australians surveyed express support for freedom-limiting policies in the fight against terrorism. The findings also illustrate substantial public awareness of Muslims identified as being at a higher risk of radicalization and affiliation with terrorist groups than the rest of the population. More importantly, this ANUpoll supports the notion that many Australians conflate terrorism and Islamic extremism, with 22 per cent of Australians 'not much' or 'not at all' bothered by the possibility of Muslims being singled out for additional surveillance and monitoring. This indicates a disconnect from the Australian Government's emphasis on cooperation with the Muslim community over enhanced law enforcement. This is significant insofar as it highlights an ongoing public perception of Muslims in Western societies as a potential danger to national security. This can result in stigmatisation, social divisions, and public backlash against the government counter-terrorism measures from those who feel unfairly targeted. Details: Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 22: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 148149 Keywords: Extremist Violence Homeland Security Muslimes National Security Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Raja, Irfan Azhar Title: Reporting British Muslims: The Re-emergence of Folk Devils and Moral Panics in Post -7/7 Britain (2005-2007) Summary: On 7 July 2005, Britain suffered its first ever suicide attack. Four young British-born Muslims, apparently well-educated and from integrated backgrounds, killed their fellow citizens, including other Muslims. The incident raised the vision that British Muslims would be seen as the 'enemy within' and a 'fifth column' in British society. To examine how this view emerged, this thesis investigates the representation of British Muslims in two major British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, over a two-year period (7 July 2005-8 July 2007). A corpus of 274 news items, including editorials, comments, interviews, and news reports on the London bombings, has been collected and analysed using the inductive approach based upon thematic analysis. The thesis asks a significant question: How did these broadsheets present British Muslims in the wake of the London bombings? This thesis aims to present a narrative of how the London bombings (hereafter 7/7) emerged in these broadsheets based on their reaction to an interpretation and perception of the 7/7 event. This research indicates that the two broadsheets shared a similar cultural approach in combating Islamist terrorism, by encouraging the embracing of British values, although their different political orientations led to them differing attitudes over the precise manner in which this should be achieved. The Guardian was more concerned about individual liberty and human rights, while The Daily Telegraph emphasised the adaptation of tough legislation to combat terrorism. Given modern Britain's secular moral fibre, the supremacy of British values dominated the debates on British Muslims which somehow reflected a manifestation of a systematic campaign to redefine Islam as a religion that fits into secular Western society, validating terms such as 'Moderate Muslim', 'Islamic terrorists', 'Islamic extremists', 'Islamic militants' and 'Islamic terrorism'. Although both newspapers argue that radicalisation is a foreign-imported dilemma that has its roots in "Islamic ideology", they differ in their attitudes on how to deal with it. This thesis uses Cohen's (1972) text, which suggests that the media often portray certain groups within society as "deviant" and "folk devils" and blames them for crimes. This research into the reactions of two broadsheets permits a contemporary discussion of the London bombings and British Muslims in the light of Cohen's concept. It aims to locate the presence of a nexus of the four Ps - political parties, pressure groups, the press, and public bodies - that influence reporting and shape the debates (Ost, 2002; Chas, 2006, p.75). It is evident that the reporting of the two broadsheets blends three significant components: the views of self-proclaimed Islamic scholars, experts and hate preachers; the use of out-of-context verses of the Quran; and the use of political language to represent British Muslims. Arguably, the press transformed the 7/7 event, suggesting that it was driven by religious theology rather than being a politically motivated act. Details: Huddersfield, UK: University of Huddersfield, 2016. 382p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 15, 2017 at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/31087/1/__nas01_librhome_librsh3_Desktop_FINAL%20THESIS.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/31087/1/__nas01_librhome_librsh3_Desktop_FINAL%20THESIS.pdf Shelf Number: 148190 Keywords: Islamist Terrorism Mass Media Moral Panics Muslims Newspapers Terrorism

Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Preventive Detention Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The Origins of America's Jihadists Summary: The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations that could try to carry out a major terrorist operation in the United States or sabotage a U.S.-bound airliner, from Americans returning from jihadist fronts or European returnees who might try to enter the United States, and from homegrown terrorists inspired by jihadist ideology to carry out attacks in the United States. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. American Muslims appear unreceptive to the violent ideologies promoted by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A small fraction express favorable views of the tactics that those organizations use, but expressions of support for political violence do not translate to a willingness to engage in violence. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. This essay identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11. These involve 178 planners and perpetrators. (This total does not include those who provided material support to jihadist groups or left the United States to join jihadist groups abroad but who did not participate in terrorist attacks or plots to carry out attacks here.) American jihadists are made in the United States, not imported. Of the 178 jihadist planners and perpetrators, 86 were U.S.-born citizens. The others were naturalized U.S. citizens (46) or legal permanent residents (23)- in other words, people who had long residencies in the United States before arrest. (One more was a U.S. citizen, but it is unclear whether he was born here or naturalized.) Eight of the 178 terrorist attackers and plotters were in the United States on temporary visas, three were asylum seekers, four had been brought into the country illegally (three as small children and one as a teenager), and two were refugees. Three foreigners were participants in a plot to attack John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport but did not enter the United States. The status of the remaining few is unknown. The nation has invested significant resources in preventing terrorist attacks. Public statements indicate that federal and local authorities have followed hundreds of thousands of tips and conducted thousands of investigations since 9/11. An average of 11 people per year have carried out or have been arrested for plotting jihadist terrorist attacks. Authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots, keeping the total death toll under 100 during the 15-year period since 9/11-clearly a needless loss of life but a remarkable intelligence and law enforcement success. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign. There is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. There has been no American intifada, just an occasional isolated plot or attack. Out of tens of millions of foreign arrivals every year, including temporary visitors, immigrants, and refugees, 91 people known to have been born abroad were involved in jihadist terrorist plots since 9/11. Information on arrival dates is available for 66 of these entrants-only 13 of them arrived in the country after 9/11, when entry procedures were tightened. Vetting is not a broken system. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity. Foreign-born jihadists come from 39 Muslim-majority countries, with Pakistan leading the list, but concern about possible attempts by returning European foreign fighters to enter the United States requires looking at a larger set of national origins. Vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Most of the foreign jihadists arrived in the United States when they were very young. The average age upon arrival was 14.9 years. The average age at the time of the attack or arrest in a terrorist plot was 27.7. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight. Of the 25 people involved in actual jihadist terrorist attacks, only one returned to the United States after training abroad with clear intentions to carry out an attack. Adding the "shoe" and "underwear" bombers (bringing the total to 27) makes three entering the country or boarding a U.S.-bound airliner with terrorist intentions. Six others entered or returned to the United States within several years of the attack, but subsequent investigations turned up no proof of connections with terrorist groups while they were abroad. The 18 others (72 percent) had no record of recent travel abroad. The complexity of terrorist motives defies easy diagnosis. Religious beliefs and jihadist ideologies play an important role but are only one component of a constellation of motives. Remote recruiting has increasingly made jihadist ideology a conveyer of individual discontents. Feelings of alienation, anger, vengeance, disillusion, dissatisfaction, and boredom; life crises; and even mental disabilities appear in the life stories of individual jihadists. Some of those engaged in jihadist attacks had previously come to the attention of the authorities. Several of these, including the shooter in Little Rock, Arkansas, one of the Boston bombers, and the attacker who killed 49 people in Orlando, Florida, had been interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials at some point in their history and were assessed as posing no immediate danger. In some cases, that assessment might have been correct at the time, but personal circumstances changed the person's trajectory. Predicting dangerousness is difficult. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Shelf Number: 148507 Keywords: Homeland Security Jihadists Terrorism Terrorist Organization Terrorists

Author: Eerten, Jan-Jaap van Title: Developing a social media response to radicalization The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization Summary: Radical groups thrive by spreading their message. They have increasingly used social media to spread their propaganda and promote their extremist narratives. Including on websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In this study, the main question that we investigate is to what extent it is possible to use counter-narrative programs via social media to de-radicalize individuals or prevent violent extremism. We focus on violent radicalization connected to SalafiJihadism. Due to the political and societal context in which this project was initiated, NCTV and WODC were interested in this specific form of radicalization. The method we used consisted of a literature study, interviews (n=8) and three focus groups (n=6, n=7 and n=8) with people with different expertise and backgrounds (including academics, field workers, social media students and a former radical. In this study, narratives are conceptualized as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through (online) strategic communication activities by state and non-state actors in attempts to shape how target audiences feel about or understand events or issues, and ultimately, guide their behavior in a manner that is conducive to their aims and goals. We conceptualize counter-narratives as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through strategic communication (or messaging) activities with the intention to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives of violent extremist groups. Narratives have been projected by radical groups through a wide range of social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. For counter-narratives on social media, we identify three domains: (1) countermessaging (e.g., activities that challenge extremist narratives head on); (2) alternative messaging (e.g., activities that aim to provide a positive alternative to extremist narratives); and (3) strategic communication by the government (e.g., activities that provide insight in what the government is doing). A central outcome of our analysis is that to the extent that people have become more radical and strongly identify with an extremist ideology or group, they are less likely to be persuaded by any counter-narrative campaign. In general, it's challenging to persuade people with strong convictions through (online) campaigning. They are typically not very receptive to messages that aim to change their views. However, it will be very difficult to challenge people with extremist attitudes. They may not pay attention to these messages or even may adopt a stronger attitude in the other direction than intended as a reaction to this persuasive attempt. Thus, we argue that counter-narrative campaigns may be most useful for prevention purposes. They could perhaps focus on those that appear to be sensitive to extremist views and information - to the extent that they can be identified meaningfully. In addition, we have raised the question whether or not such counter narrative efforts may have some effect for the individuals from radical groups who show a glimpse of doubt about their group. For such individuals, a counter-narrative message may fall on fertile grounds and a seed may be planted, although this is highly speculative at the moment and more research is needed to support this notion. A sound starting point for designing a counter-narrative campaign is research. One should develop a sound understanding of (the context of) 'the problem', underlying determinants, where communication can potentially contribute to a solution. Here it is advisable to consider relevant theories and insights about radicalization and attitude and behavioral change. Beyond borrowing from existing theory, program planners do well to develop a sound theory of change that explicates how campaign efforts are expected to lead to the desired result. In addition, the audience should be carefully defined and segmented on the bases of meaningful variables. This requires thorough audience research. Campaigns targeting an overly broad and general target audience run the risk of being ineffective and may be counterproductive. It is therefore recommendable to focus on narrow, specific audience segments. In addition to studying the audience, it is important to develop an in-depth understanding of the extremist narratives one aims to counter. When deciding upon which elements of, for example, the Salafi-Jihadi narrative one aims to counter, we argue it is also important to consider why members of the target audience in question may be attracted to these narratives. Radicalizing individuals that are looking for extremist content may have different motives. Different motives of radical people may request different alternative or counter-narrative content. Some may be drawn to an extremist ideology. However, there are a variety of other reasons that may motivate people, such as the need for group-membership and camaraderie, a search for meaning, the need for excitement and adventure. As suggested, it is important to clarify the desired outcome, and the steps towards that outcome. Relatedly, at the outset of a campaign, goals and objectives should be delineated that clearly specify which change one aims to achieve. Well-defined objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Running an effective social media effort also requires adequate resources (time, finances, people) which should be assessed at the outset of a program. It is also important to give consideration to potential partners. Involving partners from within local communities in campaign development and delivery may benefit a campaign effort. Control over the message is not strictly assured when it is released on social media. Of course, it is still important to give consideration to the content of the message. As put forward earlier, to the extent that this is possible, it may be fruitful to consider the different motives of radical people. Besides content, it is important to think about different aspects of the message. Messages that use the narrative format have the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people and may overcome various forms of resistance. In addition, double-sided messages (in which one side is being discredited) and messages with a strong emotional appeal may prove to be particularly persuasive. In terms of sources, it is clear that they need to be perceived as credible by the audience in order to function as trustworthy messengers. Commonly mentioned candidates are former extremists, victims of violence, peers and family, as well as key members of communities and civil society actors. The potential of the government to serve as a credible source might be limited. Among other things, the government often suffers from a say-do gap in the eyes of relevant target audiences. Yet, which messenger will in fact effective will depend on the context, the target audience, and the message one wants to relay. Also, it should be noted that source is a murky entity in social media environments. For instance, processes of information transfer may obscure the original source of a message or make it difficult to interpret who the source is. Some researchers also maintain that social media environments complicate traditional insights about credibility indicators. In terms of selected channels, obviously they should be frequently utilized by the audience one intends to reach. Using multiple channels is argued to be beneficial. Importantly, social media may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and linking online with offline activities is suggested to be particularly effective. In terms of message dissemination, one may join already on-going 'conversations'. Also, it may be beneficial to partner up with people and organizations that have already established a strong social media presence and are popular among the target audience. In some cases, it may also be useful to ask established online (news) outlets to share the message. Furthermore, it may be important to create opportunities for audience engagement. One should also give consideration to aspects such as timing and volume. Finally, we argue it is important to assess the potential risks, challenges and limitations when developing a communication strategy. These might include losing control of the message, counter-campaigns, threats to safety and well-being of messengers, and multi-tier approval processes that hamper campaign efforts, as well as the notorious difficulty of demonstrating the effect of counter-narrative efforts. Generally speaking, it is not easy to establish an effect of a policy or measure in counter violent extremism (CVE). For the potential effectiveness of a counter-narrative campaign, it is important to distinguish between a formative evaluation, a process evaluation and a summative evaluation. Specifically tailored at online interventions, we argue that a combination of awareness (e.g., reach and views) and engagement metrics (e.g., likes, shares, comments and emoji responses) can provide some insight into the extent to which a counter-narrative campaign achieved its desired effect. More traditional research techniques such as interviews and focus groups can give insight in the reception of online materials (thus useful in the formative phase), but can also provide input in the interpretation of quantitative data in the summative evaluation phase. Experiments (either offline or online) offer insight in the cause-and-effect-relationship, while "netnography" makes use of data usually obtained from observations of people in their regular social media environments. Sentiment and content analyses are methods to distract the overall evaluation towards a counter-narrative campaign as well as the specific narratives that were put forward in a particular online community. Finally, social network analyses may give insight into the structure of a group and potentially how this might change over time, although the use of this technique in this field has not yet been fully established. Government actors are not well-suited to act as a counter-narrative producer or messenger. They tend to lack credibility as effective messengers with relevant target audiences. In part, because they are perceived to suffer from a say-do gap, which means their actions and words do not always match in the view of the audience. However, they still can still their part. First, governments can fruitfully engage in streamlining their own strategic communications in terms of explaining their own actions locally and in an international context. Second, the government can play a valuable role by facilitating grassroots and civil society actors best placed to act as counter-narrative messengers. They can do so by establishing an infrastructure to support these initiatives and by sponsoring such efforts (providing help, expertise or financial support) as well as. Yet, they should be cautious, as government endorsement or support for such initiatives may act as a 'kiss of death' and undermine them. Thirdly, they could stimulate thorough monitoring and evaluation, as there is only limited evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narrative efforts. Finally, government efforts could focus on supporting the development of programs in the area of strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption skills In terms of limitations of the current study, in our analysis, we have focused only on counter-narratives with respect to the Jihadi ideology. As such, it is not possible to generalize these findings to other groups (e.g., extreme right wings groups). Furthermore, due to the fact that there is hardly any strong empirical research available, we had to base some of our analysis on the general literature on persuasion and communication campaigns, as well as some "grey literature" (e.g., policy papers, working papers, and recommendations). This undermines the options to draw strong conclusions from the current analysis, as one might question the extent to which it is possible to generalize from the general field of persuasion to the specific field of online counternarratives. We conclude that, although presenting online counter-narratives appears to be intuitively an appealing strategy to employ, our analysis shows that this may not be an ideal option to deradicalize people. It might be more fruitful to use counter-narratives in a prevention context, in which people's minds are still open enough to register and process the information presented. Alternatively, it might be possible to explore the options to expose known individuals (e.g., a convicted prisoner) with specific counter-narratives, but ideally not in an online context, but an offline context, in order to directly monitor the reactions of the individuals. Details: Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology/Department of Political Science, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Shelf Number: 148510 Keywords: Counter-radicalization Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Singh, Jasjit Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Shelf Number: 148691 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action. Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Shelf Number: 148692 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Peer Influence Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: St. George, Sarah Title: Assessing the Vulnerability in Targets of Lethal Domestic Extremism Summary: Domestic terrorism is a significant issue of concern and in recent years there has been a notable rise in deadly attacks committed by extremists. Extensive government resources have been allocated to prevent domestic terrorist attacks and to harden vulnerable targets. Scholars have conducted numerous studies on domestic terrorism and target selection. However, very little is known about target vulnerability and more specifically about the relationship between target vulnerability, victims and lethality. This dissertation fills this gap and examines the victims of lethal domestic extremist attacks and the situational context that surrounds these incidents. Eight separate measures of vulnerability are examined that are derived from Clarke and Newman (2006)'s EVIL DONE framework. This dissertation expands this framework by applying the framework to human targets and considering the victim and the situational context the victim was in at the time of the attack. The ideological motivation for each attack is examined to determine if there are differences in vulnerability based on motive (ideologically motivated homicides vs. non-ideologically motivated homicides) as well as the ideology of the suspect (right-wing vs. jihadist). Several factors relating to the victim and suspect are also examined. This project utilizes the Extremist Crimes Database (ECDB) and examines lethal incidents of domestic extremism that occurred between 1990-2014. This research makes several important contributions by filling a gap in terrorism literature and helps policymakers with target prioritization. Details: East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2017. 189p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed January 18, 2018 at: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Shelf Number: 148869 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homicides Terrorism

Author: Tankel, Stephen Title: The Indian Jihadist Movement: Evolution and Dynamics Summary: The Indian jihadist movement remains motivated primarily by domestic grievances rather than India-Pakistan dynamics. However, it is far more lethal than it otherwise would have been without external support from the Pakistani state, Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadist groups, and the ability to leverage Bangladesh, Nepal, and certain Persian Gulf countries for sanctuary and as staging grounds for attacks in India. External support for the Indian mujahideen (IM) from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) persists, but the question of command and control is more difficult to discern. The IM is best viewed as an LeT associate rather than an LeT affiliate. The Indian mujahideen emerged as part of a wider jihadist project in India, but now constitutes the primary domestic jihadist threat. IM is best understood as a label for a relatively amorphous network populated by jihadist elements from the fringes of the Students Islamic Movement of India and the criminal underworld. Today, it has a loose leadership currently based in Pakistan and moves between there and the United Arab Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The direct threat to India from its indigenous jihadist movement is manageable and unlikely to impact the country's forward progress or wider regional stability. It is a symptom of political, socioeconomic, and communal issues that India arguably would need to address even if indigenous jihadism disappeared tomorrow. An attack or series of attacks by indigenous jihadists, however, start a wave of communal violence in India or trigger a diplomatic crisis with Pakistan. With or without LeT assistance, the IM constitutes a potential, but minimal, direct threat to U.S. and Western interests in India. Details: Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2014. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives 17: Accessed January 25, 2018 at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-17.pdf Year: 2014 Country: India URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-17.pdf Shelf Number: 148925 Keywords: Jihadist Movement Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System Summary: In the past few years, the international community has been increasingly confronted with the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Numerous reports have shed some light on the extent of this disturbing phenomenon. Estimates indicate that, since 2009, about 8,000 children have been recruited and used by Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, some boys have been forced to attack their own families to demonstrate loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls have been forced to marry, clean, cook and carry equipment and weapons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights received consistent reports that some boys and girls were increasingly being used as human shields and to detonate bombs. In May 2015, for example, a girl about 12 years old was used to detonate a bomb at a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe State, killing seven people. Similar incidents were reported in Cameroon and the Niger. During attacks by Boko Haram, abducted boys were used to identify those who refused to join the group, as well as unmarried women and girls. In 2015 alone, the United Nations verified 274 cases of children having been recruited by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations verified the existence of centres in rural Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and rural Raqqah that provided military training to at least 124 boys between 10 and 15 years of age. Verification of the use of children as foreign fighters has increased significantly, with 18 cases involving children as young as 7 years of age. The use of children as child executioners was reported and appeared in video footage. In Iraq, in two incidents in June and September 2015, more than 1,000 children were reportedly abducted by ISIL from Mosul district. While the lack of access to areas in conflict undercuts the possibility to gather precise data, it is known that recruited children were used to act as spies and scouts, to transport military supplies and equipment, to conduct patrols, to man checkpoints, to videotape attacks for propaganda purposes and to plant explosive devices, as well as to actively engage in attacks or combat situations. These figures are likely to be significant underestimates because of the limited opportunities to gain access and monitor violations against children. Child recruitment is also perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia,5 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and neighbouring countries and by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, to name a few. Owing to the expanding reach and propaganda of terrorist and violent extremist groups, child recruitment and exploitation are in no way limited to conflict-ridden areas. More and more children are travelling from their State of residence to areas controlled by terrorist and violent extremist groups, in order to join them. They may travel with their families or by themselves, and obtaining comprehensive data on their participation in hostilities is often difficult. In the case of ISIL, for instance, information often becomes available only after the children's death, when they are eulogized as martyrs and their country of origin is revealed. Data collected for more than one year, during the period 2015-2016, concerned 89 children who died in hostilities. They included not only nationals of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but also nationals of Australia, France, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yemen. These figures do not include children taken to ISIL territory by their families. Finally, children may also be recruited to support the groups, or even carry out attacks, in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Shelf Number: 148961 Keywords: Child Exploitation Child Protection Extremist Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Slot, Brigitte Title: Interwovenness of organised crime and terrorist jihadi groups regarding the procurement of firearms Summary: The question if and how organised crime and terrorist jihadi groups are interwoven regarding the procurement of (automatic) firearms is of great interest for investigative and intelligence services. This research sheds light on the issue through three elements: - a literature review, - an exploration of the added value of social network analysis (SNA), - an illustration of this added value based on a concrete Dutch case. The literature review expounds the (criminological) theory behind the interwovenness of organised crime and terrorist jihadi groups, and elaborates the most recent developments in our thinking about the issue: criminal and terrorist organisations recruit their members from the same pool; perpetrators of (foiled) attacks in Europe often had a criminal background; in the Paris attacks firearms were found from a batch that is connected to a known firearms supply line. With the knowledge about the international and European context as a background, an exploration has been conducted of the added value of SNA on this issue for investigative services. Based on a round of discussions with various departments of the National Police tasked with monitoring developments of this issue, it is concluded that for a variety of reasons currently SNA is applied to a limited extent. After a short explanation of what SNA entails, it is subsequently discussed how an SNA can be applied to studying this nexus. Next, the added value is illustrated through the analysis of a large case involving the smuggling of and trade in firearms: - Based on primary police data (registrations and antecedents) and discussions with involved experts the case is framed and a starting group of suspects is identified. The direct network of these persons has been mapped (in connection with which other persons were they known by the police?), after which the direct network of these newly added persons-of-interest was mapped, thereby resulting in a network comprising the network of our starting group to the second degree. In addition, various personal traits of the members of the network were mapped: were they encountered with firearms? Are they of interest in the context of counterterrorism, extremism and radicalisation (CTER) monitoring? Are the known to be firearms dealers? - In this way, interrelations between over 700 persons were mapped, as well as their profile ('firearms possessor', 'firearms dealer', 'terrorism suspect'). This resulted in 24 larger and smaller networks, which operated independently of one another (no interrelations were found between these networks, based on second degree connections). In additions, new connections that had not previously been visible came to light. - Based on the data gathered, SNA-specific network indicators were calculated, which help with identifying the function of a person within a network: who is important acting as a bridge between sub-networks, who are central actors in a network, who have the most connections with 'important' persons? Proceeding from the values on these indicators, a number of persons have been identified as potentially interesting for follow-up by the investigative services A further deepening of this theme is recommended as a result of this exploration. In the context of this research, a number of concrete possibilities have been described for how to apply SNA within the police agencies to this theme and related issues. SNA can support the process of gathering further information regarding the nexus of organised crime and terrorist jihadi groups, and can assist in the decision-making concerning how to prioritise follow-up investigatory work. Details: Rotterdam: Ecorys, 2017. Executive summary. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2018 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2738_Summary_tcm29-291432.pdf (full text only available in Dutch) Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2738_Summary_tcm29-291432.pdf Shelf Number: 148985 Keywords: Crime Analysis Illegal Arms Trade Illegal Firearms Jihadi Groups Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Alusala, Nelson Title: Africa in Arms: Taking stock of efforts for improved arms control Summary: The future of Africa's development is intrinsically linked to the continent's ability to take charge of its peace and security. The African Union (AU) Commission is best placed to lead this process. However, the organisation and its member states have continuously been challenged by the widespread and uncontrolled flow of arms and ammunition. The AU Commission and its affiliated sub-regional organisations have put into place a number of initiatives and mechanisms that align their efforts with global processes, but Africa is yet to fully enjoy the dividends of these measures. This paper reviews the achievements attained so far, explores some of the drivers of the demand for arms and identifies recommendations for bolstering existing efforts. Recommendations - To strengthen current efforts, the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) should consider the following: - Strengthening stockpile management systems within member states. This should include the construction of modern armouries and capacity building for relevant personnel. - Enforcing the implementation of arms embargoes, in collaboration with the UN sanctions committees and embargo monitoring groups. - Addressing terrorism comprehensively. Terrorism is increasingly becoming a major driver for illicit arms flows. There is an urgent need for the AU and its sub-regional organisations to coordinate efforts to eliminate this growing menace. - Regulating artisanal arms manufacturers. These manufacturers should be supported in a framework that allows them to operate in a more formalised way. Failure to do this would exacerbate illicit arms proliferation and manufacturing. Details: s.l.: ENACT, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper Issue 3: Accessed February 6, 2018 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-12-13-ResearchPaper-AfricainArms-Research.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-12-13-ResearchPaper-AfricainArms-Research.pdf Shelf Number: 148998 Keywords: Arms Control Illegal Trade Illicit Weapons Terrorism Trafficking in Weapons Weapons

Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Warner, Jason Title: Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab Summary: Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group that has been plaguing Somalia since 2006, was named the most deadly terror group in Africa in 2017 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). One tactic that al-Shabaab uses in its reign of terror is suicide bombing. Despite recognition of the seriousness of the threat that al-Shabaab's suicide bombers pose, very little is known about how, when, and why al-Shabaab elects to employ the tactic of suicide bombings. This report answers these questions. By analyzing a unique dataset compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that tracks all instances of al-Shabaab suicide bombings between the group's first suicide attack on September 18, 2006, to the end of our data collection in October 2017, the authors offer the most comprehensive account to date on the emergence, evolution, and efficacy on al-Shabaab's suicide bombers. They find that al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab's suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe. Their data also reveals information about just who serves as al-Shabaab's suicide bombers; where they target; al-Shabaab's suicide bombing delivery tendencies; and timing trends along months and days of the week. In conclusion, they offer suggestions about how to combat the group's suicide bombing efforts in the future. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149106 Keywords: Boko Haram Islamic State Suicide Bombers Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Eser Davolio, Miryam Title: Background to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland: Summary: What is the background to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland? An exploratory study analysed this on both the individual and collective level, providing recommendations on prevention and intervention. For this purpose, the research team interviewed one returnee, as well as relevant professionals from schooling, social work and Muslim organisations. An accompanying Internet study was also conducted. Initial situation The phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation presents society with similar issues to those arising from other forms of extremism. A glance beyond this country's borders reveals a broad array of different intervention strategies, such as deterrence via long prison terms for returnees (GB, B), rehabilitation and social reintegration (DK), or community-oriented approaches (NL). In order to find starting points adapted to the Swiss context and to develop strategies for prevention and intervention, it is first necessary to analyse the specific backgrounds and interrelationships pertaining to radicalisation. Objective In this explorative study, the background to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland was analysed and, on this basis, recommendations on prevention and intervention were derived for the federal government. The study considered the individual psychosocial, socio-demographic and contextual factors leading to the radicalisation of adolescents and young adults on the one hand, and the societal interrelationships in the living environment and in the community on the other hand. Methodology By means of literature-based research and around twenty interviews with Swiss and foreign experts, the state of current research was established. For analysis of the individual characteristics of jihadist-motivated travellers, an interview with a returnee was conducted and a grid was developed for the investigative authorities. In an Internet study, various approaches and their associated discourses and narratives were examined. In a second step, relevant experts from the domains of schooling, social work and Muslim organisations were asked about their experiences and preliminary considerations. This revealed ways in which the phenomenon can be confronted. Results Due to the manifold and complex factors that facilitate jihadist radicalisation, listing criteria for a risk profile is unacceptable. Reduction also represents an inadequate perspective that masks out other possible motivating factors, such as humanitarian concerns or the desire to set up a new state. It would be a mistake to fixate on religious attraction processes, because political aspects rooted in Muslims' experiences of discrimination and victimisation are equally worthy of consideration. Thus, each case is to be contemplated individually. For prevention and intervention, new structures should be set up on the one hand, such as counselling services competence centres. On the other hand, the existing network of players in the social and school-based domain should be developed further, so as to identify the first signs of attraction processes at an early stage and to take a coordinated approach in specific cases. Details: Zurich University of Applied Sciences, School of Social Work Research and Development, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed FEbruary 22, 2018 at: https://www.zhaw.ch/storage/shared/sozialearbeit/Forschung/Deliquenz_Kriminalpraevention/Jugendkriminalitaet_Jugendgewalt/Schlussbericht-Jihadismus-EN.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Switzerland URL: https://www.zhaw.ch/storage/shared/sozialearbeit/Forschung/Deliquenz_Kriminalpraevention/Jugendkriminalitaet_Jugendgewalt/Schlussbericht-Jihadismus-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 149221 Keywords: Juvenile Delinquents Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Webb, Emma Title: Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector Summary: The British taxpayer has handed over more than L6 million to charities that are currently, or have been in the past, used by extremists to further their radical agenda, according to a new report from the Henry Jackson Society. The report's case studies are illustrative - so L6 million is likely the tip of the iceberg. The money is enough to fund 27,328 hospital beds per day, the annual salary of 234 infantry soldiers, or the salary of 264 new teachers - but instead, it is being handed over to individuals some of whose involvement in extremism can be traced back to the Islamist scene in the early 2000s. Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector finds that, despite more than a decade of attempts to improve regulations, a concerning number of UK-registered charities continue to fund and support extremism. Figures from across the Islamist spectrum, including the Muslim Brotherhood, form a network which seeks to delegitimise and push out moderate voices, while masquerading as representatives of 'true' Islam. For example, Helping Households Under Great Stress (HHUGS) is involved in prisoner advocacy - but extreme and illiberal individuals are involved at all levels of the organisation, from trustees to supporters, speakers and beneficiaries. The Charity Commission - legally unable to de-register these 'bad' charities - has been particularly ill-equipped to deal with these organisations. Its powers have been extended in recent legislation, but the public is still waiting for those new powers to be put to use to tackle this problem. The report makes a number of recommendations, including: The Charity Commission must urgently exercise the powers given to it under the Charities Act 2016 to direct the winding up of charities and the removal of inappropriate trustees - as well as become much more proactive in checking the background of trustees. The Government should consider increasing the resources available to the Commission so that they can effectively implement their new powers. HM Revenue & Customs should work closely with the Commission to prevent the misuse of Gift Aid. Ofcom should be granted more powers - and use its current powers more effectively - to deal with channels providing a platform for extremist content, individuals or fundraising for extremist charities. Crowd-funding and event platforms such as Eventbrite, JustGiving and Virgin Giving should do more to prevent extremist charities from raising money and advertising events through their websites. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 172p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Shelf Number: 149289 Keywords: Charities Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: EU and Member States' Policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes Summary: This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee), presents an overview of the legal and policy framework in the EU and 10 select EU Member States on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes. The study analyses how Member States define suspects of terrorism-related crimes, what measures are available to state authorities to prevent and investigate such crimes and how information on suspects of terrorism-related crimes is exchanged between Member States. The comparative analysis between the 10 Member States subject to this study, in combination with the examination of relevant EU policy and legislation, leads to the development of key conclusions and recommendations. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 1, 2018 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 149305 Keywords: Extremist Violence Extremists Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism Summary: This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year. The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country. However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL. The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility. More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group. The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals. The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt. The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired. Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can be more difficult to detect. It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD counties is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970. The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns. The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached $14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications. Details: New York: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149443 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Allgeier, Rosemary Title: ISIS Child Soldiers in Syria: The Structural and Predatory Recruitment, Enlistment, Pre-Training Indoctrination, Training, and Deployment Summary: Research on the engagement of children with the so-called Islamic State (a.k.a. ISIS) relies heavily on the analysis of obtained ISIS documents and ISIS-disseminated propaganda, leaving major elements of the recruitment and deployment process uncovered. Such ambiguities hinder future efforts aimed at dealing with ISIS' child soldiers. As such, an intensive effort to compile data using interviews and naturalistic observations across ISIS held territories in Syria was made to exhaustively explore the process of child recruitment and deployment by ISIS. Findings suggest that there are two methods of recruitment: predatory and structural. The enlistment, intensity of indoctrination, types of training, and nature of deployment were found to depend, to a high degree, on the type of recruitment (i.e., predatory or structural), and category of children based on their origin (i.e., local, Middle Eastern and North African [MENA], or foreign) and if they are orphans. The data shows that the separation between children and adults' roles/assignments is diminishing. After a thorough exploration of the elements of ISIS' recruitment and deployment process, this paper argues its findings, implications, and limitations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed March 13, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ICCT-Almohammad-ISIS-Child-Soldiers-In-Syria-Feb2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Syria URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ICCT-Almohammad-ISIS-Child-Soldiers-In-Syria-Feb2018.pdf Shelf Number: 149454 Keywords: Child Soldiers ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremists

Author: Sheikh, Sanah Title: Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK Summary: The Office of Public Management (OPM) has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) to conduct a literature review that provides a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. The specific objectives of the review are to provide an overview of evidence on: - what Muslim communities' attitudes are towards violent extremism; - what Muslim communities understand by 'violent extremism' and how this understanding is shaped; - the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism; - any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and - how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism. The literature search, review and synthesis were informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies1 and universities. 2,3 These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK. The search was conducted in partnership with search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP). The review as conducted over a number of stages and literature was identified from a number of sources including database searches, expert and prevent lead consultation, website searches and OPM and CLG collected literature. After a rigorous sifting process, 36 items were included for review. The review found that there is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and 'support' for it. Additionally, there are also some limitations to the methods utilized in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, 4 which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, the purpose of these studies is to conduct a snap shot of public attitudes, rather than a more rigorous research study of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings. Details: London: Great Britain, Office for Public Management, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Shelf Number: 118589 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Public Attitudes Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Hill, Max Title: The Westminster Bridge terrorist attack Summary: 1. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, 52-year old British-born Khalid Masood drove a hired vehicle across Westminster Bridge in the direction of the Palace of Westminster. He mounted the pavement twice colliding with pedestrians and then a third time crashing into the east perimeter gates of the Palace of Westminster. Masood then exited the car and ran into the vehicle entrance gateway of the Palace of Westminster, Carriage Gates, where he attacked and fatally injured PC Keith Palmer using a knife. Masood was shot at the scene by armed police protection officers who were in Parliament at the time of the attack. The whole incident lasted approximately 82 seconds. The attack resulted in 29 people injured and 6 fatalities. 2. The ensuing police investigation was named Operation Classific. Counter-terrorism policing officers arrested and detained 12 people in the course of the investigation. All were released without charge. I have been provided with the full details of all who were arrested, but I am unable to publish names which are not already in the public domain, because none have been charged with any offence. 3. I conducted a 'snapshot review' of the arrests, detention and release of all twelve persons in Operation Classific. I conclude, in summary, as follows: a. The police and emergency services were confronted by a terrorist incident which claimed multiple lives and which occurred mid-afternoon in central London. An immediate and comprehensive criminal investigation was required by the police, who had to work with the facts and materials presented to them at the scene, namely the abandoned hire car and its contents. b. It is important to review Operation Classific contemporaneously, in other words placing oneself in the position of police commanders on 22nd March 2017 and in the days which followed. Whilst the physical aftermath of the deadly terrorist attack was managed by all of those services who rushed to Westminster Bridge, the Metropolitan Police team were required to make quick decisions to unearth any and all evidence which might be relevant to Masood's attack planning. Whilst hindsight has its place, it is secondary to understanding in-the-moment decisions taken by police officers as the criminal investigation rapidly unfolded. c. The use of arrest and detention powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 nonetheless requires careful scrutiny. A fast-moving investigation such as this one required ongoing assimilation of information as it came to light, and quick reaction to successive events including the discovery of persons at premises known to have been associated with Masood. In the event, twelve people were lawfully arrested and detained, in most cases under the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000. Their respective detention times varied widely. All were released, and none were charged with any offence. d. The fact that twelve people were arrested and detained, and none were charged with any offence, does not imply any criticism of this investigation. Whilst the police must always strive to manage counter-terrorism investigations appropriately, and must strive to reduce pre-charge detention time in every case to no more than a necessary minimum, it is a feature of fast-moving, modern investigations into serious terrorism offences that arrest and detention powers will be used and will not lead in every case to a positive charging decision. e. Operation Classific was fast, efficient and comprehensive. Whilst lessons can always be learned from scrutinizing the arrest and detention phase of such an investigation, I have concluded on the basis of the information and materials provided to me that there was a reasoned and proportionate use of the relevant terrorism legislation in this case. I have summarised my recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report. Details: London: U.K. Government, 2018. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Shelf Number: 149600 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Dark Net De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Summary: Project SAFTE is an international research project, funded by the European Commission, that aims to contribute to the fight against (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe. This research project has demonstrated the existence of various illicit firearms markets in the EU, each with their own specific features and dynamics. The traditionally closed character of these markets has partially eroded in several EU member states in recent years, which has increased the availability of firearms in general, and military-grade firearms in particular, to criminals and to terrorists with criminal connections. To combat this, a comprehensive and proactive approach is needed that consists of improving the intelligence picture on illicit firearms trafficking, upgrading the policy and the regulatory framework on firearms, and optimising operational capacities and cooperation. Background Several terrorist attacks have been carried out with firearms in Europe in recent years, causing the deaths of hundreds of people and injuries to hundreds more. These events demonstrate that terrorists are able to get their hands on various types of firearms, including military-grade firearms. Although the use of firearms to commit terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon in the EU, Europol recently noted that firearms have become the most prevalent type of weaponry used by terrorists and violent extremists across a range of ideologies. This observation led policy-makers in Europe to develop specific measures to combat terrorist access to firearms. In-depth, evidence-based insight into the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU is limited, however. This is part of the larger problem of the scarcity of reliable data and in-depth research with regard to Europe's illicit firearms markets. Process The goal of Project SAFTE is to improve knowledge regarding (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe and to provide information that can influence policy intended to enhance the fight against this security threat. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated the project, and carried it out in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (SSSA). In addition, research teams from Arquebus Solutions, the Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma contributed extensively to the study. The design of the research project consisted of two phases. In a first phase, specialised research teams conducted qualitative, in-depth studies into illicit firearms markets, terrorist access to these markets and national policies to counter these phenomena in eight EU member states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Romania, the Netherlands and the UK. More than one hundred key national actors were interviewed during this process. The second phase consisted of a systematic and comparative analysis, in which the studies in these countries were supplemented by an explorative mapping of the situation in the other twenty EU member states. In addition, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood (the Balkans, Northern Africa and Ukraine), to address the significant interconnections between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. All these findings were then linked to the EU policy context by, for example, interviews with several key international actors. The research conducted for Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications. The findings of the systematic and comparative analysis are presented in a policyoriented synthesis report, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe: Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE. A separately edited volume, Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, publishes the individual country studies, together with the studies on the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa and Ukraine. indings on illicit firearms markets There is no unified illicit firearms market in the EU. Various regional variants of illicit firearms markets can be identified, however, each with distinct characteristics and dynamics. These differences can be attributed to a variety of local elements that shape local demand and supply of illicit firearms and influence the involvement of different actors. Although it is currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the scope of illicit firearms markets in the EU in a credible way, it is clear that most of the firearms that are available on illicit firearms markets are handguns. The presence of military-grade firearms is generally more limited. The easy and cheap access to certain firearms in some countries strongly contributes to illicit firearms trafficking across the EU. Most illicit firearms markets in Europe are driven by criminal demand. Different types of criminals tend to procure, possess and use different types of firearms, and contemporary terrorist networks usually rely on established criminal connections to acquire firearms from these markets. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the illicitly possessed firearms are in the hands of private citizens in several EU member states who have no criminal or terrorist motives. These are individuals who simply possess firearms without holding the necessary permits. Firearms end up in illicit markets in the EU through cross-border smuggling from both outside the EU (mainly from the Western Balkans) and intra-EU trafficking (mainly as a result of differences in national legislation). The most important illicit supply mechanisms for firearms in the EU are cross-border smuggling, change of ownership through theft, the conversion of blank-firing guns, and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. Each EU member state has a different illicit firearms market with its distinct supply mechanisms, however. These different supply mechanisms are characterised by their own dynamics, and present specific policy and law enforcement challenges. Our analyses indicate that supplying firearms to European illicit firearms markets is not very lucrative, and is generally not a primary source of income for those actors involved in trafficking firearms. Another observation is the cyclical nature of supply and demand in these markets. The actors involved in firearms trafficking in the EU have constantly adapted their operating methods in reaction to regional, national and European policy initiatives and law enforcement operations. Traditionally, illicit firearms markets in Europe are closed markets with restricted access for people outside criminal networks, and having the right criminal connections and reputation are crucial factors in this, even in countries with rather high levels of illicit firearms possession. Differences can be observed in the access to illicit firearms, and especially military-grade firearms, and these differences are linked to the criminal hierarchy and the criminal milieu to which the potential buyer belongs. They are also reflected by a price hierarchy for illicit firearms markets that is similar across the EU: the most expensive firearms on the illicit firearms market are generally military-grade firearms such as assault rifles, while the cheapest firearms are generally (converted) blank-firing firearms. The closed character of these markets has been under pressure in recent years, which is linked to the observed growing availability of certain types of firearms. The underlying factors of this erosion are the emergence of the Internet, the crossborder smuggling of military-grade assault rifles into the EU, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. The increased availability of firearms has contributed to arms races between criminal groups across the EU. This has facilitated the gradual tricklingdown of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU member states, especially in Western Europe. Findings on terrorist access to illicit firearms markets Significant amounts of firearms have been seized from different types of terrorist networks in recent years. These firearms include various models and brands of pistols and revolvers, but also various types of military-grade firearms, such as assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Terrorists who procure firearms generally do so exclusively for carrying out terrorist acts and to defend themselves against law enforcement agencies. Most terrorists seem to have a preference for military-grade firearms, although the observed possession of less-suitable firearms among terrorist networks suggests that not all terrorists have access to a wide range of firearms. Our comparative analysis identified clear distinctions between different types of terrorist networks in the EU in the acquisition, possession and use of firearms. While the traditional separatist groups have developed their own distinct (and context-specific) firearms acquisition patterns, religiously-inspired terrorist networks across the EU generally rely on criminal connections to obtain firearms from local illicit markets. There are no indications of significant firearms flows between the various types of terrorist networks in Europe today and also no indications of recent state-sponsored arms transfers to terrorist groups in the EU. For most of the contemporary terrorist networks operating in Europe, access to local criminal firearms markets is a key element in their firearms acquisition patterns. Through their criminal pasts, contemporary terrorists with criminal antecedents have acquired various skills that can be used in the planning and execution of successful terrorist attacks, including the skills and network needed to acquire weapons more easily. Given the generally closed character of these markets, only terrorists with the right criminal connections can acquire firearms, and in particular military-grade firearms, on illicit firearms markets in the EU. The observed terrorist firearms arsenals therefore generally reflect the specific dynamics of the local criminal firearms market. Individuals without a developed criminal network generally experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms, and are more likely to use an alternative acquisition method, for example the Internet, or to use a different type of weapon. No illicit firearms dealers have been observed who exclusively supply firearms to terrorist networks. There seem to be a number of barriers that inhibit criminals from actively and knowingly supplying weapons for terrorist attacks. Illicit firearms dealers are generally not eager to engage in activities that are not very lucrative, but at the same time involve an increased risk of detection and higher penalties. Terrorists will generally rely on already established criminal connections, often pre-dating their radicalisation, in order to obtain firearms on illicit markets, and sellers often do not know they are selling to terrorists. This can be observed among the significant number of terrorists with a criminal history. Prisons have also been identified as places that offer new opportunities for terrorists who do not yet have the necessary criminal connections to acquire firearms. The overwhelming majority of those perpetrators of recent jihadi terrorist attacks who had a criminal history were involved in low-level criminality. There have been some exceptions of perpetrators who attained a mid-level position in the criminal underworld, but none of the perpetrators or people arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years was a member of a high-level organised crime group. In countries where illicit firearms supply channels are tightly controlled by a limited number of highly-organised crime groups, it is quite difficult for terrorists to acquire firearms. In particular, countries with more chaotic criminal landscapes present potential terrorists with increased opportunities for illicit firearms acquisition. Individuals who acquire firearms for a terrorist network are generally not recruited for this specific purpose, but are already part of the network, and become responsible for this task later because of their skills and networks. Contemporary terrorist networks seeking (specific types of) firearms, but who lack the necessary criminal connections or are operating in a context of limited firearms availability in the local illicit market, can engage in the direct diversion of legally owned firearms, for example by targeted thefts of firearms from state stockpiles or legal gun owners. From a historical perspective, targeted thefts have been a vital element in the firearms acquisition patterns of separatist terror groups in Europe, but such thefts have decreased in recent years. Firearms that were deliberately stolen have only been encountered among jihadi networks in exceptional cases. The diversion of legal ownership for terrorist aims through various forms of embezzlement is also quite exceptional in the EU, as well as the legal possession of firearms by perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Yet, in some EU member states significant numbers of legally-owned firearms have been observed among members of extremist networks, and especially right-wing networks. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 149820 Keywords: Illicit Firearms Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe Summary: In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these articles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written primarily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest in size. Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforcement agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understanding of what happened in Europe's wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the significant nexus between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. Overview of the chapters The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main findings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country often labelled as one of Europe's hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenomenon, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforcement services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. In the second chapter Filip Dragovic, Paul James, Kresimir Mamic and Robert Mikac analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms possession in the country, Croatia is not characterized by a very active illicit firearms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking. In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organized motorcycle gangs as well as less organized urban street gangs, are the main customers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of firearms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregistered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by criminals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to prevent violent extremism. In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and Andre Desmarais present a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the firearms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the firearms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and networks are characterized by different firearms acquisition patterns. While jihadi terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent terrorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politically address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on firearms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest to sell firearms to terrorist networks. In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availability and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data collection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the different law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-toconvert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where controls can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smuggling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal firearms possession, a proactive operational 'investigate the gun' - approach to combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. The firearms that circulate in the UK's criminal underground are therefore very often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of firearms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists' options are largely restricted to converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the 'Troubles', including different types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportunities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons decreases. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 149844 Keywords: Firearms Gun Markets Illicit Firearms Smuggling of Firearms Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons

Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Summary: Key findings Terrorism At the crossroads of the region's most violent conflicts, Niger has served as a primary transit point for armed criminal and terrorist groups operating in the various conflict theatres that surround it. Everything from people, weapons, and low-tech communications pass through Niger's borders, providing a rich source of intelligence that is critical to understanding the nature of cross-border relationships and networks of trafficking and terrorist groups. Niger presents a privileged arena in which to observe the array of terrorist dynamics across the Sahel, and to take action against them. The country has become a major partner in counter-terrorism strategies for regional and western powers. Relatively spared by the threat of terrorism until 2015, the increase in terrorist attacks in Niger since then, first by Boko Haram and then by AQIM-related groups or splinter cells, run in parallel with the enhanced engagement of the Nigerien authorities against terrorism in the region, including MNJTF, MINUSMA, and G5 Sahel efforts. While the north of the country is particularly affected by armed banditry, the south has suffered the bulk of terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram was responsible for perpetrating 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks carried out on Nigerien soil, but 2017 saw a surge in deadly attacks against security positions near the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali by AQIM- and IS-related groups based in Mali. Sahelian terrorist groups find Niger a fertile recruiting ground and exploit long-standing community divisions, which are in turn exacerbated by increasing insecurity. Arms trafficking Niger has served as a key transit route for weapons heading to conflict zones in the region, but the deterioration of the country's security situation has resulted in an increase in the domestic demand for weapons, particularly for small arms and ammunition. Arms seized from terrorists or en route to terrorist groups in Niger over the past five years include explosives, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and associated ammunition (including MANPADS, mortar rounds, and machine guns). Vehicles were also seized. Terrorist groups operating in Niger, including those based in Mali and Nigeria, have been obtaining materiel from a variety of sources-including from national stockpiles in the region-following the collapse of state control over arsenals, as in Libya or northern Mali, attacks against security positions, or diversion in countries such as Niger or Nigeria. Ammunition held by terrorist groups, other armed actors, and civilians is very similar, indicating common sources of illicit ammunition, including past rebellions and national stockpiles from Niger and neighbouring countries. However, it does vary between the regions: while chains of transfers in the north originate mainly from Libya and Mali, materiel in the south-east comes mainly from Chad and Nigeria. While Libya continues to be a source for illicit weapons in Niger, including converted blank'firing handguns, trafficking from Libya has declined significantly since 2014 due to the depletion of Qaddafi's SALW stockpiles, national demand reinvigorated in light of renewed conflict in Libya, and increased levels of surveillance and counteraction in Niger with the deployment of Operation Barkhane. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Niger URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Shelf Number: 149854 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Illicit Trafficking Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Arms Violence

Author: Baldo, Suliman Title: Radical Intolerance: Sudan's Religious Oppression and Embrace of Extremist Groups Summary: The Obama and Trump administrations, in temporarily and then permanently lifting comprehensive sanctions on Sudan, cited improvements in the Sudanese government's counterterrorism and its broader humanitarian and human rights record. But a closer look reveals these claims to be very problematic, with major implications for the next stage of dialogue and policy between the United States and Sudan. Now that the comprehensive sanctions have been lifted, it is essential that the United States pivot rapidly and aggressively to the relationship's next phase, which should focus on creating leverage in support of American counterterrorism interests and much more fundamental reforms that could change the nature of the authoritarian, kleptocratic Sudanese state and better secure the rights of Christians, minority Muslims, war-affected Sudanese people, and others who have been victimized by this regime for nearly 30 years. Khartoum's track record raises critical questions about its role and true interests as a counterterrorism partner. Top U.S. policymakers who chart the next phase of engagement with Sudan should account for this as they engage in anticipated discussions about remaining sanctions, a significant shift in bilateral relations, terminating Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and forgiving Sudan's debt, estimated to have mushroomed to $50 billion.[i] Sudan's intolerant regime has a long-established tradition of religious persecution that continues today despite its bid for normalized ties with the United States and the rest of the world. It also has maintained long relationships with active extremist groups. This record suggests Sudan may be an untrustworthy partner in the bid to push back against religious extremism that is gaining momentum in the region and is essential for combatting international terrorism. The next phase of the policy effort should therefore focus on more structural changes in Sudan to address these core problems that continue to be central to the Sudanese regime: links to extremists and deep discrimination against religious minorities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2017. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2018 at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sudan URL: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Shelf Number: 149962 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending Title: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting American While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability Summary: The United States currently lacks an accurate accounting of how much it has spent on the fight against terrorism. Without accurate data, policymakers will have difficulty evaluating whether the nation spends too much or too little on the counterterrorism (CT) mission, and whether current spending is doing its job effectively or efficiently. In the summer of 2017, the Stimson Center convened a nonpartisan study group to provide an initial tally of total CT spending since 9/11, to examine gaps in the understanding of CT spending, and to offer recommendations for improving U.S. government efforts to account for these expenditures. Stimson's research suggests that total spending that has been characterized as CT-related - including expenditures for government-wide homeland security efforts, international programs, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria - totaled $2.8 trillion during fiscal years 2002 through 2017. According to the group's research, annual CT spending peaked at $260 billion in 2008 at the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This represents a 16-fold increase over the 2001 total. In 2017, as war funding declined, total CT spending amounted to $175 billion, nearly an 11-fold increase from the 2001 level. With this growth, CT spending has become a substantial component of total discretionary spending for programs across a wide range of areas, including defense, education, and medical research. Of $18 trillion in discretionary spending between fiscal years 2002-2017, CT spending made up nearly 16 percent of the whole.[i] At its peak in 2008, CT spending amounted to 22 percent of total discretionary spending. By 2017, CT spending had fallen to 14 percent of the total. Despite this drop, the study group found no indication that CT spending is likely to continue to decline. At the same time, budgetary caps enacted in 2011 in the Budget Control Act (BCA) have created an attractive fiscal loophole by placing new pressures on spending while exempting spending characterized as emergency or war spending, also known as overseas contingency operations (OCO). In recent years, billions of dollars in spending unrelated to the wars has been characterized as OCO in order to exempt it from the BCA caps. This practice makes it more difficult to identify spending that is truly dedicated to CT and to evaluate potential trade-offs. The Stimson study group found a variety of weaknesses in definitions, tracking, and consistencies that limit accuracy and contribute to a lack of transparency regarding the current data on CT spending. These weaknesses make it difficult to evaluate whether CT spending has been effective at enhancing security at home or overseas. The study group's recommendations are designed to improve the accuracy of tracking CT spending and to provide greater clarity for budget planning for future CT programs. The study group concluded that a broader set of parameters is urgently needed in order to make the full federal investment in CT more transparent, to identify gaps and trade-offs, and to permit more useful evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of that spending. 1. Create a clear and transparent counterterrorism funding report. Congress should reinstate and expand the statutory requirement that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) compile data and analyze government-wide U.S. homeland security spending in its annual budget request. OMB should provide metrics that show Congress and the public the scope of counter-terrorism spending relative to total discretionary spending and total spending, including mandatory spending. 2. Adopt a detailed agency-wide definition for counter-terrorism spending. OMB and Congress should develop, adopt, and enforce a clear, usable set of criteria to define counter-terrorism spending, including programs with the primary purpose of preventing, mitigating, or responding to terrorist attacks in the United States or overseas. This definition may be tailored to individual agency missions as long as agencies show how any counterterrorism spending addresses a credible threat to the United States. 3. Build on current accounting structures to anticipate future budget pressures. OMB should work with agencies to build on the current accounting structure to distinguish counter-terrorism spending at the program, activity, and project levels, identifying ongoing vs. incremental emergency needs. 4. Tie the definition of war spending to specific activities. OMB and Congress should develop and implement clear criteria for terrorism-related spending through overseas contingency operations and other emergency authorities. This should include the cost of deploying U.S. troops to conflict zones; countering terrorist groups through military, diplomatic, or other operations; training foreign militaries; and conducting emergency military response activities within the United States that have a counter-terrorism focus. Overseas contingency operations should be limited to such spending. 5. Require Congress to separately approve emergency or wartime spending. Congress should pass new legislation that requires it to vote separately to approve spending that is designated as war-related emergency or wartime overseas contingency operations spending before those funds can be obligated. Details: Washington, DC: Stimson, 2018. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 150191 Keywords: Costs of Terrorism Counter-terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism

Author: Bier, David J. Title: Extreme Vetting of Immigrants: Estimating Terrorism Vetting Failures Summary: President Donald Trump has promised to implement "extreme vetting" of immigrants and foreign travelers, asserting that widespread vetting failures had allowed many terrorists to enter the United States. This policy analysis provides the first estimate of the number of terrorism vetting failures, both before and after the vetting enhancements implemented in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Vetting failures are rare and have become much rarer since 9/11. A terrorism vetting failure occurs when a foreigner is granted entry to the United States who had terrorist associations or sympathies and who later committed a terrorism offense including support for terrorist groups abroad. This analysis defines vetting failure broadly to include individuals who had privately held extremist views before entry. Moreover, unless evidence exists to the contrary, it assumes that anyone who entered the United States legally either as an adult or older teenager, and who was charged with a terrorism offense within a decade of entry, entered as a result of a vetting failure, even without any evidence that he or she was radicalized prior to entry. By this definition, only 13 people - 2 percent of the 531 individuals convicted of terrorism offenses or killed while committing an offense since 9/11 - entered due to a vetting failure in the post-9/11 security system. There were 52 vetting failures in the 15 years leading up to 9/11, four times as many as in the 15 years since the attacks. From 2002 to 2016, the vetting system failed and permitted the entry of 1 radicalized terrorist for every 29 million visa or status approvals. This rate was 84 percent lower than during the 15-year period leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Only 1 of the 13 post-9/11 vetting failures resulted in a deadly attack in the United States. Thus, the rate for deadly terrorists was 1 for every 379 million visa or status approvals from 2002 through 2016. During this same period, the chance of an American being killed in an attack committed by a terrorist who entered as a result of a vetting failure was 1 in 328 million per year. The risk from vetting failures was 99.5 percent lower during this period than during the 15-year period from 1987 to 2001. The evidence indicates that the U.S. vetting system is already "extreme" enough to handle the challenge of foreign terrorist infiltration. Details: Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis No. 838: Accessed May 17, 2018 at: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Shelf Number: 150249 Keywords: Homeland Security Immigration Enforcement Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency Summary: In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa's enduring insurgencies. In order to better understand Boko Haram now and in the future, this report, edited by Jacob Zenn, challenges some key misconceptions about the insurgency and provides new analyses and insights based on many exclusive primary source materials and datasets. To provide these unique insights, several authors with on-the-ground experience contribute to six areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa: - Ideology (Abdulbasit Kassim) - Gender (Elizabeth Pearson) - Leadership (Atta Barkindo) - Counterinsurgency (Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri) - Regional dynamics (Omar Mahmoud) - Terrorist networks (Jacob Zenn) It is hoped that these analyses of 'Africa's enduring insurgency' will be useful to counterterrorism practitioners, humanitarian organizations, and academia and will assist in understanding and, ultimately, mitigating and resolving the conflict. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism center at West Point, 2018. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Shelf Number: 150341 Keywords: Boko Haram Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Tesfaye, B. Title: "If youth are given the chance": Effects of education and civic engagement on Somali youth support for political violence. Summary: Understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict to promote long-term stability is a perennial focus of development programs, yet policymakers still struggle to find proven, effective solutions. Underlying this challenge is a dearth of evidence regarding violence-reduction approaches. Though an increasing number of empirical studies have focused on evaluating the impact of development programs on attitudes and behaviors related to violence (including Mercy Corps' research in Somaliland and Afghanistan), questions remain about the relative effectiveness of different types of interventions and about the conditions under which some interventions may or may not succeed in reducing violence. The motivation behind this research study is to help fill these knowledge gaps. In particular, this research seeks to test the impact of two common violence-reduction approaches- education and civic engagement-on youths' level of support for armed violence. By expanding our previous study from Somaliland to examine education, civic engagement, and political violence in South Central Somalia and Puntland, this study also allows us to understand whether the effects of the same education and civic engagement interventions persist across different contexts. Somalia faces many challenges and opportunities when it comes to violence reduction. Though the nation is striving to move beyond decades of unrest and violent conflict and toward stability and broad-based development, the security situation remains tenuous. The two truck bombs that exploded on October 14, 2017, killing more than 500 people in Mogadishu, highlight both how deadly armed opposition groups continue to be and Somalia's continued vulnerability to violence. Armed groups have proven repeatedly how resilient they can be, constantly adapting to new threats- both internal and external-to ensure their own survival. A steady source of resilience for armed opposition groups is a large pool of frustrated youth whom they can recruit and indoctrinate. To promote stability, several youth development programs in Somalia seek to engage vulnerable youth and address their needs, including Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Learners Initiative (SYLI), which focused on increasing access to secondary education and civic engagement opportunities for youth. Evaluating the SYLI program provided an opportunity to better understand if and how improved access to formal secondary education and increased opportunities for civic engagement can reduce young Somalis' support for armed groups and the use of violence to achieve political aims. Details: Washington, DC: Mercy Corps, 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/If%20Youth%20Are%20Given%20the%20Chance_LR_FINAL.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Somalia URL: https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/If%20Youth%20Are%20Given%20the%20Chance_LR_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 150404 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Education and Crime Interventions Political Violence Radicalization Terrorism Violence Prevention

Author: European Court of Auditors Title: Tackling radicalisation that leads to terrorism: the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but with some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation Summary: I. European Union (EU) Member States are responsible for national security, including the fight against terrorism. They are in charge of designing and implementing measures at national level that aim to tackle radicalisation, i.e. the phenomenon of people embracing extremist ideologies and behaviours which could lead them to commit acts of terrorism. As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of preventive actions are generally deployed to address the problem. The Commission's role is to support Member States in their efforts and help to ensure that good practices are exchanged. To do so, the Commission draws on an increasingly wide range of EU funds. II. Our audit examined whether the Commission manages this cross-cutting support well. In particular, we assessed whether: the Commission provides Member States with relevant support; the actions financed by the different EU funds are coordinated to make the most of any synergies; the Commission has put in place a framework to assess the effectiveness and value for money of its support. III. Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation. IV. The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network. V. The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes. This has resulted in synergies between its actions. However, despite recent improvements, there is still scope to improve the coordination of Commission actions. For example, the Commission's overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies. We also found that the RAN, one of the Commission's main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects. VI. The Commission has not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its support is effective and offers value for money. For example, it has not broken down the overall policy objectives into more specific and measurable objectives, and the funds that the Commission has used are not accompanied by indicators and targets designed to measure success in addressing radicalisation. VII. Moreover, the achievements of specific actions are often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness. As a result, there is a risk that useful lessons might not be disseminated or taken into account when the Commission designs actions or develops its policy further. VIII. On the basis of its findings, the ECA recommends that the Commission should: improve the framework for overall coordination of actions addressing radicalisation; increase practical support to practitioners and policymakers in Member States; and improve the framework for assessing results. Details: Luxembourg City, Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 15, 2018 at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_13/SR_RADICALISATION_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 150558 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism National Security Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Shakeel, M. Danish Title: Does Private Islamic Schooling Promote Terrorism? An Analysis of the Educational Background of Successful American Homegrown Terrorists Summary: Some commentators argue that private religious schools are less likely to inculcate the attributes of good citizenship than traditional public schools, specifically proposing that private Islamic schools are relatively more likely to produce individuals sympathetic to terrorism. This study offers a preliminary examination of the question by studying the educational backgrounds of Western educated terrorists. While data are limited, in accord with prior work findings indicate the vast majority of both Islamic and reactionary terrorists attended traditional public schools and had no religious education; hence findings suggest that early religious training and identification may actually encourage prosocial behavior. Details: Little Rock, AR: University of Arkansas - Department of Education Reform, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: EDRE Working Paper No. 2017-20: Accessed June 21, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068968 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068968 Shelf Number: 150629 Keywords: Homegrown Terrorists Islam Jihadist Radicalization Right Wing Terrorism

Author: Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina Title: Refugee Admissions and Public Safety: Are Refugee Settlement Areas More Prone to Crime? Summary: According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of refugees worldwide rose to 21.3 million in 2015. Yet, resistance to the welcoming of refugees appears to have grown. The possibility that refugees may commit acts of terrorism or engage in criminal behavior has served as fuel for the Trump Administration's position in 2017. Is there any basis for these fears? We exploit the variation in the geographic and temporal distribution of refugees across U.S. counties to ascertain if there is a link between refugee settlements and local crime rates or terrorist events in the United States. We fail to find any statistically significant evidence of such a connection. Details: Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2018. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11612: Accessed July 18, 2018 at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11612.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11612.pdf Shelf Number: 150905 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Immigrants Immigrants and Crime Migrants Refugees Terrorism

Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Violence Extremists Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Vigilantism Violent Extremism

Author: Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Title: Kosovo Security Barometer: Citizens' perceptions on Violent Extremism Summary: This report is a special edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB). It represents a detailed quantitative analysis reflecting citizens' opinion on violent extremism. The results of this report show that religiously motivated violent extremism continues to be perceived as a threat to Kosovars, though not to a large extent. Respondents consider that internal religious extremism presents a larger threat to the Kosovan society rather than internationally functioning terrorism such as ISIS. The results of this survey reaffirmed that the vast majority do not support the decision of individuals to join foreign conflicts. The results showed that the respondents are largely concerned of the potential threat posed by the radicalized individuals, thus majority remained against reintegration of foreign fighters. The report measured citizens' trust towards security institutions, underlining the importance of understanding the national experts to prevent and combat violent extremism. However, the results showed that only Kosovo Police gains sufficient trust while citizens� trust towards the judicial bodies and the Government in general continues to bear extremely low trust. Finally, the report also underlined that when it comes to violent extremism, there is a low frequency of communication between citizens and respective municipal institutions. Likewise, it highlighted the potentially important role of media when it comes to developing the citizens' mind-set regarding the violent extremism. Details: Prishtina, Kosova: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2017. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Kosovo Security Barometer: Accessed August 9, 2018 at: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Shelf Number: 151098 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (Kosovo)

Author: Taneja, Kabir Title: The ISIS Phenomenon: South Asia and Beyond Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Daesh and ISIL, has changed our understanding of terrorism and the ideologies that enable it to flourish. From the successful establishment of a proto-state in the Middle East, to the transnational reach of its propaganda to recruit disillusioned individuals with jihadist leanings-the ascent of the ISIS, though disturbing, has been unique. Today, even as the group no longer holds sweeping control over parts of Iraq and Syria, the ISIS ideology continues to survive. This monograph studies ISIS-its origins, modus operandi, and its influence in India and South Asia. Details: New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2018. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2018 at: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ORF_Monograph_ISIS_Final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ORF_Monograph_ISIS_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 151127 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Terrorism

Author: Weber, Bryan S. Title: The Economics of Crime Summary: Essay 1: "Can Safe Ride Program Reduce Urban Crime?" This paper evaluates the influence of a safe ride program at a public university on neighborhood crime in a major urban area. Using an hours of the week panel, the program's operation is associated with an approximate 14 percent reduction in crime. The program being open appears to have roughly similar influence in reducing violent and non-violent crime. Moreover, increases in rides (the intensity of the program) are also associated with reductions in crime. Such increases in program intensity are also associated with notably greater reductions in crime occurring on weekends. The cost of the safe ride program suggests it is a relatively efficient means of reducing crime. Essay 2: "University Provided Transit and Urban Crime." This paper uniquely examines the influence of a new university bus service on urban crime. It concentrates on the interaction between the new bus service and a long-standing safe ride program. The new bus service reduces the number of students using the safe ride program and such substitution raises the well-known concern that a fixed transit route may concentrate victims and criminals increasing crime along the new bus routes. Despite this concern, a series of difference-in-difference estimates demonstrate that the bus service reduces crime in the entire university neighborhood and that this reduction is actually largest along the new bus routes. Essay 3: "Modeling Adversary Decisions and Strategic Response." This work uses a sequential game of conflict between a government and a terrorist organization to analyze the strategic choices between large extreme and large conventional threats. Some of these extreme options: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (CBRN), are both terrifying and highly improbable. Conversely, conventional attacks using firearms or explosives, are comparatively more likely but less destructive. Rather than leaving the game as a theoretical exercise, we calibrate the model to real data from global terror attacks, and forecast anticipated casualties when an informed adversary prepares a large attack against an uninformed government. Details: Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, 2015. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 17, 2018 at: https://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2030&context=etd Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2030&context=etd Shelf Number: 151166 Keywords: Bus Routes Campus Crime Economics of Crime Neighborhoods and Crime Terrorism Transit Crime Transportation and Crime Urban Areas and Crime

Author: Lott, John R., Jr. Title: How a Botched Study Fooled the World About the U.S. Share of Mass Public Shootings: U.S. Rate is Lower than Global Average Summary: A paper on mass public shootings by Adam Lankford (2016) has received massive national and international media attention, getting coverage in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, plus hundreds of other news outlets spanning at least 35 different countries. Lankford's claim was that over the 47 years from 1966 to 2012, an enormous amount of the world�s mass public shooters -- 31% -- occurred in the United States. Lankford attributed this to America's gun ownership. Lankford claims to have "complete" data on such shooters in 171 countries. However, because he has neither identified the cases nor their location nor even a complete description on how he put the cases together, it is impossible to replicate his findings. It is particularly important that Lankford share his data because of the extreme difficulty in finding mass shooting cases in remote parts of the world going back to 1966. Lack of media coverage could easily lead to under-counting of foreign mass shootings, which would falsely lead to the conclusion that the U.S. has such a large share. Lankford's study reported that from 1966 to 2012, there were 90 public mass shooters in the United States and 202 in the rest of world. We find that Lankford�s data represent a gross undercount of foreign attacks. Our list contains 1,448 attacks and at least 3,081 shooters outside the United States over just the last 15 years of the period that Lankford examined. We find at least fifteen times more mass public shooters than Lankford in less than a third the number of years. Even when we use coding choices that are most charitable to Lankford, his 31 percent estimate of the US's share of world mass public shooters is cut by over 95 percent. By our count, the US makes up less than 1.43% of the mass public shooters, 2.11% of their murders, and 2.88% of their attacks. All these are much less than the US�s 4.6% share of the world population. Attacks in the US are not only less frequent than in other countries, they are also much less deadly on average. Given the massive U.S. and international media attention Lankford's work has received, and given the considerable impact his research has had on the debate, it is critical that this issue be resolved. His unwillingness to provide even the most basic information to other researchers raises real concerns about Lankford's motives. Details: Crime Prevention Research Center, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238736 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238736 Shelf Number: 151317 Keywords: Gun Violence Homicides Mass Homicides Mass Shootings Terrorism

Author: Holbrook, Donald Title: What Types of Media Do Terrorists Collect? An Analysis of Religious, Political, and Ideological Publications Found in Terrorism Investigations in the UK Summary: This Research Paper presents results from the study of media usage by convicted terrorists in the UK. The purpose is to shed light on the nature of the media environment in which individuals convicted of participation in terrorist plots operated in the weeks and months prior to their arrest. The Paper concentrates on those media publications that convey religious, political, or other ideological sentiments and describes the analytical tools developed to dissect this material. The Research Paper is directed towards practitioners, scholars and students interested in the sources of influence that help shape the perspectives of those planning to carry out terrorist attacks. The Research Paper is also intended to facilitate further comparative research within this field of study. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper no. 11: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ICCT-Holbrook-What-Types-of-Media-Do-Terrorists-Collect-Sept-2017-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ICCT-Holbrook-What-Types-of-Media-Do-Terrorists-Collect-Sept-2017-2.pdf Shelf Number: 151318 Keywords: Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years Later Summary: The Research Paper opens with a conceptual discussion about definitions of 'organised crime/groups' (OCGs) and 'terrorism/terrorist groups (TGs)'. It distinguishes between four types/levels of 'links' between OCGs and TGs and identifies two special types of violent hybrid organisations. It first summarises the main findings of a background report on the links between transnational organised crime groups and international terrorist groups, prepared by the author for the UN Crime Commission in the mid-1990s. After presenting key aspects of transnational OCGs and TGs in the 1990s, and comparing some of the features noted then to the situation today, the paper elaborates key differences and similarities between these two types of organisations. In the mid-1990s, transnational organised crime groups and terrorist organisations were decidedly distinct, linked in some ways but separated in more important other ways. Today the situations has evolved as there are new features not prominent in 1996. Looking at the present situation, the paper notes that recruiters of OCGs and TGs in Western diasporas increasingly fish in the same pool of mainly ethnic youth gangs and petty criminals. Another novelty is the role of prisons where convicted terrorists have successfully radicalised common petty criminals and members of OCGs. The report also draws attention to the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa where some smuggling and trafficking networks and jihadist networks have assumed a hybrid character. The criminalisation of some states and the involvement of government officials in organised crime or in supporting terrorism is also addressed. Concluding, the Research Paper notes an increase in both organised crime and terrorism since the mid-1990s but sees the main cause for this not so much in greater and deeper links between terrorist and organised crime groups but in the development of in-house capabilities of organised crime methods by TGs and terrorist tactics by OCGs and - more importantly - in changes in their operational environments due to, inter alia, globalisation and the role of the Internet. While the links between TGs and OCGs are a matter of serious concern for the international community, the far greater problem is that increasingly past and present political power holders are involved as third parties, whereby state facilities (e.g. diplomatic channels) are used as vehicles and cover for violent and predatory crimes across international borders. The paper also features an extensive, up-to-date bibliography on the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organised crime. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICCT-Schmid-International-Terrorism-Organised-Crime-August2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ICCT-Schmid-International-Terrorism-Organised-Crime-August2018.pdf Shelf Number: 151320 Keywords: Criminal Networks Organized Crime Terrorism

Author: Stutzer, Alois Title: Camera Surveillance as a Measure of Counterterrorism? Summary: Camera surveillance has recently gained prominence in policy proposals on combating terrorism. We evaluate the instrument based on a comparative perspective and previous evidence on crime. We expect camera surveillance to have a relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on other forms of crime. In particular, we emphasize that (i) terrorists have more opportunities for substitution; (ii) targets under camera surveillance might become more and not less attractive if terrorists aspire media attention; (iii) real-time interventions are limited as behavior is only understood as suspicious in the light of hindsight; and (iv) CCTV might crowd out social surveillance. Details: Basel, SWIT: Department of Business and Economics, University of Basel, 2011. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2018 at: https://edoc.unibas.ch/27667/1/20160104154156_568a84b4639ca.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://edoc.unibas.ch/27667/1/20160104154156_568a84b4639ca.pdf Shelf Number: 151581 Keywords: Camera Surveillance CCTV Closed-Circuit Television Counter-Terrorism Public Safety Terrorism Video Surveillance

Author: Santos, Soliman M., Jr. Title: Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines Summary: A joint publication of the South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey At the centre of this book are the 'primed and purposeful' protagonists of the Philippines' two major internal armed conflicts: the nationwide Communist insurgency and the Moro insurgency in the Muslim part of Mindanao. Steeped in first-hand knowledge of the conflicts and containing the most detailed, insider-informed group profiles available, this book offers a deeper understanding of the country's many armed groups-from the ideologically driven and militarily strong to the opportunistic and criminal. Part One covers: the various peace processes and negotiations; ceasefires; counter-terrorism; disarmament, demobilization, and integration into the armed forces and police; and small arms control. Part Two comprises detailed profiles of 14 rebel or non-state armed groups in the Philippines. The groups are neither static nor easily classifiable. The profiles provide a snapshot of the groups and are offered as guides to constructive engagement where possible. This volume argues that while these non-state armed groups and their offshoots are undoubtedly part of the human security problem in the Philippines, they must also be part of the solution. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010. 474p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Philippines URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-12-Philippines/SAS-Armed-Groups-Human-Security-Efforts-Philippines.pdf Shelf Number: 151587 Keywords: Firearms Human Security Insurgency Political Violence Terrorism

Author: Thijs, Fabienne Title: Verdachten van Terrorisme in Beeld: Achtergrondkenmerken, 'Triggers' en Eerdere Politiecontacten (Suspects of Terrorism in the Picture: Background characteristics, 'Triggers' and Previous Police contacts) Summary: The threat of terrorism, the concern for travelers to Syria and Iraq and, more recently, returnees from (former) area of ​​Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are important new phenomena where the police are the last years. In recent years, attacks have occurred in Europe place, including in Barcelona, ​​Nice, Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin and Manchester. This means prevention of radicalization and terrorist acts high on the political, public and scientific agenda. Since the introduction of the Terrorist Crimes Act in 2004, and later the Act to expand the possibilities for investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes (in 2007) and the Integrated Approach Action Program Jihadism (in 2014) is the detection and trial of terrorist suspects crime is becoming an increasingly important place within the criminal justice system take it. In recent years there have been mainly on the basis of this legislation criminal investigations on jihadist crimes: preparing from or actually travel for participation in ISIS and the war Syria and Iraq, propaganda and recruitment for violent struggles, committing of crime to fund those activities, and returning from jihadist area of ​​conflict. Since 2004, there have also been suspects from the interior political-religious terrorism, such as the participants in the Hofstad group, and some individuals who were suspected of preparing for it (foiled) attacks. Jihadism is currently the most important background of terrorism in the Netherlands, but the government also focuses on terrorist crimes from the left and right extremists and animal rights activists. There are sporadic suspects of these forms of politically inspired terrorism persecuted; so in a recent case are persons in the context of the terrorism legislation condemned for throwing Molotov cocktails to a mosque. Suspects of crimes with a terrorist objective are therefore a relative new suspect group for the police. For a better understanding and approach of these suspects it is important to understand their backgrounds, their involvement in other forms of crime than terrorist crimes, and life course events prior to their involvement with terrorism. In the Netherlands, radicalization and terrorism are being dealt with by various bodies and researchers monitored and studied. Examples are the AIVD, NCTV, WODC, ICCT, National Police, researchers Dutch universities and independent radicalization experts. Many publications about Dutch terrorism suspects are based on separate cases, or small numbers of suspects or convicted persons (see, for example, Weggemans et al., 2014; Schuurman et al., 2016; Schuurman, 2017). Some scientific publications have a larger sample of a specific one subpopulation: people involved in large jihadism investigations police or known police to Syria (see for example De Poot et al., 2011; Weenink, 2015; De Bie, 2016). These studies give a global impression of a number of characteristics of terrorist suspects, such as theirs socio-economic status, demographic characteristics and criminal career, but not yet a complete picture of all suspects of crimes with a terrorist objective in the Netherlands. As a result, we have an incomplete for now and fragmented image of suspects of terrorist crimes. Research outside the Netherlands also offers interesting insights into the role of personal characteristics, events prior to terrorism and other criminal activities. Studies from North America distinguish different radicalization models and 'paths' or trajectories leading to terrorism (King & Taylor, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2009; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2008). Cause factors are distinguished on micro, meso and macro level, and different steps or phases in the radicalization process (see, among others, Doosje et al., 2016, Ljujic et al., 2017). There are also carried out several large-scale quantitative surveys abroad to extremists and lone wolfs for personal characteristics and criminal background of subgroups such as extreme right, extreme left and Al Qaida inspired extremism mapping (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2013). Such studies, involving terrorism suspects on a large-scale quantitative level is being looked at, still missing within the Netherlands. In the present study we offer an overarching picture of the entire population suspected of terrorist crimes in the Netherlands since the introduction of the Terrorist Crimes Act in 2004. We have a link to this made between an anonymous list of terrorist suspects the National Public Prosecutor's Office (OM) and population data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). This is a unique and innovative data set, since CBS data has never been before used in investigating suspects of terrorist crimes. With this data we are able to provide insight into the personal characteristics of suspects, and in their involvement in other forms of crime and the timing thereof. In addition to previous research into so-called trigger factors in the radicalization process (see, among other things, Feddes, Nickolson & Doosje, 2016) we also provide insight into the 'run-up' to the terrorist crimes of which they are suspected, on the one hand may be prior personal events (such as stopping school, losing a job, or a divorce), and secondly, changes in criminal activity. With this data collection it is possible to not only have a description the characteristics of terrorist suspects, but also an analysis creating the possible effects of characteristics and events. Details: NSCR, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource (in Dutch): Accessed October 5, 2018 at: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b7fddd584466PW102.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b7fddd584466PW102.pdf Shelf Number: 151536 Keywords: Suspect Database Terrorism

Author: Rekawek, Kacper Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Kick-Off Report Summary: The most well-known ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, saw individuals who in the past had been involved in organized crime and illegal trade graduate into the ranks of the world's most successful terrorist organisation. It is now widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are no longer radicals first and foremost but criminals who turned to political violence at some stage throughout their ordinary crime careers. Thus a threat emanating from the "crime-terror nexus" hangs over Europe. GLOBSEC, an independent, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation which aims to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy, responded to this threat by developing a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Our project titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? will: collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2018 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Shelf Number: 152909 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: de Leede, Seran Title: Women in Jihad: A Historical Perspective Summary: By exploring the different roles women have historically played in jihadist movements, this policy brief aims to broaden the understanding of women's positions in, and their relevance for contemporary jihadism. Women have maintained and propagated jihadist ideology, supported their jihadist husbands, raised their children according to jihadist ideology, recruited others, helped create alliances through strategic marriages, raised funds and transported messages, weapons and goods. On a smaller scale, women have taken on operational roles in the planning and execution of attacks, including as suicide bombers. As the principal focus in understanding (global) jihadism is often on perpetrators and leaders - positions in which women are underrepresented in jihadist movements - women's facilitative and supportive contributions are often poorly understood and assessed. This policy brief demonstrates that women's roles have been complementary to men's and argues that women form an integral part of contemporary jihadism that cannot be seen as separate from or secondary to men's contributions to jihad. Details: The Hague: Internationial Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed October 13, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ICCT-deLeede-Women-in-Jihad-Sept2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ICCT-deLeede-Women-in-Jihad-Sept2018.pdf Shelf Number: 152926 Keywords: Female Terrorists Jihadism Terrorism

Author: European Commission Title: High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) Summary: Trends and challenges of radicalisation in the European Union Europe is facing a high and evolving terrorist threat, as demonstrated by an increase in recent years in terrorist attacks, fatalities and terrorist convictions. In 2016, a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks were reported. In 2017, 16 attacks struck eight different Member States while more than 30 plots were foiled. Radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism is not a new phenomenon but the process is now taking place at an alarming speed and scale. The phenomenon is not limited to a single Member State but extends to the EU as a whole. As a matter of urgency, the European and Member States' policies must evolve to match the scale of the challenge offering effective responses. There is no official account of how many radicalised individuals are currently present in EU Member States and posing a potential security threat. Yet, various datasets collected at national level illustrate the magnitude of the problem: approximately 20,000 individuals have been reported in France; in the United Kingdom there are reportedly over 20,000 individuals having featured in previous security service inquiries; and the German security authorities have reported 11,000 Salafists, with a shift towards a more violence-prone and terrorist spectrum. Among those, a smaller fraction is considered as being particularly "dangerous". In addition, available threat assessments indicate an increase in right-wing extremism promoting anti-democratic, intolerant and divisive messages fuelling violent extremism as well as polarisation. Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been of rising concern as well. The return of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and their families, including children, home-grown jihadist extremists and lone actors is regarded as posing particular challenges also in terms of preventing as well as countering the radicalisation process. As regards the foreign terrorist fighters in particular, their return and relocation remain a significant long term challenge requiring Member States to balance repressive and "soft� responses; their imprisonment may only delay the threat they pose. Preventing radicalisation in prisons remains a significant challenge across the EU, and experts remain somewhat divided on the different existing approaches to tackle the phenomenon, in particular on isolating radicalised prisoners from other prisoners or not. Nevertheless, all of them agreed that investments in tailor-made disengagement trajectories, starting in prison but pursued long afterwards in a multiagency cooperation, are strongly recommended. Irrespective of the kind of radicalisation or country-specific circumstances, Member States are confronted with similar concerns such as the use of the internet and social media by terrorist groups or violent extremist organisations for propaganda and recruitment purposes, radicalisation in prisons, and risks of an increasing polarisation and - more broadly - the undermining of societal peace and shared values. Despite significant setbacks on the ground, Daesh continues to devote considerable effort to its media operation and early this year saw resurgence in media production. The internet tended to feature prominently in almost every attack that happened in 2017, whether it was in using online instructions to prepare for the attack or glorifying in its aftermath, and it is clear that terrorist groups continue to use the internet to groom and recruit. In addition to Daesh propaganda, other terrorist groups similarly exploit the internet for terrorist gain. Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and a worrying rise of violent right-wing extremists are all prolific users of the internet, challenging the cohesion of Europe�s societies. Consequently, these multi-dimensional challenges require multifaceted responses drawing on all relevant policy areas and involving all relevant actors at local, regional, national, European and international level, with policies aimed at preventing and countering radicalisation whilst complementing other measures as part of a more comprehensive approach to counter terrorism. The Group highlights the importance of multi-agency responses and support to initiatives on the local level. While Member States' specific needs differ, requiring the development of approaches addressing issues specific to their individual circumstances, there is a shared interest in further enhancing exchanges of practices and experiences and closer cooperation between the different national actors at European level. The HLCEG-R has explored concrete ways to strengthen these policies with a view to supporting Member States in their efforts. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180613_final-report-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20180613_final-report-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 152871 Keywords: Daesh Foreign Terrorists Fighters Radicalisation Terrorism

Author: Alexander, Audrey Title: Digital Decay?: Tracing Change over Time Among English-Language Islamic State Sympathizers on Twitter Summary: Until 2016, Twitter was the online platform of choice for English-language Islamic State (IS) sympathizers. As a result of Twitter's counter-extremism policies - including content removal - there has been a decline in activity by IS supporters. This outcome may suggest the company's efforts have been effective, but a deeper analysis reveals a complex, nonlinear portrait of decay. Such observations show that the fight against IS in the digital sphere is far from over. In order to examine this change over time, this report collects and reviews 845,646 tweets produced by 1,782 English-language pro-IS accounts from February 15, 2016 to May 1, 2017. This study finds that: - Twitter's policies hinder sympathizers on the platform, but counter-IS practitioners should not overstate the impact of these measures in the broader fight against the organization online. ‐ Most accounts lasted fewer than 50 days, and the network of sympathizers failed to draw the same number of followers over time. ‐ The decline in activity by English-language IS sympathizers is caused by Twitter suspensions and IS' strategic shift from Twitter to messaging platforms that offer encryption services. ‐ Silencing IS adherents on Twitter may produce unwanted side effects that challenge law enforcement's ability to detect and disrupt threats posed by violent extremists. - The rope connecting IS' base of sympathizers to the organization's top-down, central infrastructure is beginning to fray as followers stray from the agenda set for them by strategic communicators. - While IS' battlefield initiatives are a unifying theme among adherents on Twitter, the organization's strategic messaging output about these fronts receive varying degrees of attention from sympathizers. - Terrorist attacks do little to sustain the conversation among supporters on Twitter, despite substantive attention from IS leadership, central propaganda, and even Western mass media. ‐ Over time, there has been a decline in tweets following major attacks. This suggests that attacks in the West have diminishing effects in mobilizing support. - Current events - such as the attempted coup in Turkey and the 2016 U.S. presidential election - are among the most popular topics within the sample. ‐ Events unrelated directly to IS cause some of the greatest spikes in activity. ‐ These discussions are ongoing despite Twitter's policies. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ‐ English-language IS sympathizers on Twitter defy straightforward analysis and convenient solutions. ‐ They are skilled problem-solvers in the digital sphere. Rather than ruminating over losses, angered adherents fight to be heard, either on Twitter or other digital platforms. ‐ Counter-IS practitioners must show a similar willingness to adapt and explore alternative ventures. ‐ While some collaboration is beneficial, the government cannot rely predominantly on the efforts of tech companies to counter IS and its supporters. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf Shelf Number: 154039 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremism Social Networks Terrorism Tweets Twitter Violent Extremism

Author: Counter Extremism Project Title: Extremists and Online Propaganda Summary: Official propaganda materials produced by the media arms of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and al-Shabab are intentionally crafted to radicalize, inspire, and incite individuals to violence. These groups have produced propaganda in a myriad of textual, audio, and video forms - from music videos to glossy magazines - that have helped to convince individuals around the world to travel abroad to join extremist groups and to conduct deadly attacks in their home countries. At times, they have even offered specific guidance on how to do so. Abdirizak Warsame, who was arrested at the age of 19 for attempting to join ISIS abroad, stated that while watching violent ISIS execution videos on YouTube, he started to believe that he was "doing something for a greater cause --- for good" by supporting the group. Warsame was one of 57 individuals documented by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) who attempted to join an extremist group abroad, and one of 72 individuals who accessed explicitly violent propaganda materials. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev - who detonated two homemade bombs along with his brother, Tamerlan, at the April 2013 Boston Marathon - told investigators that he and his brother built the bombs using instructions from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s Inspire propaganda magazine. The Tsarnaev brothers were two of 26 individuals documented who successfully enacted an act of terror, and two of 25 individuals who accessed propaganda materials that provided instructions on how to prepare or execute violent terrorist acts. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice 2013, Slate, Foreign Policy, CBS News) Official extremist group propaganda materials are easily disseminated and accessed on the Internet. The individuals documented in this report accessed extremist group propaganda on a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, Paltalk, and WhatsApp. Several individuals also played a part in further propagating extremist propaganda materials. Of the 168 individuals documented by CEP, at least 51 disseminated propaganda materials either online, in person, or via mail, and 59 viewed or discussed propaganda materials with another individual. Even if extremist groups lose control over territory in their respective regions of operation, their ability to reach out and spread propaganda online will allow them to continue to attract support from across the globe. For example, even as ISIS steadily lost ground in Iraq and Syria throughout 2017, U.S. permanent resident Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov was still inspired by the group's propaganda videos to carry out a vehicular attack in New York City on October 31, 2017, that killed eight people. As long as extremist groups continue to produce compelling propaganda that plays a part in inspiring and inciting individuals to violence - and remains easily accessible online - terrorism in the name of these extremist groups will remain a threat worldwide. (Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2017) Details: New York, NY: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists-online-propaganda Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Extremists%20and%20Online%20Propaganda_040918.pdf Shelf Number: 154062 Keywords: al-Qaeda al-Shabab Counter Extremism Project Extremism Internet ISIS Radicalization Social Media Taliban Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Fernandez, Lovell Title: Review of the ISS Project on Terrorism, Money Laundering, Organised Crime and Corruption Summary: Executive Summary In the period from 2004 to 2006, the Norwegian government funded the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to carry out a project, the aim of which was to �enhance the capacity of Southern African states to counter terrorism, money laundering, organised crime and corruption�. By conducting research within these four project areas and disseminating the research findings to key role players in the sub-region, the project was expected to help develop the required legislative framework within these areas. ISS is a non-governmental organisation concentrating on applied research and this particular project was run by the ISS office in Cape Town. The Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria commissioned a review of the ISS project in October 2007, at the request of the ISS office in Cape Town. The overall objective of the review was to assess �the implementation and results of the project in order to determine its relevance, efficiency, and impact�. The methodological framework for the review was to a large extent based upon the method of outcome mapping, acknowledging the challenges with regards to establishing causal links from the research developed by the ISS and the actual enhanced capacity of the Southern African states and thereby the development of legislation. The project was implemented more or less according to plan. Some difficulties were encountered, such as initial resistance towards the ISS as an NGO working on issues which were seen as governmental matters and the fact that the political situation in some of the Southern African states did not allow for any legislative improvements. Tools to ensure the quality of the publications were developed and instruments for planning and reporting were put in place, and these became more refined as the project developed. The performance of the project was monitored regularly by the head of the ISS office, providing the Norwegian government with semi-annual progress reports where its activities were measured against the planned deliverables. By the end of 2006, the ISS had met its deliverables, sometimes even exceeding its targets, with the exception of some main deliverables such as a monograph on terrorism. The progress reports, however, provide reasonable explanations as to why these were not delivered according to plan. It is difficult to determine to what extent the project did actually enhance the capacity of Southern African states, although there are several examples as to how the ISS has contributed with relevant research and updated information pertaining to the issues in question. The component addressing terrorism was perhaps the component which made the least progress, much due to its difficulties in approaching the governments on such a sensitive issue. And although the practical implementation of policies and legislation was relatively slow, the ISS has carried out several research activities targeting both the media and civil society. Money laundering saw more progress in terms of legislation being prepared in various SADC countries. Through close collaboration with the Eastern and Southern African Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the ISS helped create awareness with regards to the need for such legislation. Similarly, the third component which dealt with organised crime benefited to a large extent from its co-operation with the Palermo Group, consisting of senior government officials with the mandate to implement the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. As the ISS provided comparative legislative analysis to this group, ten of the fourteen countries within the sub-region had ratified the Convention by the end of 2006. The ISS produced a substantial amount of research and handbooks within the area of corruption, although these publications could have been used more efficiently. Some progress was made with regards to the ratification and implementation of the SADC Protocol against Corruption, where the collaboration with the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organisation (SARPCCO) was key. At the time the project was initiated, all four components were seen as relevant to the human security of the people living in Southern Africa. The events of 9/11, coupled with the increased incidence of money laundering, organised crime and corruption, prompted the need to address these issues within the sub-regional context. At present, the weight given to each component might have changed slightly, for instance, making domestic terrorism a more genuine threat than international terrorism. The project was very efficient in the sense that it produced most, and sometimes more, of the planned deliverables within the time-frame. The results coming out of all the round-table discussions and seminars that were held could be questioned as it is difficult to establish how these plentiful activities have targeted relevant stakeholders and to what extent the participants at these events have actually applied the ISS research in their work. Nevertheless, through its research and dissemination of findings, the ISS has contributed to the passing of legislation in the areas of terrorism, money laundering, organised crime and corruption. Whether this again will impact on the actual crime rates within these particular areas remains to be seen. Among the key lessons learned is the need to establish close working relationships with role players in these thematic areas. Through its network of inter-governmental bodies, as well as civil society, the ISS has accomplished more than would be possible through just individual contacts. The recommendations directed towards the ISS include the need to develop a communication strategy in order to take a comprehensive look at its dissemination practices. What is also recommended is that the ISS keep a clear profile as a non-governmental organisation focusing on applied research. Providing training should therefore not be seen as a central task, but rather let the researchers keep on doing what they are best at doing. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassy in Pretoria are particularly keen to use ISS input at its own seminars and to participate at seminars held by the ISS, as well as using its research as input in its own policy development. The actual ISS publications could probably be used even more actively though, simply by reading them and thereby applying them directly. Notwithstanding its increased support to the ISS over the years, The Ministry would need to exercise care that it does not depend too heavily on the ISS, but that it keeps an open mind and be receptive to similar research being conducted by other institutions in the region. The recommendation to the Norwegian government would therefore be that it balances its collaboration with the ISS carefully. Details: Olso, Norway: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2007. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18. 2019 at: https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2009/review-of-the-iss-project-on-terrorism-money-laundering-organised-crime-and-corruption/ Year: 2007 Country: International URL: https://norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/final-report---review-of-iss-project-_2_.pdf Shelf Number: 154242 Keywords: Africa Anti-Money Laundering Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime Corruption Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism ESAAMLG Institute for Security Studies Money Laundering Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Organized Crime Project Evaluation Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinati Terrorism

Author: Child Rights International Network Title: Caught in the Crossfire?: An International Survey of Anti-Terrorism Legislation and its Impact on Children Summary: As terrorism has proliferated in the last 20 years, so have States' counterterrorism strategies and the legislation that underpins them, which has introduced new surveillance measures, restrictions on behaviour, powers of detention, and hundreds of new offences carrying heavy sentences. In developing their counter-terrorism strategies, States are obliged to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected in full. Approaches that undermine human rights are not only unlawful; they are now widely understood to be counter-productive, insofar as they consolidate the social conditions in which terrorism can flourish. Nonetheless, States commonly regard human rights as an operational impediment and are allowing them to erode. No group has been more vulnerable to this than children and young people, particularly from marginalised minority groups. This report presents the findings from CRIN's research of anti-terrorism legislation in 33 countries across five continents. It shows that counterterrorism measures are leading to extensive violations of children's rights: - Children's behaviour and interests are monitored in schools and online, without their consent and sometimes without their knowledge; - Children are criminalised for association with terrorist groups, even for marginal involvement, rather than treated as victims of grooming and calculated indoctrination by recruiters; - Children can be routinely detained without charge for long periods under counter-terrorism powers in many countries; - Children convicted of offences, such as association with a terrorist group, are punished with harsh and sometimes extreme penalties; life imprisonment is not unusual, and in some countries children have been executed; - Some State military and intelligence agencies use children as spies and informants, exposing them to undue and potentially serious harm. These effects of counter-terrorism measures are unambiguously incompatible with States' human rights obligations to children. In particular, the strategies violate several specific rights of the child, including: - The right to privacy and to freedom of expression; - The right to be protected from violence and exploitation; - The right not to be used by State military and intelligence agencies; - The right not to be deprived of liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily and the right to be treated with dignity; - The right to a criminal justice system designed for the particular needs of children, and which recognises their lesser culpability by virtue of their cognitive and emotional immaturity relative to adults; - The right of a child to have their best interests treated as a primary consideration in all actions concerning them. Where apprehended children can be subject to extended detention without charge or harsh penalties after conviction, their treatment defies cardinal principles of juvenile justice established by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international rules and standards. In the worst cases, such punishments amount to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Where counter-terrorism measures target one social group disproportionately, they are also likely to amount to a violation of the right to be free from discrimination. States have favoured a 'firefighting approach' to counter-terrorism, by targeting suspected terrorists but not the social conditions in which terrorism can flourish. Structural risk factors that radically increase children's vulnerability to recruitment, such as poverty, marginalisation and the stigmatisation of certain social groups - all of which are human rights violation in themselves - have been largely overlooked. A 'human rights first' approach to counter-terrorism would begin to reverse these social conditions. A human rights approach would not criminalise children for association with terrorist groups, nor incarcerate them for terrorism offences. Instead, it would recognise children's vulnerability to recruitment, supporting them to develop their own awareness of the risks. If children had been groomed and manipulated, the State would recognise their victimisation and provide rehabilitative care. Counter-terrorism authorities committed to human rights would not snoop on children, but would allow professionals charged with their care to make informed and measured decisions about any threats to their welfare. Nor should States ever imperil children by using them in the fight against suspected terrorists. No State needs to violate the human rights of its public to tackle terrorism effectively, nor is there any advantage to be gained from doing so. A State willing to sacrifice children's rights puts them in harm's way, while handing an easy victory to terrorism. Details: London, UK: The Child Rights International Network, 2018. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 20, 2019 at: https://archive.crin.org/sites/default/files/caughtinthecrossfire.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/caught-crossfire-international-survey-anti-terrorism-legislation-and-its-impact Shelf Number: 154254 Keywords: Anti-Terrorism Convention on the Rights of the Child Counter-terorrism Human Rights Juvenile Justice Juvenile Offenders Surveillance Terrorism Terrorism Recruitment

Author: Offerdahl, Thomas G. Title: A Systematic Analysis of the Challenges of Policing Senegal: The Role of the Police in Democracy Summary: Little is known about the role of the police in Africa, and even less about the police in francophone African countries. Intrastate conflicts and peace-building after the Cold War tied policing to personal security, democracy, and sustainable development. Senegal has a stable democracy and police forces that were established prior to Senegalese independence in 1960, but it is still uncertain if they can become a police force that contributes to national and personal security capable of dealing with human and narcotic trafficking, transnational crimes, and international terrorism. This study investigates the challenges facing the Senegalese police forces and their impact on the Senegalese national and personal security environment. The primary police services face challenges with resources, capacity, terrorism, and transnational crime. The major finding is that the centralized structure of the Senegalese police, controlled by a semi-authoritarian president and the political elites, prevents the police from becoming a public safety institution able to address matters of personal security. This dynamic isolates the police from the Senegalese citizens and atrophies their ability to combat crime, preventing their development into a public safety institution. Details: Scranton, Pennsylvania: University of Scranton, 2016. 107. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2019 at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1029883.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Senegal URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50607 Shelf Number: 154387 Keywords: Africa Law Enforcement National Security Police Policing Public Order Senegal Terrorism Transnational Crime West Africa

Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction It is the responsibility of both Government and private sector stakeholders to work collaboratively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of these incidents. Crowded places pose a broad range of security challenges for owners, operators and those responsible for providing a protective security overlay. They have been specifically identified - nationally and internationally - as attractive targets by those wishing to engage in terrorism, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Active armed offender attacks have occurred, and continue to occur, in crowded places around the world such as sporting stadiums, transport hubs and entertainment venues. Crowded places present a particularly attractive target for terrorism, due to the ready access to large numbers of potential victims. Attacks which occur in crowded places are particularly insidious because crowds using these places are often distracted by the venue event, reducing their situational awareness of their immediate environment. The Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active armed offender incidents pose in crowded places. The Guidelines seek to illustrate the key role that owners and operators of crowded places can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the 'Crowded Places Advisory Group' (CPAG) on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter - Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). It should be read in conjunction with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Improvised Explosive Device Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines for Crowded Places. Purpose These Guidelines aim to increase the awareness of owners and operators of crowded places of the dynamic terrorism threat, while providing guidance on the issues and options which can be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. These Guidelines set out several broad guiding principles which public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce the vulnerability of their site to the threat of terrorism. The Guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach. - Effective security outcomes in complex crowded place environments require cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment, and options for preventing and dealing with active armed offender incidents, will enable owners and operators in the private sector in particular to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage the active armed offender threat to crowded places. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of 'contingency plans' or sub-plans to supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/active-armed-offender-guidelines-for-crowded-places.aspx Shelf Number: 154371 Keywords: Active Armed Offender Australia Counterterrorism Crowded Places Crowded Places Advisory Group Entertainment Venues Event Security New Zealand Radicalization Risky Facilities Sporting Stadiums Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Venue Security

Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Who should read this and why - vehicles as weapons This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle mitigation to all owners and operators responsible for the management of crowded places. It offers insight into how protective measures can be integrated into public and private places in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of vehicles being used as weapons. Owners and operators of crowded places want their site to be as safe as reasonably possible for their staff and the public. Organisational reputation, business continuity, and legal requirements for publicly accessible areas to be safe are all important reasons for owners and operators to understand and mitigate the risk posed by hostile vehicles. The aim of this document is to provide those responsible for crowded places with knowledge to inform security design considerations and decisions. It is intended to be a starting point to the development of effective and aesthetically complementary designs that help protect crowded places from hostile vehicles. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Shelf Number: 154374 Keywords: Australia Counterterrorism Crowded Places Hostile Vehicles New Zealand Risk Management Risk Mitigation Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Vehicles as Weapons

Author: Conway, Maura Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2018: The Year in Review Summary: This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018.1 It is divided into three parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of violent jihadis, particularly the so-called 'Islamic State' (hereafter IS); Part II supplies information on contemporary extreme right online activity; and Part III identifies issues in the violent extremism and terrorism online realm that bear watching in 2019. In terms of overarching trends, the focus of policymakers, internet companies, media, and thus also publics has, since 2014, been almost exclusively on IS's online activity. A growing concern with extreme right activity, both its online and offline variants, began to be apparent in 2017 however, especially in the wake of events in Charlottesville. This solidified in 2018 due to a number of factors, including a decrease in IS terrorist attacks in the West and an uptick in extreme right and hate attacks and terrorist events, a number of the latter of which appeared to have significant online components. Having said this, IS is still active on the ground in numerous locales globally and continues to produce and widely disseminate online content, as do a large number of other groups that share core tenets of its ideology. IS may be down therefore, but it is certainly not out. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE), 2019. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154690 Keywords: Internet Crimes Islamic State Jihadism Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Durner, Tracey Title: Untangling a Marriage of Convenience: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Summary: Within the realm of policy discussions, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts are generally treated as a package deal. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF Recommendations, and related guidance documents represent today's international AML and CFT standards and are mirrored in laws and initiatives around the world. Given the "obvious similarities and differences between money laundering and terrorism financing," FATF notes "the risks (of both) are often assessed and managed using the same information flows between public and private sector institutions." This convergence between the types of information and stakeholders relevant to money laundering and terrorism financing is, in part, behind the unification of AML and CFT efforts. From a policy-making standpoint, the combination makes sense. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) already analyze suspicious financial activity, including potential instances of money laundering, often triggered by reports from the private sector resulting from frontline compliance and transaction monitoring procedures. It seems logical to incorporate the deterrence, detection, and tracking of terrorism financing into existing AML frameworks. In practice, critics have argued this "marriage" places undue burden on the private sector to understand the intent of criminals behind the actual transactions.2 Others contend that the very premise of CFT policies are misguided, resulting in ineffective and even harmful outcomes. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the preponderance of low-cost, lone-actor attacks in North America and Europe, international attention once again has focused on CFT as a central tenet in the fight against terrorism. In 2016, FATF issued a consolidated strategy on CFT, followed by the adoption of an operational plan in 2018. CFT-specific entities such as the Counter ISIL Financing Group have emerged, and the French government in 2018 convened a high-level international conference focused on combating the financing of ISIL and al-Qaida, with a second conference scheduled for Australia in mid-2019. This brief examines where and how AML frameworks are fit for purpose relative to CFT and considers where additional CFT-specific efforts are necessary. It begins with a brief summary of the evolution of money laundering and terrorism financing policies, discussing the unification of the two fields and the key differences between the motivations and typologies of money laundering and terrorism financing crimes. Against that backdrop, it explores the four objectives of CFT efforts (prevent, detect, freeze, and trace) to identify areas where existing unified AML/CFT frameworks are working and areas where more nuance is required to effectively combat threats specific to terrorism financing. Although particular attention is given to the United States and United Kingdom as international financial centers, similar approaches and convergences between AML and CFT policies and practices occur worldwide. The brief concludes with recommendations on how current CFT policy discourse and evolution can meaningfully support broader counterterrorism objectives. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2019. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GCCS-PB-Untangling-Marriage-Convenience-AML-CFT-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154691 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Financial Crimes Financing of Terrorism Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorism Financing

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Radicalising Our Children: An Analysis of Family Court Cases of British Children at Risk of Radicalisation, 2013-2018 Summary: At least 156 children have been involved in family court cases in which concerns over extremism or radicalisation have been cited, according to a new study released by the Henry Jackson Society. Of the cases examined, the think tank found that 48% of families had one family member or more who joined IS. Nikita Malik, Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism and the report's author, today warns that the UK's courts are not currently up to the task of handling a wave of women who joined the 'caliphate' returning with their children. The report concludes that the family court is frequently powerless to take steps to protect the welfare of children, even when the counter-terrorism division is aware that parents involved are often terrorists with extremist mindsets. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile, welcomed the report, and stated it is "apparent that the family court is not always able to take the appropriate steps to protect" the children of extremists. Meanwhile, Tim Loughton MP, the former Children's Minister, stressed that the Family Courts require "better protocols, guidance and support" to deal with this "increasingly urgent part of their role". Contrary to claims the girls of Islamic State were vulnerable brides, the report finds that, far more so than boys, girls who travel to the 'caliphate' made their own decisions. The author concludes that boys tended to join Islamic State under the influence of their families, whereas girls were more active and independent in seeking out extremist material - often online. All of the girls in cases analysed by the study who had self-radicalised were motivated in part by the possibility of marriage to a person of their choice. The study, which qualitatively analyses the 20 cases with the most comprehensive court records over recent years, also found that: 55% of cases had links to Al-Muhajiroun, the banned group founded by Anjem Choudary. 67% of families had a history of domestic abuse or a history of wider criminal conduct. Almost 20% of the children involved were home-schooled; while, 38% families contained children absent from school. In cases where gender was known, 64% of children involved in court actions were boys. The report calls for a bespoke set of powers for judges to use in cases of extremism involving children. Citing the high burden of proof required for the more traditional option of care orders, the report argues that the powers imbued with wardship have proved more suitable in many cases, to meet the growing and pertinent challenge of countering radicalisation. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2019. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Radicalising-Our-Children-Report-HR-web.pdf Shelf Number: 154812 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Extremism Islamic State Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "Everyone Must Confess:" Abuses Against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq Summary: Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities have arrested thousands of children for alleged affiliation with ISIS, used torture to coerce confessions, and have convicted hundreds of children of terrorism in hasty, unfair trials. Children may be prosecuted for any association with ISIS, including working as a cook or driver, or taking part in a religious training course. They may be detained in prison for years, with no access to rehabilitation or education. "Everyone Must Confess": Abuses against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in Iraq is based on Human Rights Watch research conducted since 2016, including interviews conducted in November 2018 with 29 boys and youth who had been detained for alleged ISIS association by the KRG, family members of 8 other children who had been arrested by Iraqi authorities as ISIS suspects, child protection advocates, local lawyers, and other legal experts. The consequences of Iraqi and KRG punitive policies are profound, creating long-term stigma, family separation, displacement, and severely limiting youths' ability to reintegrate into society and support themselves. Once branded as ISIS, these children fear revenge attacks if they return home after their release from detention. Children who have been arrested and detained by Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq risk re-arrest by Iraqi forces if they return to areas falling under Baghdad's control. Some child ISIS suspects believe they have no option beyond living indefinitely in camps for displaced persons or leaving the country. Details: New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2019. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2019 at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/06/everyone-must-confess/abuses-against-children-suspected-isis-affiliation-iraq Year: 2019 Country: Iraq URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0319_web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 155141 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Child Abuse Child Exploitation Internally Displaced Persons Iraq ISIS Recruitment Terrorism Terrorist Organizations

Author: Jones, Chris Title: The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study in the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy Summary: SECILE is an EU-funded research project examining the legitimacy and effectiveness of European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs). This report examines the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks (the "Data Retention Directive"). The Directive obliges providers of internet and telephony services to keep detailed "traffic data" (or "metadata") regarding the identities and activities of their subscribers for between 6 and 24 months and provide access to police and security agencies for the purposes of investigating serious crime, and has been described as the "the most privacy-invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU". This report explains the policy-making process that resulted in the Directive, the obligations stemming from it, and the way these have been transposed into the national law of the member states with reference to infringement proceedings, legal challenges and the review of the legislation by the European Commission. Details: SICILE Consortium, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: SECILE Deliverable 2.4. www.secile.eu : Accessed march 27, 2019 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Shelf Number: 155181 Keywords: Communications Counter-Terrorism Criminal Investigations Data Retention Terrorism Terrorists

Author: International Network Supporting Victims of Terrorism and Mass Violence Title: Supporting Victims of Terrorism. Report of the INVICTM Symposium in Stockholm Summary: On May 19, 2018, INVICTM - International Network Supporting Victims of Terrorism and Mass Violence - held its second international symposium on Supporting Victims of Terrorism in Stockholm, Sweden. This report reflects the discussions held during the symposium. Terrorism affects individuals, communities and societies. The Circles of Impact model offers a framework to illustrate the breadth of the potential impact of a terrorist attack: four circles encompass the different groups in society that an attack might affect. The inner circle of victimization contains individuals during the terrorist attack and directly affected by it. A second, wider, circle includes the direct victims' close social environment, such as family, friends or peers. The third circle refers to individuals who are part of the formal support network such as first responders or victim support providers. And the fourth, largest circle embraces the wider society of which the individual victim is a member. A victim response aimed at understanding and responding to the needs of all those affected by terrorism builds on the Circles of Impact model and can be more inclusive than relying on limited legal definitions of who is a victim. Experts agree that a broad set of needs are common to victims of all types of crime. Victims of terrorism, however, can have additional needs and exacerbated common crime victim needs. Symposium participants identified respect and recognition, commemoration, information provision, support, compensation, access to justice and peer support as some of terrorism victims' primary needs. The list is not exhaustive nor are the needs isolated from one another -- they are closely intertwined. This report describes primary terrorism victim needs and offers tips, practical solutions, good practices and examples from across the globe to help meet these needs. Given the complexities of supporting victims of terrorism, experts recommend a flexible approach to responding to each unique terrorist attack. Years of experience and expertise, however, allow us to identify some common predictable challenges and the practical solutions that can address them. Participants from around the world identified local challenges and practical solutions for supporting victims of terrorism during the symposium. A high quality response to victims of terrorism should build on a number of basic principles: First, understand that short and long-term terrorism victim needs are intertwined. No matter how well the immediate response is carried out, there will unavoidably be long-term consequences to the victim. Second, the foundation for an effective response is a victim-centered perspective that incorporates listening to individual victims to identify their needs and being attentive to the particular needs of vulnerable groups. Individuals or groups that are particularly vulnerable to the impact of terrorist attacks include children, cross-border victims, support providers or individuals who could have been on the scene of the attack. Vulnerable individuals may have particular needs that require a specialized and adaptive response. Given the nature of the scenario used during the symposium, participants focused, in particular, on cross-border victims. Increasingly, foreigners become victims in a country that is not their own, which adds a layer of complexity to both understanding and responding to victim needs. Third, sufficient advance planning and preparation form the backbone of any comprehensive response for victims of terrorism. Symposium participants reinforced the importance of the preparatory phase identifying numerous steps that can and should be taken in advance of an attack. Fourth, effective coordination in times of need builds on a network established during the preparatory phase. The work of creating networks is currently ongoing at both national and international levels. INVICTM's leadership role in fostering and facilitating a network is an important step in improving international collaboration to strengthen the support for all victims of terrorism. Details: Brussels: Victim Support Europe, 2018. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2019 at: https://victimsupport.eu/activeapp/wp-content/files_mf/1553847245INVICTMSymposiumReport2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://victimsupport.eu/activeapp/wp-content/files_mf/1553847245INVICTMSymposiumReport2018.pdf Shelf Number: 155340 Keywords: First Responders Terrorism Victim Services Victims of Terrorism

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Lawyers on Trial: Abusive Prosecutions and Erosion of Fair Trial Rights in Turkey Summary: In a period of mass arrests and politically motivated trials of journalists, rights defenders, and opposition politicians on terrorism charges, lawyers in Turkey have a critical role to play in protecting the rights of suspects in police custody and defendants in court. Lawyers on Trial: Abusive Prosecutions and Erosion of Fair Trial Rights in Turkey examines how since the July 2016 failed military coup, police and prosecutors have targeted lawyers with criminal investigation and arbitrary detention, associating them with the alleged crimes of their clients, charging them after they have exposed rights abuses, and readily accusing them with little or no evidence of membership of terrorist organizations. Targeting of lawyers has occurred at a time when the Turkish authorities have widened the definition of terrorism and imposed rigorous restrictions on the right of suspects accused of terrorist crimes to benefit from legal counsel and to prepare for defending themselves in court. Concluding that the unwarranted and abusive prosecution of lawyers has undermined a key guarantor of the right to a fair trial in Turkey, the report urges the Turkish authorities to protect the role and function of lawyers and uphold the right of suspects to benefit from legal counsel. Details: New York: Author, 2019. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2019 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/turkey0419_web.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Turkey URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/turkey0419_web.pdf Shelf Number: 155424 Keywords: Criminal Trials Human Rights Abuses Lawyers Political Corruption Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Colomina, Pierre Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France Summary: The worse ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, were undertaken by individuals who had been involved in criminality and illegal trade before they joined the ranks of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisation. It is no longer widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are radicals first and foremost: the bulk of them are criminals who turned to political violence along the way. The threat of a "crime-terror nexus" therefore hangs over Europe. In view of this, GLOBSEC - an independent, non-partisan, nongovernmental organisation aiming to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy - has developed a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?, the remit of the project is to: 1. collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. 2. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. 3. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: France URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155599 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Ackerman, Gary Title: On the Horizon: Security Challenges at the Nexus of State and Non-State Actors and Emerging/Disruptive Technologies Summary: Innovation and new technologies have many positive attributes and provide significant improvement to humanity, much that is likely unforeseen at the time of initial discovery. The unpredictability of the technology trajectories can lead to significant negative consequences. This white paper aims to discuss the massive leaps in innovation and understand what this means for national security. The articles are briefly summarized below. In Chapter 1, entitled "Third Offset Implications for Homeland Security: Tranquility or Turbulence," Robert McCreight states that the overall future trajectory of modern technologies hinges on a fairly imperfect and periodically naive grasp of dual-use science and technology and what it portends for our planet and its inhabitants. He goes on to say that one immediate concern is to determine not only how it is affecting our current way of life, geopolitics, the economy, social stability, governance, security, and the ordinary functions and determinants of the natural world around us, but also weigh the downstream consequences of technology growth, diversity, and convergence on all of those things ten to twenty years on. If advanced dual-use technologies hold the potential for a vast array of unanticipated threats in the next few years, we will need effective doctrine, strategy, and deterrence measures. He asks a key question: How to begin to establish criteria which guarantees that humans retain ultimate control, management, and direction of advanced dual-use technologies and thereby thwart untoward and dangerous outcomes arising from their mix of expected and unexpected outcomes. He advances five possible criteria for wrestling with the emergence of ADUCT (advanced dual-use convergent technologies) in a manner that sketches out an approach for the short term and allows flexibility for modifications and improvements along the way over the next decade. Gina Ligon and Michael Logan in Chapter 2, "Malevolent Innovation: Novelty and Effectiveness in Terror Attacks," state that terrorism provides a model context for examining creativity, as the need for survival and innovation pervades these destructive and malevolent groups. Despite this, creativity and innovation remain underdeveloped concepts in terrorism research. One reason for this is the limited empirical data about this phenomenon, making it unclear which tenets of creativity research hold versus which do not translate in the domain of terrorism. The present effort overcomes this by examining the dimensions of malevolent innovation in a large sample of terrorist attacks. To anticipate adversary threats, it is critical that we examine all of the possible combinations of VEO innovation developed in the past. This particular effort can provide planners with exemplars of the highest levels of VEO innovation across a large dataset of violent extremist organizations, providing a comprehensive look at what is possible and what should be prevented. Don Rassler in Chapter 3 "Back to the Future: The Islamic State, Drones, and Future Threats" states that the Islamic State is an irony of sorts, as while the organization looks to, is inspired by, and seeks to recreate the past certain aspects of the group's behavior also provide a window into conflicts of the future. A key case study in this regard is the Islamic State's drone program, and specifically how the group "overcame technical and cost asymmetries," and creatively developed a novel and scalable drone-based weapons system "constructed from commercial components that challenged - at least for a period of time - states' ability to respond." He goes on to state that the Islamic State's drone accomplishments speak to, and have a number of important implications regarding, the character and style of future threats that are either constructed around or that significantly leverage dual-use commercial technologies. He concludes by stating to stay ahead of the issue, and to better prepare for a future that will almost certainly be typified by the proliferation of other hybrid threats that leverage and/or repurpose commercial systems in dangerous ways, the United States should identify the pathways and methods that allowed the Islamic State to acquire and scale its fleet of quad-copter drones in the first place, and trace the evolution of functional threat streams. Bennett Clifford in Chapter 4, "Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram," makes several key observations: - English-speaking supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) use the messaging application Telegram to distribute a range of information, including instructional material - manuals and guides designed to aid operatives with step-by-step procedures for providing assistance to the group. - Channel administrators distribute whichever manuals they believe can be of aid to aspiring operatives, regardless of its ideological background. - Telegram's internal file-sharing features and lax approach to content moderation allow channel administrators to create repositories of instructional information within Telegram channels. - While attack-planning manuals available on Telegram channels understandably pose a large concern for counter-terrorism authorities, operational security and cyber-security manuals are also frequently distributed, relatively easy to implement, and help operatives successfully conduct activities in support of terrorist groups while minimizing the risk of detection or apprehension. In Chapter 5 entitled "Examining the Present and Future Role of Cybercrime-as-a-Service in Terror and Extremism," Thomas Holt makes the case that the rise of online illicit markets that enable the sale of cybercrime tools and stolen personal information have made it possible for individuals to engage in technically sophisticated forms of crime regardless of level of computer skill. Ideological and terror groups over the last decade have expressed an interest in cyber-attacks as a means to cause harm, though it is not clear how much ability they have to perform such attacks. As a result, cybercrime markets may engender their attacks, though it is not clear how often this may occur, or what conditions would lead to their use. He provides recommendations for policy and research to disrupt cybercrime markets and improve our knowledge of ideologically-motivated cyber-attackers generally. - Cybercrime markets generate millions of dollars in revenue and enable non-technical actors to perform sophisticated attacks. - They may provide a point of entry for ideologically-motivated extremists and terrorists to engage in cyber-attacks. - These markets can be disrupted through traditional law enforcement investigations, and may also be affected through other extra-legal efforts such as Sybil attacks. - Research is needed on the radicalization process of ideologically-motivated actors who engage in cyber-attacks, and how this differs from those who have engaged in physical attacks. Rebecca Earnhardt and Gary Ackerman in Chapter 6 entitled "Modelling Terrorist Technology Transfer," make the point that while technology transfer occurs as a part of routine life, the topic remains relatively understudied in the terrorism literature. As terrorists engage in increasingly lethal and technologically sophisticated attacks, the concern surrounding terrorists acquiring cutting-edge weaponry and related technologies is accumulating. They go on to describe the Terrorist Technology Transfer (T3) project which provides a first cut at addressing this critical operational gap in knowledge through the exploration of extant technology transfer literature, construction of the first iteration of the T3 Model, and illustrative application of the model to an emerging technological threat. They conclude by stating the T3 project indicates the promise of having not only research, but also operational and policy impacts. It raises the possibility of providing government stakeholders, including intelligence, law enforcement, military, and policy agencies with a variety of insights and operational tools In Chapter 7, "Hacking the Human Body: The Cyber-Bio Convergence," Rebecca Earnhardt makes the point that the increasing convergence between the fields of biosecurity and cybersecurity may result in consequences that analysts have yet considered. Biotechnology use and expertise expansion beyond practitioners have stoked concerns about a wide range of traditional biosecurity issues including shielding the outputs from advanced gene editing systems or protecting university lab data storage systems. As biotechnology advances, including digitization and automation of systems that were once localized and only accessible to those directly involved on related research, biosecurity and cybersecurity fields continue to intersect. She concludes by stating a fully-fledged research project would explore the cyber security risk factors that are cited commonly as key vulnerabilities, and filter these cyber security risk factors through an adversary technology adoption decision making and motivational analysis. In Chapter 8 entitled "Evolving Human and Machine Interdependence in Conflict: Advantages, Risks, and Conundrums," R. E. Burnett makes several key points: - Emerging science and technology will continue to disrupt customary characteristics of political and kinetic conflicts among states and non-state actors. - The increasing complex interdependence between humans and machines is one area for particular examination. - We cannot reliably predict whether or not human roles will rapidly give way to a more dominant robotic style of war, so we must prepare for a variety of futures, per the Scharre/Horowitz autonomy typologies. - Humans involved with machines that operate at vastly greater speeds and volumes of data will further create problems of cognitive demand for the human soldier that need to be examined. - We must investigate this not only in terms of technical performance, but also from a more holistic perspective, to include the social, political, and psychological dimensions of the soldier and of the citizen. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security2019. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication: Accessed May 4, 2019 at: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 155659 Keywords: Biosecurity Cybercrime Cybersecurity Drones Emerging Technologies Extremism Homeland Security Radicalism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Love, April S. Title: Lynched: The Evolution of Systematic Restraints and Their Use Against People of Color Summary: Different than any other kind of slavery, many history books like to paint the journey of the African Slave as one comparable to others who traveled to America for a new life in the land of milk and honey. Similarly today, the plight and struggle of people of color is seen to be one that has not been influenced by narratives including the systematic burden of a history of oppression. Beginning with American slavery and journeying into the present day, there is obviously an aspect of suppression that is constantly found in every single situation related to people of color. In evaluating the transition between the past and the present it is clear that much of the acts that took place in our American history still take place today, although they are almost unrecognizable because they have morphed into a different life-form. This paper offers a look at systematic restraints that consistently plague people of color in America through the historical lens of Lynching. The terroristic act of lynching occurs when a mob kills someone, typically by hanging for an alleged offense. The problem with the literal definition of lynching is that it does not encompass the terror that people of color faced during and post-slavery in America. In fact, as the United States continuously developed, lynching has developed along with it taking a form that most would not think of when encompassing the nation's societal growth. Enslavement has evolved to now include neo-systematic methods of restraint such as mass incarceration, prison labor, voter disenfranchisement, and police brutality. By juxtaposing the historical aspect of lynching and the present day suppression that so many Americans face it is clear that a past that so many think the world has left behind, is still very much present, very much active, and very much intentional. Details: Southern University Law Center Journal of Race, Gender, and Poverty, 2019. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 31, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3371668 Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3371668 Shelf Number: 156124 Keywords: Lynching Mass Incarceration Police Brutality Racism Slavery Terrorism

Author: Bensman, Todd Title: Have Terrorists Crossed our Border?: An Initial Count of Suspected Terrorists Encountered en Route and at the U.S. Southwest Border Since 2001 Summary: Key findings: From only public realm reporting, 15 suspected terrorists have been apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border, or en route, since 2001. The 15 terrorism-associated migrants who traveled to the U.S. southern border likely represent a significant under-count since most information reflecting such border-crossers resides in classified or protected government archives and intelligence databases. Affiliations included al-Shabbab, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, Hezbollah, the Pakistani Taliban, ISIS, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, and the Tamil Tigers. At least five of the 15 were prosecuted for crimes in North American courts. One is currently under Canadian prosecution for multiple attempted murder counts. Of the four in the United States, one was prosecuted for lying to the FBI about terrorism involvement, one for asylum fraud, one for providing material support to a terrorist organization, and one for illegal entry, false statements, and passport mutilation. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2018. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2019 at: https://cis.org/Report/Have-Terrorists-Crossed-Our-Border Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/bensman-terrorists-crossed_0.pdf Shelf Number: 156384 Keywords: Border Security Illegal Immigration Immigration Enforcement Terrorism

Author: Samuel, Thomas Koruth Title: Undergraduate Radicalisation in Selected Countries in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis on the Perception of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism among Undergraduates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand Summary: This study seeks to understand the perception of undergraduates from both public and private universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The research was carried out by examining the current literature on the subject, studying countries beyond the region that face similar challenges, seeking the views and opinions from experts in the field, and conducting a quantitative survey on undergraduates from the five respective countries in the region. The purpose of the research was firstly, to obtain a 'situational understanding' based on statistical analysis on the views, reasoning and understanding of the undergraduates in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on the various issues surrounding terrorism and counter-terrorism. After having a better understanding of the relationship and dynamics between the undergraduates, the universities and the various components of terrorism and counter-terrorism; the second objective was to identify areas of concern that require intervention. The third and final objective was to suggest recommendations or possible ways forward with regard to the potential challenges vis-a-vis undergraduate views on radicalisation in the Southeast Asian countries mentioned above. A major component of this study was the quantitative survey conducted in the five countries. The survey focused on having a better understanding of the thought processes of the undergraduates in seven core areas, namely: (i) their sources of information when it came to the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism; (ii) their views on what constitutes terrorism; (iii) their perception on various issues surrounding terrorism; (iv) their ideas on how traditional media and the Internet have influenced their thinking and actions in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism; (v) their opinions on both the hard and soft approaches in relation to countering terrorism; (vi) their opinions on the dynamics of mental radicalisation; and (vii) their thoughts on the possible alternatives to terrorism and its subsequent effectiveness. The survey yielded numerous insights into the thinking and behavioural patterns of the undergraduates on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the five countries. Among the key findings were: (i) radical violent and 'not-yet' violent ideas were a clear and present danger; (ii) undergraduates were very aware of terrorism and were of the opinion that it would affect their lives; (iii) images and videos were powerful mediums utilised by terrorists, and could also be used in counter terrorism efforts; (iv) there was an urgent need to identify and develop credible alternatives to terrorism in the context of addressing grievances and addressing conflict; (v) both the television and the Internet had the potential to be tremendous tools in countering terrorism; (vi) there was a small but significant minority of undergraduates who were actively seeking out terrorists and violent extremist content via the Internet; and (vii) there was a distinct and significant role that universities had played in the area of radicalisation and could play in the field of deradicalisation as well. With regards to the way forward, the areas that need further attention and careful deliberation are: (i) the need for universities to be much more involved in countering terrorism; (ii) the need to involve and partner undergraduates in countering violent extremism; (iii) the need to further exploit the media in countering terrorism; (iv) the need to target non-violent radicalisation activities/advocates to prevent violent extremism; (v) the need to tell the stories of the victims and former terrorists; (vi) the need to publicise the alternatives to terrorism; (vii) the need for digital story-tellers; (viii) the need for real-life heroes and heroines; (ix) the need to re-channel curiosity; (x) the need for critical thinking; and (xi) the need to move from 'selective CVE-inoculation' to 'comprehensive CVEinoculation'. The study concludes with two additional discoveries that are significant. Firstly, that universities can potentially provide a conducive environment for undergraduate radicalisation, and secondly, that universities and undergraduates can be significant partners as well as stakeholders in countering violent extremism. Details: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018. 274p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2019 at: http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/Articles_2016/Articles_2018/Undergraduate_Radicalisation_in_Selected_Countries_in_SEA.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/Articles_2016/Articles_2018/Undergraduate_Radicalisation_in_Selected_Countries_in_SEA.pdf Shelf Number: 156529 Keywords: Asia Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro Summary: Geography, history and political culture (characterised by high levels of corruption) combine in the economies of the former Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) to create a range of issues when it comes to combatting illicit trade. Serbia, for one, lies on a major trade corridor known as the Balkan route, which is used by criminal groups for various activities, including human trafficking and the trafficking of drugs coming from Asia and South America. Montenegro's ports are similarly used as transit points for the unloading and reloading of illicit cargo destined for Central and Western Europe. Bosnia's porous borders with the former two economies, as well as with neighbouring Croatia, enable easy transit from Eastern Europe and the Balkans region to economies in Western Europe. This could be made worse by the adoption of a Visa Liberalisation Agreement between the European Union's (EU) Schengen zone and Kosovo (which lies in an area considered by Serbia to be vulnerable to trafficking), expected by the end of the year. Compounding the problem, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the accompanying conflicts, is thought to have led to an increased risk of terrorism in the region - with an increase in Islamic radicalisation and in nationals of countries and territories in the region joining the so-called Islamic State (IS) as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic separatist and religious extremist groups are active in some southern regions of Serbia and Kosovo, whose declaration of independence in 2008 was not recognised by Belgrade. These factors lead to increased terrorist financing and thus money laundering. Bosnia's complex and decentralised government structure has also been an obstacle to reforms, and corruption is prevalent in all three economies. This briefing paper will look at the illicit trade environment in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro across the four categories of the index: government policy, supply and demand, transparency and trade, and the customs environment. It will consider how these economies compare at global and regional levels, as well as looking at some of the details particular to each. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156582 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Financing of Terrorism Human Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Organized Crime Political Corruption Terrorism

Author: Europol Title: Do Criminals Dream of Electric Sheep?: How Technology Shapes the Future of Crime and Law Enforcement Summary: The advent of so-called disruptive technologies -those that fundamentally alter the way we live, work and relate to one another - provides criminals with new ways to pursue their illegal goals, but also equips law enforcement with powerful tools in the fight against crime. To remain relevant and effective, it is necessary for law enforcement authorities to invest in understanding and actively pursuing new, innovative solutions. Europol has published today a report, which will serve as a basis for future discussions between Europol, EU law enforcement and their stakeholders. Some of the emerging technologies include Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, 5G, alternative decentralised networks and cryptocurrencies, 3D printing and biotech. These are set to have a profound impact on the criminal landscape and the ability of law enforcement authorities to respond to emerging threats. The disruption comes from the convergence between these new technologies, the previously unseen use cases and applications, and the challenges posed by existing legal and regulatory frameworks. The report aims to identify the security threats associated with this and points to ways for law enforcement to use the opportunities brought by these technologies to combat crime and terrorism. It also highlights the pivotal role of the private sector and the importance of law enforcement to engage more with these actors. Furthermore, it is of paramount importance that the voice of law enforcement is heard when legislative and regulatory frameworks are being discussed and developed, in order to have an opportunity to address their concerns and needs, particularly with regard to the accessibility of date and lawful interception. Europol can deliver additional value in an age of rapid digital technological development by increasingly engaging in expertise coordination and collective resource management, which avoids unnecessary duplication of resources and expertise at national level. The Europol Strategy 2020+ set out for the organisation to support the Member States by becoming a central point for law enforcement innovation and research. Details: The Hague, The Netherlands: Europol, 2019. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2019 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/do-criminals-dream-of-electric-sheep-how-technology-shapes-future-of-crime-and-law-enforcement Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/do-criminals-dream-of-electric-sheep-how-technology-shapes-future-of-crime-and-law-enforcement Shelf Number: 157041 Keywords: Artificial Intelligence Cryptocurrencies Digital Technology Law Enforcement Technology Terrorism

Author: Mulhall, Joe Title: Modernising and Mainstreaming: The Contemporary British Far Right Summary: By analysing the rhetoric espoused at a series of major far-right events across 2018 and comparing it to societal polling it becomes evident that large parts of the contemporary far-right's platform - namely anti-Muslim politics, co-option of the free speech debate and an anti-elite populism - have widespread public support. Details: London: Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2019 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modernising-and-mainstreaming-the-contemporary-british-far-right Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816694/Joe_Mulhall_-_Modernising_and_Mainstreaming_The_Contemporary_British_Far_Right.pdf?_ga=2.5277243.944050908.1566684102-2006 Shelf Number: 157044 Keywords: Anti-Muslim Extremism Far Right Public Support Radicalization Terrorism