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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for terrorist
9 results foundAuthor: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara Summary: The Sahara has been a pipeline for smuggling and trafficking of many types of goods for well over a thousand years. Libya, which has ties to Europe dating back to the Roman Empire, has always been a key destination and transit area for many of these illicit flows. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the smuggling and trafficking business involving both armed groups and organized crime networks has increased dramatically in Libya. Instability and state breakdown has allowed the traditional tribal trans-Sahara trade, in drugs, counterfeit products and migrants and arms to grow to around US$43-80m at most, distributed among a large number of traffickers, clans and groups. The increase in flows of money and illegal goods are having repercussions across North Africa and the Sahel. Illicit finances and weaponry from Libya helped facilitate the rebellion in Mali in 2010, and continues to fuel conflict today. More significantly, the high number of migrants along the North African coast has enabled the development of a far more lucrative coastal migrant trade, valued now at US$ 255 - 323 million per year in Libya alone. The value of this trade dwarfs any existing trafficking and smuggling businesses in the region, and has particularly strengthened groups with a terrorist agenda, including the Islamic State. Drawn from a range of open source data and a number of recent interviews across the Saharan region, this brief documents the current scope and scale of trans-Saharan criminal economies and highlights their possible implications on stability and security. The goal of this brief is to provide a timely update of the evidence base on potential conflict drivers in the greater Sahara region, for the benefit of policy-makers, practitioners and researchers. The brief is a collaboration between the Norwegian Centre for Global Analysis (Rhipto) and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The brief concludes that given the level of illicit revenue it is currently possible to generate from the migrant flow, preventing Islamic State and coastal Libyan armed groups from becoming involved in or profiting from migrant smuggling should be of greater priority than attempting to cut off the long-established trans-Saharan trade routes passing through the Sahel towards Libya. Details: Geneva: The Global Initiative, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Libya URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 136144 Keywords: Financial crimesIllegal TradeTerroristTerrorist Financing |
Author: Bergen, Peter Title: ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism Summary: On Friday, November 13, 2015, France had its 9/11. At least 129 people were killed at multiple locations in and around Paris, including a concert hall, a soccer stadium, and a popular restaurant, the kinds of venues that ordinary Parisians flock to on a Friday night. At, or near, these venues the attackers deployed a mix of terrorist tactics, including multiple suicide attackers, an assault using more than one gunman willing to fight to the death, hostage-taking, and bombings. In the years after 9/11, we have seen various forms of this terrible news story play out before: the multiple bombs on trains in Madrid that killed 191 in 2004; a year later, the four suicide bombings in London that killed 52 commuters; the attacks in Mumbai by 10 gunmen willing to fight to the death in 2008, who killed 166; and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 that killed 12 people. The attackers in Paris seemed to have learned lessons from all these attacks. French President Francois Hollande blamed ISIS for the Paris attacks. It is still early in the investigation, but already leading media outlets are reporting that as many as six French nationals who have been identified as among the perpetrators of the attacks had traveled to Syria, while one of the leaders of the attack is a Belgian citizen who also spent time in Syria. According to French prosecutors, one of the attackers identified by fingerprints is a French national known to police, and a Syrian passport was found on one of the bodies of the attackers. Hitherto, the only case of a Western fighter in Syria returning and conducting a deadly terror attack in the West was French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, who is accused in the May 24, 2014, shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, that left four people dead. Returning militants like Nemmouche are a worrying source of terror attacks. And two major factors place Europe at far greater risk of "returnee" violence from veterans of the Syrian conflict than the United States - the much larger number of European militants who have gone to fight in Syria and the existence of more developed jihadist networks in Europe. So who exactly are the estimated 4,500 Westerners who have been drawn to join ISIS and other militant groups in Syria and how great of a threat do they pose? In order to provide some answers to that question, New America collected information on 474 individuals from 25 Western countries who have been reported by credible news sources as having left their home countries to join ISIS or other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq. Details: Washington, DC: New America, 2015. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2015 at: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Shelf Number: 137432 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISSuicide BombingTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Benotman, Noman Title: The Children of Islamic State Summary: The future of children born and raised in Islamic State is a pertinent and pressing problem, requiring the immediate attention of the international community. There are currently 31,000 pregnant women within the 'caliphate'. As many as 50 children from the United Kingdom are growing up on jihad in Islamic State, and no prior research examines what will happen to them if they choose to return. This report attempts to fill this gap by addressing the reintegration, re-education, and rehabilitation challenges of returning or escaping children. Over the last six months, Quilliam researchers have archived, translated, and analysed propaganda released by Islamic State featuring children. This is the first database of its kind, and reveals the following: - The largest amount of Islamic State media featuring children relates to violence, comprising either of children directly participating in violence, or being exposed and normalised to violence. - Islamic State's wilayats in Iraq have released the most images showing children and teens in combat and acting as suicide bombers. - In the last six months, Islamic State propaganda depicts 12 child executioners, and one child participating in a public execution. The report highlights the following exclusive findings which pertain to the recruitment and training of child soldiers in the Islamic State: - Direct coercion into joining Islamic State generally occurs through abductions. However, Islamic State also engages in more indirect, systemic coercion where people, specifically children, are pressured to join the group out of fear. - Children can not only assist in meeting the present needs of the 'caliphate', but can continue to propagate its existence and expansion once they grow up, thus securing the long-term survival of the 'caliphate'. - The current generation of fighters sees children as better and more lethal fighters than themselves. Rather than being converted into radical ideologies, children have been indoctrinated into extreme values from birth or at a young age. - Schools and the education system are central to shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation. The indoctrination that begins in schools intensifies in training camps, where children between the ages of 10 and 15 are instructed in shari'a, desensitised to violence, and are taught specific skills to best serve the state and take up the banner of jihad. - Boys learn a rigid Islamic State curriculum, where drawing, philosophy and social studies, the 'methodology of atheism', have been removed. Instead, children churn out memorised verses of the Qur'an and attend 'Jihadi Training', which includes shooting, weaponry and martial arts. Girls, also known as the 'pearls of the caliphate', are veiled, hidden, confined to the home, and taught to look after husbands. - The prolonged exposure and desensitisation to violence that children experience affects their physical and psychological well-being, both in the short term and in the long term. Looking to the future, it is inevitable that these children will suffer from severe physical and mental trauma, as well as systematic extremist indoctrination. By coupling in-depth fieldwork with extensive research, Quilliam was able to discern not only what life for children within Islamic State is like, but the extent of the challenge of re-integration to come. Based on our findings, the report proposes a thorough assessment process for children who return or escape from Islamic State. This procedure evaluates the extent of radicalisation of the child, their degree of agency in joining Islamic State, the trauma and abuse they have suffered, and the immediate and long-term needs for ensuring effective Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation DDR(R). The recommendations detail a multi-structural support network for monitoring a child's progress. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 5, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://f.hypotheses.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2725/files/2016/04/the-children-of-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 147741 Keywords: CaliphateChild SoldiersCounter-terrorismExtremismIslamic StateJihadRadicalizationTerrorist |
Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorist |
Author: Khalil, James Title: Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming Under the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) Summary: While Kenya received global attention in September 2013 due to the attack at the Westgate shopping mall, this event represents just one of many violent incidents in the country over recent years, often considered to be in part a spill-over from instability in Somalia. The tensions in Coastal Kenya also take additional forms and are driven to a considerable degree by the perceived political and economic marginalisation of the region. Drawing upon professed historical injustices, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) reportedly relies upon violence to promote independence, and has encouraged local residents to boycott elections. Tensions between Christians and Muslims are also pronounced on the Coast, particularly after the killing of prominent Muslim clerics such as Aboud Rogo. In this context fits the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme. Since 2011 KTI has been operational in Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012 it expanded to the Coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa. The KTI programme was essentially a pilot of the new CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that supported individuals, networks and organisations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The grants were designed to target the key ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors responsible for driving Violent Extremism (VE). As understood by KTI, the former ‘drive youth to join extremist movements,’ whereas the latter ‘attract youth towards extremism as an emotional struggle for purpose, direction and identity.’1 Examples of push factors may include, for instance, police harassment, elevated unemployment and racial profiling, whereas KTI’s identified pull factors included personal appeal of radical preachers and a radicalised religious environment. 2. THIS STUDY As part of the learning process during closedown, KTI engaged Integrity Research and Consultancy (Integrity) to undertake a qualitative study into its intervention. Following an introduction looking at the background, objectives and the study methods (Section 1), this report is structured loosely to mirror KTI’s lifecycle, sequentially focusing upon the research undertaken to inform the intervention (Section 2), programme design (Section 3), and the selection of grants (Section 4). This is followed by conclusions (Section 5), and a series of actionable recommendations designed to inform future CVE initiatives in Kenya and elsewhere (Section 6). The KTI Terms of Reference (TOR) largely advised our research methods, with a primary focus upon a review of KTI documentation being complemented by key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders, focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries, and grantee observations. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Shelf Number: 145395 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerroristViolent Extremism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel Summary: After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and non-immigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44678: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Shelf Number: 146283 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic StateRadical Groups Terrorist |
Author: Farnham, Nicholas Title: Can a Copycat Effect be Observed in Terrorist Suicide Attacks? Summary: The purpose of this paper is to explore how a copycat effect - established within the field of suicide studies - may manifest itself in terrorist suicide attacks, and takes an exploratory approach in evaluating the prospect of incorporating open-data resources in future counter-terrorism research. This paper explores a possible 'copycat effect' in cases of suicide terrorism, which entails a perpetrator being inspired by a preceding attack to carry out a similar attack not long after the original. In the wake of mounting risks of lone wolf terrorist attacks today and due to the general difficulties faced in preventing such attacks, in this paper we explore a potential area of future prevention in media reporting, security and anti-terrorism policies today. Using the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD), this paper investigates terrorist suicide-attack clusters and analyses the relationship between attacks found within the same cluster. Using a mixed-method approach, our analyses did not uncover clear evidence supporting a copycat effect among the studied attacks. These and other findings have numerous policy and future research implications. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICCT-Farnham-Liem-Copycat-Effects-in-Terrorist-Suicide-Attacks-March-2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICCT-Farnham-Liem-Copycat-Effects-in-Terrorist-Suicide-Attacks-March-2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 144735 Keywords: Copycat EffectLone Actor TerroristsLone Wolf TerroristsSuicide TerrorismTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Almohammad, Asaad Title: The ISIS Prison System: Its Structure, Departmental Affiliations, Processes, Conditions, and Practices of Psychological and Physical Torture Summary: This paper endeavors to explore the ISIS prison system, the arrest or abduction, interrogation and confession and total detention processes; as well as the condition of detention facilities, and the physical and psychological torture taking place within the terrorist organization's jails. Fifty-five ISIS cadres (defectors, returnees or prisoners) and 17 Syrian civilian interviewees who had been detained by ISIS were interviewed regarding their knowledge of and first experiences of incarceration in ISIS prison facilities. Their reports are compiled and dissected into three phases: 1) abduction/arrest, 2) initial processing including interrogation and confession phases, and 3) post interrogation processing. The accounts obtained from ISIS cadres, detainees and sources on the ground provided a chilling portrayal of ISIS' prison system. The detention facilities are run by different entities. These entities are namely: the Islamic police, military police, hisbah (morality police), raid squads, and Emni (security forces). Methods of detention, conditions, and torture and punishment varied across the aforementioned entities. Throughout their abduction/arrest and interrogation, detainees are subjected to a number of psychological methods of torture. These include the threat of execution, promises to receive similar fates as other tortured fellow detainees, solitary confinement, and the placement of severed heads in cages in which detainees are being held. Elaborate physical torture includes seven methods named as follows: Lashing, the Fuel, Bisat al-Rih (Flying Carpet), Shabeh (Ghost), German Chair, the Biter, and the Tire. It is hard to assess whether ISIS operatives gained actionable information or confessions as result. For many of the tortured interviewed detainees as well as the defectors, confessions meant that they would be executed by the terrorist organization. Though, detainees appear to collectively develop coping mechanisms and strategies including sharing information to avoid coerced confessions to inhibit the effectiveness of ISIS' interrogations. The use of torture serves as a reinforcement of ISIS' brand of terror. In that sense, torture is a violent method that scares civilians into submitting to ISIS' theological codes and socio-political aims. Throughout detainees' time in shared cells, they were expected to participate in sharia courses. The first course was called Redemption. The sharia lectures were often delivered by highly ranked sharia figures. The courses are carried out to indoctrinate detainees in ISIS ideology prior to their release. The last phase of the incarceration starts when the interrogation is concluded. Former detainees reported that they were not made aware beforehand of meeting sharia judges. Detainees who have been cleared of their purported offences and those who have survived ISIS' punishment are subjected to conditional release. ISIS is reported to offer former detainees to either make a ransom-like payment, or for those with skills needed by the terrorist organization to work for ISIS directorates. ISIS operatives try to coerce former detainees who can neither make the payment nor possess the skills deemed valuable by the terrorist organization to commit suicide operations. The presented findings illustrate that ISIS jailors cooperate with media operatives to use, most probably coerced, pre-execution testimony for its propaganda. The current paper also puts forth a number of names and details on ISIS operatives engaged in detaining, torturing, and extorting civilians to supply the terrorist organization with material support. Evidence of the terrorist organization's handling of hostages suggests that they were subjected to various methods of psychological and elaborate physical torture. The category of detainees that ISIS uses as sabaya or sex slaves include the Yazidis captured in Iraq, wives and daughters of captured Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al Nusrah cadres. These women are either sold or given to foreign fighters, ISIS cadres or outsiders or held in detention facilities in both Syria and Iraq. Those held in detention centers are subjected to repeated rapes by ISIS cadres who are given access to them as a reward for service. The report also demonstrates a level of sophistication in the organizational structure and governance of ISIS' prison system and interrogation processes. Based on evidence provided throughout the paper, ISIS has been observed to move its detention facilities when fearing territorial loss. This trend may be informative in reading future movements of the terrorist organization. Alongside ISIS cash reserves and ISIS leadership, the cities of Mayadin and al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor received a significant number of detainees and hostages. The aforementioned indicators suggest the operational significance of the two cities in taking the fight to ISIS. Details: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremists, 2017. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 29, 2017 at: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Year: 2017 Country: Syria URL: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Shelf Number: 146928 Keywords: ISISPrisonersPrisonsTerroristTortureViolent Extremists |