Date: November 25, 2024 Mon

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Results for terrorists

243 results found

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct Summary: Findings from the American Terrorism Study (NIJ grant #1999-IJCX-0005 and DHS/MIPT grant #lO6- 1 13-2000-064) reveal that unlike traditional criminality, terrorists are much less spontaneous, engage in substantial planning activities, and commit ancillary and preparatory crimes in advance of a terrorist incident. Building on these findings, the goals of the current project were to determine whether (1) sufficient open source data exists to examine the temporal and spatial relationships that exist in terrorist group planning, and (2) if such data do exist, can patterns of routinized preparatory conduct be identified. To accomplish these goals, subject matter experts were selected to identify terrorist groups incidents that operated or occurred within the United States from four major categories: international; and three types of domestic terrorism -- left-wing, rightwing, and single issue (which was limited to environmental and anti-abortion terrorism). Sixty-seven "cases" were selected for analysis. Of these sixty seven, sixty of the cases were sufficiently fertile to provide some data for analysis. These included 22 right-wing, 9 left-wing, 10 international, and 17 single issue cases. Information on some 200 terrorist "incidents" (right-wing, 41; left-wing, 51; international, 58; and single issue, 50) was extracted from open source data on these cases to create a relational database composed of 265 variables. Geospatial data was recorded on some 515 terrorists' residences, planning locations, preparatory activities, and target locations. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, analyses focused upon the identification of general temporal and spatial patterns of activity. On average, the terrorist groups studied existed for some 1,205 days from the date of the first known planning meeting to the date of the actuallplanned terrorist incident.' This figure, however, should not be taken as indicative of the average "lifespan" of terrorist groups. Some of the groups studied, such as the United Freedom Front and Omega 7, operated for several years, atypical for most terrorist groups. The planning process for specific acts began, on average, approximately 2-3 months prior to the commission of the terrorist incident. Planning and preparatory activities were intermingled during this period. However, on average, a lull in activities occurred during the last three to four weeks prior to the incident. Approximately two and one-half known planning and preparatory behaviors were recorded per incident and these varied by type of terrorist group. The spatial analysis revealed that terrorists typically live relatively close to the incident target. Nearly one-half of the terrorists resided within 30 miles of the target location. Similarly, approximately one-half of the terrorists engaged in their planning and preparatory activities within this distance of their residences. Finally, a similar percentage of preparatory behaviors took place within 30 miles of the eventual target of the terrorist incident. the terrorist incident. The implications for local law enforcement are extremely important. While terrorists may think globally, they act locally. Both preventative efforts and post-incident investigations should focus upon local events and persons as the primary source of information about terrorist activities. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center, Fullbright College, University of Arkansas, 2006. 540p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214217.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214217.pdf Shelf Number: 117132 Keywords: Spatial Analysis Terrorism Terrorist Targets Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process Summary: Homegrown terrorists are of increasing concern to intelligence services in both the United States and the United Kingdom. This report addreses an identified gap in the literature on this topic through an empirical examination of behavioral manifestations of the radicalization process in 117 homegrown "jihadist" terrorists from both the U.S. and the U.K. Details: Washington, DC: FDD Press (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), 2009 Source: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116212 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schanzer, David Title: Anti-terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans Summary: In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere around the world, a key counterterrorism concern is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in the United States. Yet, the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism. This project seeks to explain this encouraging result by identifying characteristics and practices in the Muslim-American community that are preventing radicalization and violence. Details: Durham, NC: Sanford School of Public Policy, 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 117774 Keywords: Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jackson, Brian A. Title: Understanding Why Terrorist Operations Succeed or Fail Summary: This occasional paper examines the issue of why terrorist operations succeed or fail. Given the importance of this issue for security planning, there is a significant literature on the topic, and a variety of these contributions identify factors that can shape operations going well or poorly. This paper reacts to and responds to that literature and proposes an overarching framework for thinking through why attack options can have very different outcomes. In it, it is argued that such a framework is critical for security planning efforts because focusing on individual factors in isolation risks producing an overall picture that does not accurately describe terrorist behavior. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 29p. Source: Homeland Security Program; Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116319 Keywords: Security Operations Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Commercial Websites and Internet Payment Systems Summary: Criminals have shown adaptability and opportunism in finding new channels to launder the proceeds of their illegal activities and to finance terrorism. As the Internet becomes more and more a worldwide phenomenon, commercial websites and Internet payment systems are potentially subject to a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminal organizations and terrorist groups. This study analyses money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks with commercial websites and Internet payment systems with the focus on mediated customer-to-customer websites as the most vulnerable to abuse because of their popularity, accessibility to the public, and high volume of cross border transactions. The analysis also provides a number of case studies that illustrate how mediated customer-to-customer websites can be exploited for ML/TF purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2008. 39p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118344 Keywords: Internet Crimes Internet Safety Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Through the Real Estate Sector Summary: The objective of this report is to develop more information on the issue of using the real-estate secotor to launder money and to present a clearer picture of the way that real estate activity can be used for money laundering or terrorist financing. First, it explores the means by which illicit money is channelled through the real-estate sector to be integrated into the legal economy. Second, it identifies some of the control points that could assist in combating this phenomenon. Details: Brussels, Belgium: FATF, 2007. 41p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2007 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118345 Keywords: Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorism Financing Terrorists

Author: Borchgrave, Arnaud de Title: Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments from the Field Summary: These essays on Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, Burma, and Australian have a common thread: terrorism, like politics, is local. Yes, there is a superficial frame, which is shared by local terrorists, but the vicissitudes of violence vary according to local events. Except for training provided a decade earlier to some aspiring terrorists, al Qaeda is notably absent from the various accounts in the present collection. Indeed, the weak links to al Qaeda central, trumpeted in the West more than in Southeast Asia, obscure the local dynamics, showing an upsurge in the threat earlier in this decade and a general decline as time goes on. While the ideology is similar, local social conditions change, and law enforcement agencies learn to deal with their foes. As the essays show, the situation is improving in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. The situation is deteriorating in Thailand because violent Islamists wrapped themselves with separatist grievances, while the situation in the Philippines is so embedded in local politics that it is difficult to even analyze it in terms of terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. 87p. Source: A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 116190 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jacobson, Michael Title: Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left Summary: There is a growing recognition that capturing or killing every terrorist is not a realistic strategy and that we need to spend more time exploring the radicalization process - what motivates people to become extremists in the first place. Despite this, little study has been undertaken of the "flip side" - those who decide to leave terrorist and extremist organizations. This report is based on approximately twenty-five interviews with those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations. An analysis of the interviews reveals that individual dropout cases clearly show that no single overarching reason explains why individuals leave terrorist or extremist groups, just as no single reason leads to their radicalization in the first instance. Nonetheless, several patterns emerge that should give policymakers cause for optimism. First, it is clear that many of those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations have done so without being harmed or even threatened. And second, these organizations are often hid hard when leadership defections take place. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010. 34p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Focus #101 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117701 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Great Britain. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Title: Muslim Prisoners' Experiences: A Thematic Review Summary: There are around 10,300 Muslims in prisons in England and Wales, a number that has been growing steadily over recent years. There has been considerable public focus on them as potential extremists and on prisons as the place where they may become racialized, often through conversion - even though fewer than 1% are in prison because of terrorist-related offenses. This report looks at the actual experience and perceptions of Muslim prisoners - using prisoner surveys and inspection reports over a three-year period, and supplementing this with in-depth interviews with a representative sample of 164 Muslim men in eight prisons and interviews with the Muslim chaplains there. The headline finding, from surveys and interviews, is that Muslim prisoners report more negatively on their prison experience, and particularly their safety and their relationship with staff, than other prisoners - this is even more pronounced than the discrepancy between the reported experiences of black and minority ethnic prisoners compared to white prisoners. Details: London: HM Inspector of Prisons, 2010. 116p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119133 Keywords: Inmates (U.K.) Minority Groups Muslims (U.K.) Prisoners (U.K.) Terrorists

Author: Brynjar, Lia Title: Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature Summary: This report presents a critical survey of the academic literature on the causes of terrorism. The study focuses primarily on theories that seek to explain why some societies are more exposed to terrorism than others, i.e. theories on a national or societal level of analysis. It also examines theoretical frameworks for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis. The report underscores the importance of understanding terrorism in its political and societal contexts. By identifying the socio-economic conditions, political regime factors and international system characteristics that are more likely to generate high levels of terrorism, the study also provides useful tools for trend analysis and forecasting. Details: Kjeller, Normay: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005. 82p. Source: Internet Resource; FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307 Year: 2005 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119182 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Terrorism in the West 2008: A Guide to Terrorism Events and Landmark Cases Summary: This report describes that state of terrorism in Western countries over the course of 2008. It includes the following: 1) a comprehensive look at terrorism events in the West, including attacks, failed plots, and arrests; 2) a discussion of landmark terrorism prosecutions; 3) an assessment of broad trends in terrorist activity over the course of the year; and 4) expert commentary from Jeff Breinholt, Douglas Farah, Rohan Gunaratna, Andrew C. McCarthy, and Reuven Paz. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009. 105p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119218 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The handbook is a compilation of legal experiences relating to actual terrorist cases gained by high-ranking experts from several countries who have gathered at meetings organized by UNODC in Austria, Colombia and Italy. The experts share their experiences in dealing with terrorism cases, reflect on their positive and negative judicial experiences, and explain specific investigative and prosecutorial techniques used in these cases. Details: New York: UNODC, 2010. 129p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118731 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter R. Title: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries Summary: The report identifies trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that will help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. Among the key findings and recommendations are: 1) The current emphasis on security and containment leads to missed opportunities to promote reform. Prison services should be more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches to facilitate extremists’ transition back into mainstream society; 2) Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to radicalisation. Badly run prisons make the detection of radicalisation difficult, and they also create the physical and ideological space in which extremist recruiters can operate at free will; 3) Religious conversion is not the same as radicalisation. Good counter-radicalisation policies – whether in or outside prison – never fail to distinguish between legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. Prison services should invest more in staff training, and consider sharing specialised resources; 4) Individual de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes – such as the ones in Saudi-Arabia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other countries – can make a difference. Their positive and outward-looking approach should serve as an inspiration for governments and policymakers everywhere; 5) Even in the best circumstances, however, such programmes complement rather than replace other instruments in the fight against terrorism. They work best when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists or insurgents. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 119428 Keywords: Prison Gangs Prisons Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Chalk, Peter Title: The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment Summary: Terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. For much of the Cold War, the activities of a variety of domestic ethnonationalist and religious militant groups posed a significant challenge to the region's internal stability. Since the 1990s, however, the residual challenge posed by substate militant extremism has risen in reaction to both the force of modernization pursued by many Southeast Asian governments and the political influence of radical Islam. Building on prior RAND research analyzing the underlying motives, drivers, and capabilities of the principal extremist groups that have resorted to terrorist violence in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and Indonesia, this study examined the historical roots of militancy in these countries to provide context for assessing the degree to which local agendas are either being subsumed within a broader ideological framework or shaped by other extremist movements. Moving beyond simple terrorism analysis, this research also examined national and international government responses to militant movements in the region, including counterterrorist initiatives, military and policing strategies, hearts-and-minds campaigns, and funding and support from international organizations and governments (including the United States). Finally, the study broke new ground in assessing Cambodia as a potential future terrorist operational and logistical hub in Southeast Asia. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 238p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Asia URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf Shelf Number: 115178 Keywords: National Security Terrorism, Southeast Asia Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Threat Assessment Summary: The Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment (GTA) report provides an assessment of the global systemic money laundering/terrorist financing threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimize the harms they can cause. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Shelf Number: 119711 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade Zones Summary: Free trade zones (FTZs) are designated areas within countries that offer a free trade environment with a minimum level of regulation. The number of FTZs have increased rapidly in recent years, today there are approximately 3,000 FTZs in 135 countries around the world. FTZs offer many incentives and benefits to the companies that operate within it, such as the exemption from duty and taxes and simplified administrative procedures. However, the absence of strict regulations and transparency of the FTZs which is beneficial for legitimate businesses, also make them highly attractive for illicit actors who take advantage of this relaxed oversight to launder the proceeds of crime and finance terrorism. Through a series of cases studies, this report aims to illustrate the ways in which FTZs can be misused for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Shelf Number: 119712 Keywords: Money Laundering Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Thiel, Darren Title: Policing Terrorism: A Review of the Evidence Summary: The London bombings in July 2005 have changed society and how it is policed. The Government has necessarily focused its efforts on passing new legislation to improve the security of the nation, but the longer term task of illuminating the causes of terrorism committed by British nationals and the role of effective community engagement in this also needs to be urgently addressed. Establishing and maintaining the right balance between security and liberty is crucial to the health of a democratic society and an independent assessment of the impact of the new anti-terrorism legislation needs to be undertaken. This report aims to identify what is known and what is not known about contemporary terrorism; Considers how to improve the exchange of information and intelligence between communities, local police and security services; and Assesses how the police could improve levels of trust and legitimacy in communities that may be characterised by high levels of tension and alienation, particularly with regard to relationships between the police and young British Muslim men. Details: London: Police Foundation, 2009. 73p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115292 Keywords: Policing Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society Summary: The U.K. Coalition Government has the opportunity to initiate a new era of counter terrorism policy. It has started well by signalling its commitment to ‘restore the rights of individuals in the face of encroaching state power’, including the introduction of a ‘Freedom Bill’, and a review of counter-terrorism legislation. This paper considers one aspect of that review, ‘home-grown’ terrorism, and the future of one specific type of response, prevention. It argues for an approach to prevention work that is consistent with the Coalition’s goal of creating a Big Society of active citizens and protecting civil liberties. That there has been no successful terrorist plot in the UK since 7/7 owes much to the skills of our policing and security services, as well as a sustained effort from Muslim communities to fight terrorism. But the threat of al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains, as does a sense of alienation and frustration among many British Muslims. Preventing terrorism before it takes place is a vital part of the counter-terrorism effort, particularly given the home-grown threat we face. This is known as ‘Prevent’, which is the second ‘P’ in the UK’s CONTEST II strategy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare). However, the five years since 7/7 have demonstrated how complicated prevention work is. Stopping a problem before it arises always poses ethical and practical questions; in counter-terrorism, it involves sensitive issues of theology, integration, and identity. And because the paths that people take into terrorism are varied, complicated, and unpredictable, it is difficult to know where and when ‘prevention’ should take place. A number of recent reports have been critical of the UK’s current prevention efforts, culminating in the House of Commons Select Committee Report into Preventing Violent Extremism, released in March 2010. It is widely believed that Prevent has alienated Muslim communities, increased intercommunity tensions, and threatens to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to community cohesion because of the link to counter terrorism. It is also extremely difficult to assess its effectiveness as the relationship between these programmes and countering terrorism is weak. Thus,in a time of tightening public sector budgets, the question of value for money is impossible to determine.Some of these criticisms have been based on misconceptions about what prevention is about but it is difficult to know how to overcome them. Some form of terrorism prevention work must remain. This paper sets out a new vision for how it could be reformed under a new government. It proposes replacing the current broad approach to prevention, which targets all Muslims, with a more precise focus on individuals that have the intent to commit criminal acts. Broader plans for cohesion are important, but should not be pursued directly or through the prism of security. Instead, Big Society initiatives can indirectly create a more cohesive society and address some of the root causes of terrorism. But a Big Society will mean disagreement, dissent, and extremism. Deciding the limits of free expression will be a defining question. Rather than vague notions of tackling extremism, we propose a liberal republican solution. This means that intolerance must be allowed a platform, but the onus falls on us to demolish it in argument. It also means intervening when certain types of extremism stop others leading a life of their own choosing. The recommendations contains a number of recommendations to enable the coalition government to create a cohesive society and address some of the causes of terrorism. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Shelf Number: 119743 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jones, Seth G. Title: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Summary: Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks — including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters — exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 185p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 7, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Shelf Number: 119759 Keywords: Counterinsurgency Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bergen, Peter Title: Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group Summary: Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to pose a threat to the United States. Although it is less severe than the catastrophic proportions of a 9/11-like attack, the threat today is more complex and more diverse than at any time over the past nine years. Al-Qaeda or its allies continue to have the capacity to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. A key shift in the past couple of years is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. citizens and residents have played in the leadership of al-Qaeda and aligned groups, and the higher numbers of Americans attaching themselves to these groups. Another development is the increasing diversification of the types of U.S.-based jihadist militants, and the groups with which those militants have affiliated. Indeed, these jihadists do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educational, or social profile. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2010 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 119828 Keywords: National Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Perelygin, Alexander Title: Metal Fingerprint: Countering Illicit Trade in Precious Metals and Gemstones Summary: International efforts to disrupt terrorist and organized crime networks must pay special attention to how these networks are financed. Global trade in precious metals and gemstones has become a significant source of financing for both organized crime and terrorist groups. As the demand for materials bearing precious metals and stones continues to grow, criminal and terrorist networks will exploit weak national and international monitoring of the trade to finance activities that threaten us all. Public-private partnerships offer a real chance of increasing transparency and monitoring in the trade of precious metals and gemstones, thus undermining the financial foundation of global terrorist networks. Serious efforts have been undertaken by governments, international organizations, and the global business community to stem illegal trade in many commodities used in money laundering and terrorist financing—especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Significant success has been seen in disrupting the trade of illegal rough diamonds through the Kimberly Process. But success has been elusive in the illegal trafficking of precious metals and gemstones. Efficient law enforcement in this area is hampered by the lack of internationally recognized procedures for certifying batches of primary precious metals-bearing raw materials and a lack of well-established methods of identifying the origin of both precious metals and gemstones. These shortcomings complicate the process of distinguishing between legal and criminal supplies and place a substantially greater burden on the due diligence efforts of precious metals refiners and stonecutters to ascertain the veracity of their customers. Russian research institutes and forensic laboratories, led by the mining and metallurgical company Norilsk Nickel, have devised advanced methods to identify the origin of semi-products bearing platinum-group metals (PGM). This methodology can be expanded to other metal groups and gemstones, taking the form of a Platinum Initiative to ensure efficient certification procedures in the international metal trade and strengthen existing certification schemes in the diamond and gemstones industries. In July 2007, an informal international working group, including experts from the private sector, government, and independent think tanks, was established under the auspices of the G8 in order to explore the potential of the Platinum Initiative. The conclusions and recommendations formulated in this policy paper are to a large extent based on the initial findings discussed at the first three meetings of this Working Group held in July and October 2007 and February 2008. Key Recommendations include the following: Develop the Platinum Initiative into a strong industry-focused program that includes: an international register of verified and legitimate traders in PGM; enhanced customs control procedures to identify PGM-bearing goods; internationally shared databases of PGM-bearing raw materials; enhanced control measures in mining and metallurgical companies; an international network of certified forensic and expert laboratories capable of tracing the origins of the goods and commodities in question. Coordinate the enforcement mechanisms of the Platinum Initiative with the relevant international organizations—in particular, the World Customs Organization (WCO), appropriate UN agencies, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the G8 governments. Incorporate data on platinum-metals bearing goods and materials into the existing WCO framework using tracking systems such as the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and the Customs Enforcement Network. Establish standardized procedures for information-sharing between national law enforcement agencies and PGM-producing companies to respond rapidly to the appearance of suspicious consignments of unfinished precious metals-bearing materials on the market. Strengthen the implementation and regulatory framework of the World Bank’s anti-money laundering (AML) program to reflect the significant role of illegal precious metals trading as an instrument of terrorist financing. Details: New York: East West Institute, 2008. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper 4/2008: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.ewi.info/metal-fingerprint-countering-illicit-trade-precious-metals-and-gemstones Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.ewi.info/metal-fingerprint-countering-illicit-trade-precious-metals-and-gemstones Shelf Number: 119899 Keywords: Illegal Trade Metal Theft Organized Crime Precious Metals Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Terrorist Financing Summary: Terrorist organisations vary widely, ranging from large, state-like organisations to small, decentralised and self-directed networks. Terrorists financing requirements reflect this diversity, varying greatly between organisations. Financing is required not just to fund specific terrorist operations, but to meet the broader organisational costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organisation and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities. The direct costs of mounting individual attacks have been low relative to the damage they can yield. However, maintaining a terrorist network, or a specific cell, to provide for recruitment, planning, and procurement between attacks represents a significant drain on resources. A significant infrastructure is required to sustain international terrorist networks and promote their goals over time. Organisations require significant funds to create and maintain an infrastructure of organisational support, to sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda, and to finance the ostensibly legitimate activities needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for terrorist organisations. Terrorists have shown adaptability and opportunism in meeting their funding requirements. Terrorist organisations raise funding from legitimate sources, including the abuse of charitable entities or legitimate businesses or self-financing by the terrorists themselves. Terrorists also derive funding from a variety of criminal activities ranging in scale and sophistication from low-level crime to organised fraud or narcotics smuggling, or from state sponsors and activities in failed states and other safe havens. Terrorists use a wide variety of methods to move money within and between organisations, including the financial sector, the physical movement of cash by couriers, and the movement of goods through the trade system. Charities and alternative remittance systems have also been used to disguise terrorist movement of funds. The adaptability and opportunism shown by terrorist organisations suggests that all the methods that exist to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk. Disrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, constraining overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their ability to execute attacks. Disrupting terrorist financing involves both systemic safeguards, which protect the financial system from criminal abuse, and targeted economic sanctions informed by counter-terrorism intelligence. The study highlights the links between financial tools and wider counter-terrorist activity: the effectiveness of authorities at both detecting and investigating terrorist activity is significantly enhanced when counter-terrorist intelligence and financial information are used together. Looking ahead the study identifies four areas which could be the focus of efforts to further strengthen counter-terrorist financing efforts: (1) action to address jurisdictional issues including safe havens and failed states, (2) outreach to the private sector to ensure the availability of information to detect terrorist financing, (3) building a better understanding across public and private sectors and (4) enhanced financial intelligence to exploit the value of financial investigation as a tool in fighting terrorism. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force/OECD, 2008. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Shelf Number: 119764 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas — and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority — continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad. This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress: Acceessed October 25, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 120066 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Crone, Manni Title: Homegrown Terrorism in the West, 1989-2008 Summary: The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as "homegrown terrorism." This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term "homegrown," which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal - but not autonomous. Finally, we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Working Paper 2010:30: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2010/WP2010-30-homegrown-terrorism-web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2010/WP2010-30-homegrown-terrorism-web.pdf Shelf Number: 120304 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter R. Title: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries Summary: This report offers a wide-ranging analysis of the role prisons can play in radicalising people – and in reforming them. In doing so, it examines the policies and approaches of 15 countries, identifying trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that can help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. They are ‘places of vulnerability’ in which radicalisation takes place. Yet they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Much of the current discourse about prisons and radicalisation is negative. But prisons are not just a threat – they can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalisation and terrorism in society as a whole. Many of the examples in this report demonstrate how prisons can become net contributors to the fight against terrorism. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Shelf Number: 120329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Prisons Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cook, David Title: Rehabilitation of Radicals Summary: In the past 10 years, the rehabilitation of Muslim radicals has become a pressing issue. Great numbers of radicals have passed in and out of various incarcerating institutions and are returned to their societies where they frequently rejoin radical groups, sometimes more radicalized and technically proficient than they were prior to their incarceration. Both Muslim and non-Muslim governments have sought different methods to rehabilitate radicals, ranging from arranging debates between radicals and mainstream Muslim religious elite to confronting them with betrayals and denunciations by relatives, friends, and associates. There are also full-scale “reeducation” camps. This policy paper will seek to evaluate these methodologies and propose for the United States a workable policy for re-integrating radicals into society, thus defusing the power of recidivism. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI-pub-CookRadicalRehab-100710.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI-pub-CookRadicalRehab-100710.pdf Shelf Number: 120345 Keywords: Muslims Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Hussain, Syed Ejaz Title: Terrorism in Pakistan: Incident Patterns, Terrorists' Characteristics, and the Impact of Terrorist Arrests on Terrorism Summary: This dissertation, in a 3-paper format, uses three datasets to study three aspects of terrorism in Pakistan. In the first paper, using data from the GTD, I describe empirically the temporal and spatial patterns of terrorism incidents in Pakistan from 1974 to 2007. In addition, I also describe the patterns in target types, weapon types and terrorist types and the patterns prior to and following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysis methods include the univariate time series, descriptive statistics and the GIS. The study offers new insights on the measurement of terrorism, the cyclical nature of terrorism, the role of conflict, the choice of weapons, the sponsorship of terrorism, the selection of targets and the reactionary nature of terrorism. The second paper analyzes personal, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of arrested terrorists in Pakistan from 1990 to 2009. I analyze police data on 2,344 terrorists using the GIS, univariate and bivariate analyses. Significant group differences, as well as differences based on geography lead to the conclusion that a generic profile of terrorists is almost impossible. One factor universally present in the circumstances of almost all the terrorists is that they belong to some area of conflict. In the third paper, I test Sherman’s theory of defiance (1993) to discern how arrests of different terrorist types and terrorist arrest types result in different types of reactions—defiance, deterrence, or irrelevance. Terrorist types can be divided into hardcore terrorists and peripheral terrorists, and arrest types can be divided into ordinary arrests or arrests by killings. I use 20 years of data from eight regions of the Punjab. Using fixed-effects cross-sectional time series (long panel), instrumental variable approach and Poisson distribution, I conclude that: aggregated arrests, ordinary arrests, and arrests of hardcore terrorists, in the current period, are associated with higher expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism in the same six month period. Further, that as compared to peripheral arrests, hardcore arrests generate more defiance. Lags of arrests and ordinary arrests decrease the expected incidence and seriousness of terrorism, suggesting a possible decay in defiance after the first six months. Details: Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2010. 179p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 7, 2010 at: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=edissertations Year: 2010 Country: Pakistan URL: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=edissertations Shelf Number: 120404 Keywords: Arrests Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Siddique, Qandeel Title: Tehrik-E-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons For Its Growth in Pakistan's North-West Summary: The present report aims to describe the concept of the militant umbrella organization Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by looking at the organisational structure, background and ideology of the group. Tactics and recruitment strategies are also discussed, along with the various financial sources that have helped sustain the TTP. Finally, the reasons for the spread and rise of the TTP are analysed. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s presence and influence appear to be spreading across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP). Pockets within the Punjab and Sind provinces have also been affected by the TTP. However, in light of recent political and military manoeuvres along Pakistan’s North Western Pashtun belt, the dynamics of ‘Talibanization’ – i.e. jihadist activity and the enforcement of a parallel administrative system and social code – are expected to alter. A number of the new breed of TTP leaders are in their thirties, with little or no formal education, and come from relatively poor socio-economic backgrounds. The exact number of TTP militants is uncertain but likely to be upwards of 10,000. Fault lines and nuances exist within the TTP umbrella organization, distinguishing one Taliban faction from the other. Bombings, including suicide strikes, appear to be the group’s preferred modus operandi, these being targeted especially at the Pakistani security forces and symbols of the state. Illegal FM radio channels and the circulation of DVD, CDs and pro-TTP newspapers and websites serve to promote the organization’s propaganda campaign. Child recruitment appears common; certain Pakistani Taliban commanders bear a specific responsibility for training suicide bombers, and a significant amount of propaganda material is directed at young people. The role of Internally Displaced Persons as a possible recruitment pool for the TTP needs to be studied further. A myriad of financial sources swell TTP coffers, including criminal activity, ‘protection money’ and donations from sympathisers inside and outside of Pakistan. TTP ideology reinforces the points laid out in the initial moves announced by the organization upon its formation in December 2007, namely: 1. Enforce sharia. 2. Unite against coalition forces in Afghanistan. 3. Perform defensive jihad against the Pakistani Army. In addition, a marked sectarian tinge has coloured the TTP ideology, this most likely being due to the injection of leaders and cadres from sectarian backgrounds into the TTP. Although previously affiliated with religious political parties, TTP leaders now appear to have adopted a rigid anti-democracy stance. There has also been a growing reference to a ‘global jihad’ – either in relation to rescuing fellow Muslims from ‘occupation,’ spreading sharia, or avenging the growing US presence and drone attacks in Pakistan. Difference may arise with regard to how any particular TTP faction prioritize the above points, depending on the individual background of a particular group leader, the political history of his territory, predominant social dynamics, and the extent and nature of its relations with other groups, such as the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida. Such nuances distinguish, for example, the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Haqqani group, who remain focused on Afghanistan, from the Baitullah Mehsud group and Fidayeen Islam, who claim the fight against the Pakistani security forces to be the ‘real jihad.’ It is also important to separate rhetoric from reality: alliances are often formed for the purpose of political posturing, rather than reflecting an actual alignment of agendas or ideologies. The frequent formation of tribal militias to confront the Taliban points to a lack of local support for the TTP. Factors accounting for cases where the TTP is known to have received local backing include threats and coercion by the rebels, local power structures supplanted by TTP governance, an effective propaganda campaign and feeding off the socio-economic frustrations of the local population. The last point in particular deserves further attention, as evidence from FATA and KPP suggests that long-standing socio-economic grievances among the local population, coupled with ongoing feelings of victimization at the hands of the Pakistani state and army, may drive them to support extremist ideology and the parallel forms of governance and ‘justice’ it offers. Details: Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2010. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: DISS Report 2010:12: Accessed December 17, 2010 at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2010/RP2010-12-Tehrik-e-Taliban_web.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2010/RP2010-12-Tehrik-e-Taliban_web.pdf Shelf Number: 120536 Keywords: Criminal Violence Terrorism (Pakistan) Terrorists

Author: Peters, Gretchen Title: Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact—and sometimes fight — with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2010. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 120547 Keywords: Corruption Insurgents Organized Crime Terrorism (Afghanistan, Pakistan) Terrorists

Author: Ginsburg, Susan Title: Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy Summary: This report provides a blueprint for an integrated strategy to thwart terrorists by focusing on terrorist mobility. While all but the most recent government counterterrorism strategies since 9/11 omit mobility as a distinct element of terrorism requiring its own operational strategy, the report argues that terrorist mobility deserves comparable attention a nd resources to those devoted to terrorist finance and communications. She describes the elements of a terrorist mobility strategy that can use leads generated by terrorists' need to travel to counter their ability to enter, live in, or move within the United States and like-minded countries. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2011 at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_TaskForce_Ginsburg.pdf Shelf Number: 120652 Keywords: Border Security Homeland Defense Migration Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Snyder, Neil N. Title: Disrupting Illicit Small Arms Trafficking in the Middle East Summary: "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons delivers a global supply of weapons and ammunition to the demand of rogue state and non-state actors. While arms do not create conflict, they increase the intensity of violent conflict. The illicit trafficking of small arms contributes to irregular conflicts in the Middle East, a region of persistent conflict and instability. The international community has attempted to regulate the global supply of small arms through non-binding agreement and embargoes, but these efforts have been ineffective in achieving the goal of preventing the flow of weapons to criminal organizations, terrorists, and other de-stabilizing non-state actors. This thesis systematically examines the illicit small arms trade to identify points of vulnerability. This study identifies a strategy to disrupt the flow of arms to specific groups or states by countering arms brokers and the networks of actors that brokers coordinate." Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=107048&coll=limited Year: 2008 Country: International URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=107048&coll=limited Shelf Number: 120811 Keywords: Arms Trafficking (Middle East) Illicit Trade Organized Crime Terrorists

Author: Sloan, Britt Title: Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats? Summary: Despite their diverging strategic objectives, terrorists, criminals, and insurgents appear increasingly to collaborate. The deep connections among terrorism, drug production, and insurgency in Afghanistan and Colombia are well known. In the Sahel, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is funded at least in part through the paid protection of trafficking routes and through criminal kidnapping campaigns. In southern Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) long has mixed oil bunkering, kidnapping, and ethnic rebellion, and it recently may have added terrorism to its repertoire. In Somalia, there is increasing concern about the possibility of Islamist militants taxing, controlling, or even investing in the piracy industry. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) made millions of dollars from sophisticated cybercrime, including extensive credit card fraud, and for years used its resulting military might to exercise de facto control over a large territory. Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labor and populations inured to and traumatized by violence, frequently represent sites of competitive advantage for terrorist organizations, criminal networks, and violent political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three —financing terrorism, protecting crime, and securing political control. The UN Security Council has gone so far as to suggest that such conjoined transnational threats may represent a threat to international peace and security. Yet, policymakers appear unclear about how to handle the confluence of these threats. This policy brief offers eight targeted policy recommendations for combating the convergence of terrorism, crime, and politics. Rather than simply warning about the potential for interaction and synergy among terrorist, criminal, and political actors, this policy brief aims to explore possibilities for exploiting their divergences. In particular, it emphasizes the need to grapple with the economic, political, and combat power that some terrorist groups enjoy through their involvement in crime and conflict. This requires an approach to counterterrorism that incorporates policy proscriptions from the criminological, conflict transformation, peacebuilding, development, and sociological arenas, while developing a coordinated interagency strategy for deploying common tools, such as macroeconomic reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts; security sector reform (SSR); improved border control; financial sector reform; and legal-institution capacity building. Above all, this approach requires taking the social power of violent organizations more seriously. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 14, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/BS_policybrief_117.pdf Shelf Number: 120928 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists Transnational Crime

Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes Summary: On 1 May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, tried to detonate a car bomb in the heart of New York’s Times Square. Thanks to the vigilance of local witnesses and to technical shortcomings, the bomb was detected and failed to explode. The investigation surrounding Shahzad’s case, like other, more recent cases, shows that the Internet played an important role in his violent radicalization and the planning and execution of the attempted attack. For example, he drew spiritual inspiration from lectures and videos circulated online by Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-Yemeni cleric, who helped to convince Shahzad to take up the cause of al-Qaida. Shahzad accessed Web sites for operational and planning purposes. He viewed “real-time video feeds of different areas of Times Square” to help determine which areas attract a large crowd and would result in a high casualty rate if attacked. Shahzad also used the Internet to discuss his plans with militants based in Pakistan. Terrorist operatives such as Shahzad often draw inspiration, reinforcement, support, and guidance from a variety of on- and off-line sources. Some clerics; experts; scholars, such as al-Awlaki; and virtual communities use the Internet to promote violent extremism on their blogs, social network pages, discussion forums, or through the streaming of videos on multimedia platforms such as YouTube. This brief provides an overview of challenges posed to stakeholders by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. It argues that the Internet is not the problem and that the online platform can be employed to counter terrorism efforts. Specifically, models of violent radicalization processes off-line offer an important and useful framework for the development and implementation of policies to counter online use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The brief concludes by offering multilateral institutions, states, civil society organizations, the media, and the private sector examples of how they can use the Internet more effectively as a counterterrorism tool to prevent and counter the use of the Internet for violent radicalization. Four intervention points are suggested: (1) weaken cult personalities, (2) challenge the extremist doctrine, (3) dispel the glory of the “terrorist lifestyle,” and (4) offer a street-smart and locally developed and communicated counternarrative. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2011. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed March 18, 2011 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/policybriefs/LS_policybrief_119.pdf Shelf Number: 121073 Keywords: Computer Crimes Counter-Terrorism Internet Crimes Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Theohary, Catherine A. Title: Terrorist Use of the Internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace Summary: The Internet is used by international insurgents, jihadists, and terrorist organizations as a tool for radicalization and recruitment, a method of propaganda distribution, a means of communication, and ground for training. Although there are no known reported incidents of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as acts of terror, this could potentially become a tactic in the future. There are several methods for countering terrorist and insurgent information operations on the Internet. The federal government has organizations that conduct strategic communications, counterpropaganda, and public diplomacy activities. The National Framework for Strategic Communication guides how interagency components are to integrate their activities. However, these organizations may be stovepiped within agencies, and competing agendas may be at stake. This report does not discuss technical and Internet architecture design solutions. Some may interpret the law to prevent federal agencies from conducting “propaganda” activities that may potentially reach domestic audiences. Others may wish to dismantle all websites that are seen to have malicious content or to facilitate acts of terror, while some may have a competing interest in keeping a site running and monitoring it for intelligence value. Key issues for Congress: • Although the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative addresses a federal cybersecurity strategy and departmental roles and responsibilities, overclassification, competing equities, and poor information sharing between agencies hinder implementation of a national cybersecurity strategy. (See “Federal Government Efforts to Address Cyberterrorism.”) • Federal agencies have interpreted the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. § 1461), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, as creating a “firewall” between foreign and domestic audiences, limiting U.S. government counterpropaganda activities on the Internet. (See “Institutional Constraints.”) • Some agencies favor monitoring and surveillance of potentially harmful websites, while others would shut them down entirely. (See “Intelligence Gain/Loss Calculus.”) • Different agency approaches to combating terrorists’ use of the Internet and different definitions and strategies for activities such as information operations (IO) and strategic communications (SC) create an oversight challenge for Congress. (See “Counterpropaganda: Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations.”) Cybersecurity proposals from the 111th Congress such as S. 3480, which contained controversial provisions labeled by the media as the Internet “Kill Switch,” are likely to be reintroduced in some form in the 112th Congress. (See “Congressional Activity.”) With growing interest in strategic communications and public diplomacy, there may also be an effort to revise the Smith- Mundt Act. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: R41674: Accessed March 22, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf Shelf Number: 121095 Keywords: Cybercrime Cybersecurity Internet Crimes Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Poot, C.J. de Title: Jihadi Terrorism in the Netherlands: A Description Based on Closed Criminal Investigations Summary: What is the nature of jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands at the outset of the 21st century when we base our analysis on information the police gathered about this phenomenon? That is the core question of this research. In order to increase the understanding of jihadist terrorism, the knowledge collected by the police during criminal investigations into jihadist activities has been analysed systematically. When we refer to jihadist activities, we mean activities which are aimed at making a contribution to the armed fight against the West and against other perceived enemies of Islam. For the purpose of this research, we analysed a total of twelve (large-scale) criminal investigations that were conducted in the Netherlands in the period between July 2001 and July 2005. In doing so, we have sketched the portrait of an era. The most recent criminal investigation we analysed was conducted in the spring of 2005. We cannot make any projection about the manner in which the phenomenon of jihadism has changed since then under the influence of national or international developments. We have based this research on police files. This entails considerable restrictions. Firstly, not all jihadist activities come to the knowledge of the police and the police do not initiate criminal investigations into all jihadist activities which come to their knowledge. Secondly, we only selected a part of the cases which have been investigated during the research period. This selection may have influenced our perception. Thirdly, we have based this research on the information gathered by investigation teams which had the aim of reconstructing terrorist crimes and submitting these to the court substantiated by evidence. This focus of the investigation teams, their investigation hypotheses and the related selection and interpretation of information has also influenced our perception. The findings presented below must be seen in this light. For the purpose of obtaining an objective analysis of the available investigation material, but also because different criminal investigations into jihadist activities are often interrelated, we considered the selected investigation material in its entirety, and chose to rely less on the structures of the separate criminal investigations. The raw empirical material was subsequently restructured, so that groups of cooperating persons and joint activities could be examined together. In analysing this material, we focused on three dimensions of this phenomenon: (1) jihadist cooperations; (2) the activities performed in these cooperations and (3) the jihadist actors. Details: The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2011. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Onderzoek en beleid, 291: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/1381a-jihadist-terrorism-in-the-netherlands-a-description-based-on-closed-criminal-investigations.aspx?cp=45&cs=6796 Year: 2011 Country: Netherlands URL: http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/1381a-jihadist-terrorism-in-the-netherlands-a-description-based-on-closed-criminal-investigations.aspx?cp=45&cs=6796 Shelf Number: 121318 Keywords: Criminal Investigation Extremist Groups Islam Terrorism (Netherlands) Terrorists

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism Summary: Efforts to promote “deradicalization,” or to rehabilitate detainees charged with terrorism-related offenses, have taken multiple forms in a wide range of countries, often as part of broader counter-radicalization strategies that seek to prevent the adoption of violent extremist ideologies or behaviors in the first place. This paper draws on recent insights from case studies of deradicalization initiatives in eight Muslim-majority countries and a variety of approaches adopted by countries in Europe and Asia. The paper makes recommendations concerning what role the United Nations might play in furthering such initiatives by states and facilitating broader international efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Shelf Number: 121610 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu Title: Immigration Policy and Counterterrorism Summary: A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country; increases in the skilled immigration quota may or may not raise terrorism against the developed country. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically augments its terrorism defenses and reduces its unskilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host country. The influence of leadership on the skilled immigration quota is more nuanced. Details: St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series; Working Paper 2011-012A: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-012.pdf Shelf Number: 121613 Keywords: Counterterrorism Economics Immigrants Immigration Policy Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations Summary: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. This report provides background information on key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. It discusses • several enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided to the FBI through post-9/11 legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; the 2008 revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey Guidelines); and the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout the country; • intelligence reform within the FBI and concerns about the progress of those reform initiatives; • the FBI’s proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its terrorism investigations using preventative policing techniques such as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of agent provocateurs; and • the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventative policing techniques to combat terrorism. This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role. These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives. In addition, these issues will also be relevant during confirmation hearings for a new director. The statutory 10-year term of current FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III expires in September 2011. A new director will be subject to Senate confirmation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R41780: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf Shelf Number: 121706 Keywords: Criminal Investigations Domestic Intelligence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases Summary: The following is a timeline of criminal proceedings related to the terror activities of American Muslim extremists and other Americans involved in activities with terrorist organizations whose ideologies are rooted in radical interpretations of Islam. In addition to planning terrorist plots, Americans have also been convicted of raising funds and providing material goods to foreign terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The equally disturbing terror-related activities of Americans who subscribe to anti-government, white supremacist and other extremist ideologies are not reflected in the timeline. Similarly, the list does not include the activities and plots against targets in the U.S. conceived by non-Americans motivated by radical interpretations of Islam. In May 2010, for example, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen living in the U.S. illegally, pleaded guilty to attempting to detonate explosives at a Dallas skyscraper the previous September in order to “bring down the building”. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Shelf Number: 121766 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Belli, Roberta Title: Where Political Extremists and Greedy Criminals Meet: A Comparative Study of Financial Crimes and Criminal Networks in the United States Summary: Financial crime poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of legitimate businesses and institutions, and to the safety and prosperity of private citizens and communities. Experts argue that the profile of financial offenders is extremely diversified and includes individuals who may be motivated by greed or ideology. Islamic extremists increasingly resort to typical white-­‐collar crimes, like credit card and financial fraud, to raise funds for their missions. In the United States, the far-­‐right movement professes its anti-­‐government ideology by promoting and using a variety of anti-­‐tax strategies. There is evidence that ideologically motivated individuals who engage in financial crimes benefit from interactions with profit-­‐driven offenders and legitimate actors that provide resources for crime in the form of knowledge, skills, and suitable co-­‐offenders. This dissertation sheds light on the nexus between political extremism and profit-­‐driven crime by conducting a systematic study of financial crime cases involving Islamic extremists, domestic far-­‐rightists, and their non-­‐extremist accomplices prosecuted by federal courts in 2004. Attribute and relational data were extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which is the first open-­‐source relational database that provides information on all extremist crimes, violent and non-­‐violent, ideological and routine crimes, since 1990. A descriptive analysis was conducted comparing schemes, crimes, and techniques used by far-­‐rightists, Islamic extremists, and non-­‐extremists, before moving into an in-­‐depth social network analysis of their relational ties in co-­‐offending, business, and family networks. The descriptive findings revealed considerable differences in the modus operandi followed by far-­‐rightists and Islamic extremists as well as the prosecutorial strategies used against them. The subsequent exploratory and statistical network analyses, however, revealed interesting similarities, suggesting that financial schemes by political extremists occurred within similarly decentralized, self-­‐organizing structures that facilitated exchanges between individuals acting within close-­‐knit subsets regardless of their ideological affiliation. Meaningful interactions emerged between far-­‐rightists and non-­‐extremists involved in business ventures and within a tax avoidance scheme, indicating that the crime-­‐extremism nexus was more prevalent within far-­‐right settings compared to Islamic extremist ones. The findings were discussed in light of their implications for criminological theories, criminal justice and crime prevention policies, and methodological advances. Details: Dissertation, City University of New York, 2011. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Shelf Number: 121874 Keywords: Extremist Groups Financial Crimes Fraud Organized Crime Tax-Evasion Terrorism Terrorists White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Frampton, Martyn Title: The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism Summary: Since the Belfast Friday Agreement of 1998, the security situation in Northern Ireland has improved immeasurably. The Provisional IRA and the main loyalist terrorist groups have called an end to their campaigns and their weapons have been decommissioned under an internationally monitored process. In recent years, however, dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland – such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, who continued to oppose the peace process – have grown stronger. Given the understandable focus on Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism in recent years, much less attention has been given to such groups. However, in the government’s National Strategic Defence and Security Review, published in October 2010, ‘residual terrorism linked to Northern Ireland’ was identified as a Tier One risk to national security: ‘There is a calculated campaign of violence from small dissident republican groups. Despite continuing political progress, their activities have increased in the last 18 months and the security situation is unlikely to improve in the short-term. There have been 37 attacks this year, compared with 22 in all of 2009. The ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to Substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility.’ This report, the first of its kind in the public domain, analyses the origins and the nature of the threat posed by violent dissident republicans over the last two years. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2010. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 5, 2011 at: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1289498383ICSR_TheReturnoftheMilitantsReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1289498383ICSR_TheReturnoftheMilitantsReport.pdf Shelf Number: 121970 Keywords: Political Violence Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (Northern Ireland

Author: Archick, Kristin Title: U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism Summary: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security. As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to clamp down on terrorist financing and to improve aviation and transport security. Despite U.S.-EU strides to foster closer counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, some challenges remain. Data privacy has been and continues to be a key sticking point. In February 2010, the European Parliament (EP) rejected a U.S.-EU agreement—known as the SWIFT accord—that would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to financial data stored in Europe to help combat terrorism on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. Although the EP approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, some Members of the European Parliament—for many years and for similar reasons—have also challenged a U.S.-EU agreement permitting airlines to share passenger name record (PNR) data with U.S. authorities. U.S. and EU officials are currently negotiating revisions to the existing PNR accord in an effort to assuage EP concerns. Other issues that have led to periodic U.S.-EU tensions include terrorist detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing border security with legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and other homeland security issues. Congressional decisions related to improving border controls and transport security, in particular, may affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament’s growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape Parliament’s views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 112th Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: RS22030: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Shelf Number: 121982 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gagel, Andrew C. Title: Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010 Summary: There are many definitions of terrorism and many ways to count it. The key, from a US policy viewpoint, is how the US government makes that count and what data it uses for measuring the threat and shaping its counterterrorism policies. With this in mind, the Burke Chair has compiled a set of tables showing terrorist attacks in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia from 2007-2010. All of these data come from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s (NCTC) World Wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS). While the NCTC tracks attacks by a number of different factors, the tables created below show the number of attacks, dead, wounded, and hostages broken down by country and then by terrorist groups acting within each country. Every group that the NCTC had as at least conducting a single, known attack in the time period has been included (even if the attack resulted in not a single death, wounded, or hostage taken). Attacks that were not claimed by or attributed to any particular group fall under the category “Unknown/Unclaimed.” It should be noted that such counts do not include low-level acts of terrorism like intimidation and extortion, which are often a critical part of the threat; nor do they attempt to measure the influence and control that terrorist and extremist groups have in given areas. The goal of such actors is not terrorism, per se, but the use of terrorism to achieve political and ideological control or influence. There also is no way to measure the error rate or uncertainty in such data. Many countries deliberately conceal the success of terrorist and extremist movements, and others count what the US sees as legitimate political protest as terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2011 at: http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_MENA_Central_Asia_China_Terrorism_2007_2010.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_MENA_Central_Asia_China_Terrorism_2007_2010.pdf Shelf Number: 122051 Keywords: Terrorism (Africa, Asia, Middle East) Terrorists

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Radicalization, Linkage, and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism in Europe Summary: Although it has not suffered a successful attack since the July 7, 2005, bombings in London, Europe perceives itself to be under a constant threat from jihadist-inspired terrorism. Indeed, European authorities arrest some 200 individuals and thwart a handful of plots of jihadist inspiration every year. Based on a survey of legal documents, intelligence reports, academic literature, and media sources, and on conversations with experts and government officials, this paper provides an overview of current trends in jihadism in Europe from an operational perspective. Its main finding is that, although most European plots appear to have been independent, the most serious ones tended to involve extensive operational connections to groups operating outside of Europe. Moreover, contrary to common characterizations, there is little evidence indicating that al Qaeda and affiliated organizations operating outside of Europe conduct direct efforts to recruit European Muslims. Rather, connections between individuals or clusters in Europe on one hand and al Qaeda and affiliated movements on the other are forged through a process of linkage, often facilitated through personal connections and "jihad entrepreneurs," that typically occurs after radicalization and is initiated by European militants. The presence of this linkage characterizes the fourth and current phase of jihadism in Europe Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2011. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP333.html Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP333.html Shelf Number: 122089 Keywords: Jihadism Terrorism (Europe) Terrorists

Author: Fishman, Shira Title: Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force Summary: Recently, a number of United States citizens have been charged with seeking oversees training for terrorist plots, sending money to fund terrorism or plotting to launch terrorist attacks within the United States. These actions underscore the need to prevent violent radicalization well before the immediate threat of an attack. This is an emerging research area, and far too little is known about what drives individuals to engage in violent radical behavior. In addition, the vast majority of past research has focused on case studies constructed after an attack or attempted attack, large-scale attitudinal surveys, or interviews with former terrorists. As with all research, these methods have limitations including lack of external validity (limiting ones’ ability to generalize from one individual to other cases), the reliance on finding and convincing individuals to grant interviews, and the ability of large-scale attitudinal surveys to capture extremist beliefs. Thus, the current project was launched to explore alternative research approaches that could be used to improve understanding of the processes surrounding violent radicalization. In particular, we sought to examine whether empirical research, using archival or institutional data at the community level, could provide new insights into factors that might leave individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Scholars from around the world with expertise in radicalization, communities in the United States and innovative methods from related fields, agreed to serve on a Task Force focused on these issues. The group was brought together for a day and a half to explore the potential relationship between community characteristics and susceptibility to radicalization. The Task Force began with the theoretical premise that some communities might possess certain characteristics that make the likelihood and/or rates of radicalization higher in those communities. Marginalized communities (including Diaspora groups), those that experience relative deprivation (of resources, both financial and otherwise), and communities that have experienced significant social disruption emerged as priority areas for future research. To conduct empirical research, three categories of dependent variables were identified by Task Force members as potential proxies for violent radicalization. The categories are: • The amount of terrorism – this variable could include the number of incidents, the number of casualties or an estimate of the damage caused by an attack. • The number of other severe (both violent and financial) ideologically motivated crimes – extremist crimes may well serve as a gateway to other ideologically motivated violence, thus, a community with other ideological crimes may well be a proxy for radicalization. • The number of attempted terrorist attacks –there is a need to consider not just successful attacks but attempts as well. Using thwarted and successful attacks is most likely a better indicator, both theoretically and statistically, of concentrations of radicalization. To test theories of radicalization, Task Force members suggested specific conditions under which radicalization may be more likely to emerge: • Marginalized communities – measuring the extent to which a subgroup, including Diaspora communities, feels included in or excluded from a larger community. o Economic measures – to assess the extent of economic distress felt by a community, including variables such as unemployment rates, median household income, income inequality, and data on participation in government assistance programs. o Social capital – the extent to which members of a community feel connected or trusting of neighbors and government, with lower levels of social capital being indicative of marginalization. Variables included here are family structure (divorce rates, single parent families), the number (or density) of social service organizations, civic organizations or arts/sports organizations, and voter turnout rates. o Political inclusion/exclusion – the extent to which members of a community feel included in local politics and political institutions. These variables include participation rates in local elections, active involvement in campaigns and the extent to which a members of a subgroup are elected or appointed to local offices. o Social support – the greater the amount of services available, the less vulnerable a community may be to radicalization. Measures of support include Head Start programs, number of children enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid, and, for Diaspora communities, number of organizations or individuals receiving money from state Offices of Refugee Resettlement. o Demographics of Diaspora community – the social structure of an immigrant community is vital to a community’s success. Such factors that may impact the prevalence of radicalization include the age at which immigrants arrive in the United States, the number of foreign language speakers or students in ESL classes and the extent to which the community establishes its own institutions such as banks and local media. • Ideology – the variables discussed previously were assumed to affect radicalization across ideologies. However, there should be some indicators that are ideology-specific . Extremist organizations are ideologically motivated and may serve as a gateway toward extremist violence. The link between such organizations and terrorism could be tested by tracking the organizations’ legal activities, the number of extremist organizations or the extent to which an organization attracts members of a community. In all, participants of the Task Force concluded that pursuing research using community-level archival or institutional data to study radicalization was a challenging but necessary task. Issues such as the marginalization or deprivation of certain communities, especially Diaspora communities, are increasingly important to study. To date, violent radicalization is still a fairly rare problem within the United States, thus, it may be possible that the community level is too broad to adequately give guidance on when, where or how individuals radicalize. However, if such research does prove successful then it may have a major impact on the way in which law enforcement deals with terrorism. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2010. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Shelf Number: 122354 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11 Summary: Since September 11, 2001, so-called "homegrown terrorists," working alone or with others, have planned and in some cases implemented terrorist activities, contributed financial or other material support to others' terrorist activities, or become radicalized in the United States and then traveled to other countries to conduct terrorist activities directed against those countries or against the United States. This paper examines the cases of homegrown terrorism from 9/11 through 2010, highlights lessons learned from those cases that suggest actions for the future, and includes a chronology of numbers and case descriptions of terrorist events in the United States during that period. Most of the individuals involved are Muslim, but the numbers are small. A total of 176 Americans have been indicted, arrested, or otherwise identified as jihadist terrorists or supporters since 9/11. They were involved in 82 cases, a majority of which involve the actions of a single individual. Al Qaeda has increasingly used the Internet to build an army of followers. Many of the terrorists identified in this study began their journey online. However, al Qaeda has not yet managed to inspire its online followers to action. Few of the 32 locally hatched jihadist plots to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 got much beyond the discussion stage. Nevertheless, al Qaeda remains a threat. More terrorist attempts will occur. Traditional law enforcement, in which authorities attempt to identify and apprehend a perpetrator after a crime has been committed, is inadequate to deal with terrorists who are determined to cause many deaths and great destruction and who may not care whether they themselves survive. Public safety demands a preventive approach — intervention before an attack occurs. In addition to law enforcement, intelligence collection, and community policing, public reaction is an essential component of such preventive defense. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html Shelf Number: 122679 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Vargas, Alejandro, Jr. Title: Applying Psychosocial Theories of Terrorism to the Radicalization Process: A Mapping of De La Corte‘s Seven Principles to Homegrown Radicals Summary: This study contains an application of psychosocial theories to the process of radicalization among Muslim militants (jihadis) with a history of activity in the United States. Drawing extensively from De la Corte‘s seven psychosocial principles of terrorism, the study codes each principle into a corresponding example from case studies of American jihadism. The end result is the use of theory to create a new empirical and psychosocial perspective into homegrown jihadism. The application of De la Corte‘s theory is also used as a framework to suggest frameworks for detection, intervention, and interdiction when it comes to homegrown jihadi activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Shelf Number: 122777 Keywords: Homeland Security Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter Title: Preventing Violent Radicalization in America Summary: In December 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder told journalists that the terrorist threat had changed from “foreigners coming here to… people in the United States, American citizens.” A number of independent studies have confirmed this assessment. One of the most recent – published by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University – showed that “nearly half” of the 175 cases of al Qaeda-related homegrown terrorism since September 11, 2001 occurred in 2009 and 2010. The threat is sufficiently serious to ask whether the U.S. government is fully prepared to confront this new challenge. “Hard” counterterrorism efforts – both at home and abroad – have become sophisticated and successful, yet there still is no domestic equivalent of the State Department’s “Countering Violent Extremism” policy seeking to prevent young Americans from being radicalized at home. Last September’s report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) National Security Preparedness Group, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, concluded that the lack of a coherent approach towards domestic counter-radicalization has left America “vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying.” The purpose of this report is to provide guidance on ongoing efforts aimed at developing such an approach. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Shelf Number: 122909 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: U.S. General Accounting Office Title: Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure That Officers Are Fully Trained Summary: Recent incidents involving potential terrorists attempting to enter the country highlight the need for a vigilant and well-trained workforce at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency in charge of inspecting travelers and goods for admission into the United States. About 20,000 CBP officers play a central role in ensuring that CBP accomplishes its mission of securing the border while also facilitating the movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which CBP has (1) revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with training standards and (2) identified and addressed the training needs of incumbent CBP officers. GAO analyzed data and documentation related to the agency’s training efforts, such as its covert test program and its training records. GAO also interviewed CBP officials and CBP officers. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted. To improve CBP training efforts, GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course; analyze covert test results; establish a policy for training responsibilities, including oversight of training records; and, conduct a training needs assessment. CBP concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-269: Accessed January 10, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587314.pdf Shelf Number: 123548 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Custom Enforcement Immigration Terrorism Terrorists Training, Border Personnel

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Roots of Violence Radicalisation. Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. Summary: On 7 July 2005, 52 people were killed and more than 770 others injured in attacks on the London transport network carried out by four men from West Yorkshire who had been radicalised by the ideology and rhetoric of Al Qa’ida. The nature of the current, deadly threat facing the UK from home-grown terrorism was fully exposed for the first time. This was only one of a number of terrorist plots which caused the British authorities to shift their attention over the past decade from external threats to national security to those lying within the UK borders. Radicalisation is one of four strategic factors identified in the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, that have enabled terrorist groups to grow and flourish. Yet four years after 7/7, the reasons why some British-born and raised individuals are vulnerable to violent radicalisation remain unclear. On taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government announced a wholesale review of the Prevent Strategy (often referred to simply as “Prevent”), which was drawn up to tackle violent radicalisation in the UK in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. The original strategy had attracted criticism for its alleged exclusive focus on Muslim communities, spying, and unhealthy conflation of law enforcement with integration policy. The outcome of the Prevent Review was published in June 2011. In anticipation of this, we decided in May 2011 to launch an inquiry that would test the evidence base for the Prevent Review and explore issues regarding its implementation. We undertook to examine the root causes of violent radicalisation in the UK, the individuals and groups particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and the locations where this radicalisation tends to take place, in relation to the primary terrorist threats facing the UK. Specifically, we intended to: • determine the major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements linked to (a) Islamic fundamentalism (b) Irish dissident republicanism and (c) domestic extremism; • examine the relative importance of prisons and criminal networks, religious premises, universities and the internet as fora for violent radicalisation; • examine the operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist groups; • consider the appropriateness of current preventative approaches to violent radicalisation, in light of these findings, including the roles of different organisations at national and local level; and • make recommendations to inform implementation of the Government’s forthcoming revised Prevent strategy. Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-12; Accessed March 21, 2012 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Shelf Number: 124124 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism (U.K.) Terrorists

Author: Williams, Phil Title: Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability Summary: The rationale for this series is a reflection of the ways in which the world of armed groups has changed and is continuing to change, and the impact of these changes on threats and challenges to national and global security. Although challenges posed by various kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all reflect the increasing connections between security and governance—and, in particular, the relationship between poor governance and violent armed groups. The growth in the number of states with capacity gaps, functional holes, and legitimacy deficits helps to explain the resurgence of a new medievalism, and the rise of illegal quasi-governments in localized areas. The irony is that after several decades in which the number of sovereign states represented in the United Nations (UN) has increased significantly, relatively few of these states can truly claim a monopoly on force within their territorial borders. Violent challengers to the Westphalian state have taken different forms in different parts of the world. These forms include tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations. In many cases, these groups are overtly challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one another. The mix is different, the combinations vary, and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent forms, however, nonstate violent actors share certain viii qualities and characteristics. As Roy Godson and Richard Shultz have pointed out, “As surprising as it may seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon, and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.” Indeed, these violent armed groups or, as they are sometimes called, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) represent a common challenge to national and international security, a challenge that is far greater than the sum of the individual groups, and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over the next several decades. Although the U.S. military—especially the Air Force and the Navy—still place considerable emphasis on the potential emergence of peer competitors among foreign armed forces, more immediate challenges have emanated not from states but from various kinds of VNSAs. This monograph, “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability,” focuses on the complex relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency, but also carry certain risks for the insurgency. Subsequent monographs will focus on specific areas where violent armed groups operate, or they will delve into specifics about some of those groups. Some works will be descriptive or historical, while others are more analytical, but together they will clarify the security challenges that, arguably, are the most important now faced by the United States and the rest of the world. The series will include monographs on Mexico, the Caribbean, and various kinds of violent armed groups. Details: Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Securities Studies; Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2012 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf Shelf Number: 125243 Keywords: Criminal Organizations Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Terrorists Violence Violent Crime Youth Gangs

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) brought together senior criminal justice experts—including Attorney-Generals and Chief Prosecutors—to share experiences and good practices on how to deal with terrorism cases. The outcome is this Digest of Terrorist Cases, giving policymakers and criminal justice officials practical ideas and expert insights on how to deal with a relatively new field of jurisprudence. It complements other UNODC tools that provide guidance on how to address acts of terrorism within a legal framework, like legislative guides. The judicial cases featured in this Digest cover relevant aspects of the international legal regime against terrorism. It provides a comparative analysis of national statutory frameworks for terrorism prosecutions, and it identifies legal issues and pitfalls encountered in investigating and adjudicating relevant offences. In addition, it identifies practices related to specialized investigative and prosecutorial techniques. It also addresses the links between terrorism and other forms of crime (like organized crime, the trafficking of drugs, people and arms), as well as how to disrupt terrorist financing. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Shelf Number: 126803 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Organized Crime Prosecution, Terrorist Cases Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Lindekilde, Lassee Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Denmark Background Report Summary: This report provides background information for understanding and assessing the impact and effectiveness of Danish counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies on minority ethno-cultural communities, in particular Muslim ones. The report contextualises questions of impact – positive as well as negative – in Denmark in terms of the demographic/socio-economic profile of immigrants; general perceptions of threats from terrorism and perceptions of discrimination experienced by minorities; the legal framework of counter-terrorism; policies of radicalisation prevention and their implementation in practice; key institutional structures of counter-terrorism and division of labour; high profile terrorist court-cases; and developments in the general political climate and public discourse regarding issues of ‘integration’ and security. Part 1 of this report focuses on the demographic and socio-economic profile of minority communities in Denmark and on their perceptions of discrimination. It shows that immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants, most of whom are of Muslim origin, currently make up 6.8% of the Danish population, a proportion which is expected to increase to around 10% by 2050. These communities are of relatively recent origin: nearly all came after 1967, and 67% arrived in, or were born in, Denmark after 1980. Their socio-economic profile indicates relative disadvantage. Even allowing for the fact that they are younger than the general population, they are disproportionately absent from the labour market: only 50% of those of working age are employed, against 74% of ethnic Danes. 75% of ethnic Danes but only 49% of descendants from non-Western countries complete some form of further or vocational education. Those immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries who are employed are generally found at the lowest levels of the labour market. With regard to discrimination, one regular survey shows perceptions of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity/religion declining from 40% in 2000 to 31% in 2011, with discrimination encountered primarily in the workplace. Official figures for hate crimes report only a handful each year, but these figures are probably not reliable, and one survey reported a suspected racial motive in 10% of cases of violence and vandalism. Part 2 introduces the legal context of counter-terrorism in Denmark. It shows how Danish counterterrorism legislation was introduced in two main packages, one in 2002 and one in 2006, and looks at checks on counter-terrorism powers, both formal and in the shape of reactions in the public debate. In general, the 2002 and 2006 packages simply implement Council of the European Union, Council of Europe and United Nations resolutions, while the definition of terrorism employed is taken almost wordfor- word from the Council of the European Union resolution. Where Danish legislation has gone beyond these international models is primarily in regard to electronic surveillance and data collection, most notably in increasing access by the internal security service to the wealth of centrally linked, very detailed and generally accurate data concerning all individuals resident in Denmark that is held by various government departments and agencies. The use of secret evidence is also permitted in terrorism cases. Police gained stop-and-search powers in specified areas of Denmark in 2004, but in response to gang violence rather than terrorism. These powers are perceived to have been used especially against minority youths. Checks on all these powers consist primarily of international human rights law, which has occasionally been invoked in Danish courts, sometimes with success. There has been much public criticism surrounding the use of secret evidence to land convictions, and notably concern that in at least one case, a police informant may have been acting as an agent provocateur. Part 3 deals with Danish counter-radicalisation policies, while providing an overview of how these are perceived by the general public and by minority communities. This part shows how comprehensive counter-radicalisation measures were implemented in Denmark by one government in 2009 and then tacitly revised by another in 2011-12. The 2009 policy defined extremism very widely to include intolerant ideas and attitudes, and its counter-radicalisation measures included spreading information concerning democracy and citizenship. These and other measures were implemented by a range of local government bodies, building on existing practices, and coordinated and reinforced by a central government body. They included targeted interventions, initially by local government and mentors and ultimately by the internal security service. Of these measures, only the targeted interventions have been retained since the change of government in 2011. Part 3 also covers arrangements for oversight of both the internal security and foreign intelligence services, which are currently being revised following a number of controversial events, only one of which was connected to terrorism. Looking at the level of general trust and experiences of discrimination by the police among ethnic minority groups, it can be concluded that although trust is relatively high in comparative terms, there are groups of predominantly young male immigrant descendants living in urban areas who socialise little with ethnic Danes, who in general have lower average trust in the police and who experience a high level of police discrimination, notably in connection with ‘inspection zones’ in which stop-and-search powers can be used. Part 4 focuses on security threats and cases of terrorism in Denmark. There has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark since 2001, but there have been thirteen high-profile terrorist cases. Two of these involved the extreme left, while extreme right-wing violence has not so far been prosecuted as terrorism in Denmark, though there are signs of changes in attitudes since the Breivik attacks. Two cases involved attempted attacks on Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist responsible for the best-known cartoon published during the Cartoon Crisis (the one of the prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban), and four cases involved attempted attacks from outside Denmark against the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper that printed the cartoons. Other cases involved assistance to, or preparation for, terrorism; no targets were actually established. Part 5 offers a brief account of the development of the political climate in Denmark with regard to counter-terrorism and minority communities from 2001 until today. It shows that three events have had a significant impact on majority-minority relations in Denmark since 2001. One was the 2001 election campaign, which focused on ‘new politics’ issues of immigration, identity, and security. The second was the Cartoon Crisis of 2005-06, which took place against the background of the ‘new politics’ issues that had emerged in 2001, and caused a division in the public mind between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, as well as playing a part in the development of the original counter-radicalisation policies considered in part 3 of this report. The third was the election of 2011, which marked a turn away from the identity questions that had dominated the political agenda over the previous decade, and led to subsequent modifications in counter-radicalisation policies. Whether this last change will prove temporary or permanent remains to be seen. Part 6 of this report presents and discusses existing academic and official literature dealing with the impact and effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and of radicalisation prevention policies on minority groups in Denmark. Counter-terrorism measures might be considered a success in the sense that there has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark, but less so in terms of the possible contribution to the construction of Danish Muslims as a ‘suspect community’. Radicalisation prevention policies may be judged a success in terms of output, but outcomes are harder to assess. Some interventions may have worked, but certain academic studies, notably that of Lindekilde, indicate that counter-radicalisation discourses may have had an opposite impact from that intended, whether through frustrations generated by role-model campaigns or through the exclusion from the public debate of voices that fear accusations of radicalism, leaving the field open to those who have may have less to lose from such accusations. Three methodological challenges are identified: the case-based and anecdotal nature of the available data, which makes generalisation of impacts and valid conclusions on causality difficult; the difficulty of excluding alternative explanations of observed impact; and the often multiple, layered and abstract policy objectives, that create major problems in designing clear indicators of success. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Denmark URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Shelf Number: 126852 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Denmark) Minorities Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Eijkman, Quirine Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Netherlands Background Report Summary: This country report sets the context for research on the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policies on racial, ethnic and religious minority communities in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that over the last decade various security measures have been assessed, there are few studies on their context-specific effect. This report discusses the Dutch population and community situation, the counter-terrorism legal framework, its policy and policing background as well as security and political perspectives. It concludes that, in the years since 9/11, the Madrid and London terror attacks, and the murder of filmmaker and Islam-critic Theo van Gogh, fear of terrorism has decreased. Furthermore, the general public appears more concerned about the effect that security measures have on their civil rights and liberties. Public security and crime-prevention remain high on the political agenda and various trends, including the emergence of anticipatory criminal justice, the use and availability of ethnic data and the strength of populist parties mobilising around (cr)immigration and integration, have made the risk of side-effects of security measures for minority communities more pertinent. The apparently decreased political and public support for the anti-discrimination framework and the weak socio-economic position and institutional representation of ethnic minorities and migrants, contribute to the necessity of sound empirical research on the impact of security measures on minority, especially Muslim, communities in the Netherlands. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Netherlands_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Netherlands_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 126880 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Netherlands) Minorities Muslims Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Sweden Background Report Summary: This report provides an overview of the development of counter-terrorism policies and policing in Sweden, and the impact these have had on minority communities in Sweden, particularly Muslim communities. The report presents existing research and information on demographics and socio-economic contexts of ethnic minority communities, the development of a legal framework to address terrorism, the history of policy and policing with regard to counter-terrorism, the security context and attitudes towards counter-terrorism, and the political context surrounding migration, citizenship and terrorism. Part One outlines the history and current context of immigration and settlement of ethnic minority groups in Sweden, and provides a background on Sweden’s demographics. In recent years, ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. This section provides an overview of Muslim migration to and settlement in Sweden, and the mixed and unfavourable outcomes for Muslims and other minority groups in the labour market, education and housing. It sets out recent data on ethnic and religious discrimination in Sweden, particularly towards Muslims after 9/11. Finally, this section outlines levels of cooperation between the government and Muslim civil society organisations, and notes that there have been high levels of cooperation; Muslim civil society organisations have also received generous funding from the state and Swedish foundations. Part Two details the key legislation used in relation to counter-terrorism in Sweden. Sweden was first confronted with acts of terrorism in the early 1970s, and the government introduced the first anti-terrorist legislation in 1973. It sets out the criminalisation of terrorist attacks, legal definitions of terrorism, and the institution of special laws on criminal responsibility for financing terrorism. This section furthermore discusses the legal framework for investigatory measures and surveillance, including the controversial FRA law which had allowed the National Defence Radio Establishment to monitor all phone and email communications to and within Sweden without warrant, and, after heavy criticism, was amended in 2009 to improve privacy. Part Two ends with a discussion of checks and balances on counter-terrorism measures and laws. Part Three covers the policy context for counter-terrorism, providing an overview of the key policies in place to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Sweden. These include the ‘Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism’, presented in December 2011, and ‘Sweden’s national counter-terrorism strategy’, presented by the government in February 2012. This section presents the key institutional structures, including the structure of the Swedish Police Service, and roles and responsibilities in countering terrorism in Sweden. It then outlines mechanisms for accountability within for these structures, detailing parliamentary committees and consultations set up to scrutinise the work of the police and other institutions. The section ends with a discussion of police behaviour and incidences of police misconduct and discrimination in Sweden. Several key incidents have drawn attention to the problem of racial profiling by the police in Sweden. Part Four discusses Swedish experiences with terrorism, providing an account of terrorist incidents in Sweden since the early 1970s, when cases of Croatian separatist terrorism brought terrorism onto the political agenda. This section includes the numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism offences in Sweden, and details several key events in recent years that have contributed to increased concerns about terrorism. This includes the 2007 publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, which sparked protests and violent threats towards Sweden and the cartoonist himself. The most recent significant terrorist attack on Swedish soil was the December 2010 suicide bombing in Stockholm, perpetrated by a Swedish citizen of Iraqi descent. This section also discusses perceptions of the threat of terrorism among the Swedish public. Part Five explains the political climate surrounding minority communities and counter-terrorism in Sweden, and how political parties have addressed issues concerning migration, citizenship, security and terrorism. Though Swedish politics has historically been characterised by consensus across party lines on the subject of immigration, and such issues have not been politicised, recent years have seen the perceived importance of immigration and terrorism as political issues grow. The emergence of the Sweden Democrats -an anti-immigrant party arguing for increased political attention to Islamist extremism and the ‘threat’ posed by Muslim communities- in Parliament has not wavered the positions of mainstream parties on these issues. However, this section notes that the climate has become much harsher and the ‘tough on crime’ card is more often played in election campaigns, and immigrants and Muslim communities in particular are often presented as ‘problem’ communities in this respect. This shift in climate has significantly impacted ethnic and religious minorities in Sweden, and has had a particularly negative impact on Muslim communities, who have increasingly become the victims of suspicion and hatred, manifested in discrimination and violence. This report draws upon existing research on the Swedish population, the development of migrant and minority communities, and in particular Muslim communities. It refers to official government communications and external analyses to paint a picture of the legal and policy approaches to counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism in Sweden. Though there are Ombudsman statistics available on mistreatment by the police, and there has been some recent research to better understand attitudes and discriminatory behaviour within the police, more work must be done to assess the relationship between minority communities and the police. There has been little research directly on the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities in Sweden, and this report lays the groundwork for future inquiries on this issue. Given the existing state of research, it is, however, clear that through a combination of persistent socio-economic disadvantage, shifts in the political climate on security and migrant communities, the occurrence of Sweden’s first suicide bombing by an Islamist extremist, and increased government attention paid to Islamist extremism in Sweden, Muslim communities in Sweden have increasingly been subject both to suspicion and discrimination. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Sweden URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Shelf Number: 126884 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Sweden) Minorities Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Rollins, John Title: Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress Summary: This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government’s perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options. In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns. • Partnership Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations. • Appropriation of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. • Organizational Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda’s affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah. To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources sufficiently respond to the combined crimeterrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R41004: Accessed November 9, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Shelf Number: 126913 Keywords: Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Transnational Crime

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes. The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality. DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. Details: Wshington, DC: GAO, 2012. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-79: Accessed November 20, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Shelf Number: 126940 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Training Extremist Group Homeland Security (U.S.) Police Training Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C: Citizzen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links Between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union Summary: The study presents a qualitative analysis of the linkages between Organised Crime (OC) and terrorism with specific reference to the European Union. A conceptual basis of the links between OC and terrorism is outlined, and systematically used to identify how these two phenomena come together in the European theatre. The study also considers developments regarding the relationship between OC and terrorism in regions outside the E.U., that have a direct impact on how the nexus is evolving in E.U. member-states. It reveals that certain linkages between OC and terrorism exist in the E.U. Trends suggest that these linkages will continue to develop. The study concludes by assessing the impact of OC-terrorism linkages on the E.U., and providing recommendations on how to address it. It points out that the effective fight against OC and terrorism depends on an integrated approach that involves all stakeholders at both national and E.U. levels. Details: Brussels: European Parliment, 2012. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 27, 2012 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/nov/ep-study-crime-terrorism.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/nov/ep-study-crime-terrorism.pdf Shelf Number: 127010 Keywords: Crime-Terror Nexus Organized Crime (Europe) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Whitfield, Nathan S. Title: Traveling the Terror Highway: Infiltration of Terror Operatives across the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, border security and immigration have received increased attention. Public and political scrutiny have elevated and changed the priority of border security and immigration enforcement; from migrant workers seeking employment to counter-terrorism. However, the question remains: if United States law enforcement and security agencies are unable to stop the smuggling of drugs and illegal migrants across the southwestern border between the U.S. and Mexico, is it possible to prevent terrorists from gaining unauthorized and unaccountable entry into the heartland of the U.S.? A corollary question is: given attempts to restructure the immigration enforcement policy and infrastructure to deter illegal entry of terrorists, will it still be possible and lucrative for terrorists to attempt to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border? This research seeks to explore existing conditions that may facilitate or increase the likelihood that terrorists would seek to infiltrate personnel across the U.S.-Mexico border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127037 Keywords: Border Security Illegal Aliens Illegal Immigrants Immigration (U.S. - Mexico) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: 2012 Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002 - 2011 Summary: The Global Terrorism Index is a comprehensive body of work which systematically ranks the nations of the world according to their terrorist activity. The index combines a number of factors associated with terrorist attacks to build a thorough picture of the impact of terrorism over a 10-year period, illustrating trends, and providing a useful data series for further analysis by researchers and policymakers. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity and has codified over 104,000 cases of terrorism. This report summarizes changing trends in terrorism over time, as well as analyzing its different dimensions in terms of geographic activity, methods of attack, organizations involved, and its national context in terms of economic development and governance. The index has also been compared to other socioeconomic indicators to determine what factors are commonly associated with terrorism. Details: London: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 127141 Keywords: Terrorism (International) Terrorists

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: 2012 Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002 - 2011 Summary: The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive body of work which systematically ranks the nations of the world according to their terrorist activity. The index combines a number of factors associated with terrorist attacks to build a thorough picture of the impact of terrorism over a 10-year period, illustrating trends, and providing a useful data series for further analysis by researchers and policymakers. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity and has codified over 104,000 cases of terrorism. This report summarizes changing trends in terrorism over time, as well as analyzing its different dimensions in terms of geographic activity, methods of attack, organizations involved, and its national context in terms of economic development and governance. The index has also been compared to other socioeconomic indicators to determine what factors are commonly associated with terrorism. Details: Sydney; New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 29, 2013 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 127417 Keywords: Terrorism (International) Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homegrown Terrorists Homeland Security Jihadist Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Chana, Rajinder Title: The Prevent Initiative: A Review of Local and National Prevent Work. What Can Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region Learn? Summary: Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region has been responsible for supervising offenders convicted under the Terrorism Act (TACT) or for terrorist related offences. It is predicted that these numbers will potentially increase as will the number of offenders on the Trust’s caseload that may be at risk of radicalisation. A recent evaluation (Harris, 2010) looked at the training, consultancy, and support work developed and offered to assist Offender Managers at West Yorkshire Probation Trust (WYPT). Staff feedback from the evaluation found that they felt more confident in such work. The purpose of the current research is to assess what work is being developed and undertaken, both locally and nationally, with radicalised offenders on probation and those identified as susceptible to radicalisation. The key research questions are: 1. What work is currently undertaken nationally and locally with radicalised offenders on probation and those susceptible to radicalisation? Does this differ across areas? 2. What does the literature suggest as to what makes an individual become radicalised or susceptible to radicalisation? 3. What interventions have been or are being developed for such individuals locally and nationally? Does this differ across areas? 4. Are there any emerging trends or evidence since the initiative began of what can be applied to such individuals for what we can prescribe as an intervention? 5. Are there any issues relating to the new risk assessment tool1 that is being piloted by NOMS? The research will be used to inform the development of interventions within Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region. Details: Wakefield, UK: West Yorkshire Probation Trust, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2013 at: www.westyorksprobation.org.uk Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 127817 Keywords: Probation Probationers Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (U.K.)

Author: Mesoy, Atle Title: Poverty and Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: A Causal Link? Summary: The consensus in past research into terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) is that generally there is no link between poverty and radicalisation, and if such a link exists, it is a weak one. However, insufficient attention has been paid to how terrorism has changed over the last few years to become a phenomenon that frequently occurs in weak, conflict-ridden states. In these states, poverty seems to play an essential role especially with regard to the motivation of suicide bombers. In the case of Pakistan, a current hotbed of terrorism, little research has been done on this issue and what little research that has been conducted points in opposite directions. However, more recent research has concluded that RVE and terrorism have to be researched in each country/area where terrorism exists and conclusions cannot be generalised to all countries. There is reason to believe that there is a causal link between poverty and RVE, especially in countries such as Pakistan, where there are high levels of poverty and militant groups both recruit and supply social services, and where poverty-stricken young men have few livelihood options other than that of joining a militant group. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2013. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: NOREF Expert Analysis: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Shelf Number: 128212 Keywords: Economic Conditions and Crime Poverty Radical Groups (Pakistan) Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Information Sharing: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure That Efforts to Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports Are Effective Summary: In 2007, DOJ and its federal partners developed the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative to establish a capability to gather and share terrorism-related suspicious activity reports. GAO was asked to examine the initiative's progress and performance. This report addresses the extent to which (1) federal agencies have made progress in implementing the initiative, and what challenges, if any, remain; (2) the technical means used to collect and share reports overlap or duplicate each other; (3) training has met objectives and been completed; and (4) federal agencies are assessing the initiative's performance and results. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed federal officials responsible for implementing the initiative and stakeholders from seven states (chosen based on their geographic location and other factors). The interviews are not generalizable but provided insight on progress and challenges. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ implement formalized mechanisms to provide stakeholders feedback on the suspicious activity reports they submit, mitigate risks from supporting two systems to collect and share reports that may result in the FBI not receiving needed information, more fully assess if training for line officers meets their needs, and establish plans and time frames for implementing measures that assess the homeland security results the initiative has achieved. DOJ agreed with these recommendations and identified actions taken or planned to implement them. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-233: Accessed May 1, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 128579 Keywords: Fusion Centers Information Sharing Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Smith, David Michael Title: Immigrants and Counterterrorism Policy: A comparative study of the United States and Britain Summary: This project examines the political mechanisms through which foreign nationals are perceived as security threats and, as a consequence, disproportionately targeted by counterterrorism policies. Evidence suggests that domestic security strategies that unduly discriminate against non-citizens or national minorities are counterproductive; such strategies lead to a loss of state legitimacy, they complicate the gathering of intelligence, and they serve as a potential source of radicalization. At the same time, discriminatory counterterrorism policies represent a significant break from liberal democratic ideals by legitimizing unfair treatment of targeted groups. If discriminatory counterterrorism policies are counterproductive and undemocratic, why do policymakers support such strategies in the first place? By what means do these types of policies and related administrative measures gain traction in the political system? How do these measures operate in practice, and what accounts for variations in their implementation over time? To answer these questions, a policy process model is used that distinguishes between the problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, and policy implementation phases of policymaking. The American government’s handling of the First Red Scare (1919-1920), the American response to 9/11, and the British response to 9/11 are examined to provide a comparative perspective on these issues. Policy outputs across these three cases were remarkably similar. The rights of noncitizens were curtailed to a much greater extent than were the rights of citizens. These similarities are attributed to the ways in which notions of national identity influence problem definition and policy legitimation. In particular, concepts that were prevalent in nationalist narratives about the Other were incorporated into dominant policy narratives about terrorism. The nationalist Other became indistinguishable from the terrorist Other, thereby contributing to the translation of group-neutral policies into a group-specific practice of counterterrorism. The greatest variation, within and between cases, was observed in the implementation of counterterrorism policy. Each instance of implementation represented a unique trajectory, and both American cases displayed a much more vigorous and public set of counterterrorism activities than the British case. These differences are traced to variations in other institutional (domestic and international) and political variables that were found to be influential in each case. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, 2013. 263p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Shelf Number: 128779 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Security Homeland Security Immigrants (U.S. and U.K.) Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism Summary: This paper examines radicalization as a social phenomenon through the behavior of individuals and networks. Violent extremists, individuals pursuing political change through violence, remain committed to striking the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad. It is important to understand how radical ideas spread to counter or contain this immediate and persistent threat. This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. This means that there is value in differentiating why radical ideologies resonate among individuals, and how individuals come to adopt and advocate those ideas. This report helps contextualize the current terrorist threat, the role of technology in radicalization, and next steps in decoding radicalization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Shelf Number: 129585 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Terror From the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City Summary: At 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a 7,000-pound truck bomb, constructed of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane racing fuel and packed into 13 plastic barrels, ripped through the heart of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion wrecked much of downtown Oklahoma City and killed 168 people, including 19 children in a day-care center. Another 500 were injured. Although many Americans initially suspected an attack by Middle Eastern radicals, it quickly became clear that the mass murder had actually been carried out by domestic, right-wing terrorists. The slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy theories and white-hot fury of the American radical right, marked the opening shot in a new kind of domestic political extremism — a revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random to make a political point. After Oklahoma, it was no longer sufficient for many American right-wing terrorists to strike at a target of political significance — instead, they reached for higher and higher body counts, reasoning that they had to eclipse McVeigh’s attack to win attention. What follows is a detailed listing of major terrorist plots and racist rampages that have emerged from the American radical right in the years since Oklahoma City. These have included plans to bomb government buildings, banks, refineries, utilities, clinics, synagogues, mosques, memorials and bridges; to assassinate police officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and others; to rob banks, armored cars and other criminals; and to amass illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives and biological and chemical weapons. Each of these plots aimed to make changes in America through the use of political violence. Most contemplated the deaths of large numbers of people — in one case, as many as 30,000, or 10 times the number murdered on Sept. 11, 2001. Details: Montgomery AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129598 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.) Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Summary: Even though over the last twenty years some of its citizens have been killed or kidnapped by various jihadist groups abroad, internally Switzerland has not witnessed jihadist activities on a significant scale. Unlike most Western European countries, in fact, no successful terrorist attack of jihadist inspiration has ever been perpetrated on its territory and there is no publicly available information indicating that concrete plans for an attack in Switzerland were ever made. Less than a dozen individuals have been tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of them involving non-violent activities of material support and propaganda. The number of Swiss residents who have traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is also estimated to be lower than in most other European countries. Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and argue that "Switzerland is not an island." Counterterrorism officials have consistently claimed that there is ample evidence suggesting that some of the same radicalization trends that have long characterized other Western European countries also exist in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. This report seeks to assess the size and dynamics of jihadist radicalization in the country. Its main findings are as follows: - While it is impossible to provide anything even close to an exact number, it can be argued that radicalization of jihadist inspiration involves a negligible cross-section of the Swiss Muslim community. There are probably only a couple of dozens of individuals in Switzerland who are actively involved in jihadist activities. Similarly, it can be argued that the number of those fully embracing jihadist ideology is somewhere in the hundreds, and of those with varying degrees sympathizing with it is somewhere in the lower thousands. - Basing the analysis on the admittedly limited number of Swiss-based individuals who are known to have embraced jihadist ideology, it is evident that jihadist enthusiasts, as elsewhere in Europe, do not have a common profile. In the 1990s and early 2000s most of them were first generation immigrants who had arrived in Switzerland already radicalized. An example is the case of Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el Aroud, the Fribourg-based administrators of prominent jihadist forums who had contacts with the upper echelons of al Qaeda, or members of various cells providing support to North African-based al Qaeda affiliates. Following a pattern common throughout Europe, over the last few years an increasing number of jihadist sympathizers have had homegrown characteristics: born (or at least raised) in Switzerland, they radicalized independently in the country and operated largely outside of the framework of established groups. Occasionally some Swiss-based radicalized individuals manage to link up with al Qaeda-affiliated groups outside of Europe and train or fight with them. - Militants are not born in a vacuum. Rather, radicalization takes place "at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory." This report identifies militant Salafism as the ideological milieu from which jihadists, in Switzerland as elsewhere, can come from. An automatic identification of Salafism with terrorism is a gross analytical mistake. Moreover, even among those who interact with the most radical fringes of the Salafist movement, only a marginal fraction will make the leap into violent radicalism. But militant Salafism is the larger sea in which the fish swim. - The report analyzes various factors that, often operating concurrently, contribute to radicalization: 1. The internet: the report finds evidence of a small, loose-knit community of Swiss-based jihad enthusiasts who interact among themselves and with likeminded individuals abroad on jihadist forums and online social networks. 2. Mosques: the overwhelming majority of Swiss mosques reject extremism, but small groups of jihad enthusiasts congregate at the margins of some of Switzerland's most conservative mosques or in private prayer rooms. 3. Gateway organizations: there are a handful of organizations in Switzerland which do not advocate violence themselves, but spread ideas that may lead others to do so. 4. Links abroad: Swiss militants regularly interact with like-minded individuals from countries where the Salafist scene is more developed. It is common for Swiss residents to travel abroad to participate in seminars and for foreign speakers to come to Switzerland. This interaction is particularly strong with the Salafist scenes in Germany and in the Balkans. - Patterns of linkage are very difficult to assess, but there are indications pointing to the presence of "gatekeepers" operating on Swiss territory that channel aspiring jihadists in the direction of established groups operating in Africa, the Middle East or South Asia. - As in any other European country, radicalization of jihadist inspiration seems to affect only a statistically marginal segment of the Swiss Muslim population. But radicalization in Switzerland appears to be a limited phenomenon also when compared to other European countries. Four factors can explain this difference: 1. Lack of an "infecting cluster": Switzerland never hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihadists, elements that in other countries have been crucial in spreading jihadist ideology. 2. Good degree of social, economic and cultural integration of most Muslims living in Switzerland, rendering them more resilient to extremist narratives. 3. Demographic characteristics of the Swiss Muslim population: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims trace their origins to the Balkans or Turkey, where the vast majority of Muslims traditionally espouses forms of Islam that are tolerant and apolitical. 4. Switzerland's foreign policy, whose largely neutral stance does not provide a source of grievances. - While these concurrently operating factors can potentially explain the low levels of jihadist radicalization in Switzerland, none of them is a guarantee. Each, in fact, presents weaknesses and exceptions. Many of the dynamics present throughout Europe are visible also in Switzerland, albeit on a much smaller scale. There are loosely knit milieus in Switzerland, both in the virtual and physical world, that sympathize with jihadist ideology. And occasionally individuals who belong to these milieus do make the leap from words to action. Details: Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Switzerland URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Shelf Number: 132180 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Jihadism Muslims Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Davis, Paul K. Title: Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect Potential Violent Acts : A Review of the Science Summary: Government organizations have put substantial effort into detecting and thwarting terrorist and insurgent attacks by observing suspicious behaviors of individuals at transportation checkpoints and elsewhere. Related technologies and methodologies abound, but their volume and diversity has sometimes been overwhelming. Also, effectiveness claims sometimes lack a clear basis in science and technology. The RAND Corporation was asked to review the literature to characterize the base in behavioral sciences relevant to threat detection, in part to help set priorities for special attention and investment. Our study focused on the science base for using new or nontraditional technologies and methods to observe behaviors and how the data gathered from doing so might-especially when used with other information-help detect potential violent attacks, such as by suicide bombers or, as a very different example, insurgents laying improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Behavioral indicators may help identify individuals meriting additional observation in an operational context. For that context, security personnel at a checkpoint are assessing whether an individual poses some risk in the limited sense of meriting more extensive and perhaps aggressive screening, follow-up monitoring, or intercept. They obtain information directly, query databases and future versions of information-fusion centers ("pull"), and are automatically provided alerts and other data ("push"). They report information that can be used subsequently. In some cases, behaviors of a number of individuals over time might suggest a potential ongoing attack, even if the individuals are only pawns performing such narrow tasks as obtaining information. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 306p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR215/RAND_RR215.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR215/RAND_RR215.pdf Shelf Number: 132701 Keywords: Behavioral Analysis Crime Prevention Risk Assessment Suicide Bombing Terrorism Prevention Terrorists Violence

Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Homeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion Centers Homeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions Summary: Since September 11, 2001, the US government has prosecuted more than 500 people for alleged terrorism-related offenses in the United States. Many prosecutions have properly targeted individuals engaged in planning or financing terrorist acts under US law. However, in other cases, the individuals seem to have been targeted by US law enforcement because of their religious or ethnic background, and many appear to have engaged in unlawful activity only after the government started investigating them. In Illusion of Justice, Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute examine 27 federal terrorism-related prosecutions against American Muslims since 2001 that raise serious human rights concerns. While the government maintains its actions are intended to prevent future attacks, in practice US law enforcement has effectively participated in developing and furthering terrorism plots. As a judge said in one case, the government "came up with the crime, provided the means, and removed all relevant obstacles," and in the process, made a terrorist out of a man "whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in scope." Other concerns include the use of overly broad material support charges, prosecutorial tactics that may violate fair trial rights, and disproportionately harsh conditions of confinement. US counterterrorism policies call for building strong relationships with American Muslim communities. Yet many of the practices employed are alienating those communities and diverting resources from other, more effective, ways of responding to the threat of terrorism. The US government should focus its resources on a rights-respecting approach to terrorism prosecutions, one that that protects security while strengthening the government's relationship with communities most affected by abusive counterterrorism policies. Details: New York: HRW, 2014. 212p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132735 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Human Rights Abuses (U.S.) Muslims Prosecutions Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Couture, Krista London Title: A Gendered Approach To Countering Violent Extremism. Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco Summary: As the United States and world transition from a reflexive and hard approach in counterterrorism to a more reflective and soft one for the prevention of terrorism, the search for best practices and lessons learned is more critical than ever. While programming related to countering violent extremism (CVE) continues to grapple with the adoption of official definitions, priorities, evaluation methodologies, and qualitative and quantitative metrics, there is a growing awareness of the importance of harnessing female actors as positive, operational agents of change. Women continue to be an underutilized and under-tapped resource in the fight against extremism. This research identifies best practices through lessons learned from efforts that utilize women to encouragingly affect catalysts and circumstances that drive individuals to engage in terrorism. The empowerment of women not only makes practical sense, but also is a good investment in economics, business, and counterterrorism. In micro lending, for every $1US a woman earns, she reinvests 90 percent back into her family and/or community; men re-invest only 40 percent. When a woman has an education, she marries on average four years later, enters into non-abusive relationships, and has 2.2 children who are healthier and better educated. Extremism is most effectively countered through increased education, better critical thinking, and enhanced opportunities. These empowerment scenarios and positive outcomes become manifest in the impact a woman has within her family and community. In the words of former Secretary to the United Nations Kofi Annan, "There is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole - women and men alike - than the one which involves women as central players." While originally intended to only bring awareness of the role of women in preventing terrorism, this research reveals several additional important findings. Most notably, as is the case with their impact on peace and stability, women play a critical role in the security realm, and CVE is no exception. Empowering women in culturally and country-specific ways enables them to be valuable players in the extremism paradigm. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Shelf Number: 132873 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violence Prevention Violent Extremism (Bangladesh, Morocco)

Author: Jones, Derek Title: Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations Summary: Lieutenant Colonel Derek Jones wrote this School of Advanced Military Studies award-winning comprehensive study of clandestine cellular networks and the effect on counterinsurgency operations in 2008 while a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Consequently, his monograph, although timeless in its discussion and analysis of clandestine cellular networks, was drafted years before the May 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden that resulted in his death. Therefore, the paper does not address the impact on such organizations from the death of its most charismatic leader. His monograph does provide, however, a theoretical, doctrinal, and operational understanding of the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks resulting in valuable insight and understanding of the complex nature of these organizations. As the world s societies have migrated into the urban areas, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones, the urban guerrilla, underground, and auxiliaries, all operating as clandestine cellular networks, have become increasingly important, especially the core members of the movement within the underground. His analysis presents the problem from a Western military, and especially the counterinsurgent perspective pointing out that the primary components of these networks, the underground and auxiliary elements and the urban guerrillas, exist among and are drawn from the local population. As such, thus, they continually frustrate counterinsurgent operations. Any misapplication of force by the counterinsurgent, in LTC Jones s view, automatically delegitimizes the government s efforts. LTC Jones answered the primary research question what is the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks? Although each insurgency is unique, underground clandestine cellular networks as the foundation of insurgent organizations are not, nor are their form, function, and logic. Details: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 139p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-3: Accessed October 27, 2014 at: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA572767 Shelf Number: 131728 Keywords: Counterterrorism Criminal Networks Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. Feature Focus 2014: Responding to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorism-related Pubposes Summary: Understanding how the global threat environment affects the terrorist threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests enables the Government to counter these threats more effectively. This document, the Government's 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, examines major international and domestic terrorism-related developments during 2013 and early 2014. It highlights two alleged terrorist plots that resulted in arrests in Canada. It also describes several cases where individuals left Canada to participate in terrorism-related activities abroad. These observations draw on consultations with non-government partners, including Canadian community leaders, academics and those in the private sector. In many cases, the 2014 Public Report explains further developments relating to issues discussed in the 2013 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. The 2014 Public Report also contains a Feature Focus detailing Government actions in 2013 to respond to violent extremism and travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes. The 2014 Public Report represents the combined efforts of several Canadian federal departments and agencies. It fulfills a Government commitment made in the February 2012 document, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy, to update Canadians on the terrorist threat. In accordance with their individual mandates, many departments and agencies also provide separate updates to Canadians on various aspects of the threat. Details: Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 134499 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism (Canada) Terrorists

Author: Cigar, Norman Title: Tribal Militias: An effective tool to counter Al-Qaida and its affiliates? Summary: Despite over a decade of open war, dealing with Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Middle East is likely to remain a concern for the foreseeable future and will pose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that is likely to be effective in meeting the threat. Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida has operated in the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001, have a predominantly tribal character or at least have a strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools to counter Al-Qaida's continuing presence in that social environment, therefore, is a priority and requires understanding Al-Qaida's critical vulnerabilities when it operates in those societies and developing the means to counter Al-Qaida's efforts. This monograph addresses the role of tribal militias in the context of the fight against Al-Qaida. The intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify options for future operations by focusing on past experience in order to identify the positive and negative aspects related to the use of such militias. The focus in this monograph is on Iraq and Yemen. However, many of the lessons learned may be applied more broadly. The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-based militias provide may be one of the most efficient, cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, such militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S. Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground in significant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias can reduce the need for a U.S. commitment on the ground in environments that might present unfavorable conditions for a significant U.S. Landpower footprint. At the same time, given the complexity of the local political environment, tribal militias are no panacea, but can be a two-edged sword. Like any weapon, the use of tribal militias has to be understood and wielded with caution and skill in order to avoid unintended consequences. This discussion includes two models for the tribal militias based on the nature of their patron. In Model 1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model 2, the national government is the patron (although an outside entity may provide ancillary support). The first case study deals with a Model 1 situation, where a foreign patron - the United States - acted in that role in Iraq beginning in late-2006 and lasting through the hand-over to Iraqi authorities during the period from December 2008 to April 2009. The second case study deals with two ongoing Model 2 situations, again with Iraq, but taking place after the national government's assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in 2009. This case study is especially useful for comparative purposes with the first case study. The third case study deals with Yemen, where the local government has acted as the militia patron since 2012. Details: Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 19, 2015 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1230.pdf Shelf Number: 134967 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Militia Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Euer, Katrin Title: Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalization (STRESAVIORA) Part I: Literature analysis Summary: Radicalization is a complex process. Former research pointed to the importance of multiple factors covering the social-, demographic- and psychological spheres. Furthermore, triggers like the deceasing of a family member or drastic events that circulate on (social) media, play an important part in the development of radical ideas. Especially youngsters and adolescents who are in the process of developing a social identity, are vulnerable to influences from charismatic role models or peers. In this report the results of the research on the process of violent radicalization are presented. During this research, our focus evolved from paying attention to deradicalization interventions and risk factors to prevent radicalization, to a mind set in which we became conscious that the focus should be on positive experiences, instead of fighting against situations we do not want to happen. An overview is given of risk factors as well as protective factors on several levels and related to different spheres in the process of violent radicalization. In the consulted literature, little has been written about protective factors, therefore our aim was to uncover these during the qualitative interviews. Instead of only focussing on aspects which should be banished, attention should be paid to hopes, wishes and dreams. Further, in this report an overview of promising practices concerning trainings for the enlargement of resilience among youths is presented. This research aims to prevent certain (radical) attitudes to develop. Although the process of involvement in radical movements or developing radical attitudes is difficult to grasp, some preventive strategies could be identified. Also, indicators to take into account for the design and evaluation of trainings are discussed, in order to hand out guidelines for the development of tools. There is no univocal answer to the question: which measure or intervention is the most effective and efficient. Yet, we state that a comprehensive, integrated approach is useful if combined with a focus on positive factors, in order to increase youngsters� resilience to prevent involvement in violent radicalization. Details: Brussels: Belgian Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Shelf Number: 135542 Keywords: Radical Groups Radical Groups (Europe) Radicalization Terrorists Violence

Author: Soldz, Stephen Title: All the President's Psychologists: The American Psychological Association's Secret Complicity with the White House and US Intelligence Community in Support of the CIA's Summary: When considering the analysis presented here, it is important to be mindful of the fundamental principles that define and inform the behavior of all health professionals and professional associations. A profession is characterized by a specialized body of knowledge applied in the service of the individual patient and society. It is incumbent upon a profession to disseminate and expand such knowledge, to abide by codes of ethics worthy of the designation of "profession," including the responsibility to self regulate. The APA is the largest association of professional psychologists in the United States, and, indeed, the world. As such it plays a major role in setting standards for psychological research, practice, and education. Those standards are a primary mechanism that international standards for health professionals, including such international instruments as the Convention against Torture, become integrated into the practice and standards of US psychologists. Further, APA's standards and positions exert influence on psychological professionals and associations around the world. The APA lobbies on behalf of funding for psychological research and practice, credentials graduate training programs and internships, and is responsible to protect the interests of psychology as a profession. The APA created and periodically revises a code of ethics that governs the ethical behavior of members and is integrated into or forms the basis of most state licensing requirements for psychologists. That code, like that of other health professions, is based on principles of avoiding harm and improving people's lives. These principles undergird the basis of trust in the profession necessary for psychologists being able to help people with some of the most difficult and intimate of life's problems. Federal regulations require that professional psychologists in the employ of the US government, including those in the military, be licensed by a state and follow the state's ethics code. The APA's complicity in the CIA torture program, by allowing psychologists to administer and calibrate permitted harm, undermines the fundamental ethical standards of the profession. If not carefully understood and rejected by the profession, this may portend a fundamental shift in the profession's relationship with the people it serves. Details: s.l., 2015. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2015 at: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.transcend.org/tms/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/All-The-Presidents-Psychologists-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135812 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Prisoner Interrogation Terrorism Terrorists Torture

Author: Behr, Ines von Title: Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Summary: This paper presents the results from exploratory primary research into the role of the internet in the radicalisation of 15 terrorists and extremists in the UK. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners and the academic community have begun to examine how the internet influences the process of radicalisation: how a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism associated with terrorism. This study advances the evidence base in the field by drawing on primary data from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations. The 15 cases were identified by the research team together with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and UK Counter Terrorism Units (CTU). The research team gathered primary data relating to five extremist cases (the individuals were part of the Channel programme, a UK government intervention aimed at individuals identified by the police as vulnerable to violent extremism), and ten terrorist cases (convicted in the UK), all of which were anonymised. Our research supports the suggestion that the internet may enhance opportunities to become radicalised and provide a greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs. However, our evidence does not necessarily support the suggestion that the internet accelerates radicalisation or replaces the need for individuals to meet in person during their radicalisation process. Finally, we didn't find any supporting evidence for the concept of self-radicalisation through the internet. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Shelf Number: 136018 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Crime Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Amirault, Joanna Elizabeth Title: Criminalizing Terrorism: The Impact of Context and Cohort Effects on the Sentencing Outcomes of Terrorist Offenders Summary: Despite the recent criminalization of terrorism specific offenses little is known about the legal processing of terrorist offenders, and even less is known about how the context that terrorist offenders are adjudicated in impact sentencing outcomes. Collectively, this dissertation explores how changing contextual environments related to legal responses, the timing of an offender' adjudication and perceptions of threat impact the sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders by utilizing a sample of terrorist offenders convicted both recently, and historically, in Canada (n = 153), and by further employing a sample of terrorist offenders recently adjudicated in the United Kingdom (n = 156). Across studies the context that offenders are sanctioned in impact sentencing outcomes, and cohort effects are uncovered. Terrorism specific offenses are readily utilized, and the criminalization of terrorism offenses appear to have provided law enforcement with legal measures that assist in the proactive prevention of terrorist incidents. However, general criminal provisions still have a significant role to play in the adjudication of terrorist offenders as offenders sanctioned of general criminal provisions only, or both general and terrorism specific offenses, are sentenced more severely than offenders convicted of terrorism specific offenses alone. The timing of an offender's adjudication also impacts sentencing outcomes as offenders sanctioned in the latter stages of a terrorist campaign are generally sentenced more severely than offenders adjudicated at the onset for similar crimes, while variability in the sentence outcomes achieved throughout a terrorist campaign are characterized by cohort effects. Furthermore, being sanctioned in proximity to major terrorist incidents is found to affect sentencing outcomes as offenders sentenced following these events are punished less severely. Finally, offenders who are characterized by factors that are associated with increased perceptions of threat receive harsher punishments; however the impact of perceptions of threat on sentencing outcomes can be limited to specific time periods. Details: Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2014. 158p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14456 Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/14456 Shelf Number: 136226 Keywords: Sentencing Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gramizzi, Claudio Title: Tackling illicit small arms and light weapons and ammunition in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa Summary: Following a decision of the Council of the European Union on 27 February 2012, a two-year project on 'Supporting EU-China-Africa dialogue on conventional arms control' was launched on 5 June 2012. Implemented by Saferworld, together with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the Africa Peace Forum the project was aimed at enhancing dialogue between the African, the Chinese and the European civil society and research communities on conventional arms control and the struggle against illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) through the creation of an 'Africa-China-EU Expert Working Group on conventional arms' (EWG) and its activities. During the project, the EWG, made up of nine high-profile arms control and non-proliferation experts from Africa, China and Europe, acted as a driving force to facilitate dialogue, dissemination of information and research, and to share ideas and expertise among its members and relevant partners on issues related to the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALW and conventional military equipment in Africa, with a specific focus on the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region of the continent. The main objective of this working paper is to provide an assessment of the threats posed by the proliferation and illicit circulation of SALW and their impact on security and social-economic development in the countries of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa; to illustrate the outcomes of the EWG activities and experiences; to highlight lessons learnt during the meetings and consultations held within the EWG and with relevant partners in Africa, China and the EU; and formulate recommendations regarding ways to maximise the results obtained over the two-year period of the project, and how this might be used to inform future work through Africa-China-EU tripartite cooperation in the area of SALW and arms control. Details: London: Africa Peace Forum, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Saferworld, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/838-tackling-illicit-small-arms-and-light-weapons-and-ammunition-in-the-great-lakes-and-the-horn-of-africa Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/838-tackling-illicit-small-arms-and-light-weapons-and-ammunition-in-the-great-lakes-and-the-horn-of-africa Shelf Number: 136279 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Illicit Trade Organized Crime Terrorists

Author: Walther, Olivier J. Title: Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa Summary: This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate transnationally. Details: Sonderborg, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Department of Border Region Studies Working Paper No. 04/15: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Shelf Number: 136293 Keywords: Border Security Extremist Groups Social Networks Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Sagramoso, Domitilla Title: The proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in and around the European Union: Instability, organised crime and terrorist groups Summary: Although the end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the threat of nuclear war, it has also resulted in an increase in the number of local wars and civil conflicts throughout the world fought primarily with small arms and light weapons. Large quantities of small arms are in circulation today moving from one armed conflict to another, a process abetted by brokers, local arms dealers and certain producer governments. Weapons are being transferred regularly to regions of conflict in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, from areas with weak export controls and large surplus stocks, such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, more recently, traditionally safer areas such as Western Europe have also been adversely affected by the spread of small arms. Although the influx of weapons into the European Union (EU) is not overwhelming, there is a regular trickle of small arms primarily from the Balkan region, as well as from Eastern Europe, which could increase as the EU and the Schengen Rim both expand to the east and south-east. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact and the wars in former Yugoslavia have resulted in a relaxation of border controls and an excess supply of light weapons, some of which have found their way into Europe. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) have fed the local criminal underworld as well as European terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA, thus contributing to the undermining of West European public safety. The EU looks set for significant expansion, which will compound the difficulties facing the control of illegal weapons proliferation, especially given that in some of the potential candidate countries, e.g. Cyprus, the components of former Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Hungary, organised crime is particularly strong. Moreover, as the EU expands, its outer rim will be policed and protected by state security forces and customs officials that may be less well-trained and capable overall than their current counterparts. Before too long, the EU might border unstable regions in former Yugoslavia and Albania. Although military conflict has been brought to an end in Kosovo and Bosnia, and former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has been ousted from power in Belgrade, the political situation in the region remains highly unstable. A renewal of violence and new demand for light weapons cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the end of the wars in former Yugoslavia has resulted in widespread availability of cheap but powerful light weapons, many of which have ended up in the hands of local organised crime groups. These groups are now becoming increasingly powerful, as they forge links with well-established groups on the other side of the Adriatic. The spread of crime and instability, especially to the southern regions of Europe, could lead to further proliferation of light weapons in the region and eventually into the EU. The potential for a future light weapons proliferation crisis within the EU which is normally considered a secure area, therefore needs to be assessed. This project has involved research on the proliferation of arms in two EU countries which are geographically close to the areas of instability - Germany and Italy - and in two which are further away from the areas of tension but could also become affected by the spread of arms - the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In addition, research has been conducted in two EU candidate countries, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, in order to assess the implications of their future EU membership for European public safety. Finally, particular attention has been devoted to the examination of terrorist organisations in Europe that still have important arsenals, and which represent a threat to their country's security. Information has been gathered from a series of personal interviews with relevant public officials, experts and journalists, as well as from official statistics and documents, newspapers and specialised journals. Details: London: Saferworld, 2001. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/77-the-proliferation-of-illegal-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-and-around-the-european-union Year: 2001 Country: Europe URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/77-the-proliferation-of-illegal-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-and-around-the-european-union Shelf Number: 105693 Keywords: Organized Crime Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Weapons

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia Summary: Many convicted Indonesian terrorists will be released over the next several years after serving time in prison. he Indonesian government has little capacity at present to provide adequate post-release monitoring, although it is taking some steps to remedy this. Under the circumstances, how much of a security risk do these releases pose? he answer is probably not as much as some people fear; the recidivism rate for convicted extremists remains low. he problem is that systems are not yet in place to keep track of individuals who are considered potential problems. Any evaluation of risk must take several factors into account. One is the numbers involved. In early 2013, articles appeared in the regional media suggesting that 300 prisoners were due for release by the end of 2014. he National Anti-Terror Agency (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) later stated the real figure was only 39. A more reasonable estimate is about 80 releases in 2013-2014, some of which have already taken place, with over 100 more in 2015-2016. No one has exact data, however, and accurate predictions are close to impossible. A second factor is the prison experience of those scheduled for release. It is simply not possible to assess risk on the basis of the activities that led to their convictions. Some of the men that might have been judged most dangerous appear to have modified their views and behavior; others who might have seemed low risk have grown more militant because of associations made in prison. Which way an individual turns may depend less on government "deradicalisation" programs -- although interventions that provide status and income can help -- than on the nature and influence of fellow inmates and connections maintained on the outside. In general, senior JI leaders tend to exert a moderating influence, whereas those who follow radical preacher Aman Abdurrahman are likely to keep the level of militancy high. Other factors can also come into play, including the degree to which inmates can mix with ordinary criminal offenders. he problem of released prisoners does not relate just to those charged with terrorism but also to others they may have recruited. he largest cluster of repeat offenders among convicted extremists consists of men whose first offense had nothing to do with terrorism. The riot in Tanjung Gusta prison, Medan, on 11 July 2013 was a reminder that in thinking about scheduled releases, one should think of unscheduled ones, too, even if the number of terrorist escapes over the last decade has been remarkably low. Overcrowding, understaffing and the poor physical condition of many Indonesian prisons combine to produce escapes of ordinary criminals so frequently that it is a wonder that not more extremists make the attempt. To address these risks, improving the capacity of the Indonesian corrections system to analyse and respond to developments in prison is essential. It is also important for the government as a whole to recognize the need for improved post-release monitoring and allocate the necessary resources to put a better system in place. Managing convicted extremists goes to two much larger issues, however. One is overall prison reform: the government acknowledges that the prison system as a whole is in a state of crisis and the Corrections Directorate with the Law and Human Rights Ministry has been receptive to donor assistance in trying to address it. The second is the spread of extremist teachings in a way that generates new groups of young radicals convinced that violence is the way to address injustice, religious deviance and vice. Until the government does more to address this much more sensitive problem, the best monitoring program in the world will be of limited value. Details: Indonesia: IPAC, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 2: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129777 Keywords: Deradicalization Prisoners Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Convergence of Crime and Terror: Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils Summary: The Convergence of Crime and Terror: Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils provides an analysis of the increasingly important link between traditional criminal activities and terrorism. By cataloging a number of relevant cases, the authors have illustrated that terrorists routinely resort to "traditional" crimes, from drug trafficking to financial scams, to further their objectives. As a result, terror prosecutions must find inspiration from historical government efforts to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate notorious violent criminals such as Al Capone on relatively minor charges such as tax evasion. The aggressive prosecution of such relatively minor offenses can serve to disrupt grander malevolent schemes. As the authors suggest, the rise of terrorism means that the traditional, reactive law enforcement model must change. We cannot afford to wait until after a successful terrorist attack occurs to investigate and prosecute. The examples from Europe included in this paper provide a sobering explanation for why that is so. Law enforcement officials must consider disruptive investigations and prosecutions that may not ultimately lead to a criminal trial on terrorism charges but that will stop potential terror plots before they are put into motion. We face a decentralized, networked, and self-sufficient enemy. Independent cells are increasingly purchasing that self-sufficiency with the proceeds of criminal enterprises. This hard reality provides yet another justification for transforming state and local first responders into first preventers of crime and terror. Details: New York: Manhattan Institute, Center for Policing Terrorism, 2007. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ptr_01.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ptr_01.pdf Shelf Number: 137223 Keywords: Prosecution Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Coyne, John Title: Securing the Australian Frontier: An agenda for border security policy Summary: This report explores the key border security concepts and emergent policy challenges that will impact on Australia's border security policy. Effective border security allows for the seamless legitimate movement of people and goods across Australia's borders, which is critical to enhancing trade, travel and migration. The provision of border security involves far more than creating a capability focused solely on keeping our borders secure from potential terrorists, irregular migrants and illicit contraband. Border security policy deals with a unique operating space, in which extraordinary measures (extraordinary in character, amount, extent or degree) are often needed to provide a sense of security at the same time as creating the sense of normalcy that will allow economic interactions to flourish. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Stategic Policy Institute, 2015. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 12, 2015 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/securing-the-australian-frontier-an-agenda-for-border-security-policy/SR83_ASPI_Border_security_agenda.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/securing-the-australian-frontier-an-agenda-for-border-security-policy/SR83_ASPI_Border_security_agenda.pdf Shelf Number: 137275 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Illicit Goods Irregular Migrants Terrorists

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index: 2015. Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socioeconomic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism. In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries - Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon. While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year. Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State)as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens. The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries. The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally, Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137333 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. By virtue of its large number of supporters and highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers and more recently, the immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while using social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks. Although much ink has been spilled on the topic of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions remain unanswered, including such fundamental issues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who they are, and how many of those supporters take part in its highly organized online activities. Previous efforts to answer these questions have relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS social network. Because of the small, cellular nature of that network, the examination of particular subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small numbers, may create misleading conclusions. The information vacuum extends to - and is particularly acute within - the sometimes heated discussion of how the West should respond to this online campaign. While there are legitimate debates about the bounds of free speech and the complex relationship between private companies and the public interest, some have argued against suspending terrorist social media accounts on the basis that suspensions are not effective at impeding extremist activity online. These arguments that are usually predicated on very small samples of potentially misleading data, when data is proffered at all. We set out to answer some of these important questions using innovative techniques to create a large, representative sample of accounts that can be clearly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to define the boundaries of ISIS's online social network. The goals of the project included: - Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter using a very large and accurate sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper). - Outline a methodology for discovering and defining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for future research using consistent comparison data (section 3). - Create preliminary data and a path to further investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspended by Twitter and the effects of suspensions (section 2.5). Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, include: - From September through December 2014, we estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. - The 46,000 figure is our most conservative estimate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; however, we believe the truth is closer to the low end of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). - Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization's territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded (section 1.4). - Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). - ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users (section 2). - Much of ISIS's social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume (section 2.1). - A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended (section 2.5.1). - At the time our data collection launched in September 2014, Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this prevented us from creating a pre-suspension dataset, we were able to gather information on how the removal of accounts affected the overall network (section 2.5.4). - Account suspensions do have concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on social media. They do not, at the current level of implementation, eliminate those activities, and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any balanced evaluation of current levels of suspension activity clearly demonstrates that total interdiction is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over how suspensions affect the performance of the network and whether a different level of pressure might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions in a manner that would be far more devastating to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an approach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). - The process of suspension does create certain new risks. Most importantly, while suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS's social network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization (section 4.3). - Further study is required to evaluate the unintended consequences of suspension campaigns and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). - Social media companies and the U.S government must work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Although discussions of this issue often frame government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures of how suspensions are applied (section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis Paper No. 20: Accessed November 27, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Shelf Number: 137342 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State (ISIS) Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bergen, Peter Title: ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism Summary: On Friday, November 13, 2015, France had its 9/11. At least 129 people were killed at multiple locations in and around Paris, including a concert hall, a soccer stadium, and a popular restaurant, the kinds of venues that ordinary Parisians flock to on a Friday night. At, or near, these venues the attackers deployed a mix of terrorist tactics, including multiple suicide attackers, an assault using more than one gunman willing to fight to the death, hostage-taking, and bombings. In the years after 9/11, we have seen various forms of this terrible news story play out before: the multiple bombs on trains in Madrid that killed 191 in 2004; a year later, the four suicide bombings in London that killed 52 commuters; the attacks in Mumbai by 10 gunmen willing to fight to the death in 2008, who killed 166; and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 that killed 12 people. The attackers in Paris seemed to have learned lessons from all these attacks. French President Francois Hollande blamed ISIS for the Paris attacks. It is still early in the investigation, but already leading media outlets are reporting that as many as six French nationals who have been identified as among the perpetrators of the attacks had traveled to Syria, while one of the leaders of the attack is a Belgian citizen who also spent time in Syria. According to French prosecutors, one of the attackers identified by fingerprints is a French national known to police, and a Syrian passport was found on one of the bodies of the attackers. Hitherto, the only case of a Western fighter in Syria returning and conducting a deadly terror attack in the West was French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, who is accused in the May 24, 2014, shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, that left four people dead. Returning militants like Nemmouche are a worrying source of terror attacks. And two major factors place Europe at far greater risk of "returnee" violence from veterans of the Syrian conflict than the United States - the much larger number of European militants who have gone to fight in Syria and the existence of more developed jihadist networks in Europe. So who exactly are the estimated 4,500 Westerners who have been drawn to join ISIS and other militant groups in Syria and how great of a threat do they pose? In order to provide some answers to that question, New America collected information on 474 individuals from 25 Western countries who have been reported by credible news sources as having left their home countries to join ISIS or other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq. Details: Washington, DC: New America, 2015. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2015 at: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Shelf Number: 137432 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Suicide Bombing Terrorist Terrorists

Author: Chalk, Peter Title: Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia Summary: Although the prime focus of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been on establishing a state - a caliphate - in the Middle East, it has also sought to gain a presence beyond that area. Southeast Asia is one region that's now receiving increased attention as a potential beachhead for the group. Most concern has focused on Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the Malay Muslim provinces of Thailand. The paper considers how these nations are responding to the threat. Beyond Southeast Asia, ISIL is showing a growing influence in Australia. The measures the Australian Government are taking have been generally well received. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the pace and nature of Australia's emergent counterterrorist strategy and their implications for the nation's democratic character. The paper puts forward national priorities and suggests that regionally greater emphasis needs to be given to formalising genuine counterterrorist cooperation. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137451 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2015 Summary: When it came to domestic terrorism and extremism, the year 2015 was a grisly one for the United States. In the past twelve months, the names of a number of American cities became unwelcome shorthand for the carnage that extremist killers wreaked in them: Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, San Bernardino. Each of these cities became scenes of tragedy and death, thanks to the cold-hearted ideological motivations of angry killers. It is thus no surprise that these and other domestic extremist killers have collectively amassed a higher number of victims in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing. Preliminary tallies by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism indicate that a minimum of 52 people in the United States were killed by adherents of domestic extremist movement in the past 12 months. This number is bound to grow further still, as extremist connections to some murders often take years to be revealed - and there are likely still other murders whose extremist connections may never see the light of day. Still, the 52 people known to have died at the hands of domestic extremists are disturbing enough, more than the numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 put together. The victims included police officers, government workers, service members, and civilians from all walks of life. Key Findings of Report - In 2015, the 52 deaths came at the hands of adherents of four domestic extremist movements: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, domestic Islamic extremists, and anti-abortion extremists. - As has been the case every year since 1995, white supremacists have been responsible for the largest number of deaths, at 20. One incident, the June 17 mass shooting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, which killed nine, was responsible for almost half of these deaths. - Usually, right-wing anti-government extremists account for the next highest number of murders each year, but in 2015, in a disturbing development, domestic Islamic extremists were responsible for 19 deaths, virtually the same as white supremacists. All of these deaths stemmed from two shooting rampages: the July 16 attacks by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on military targets in Chattanooga and the December 2 rampage by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. - The 52 murders occurred in 17 separate incidents, with nine of the incidents involving multiple murders. This is unusual, in that most extremist-related examples of murder involve a single victim. - Ideology played a primary or substantial role in 10 of the 17 incidents in 2015, accounting for 34 of the 52 victims. Non-ideological killings by extremists, which accounted for the remainder, tend to involve group-related killings (such as killing a suspected informant or a rival gang member) or traditional criminal violent activity (in which extremists also often engage). - Overwhelmingly the extremist weapon of choice in 2015 - as in virtually every year - was firearms. In fact, 48 of the 52 victims were killed by firearms. The other four victims were killed by a variety of means, including two stabbings, a blunt instrument killing, and a motor vehicle incident. All of the multiple murder incidents involved the use of one or more firearms. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Shelf Number: 137452 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Gun Violence Homicides Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crime

Author: Miller, Erin Title: Mass-Fatality, Coordinated Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in France Summary: On November 13, 2015, assailants carried out a series of coordinated attacks at locations in Paris, France, including a theater where a concert was being held, several restaurants, and a sporting event. These attacks reportedly killed more than 120 people and wounded more than 350 others. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attack. To provide contextual information on coordinated, mass-fatality attacks, as well as terrorism in France and the attack patterns of ISIL, START has compiled the following information from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The report, "Mass-Fatality, Coordinated Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in France," is available on START's website and includes details such as: - Between 1970 and 2014, there have been 176 occasions on which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people (excluding perpetrators), in a particular country on a particular day. - Between 2000 and 2014, there were 83 days on which more than 100 people were killed by terrorist attacks in a single country. These attacks took place in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; however, they were especially concentrated in Iraq and Nigeria. - Preliminary data from 2015 suggest that the unusual frequency of mass casualty terrorist attacks in 2014 has continued. Between January and June 2015 there were 11 occasions in which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people in a single country on a single day. - ISIL, under its current incarnation, carried out more than 750 coordinated attacks from 2000-2014 - specifically in 2013 and 2014. However, this is a conservative assessment because the Global Terrorism Database records the names of perpetrator organizations at the time of the attack. Thus, it is important to note that al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), ISIL's predecessor, carried out at least 400 coordinated attacks as well. Also, 25 coordinated attacks were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another identity previously assumed by ISIL, and several other coordinated attacks were carried out by provinces of the Islamic State, including the Sinai Province and the Tripoli Province. Details: College Park, MD: START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), 2015. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Background Report: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_ParisMassCasualtyCoordinatedAttack_Nov2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: France URL: Shelf Number: 137703 Keywords: Islamic State of Iraq Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport Security Border Security Extremists Homeland Security Radicals Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Simcox, Robin Title: The Presumption of Innocence: Difficulties in bringing Suspected Terrorists to Trial Summary: The Presumption of Innocence, by Henry Jackson Society Research Fellow Robin Simcox, looks at the variety of reasons why the state has not always been able to try terror suspects. The main finding of the report is that, in an era of mass casualty terrorism, the notion that all such individuals can be tried in court is outdated The report demonstrates how prosecutions are just one aspect of a much broader strategy of stopping terrorism and not always necessary in order to prove the existence of a specific threat. The report goes on to call on Western governments - particularly those in Europe - to be clearer in explaining exactly why the state is forced to apply a broad series of measures in combating international terrorism. Partially based on field research undertaken at Guantanamo Bay, the report also argues that: - The majority of those detained at Guantanamo Bay will not be tried. Detention during a time of war takes place to prevent a perceived immediate threat; not as a prelude to trial for a criminal offence. - The operational counter-terrorism tactics of intelligence agencies and law enforcement can diverge significantly. Intelligence agencies' priority is disruption and prevention, not assembling information that can be used in court. - Prosecution of suspected terrorists is not always in the public interest. They risk disclosing classified information in court that hinders ongoing investigations, revealing sensitive sources, or exposing intelligence-gathering methods. - As al Qaeda often operates in ungoverned mountainous regions, the U.S. and its allies have limited access to capturing fighters based there. This has led to the increased use of armed drones and targeted killing, a tactic that will continue in the future. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2013. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/ Shelf Number: 137846 Keywords: Islam Prosecution Terrorism Terrorist Detention Terrorists

Author: Simcox, Robin Title: "We Will Conquer Your Rome": A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West Summary: The Islamic State (IS) presently controls significant amounts of land throughout Iraq and Syria. However, its ambitions are not restricted to this territory. Within days of announcing its 'Caliphat', the self-appointed 'Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowed that IS would eventually "conquer Rome". IS precursor groups and the individuals which have trained alongside them have displayed an interest in attacking the West for years. However, an audio message released on 21 September 2014, saw Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, an IS spokesman, attempt to ratchet up the threat. He instructed IS supporters to carry out attacks in the West - no matter how crude. There has subsequently been an increase in IS-linked plots that have emerged in the West. "We Will Conquer Your Rome:" A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in the West by research fellow Robin Simcox studies all those that have been reported since the declaration of the 'Caliphate', and attempts to draw conclusions about any trends that may be developing. The report studies over a year's worth of Islamic State plots. It examines which countries were most commonly targeted; the age; nationality; background; terrorist training and combat experience of the perpetrators; relevance of the Internet; which sectors are most commonly targeted for attack; and assesses the extent to which the Islamic State directed, assisted or simply just inspired these plots. It concludes that since the declaration of IS's 'Caliphate', there have been, on average, over two plots related to IS that either are foiled or take place in the West every month. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ISIS-brochure-Web.pdf Shelf Number: 137847 Keywords: Cyber Security Internet Crimes Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cohen, Katie Title: Who Will Be a Lone Wolf Terrorist? Mechanisms of self-radicalisation and the possibility of detecting lone offender threats on the Internet Summary: Solo actor terrorism, also known as lone wolf terrorism, is a growing threat against civil security, partly due to the fact that Internet access makes it easier than ever to engage in study and dissemination of extremist views. A large variation regarding factors such as ideology, social background, psychopathology and personality type means there is no clear profile for lone wolf terrorists. An assessment of which individuals from a population of political extremists that will go on to commit acts of terrorism can therefore not only be based on factors such as individual experiences or personality traits. A threat assessment should rather be based on the potential perpetrator's behaviour during the time closely preceding the attack. Hence, behaviours that have been empirically proven to precede terrorist attacks and other incidents of planned violence, such as mass murder or school shootings, so called warning behaviours, can have an important role in assessing lone wolf terrorist threats. Warning behaviours often precede terrorist acts and are in their turn preceded by a radicalisation process, where an individual gradually enters a state of mind characterised by a proneness to premeditated violence with the purpose of advancing an ideology. Most lone wolf terrorists have gone through a process of self-radicalisation, wherein media has had a crucial role. Internet is indisputably the medium that has had the greatest influence on the radicalisation process during the last decade. However, while it has facilitated the process, the Internet has also created new possibilities of discovering warning behaviours prior to an actual terrorist attack. From an existing typology of eight different warning behaviours, the three that can most easily be inferred from the subject's Internet communication will be discussed in the following report: (1) Leakage, when the subject, more or less specifically and more or less intentionally, informs a third party about an intent to perpetrate a terrorist attack, (2) fixation, which expresses an extreme preoccupation with a person or cause or extensive gathering of facts about a target, and (3) identification, which comprises a self-image characterised by fantasies about being a hero or warrior and/or a strong interest in weapons and military paraphernalia, as well as a strong influence from other radical proponents of lone wolf terrorism. The aim of the following report is firstly, to shed light on different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms behind self-radicalisation and the interaction between the individual and the environment during the radicalisation process, and secondly, to examine the possibility of using semi-automatic techniques for text analysis of the subjects Internet communication to discover warning behaviours. Details: Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2012. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2015 at: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.foi.se/en/Search/Abstract/?rNo=FOI-R--3531--SE Shelf Number: 137887 Keywords: Lone Wolf Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Threat Assessment

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Islamic State Islamists Jihad Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Terrorist Chatter: Understanding what terrorists talk about Summary: Since the early 2000s the Internet has become particularly crucial for the global jihadist movement. Nowhere has the Internet been more important in the movement's development than in the West. While dynamics differ from case to case, it is fair to state that almost all recent cases of radicalization in the West involve at least some digital footprint. Jihadists, whether structured groups or unaffiliated sympathizers, have long understood the importance of the Internet in general and social media, in particular. Zachary Chesser, one of the individuals studied in this report, fittingly describes social media as "simply the most dynamic and convenient form of media there is." As the trend is likely to increase, understanding how individuals make the leap to actual militancy is critically important. This study is based on the analysis of the online activities of seven individuals. They share several key traits. All seven were born or raised in the United States. All seven were active in online and offline jihadist scene around the same time (mid- to late 2000s and early 2010s). All seven were either convicted for terrorism- related offenses (or, in the case of two of the seven, were killed in terrorism- related incidents.) The intended usefulness of this study is not in making the case for monitoring online social media for intelligence purpose - an effort for which authorities throughout the West need little encouragement. Rather, the report is meant to provide potentially useful pointers in the field of counter- radicalization. Over the past ten years many Western countries have devised more or less extensive strategies aimed at preventing individuals from embracing radical ideas or de- radicalizing (or favoring the disengagement) of committed militants. (Canada is also in the process of establishing its own counter- radicalization strategy.) Radicalization is a highly complex and individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. It is no surprise then that counter-radicalization initiatives are equally complex. Even among the seven subjects in this project there are only limited commonalities in terms of interests and views. While all seven subjects share a common background, based on the evidence of their online activities, their interests, views and approaches remain highly diverse. Some are focused mostly on religion; others are more interested in political issues. Some immediately adopt a jihadist mindset; others seem to undergo a long radicalizing trajectory. Given this diversity, it becomes obvious that any counter- radicalization needs to be tailored to the specifics of the case. Flexibility is the name of the game. Another key finding is that, at least in the beginning of their trajectories, the individuals studied here are all avid seekers of knowledge and information on religion. All refer to religious concepts and frames throughout their posts. Jihadism is a complex ideology that mixes religion and politics. But this study confirms the importance of its religious aspect for many of those who embrace violence - a fact some studies have dismissed. Any counter-radicalization effort, while not ignoring other aspects, should take into consideration the centrality of religious issues for those embracing jihadism. While for legal, political and cultural reasons it might be difficult to replicate in the West some of the religion-based counter- radicalization efforts adopted in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Singapore, the religious aspect should take a central role. The study also shows that those interested in religion are extremely inquisitive during the first stages of their radicalization trajectories. In the first months or even years of their posting life, in fact, these individuals constantly engage with fellow posters for sources and opinions on religious matters. They seem to be constantly searching for validation of their opinions. Over time, this openness seemed to slowly decrease, and by the end of the posting trajectory, there are only limited traces of questions. In the late stages, instead of questions, statements appear, often filled with confident pronouncements of their own knowledge. This attitude provides an enormous opportunity for counter- radicalization. It is arguable that it is in this phase that any kind of intervention might be more likely to succeed. Details: Ottawa: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: NPSIA Working Paper Series: Working Paper No. 03, 2015: Accessed February 26, 2016 at: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/uploads/No.-03-Terrorist-Chatter.pdf Shelf Number: 137979 Keywords: Internet Jihadism Online Communications Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Organized Crime Infiltration of Legitimate Businesses in Europe: A Pilot Project in Five European Countries. Final report on Project Ariel Summary: This research is an exploratory study on the infiltration of organised crime groups (OCGs) in legal businesses. Infiltration occurs in every case in which a natural person belonging to a criminal organisation or acting on its behalf, or an already infiltrated legal person, invests financial and/or human resources to participate in the decision-making process of a legitimate business. The main output of the research is a list of risk factors of OCG infiltration in legal businesses, i.e. factors that facilitate or promote infiltration. Risk factors are derived from an unprecedented cross-national comparative analysis of the vulnerabilities of territories and business sectors, criminal groups' modi operandi, and the characteristics of infiltrated businesses. Infiltration risk factors provide inputs for the development of a risk assessment model of OCG infiltration. Its development will assist Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in identifying the factors facilitating and/or promoting infiltration and enhancing the prevention and enforcement of criminal infiltration. This will help protect EU MS legitimate economies from the misuse of legal businesses for illicit purposes. Project ARIEL - Assessing the Risk of the Infiltration of Organised Crime in EU MSs Legitimate Economies: a Pilot Project in 5 EU Countries (www.arielproject.eu) - was carried out with the financial support of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of and Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme. It focused on five EU MS: Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Details: Trento: Transcrime -- Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2015. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Project-ARIEL_Final-report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Project-ARIEL_Final-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137990 Keywords: Crimes Against Businesses Organized Crime Terrorists

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Shelf Number: 138035 Keywords: Extremists ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Manning, Ruth Title: In and Out of Extremism Summary: Quilliam's latest report In and Out of Extremism features testimonies from 10 former extremists who have now deradicalised and provides analysis on their shared experiences. Building on Maajid Nawaz's personal deradicalisation story In and Out of Islamism, this report looks at the human processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation in five former far-right extremists and five former Islamist extremists. Combining interviews and correspondence with the former extremists, with Quilliam's own expertise and experience in these processes, this report synthesises the human with the academic to provide a deeper understanding of a complex phenomenon. - In particular, this report shows factors which increase vulnerability to radicalisation, the ways in which this vulnerability is exploited by extremist groups and individuals in the radicalisation process, and the factors that prompt escalation from contemplation to action. - In and Out of Extremism finds that when political grievances are combined with personal grievances, individuals consider extremist ideologies and narratives to better understand the world or to find perceived solutions to their personal difficulties. While these ideologies and narratives appear comforting in their simplicity, the former extremists found that they seldom changed the world or improved their lives. - This report also sheds light on the factors that have intervened in the radicalisation process to prompt the individuals to consider their commitment to extremist ideologies and narratives. In and Out of Extremism finds that challenging extremist messaging is central to this intervention and that the message should be targeted for the individual, with the identity, language, and even appearance of the messenger being of central importance. - Quilliam is well-known for our contribution to the macro debate on counter-extremism strategy and policy, but this report shows our value at a micro level, providing inspiration and support in deradicalising extremists. - In policy terms, this report also considers the value of refining the teaching of critical thinking skills in schools to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation, and of improving progressive online counter-extremism efforts through the development of a greater number and variety of counter-narratives. Details: London: Quilliam, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/in-and-out-of-extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/in-and-out-of-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 138131 Keywords: Deradicalizing Extremism Extremists Groups Muslims Racial Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Summary: This report illuminates the strategic thinking behind Islamic State's propaganda machine. Building on the theoretical framework established in 'The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy', the following analysis is based upon an exhaustive 30-day survey of Islamic State's media output. At 24 hour intervals from 17 July to 15 August 2015, the Islamic month of Shawwal, all media output from Islamic State's official outlets, from the provincial offices to the central foundations, was compiled for aggregated analysis. A total of 1146 separate events - discrete batches of propaganda - were recorded in the data collection period: a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on. After the data collection period had ended, the archive was translated and refined, as events were grouped according to their primary narrative and, if applicable, sub-narratives. Following this, the data was rigorously tested against a number of variables to determine inconsistencies and anomalies. Then, the archive was broken down into its various narrative groupings, which were qualitatively assessed both in isolation of, and respect to, each other. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Shelf Number: 138172 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Rafiq, Haras Title: Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State Summary: The following report discusses the appeal of the Islamic Sate 'caliphate' to women. To do this, the authors have embarked upon a close analysis of Islamic State's official propaganda and unofficial proselytisers. In the process, four promises "empowerment, deliverance, participation and piety" are identified as the organisation's key pull factors. -The promise of empowerment conveyed by Islamic State's official and unofficial propaganda encourages women to understand joining the organisation as a means to reverse the ills that they face in life outside the 'caliphate'. By joining Islamic State, the line goes, women can defiantly take charge of their lives in the same way that men can: through living in Islamic State's "caliphate" and supporting its jihad by marrying a fighter, women are led to believe that they can emancipate themselves from kufr (disbelief). - The deliverance promise focuses on the idea that, by joining Islamic State, grievances that women suffer in the West are immediately resolved. Women can be freed from daily degradations and disbelief, and are instead assimilated into a tight-knit collective sisterhood that will provide them with a network of support and friendship. Reflective of this, the ideas of redemption and deliverance tend to be directed to females by females. - The participation promise incentivizes women to join Islamic State even though their role is strictly non-military. It conveys a sense that there is more to the 'caliphate's' jihad than fighting and that, for women, there is a specific state-building role. A constant theme in Islamic State propaganda is that supporting the 'caliphate', making it grow and flourish, is the job of everyone. For women, this takes the role of providing, maintaining and educating its 'cubs', the next generation of fighters, as well as supporting their soldier spouses. - The last promise of Islamic State's women-orientated propaganda is piety, something built up the theological imperative to join the group. The alleged pristine nature of an 'Islamic existence' in the "caliphate" is a means of justifying each stress and sacrifice and also acts as a means for recruiters to exert peer pressure to push others to make hijra (migrating). - These four themes alone do not cause female supporters of Islamic State in the West to make hijra. However, when combined with the group's copious amounts of audio-visual propaganda, they play a crucial role in the rhetorical armoury of the 'caliphate's' recruiters. �-The discussion on the radicalisation of women is overly gendered and, all too often, predicated on misconceptions. In reality, when it comes to joining violent extremist causes, women are susceptible to the very same processes as men: narratives, ideology, grievances, and various push and pull factors. Reflecting this, the last part of this report delivers policy recommendations on how we must reappraise our attempts to counter the twin processes of female radicalisation and recruitment, in line with general counter-radicalisation, but using women as specific entry points. The four promises used in Islamic State propaganda, and cited in this report, are not exhaustive. There are a multitude of factors that contribute to an individual's radicalisation, of which propaganda can play an important part. As such, research into the key narratives employed by the 'caliphate' can shine an important individual's journey to jihad. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Shelf Number: 138173 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Terrorism De-radicalization Islamic State Media Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State�s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anderson, Wesley J.L. Title: Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations Summary: Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2008. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 08-3: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138198 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Fellman, Philip V. Title: Disrupting Terrorist Networks - A Dynamic Fitness Landscape Approach Summary: The study of terrorist networks as well as the study of how to impede their successful functioning has been the topic of considerable attention since the odious event of the 2001 World Trade Center disaster. While serious students of terrorism were indeed engaged in the subject prior to this time, a far more general concern has arisen subsequently. Nonetheless, much of the subject remains shrouded in obscurity, not the least because of difficulties with language and the representation or translation of names, and the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the subject matter. One of the most fruitful scientific approaches to the study of terrorism has been network analysis (Krebs, 2002; Carley, 2002a; Carley and Dombroski, 2002; Butts, 2003a; Sageman, 2004, etc.) As has been argued elsewhere, this approach may be particularly useful, when properly applied, for disrupting the flow of communications (C4I) between levels of terrorist organizations (Carley, Krackhardt and Lee, 2001; Carley, 2002b; Fellman and Wright, 2003; Fellman and Strathern, 2004; Carley et al, 2003; 2004). In the present paper we examine a recent paper by Ghemawat and Levinthal, (2000) applying Stuart Kauffman's NK-Boolean fitness landscape approach to the formal mechanics of decision theory. Using their generalized NK-simulation approach, we suggest some ways in which optimal decision-making for terrorist networks might be constrained and following our earlier analysis, suggest ways in which the forced compartmentation of terrorist organizations by counter-terrorist security organizations might be more likely to impact the quality of terrorist organizations' decision-making and command execution. Details: Unpublished Paper, 2007. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0707/0707.4036.pdf Shelf Number: 138424 Keywords: Criminal Networks Decision Making Network Analysis Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Patterns of Intervention in Federal Terrorism cases: Interim Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Summary: America's response to terrorism has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. Changes have included everything from the way in which terrorism is portrayed politically, to the manner in which terrorists are investigated, prosecuted, and punished. Modifications to governmental interventions also have affected the manner in which terrorists plan and conduct terrorist activities as well as the manner in which they defend themselves in court. Although it would be difficult to address all of these changes in a single paper, the purpose of the current manuscript is to provide an overview of the most significant events that evoked changes in the manner in which terrorists are portrayed, pursued, and prosecuted as well as the way in which terrorists and their defenders have responded to federal prosecutorial efforts. The specific ways in which federal agencies respond to terrorism, however, are rooted in much larger political and social issues. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Shelf Number: 138441 Keywords: Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Phillips, Peter J. Title: Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory Summary: This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This approach permits a computable opportunity set within a risk-reward or mean-variance framework. Optimal choices can be determined using the Markowitz quadratic programming technique. The framework may provide a useful foundation for an economic perspective on 'offender profiling' applied within a terrorism context. Mapping attack methods into mean-variance space provides a more definitive categorisation of the riskiness of attack methods from the terrorist's perspective and suggests the possibility of identifying the terrorist's revealed risk preference. Inferences about the unknown offender may be drawn that complement other aspects of the investigative process. One of the key challenges of law enforcement is drawing inferences about the offender's location and the location of potential targets. Superimposing a game theoretical payoff matrix over a geographic location where payoffs are partially informed by the terrorist's choices and risk preference may contribute another, economic, perspective to this part of the law enforcement process. Prospect theory may also contribute useful insights into the geographical profiling problem. Details: Toowoomba, QLD: University of Southern Queensland - Faculty of Business, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Shelf Number: 138469 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Geographic Profiling Lone Wolf Terrorists Offender Profiling Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cilluffo, Frank Title: Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prison Radicalization Summary: The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States poses a threat of unknown magnitude to the national security of the U.S. Prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could find a willing ear, and conditions are often conducive to radicalization. With the world's largest prison population (over 2 million - ninety-three percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) and highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000), America faces what could be an enormous challenge - every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that "[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells - radicalized online, in prisons and in other groups of socially isolated souls - may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection." The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, to name just two incidents, illustrate the threat posed by a state's own radicalized citizens. By acting upon international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position. Under the leadership of The George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), a task force of diverse subject matter experts was convened to analyze what is currently known about radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prison systems at the federal, state and local levels. The goal of this diverse, multidisciplinary group was to give unbiased and well-informed recommendations for further action. The task force performed an extensive literature review and received briefings from professionals with expertise in this area. Federal, state and local officials provided background information on radicalization and ongoing efforts to decrease the threat of terrorist activity in prisons. The task force sought and received perspectives from religious service providers in prisons and jails, behavioral and social scientists, and members of the national security and intelligence communities. Researchers of radicalization in foreign prisons provided first hand accounts of radicalization and terrorist activities overseas. Due to the sensitive nature of many of these briefings and the desire of some briefers to remain anonymous, this report makes reference to information for which no source is cited. All information provided, where no source is provided, originates from task force briefings with subject matter experts and officials with personal experience in dealing with prisoner radicalization. This report focuses on the process of radicalization in prison. Radicalization "refers to the process by which inmates...adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes." By "extreme views," this report includes beliefs that are anti-social, politically rebellious, and anti-authoritarian. This report focuses, in particular, on religious radicalization in conjunction with the practice of Islam. Radical beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world. Just as young people may become radicalized by "cut-and-paste" versions of the Qur'an via the Internet, new inmates may gain the same distorted understanding of the faith from gang leaders or other influential inmates. The task force recognizes the potentially positive impact of religion on inmates, and it should be noted that inmates have a constitutional right to practice their religion, a right reinforced by further legislation. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute; Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, Critical Incident Analysis Group, 2006. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2016 at: https://med.virginia.edu/ciag/wp-content/uploads/sites/313/2015/12/out_of_the_shadows.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: https://med.virginia.edu/ciag/wp-content/uploads/sites/313/2015/12/out_of_the_shadows.pdf Shelf Number: 102908 Keywords: Gangs Islam Muslims Prisoner Radicalization Prisoners Radicalization Religion Terrorists

Author: Hofmann, David Title: Warriors and Prophets: The Role of Charismatic Authority in the Radicalization Towards Violence and Strategic Operation of Terrorist Groups Summary: In the past four decades, there has been increased multi-disciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. However, there is little systematic theoretical and empirical examination of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of charismatic leaders in the formation, operation, and demise of terrorist groups. This dissertation seeks to re-orient and stimulate future scholarship through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between charismatic authority, the radicalization towards violence, and strategic operation of terrorist groups. The introductory chapter grounds the subsequent research by providing working definitions of core concepts, reviewing the current literature on terrorist leadership, discussing methods to improve future analyses of terrorist leadership, before ending with a brief consideration of methods, data, and research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of how the current terrorism literature misuses the social-scientific concepts of charisma and charismatic authority. After examining where and how the literature has fallen short, it provides a synthesis of the available multi-disciplinary social-scientific research on charismatic authority, identifies the three common ways in which the concept of charisma is commonly misused in terrorism studies, and explores several challenges and opportunities for future research. Building upon this foundational analysis, chapter 3 contributes to future research by presenting and justifying a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups based upon Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic leadership in new religious movements. This framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between the presence of charismatic authority and the radicalization towards violence within the far-right terrorist group 'The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord'. Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of the relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority, choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices), and results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. The concluding chapter provides a synthetic summary of the findings, discusses the contributions of the dissertation to the literature, makes several policy-relevant suggestions, considers study limitations, and outlines avenues for future research. Details: Waterloo, ONT: University of Waterloo, 2015. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138583 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy Summary: This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS' growth model, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS' direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS' global propaganda efforts. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138589 Keywords: Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Kavanagh, Jennifer E. Title: The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses. Summary: Existing literature does not explain why protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are sometimes characterized by escalating, tit-for-tat retaliation, but exhibit little responsive violence at other points. I argue that the expectations of local constituents and local political dynamics are primary determinants of conflict escalation and de-escalation. State and non-state constituents form expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to a protracted conflict through Retrospective Projection, which combines evaluations of the past, present, and future. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected benefits of a military (militant)-based strategy exceed confidence in existing political alternatives. Demands for retaliation by local publics create incentives for state and non-state actors to use violence as a tool of Constituent Service. I evaluate the argument with extended case studies of Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and the Second Intifada, supplemented by four qualitative cases: Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The extended case studies combine qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) to empirically describe dynamic associations between violence and political attitudes. Consistent with the argument, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political alternatives influence the timing of demands for retaliation, and demands for violence determine the timing and form of armed retaliation by state and non-state actors. Demands for violence occur where military-based strategies appear more effective than political alternatives, prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada and in the 1970s during the 'Troubles,' and retaliatory violence is most likely in these same periods. Military failures and political alternatives that weaken constituent support for violence encourage de-escalation. Effective counterterror policies are those that shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism, constraining violence by reducing demands for violence. There is a place for military-based counterterrorism, but the case studies underscore the benefits of strategies that encourage confidence in political alternatives. Law-enforcement counterterrorism and influence operations appear especially valuable because they erode support for violence and shape attitudes towards political compromise at the local level. Local political dynamics and constituent expectations must inform counterterror policy applied in regional protracted terror conflicts and used against transnational terrorist threats Details: Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2011. 430p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 11, 2015 at: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/84524 Shelf Number: 138622 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Disley, Emma Title: Using Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements to manage and supervise terrorist offenders: Findings from an exploratory study Summary: Since 2000 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) have been used to manage violent and sexual offenders on release from prison. Under these arrangements, offenders are identified, assessed and subject to supervision and monitoring in order to protect the public. Central to MAPPA is that key agencies - including police, probation, housing, social services, education and health - are under a statutory duty to share information and cooperate. In 2009 these arrangements were extended to cover those convicted of terrorist offenders. RAND Europe conducted an exploratory study in 2011 to examine potential challenges in applying MAPPA to terrorist offenders and the readiness of those involved to do so. The research aimed to identify priorities for further attention by policymakers and researchers looking at the effectiveness of post-release supervision of terrorist offenders. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR441/RAND_RR441.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR441/RAND_RR441.pdf Shelf Number: 138705 Keywords: Offender Supervision Prisoner Reentry Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? Initial Observations from a Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Europe from 1970 to 2013 Summary: Major terrorist events in the United States and Europe generate fear among the public and prompt swifter responses from public officials, reflecting a belief that terrorist attacks occur in clusters. If there is one attack, the concern is that others will soon follow. That presumption leads to two analytical questions: Does a significant terrorist attack somehow inspire other terrorist attacks, and can terrorist attacks be anticipated statistically? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examine the historical record of terrorism in the United States and Europe between 1970 and the end of 2013. Using the Global Terrorism Database, the researchers find an absence of clustering for terrorist events around trigger events since 1994, no increases in terrorism on significant dates, and a decline of terrorism in the West since the 1970s, suggesting that the threat of terrorism should not affect individuals' behavior and decisions in the United States and Western Europe - not even in the wake of a significant terrorist event. However, heightened security may be justified. It may enable authorities to respond quickly to increased reports of suspicious activity and hoaxes that terrorist events inspire. Increased police presence also permits authorities to diagnose and intervene more rapidly if there are further incidents. Moreover, temporary security increases may be warranted as a precautionary measure, even if only to reassure an alarmed public that it is safe. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspectives: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Shelf Number: 138706 Keywords: Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorists Threat Assessment

Author: Deutschmann, Emanuel Title: Between Collaboration and Disobedience: The behavior of the Guantanomo Detainees and its Consequences Summary: The Guantanamo detainees find themselves in a prisoner-s-dilemma-like situation characterized by uncertainty where they may incriminate others, remain silent, or disobey. We examine their behavior under these conditions and how it influences their chances of getting a release recommendation. We use JTF-GTMO-authored memoranda on 765 detainees to create a social network of the accusations between detainees and an attribute dataset, which we analyze using multivariate regression and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. We find that the distribution of incriminating statements obeys a power law. Yemenites and Saudi Arabians heavily over-contribute in terms of incriminating statements and disobedient actions, whereas Afghans and Pakistanis under-contribute. Disobedient behaviour does not affect the likelihood of getting released, except for hunger strike, which has a negative effect. By releasing information on others, detainees do not improve their own situation but impair that of those they talk about. Details: Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2012. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Sociology Working Papers Paper Number 2013-02: Accessed May 6, 2016 at: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2013-02.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2013-02.pdf Shelf Number: 138962 Keywords: Detainees Guantanamo Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Buggy, Kate Title: Under the Radar: How might Australia enhance its policies to prevent 'lone wolf' and 'fixated person' violent attacks? Summary: This paper addresses the detection, intervention and prevention of so-called 'lone wolf' and 'fixated perso' violent attacks in Australia. It argues that while the threat of terrorism may vary over time, the increase in lone wolf terrorism over the past decade requires a more focused approach to the identification and monitoring of individuals who are moving along the pathway from radical ideology to radical violence. The paper proposes that a specialised unit, the National Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, be established to assess the threat posed by such persons, regardless of whether they fall into the category of lone wolf, fixated persons or other, grievance-fuelled violent actors. It also proposes community-friendly options of e-referral and a new hotline in an effort to identify persons on a radicalisation pathway. With research confirming that the majority of such individuals suffer from mental illness or mental instability, the paper concludes that these initiatives should reduce the risk by providing an opportunity to intervene before violent activity occurs. Details: Canberra: Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers: Accessed June 1, 2016 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 139257 Keywords: Extremists Lone Wolf Terrorism Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Feel We Are Cursed": Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya Summary: In February 2015 the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) began taking over the Mediterranean port city of Sirte, Libya. By the following August ISIS had turned Sirte into its largest stronghold outside of Iraq and Syria. This report documents serious crimes committed by ISIS in Sirte including the executions of 49 people the group accused of "spying," "sorcery," and "insulting God." "We Feel We Are Cursed," based on research including interviews with 45 Libyans who lived under ISIS in Sirte, details how the group imposed its severe interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) on all aspects of life. Meanwhile, ISIS has failed to provide basic necessities to the local population, diverting food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes of residents who fled, to its fighters and functionaries. With war-wracked Libya's institutions in near-collapse, countries able to exercise criminal jurisdiction should take immediate steps to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for atrocities by ISIS and other parties. The International Criminal Court should prioritize an investigation of ongoing serious crimes in Libya as well. The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint an independent expert to document serious, ongoing abuses in Libya. The Security Council should impose sanctions on those found responsible for serious crimes in Libya while ensuring appropriate due process. International parties have repeatedly failed to act on their promises to identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes in Libya. Continued failure to act will result in more horrific crimes by groups including ISIS. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Libya URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 139336 Keywords: Extremist Groups Human Rights Abuses ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Hallowell, Beth Title: Mixed Messages: How the Media Covers "Violent Extremism" and What You Can Do About It Summary: Every day, the U.S. news consumer is bombarded with images of spectacular extremist violence and increasingly aggressive and bellicose rhetoric from politicians and pundits. This coverage warrants a close look, as public discourse sinks to new lows in justifying violence against entire racial and religious groups. In this public conversation, the stakes are high; lives are on the line. How is the media helping or hurting our public discussion about political violence? What are they covering when they cover extremism? Ninety percent of the time they also mention Islam, even when it's not part of the events covered, and three-quarters of the time journalists report on violent responses to conflict. And they also amplify voices promoting and stories depicting military intervention far more than peace building or nonviolent resistance to violent extremism - solutions to conflict that research has shown are more effective. How can the U.S. public be expected to do anything but support further military intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries, given this framework for covering violent extremism? In Mixed Messages, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) shares the results of its original content analysis of three months of media coverage of extremism sampled from 20 U.S. news outlets. We sampled articles from 15 national media outlets as well as five major "influencer" outlets that reach a high-level audience of policymakers and government staff. Details: Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 139388 Keywords: Discrimination Extremist Groups Media Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Final Report Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the final report in the CLAT series. It aims to synthesise key aspects of the project, bringing together insights from the literature, details of the project's methodology and key findings, along with suggestions for further research. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 11: Accessed June 11, 2016: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_clat_final_report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_clat_final_report.pdf Shelf Number: 139389 Keywords: Lone-Actor Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: A European Perspectives Summary: This Research Paper by Dr. Alex P. Schmid opens with a brief exposition of the foreign (terrorist) fighter (FTF) phenomenon, concentrating on Salafist jihadists and their astonishing growth after the Caliphate was proclaimed in mid-2014. The author then discusses various definitions of FTFs. Subsequently, Dr. Schmid seeks to bring structure and order into the widely diverging estimates of the numbers of foreign fighters. He then identifies problems posed by foreign fighters for European democracies with Muslim diasporas, focusing on the range of motivations driving vulnerable young men and women - mainly second generation immigrants and recent converts to Islam - to join the so-called "Islamic State". Having identified push and pull as well as resilience factors that facilitate or inhibit young Muslims joining ISIS, he argues that stopping them from departing to Syria is not enough; political solutions have to be sought. Details: The Hague: international Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf Shelf Number: 139408 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Lone-Wolf Terrorism Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Shelf Number: 139409 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Horgan, John Title: Across the Universe? A Comparative Analysis of Violent Radicalization Across Three Offender Types With Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education Summary: Using a series of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses, this study compared demographic, psychological, and offense-related behavioral variables across and between 71 lone-actor terrorists and 115 solo mass murderers. The study found little to distinguish these two violent offender types in their socio-demographic profiles. Their behaviors, on the other hand, differed significantly in the degree to which they had interacted with co-conspirators, their antecedent event behaviors, and the degree to which they lacked information prior to their attack. Unlike lone terrorists, mass murderers' violence was spontaneous due to unplanned physical or emotional conflicts. Lone terrorists, on the other hand, were motivated to commit violence due to ideologically based conflicts or differences with potential target victims. Regarding threat or risk, there are a number of overlapping questions that must be considered, including what type of action is most likely, under what conditions is a particular mass violence attack likely to be perpetrated, and what interventions are likely to be effective in preventing or mitigating the perpetration of violence. Lack of predetermined intent and strategy distinguishes mass murderers and lone terrorists. The lone terrorist tends to engage in more observable behaviors and planning than the mass murderer, which presents more of an opportunity to observe and assess preparatory actions and intervene to prevent the planned violence from occurring. Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249937.pdf Shelf Number: 139625 Keywords: Extremists Lone Actor Terrorists Mass Murderers Police Education and Training Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schuurman, Bart Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139817 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremists Jihad Muslims Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 139949 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Meitz, Eric Title: What About the Women? Understanding and Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans Summary: In many ways, female recruits, both from the Western Balkans and other regions, are attracted to the Islamic State for the exact same reasons as men, highlights BCSP guest researcher Eric Mietz. This policy paper aims to bring attention to an oft-neglected security problem in the Western Balkans: women being recruited by and migrating to the Islamic State. The roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different to warrant a gender-based perspective in countering violent extremism (CVE) policymaking. The first part of the paper looks at the numbers of women leaving from the Western Balkans to Islamic State-held territory, the profiles of women who migrate, and the roles they take on in the Islamic State. To explain why women are influenced to migrate, the second part examines the "push" and "pull" factors of Islamic State recruitment. The last part focuses on the efforts of Western Balkans governments to criminalize participation in or support of the Islamic State and the disadvantages of relying solely on this policy Details: Belgrade, Republic of Serbia: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/women_and_isis.pdf Shelf Number: 140145 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radicalization Recruitment, Women Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign Fighters Homeland Security ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Mercy Corps Title: Gifts and Graft: How Boko Haram Uses Financial Services for Recruitment and Support Summary: In April 2016, Mercy Corps published a study titled "'Motivations and Empty Promises': Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth," exploring the reasons youth join Boko Haram. In that initial study, we uncovered a number of factors driving support for and recruitment to Boko Haram, including governance grievances and inequality. With support from the Ford Foundation, we conducted this follow-up study to examine in greater depth how inequality drives recruitment, and particularly how Boko Haram uses financial incentives to lure people into the group. We also explored the broader landscape of financial opportunities and barriers to accessing them, with the aim of informing smart policies and programming that address youth needs and help to prevent future participation in violence. Key Findings 1. Boko Haram's financial services provide more than money: they offer the promise of protection and opportunity. Many respondents who accepted financial support and cooperated with the group's demands did so under a protection scheme from Boko Haram. In other cases, community members' desire to improve their financial standing made them receptive to recruitment tactics. 2. Communities see Boko Haram's financial services as more accessible than existing alternatives. Many respondents reported they did not know of viable alternatives to access cash or credit that would allow them to pursue their economic ambitions. They reported that government-provided economic support was not accessible without political connections or bribes. 3. Boko Haram's financial services are used both for recruitment and to gain community support. Respondents reported that Boko Haram used financial support to increase recruitment, achieve tactical aims through local business connections, and broaden popular support. 4. The conditions of Boko Haram's financial support are fluid and unpredictable. While many recipients knew the conditions of their financial assistance at the outset, others did not. Demands could come at any time and without warning and be ideological, tactical, or financial in nature. Recommendations A Increase the quality, availability, and diversity of financial services, particularly to youth with small, informal businesses. In addition to engaging with youth to discuss their financial options and needs, government and private sector financial service providers should expand their products for informal businesses, including micro loans that comply with Islamic financing. A Improve the transparency and accessibility of government-led economic programs. Respondents perceive that government economic development programs are available only to an elite few with money and connections. These programs should be more transparent and accessible for underserved populations and reinforce continued efforts to reduce corruption and address underlying governance grievances. A Expand the role of civil society in developing the Northeast's economic sector. Civil society's role in advocating for equitable economic development and government accountability is crucial to ensuring growth is inclusive and government programs are increasingly transparent. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Gifts_and_Graft_Mercy_Corps_Sept_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140246 Keywords: Financing of Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M. Title: Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT - The Hague Research Fellow Tinka Veldhuis makes an argument for a Realist approach to rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for inmates with a terrorist or extremist background. Accordingly, within the Realist framework, it is stressed that the outcomes of rehabilitation programmes should be understood as a product of the policy mechanisms and the context in which they are implemented. To maximise the likelihood of success it is important to make explicit the underlying assumptions about how the intervention should, given the unique context, contribute to achieving its objectives. This paper endeavours to highlight some of the key questions that need to be answered before and during the implementation of rehabilitation policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 140257 Keywords: Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Offenders

Author: Braziel, Rick Title: Bringing Calm to Chaos: A critical incident review of the San Bernardino public safety response to the December 2, 2015 terrorist shooting incident at the Inland Regional Center Summary: In December 2015, two terrorists attacked a training session and holiday party for San Bernardino County employees, killing 14 and wounding 24 including two police officers. Further losses were averted by the response of the police department, sheriff's office, emergency services, and FBI, who came together to prevent additional deaths and injuries. This Critical Incident review provides a detailed overview of the incident response; lessons learned to improve responding agencies' policies, procedures, tactics, systems, culture, and relationships; and guidance to other agencies and first responders as they prepare for responses to terrorist, active shooter or other hostile events, and mass casualty incidents. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2016. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bringing-Calm-to-Chaos-Final-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bringing-Calm-to-Chaos-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140272 Keywords: Critical Incident Review Police Response Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2016 Public Report on Terrorist Threat to Canada Summary: Threat Environment The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers - including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling - poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2015, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travelers who had returned to Canada. The National Terrorism Threat Level This Report, for the first time, includes a description of Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level system. The threat level has been unchanged since October 2014; it is MEDIUM, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level aims to ensure a consistent understanding across the Government of the general terrorism threat to Canada. The threat level serves as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism. The Global Environment The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada's borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. This past year also saw Daesh's expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as an Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment. Emerging Issues This Report includes a feature on emerging issues in terrorism. These issues - the role of technology in terrorism, the participation of women in terrorist activities, and use of chemical weapons by terrorist organizations - have been widely discussed in the media over the past year. They represent only a fraction of many evolving issues that make terrorism such a complex problem. Responding to the Threat Since 2002, 20 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Another 21 have been charged with terrorism-related offences (including 16 since January 2015) and are either awaiting trial or have warrants outstanding for their arrest. Canada is contributing in a robust way, with more than 60 other countries, to the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. This includes military initiatives and efforts to stem the flow of "foreign terrorist fighters," cut off Daesh's funding sources, support stabilization, and expose and counter Daesh's ideology. More broadly, Canada has maintained a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program as a key part of its terrorism prevention efforts. The Government of Canada's counter-terrorism efforts to address this evolving threat continue to be guided by the twin obligations to both keep Canadians safe and safeguard fundamental Canadian values and liberties. The Terrorist Threat to Canada In October 2014, Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by lone-actors who had been inspired by extremist ideologies and radicalized to the point of violence. The attacks, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa, left two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel dead. More recently, the RCMP, working in close collaboration with domestic and international partners, took action in Strathroy, Ontario, to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat and ensure public safety. These incidents reminded Canadians that Canada is not immune to terrorism. Canada remains the target of direct threats by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and al-Qaida, and by individuals inspired by the violent extremist ideologies of these groups. The United States of America (U.S.) and Western Europe experienced multiple attacks in 2015. Some notable incidents included, in the U.S., attacks on police officers in Boston (June, 2015), military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee (July, 2015) and an office party in San Bernardino, California (December, 2015). European incidents included attacks on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo and a grocery store in Paris (January, 2015), an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train (August, 2015) and coordinated attacks directed by Daesh at several public spaces in Paris (November, 2015). In 2014 and 2015, Australia experienced three attacks - two targeting law enforcement officers in Melbourne and Sydney (September 2014, October 2015) and another targeting civilians in Sydney (December 2014). Terrorist incidents continue to occur with terrible regularity. In June 2016, 49 people were killed and 53 injured when a gunman, who may have been inspired by Daesh, opened fire at an Orlando, Florida night club. In July, 85 people were killed and hundreds more were injured when an attacker drove a truck through a crowd in Nice. There have been other attacks in Western Europe as well, for example, in Brussels, Belgium and in Rouen, France. In Turkey this past June, suicide bombers believed to be affiliated with Daesh struck Istanbul's international airport, killing 45 and injuring over 200. Globally, a few countries bear the heaviest burden of attacks and casualties, particularly during civil conflicts or where terrorist groups have taken part in insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Database for 2015 shows that terrorist activities continue to be highly concentrated. Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria - sustained more than 55 per cent of all attacks that year, and five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - sustained 74 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities. This threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests. CAF personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of this year. In January 2016, an al-Qaida-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work. Current Threats The Principal Threat The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. Some individuals have engaged in terrorism-related activities such as promoting violence online, radicalizing peers, recruiting and fundraising. Others may consider travelling abroad to join a terrorist group or conducting terrorist attacks themselves. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140520 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point Summary: Key Facts - 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned. - Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010. - The UK's annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from L594 million in 2015-16 to L670 million for 2016-17. - The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 36,500 requests per year. - The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed. - Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were linked to terrorists. Google removed over 14 million videos globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse. - Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of themselves as British - a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities effectively. - Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. Details: London: House of Commons, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 135: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Shelf Number: 140678 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Milton, Daniel Title: Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State's Media Efforts Summary: This report breaks down the Islamic State's media activities through a two-fold approach. First, it examines a small number of declassified documents captured from the group's predecessors to provide a baseline understanding its present-day media structure and operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles. A number of findings emerge from these analyses. First, the Islamic State's media network is adaptive and complex. Second, the group publishes products on a variety of themes, only one of which has to do with the violence for which the group is so well-known. Third, the frequency of the group's products has declined significantly since its high-point in the summer of 2015. Fourth, the Islamic State's provincial media bureaus are not all equal in terms of their production content. Finally, although advances have been made in limiting the group's media activities, there is still more than can be done to limit the group's outreach efforts. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf Shelf Number: 145442 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Acheson, Ian Title: Summary of main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice Summary: 1. This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations. 2. In September 2015 the then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a departmental review, supported by external expertise, to:  assess the threat which Islamist Extremism (IE) and the radicalisation which sustains it pose to prisons and probation services; and  assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to manage that threat. 3. The review team submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations to the then Secretary of State on 17 March 2016. 4. Given the nature of its content, and implications for public safety and security, the review is in the form of a classified report to the then Secretary of State. The subject matter is complex, with significant policy implications. The main findings of the review have been summarised below. 5. The then Secretary of State welcomed the review as a vital element of the MoJ's overall approach to addressing the threat presented by extremism and radicalisation in prisons and probation. Its findings will inform future policy development and operational practice, about which more will be said in the coming months. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140760 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted � still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization De-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel Summary: After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and non-immigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44678: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Shelf Number: 146283 Keywords: Airport Security Border Security Homeland Security Terrorist Terrorists

Author: Thornton, Amy Elise Title: Understanding Radicalisation Summary: Given the considerable amount of effort and public resources invested in countering radicalisation, achieving a clearer understanding of what radicalisation is and of its causes is arguably a worthwhile and necessary endeavour. This thesis argues that such an understanding is lacking at present. Up until recently, researchers have relied upon interviews with current or former radicals in order to try and tease out those factors which might have contributed to radicalisation. As a result of the methodological approach, the focus has been upon individuals who are radicalised and their personal backgrounds, rather than on causal factors and mechanisms which might have been at work at other levels of analysis. Utilising and developing a tripartite theory of radicalisation by Bouhana and Wikström 2011, this thesis focuses on the emergence of radicalising settings. The role of so-called macro-level, or systemic, factors, which would affect the broader ecology and explain why settings propitious to radicalisation do or do not emerge in particular environments (e.g. communities) at particular times has been largely overlooked. One explanation is that such factors are rarely accessible through interviews conducted with those who commit terrorist acts. By using a relatively new methodology in the field, agent-based modelling, simulation experiments were conducted to examine the impact of collective efficacy and social disorganisation upon the emergence and maintenance of radicalisation within a setting. Systematic reviews were conducted in order to elucidate existing data for modelling parameters, while interviews with former radicals and current deradicalisation experts were carried out in order to provide new data for the model and add to a field in which this primary data is still limited. Agent-based modelling is shown to provide the field of radicalisation studies with a methodology in which to test and refine theory, scientifically examine current hypothesis and generate more by investigating potentially unexpected results from simulation experiments. This could be of great help to practitioners who seek to understand the impact of their interventions when conducting counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation work in the future. Details: London: University College London, 2015. 241p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470565/ Shelf Number: 147912 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization De-Radicalization Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks Summary: In November 2015, coordinated attacks by armed extremists killed 130 people in Paris. Four months later, attackers struck in Brussels, killing 32. The attacks were the deadliest in France and Belgium in decades. In both cases, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) claimed responsibility. Perpetrators in both strikes had connections to Belgium. The Belgian authorities responded by enacting a ra‚ of counter-terrorism laws and deploying 1,800 soldiers in major cities. The police have carried out several hundred raids, detentions, and stops-and-searches. These actions have helped the authorities charge and convict dozens of terrorism suspects. But as Grounds for Concern reveals, these laws, particularly if enforced arbitrarily or in ways that could be perceived as discriminatory, threaten basic rights including those to movement, liberty, free expression and privacy. In addition, some police operations have involved alleged beatings or other use of excessive force. Human Rights Watch investigated 26 incidents of alleged police abuse. In all but one case those targeted were Muslim. The Belgian authorities should amend and monitor counter-terrorism laws and policies to ensure they do not erode fundamental rights and enforce zero tolerance for police abuse. Governments have a responsibility to protect people from attack and to hold those responsible to account. But disproportionate responses are not only unlawful, they also risk driving a wedge between the Belgian authorities and communities that feel targeted—the very outcome that ISIS seeks to provoke. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/belgium1116_web.pdf Shelf Number: 147308 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Violence Extremists Human Rights Abuses ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Deaths and Disappearances: Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations in Nairobi and in Northeastern Kenya Summary: Since late 2014, the Somalia-based Islamist armed group Al-Shabab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya, leaving hundreds dead. In response, Kenya’s police, military and other state forces have carried out numerous operations to arrest those allegedly linked to Al-Shabab. Allegations of abuses, including forced disappearances, torture and killings by security forces have increased, but thus far, the government of Kenya denies any wrongdoing. Based on over 8 months of research, including in the northeastern counties of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera and interviews with over 110 people, Deaths and Disappearances: Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations in Nairobi and in Northeastern Kenya documents 34 cases of enforced disappearances and at least 11 cases in which dead bodies of people previously arrested by state agents have been found in the last two years, in some instances far from the location of their arrest. Families of those missing have searched detention facilities far and wide, asked for help from political and religious leaders, made reports to state agencies, and in some cases, boldly taken to social media to locate their loved ones. Kenya authorities deny any knowledge of the missing people, fail to acknowledge the growing evidence of abuses during counterterrorism operations, fail to investigate the allegations and in some instances, intimidate and harass those seeking information and accountability. Human Rights Watch calls on the Kenyan police and military to urgently investigate allegations of disappearances, killings and torture in northeast, and bring those responsible to justice. The president should establish a special commission of inquiry to investigate and establish the extent of the abuses in Kenya’s counterterrorism operations. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/kenya0716web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/kenya0716web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 140309 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Disappearances Human Rights Abuse Terrorists

Author: Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo Title: Terrorist murder, cycles of violence, and terrorist attacks in New York City during the last two centuries Summary: I apply the Beveridge-Nelson business cycle decomposition method to the time series of murder of New York City – NYC (1797-2005). Separating out "permanent" from "cyclical" murder, I hypothesize that the cyclical part coincides with documented waves of organized crime, internal tensions, breakdowns in social order, crime legislation, social, and political unrest, and recently with the periodic terrorist attacks in the city. The estimated cyclical terrorist murder component warns that terrorist attacks in New York City from 1826 to 2005, historically occur in the estimated turning point dates, of whether a declining, or ascending cycle, and so, it must be used in future research to construct a model for explaining the causal reasons for its movement across time, and for forecasting terrorist murder and attacks for New York City. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2007. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 4200: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4200/1/MPRA_paper_4200.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4200/1/MPRA_paper_4200.pdf Shelf Number: 147950 Keywords: Cycles of Violence Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crimes

Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mehra, Tanya Title: Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Trends, Dynamics and Policy Responses Summary: This paper, which was developed for the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group, takes stock of the current trends and dynamics related to the FTF phenomenon and identifies some of the gaps that still need to be addressed. The distinction between home-grown terrorists and (returning) FTFs is fading, the difference between ISIL/Da’esh inspired or directed terrorist attacks is becoming more fluid and the nexus between terrorism and crime is more prominent, which clearly indicates that terrorism can manifest itself in many different ways. The involvement of returning FTFs in some terrorist attacks is a stark reminder of the potential threat returning FTFs pose. The data also indicate a demographic change with a more prominent role of female FTFs and children being recruited and used in hostilities or involved in terrorist attacks. The current trends underline the need for a comprehensive, tailored and multidisciplinary approach including the involvement of stakeholders at the local level to adequately address the evolving aspects of the FTF phenomenon. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, (ICCT), 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed January 26, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-1.pdf Shelf Number: 145432 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Keatinge, Tom Title: Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance? Summary: As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play. Efforts to disrupt the funding of Daesh have taken up a significant amount of the time and resources of policymakers, law enforcement and the military. These efforts have also involved mobilising the private sector, particularly banks, oil companies and antiquities dealers. However, little attention has been paid to understanding and addressing the financing associated with the plots (whether successful, failed or disrupted) of lone actors and small cells that have acted beyond Daesh-controlled territory. This paper seeks to provide insight into the financing connected with a sample of 63 lone-actor and small cell terrorist plots in Great Britain and France since 2000, including those that are religiously inspired, right wing, nationalist, and single issue. The aim is to inform thinking and raise awareness among those charged with tackling this threat. The report also draws on a similar study by Australia's financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, thereby providing an overview of lone-actor and small cell terrorist finance from the perspective of three countries, each with individual and distinct experiences. What is clear from both studies is that the simplicity and spontaneity of these attacks, particularly those attempted by a lone assailant as opposed to a dyad or triad, means that assailants are often able to make use of their own funding resources, offering limited opportunities for traditional counter-terrorist financing (CTF) approaches to reveal financial indications of plans prior to their execution. Despite this challenge, the research conducted for this paper has highlighted a number of key themes that it is hoped can contribute to the approaches taken by law enforcement and security authorities as they adapt their CTF response to the evolving threat posed by such terrorists: While there has been an undoubted need to focus on disrupting the significant financing accrued by Daesh over the past two years, a comprehensive CTF strategy should not lose sight of the fact that lone actors and small cells operating at home present a considerably more immediate threat to citizens than Daesh, given that the latter mainly operates in Iraq and Syria. Although it has traditionally been the case in many countries that terrorist financing has been addressed separately from broader financial crime, the increasing intersection of lone actors and small cells with low-level criminality suggests that this separation needs to be reconsidered. Investigations need to at least acknowledge this emerging connection and create dedicated inter-agency links to combat it. Attacks undertaken with knives have certainly resulted in casualties; however, the use of firearms (particularly automatic weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far greater scale. As such, increased focus should be placed on identifying and disrupting financial flows related to the trade in illicit firearms. Information about the financial tools employed by lone actors and small cells must be more widely disseminated to raise awareness among those agencies and actors = in both the public and private sectors - who are less familiar with terrorist financing techniques. These might include certain types of retailer, payday lenders and student loan companies, as well as online payment systems that may increasingly be the target of terrorist-related fraud. Closer monitoring of the welfare system is also advised, in light of cases identified where benefits were used to fund terrorist plots. The financial patterns of lone actors and small cell operators are often indistinguishable from legitimate financial behaviour, and proactive identification of these individuals through financial reporting remains challenging. National financial intelligence units must therefore act as a critical bridge between national security and law enforcement agencies (that identify subjects of interest via non-financial means) and the private sector, to allow financial institutions to conduct more targeted monitoring. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Shelf Number: 145541 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorism Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Jensen, Michael Title: Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Summary: The Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project uses a mixed-method, nested approach to explore a number of key research questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? To address these questions, EADR researchers built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database includes 147 variables covering demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information for 1,473 violent and non-violent extremists from across the ideological spectrum. The database was analyzed using comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression techniques. Additionally, project researchers produced 56 life-course narratives of individuals who radicalized in the U.S., which were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), a methodology that makes it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. EADR produced a number of findings that are relevant for domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, law enforcement, criminal justice policy, and academic research. First, a descriptive comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted radicalization warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment, are not more common among extremists than they are for the general population. CVE programs designed to address feelings of relative deprivation may be ineffective in many cases. The results also indicate that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Programs designed for juveniles and men may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, who are especially prevalent among the far right and single-issue milieus, and women, who are found in large numbers on the far left. In addition to addressing issues of age and gender, intervention programs should look to take advantage of the comparatively long radicalization durations that exist across the ideological spectrum, which often last several months or years, and they should target the face-to-face and virtual social networks that mobilize lone and group-based extremists to act. Second, through a set of robust statistical models, the project identified a number of factors that indicate which extremists are most likely to engage in violent acts. All other things held constant, pre-radicalization criminal activity and post-radicalization clique membership are strongly associated with violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. To the extent that law-enforcement agencies and CVE programs prioritize potentially violent individuals over others when resources are constrained, this finding suggests that their focus should be placed on individuals with prior interactions with the criminal justice system and those who are known to associate with others holding extreme views. Other factors uncovered by this analysis suggest that individuals on the far right and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies are more likely to engage in violence, while those with stable employment histories and those motivated by animal rights and environmental concerns are significantly less likely to do so. Lastly, EADR reveals that psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors can combine in complex ways to produce many pathways to violent extremism. Social and behavioral indicators of radicalization are embedded in complex processes that unfold in non-linear ways. Using fs/QCA techniques, the project reveals that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways to violent extremism. Of these, the majority are driven by psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that stem from lost significance, personal trauma, and collective crises. These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances. Programs that place an undue focus on particular communities are likely to be counterproductive by exasperating feelings of collective victimization. Successful programs, on the other hand, will be tailored to specific ideological groups and sub-groups, and will address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. The results of the EADR project lend good support to radicalization mechanisms that are based on personal and collective psychology. That said, our analysis failed to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of 35 cases of violent extremism that were analyzed, which indicates that extant radicalization research does not account for all of the causal conditions that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future research efforts should focus on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations in order to identify these missing conditions. Doing so will also allow researchers to more closely chart how attitudinal and behavioral traits change over-time. The results of these efforts should be used to inform domestic CVE efforts, especially when it comes to program design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145380 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Silverman, Carol J. Title: Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists Summary: This report presents findings from a two-year study, "Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists." This investigation examines multiple aspects of recruitment and radicalization, such as the quality and quantity of exposure to right-wing ideologies prior to extremist involvement; types of recruitment; pre-entry risk factors for extremist participation; and the extremists' perception about why he/she was unable to progress beyond the planning stages of a terror plot. The empirical analysis is divided into four distinct but overlapping reports. Report one consists of a comprehensive thematic assessment, which focuses on family socialization prior to extremist involvement; entry processes into extremism; recruitment strategies and the extremist subculture of violence. In terms of socialization, although only a small segment of our sample (n=3, 9.7%) were raised by parents who were members of extremist groups, a vast majority (n=28, 90.3%) were exposed to racist/anti-Semitic beliefs during childhood. Regarding motivation for entry into violent extremism (VE), our findings indicate a variety of non-ideological factors increased the appeal of these groups such as acceptance from peers, attraction to the group's forbidden social image and the ability to increase ones’ level of personal significance. In addition, participants also felt the group offered protection from bullies at school and rival gangs in their neighborhoods. In terms of recruitment, extremist groups relied on a variety of marketing strategies (e.g., leafleting and house parties) in order to promote their political agenda. Our data suggest these groups targeted marginalized youth who were angry and looking for solutions to their problems. However, the most effective recruitment tool was extremist music. Music provided recruiters with opportunities to introduce potential recruits to the extremist subculture in venues and through mediums with decreased monitoring from agents of formal social control. In addition, report one also examines the violent subculture of right-wing extremist groups. As part of this discussion, we highlight the role of various cultural practices such as violent rituals which were used to increase commitment to the group and to distinguish strong members from weaker ones. As our data indicates, however, there does seem to be a threshold for violence. That is, some extremists condemned violence when it was directed towards “defenseless” targets. Overall, these findings underscore the similarities individuals experience throughout their extremist careers. Report two contains a detailed description of pre-entry risk factors for VE participation. Specifically, we apply a circumplex model of affect to examine sample of extremists. The circumplex model of affect proposes that rather than viewing emotion from independent neural systems, affective states should be understood as arising from common, overlapping neurophysiological systems (Posner, Russel, and Petersen, 2005; Russel 1980). More specifically, this model proposes that affective states arise from two fundamental neurophysiological systems: valence (please-displeasure continuum) and arousal (or alertness) with all emotions reflecting some combination of these two dimensions. Report two relies on this model to help examine how individuals reflect on their entry into VE and the affective states that can be discerned from their narrative descriptions of those events. Our findings are drawn from a subsample of the study (n=20) and emphasize the role that nonideological push factors have in extremist participation and the onset of violent offending. For instance, the majority of our participants reported dysfunctional family environments such as divorced parents (n=16, 80%), child abuse (n=7, 35%), emotional abuse (n=2, 10%), sexual abuse (n=4, 20%) and neglect (n=4, 20%). In terms of the motivation for entry, the two most common turning point events related to entertainment and peer relationships. In total, 14 (70%) subjects expressed both entertainment and friends in their turning point event description. Seven subjects expressed disillusionment with society and 8 participants expressed negative exposure to diversity during their recollection of the turning point event that led to involvement in violent extremism. These findings highlight the influence of pre-entry risk factors on VE participation. Report three presents an empirically informed trauma model of extremist participation. This study relies on an expanded sample of right-wing extremists as compared to report two (n=44) and examines childhood trauma and adolescent misconduct as precursors to the onset of VE. This model consists of three primary dimensions: 1) different types of childhood trauma experienced, 2) subsequent onset of conduct problems during adolescence, and 3) non-ideological motivations and circumstances leading to extremist participation. Based on the analysis, we find the model fits slightly more than one-half of the subjects in the sample (n=27, 55%) with some variation of additional fit for the remaining subjects. For instance, a large portion of the sample reported experiencing some type of childhood maltreatment such as physical abuse (n=20, 45%), sexual abuse (n=10, 23%) or neglect (n=21, 48%). In addition to maltreatment, participants also reported a variety of chaotic living conditions such as parental incarceration (n=13, 30%), parental abandonment (n=14, 32%) and family substance abuse (n=21, 48%). In terms of adolescent conduct problems, a significant portion of our sample (n=28, 64%) reported experimenting with alcohol and illicit drugs prior to age 16. Furthermore, a majority of participants (n=26, 59%) reported skipping school as well as dropping out of school or being expelled from school (n=24, 55%). Although there is no single pathway to VE, our data suggests that nonideological risk factors, in part, accumulate over time leading to substantial life course disadvantages that facilitate a number of possible negative outcomes including VE participation. Report four examines the social and psychological barriers to mass casualty violence. Specifically, we describe four obstacles that decreases the likelihood of mass casualty violence (MCV). The first barrier functions as a sorting process away from MCV. Our data suggests one of the earliest barriers obstructing MCV is the preference for interpersonal violence rather than MCV. In other situations, the extremist organization condemns violence as a counterproductive strategy. The second barrier involves the impact that various non-movement, personal obligations have on an individual’s capacity to further radicalize toward MCV. That is, time spent drinking or using drugs, time dedicated to personal obligations (e.g., children, spouses or work) and time spent fighting rival gangs means less time available to coordinate acts of MCV. The third barrier, disillusionment, occurs when an extremist is discouraged by behaviors observed in the movement that are inconsistent with the official movement doctrine. Over time, the extremist begins to question his/her own commitment and the legitimacy of the groups’ ideologies. The fourth, and final, barrier involves the extremist’s inability to justify the use of violence against other individuals especially a large number of unknown victims. Overall, findings from the current study suggest that internal and external influences interact with one another to reduce the likelihood of MCV which helps explain the rarity of this type of violence. Findings from this project underscore the complexities of extremist participation. The current report begins to unravel these intricacies by moving beyond the traditional case study methods previously used to explore recruitment and radicalization processes. Overall, this study finds that VE participation is influenced, in part, through non-ideological risk factors prior to entering an extremist group and that social and psychological obstacles reduce the likelihood of MCV. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 260p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_RecruitmentRadicalizationAmongUSFarRightTerrorists_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_RecruitmentRadicalizationAmongUSFarRightTerrorists_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140802 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Fajmonova, Veronika Title: Origin-group differences in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims: Reactions to the War on Terrorism Summary: This study compared opinions relating to the war on terrorism for six origin-groups in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S Muslims (each poll ~1000 participants). Origin-groups included Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, and sub-Saharan African countries, as well as African-American Muslims. Opinions changed little from 2007 to 2011 except for a massive increase in presidential approval (Obama vs. Bush). In each origin-group, nearly half of respondents continued to believe the U.S. war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, but approval of al-Qaida and suicide bombing in defense of Islam was less than ten percent. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born were older and less religious than other groups but had opinions similar to other U.S. Muslims. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were generally most negative about living as Muslims in the United States. Experience of discrimination did not predict opinion of al-Qaida or suicide bombing, nor were converts more extreme. Discussion emphasizes the need to understand why many U.S. Muslims are negative toward the war on terrorism and why a very few persist in radical opinions approving al-Qaida and suicide bombing. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144825 Keywords: Al-Qaida Counter-Terrorism Muslims Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Pape, Robert Title: The American face of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-related terrorism in the US: March 2014-August 2016 Summary: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is mobilising sympathisers in the US at rates much higher than seen for previous terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. To understand this new American face of ISIS, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) study examined 112 cases of individuals who perpetrated ISIS-related offences, were indicted by the US Justice Department for such offences, or both, in the US between March 2014 and August 2016. This is the first comprehensive analysis of ISIS-related cases to examine the profiles of indictees overall, as well as to identify characteristics associated with each of the offence types. The findings are striking, and provide a valuable contribution to understanding the contemporary face of ISIS-related terrorism in the US. Details: Barton ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-american-face-of-isis-analysis-of-isis-related-terrorism-in-the-us-march-2014august-2016/ASPI_CPOST_ISIS_Indictees.pdf Shelf Number: 145772 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gyles, Roger Title: Certain Questioning and Detention Powers in Relation to Terrorism Summary: This report is to review the operation, effectiveness, and implications, of the relevant legislation, including consideration as to whether it: contains appropriate safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals; remains proportionate to the threat of terrorism, or threat to national security, or both; and remains necessary. Assessment as to whether the legislation is being used for matters unrelated to terrorism and national security is required. I must have regard to Australia's obligations under international agreements and to the arrangements agreed from time to time between the Commonwealth, the States, and the Territories, to ensure a national approach to countering terrorism. A review of div 3 of pt III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) and any other provision of that Act as far as it relates to that division, pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) (INSLM Act) is required to be completed by 7 September 2017. That division provides the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) with special powers relating to terrorism offences, being questioning warrants (QWs), and questioning and detention warrants (QDWs), and related matters. That time limit requires that the review take place notwithstanding s 9 of the INSLM Act. A review of pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) is also one of the functions of the office. That part provides for the detention (and questioning) of persons arrested for Commonwealth offences. Subdivision B of div 2 deals with terrorism offences. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (formerly the Australian Crime Commission) (ACIC) has compulsory questioning powers. The arrangements that are in place mean that those powers apply to certain terrorism offences, and to that extent, may be reviewed pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the INSLM Act. Combining those reviews provides a better perspective than separate reviews and is the best use of limited resources. The existence and exercise of other powers relating to counter-terrorism and national security vested in federal and state bodies form part of the backdrop to this review and report. The previous Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Mr Bret Walker SC, reviewed and made recommendations about ASIO QWs, and QDWs, in chs IV and V of his 2012 Annual Report. He dealt with police powers of questioning post-arrest and pre-charge in Appendix F of the same report, but made no recommendations as to them. He touched on pre-emptive detention for questioning by the then Australian Crime Commission, and the New South Wales Crime Commission, in ch V of that report. The principal recommendation was that QDWs be abolished by repeal of the relevant statutory provisions. That recommendation has not been acted on. Several changes to the QW procedures were recommended, some based on the assumption that QDWs would be abolished. Only some have been adopted. These powers are revisited in this report in light of experience over recent years and the current security situation. This review has involved public and private written submissions, public and private hearings, private consultations, and the voluntary and compulsory provision of information. As much material as possible has been published on the INSLM website. The submissions published there give a comprehensive account of the considerations and arguments that have been advanced and taken into account. It is unnecessary to reproduce all of that information in this report. An account of the review process may be found at Appendix 1. Details: Sydney: Australian Government, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 2016. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/inslm_certainquestioninganddetentionpowers_feb_2017.pdf Shelf Number: 145788 Keywords: National Security Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015 Summary: 1. Purpose of Study: This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL. 2. The Problem: How and why do foreign terrorist organizations recruit Americans to their cause? Three answers have been proposed to this question:  Homegrown terrorism is a tactic developed by the foreign terrorist organization to further its strategic interest in attacking Western targets. Command and control is essential to all terrorist organizations.  Homegrown terrorism is essentially "leaderless". The root cause of militancy lies at home. US militants may declare allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations, but this is just a matter of aspiration.  Terrorist groups are comprised of leaders and foot soldiers, and tailor their operations to meet strategic goals, including, perhaps most importantly, keeping their numbers up. An emphasis on recruitment requires an open structure; fundraising requires centralized control over the flow of money; plotting attacks needs a covert and decentralized and covert organization. 2. Data and Methodology: The data were collected as part of the Western Jihadism Project (WJP), a database of Western nationals associated with terrorist plots related to Al Qaeda and aligned groups, including ISIL, from the early 1990s to the end of 2015.  Over the past twenty-five years, close to 800 residents or citizens of the U.S. have committed terrorism offenses inspired by one of the many Islamist terrorist groups that have been active in this country.Of these, about 560 may be described as "homegrown" terrorists: American citizens or residents who have been arrested or have died in incidents related to Al Qaeda and its many affiliates and successors. Foreigners who have attacked the United States, e.g. the September 11 hijackers, or have been brought to trial in the United States, are excluded from this estimate, and are not considered in this study.  Data were also collected on Americans convicted on charges related to Hamas and Hezbollah in order to assess differences in network organization that are related to the particular objectives of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. All data were collected from court records and other public documentation. Data collection procedures were designed to facilitate social network analysis through the comprehensive coding of information about communications and relationship between known terrorist offenders.  The study uses a method termed social network analysis (SNA). Developed by sociologists to study informal network dynamics, it has proved to be helpful in ascertaining structures, variations and patterns of change in terrorist organizations. 3. Key Findings: 2015 ended with a record number of arrests in the U.S. related to Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism, the highest count since the 9/11 attacks. The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and the ability of home-based if not necessarily homegrown militants to carry out successful mass shooting attacks in 2015 and 2016 are further indications that the country faces a significant and growing threat from Americans who are inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology and who are guided by recruiters acting on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations.  Islamist terrorism in the United States has taken many different forms. These range from the pyramidal hierarchy of the Brooklyn-based cell in the 1990s to the family-based criminal fundraising schemes run by Hamas and Hezbollah and the recent decentralized pop-up cells of Americans who have become enamored of the Islamic State’s propaganda.  The 1993 Brooklyn-based cell was markedly hierarchical and typical for an enclave-based terrorist organization that combines proselytizing and recruitment with planning and mobilization for terrorism. It was therefore vulnerable to prosecution and suppression, and its legacy for jihadist terrorism in the Untied States was minimal. Only actors who escaped abroad were able to carry on.  Hamas and Hezbollah have used the United States as a base for raising funds, and occasionally as a safe harbor for important operatives. They retained the character of diaspora organizations focused on supporting organizations in the Middle East and eschewed domestic recruitment and mobilization for violent action in the United States. Highly centralized and vertical networks, they tend to organize around large-scale family-based fraud conspiracies involving siblings, parents and children, spouses, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and even more distant relatives. While the cells lacked broader connections within the United States, they were linked to the mother organizations in Lebanon or Gaza, often through nodes placed outside the United States.  The number of Americans who die abroad in connection with terrorist actions on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations has risen sharply in recent years. Homegrown American militants nearly always first want to go abroad to fight. Later, they may be turned around to carry out attacks at home—or if they are frustrated in their ambition to go abroad, choose to commit acts of terrorism at home. After the 9/11 attacks, jihadist recruitment in the United States recovered only slowly, facilitated by travel to Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and a web-based proselytizing and recruitment strategy. In the last two years, travel to territories controlled by ISIL produced an uptick in deaths.  Recruitment networks funneling people abroad look very different from the networks of the past that were intent of organizing attacks at home. The Islamic State’s recruitment structure presents a classic pattern of what is known as a star network, i.e. a communication network in which all nodes are independently connected to one central unit, here the recruiters for the Islamic State. Flat, dispersed, and highly connected through the central hub, all traffic goes through the leadership based abroad. The peripheral nodes may be comprised of just one person linking up via a home computer or the node may be a pop-up cell of friends and family communicating with the central hub. But characteristically those on the periphery have little awareness of each other.  The new network structure associated with social media recruitment prioritizes recruitment over exercising control and command of violent plots. It is inaccurate to say that it exemplified “leaderless” terrorism as all information and action scripts run through the central hub of the network, comprised of recruiters and middle-men acting on behalf of the ISIL.  Jihadist recruitment has reached into small and mid-sized cities in every state of the country. The impact of online recruitment is evident in the diversity of American terrorism offenders, who today have come from forty different ethnicities and all races. In 2015 investigations related to the Islamic State were in progress in all fifty states. Given the extraordinary diversity of the American homegrown terrorism offenders, no common denominator and no common set of grievances, or even common motivations, can explain what makes a few individuals opt to join groups espousing violent jihad. 4. Inferences and Recommendations For Policy: Family members and spouses are often the first to know when a person is about to do something. American homegrown terrorists rebel against the nation and their parents, and against the American Muslim community. Establish a duty to report: State and federal laws should make it a duty to report suspicions about imminent criminal activity related to terrorism. The legal construction may mirror current rules regarding the obligation to report child abuse if the family member, teacher, or community member has “cause to believe” that a risk to the public exists. But what are bystanders supposed to see? There is a real risk that American Muslims will be unfairly stereotyped in the absence of a clearly formulated public education program that focus on signs of radicalization to violent extremism. Focus on community education: The growing involvement of converts and the diffusion of risk outside the metropolitan areas suggests a need to educate community leaders, teachers, prison wardens and social workers in the detection of the signs of dangerous radicalization. The number of Americans participating in lethal attacks abroad has increased. For this reason and because of the intimate connection between perpetrating an attack at home and going abroad—in whatever order— the expression of a desire to go abroad to fight for a jihadist organization should be treated as an immediate risk to homeland security. Disrupt and intercept travel to foreign terrorist organizations and insurgencies: Withdrawal of passports is one tool. Preventing the development of hidden communities of extremism should continue be a high priority. Radicalization takes place in online and offline networks and peer groups. Profile the networks: Social network analysis may provide a fuller picture of an individual’s risk profile if it is used to profile all contact points, ranging from social media networks to offline engagements with other militants. The focus should be on top-down suppression of the purveyors of extreme political violence rather than bottom-up elimination of militant social media activists. Many would-be terrorists are caught online. That does not mean that they radicalized online. Moreover, online data have proven of value to law enforcement. Suppress Internet Producers of Online Violent Extremism: Policy should focus on targeting and suppressing the recruiters rather than retail-level consumers of terrorist propaganda. Details: Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Shelf Number: 146964 Keywords: Al Qaeda Extremists Homegrown Terrorism Homeland Security ISIL Islam Radical Groups Social Networks Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Barrett, Richard Title: The Islamic State Summary: The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory. But ultimately, its impact will flow as much from its challenge to established concepts of government, national sovereignty, and national identity. The Islamic State is most notable for the violence with which it asserts control, but its ruthless tactics will likely prevent the group from ruling effectively and building broader support beyond the front line fighters who protect its security and the authoritarian killers who patrol its streets. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards proto-statehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground. As a result, this paper relies on the group's own publications, the observations of defectors, and analysis by others who take an interest in its progress, despite the paucity of information. Nonetheless, The Soufan Group believes that enough is available to draw a useful picture of the evolution of the State, its structure and its operations, even though it may lack clarity and detail. The paper refers throughout to the organization as The Islamic State, being the name it uses to describe itself. The only alternative would be to call it by its Arabic acronym, commonly transliterated as Da'ish or Daesh (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham). Clearly, the use of its full name does not imply any endorsement or recognition of its self-description. Details: New York: Soufan Group, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Shelf Number: 141177 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko Haram Citizen Attitudes Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures in North and West Africa Summary: The Islamic State (referred to in this report as ISIL) has seen its prospects in North and West Africa grow increasingly dim since early 2015. ISIL has experienced significant losses in North Africa in the past year, especially in Libya, which was once ISIL's most valuable territory outside of Syria and Iraq, and was home to the group’s unofficial African capital. Meanwhile, the Nigerian militant group popularly known as Boko Haram, which is ISIL's West Africa Province (ISWAP), has experienced major internal schisms, as different factions vie for resources, compete for the attention of ISIL's senior leadership, and renew longstanding personal, ideological and strategic disputes. But despite these setbacks, ISIL continues to pose a threat to North and West Africa, and is capable of mounting high-profile terrorist attacks in the region and beyond. Additionally, continued political instability and conflict in countries like Mali and Libya could undermine counter-ISIL efforts, and provide the group an opportunity to rebuild its networks and mount a resurgence. Indeed, two recent occurrences – the reemergence of ISIL in northern Mali and the group's temporary takeover of the town of Qandala in Puntland (a region in northeastern Somalia) – illustrate ISIL's ability to exploit ungoverned spaces and fragile states. It is possible that ISIL's global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from combatting ISIL to other seemingly more urgent issues, giving ISIL the breathing room it needs to regenerate. Several factors will have a fundamental impact on ISIL’s future trajectory in North and West Africa: 1. The future of ISIL’s Sirte network: In order to survive and rebuild in North and West Africa, ISIL will likely need to preserve at least some of the militant infrastructure it developed during its year-plus in control of the Libyan city of Sirte. The Sirte network has been a key bridge between ISIL's Syria-Iraq leadership and its African allies, and ISIL has relied heavily on the Sirte network to maintain its patronage of its provinces (as ISIL refers to its affiliates) in the region. While ISIL has lost its foothold in Sirte, the group may be able to preserve some of the jihadist apparatus that had ruled and administered the city. 2. ISWAP's organizational dynamics: ISWAP's internal schisms threaten to cripple the group and weaken, if not sever, its ties to ISIL. The loss of its Nigerian province would be a major blow to ISIL's expansion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and would further tarnish the group’s brand. Conversely, if ISWAP remains in ISIL's orbit, ISWAP could provide ISIL with a vehicle through which to expand its presence into other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal and Mali. 3. The resilience of ISIL in northern Mali: ISIL's recent resurgence in northern Mali gives the group a new foothold at a time when it is struggling elsewhere in the region, and across the globe. But ISIL's presence in Mali remains tenuous, as both regional and French security forces, as well as rival al-Qaeda militants, will likely target ISIL. 4. Political stability in North Africa: ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria’s political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 141325 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIL Islamic State Radical Groups Radical Violence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Heissner, Stefan Title: Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State's Financial Fortunes Summary: About this Study • The so-called Islamic State has often been described as the richest terrorist organization in the world. • This estimate of Islamic State revenues for the years 2014–2016 results from a collaboration between EY and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London. It is based on a systematic review of open source information about the finances of Islamic State in its core territory in Syria and Iraq. Key Findings • Estimates vary widely. It remains impossible to say exactly how much money Islamic State has at its disposal. • The group's most significant sources of revenue are closely tied to its territory. They are: (1) taxes and fees; (2) oil; and (3) looting, confiscations, and fines. We have found no hard evidence that foreign donations continue to be significant. Similarly, revenues from the sale of antiquities and kidnap for ransom, while difficult to quantify, are unlikely to have been major sources of income. • In the years since 2014, Islamic State’s annual revenue has more than halved: from up to $1.9b in 2014 to a maximum of $870m in 2016. There are no signs yet that the group has created significant new funding streams that would make up for recent losses. With current trends continuing, the Islamic State’s "business model" will soon fail. Assessment • Evaluating Islamic State finances through traditional approaches towards "countering terrorist finance" leads to serious misconceptions. Islamic State is fundamentally different because of the large territory it controls and the unique opportunities this offers for generating income. • Conversely, its reliance on population and territory helps to explain the group's current financial troubles. According to figures provided by the Global Coalition, by November 2016 Islamic State had lost 62 per cent of its mid-2014 "peak" territory in Iraq, and 30 per cent in Syria. From a revenue perspective, this means fewer people and businesses to tax and less control over natural resources such as oil fields. Prospects • There are good reasons to believe that Islamic State revenues will further decline. In particular, capturing Mosul, the Caliphate's "commercial capital", will have a significant detrimental effect on Islamic State finances. • Nevertheless, Islamic State, and its Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) predecessor, have repeatedly demonstrated that financial and military setbacks can be overcome. • Moreover, the decline in revenues may not have an immediate effect on the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside its territory. While hurting Islamic State finances puts pressure on the organization and its state-building project, wider efforts will continue to be necessary to ultimately defeat it. Details: London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London: 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Shelf Number: 141335 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS Summary: This Research Paper seeks to explore what 'sympathy' and 'support' actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 141336 Keywords: al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Extremists Groups Islamic State Jihadists Public Opinion Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts Summary: Why GAO Did This Study - Violent extremism - generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically - motivated acts of violence - has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi-agency efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-300: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Shelf Number: 144734 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Farnham, Nicholas Title: Can a Copycat Effect be Observed in Terrorist Suicide Attacks? Summary: The purpose of this paper is to explore how a copycat effect - established within the field of suicide studies - may manifest itself in terrorist suicide attacks, and takes an exploratory approach in evaluating the prospect of incorporating open-data resources in future counter-terrorism research. This paper explores a possible 'copycat effect' in cases of suicide terrorism, which entails a perpetrator being inspired by a preceding attack to carry out a similar attack not long after the original. In the wake of mounting risks of lone wolf terrorist attacks today and due to the general difficulties faced in preventing such attacks, in this paper we explore a potential area of future prevention in media reporting, security and anti-terrorism policies today. Using the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD), this paper investigates terrorist suicide-attack clusters and analyses the relationship between attacks found within the same cluster. Using a mixed-method approach, our analyses did not uncover clear evidence supporting a copycat effect among the studied attacks. These and other findings have numerous policy and future research implications. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICCT-Farnham-Liem-Copycat-Effects-in-Terrorist-Suicide-Attacks-March-2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICCT-Farnham-Liem-Copycat-Effects-in-Terrorist-Suicide-Attacks-March-2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 144735 Keywords: Copycat Effect Lone Actor Terrorists Lone Wolf Terrorists Suicide Terrorism Terrorist Terrorists

Author: Huq, Aziz Title: The President and the Detainees Summary: Entering the White House in 2009, President Barack Obama committed to closing the military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Eight years later, the facility remains open. This Article uses the puzzle of why Obama's goal proved so recalcitrant as a case study of separation-of-powers constraints upon presidential power. Deploying a combination of empirical, doctrinal, and positive political science tools, it isolates the salient actors and dynamics that impeded Obama's goal. Its core descriptive finding is that a bureaucratic - legislative alliance was pivotal in blocking the White House's agenda. This alliance leveraged its asymmetrical access to information to generate constraints on the President. The most significant of these constraints operated through political channels; statutory prohibitions with the force of law were of distinctively secondary importance. The analysis, furthermore, sheds light on why individualized judicial review, secured through the mechanism of habeas petitions under the Constitution's Suspension Clause, had scant effect. Contrary to standard approaches to the Constitution's separation of powers, the case study developed here points to the value of granular, retail analysis that accounts for internally heterogeneous incentives and agendas instead of abstract theory that reifies branches as unitary and ahistorical entities. Details: Chicago: University of Chicago Law School, Chicago Unbound, 2017. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 793: Accessed April 11, 2017 at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=law_and_economics Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=law_and_economics Shelf Number: 144795 Keywords: Guantanoma Bay Military Detention Terrorists

Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Jihadists Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Dreher, Axel Title: The Effect of Migration on Terror - Made at Home or Imported from Abroad? Summary: We investigate whether the stock of foreigners residing in a country leads to a larger number of terrorist attacks on that country. Our instrument for the stock of foreigners relies on the interaction of two sets of variables. Variation across host-origin-dyads results from structural characteristics between the country of origin and the host, while variation over time makes use of changes in push and pull factors between host and origin countries resulting from natural disasters. Controlling for the levels of these variables themselves and fixed effects for dyads and years, the interaction provides a powerful and excludable instrument. Using data for 20 OECD host countries and 187 countries of origin over the 1980-2010 period we show that the probability of a terrorist attack increases with a larger number of foreigners living in a country. However, this scale effect is not larger than the effect domestic populations have on domestic terror. We find some evidence that terror is systematically imported from countries with large Muslim populations. A larger number of attacks against foreigners in the host country increases the risk of terror from foreigners there. We find that host country policies relating to integration and the rights of foreigners are key to fight terror - stricter policies that exclude foreigners already living in a country increase the risk of terror. High-skilled migrants are associated with a significantly lower risk of terror compared to low-skilled ones, while there is no significant difference between male and female migrants. Details: Munich: Center for Economic Studies, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper Series: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6441 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6441 Shelf Number: 145310 Keywords: Migration and Crime Migration Policy Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Overton, Iain, ed. Title: Understanding the Rising Cult of the Suicide Bomber Summary: The sharp rise in the number of suicide bombings over the last few years is incontestable. 1982 - the year of the Hezbollah attack on the Tyre headquarters of the Israeli army - is often cited as the beginning of the 'modern age' of suicide bombings, but the relatively limited activities of the 80s and 90s cannot compare with the current scope of the problem. Before 2000, no year saw more than 22 suicide attacks worldwide. In 2015, there were at least 600. Over the last five years of AOAV's Explosive Weapons Monitoring Project (EWMP), which records data on explosive weapon usage worldwide according t0 English-language news sources, suicide bombings have consistently caused high levels of civilian harm. In total, 1,191 incidents were recorded across the 2011-2015 period, resulting in 31,589 civilian deaths and injuries. This is an average of 27 civilians killed or injured per incident. Of the ten worst incidents recorded by AOAV over the five-year period, five were suicide bombings - a figure only matched by airstrikes. In the same period, AOAV also recorded a worrisome overall trend of rising civilian deaths and injuries from suicide bombings, as well as ever-greater numbers of countries affected. In 2015, for example, suicide bombings were recorded in 21 countries - the highest number ever recorded by AOAV or by other datasets. Indeed, both 2015 and 2016 saw a considerable uptick in the overall lethality of suicide bombings. This was in spite of similar incident numbers to previous years. Suicide strikes in 2015 resulted in an average of 36 civilian deaths and injuries per incident, markedly higher than the five-year average of 28. In 2016 that figure has risen to 38. This rise can largely be attributed to an intensification of high-profile suicide bombings launched by Boko Haram and IS, but also by other armed groups involved in conflicts in Syria and Yemen, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP). In spite of the clear differences in scale and objectives between the 1980s and the post-9/11 world, this is largely not reflected in modern scholarship. Most studies on suicide bombings - even those emerging after the 11 September 2001 attacks and the Iraqi insurgency of the mid-2000s - focus on the relatively small-scale nationalist campaigns of the 80s and 90s. This is probably largely because of the comparatively large amounts of available data on these campaigns (such as the relatively comprehensive information on Palestinian suicide bombings, for example). Much of this scholarship into the drivers of suicide attacks has also focused at the individual level, ambitiously, searching for the magical last piece of the puzzle that will explain 'what makes a suicide bombe''. The overwhelming majority suicide bombers in recent years are, with a few exceptions, internationalist Islamists of a Salafi-Jihadist persuasion (or, more accurately, those who carry out bombings on behalf of such organisations). This should not be taken to mean that suicide bombing is a problem somehow 'stemming from Islam', unique to Islamists, or even particularly characteristic of Islamist political movements as a whole. What it does mean, is that these groups - rather than nationalist movements - should be the centre of current research, as well as policy and military discussions on reducing the current impact of suicide bombing. Another concern regarding recent scholarship is that most has focused on finding a single underlying cause for all uses of suicide bombing worldwide. Suicide bombing is a tactic that can be used in many different ways and for many different strategic objectives. It obviously emerges under specific conditions - but this does not mean its use will be limited to those conditions. The suicide bombing that killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 shares no more with a huge market truck bombing in 2015 Baghdad than the means of activation method. This report sets out to address the main factors that contribute significantly in creating the cult of suicide bombers in armed Salafi-Jihadi groups. Our research found that suicide bombers of Salafi-Jihadi groups blow themselves up for a combination of reasons. Firstly, the concept of martyrdom propagated by Salafi-Jihadi groups seems to appeal to many who have personal and individual desires pertaining to elevation of status. Such desires are often rooted in a sense of inferiority, whether it is socio-economic or social, and is often caused by (perceived or real) discrimination. The act is often justified as a defence of Islam, which gives the bomber both a sense of fulfilling a purpose and hero status among their peers. Religion often serves as the binding force, and usually becomes a factor towards the end of an individual's radicalisation process. These more 'ideological' motivations are, in general, most predominantly found in foreign fighter suicide bombers. Secondly, some bombers are merely motivated by the logic of the battlefield or by personal experience. For example, many Syrian suicide bombers have spent time as political prisoners or witnessed deaths caused by airstrikes, which may give them enough grievances to exert revenge. Suicide bombings might also be motivated by more pragmatic reasons, for example as a means to protect one's home community.Thirdly, the deterioration of conflict in Syria and Iraq, as well as the sectarian climate that has been developed as a result of these conflicts, has polarised the Muslim population and has undoubtedly eradicated some of the neutral positions in each conflict. This has paved the ground for more suicide attacks in the short run but also for jihadi sympathisation in the long run. Details: London: Action on Armed Violence, 2017. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2017 at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Understanding-the-rising-cult-of-the-suicide-bomber.pdf Shelf Number: 145312 Keywords: Islam Radicalization Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Zakaria, Rafia Title: Hate and Incriminate: The U.S. Election, Social Media, and American Muslims Summary: In the grim days following the mass shooting in Orlando, Florida, news commentator and retired Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters appeared on Fox News, saying: "Not all Muslims are terrorists, but virtually all terrorists are Muslim." Peters's statement represents the sort of venomous rhetoric that has emerged all too often this election. Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has put an immigration ban on Muslims at the core of his nativist pitch to voters, alleging that American Muslims and mosques are knowingly harboring terrorists. While many Americans, including President Obama, have spoken out against Trump's characterization of American Muslims as terrorists, there has been little opposition to the premise that all terrorists are Muslims. The prevalence of Islamophobia has been coupled with a selective definition of terror under US law, contributing to the belief that all terrorists are Muslims and hence that all Muslims be viewed with suspicion, justifiably hated, excoriated, and even banned. At the same time, amplification by social media reinforces hostile political rhetoric, making legislative reform that protects Muslims as effectively as the rest of the population more difficult. This paper dissects the premise that terror is a particularly Muslim problem and analyzes the key role that social media is playing in this issue. The paper begins with a quantitative snapshot of both antiMuslim and anti-Islamophobic Google searches and statements made on social media. It then moves to a qualitative analysis of the low rates of reporting and prosecution of hate crimes against Muslims, paying particular attention to differing standards of proof required for these prosecutions. The second section looks at terror prosecutions of Muslims, noting how speech - and especially online speech - is treated very differently by courts when it involves Muslim American defendants and the mere possibility of terror connections. In paying particular attention to prosecutions under the Material Support for Terrorism Statute, we note how concerns raised in the prosecutorial context of hate crimes (such as requirements of intent and purposefulness) are summarily discarded when they arise in relation to terrorism cases. Details: New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism Columbia Journalism School, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 12, 2017 at: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/US%20Election%2C%20Social%20Media%2C%20and%20American%20Muslims%20%28Zakaria%29.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://cjrarchive.org/img/posts/US%20Election%2C%20Social%20Media%2C%20and%20American%20Muslims%20%28Zakaria%29.pdf Shelf Number: 145455 Keywords: Discrimination Hate Crimes Media Muslims Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide Summary: The aim of this compendium is to provide guidance and insight for practitioners, policymakers, governments and civil society organizations in South East Asia that are interested in developing counter-narratives and alternative narratives to the messaging produced by violent extremists. The compendium will draw on international good practice and lessons learned to inform and inspire these actors to utilize the most effective methods and strategies. The compendium begins with a step-by-step approach to counter-narratives, with clear examples from South East Asia. The compendium then dives deeper into several case studies, highlighting elements of good practice from the region before presenting a detailed annex of 80 existing counter-narratives from South East Asia (Annex 3). It should be noted that the narratives and subsequent analysis of the narratives and counter-narratives contained in this report mostly focus on violent extremism of groups that claim to be Islamic, primarily because the majority of the threats posed by violent extremist groups in South East Asia fall under this category. However, this is not to say that violent extremism only relates to the above category, and there are case examples from other non-Islamic forms of violent extremism. For a more robust assessment of the threats of violent extremism in the region, refer to Annex 2: Violent Extremism in South East Asia. It is important to establish the terminology that has been adopted throughout the compendium. The term "narrative" generally refers to the story or recruitment pitch of violent extremists, whereas "counter-narrative" generally refers to the story or counter-argument utilized to reduce the appeal of violent extremism. Counter-narratives include counter-arguments as well as positive, alternative narratives and government strategic communications. The contents of this compendium rely on a number of sources: 1) research on the academic and policy literature conducted by the author; 2) an expert workshop on "South East Asia Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)" hosted by Hedayah and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia in March 2016 and the subsequent report;1 and 3) a consultation process on draft versions of the compendium with regional experts and policymakers from the region. Details: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Hedayah Center, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Shelf Number: 145466 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Buchanan-Clarke, Stephan Title: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn Summary: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns - the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE. 1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present. Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups: 1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) 2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali). 3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism. Details: Afrobarometer, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Shelf Number: 145467 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Countering-Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Feldstein, Michelle Title: Into the Fold: Evaluating Different Countries' Programs to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists Summary: Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country's efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state's level of repression affects that country's level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state's official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious reeducation or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country's de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country's level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country's de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state's religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists-as a practice and concept-is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2015. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145667 Keywords: De-radicalization Islamist Terrorist Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper Dr. Bibi van Ginkel takes an in depth look at how multi‐lateral institutions, engage with civil society to counter violent extremism. Dr.van Ginkel argues that civil society can play a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways - by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism. The paper finds that over the last decade there has been a more intensive coordination of activities between the UN and other multi‐lateral organisations and civil society but the question remains whether the implementation as well as the drafting of these policies will live up to their potential effectiveness. This paper gauges how effective these measures have been and what more there is to do. The final section concludes with a series of policy recommendations Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 145749 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Wilson, Tom Title: Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg Summary: Shakeel Begg, described in court by a judge as "an extremist Islamic speaker who espouses extremist Islamic positions", has established himself as an influential figure within numerous public bodies and groups - even after the ruling, where he lost a libel case against the BBC. A new Henry Jackson Society report, Extremism in the Community: The Case of Shakeel Begg, has found that Begg firmly entrenched himself within numerous community groups, and has been active even since he was declared to be an extremist in court. He has also continued to associate with senior politicians, including the leaders of major British political parties. The report's main findings include: He shared a platform with Tim Farron and Stella Creasy in December after the ruling declared him an extremist. This was not reported at the time. He shared a platform in 2013 with Jeremy Corbyn in the days following the Lee Rigby killing - in spite of the fact that the killers came from the mosque where he was Imam, and the fact that his mosque has a long history of hosting hate preachers. The John the Baptist Primary School put documents on their website stating that they work to promote British values, and gave the fact that they worked with Begg as evidence for this. This relationship continued after the ruling, with school children visiting Begg's mosque. This was a clear breach of the Prevent duty. Begg sat on a body at Lewisham Council charged with advising on religious education. He was advised them on their response to the Trojan horse revelations. Begg is known to have worked closely with the police in community partnerships, and the police provided character witnesses during the libel case. He has been a Muslim chaplain at Lewisham and Greenwich NHS trust in the past. He was also a chaplain at Goldsmith's university, and has continued to visit as a guest speaker since. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism , 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper No. 8: Accessed May 25, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/03/20/extremism-in-the-community-the-case-of-shakeel-begg/ Shelf Number: 145800 Keywords: Extremists Islam Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim Title: Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat Summary: Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60-100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to South Africa and the government's response to this challenge. Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress' National Conference in Manguang. Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around violent extremism in South Africa and the state's capacity to respond. While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups. This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa's post-apartheid experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa. Details: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, 2017: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Shelf Number: 145835 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Carroll, Jacinta Title: Manchester Arena bombing, 22 May 2017 Summary: On 22 March 2017, 52-year-old Khalid Masood (born Adrian Elms, with multiple AKAs) drove a hire car onto London's Westminster Bridge, mounted the vehicle onto the pavement and accelerated into pedestrians. Masood then drove the vehicle around permanent bollards at the end of the bridge before remounting the pavement and crashing the car. Masood abandoned the vehicle and proceeded on foot into the Houses of Parliament complex. The attack lasted 82 seconds and resulted in six deaths, including Masood's, and 49 people injured. This CT Quick Look paper highlights the key issues and assesses the relevance for affected stakeholders and Australia. It provides recommendations for government. Details: Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: CT Quick Look: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Shelf Number: 145842 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Islamic Radicalization in Belgium Summary: Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile a ground for Islamic radicalization? This paper points to the low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community. These poor demographic realities of the Belgian Muslim community might be significant in providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic parties and organizations to influence and recruit. This paper analyzes Islamic radicalization in Belgium. The first part of this paper examines Belgian-Muslim demographics, including population, integration, political participation, and organization. Then, Belgian Islamic radicalization is examined through the theoretical frameworks of both McCauley and Moskalenko and Social Movement Theory. To conclude, this paper considers governmental responses and recommendations for future preventative actions. Details: Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Shelf Number: 146257 Keywords: Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Warner, Jason Title: Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers Summary: Introduction Since 2009, the Islamist group known as Boko Haram (formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, or more recently, the Islamic State's West Africa Province [ISWAP]) has ushered in a wave of violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa, at the intersection of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Among other tactics that it has employed during its reign of terror, the group has been noted for its use of suicide bombers. While the prevalence of suicide bombings has been duly recognized, little remains known about the broader arc of their existence and efficacy: What strategic and operational trends underlie Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers, and how effective have they been at achieving their objectives? Just who are Boko Haram's suicide bombers? Where are they deployed, what do they target, and how do diferent bomber demographics difer in their actions? More broadly, what does Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers reveal about the past, present, and future of the terrorist group? Methodology Drawing on analysis of an original dataset of all Boko Haram suicide bombings from their first deployment in April 2011 to June 2017, this report presents the fullest picture available to date that tracks and analyzes Boko Haram's use of suicide bombers. To do so, we investigate two main phenomena from our dataset: operational trends of bombers (longitudinal trends, lethality, injuries, geography, and targeting trends) and demographic trends of bombers (gender, age, and recruitment). From these trends, we assert that it is possible to categorize Boko Haram's suicide bombing eforts into four distinct historical phases. In light of our understanding of the group's past and present operational and demographic trends, we conclude by suggesting how the group might act in the future and how counter-terrorism efforts might best address its likely incarnations. Overall Findings In the main, we argue that Boko Haram's operational profile is noteworthy in that, despite the attention the group garners for its deployment of suicide bombers, it shows itself to be less effective than otherwise expected in using them. Concurrently, we argue that Boko Haram's demographic profile is unique in that it created novel uses for women and children in its suicide bombing efforts, rendering it distinctive among extant and historical terrorist groups. Our dataset reveals that from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 diferent targets during 238 suicide-bombing attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women, and at least 81 bombers were specifically identified as children or teenagers. A more comprehensive overview follows. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2017. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Exploding-Stereotypes-1.pdf Shelf Number: 146957 Keywords: Boko Haram Islamic State Suicide Bombers Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Samuel, Thomas Koruth Title: Reaching the Youth: Countering the terrorist narrative Summary: Youths are full of potential and will determine the future. Extremists, terrorists and all who prey upon the youth have always understood this well. However, while there are numerous debates, conferences and concept papers among the authorities, academic circles, civil society and people in general on the meaning, parameters and extent of this premise, I would argue that terrorists and extremists are far ahead in realising this truth, developing methods and techniques to capitalise on this potential, and they will without doubt ride the 'coat tails' of these youth in shaping the future according to their vision. Where does that leave us? This study hopes to look into the dynamics between the youth and the terrorist, the push and pull factors and the subsequent consequences, the narrative of the terrorists that make such a relationship possible and the possible counternarrative. It must be clearly stated at the onset however, that this study is very much a work in progress. There still remains a great need to do further quantitative and qualitative work in this particular area, a more in-depth study at the ground level and a more extensive survey of the literature currently available. In short, this study is just the beginning. Details: Lampur, Malaysia: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), 2012. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/Reaching_the_Youth_Countering_The_Terrorist_Narrative.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/Reaching_the_Youth_Countering_The_Terrorist_Narrative.pdf Shelf Number: 147031 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremists Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Greenberg, Karen J., ed. Title: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States: The ISIS Cases Summary: The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States - The ISIS Cases is the third in a series of reports issued by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School on federal prosecutions of individuals accused of ISIS-related crimes. Notably, this report reveals several new trends since the Center's last report was published. 2016 was a year of growing concern about the threat ISIS posed within the United States. In addition to a record number of terrorism arrests carried out since 9/11, there had been several attacks that resulted in deaths, including the attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando - the latter particularly noteworthy because it doubled the casualties resulting from jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks that had occurred cumulatively between 9/11 and 2015. By contrast, 2017 has shown a decline in incidents of ISIS-related terrorist attacks and attempted attacks. At the same time, there has been a significant decrease in the number of federal indictments for ISIS-related crimes. The 2017 edition of Terrorism Prosecutions in the United States examines these and other trends in an effort to glean insight concerning both the individual defendants accused of ISIS-related crimes and the dispositions of the criminal cases against them in federal court. This report has several new features meant to illustrate these developments. First, the charts include illustrations of changes over time. In addition, this edition of our ongoing study on terrorism includes, where possible, comparisons between terrorism prosecutions and U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. The findings contained in this year's report are summarized as follows: Finding No. 1: Although the federal courts have shown a capacity to handle these cases, the dispositions of these cases differ markedly from those of U.S. criminal justice prosecutions overall. ISIS cases are more likely to go to trial than federal cases generally. Those terrorism prosecutions that have been resolved have proceeded more quickly through the courts than the average case. ISIS defendants are granted pre-trial release with much less frequency than criminal defendants overall. Every case that has been resolved has resulted in conviction, in contrast to the national average conviction rate of 92.5%. Sentences are comparatively higher in these cases, exceeding the national average by 10 years. In fact, the average ISIS sentence of 14.5 years more than triples the average federal sentence of 3.75 years. Finding No. 2: ISIS-related prosecutions rely increasingly on the use of FBI undercover agents or informants. The use of informants, a controversial strategy challenged by civil liberties groups, has continued to rise in ISIS prosecutions. In 2014, 33% of the ISIS-related cases involved government informants or undercover agents. However, the share of ISIS prosecutions involving FBI undercover agents or informants has since increased to 65%. For the new cases in 2017, it is even higher- 83%. Finding No. 3: The personal details of the individual defendants differ from those of non-terrorism defendants generally. Terrorism defendants are significantly younger than typical criminal defendants. They are more frequently American citizens. They are less likely to have spent prior time in prison than their criminal justice counterparts overall. Finding No. 4: ISIS-related defendants are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam than Muslim by birth. This year's findings show Muslim defendants in ISIS-related cases are increasingly more likely to be converts to Islam. In addition, there were fewer allegations of interfamilial coconspirators, and fewer incidences of romantic ties among and between co-conspirators. In sum, federal terrorism prosecutions in the 16 years since 9/11 are still not normalized in terms of their disposition. The use of material support statutes that are relied upon in the majority of these cases, as well as the terrorism enhancements available in sentencing guidelines, have provided the legal framework for this trend, while the details of investigation, prosecution, and litigation have, as this report shows, solidified the harsh practices evident for terrorism cases. Nor are terrorism prosecutions trending towards normalization. Instead, it seems, the federal courts have made an exception - one that maximizes the punitive aspect of criminal justice - for these cases, and continue to do so. More than a decade and a half since the Sept. 11 attacks, this report suggests that it's time to acknowledge that terrorism cases have evolved from the prosecutions of complex, sophisticated, trained networks of individuals towards individual actors in search of purpose and attention. As such, normalization of these criminal proceedings might appropriately lie on the horizon. Details: New York: Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/59b9965529f187bdd6bd4fc3/1505334870512/The+American+Exception+9-17.pdf Shelf Number: 147247 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Prosecutions Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Ligon, Gina Scott Title: The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles Summary: The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, funded by DHS S&T OUP since 2010, uses a longitudinal, industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology approach to assess organizational features in relation to their capacity for innovative and violent performance. The scope of the present effort is to use the LEADIR database and an internal strategic organizational approach to gain insight into 10 different violent extremist organizations (VEO) with a foothold in the current "Jihadi Industry." In addition, a VRIO analysis was performed to assess each VEO's unique set of strategic resources (e.g., cyber infrastructure) and capabilities (e.g., attack innovation) that provide a competitive advantage among their industry peers. When examining 10 VEOs in the Jihadi Industry, what are the features that differentiate them? This report, commissioned by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), seeks to address this question by examining a sample of 10 active jihadi organizations through December 31, 2015. Drawing on longitudinal data analytics, organizational science literature, and computer science techniques, this report provides a picture of key organizations operating in the Jihadi Industry. The report's main findings indicate that leadership, organizational structure, and innovation vary across the Jihadi Industry, which has implications for how government resources should be allocated for monitoring and analysis. In addition, the findings highlight the need for additional research to determine advanced indicator and warning signals of which groups will emerge as the most strategically differentiated and capable of malevolent innovation in coming years. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Shelf Number: 147366 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Parkin, William S. Title: Criminal Justice & Military Deaths at the Hands of Extremists Summary: As there have been a number of high profile incidents where extremists have targeted criminal justice personnel generally, and law enforcement officers specifically, it is important to provide some context with data on attacks over time. START researchers examined the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to provide analysis on attacks on agents of the criminal justice system and military personnel in the United States between 1990 and 2015. The ECDB identifies 66 criminal justice/military homicides perpetrated by an offender associated with either al-Qaida and its associated movement (AQAM) or far-right extremism (FRE) in this time period. This background report presents information on these incidents, the offenders and victims of these attacks. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147461 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homeland Security Homicides Military Personnel Terrorists

Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Preventive Detention Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The Origins of America's Jihadists Summary: The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations that could try to carry out a major terrorist operation in the United States or sabotage a U.S.-bound airliner, from Americans returning from jihadist fronts or European returnees who might try to enter the United States, and from homegrown terrorists inspired by jihadist ideology to carry out attacks in the United States. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. American Muslims appear unreceptive to the violent ideologies promoted by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A small fraction express favorable views of the tactics that those organizations use, but expressions of support for political violence do not translate to a willingness to engage in violence. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. This essay identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11. These involve 178 planners and perpetrators. (This total does not include those who provided material support to jihadist groups or left the United States to join jihadist groups abroad but who did not participate in terrorist attacks or plots to carry out attacks here.) American jihadists are made in the United States, not imported. Of the 178 jihadist planners and perpetrators, 86 were U.S.-born citizens. The others were naturalized U.S. citizens (46) or legal permanent residents (23)- in other words, people who had long residencies in the United States before arrest. (One more was a U.S. citizen, but it is unclear whether he was born here or naturalized.) Eight of the 178 terrorist attackers and plotters were in the United States on temporary visas, three were asylum seekers, four had been brought into the country illegally (three as small children and one as a teenager), and two were refugees. Three foreigners were participants in a plot to attack John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport but did not enter the United States. The status of the remaining few is unknown. The nation has invested significant resources in preventing terrorist attacks. Public statements indicate that federal and local authorities have followed hundreds of thousands of tips and conducted thousands of investigations since 9/11. An average of 11 people per year have carried out or have been arrested for plotting jihadist terrorist attacks. Authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots, keeping the total death toll under 100 during the 15-year period since 9/11-clearly a needless loss of life but a remarkable intelligence and law enforcement success. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign. There is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. There has been no American intifada, just an occasional isolated plot or attack. Out of tens of millions of foreign arrivals every year, including temporary visitors, immigrants, and refugees, 91 people known to have been born abroad were involved in jihadist terrorist plots since 9/11. Information on arrival dates is available for 66 of these entrants-only 13 of them arrived in the country after 9/11, when entry procedures were tightened. Vetting is not a broken system. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity. Foreign-born jihadists come from 39 Muslim-majority countries, with Pakistan leading the list, but concern about possible attempts by returning European foreign fighters to enter the United States requires looking at a larger set of national origins. Vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Most of the foreign jihadists arrived in the United States when they were very young. The average age upon arrival was 14.9 years. The average age at the time of the attack or arrest in a terrorist plot was 27.7. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight. Of the 25 people involved in actual jihadist terrorist attacks, only one returned to the United States after training abroad with clear intentions to carry out an attack. Adding the "shoe" and "underwear" bombers (bringing the total to 27) makes three entering the country or boarding a U.S.-bound airliner with terrorist intentions. Six others entered or returned to the United States within several years of the attack, but subsequent investigations turned up no proof of connections with terrorist groups while they were abroad. The 18 others (72 percent) had no record of recent travel abroad. The complexity of terrorist motives defies easy diagnosis. Religious beliefs and jihadist ideologies play an important role but are only one component of a constellation of motives. Remote recruiting has increasingly made jihadist ideology a conveyer of individual discontents. Feelings of alienation, anger, vengeance, disillusion, dissatisfaction, and boredom; life crises; and even mental disabilities appear in the life stories of individual jihadists. Some of those engaged in jihadist attacks had previously come to the attention of the authorities. Several of these, including the shooter in Little Rock, Arkansas, one of the Boston bombers, and the attacker who killed 49 people in Orlando, Florida, had been interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials at some point in their history and were assessed as posing no immediate danger. In some cases, that assessment might have been correct at the time, but personal circumstances changed the person's trajectory. Predicting dangerousness is difficult. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Shelf Number: 148507 Keywords: Homeland Security Jihadists Terrorism Terrorist Organization Terrorists

Author: Singh, Jasjit Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Shelf Number: 148691 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action. Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Shelf Number: 148692 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Peer Influence Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Warner, Jason Title: Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab Summary: Al-Shabaab, an Islamist terrorist group that has been plaguing Somalia since 2006, was named the most deadly terror group in Africa in 2017 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). One tactic that al-Shabaab uses in its reign of terror is suicide bombing. Despite recognition of the seriousness of the threat that al-Shabaab's suicide bombers pose, very little is known about how, when, and why al-Shabaab elects to employ the tactic of suicide bombings. This report answers these questions. By analyzing a unique dataset compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that tracks all instances of al-Shabaab suicide bombings between the group's first suicide attack on September 18, 2006, to the end of our data collection in October 2017, the authors offer the most comprehensive account to date on the emergence, evolution, and efficacy on al-Shabaab's suicide bombers. They find that al-Shabaab has deployed at least 216 suicide attackers who carried out a total of 155 suicide bombing attacks, killing at least 595 and as many as 2,218 people. Their data indicates that al-Shabaab's suicide attacks are highly targeted, aimed at degrading the Somali state and members of the international community (United Nations, African Union, or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)) that are combating it. Unlike certain other terrorist groups, al-Shabaab's suicide attacks tend to attempt to avoid targeting non-combatant civilians, and thus do not seem to be undertaken simply to engender shock and awe. Their data also reveals information about just who serves as al-Shabaab's suicide bombers; where they target; al-Shabaab's suicide bombing delivery tendencies; and timing trends along months and days of the week. In conclusion, they offer suggestions about how to combat the group's suicide bombing efforts in the future. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/02/Targeted-Terror-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149106 Keywords: Boko Haram Islamic State Suicide Bombers Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Evolving Terror: The Development of Jihadist Operations Targeting Western Interests in Africa Summary: After the Arab Spring, North African countries experienced growing instability, and jihadist groups capitalized on both social unrest and local conflicts. As these groups strengthened, jihadists expanded their operations into the Sahel, and were able to propagate their transnational ideology to new audiences. The threat that jihadist groups in Africa pose to Western interests has grown over the past decade, as groups operating in North Africa, the Sahel, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa have honed their capabilities. This is reflected in the increased frequency and complexity of attacks against Western interests. Between January 2007 and December 2011, jihadists conducted 132 successful, thwarted, or failed attacks against Western interests in Africa. This figure nearly tripled to 358 attacks between January 2012 and October 2017. While the 490 total attacks against Western interests in Africa recorded in this study have varied in target type and tactics, jihadist operations have generally become more sophisticated. In some cases, jihadist organizations developed new tactics for penetrating well-guarded facilities. For example, the Somali militant group al-Shabaab has increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), often supplementing such attacks with armed assaults. This adaptation allowed Shabaab to gain entrance to facilities like airports and UN humanitarian compounds, frequently penetrating past guarded gates. African jihadist groups have also developed innovative ways to thwart the aviation industry's security measures on the continent. For example, a Shabaab suicide bomber detonated a laptop bomb on Daallo Airlines Flight 159 in February 2016. A month later, Shabaab operatives concealed another bomb in a laptop that exploded at Somalia's Beledweyne airport, and authorities defused two other bombs in the same incident, including one hidden in a printer. Not only do these events suggest an escalating threat to African aviation, but they also highlight how African jihadist groups learn and innovate. The ability to learn is critical to any violent non-state actor (VNSA), but particularly so for militant groups, which are pursued by state actors and sometimes also by other VNSAs. These groups need to be able to mount successful attacks against foes who constantly refine their defenses. The learning processes of African jihadist groups are evident in this study's data set, as these groups have engaged in unambiguous adaptations over the course of the past decade. They will continue to engage in organizational learning in an effort to make themselves more effective - and, consequently, more dangerous. But there is also a significant risk that outside jihadist groups are assisting African jihadists' innovations, and watching carefully to bring these tactics to new theaters after seeing how they fare in a "testing ground." We return to the topic of jihadist learning processes in this study's conclusion. To understand evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), targeting, and jihadist innovation, this report uses empirical and historical analysis to map trends in operations against Western interests over the past decade. The report focuses on five target types: (1) establishments popular among foreigners, such as restaurants and hotels; (2) energy and mineral resources infrastructure and facilities; (3) non-African tourists, expatriates, and NGO workers; (4) national and international government facilities, such as embassies and UN humanitarian compounds; and (5) the aviation industry. This report is based on an extensive list of successful, thwarted, and failed attacks against each target type, and utilizes both quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify trends and draw conclusions about the evolution of targeting preferences and TTPs since 2007. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2018. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 26, 2018 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/REPORTS_EvolvingTerror.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/REPORTS_EvolvingTerror.pdf Shelf Number: 149233 Keywords: Jihadist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: EU and Member States' Policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes Summary: This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee), presents an overview of the legal and policy framework in the EU and 10 select EU Member States on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes. The study analyses how Member States define suspects of terrorism-related crimes, what measures are available to state authorities to prevent and investigate such crimes and how information on suspects of terrorism-related crimes is exchanged between Member States. The comparative analysis between the 10 Member States subject to this study, in combination with the examination of relevant EU policy and legislation, leads to the development of key conclusions and recommendations. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2017. 164p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 1, 2018 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596832/IPOL_STU%282017%29596832_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 149305 Keywords: Extremist Violence Extremists Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism Summary: This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year. The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country. However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL. The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility. More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group. The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals. The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt. The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired. Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can be more difficult to detect. It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD counties is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970. The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns. The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached $14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications. Details: New York: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149443 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Rushchenko, Julia Title: Prison Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders: Is Separation Effective? Summary: - In the European Union, many states do not have any terrorist prisoners in their jails, and most of the countries house only a handful of terrorism-related offenders. When such prisoners appear in the correctional system, they can have a powerful effect on other inmates. The presence of violent extremist offenders in the criminal justice system generates unique challenges for most states worldwide, and this issue has prompted an ongoing debate concerning the rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, and on the successes and failures of the prison policies. - According to Europol, in recent years there has been an increase in terrorism-related arrests in the UK, France and Spain. The largest proportion of arrests in the EU in 2013- 2015 was linked to Islamist terrorism, compared to smaller numbers of arrests for separatist, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. The phenomenon of returning foreign fighters is yet another concern for criminal justice systems worldwide, including the processes of prosecution and incarceration. In October 2017, the BBC reported that 121 British foreign fighters have been convicted, but little information is available about how exactly inmates with foreign military training are managed in the UK prison system. - British prisons have a long history of coping with terrorists and political and religious extremists. Most recently, the increase in legislative scope and security responses in the wake of 7/7 led to a significant increase in conviction rates for terrorist offences. As of June 2015, there were 182 offenders convicted of, or on remand for, offences linked to terrorism and extremism in prisons in England and Wales, including people who hold neo-Nazi views and Islamist extremists. Current trends of returning foreign fighters suggest that the number of people to be prosecuted is likely to increase. - Most of those who appear to be radicalised in prisons begin their incarceration with not particularly strong religious affiliation. Radicalisation in prisons has been mentioned repeatedly by academics and practitioners as one of the most pressing security concerns, particularly in the context of Islamist ideology. While both prison and probation are supposed to be strong partners in deradicalisation and resettlement, instead of promoting disengagement from violence, these systems frequently facilitate extremism because of the push and pull factors discussed in this report. - Unlike traditional criminals whose illicit activities are often disrupted in prisons, violent extremists might be comfortable with their convictions because of opportunities to preach in correctional institutions. According to an inquiry carried out by Ian Acheson in 2016, Islamist ideology in prisons could be threatening in various ways, including Muslim gang culture, charismatic prisoners acting as self-styled "emirs" and exerting a radicalising influence on Muslim inmates, aggressive encouragement of conversions to Islam, availability of educational materials promoting Islamist extremism, exploitation of staff's fear of being labelled racist, and so on. - Following the above-mentioned inquiry, the government announced its plans to crack down on the spread of Islamist ideology in prisons by creating three "separation centres" (HMP Frankland near Durham, HMP Full Sutton near York and HMP Woodhill in Milton Keynes) which are expected to hold the most subversive offenders, including Michael Adebolajo and Anjem Choudary. As of January 2018, HMP Frankland near Durham has been created, and it is the first time the UK government has practised the policy of separating terrorism-related offenders. - At the same time, most of the mass media coverage of the UK experiment with regard to tackling radicalisation in prisons has been negative and focused on drawing parallels between UK separation centres and Guantanamo Bay, labelling the centres "jihadi jails". One of the main points of criticism revolves around the idea that segregation is counterproductive as it could potentially give an elevated status to the most dangerous extremists and intensify the issue of Islamism in prisons. - Currently, a more balanced and nuanced evaluation of the containment policy is absent from UK discourse. Although there is a risk that a new intervention will generate additional safety concerns, this report argues that separating the most dangerous terrorism-related offenders is the only viable solution for mitigating the threat of prison radicalisation. However, it is crucial to develop a comprehensive policy framework that takes into account the recent dynamics of radicalisation threats, including demographic changes such as gender and age. Details: London: Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149566 Keywords: Correctional Administration Isolation Muslims Radicalization Restrictive Housing Terrorist-Related Offenders Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Wilson, Tom Title: Mend: "Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians" Summary: Compiling years' worth of evidence, the report, Mend: "Islamists Masquerading As Civil Libertarians", demonstrates how Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. Our findings include: How Mend meets the government's own definition of extremism, even while local authorities, police, teachers and MPs have been working with this organisation. It reveals how Mend has regularly hosted illiberal, intolerant and extremist Islamist speakers, while also pushing a message that risks being inflammatory and making British Muslims feel further alienated from wider society. Mend and key figures in the organisation have also attacked moderate Muslim groups. Mend has openly sought to undermine counter-terrorism legislation and counter-extremism efforts, in addition to having its own links to extremists. Despite this, the group received public funding from Tower Hamlets council to review part of the borough's counter-radicalisation Prevent programme. Several of the organisation's employees and volunteers, including senior figures, have publicly expressed a range of disturbing views on terrorism and anti-Semitism. This has included expressing support for terrorists overseas, dismissing recent terror attacks in the UK, promoting anti-Semitic conspiracies and even calling on British Mosques to hold prayers for "the Mujahedeen". Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Mend-Report-2.pdf Shelf Number: 149596 Keywords: Extremists Islam Islamophobia Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Hill, Max Title: The Westminster Bridge terrorist attack Summary: 1. On Wednesday 22 March 2017, 52-year old British-born Khalid Masood drove a hired vehicle across Westminster Bridge in the direction of the Palace of Westminster. He mounted the pavement twice colliding with pedestrians and then a third time crashing into the east perimeter gates of the Palace of Westminster. Masood then exited the car and ran into the vehicle entrance gateway of the Palace of Westminster, Carriage Gates, where he attacked and fatally injured PC Keith Palmer using a knife. Masood was shot at the scene by armed police protection officers who were in Parliament at the time of the attack. The whole incident lasted approximately 82 seconds. The attack resulted in 29 people injured and 6 fatalities. 2. The ensuing police investigation was named Operation Classific. Counter-terrorism policing officers arrested and detained 12 people in the course of the investigation. All were released without charge. I have been provided with the full details of all who were arrested, but I am unable to publish names which are not already in the public domain, because none have been charged with any offence. 3. I conducted a 'snapshot review' of the arrests, detention and release of all twelve persons in Operation Classific. I conclude, in summary, as follows: a. The police and emergency services were confronted by a terrorist incident which claimed multiple lives and which occurred mid-afternoon in central London. An immediate and comprehensive criminal investigation was required by the police, who had to work with the facts and materials presented to them at the scene, namely the abandoned hire car and its contents. b. It is important to review Operation Classific contemporaneously, in other words placing oneself in the position of police commanders on 22nd March 2017 and in the days which followed. Whilst the physical aftermath of the deadly terrorist attack was managed by all of those services who rushed to Westminster Bridge, the Metropolitan Police team were required to make quick decisions to unearth any and all evidence which might be relevant to Masood's attack planning. Whilst hindsight has its place, it is secondary to understanding in-the-moment decisions taken by police officers as the criminal investigation rapidly unfolded. c. The use of arrest and detention powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 nonetheless requires careful scrutiny. A fast-moving investigation such as this one required ongoing assimilation of information as it came to light, and quick reaction to successive events including the discovery of persons at premises known to have been associated with Masood. In the event, twelve people were lawfully arrested and detained, in most cases under the provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000. Their respective detention times varied widely. All were released, and none were charged with any offence. d. The fact that twelve people were arrested and detained, and none were charged with any offence, does not imply any criticism of this investigation. Whilst the police must always strive to manage counter-terrorism investigations appropriately, and must strive to reduce pre-charge detention time in every case to no more than a necessary minimum, it is a feature of fast-moving, modern investigations into serious terrorism offences that arrest and detention powers will be used and will not lead in every case to a positive charging decision. e. Operation Classific was fast, efficient and comprehensive. Whilst lessons can always be learned from scrutinizing the arrest and detention phase of such an investigation, I have concluded on the basis of the information and materials provided to me that there was a reasoned and proportionate use of the relevant terrorism legislation in this case. I have summarised my recommendations in Chapter 4 of this report. Details: London: U.K. Government, 2018. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695304/IRTL-Westminster_Bridge_Attack_Report_March_2018..pdf Shelf Number: 149600 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Coyne, John Title: Border security lessons for Australia from Europe's Schengen experience Summary: Brexit, and the 2016 US presidential election result, provided tangible evidence that migration and border security policies are becoming increasingly politicised in Western liberal democracies. Public policy dialogue on migration and border security has become ever more polarised into a zero sum game in which debates on both issues descend into a binary 'secure' or 'insecure' ultimatum. Far too often, pragmatism is giving way to simplistic 'balancing' metaphors that achieve neither security nor border facilitation goals. It's this binary border security policy thinking that's tearing at the Schengen Area's collaborative strategy. Adding further complexity to this policy space is a phenomenon in which citizens of Western liberal democracies are experiencing an inexplicable and illogical fear of migrants. In a practical sense, the public policy dialogue, along with its media coverage, is widening the gap between the fear of migrants and migration-related risks and the actual or estimated probable threat. From a security perspective, people are more scared of migration and migrants than they ought to be. US President Trump's successful 2016 election platform engaged with this emotively charged public fear by further demonising migration. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Insights, 117: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/import/SI117_-Schengen-lessons-for-Australia.pdf?fr4QW2WQxT2ozsmvLeaOyunDB7o83kWb Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/import/SI117_-Schengen-lessons-for-Australia.pdf?fr4QW2WQxT2ozsmvLeaOyunDB7o83kWb Shelf Number: 149753 Keywords: Border Patrol Border Security Illicit Goods Irregular Migrants Terrorists

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Dark Net De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Summary: Project SAFTE is an international research project, funded by the European Commission, that aims to contribute to the fight against (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe. This research project has demonstrated the existence of various illicit firearms markets in the EU, each with their own specific features and dynamics. The traditionally closed character of these markets has partially eroded in several EU member states in recent years, which has increased the availability of firearms in general, and military-grade firearms in particular, to criminals and to terrorists with criminal connections. To combat this, a comprehensive and proactive approach is needed that consists of improving the intelligence picture on illicit firearms trafficking, upgrading the policy and the regulatory framework on firearms, and optimising operational capacities and cooperation. Background Several terrorist attacks have been carried out with firearms in Europe in recent years, causing the deaths of hundreds of people and injuries to hundreds more. These events demonstrate that terrorists are able to get their hands on various types of firearms, including military-grade firearms. Although the use of firearms to commit terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon in the EU, Europol recently noted that firearms have become the most prevalent type of weaponry used by terrorists and violent extremists across a range of ideologies. This observation led policy-makers in Europe to develop specific measures to combat terrorist access to firearms. In-depth, evidence-based insight into the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU is limited, however. This is part of the larger problem of the scarcity of reliable data and in-depth research with regard to Europe's illicit firearms markets. Process The goal of Project SAFTE is to improve knowledge regarding (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe and to provide information that can influence policy intended to enhance the fight against this security threat. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated the project, and carried it out in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (SSSA). In addition, research teams from Arquebus Solutions, the Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma contributed extensively to the study. The design of the research project consisted of two phases. In a first phase, specialised research teams conducted qualitative, in-depth studies into illicit firearms markets, terrorist access to these markets and national policies to counter these phenomena in eight EU member states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Romania, the Netherlands and the UK. More than one hundred key national actors were interviewed during this process. The second phase consisted of a systematic and comparative analysis, in which the studies in these countries were supplemented by an explorative mapping of the situation in the other twenty EU member states. In addition, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood (the Balkans, Northern Africa and Ukraine), to address the significant interconnections between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. All these findings were then linked to the EU policy context by, for example, interviews with several key international actors. The research conducted for Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications. The findings of the systematic and comparative analysis are presented in a policyoriented synthesis report, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe: Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE. A separately edited volume, Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, publishes the individual country studies, together with the studies on the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa and Ukraine. indings on illicit firearms markets There is no unified illicit firearms market in the EU. Various regional variants of illicit firearms markets can be identified, however, each with distinct characteristics and dynamics. These differences can be attributed to a variety of local elements that shape local demand and supply of illicit firearms and influence the involvement of different actors. Although it is currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the scope of illicit firearms markets in the EU in a credible way, it is clear that most of the firearms that are available on illicit firearms markets are handguns. The presence of military-grade firearms is generally more limited. The easy and cheap access to certain firearms in some countries strongly contributes to illicit firearms trafficking across the EU. Most illicit firearms markets in Europe are driven by criminal demand. Different types of criminals tend to procure, possess and use different types of firearms, and contemporary terrorist networks usually rely on established criminal connections to acquire firearms from these markets. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the illicitly possessed firearms are in the hands of private citizens in several EU member states who have no criminal or terrorist motives. These are individuals who simply possess firearms without holding the necessary permits. Firearms end up in illicit markets in the EU through cross-border smuggling from both outside the EU (mainly from the Western Balkans) and intra-EU trafficking (mainly as a result of differences in national legislation). The most important illicit supply mechanisms for firearms in the EU are cross-border smuggling, change of ownership through theft, the conversion of blank-firing guns, and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. Each EU member state has a different illicit firearms market with its distinct supply mechanisms, however. These different supply mechanisms are characterised by their own dynamics, and present specific policy and law enforcement challenges. Our analyses indicate that supplying firearms to European illicit firearms markets is not very lucrative, and is generally not a primary source of income for those actors involved in trafficking firearms. Another observation is the cyclical nature of supply and demand in these markets. The actors involved in firearms trafficking in the EU have constantly adapted their operating methods in reaction to regional, national and European policy initiatives and law enforcement operations. Traditionally, illicit firearms markets in Europe are closed markets with restricted access for people outside criminal networks, and having the right criminal connections and reputation are crucial factors in this, even in countries with rather high levels of illicit firearms possession. Differences can be observed in the access to illicit firearms, and especially military-grade firearms, and these differences are linked to the criminal hierarchy and the criminal milieu to which the potential buyer belongs. They are also reflected by a price hierarchy for illicit firearms markets that is similar across the EU: the most expensive firearms on the illicit firearms market are generally military-grade firearms such as assault rifles, while the cheapest firearms are generally (converted) blank-firing firearms. The closed character of these markets has been under pressure in recent years, which is linked to the observed growing availability of certain types of firearms. The underlying factors of this erosion are the emergence of the Internet, the crossborder smuggling of military-grade assault rifles into the EU, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. The increased availability of firearms has contributed to arms races between criminal groups across the EU. This has facilitated the gradual tricklingdown of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU member states, especially in Western Europe. Findings on terrorist access to illicit firearms markets Significant amounts of firearms have been seized from different types of terrorist networks in recent years. These firearms include various models and brands of pistols and revolvers, but also various types of military-grade firearms, such as assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Terrorists who procure firearms generally do so exclusively for carrying out terrorist acts and to defend themselves against law enforcement agencies. Most terrorists seem to have a preference for military-grade firearms, although the observed possession of less-suitable firearms among terrorist networks suggests that not all terrorists have access to a wide range of firearms. Our comparative analysis identified clear distinctions between different types of terrorist networks in the EU in the acquisition, possession and use of firearms. While the traditional separatist groups have developed their own distinct (and context-specific) firearms acquisition patterns, religiously-inspired terrorist networks across the EU generally rely on criminal connections to obtain firearms from local illicit markets. There are no indications of significant firearms flows between the various types of terrorist networks in Europe today and also no indications of recent state-sponsored arms transfers to terrorist groups in the EU. For most of the contemporary terrorist networks operating in Europe, access to local criminal firearms markets is a key element in their firearms acquisition patterns. Through their criminal pasts, contemporary terrorists with criminal antecedents have acquired various skills that can be used in the planning and execution of successful terrorist attacks, including the skills and network needed to acquire weapons more easily. Given the generally closed character of these markets, only terrorists with the right criminal connections can acquire firearms, and in particular military-grade firearms, on illicit firearms markets in the EU. The observed terrorist firearms arsenals therefore generally reflect the specific dynamics of the local criminal firearms market. Individuals without a developed criminal network generally experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms, and are more likely to use an alternative acquisition method, for example the Internet, or to use a different type of weapon. No illicit firearms dealers have been observed who exclusively supply firearms to terrorist networks. There seem to be a number of barriers that inhibit criminals from actively and knowingly supplying weapons for terrorist attacks. Illicit firearms dealers are generally not eager to engage in activities that are not very lucrative, but at the same time involve an increased risk of detection and higher penalties. Terrorists will generally rely on already established criminal connections, often pre-dating their radicalisation, in order to obtain firearms on illicit markets, and sellers often do not know they are selling to terrorists. This can be observed among the significant number of terrorists with a criminal history. Prisons have also been identified as places that offer new opportunities for terrorists who do not yet have the necessary criminal connections to acquire firearms. The overwhelming majority of those perpetrators of recent jihadi terrorist attacks who had a criminal history were involved in low-level criminality. There have been some exceptions of perpetrators who attained a mid-level position in the criminal underworld, but none of the perpetrators or people arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years was a member of a high-level organised crime group. In countries where illicit firearms supply channels are tightly controlled by a limited number of highly-organised crime groups, it is quite difficult for terrorists to acquire firearms. In particular, countries with more chaotic criminal landscapes present potential terrorists with increased opportunities for illicit firearms acquisition. Individuals who acquire firearms for a terrorist network are generally not recruited for this specific purpose, but are already part of the network, and become responsible for this task later because of their skills and networks. Contemporary terrorist networks seeking (specific types of) firearms, but who lack the necessary criminal connections or are operating in a context of limited firearms availability in the local illicit market, can engage in the direct diversion of legally owned firearms, for example by targeted thefts of firearms from state stockpiles or legal gun owners. From a historical perspective, targeted thefts have been a vital element in the firearms acquisition patterns of separatist terror groups in Europe, but such thefts have decreased in recent years. Firearms that were deliberately stolen have only been encountered among jihadi networks in exceptional cases. The diversion of legal ownership for terrorist aims through various forms of embezzlement is also quite exceptional in the EU, as well as the legal possession of firearms by perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Yet, in some EU member states significant numbers of legally-owned firearms have been observed among members of extremist networks, and especially right-wing networks. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 149820 Keywords: Illicit Firearms Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons

Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe Summary: In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these articles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written primarily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest in size. Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforcement agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understanding of what happened in Europe's wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the significant nexus between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. Overview of the chapters The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main findings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country often labelled as one of Europe's hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenomenon, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforcement services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. In the second chapter Filip Dragovic, Paul James, Kresimir Mamic and Robert Mikac analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms possession in the country, Croatia is not characterized by a very active illicit firearms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking. In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organized motorcycle gangs as well as less organized urban street gangs, are the main customers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of firearms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregistered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by criminals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to prevent violent extremism. In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and Andre Desmarais present a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the firearms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the firearms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and networks are characterized by different firearms acquisition patterns. While jihadi terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent terrorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politically address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on firearms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest to sell firearms to terrorist networks. In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availability and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data collection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the different law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-toconvert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where controls can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smuggling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal firearms possession, a proactive operational 'investigate the gun' - approach to combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. The firearms that circulate in the UK's criminal underground are therefore very often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of firearms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists' options are largely restricted to converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the 'Troubles', including different types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportunities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons decreases. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 149844 Keywords: Firearms Gun Markets Illicit Firearms Smuggling of Firearms Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons

Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts: Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger Summary: Key findings Terrorism At the crossroads of the region's most violent conflicts, Niger has served as a primary transit point for armed criminal and terrorist groups operating in the various conflict theatres that surround it. Everything from people, weapons, and low-tech communications pass through Niger's borders, providing a rich source of intelligence that is critical to understanding the nature of cross-border relationships and networks of trafficking and terrorist groups. Niger presents a privileged arena in which to observe the array of terrorist dynamics across the Sahel, and to take action against them. The country has become a major partner in counter-terrorism strategies for regional and western powers. Relatively spared by the threat of terrorism until 2015, the increase in terrorist attacks in Niger since then, first by Boko Haram and then by AQIM-related groups or splinter cells, run in parallel with the enhanced engagement of the Nigerien authorities against terrorism in the region, including MNJTF, MINUSMA, and G5 Sahel efforts. While the north of the country is particularly affected by armed banditry, the south has suffered the bulk of terrorist attacks. In 2016, Boko Haram was responsible for perpetrating 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks carried out on Nigerien soil, but 2017 saw a surge in deadly attacks against security positions near the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali by AQIM- and IS-related groups based in Mali. Sahelian terrorist groups find Niger a fertile recruiting ground and exploit long-standing community divisions, which are in turn exacerbated by increasing insecurity. Arms trafficking Niger has served as a key transit route for weapons heading to conflict zones in the region, but the deterioration of the country's security situation has resulted in an increase in the domestic demand for weapons, particularly for small arms and ammunition. Arms seized from terrorists or en route to terrorist groups in Niger over the past five years include explosives, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and associated ammunition (including MANPADS, mortar rounds, and machine guns). Vehicles were also seized. Terrorist groups operating in Niger, including those based in Mali and Nigeria, have been obtaining materiel from a variety of sources-including from national stockpiles in the region-following the collapse of state control over arsenals, as in Libya or northern Mali, attacks against security positions, or diversion in countries such as Niger or Nigeria. Ammunition held by terrorist groups, other armed actors, and civilians is very similar, indicating common sources of illicit ammunition, including past rebellions and national stockpiles from Niger and neighbouring countries. However, it does vary between the regions: while chains of transfers in the north originate mainly from Libya and Mali, materiel in the south-east comes mainly from Chad and Nigeria. While Libya continues to be a source for illicit weapons in Niger, including converted blank'firing handguns, trafficking from Libya has declined significantly since 2014 due to the depletion of Qaddafi's SALW stockpiles, national demand reinvigorated in light of renewed conflict in Libya, and increased levels of surveillance and counteraction in Niger with the deployment of Operation Barkhane. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Niger URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf Shelf Number: 149854 Keywords: Arms Trafficking Illicit Trafficking Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Arms Violence

Author: Anderson, Angela J. Title: Modern Intelligence Measures to Combat Animal Poaching: A Conservation & Counterterrorism Strategy Summary: This thesis explores nuanced intelligence techniques and technologies currently implemented by analysts, rangers, anti-poaching units, and governments to combat the growing problem of animal poaching. It explores how these new intelligence methods can be incorporated into anti-poaching operations and in what environments they are most effective. The study finds that terrain, cultural factors, and specific, customizable, anti-poaching intelligence techniques play a large role in terms of devising the best possible intelligence strategy to combat animal poaching. The study views these possible solutions through the lens of the INT's including HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT, GEOINT, and OSINT. It further highlights terrorist groups' increasing use of poaching to fund their operations. This thesis takes a case study methodological approach in order to describe a wide variety of cases in various national parks, reserves, conservatories, anti-poaching organizations, and countries across the African continent. Due to a lack of data and only recent implementation of these methods, this approach provided the best possible means to display and analyze the current available data applicable to intelligence in anti-poaching operations. Details: Erie, PA: Mercyhurst University, 2014. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed April 19, 2018 at: https://www.mercyhurst.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/799478-anderson-thesis-final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://www.mercyhurst.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/799478-anderson-thesis-final.pdf Shelf Number: 149859 Keywords: Animal Poaching Terrorists Wildlife Conservation Wildlife Crime

Author: Birkeland, Jane Title: Extremist Use of Social Media: Balancing Privacy and National Cybersecurity Summary: Social media is used by extremists, terrorists, activists, and ordinary people. The complexity of tackling extremist use of social media lies in balancing the privacy of civilians and US national security interests. Currently, there is a lack of comprehensive policy across industry and government to effectively manage extremist usage-providing a unique dilemma in dealing with extremist use patterns for online recruiting and communication efforts, while maintaining privacy and security for ordinary citizens. We have sought to propose solutions to this dilemma through research of the following aspects of social media usage: - Recruitment and communication efforts between extremists and citizens - Private industry's efforts to balance between online security and privacy - Existing constitutional rights, government policies, and organizations relevant to addressing extremist use of social media - Civil society's role in keeping the government accountable for citizen rights in relation to cybersecurity-related policies Through our research, we found an overall lack of coordination and communication between industry and government, which creates grey areas in current policy and law. The following recommendations have been made to effectively address extremist use of social media: - Civil Society Interaction o Sponsor ad-campaigns that seek to raise awareness of extremist contact via social media and how to approach and report such situations o Begin the education of children and young adults, focusing on internet safety and online extremism o Create an official summit that includes industry and civil society to enhance cybersecurity discourse. - Industry Interaction o Take into account what industry has already implemented when creating new policy o Maintain that the removal of extremist accounts stays in the hands of industry o Allow the legal collection of necessary information by the government and law enforcement if the person(s) in question present a clear and present danger In this report, we will outline extremist use patterns of social media and explore the balance of civilian privacy with national security. We will then address existing government responses to extremist use patterns and end with civil society's role in keeping government accountable to the people it serves. We will lastly demonstrate that the afore summarized recommendations are the best way to effectively address extremist use patterns of social media for fundraising and communication efforts. Details: Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Task Force Report 2017: Accessed May 10, 2018 at: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-B-Report_2017_Beyer.pdf Shelf Number: 150141 Keywords: Cybercrime Cybersecurity Extremists National Security Social Media Terrorists

Author: Bier, David J. Title: Extreme Vetting of Immigrants: Estimating Terrorism Vetting Failures Summary: President Donald Trump has promised to implement "extreme vetting" of immigrants and foreign travelers, asserting that widespread vetting failures had allowed many terrorists to enter the United States. This policy analysis provides the first estimate of the number of terrorism vetting failures, both before and after the vetting enhancements implemented in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Vetting failures are rare and have become much rarer since 9/11. A terrorism vetting failure occurs when a foreigner is granted entry to the United States who had terrorist associations or sympathies and who later committed a terrorism offense including support for terrorist groups abroad. This analysis defines vetting failure broadly to include individuals who had privately held extremist views before entry. Moreover, unless evidence exists to the contrary, it assumes that anyone who entered the United States legally either as an adult or older teenager, and who was charged with a terrorism offense within a decade of entry, entered as a result of a vetting failure, even without any evidence that he or she was radicalized prior to entry. By this definition, only 13 people - 2 percent of the 531 individuals convicted of terrorism offenses or killed while committing an offense since 9/11 - entered due to a vetting failure in the post-9/11 security system. There were 52 vetting failures in the 15 years leading up to 9/11, four times as many as in the 15 years since the attacks. From 2002 to 2016, the vetting system failed and permitted the entry of 1 radicalized terrorist for every 29 million visa or status approvals. This rate was 84 percent lower than during the 15-year period leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Only 1 of the 13 post-9/11 vetting failures resulted in a deadly attack in the United States. Thus, the rate for deadly terrorists was 1 for every 379 million visa or status approvals from 2002 through 2016. During this same period, the chance of an American being killed in an attack committed by a terrorist who entered as a result of a vetting failure was 1 in 328 million per year. The risk from vetting failures was 99.5 percent lower during this period than during the 15-year period from 1987 to 2001. The evidence indicates that the U.S. vetting system is already "extreme" enough to handle the challenge of foreign terrorist infiltration. Details: Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis No. 838: Accessed May 17, 2018 at: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Shelf Number: 150249 Keywords: Homeland Security Immigration Enforcement Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency Summary: In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa's enduring insurgencies. In order to better understand Boko Haram now and in the future, this report, edited by Jacob Zenn, challenges some key misconceptions about the insurgency and provides new analyses and insights based on many exclusive primary source materials and datasets. To provide these unique insights, several authors with on-the-ground experience contribute to six areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa: - Ideology (Abdulbasit Kassim) - Gender (Elizabeth Pearson) - Leadership (Atta Barkindo) - Counterinsurgency (Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri) - Regional dynamics (Omar Mahmoud) - Terrorist networks (Jacob Zenn) It is hoped that these analyses of 'Africa's enduring insurgency' will be useful to counterterrorism practitioners, humanitarian organizations, and academia and will assist in understanding and, ultimately, mitigating and resolving the conflict. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism center at West Point, 2018. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Shelf Number: 150341 Keywords: Boko Haram Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Title: Action Agenda on Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali: Gaps, Challenges and Action Plans for the Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali Summary: he violent conflict in Mali, initiated in 2012, is complex and continuously evolving: the groups involved include terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour l'Unicite and le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Al Mourabitoune. As the number of extremist detainees has increased due to the country's situation, it is important to consider issues that come along with this: how to deal with violent extremists when they are in prison? What different actors can play a role during this detention time? As most of the detainees will eventually be released, it is also important to take into consideration challenges linked to re-integration. This Action Agenda aims to address a number of these issues by outlining four Action Areas that currently deserve the attention of both national and international actors in order to efficiently deal with problems associated with detaining Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs). In August 2016, UNICRI conducted an assessment mission in Mali to present its programme on Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, developed within the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The presentation was addressed to key national and international stakeholders and aimed to ensure their engagement. From September 2016 onwards, ICCT and UNICRI joined their efforts in Mali on Reintegration and Rehabilitation (R&R) of violent extremists. Three trainings have been jointly organised so far: first, a training on the psychological aspects of violent extremism for prison staff in the Central Prison of Bamako (December 2016); second, a training for religious leaders on radicalisation (April 2017); and third, a training on risk assessment with a special focus on violent extremism for personnel of the National Prison Administration, DNAPES (August 2017). These training workshops have been designed in close consultation with national authorities and international partners, such as the Justice and Correction Section of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA/JCS). Throughout the needs assessment mission and training workshops, and in consultation with different actors on the ground, ICCT and UNICRI have identified four target areas that deserve the attention of both national and international actors, namely (1) increasing awareness of the causes and consequences of violent extremism in the Malian context, (2) intake and risk assessment of violent extremist offenders, (3) empowerment of youth leaders, and (4) disengagement of VEOs through vocational training and engagement of communities through dialogue sessions in prison. These areas will be further discussed below, outlining specific actions recommended to increase capacity building, intensify inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and design and implement an R&R program, all using research to ensure that actions are tailored to local needs and guided by an evidence-based approach. This Action Agenda is composed of three sections: the first briefly discusses the background of the conflict in Mali as well as some of the issues faced in Mali with regards to VEOs in prison. The second section describes the four Action Areas and outlines proposed activities to address concerns and needs identified by ICCT and UNICRI throughout the initiatives implemented by both organisations so far. Finally, next steps and recommendations will be discussed. Details: The Hague: ICCT, 2018. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mali URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf Shelf Number: 150408 Keywords: Extremists Prisoner Reintegration Rehabilitation Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Phillips, Whitney Title: The Oxygen of Amplification: Better Practices for Reporting on Extremists, Antagonists, and Manipulators Online Summary: We live in a time where new forms of power are emerging, where social and digital media are being leveraged to reconfigure the information landscape. This new domain requires journalists to take what they know about abuses of power and media manipulation in traditional information ecosystems and apply that knowledge to networked actors, such as white nationalist networks online. These actors create new journalistic stumbling blocks that transcend attempts to manipulate reporters solely to spin a beneficial narrative - which reporters are trained to decode - and instead represent a larger effort focused on spreading hateful ideology and other false and misleading narratives, with news coverage itself harnessed to fuel hate, confusion, and discord. The choices reporters and editors make about what to cover and how to cover it play a key part in regulating the amount of oxygen supplied to the falsehoods, antagonisms, and manipulations that threaten to overrun the contemporary media ecosystem�and, simultaneously, threaten to undermine democratic discourse more broadly. This context demands that journalists and the newsrooms that support them examine with greater scrutiny how these actors and movements endeavor to subvert journalism norms, practices, and objectives. More importantly, journalists, editors, and publishers must determine how the journalistic rule set must be strengthened and fortified against this newest form of journalistic manipulation - in some cases through the rigorous upholding of long-standing journalistic principles, and in others, by recognizing which practices and structural limitations make reporters particularly vulnerable to manipulation. With a particular focus on coverage of internet trolls, conspiracy theories, and networks of white nationalists during and after the 2016 US presidential election, this report explores these issues through the perspectives of those who must navigate this territory every day: the journalists themselves. The report's three parts incorporate interviews with 50 individuals with intimate knowledge of the contemporary news media. Fifty-six percent of these respondents are women, 30% are people of color, and 26% are natural-born citizens of countries outside the United States, with additional insights gleaned from the scores of the more informal discussions the author - a frequent expert commentator on stories about internet trolling - has had with reporters since 2010. While each part may be read on its own, each informs and is informed by the others. Details: New York: Data & Society, 2018. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 31, 2018 at: https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FULLREPORT_Oxygen_of_Amplification_DS.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/FULLREPORT_Oxygen_of_Amplification_DS.pdf Shelf Number: 150414 Keywords: Extremists Internet Journalists Mass Media Media Social Media Terrorists

Author: Institute for Integrated Transitions Title: The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism Summary: The Limits of Punishment is a research project led by the United Nations University's Centre for Policy Research, in partnership with the Institute for Integrated Transitions, and supported by the UK Department for International Development. It seeks to understand if, when and how transitional justice, in combination with other conflict resolution tools, can contribute to transitions away from conflict in settings affected by major jihadist groups. Specifically, it aims to answer two questions: 1. What are the effects of current approaches toward punishment and leniency for individuals accused of association with jihadist groups in fragile and conflict-affected states? 2. What factors should policymakers consider in designing alternative and complementary strategies leveraging transitional justice tools to better contribute to sustainable transitions away from conflict? To answer the first question, the project undertook three fieldwork-based case studies that assessed nationally-led approaches to handling individuals accused of having been associated with: al Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The case studies look at a broad range of formal and informal mechanisms of punishment and leniency. These include, inter alia: amnesties; prosecutions; traditional justice; and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), rehabilitation, and similar programs that, in practice, offer some individuals alternatives to criminal justice. The case studies demonstrate the risks of excessively heavy-handed and at times indiscriminate approaches that penalise broad sectors of local populations accused of association with these groups, and assess the quality and limitations of existing leniency programs for such individuals. To answer the second question, the Institute for Integrated Transitions' Law and Peace Practice Group - a group of leading transitional justice experts - analysed the empirical evidence of the case studies in light of broader lessons learned from decades of international practice in the field of transitional justice. On this basis, the Group developed a framework to assist national policymakers and practitioners - as well as their international partners - in applying transitional justice tools as part of a broader strategy to resolve conflicts involving groups deemed violent extremist. The framework offers a range of approaches toward effectively balancing leniency and accountability, that can be tailored to conflict settings marked by violent extremism. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150732 Keywords: Conflict Resolution Extremist Groups Jihadists Punishment Radical Groups Terrorists Transitional Justice Violent Extremism

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Dispositif d'intervention sur la radicalisation violente en milieu ouvert : identification des difficultes et des besoins des professionnels des SPIP, aide a l'adaptation des pratiques Summary: The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) carried out a research-action over 18 months in collaboration with the French Penitentiary Administration (DAP) in order to develop an intervention response for individuals who have been radicalized or are in the process of radicalization within the Penitentiary Services for Integration and Probation (SPIP) within the probation system. This project was developed in three pilot sites: Grenoble, Lyon and Nice. This "intervention response" is understood as a set of actions and initiatives implemented at the institutional level to counter violent radicalization, namely: - A decision-making support system in the process of identifying and reporting individuals who have been or are being radicalized. For this purpose, the following products were developed by the research-action: - An Identification and Reporting Protocol for individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence, and - A Semi-Structured Interview Guide for the Identification of individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence. - A support system for individuals who are at risk or are already radicalized. For this component, three different actions were developed: - Two collective actions, one of which is primary-secondary prevention (Vivre Ensemble) and the other is secondary-tertiary prevention (CODE), as well as - An individual program for the prevention of recidivism (Accordeon). This research-action is a world first. Never has a project of such magnitude been implemented within the probation system. Violent radicalization although very popular remains very difficult to apprehend. This is the reason why this research-action is quite unique considering its very great ambition that is to think of and create identification and support procedures and methods. This Report is aiming to present the work achieved from July 4, 2016 to December 31, 2017, by pilot research units (mainly professionals of the Ministry of Justice and the ICPC) in the framework of the project: "Intervention response to violent radicalization within the probation system: identifying the challenges and the needs of the SPIPs professionals, and support to adapt practices". This report describes the methodology used, developed products, the results of the process evaluation and the impact of this approach as well as the actions implemented. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2018 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Year: 2018 Country: France URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Shelf Number: 150761 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Prisoners Probationers Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Bruijns, I.S.M. Title: Boze, bange of betrokken buren? Een onderzoek naar de protestbereidheid van buurtbewoners tegen de terugkeer van ex-delinquenten in de wijk Summary: The re-entry of politically sensitive former offenders has taken place in recent years provided protest a number of times. Three types of politically sensitive ex-offenders who can generate large-scale social disruption are perpetrators of one pedophile crime, terrorist-related offense and a crime of life. Especially perpetrators of a pedophile crime are seen as folk devils of the society. This thesis was investigated in surveys (N = 164) the extent to which local residents of the Mariahoeve district in The Hague are prepared to participate in protest against the return of politically sensitive former offenders, and which motivations to participate. The question in this research was central: To what extent does the protest willingness differ from local residents against the return to the neighborhood of perpetrators of a crime of life a pedosexual offense and a terrorism-related offense of each other, and what are the determinants of this protest? The findings of the study showed that although the literature and the media make us believe that especially sex offenders indignation and fear calls, the willingness to protest against the return of a perpetrator pedophile offense was not higher than when a terrorist convict or perpetrator would return from a life crime. There was no evidence from empirical research significant difference between the protest readiness against the return of the three types of offenders. The literature study also showed that feelings of anger and fear, a high expected effectiveness of the protest, a sense of social identity and ideology are predictors of collective protest. From the results however, empirical research showed that only the variables are fear and ideology had a significant effect on the willingness to protest against the return of one perpetrator of a crime of life. The variable anger had a significant effect on the protest readiness against the return of a perpetrator of terrorism related offense. The variable ideology had a significant effect on the willingness to protest against it the return of a perpetrator of a pedosexual offense. This means that Participants would participate in protest to ventilate their emotions and / or because they want to express their values ​​and standards. Expected effectiveness and social identity did not appear to be predictors in the context of this research participation in protest. Details: The Hague: Leiden University, Crisis and Security Management, 2016. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2018 at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/53690/2016_Bruijns_CSM.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2016 Country: Netherlands URL: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/53690/2016_Bruijns_CSM.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 151008 Keywords: Pedophiles Prisoner Reentry Sex Offenders Terrorists

Author: Smith, Allison G. Title: Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us Summary: Since its creation in 2012, the National Institute of Justice's Domestic Radicalization to Terrorism program has sponsored research to support community members and practitioners in (1) identifying individuals who are radicalizing to terrorism and (2) developing prevention and intervention efforts. To do so, it has funded top social and behavioral science researchers from around the world to examine risk factors, protective factors, and indicators associated with radicalization to terrorism in the United States. These research teams have studied a wide range of groups and individuals who support and commit ideologically motivated terrorism to further political, social, or religious goals, including Islamist terrorists but also those associated with anti-government, anti-capitalist, nativist, and other political and social terrorist movements (often referred to as "religious," "left-wing," "right-wing," and "single-issue" terrorism in the literature). Although many of these projects are ongoing, important findings regarding the potential risk factors and indicators associated with individuals engaging - or attempting to engage - in terrorism have begun to emerge. This paper begins by providing a brief background on risk factors and indicators, how they were identified in NIJ-sponsored research, and some general limitations that need to be considered when interpreting the results of these analyses. It then presents findings based on four NIJ-sponsored projects and some of the possible implications of these findings for prevention and intervention efforts. Next, it compares these findings with the risk factors and indicators included in three existing risk assessment instruments and methods that have been developed to assess the likelihood that individuals will engage in illegal extremist activity, terrorism, or violence in general. Finally, it concludes by providing an overview of the findings and discussing next steps. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2018. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2018 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251789.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251789.pdf Shelf Number: 151035 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Title: Kosovo Security Barometer: Citizens' perceptions on Violent Extremism Summary: This report is a special edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB). It represents a detailed quantitative analysis reflecting citizens' opinion on violent extremism. The results of this report show that religiously motivated violent extremism continues to be perceived as a threat to Kosovars, though not to a large extent. Respondents consider that internal religious extremism presents a larger threat to the Kosovan society rather than internationally functioning terrorism such as ISIS. The results of this survey reaffirmed that the vast majority do not support the decision of individuals to join foreign conflicts. The results showed that the respondents are largely concerned of the potential threat posed by the radicalized individuals, thus majority remained against reintegration of foreign fighters. The report measured citizens' trust towards security institutions, underlining the importance of understanding the national experts to prevent and combat violent extremism. However, the results showed that only Kosovo Police gains sufficient trust while citizens� trust towards the judicial bodies and the Government in general continues to bear extremely low trust. Finally, the report also underlined that when it comes to violent extremism, there is a low frequency of communication between citizens and respective municipal institutions. Likewise, it highlighted the potentially important role of media when it comes to developing the citizens' mind-set regarding the violent extremism. Details: Prishtina, Kosova: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2017. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Kosovo Security Barometer: Accessed August 9, 2018 at: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Shelf Number: 151098 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (Kosovo)

Author: Liem, Marieke Title: Cut from the same cloth? Lone Actor Terrorists versus Common Homicide Offenders Summary: The term "lone actor" has been applied to a variety of violent individuals, including jihadists, right-wing extremists, school shooters, and others whose crimes were ideologically motivated and generated much societal impact. It may be argued, however, that such a classification of this rare subset of violent offenders is an artificial one, based on political perspectives rather than on empirical findings. In this study, we examine and compare characteristics of European single perpetrators or lone actor terrorists to a large sample of European 'common' homicide offenders. Bivariate analysis shows that lone actors are significantly younger, more single, and more educated than homicide offenders. In terms of event characteristics, however, the two groups differ more substantially. Lone actors are more likely to attack 'strangers' in public places and to use firearms, while homicide offenders tend to attack victims they know in private settings and to use more hands-on methods. These differences may be understood through the notion of instrumental versus expressive motivations. Our findings question the classification of lone actors as an entity fundamentally different from our sample of single homicide offenders and call for future in-depth assessments of possible differences in homicidal drive. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ICCT-Liem-et-al-Cut-from-the-Same-Cloth-April2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ICCT-Liem-et-al-Cut-from-the-Same-Cloth-April2018.pdf Shelf Number: 151121 Keywords: Lone Actor Terrorists Terrorists Violent Offenders

Author: Cocarascu, Oana Title: A Framework for Modelling and Reasoning About Lone Actor Terrorism Summary: Identifying key risk factors for offending is recognised as one of the main challenges facing criminological research. In this project, we investigate the use of machine learning techniques to identify the most relevant characteristics and antecedent behaviors of lone actor terrorists for explaining their target selection. The choice for an ensemble of classifiers is guided by their proven capabilities to outperform the standard algorithms the ensemble consists of. The classifier ensemble is based on Support Vector Machines, known for generating good models even when handling limited data (which is the case in lone actor terrorism), Decision Trees and K Nearest Neighbours. Features are grouped according to three themes (ideology, network membership and mental illness) and explanatory models are generated under each theme using a pairwise feature selection model based on information gain. Each generated model comprises only those features that are considered most relevant with respect to target choices. These are then compared with a model generated using all variables combined (i.e. not with respect to themes). A Bayesian network is used with the attributes obtained from the best model as a graphical representation and inference engine to model the knowledge about individual terrorists and the relationships between characteristics. Details: London: Imperial College London, Department of Computing, 2015. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 13, 2018 at: https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/teaching/distinguished-projects/2015/o.cocarascu.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/teaching/distinguished-projects/2015/o.cocarascu.pdf Shelf Number: 151124 Keywords: Lone Actor Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Dean, Chris Title: Intervening with Extremist Offenders: A Pilot Study Summary: In order to respond to the increasing number of individuals convicted of extremist offences HMPPS developed the Motivational and Engagement Intervention (MEI) and the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII). These were piloted in 2010 and 2011, and were the first offender behaviour programmes to be delivered to convicted extremists in England and Wales. The programmes aim to encourage and facilitate desistance and disengagement from extremist offending, regardless of a person's particular ideological background. A process evaluation of the pilot explored the implementation using a qualitative approach. Twenty-two intervention participants and 22 facilitators who delivered the interventions were interviewed. This summary presents the findings of the process evaluation as the first indicative step toward establishing whether the MEI and HII programmes are useful in facilitating desistance and disengagement, and preventing future extremist offending. The findings have led to a number of intervention revisions. Key findings - Overall, HII and MEI were viewed positively by facilitators and participants, and are believed to have utility with a range of extremist offenders. Participants reported that the programmes helped them gain an understanding of their motivations for offending and develop strategies to facilitate desistance. - The interventions were responsive and flexible in sequencing, pace and material. Facilitators particularly praised the focus on personal and social identity and needs, and the capacity to elicit discussions around faith, personal values and goals. Further positive aspects included the motivational and engaging approach used to deliver the interventions, with the supportive and collaborative facilitator-participant relationship playing a key part. - There was some repetition within and between the MEI and HII, leading to the recommendation to combine the two with a range of mix-and-match modules. - The interventions may not be suitable for people whose offending is not driven by engagement and identification with an extremist group, cause and/or ideology. - For participants who justified offending on religious grounds, a twin-track approach of addressing psycho-social issues alongside religious and/or political issues is recommended. - Barriers to engaging in treatment were reported to include solicitors dissuading offenders from participating, and a previous lack of engagement between individuals and sentence management staff. Details: London:HM Prison & Probation Service, 2018. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Analytical Summary: Accessed August 17, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727966/Intervening_with_Extremist_Offenders_A_Pilot_Study.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727966/Intervening_with_Extremist_Offenders_A_Pilot_Study.pdf Shelf Number: 151163 Keywords: Behavior Modification Extremists Interventions Terrorists Violent Offenders

Author: Holbrook, Donald Title: What Types of Media Do Terrorists Collect? An Analysis of Religious, Political, and Ideological Publications Found in Terrorism Investigations in the UK Summary: This Research Paper presents results from the study of media usage by convicted terrorists in the UK. The purpose is to shed light on the nature of the media environment in which individuals convicted of participation in terrorist plots operated in the weeks and months prior to their arrest. The Paper concentrates on those media publications that convey religious, political, or other ideological sentiments and describes the analytical tools developed to dissect this material. The Research Paper is directed towards practitioners, scholars and students interested in the sources of influence that help shape the perspectives of those planning to carry out terrorist attacks. The Research Paper is also intended to facilitate further comparative research within this field of study. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper no. 11: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ICCT-Holbrook-What-Types-of-Media-Do-Terrorists-Collect-Sept-2017-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ICCT-Holbrook-What-Types-of-Media-Do-Terrorists-Collect-Sept-2017-2.pdf Shelf Number: 151318 Keywords: Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Nemr, Christina Title: It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism Summary: This report examines the role of civil society organisation (CSOs) in the rehabilitation and reintegration of those associated with and affected by violent extremism. It builds on the work conducted by ICCT and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, together with four subregional partners over the past two-and-a-half years in Africa and South-East Asia. The project aimed to first understand how CSOs work within their communities and with their governments to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, victims of violence, and affected communities. It then supported the work of select CSOs by facilitating small grants to bolster existing efforts or pilot innovative approaches. The findings and lessons learned from the project have culminated in the development of this action agenda, which provides policy and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders working on rehabilitation and reintegration and the role of CSOs in supporting that process. The project focused on three regions: the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). While each region has its own rich experiences and unique challenges, there are overarching lessons that emerged-lessons that are applicable to a variety of rehabilitation and reintegration contexts. The action agenda therefore is not divided by region but, rather, by themes and the audiences to whom the recommendations are directed. Overall, the report consists of six guiding principles and 10 recommendations targeted to a range of audiences. Each guiding principle and recommendation is followed by examples that illustrate the ways a recommendation has been put into practice or offer suggestions for implementing a given recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151328 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Radical Groups Terrorist Rehabilitation Terrorists Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Rekawek, Kacper Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Kick-Off Report Summary: The most well-known ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, saw individuals who in the past had been involved in organized crime and illegal trade graduate into the ranks of the world's most successful terrorist organisation. It is now widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are no longer radicals first and foremost but criminals who turned to political violence at some stage throughout their ordinary crime careers. Thus a threat emanating from the "crime-terror nexus" hangs over Europe. GLOBSEC, an independent, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation which aims to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy, responded to this threat by developing a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Our project titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? will: collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2018 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Shelf Number: 152909 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Vanessa Title: The many criminal heads of the Golden Hydra: How the Tri-Border Area's Interlocking Arcs of Crime Create LatAm's #1 International Fusion Center Summary: The Tri-Border Area ('TBA') that straddles the intersection of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil is considered the 'Golden Hydra,' as it is the lucrative regional entry point of many 'heads' of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) that all lead to the underworld of illicit trade for more than forty years. This is partly a consequence of its ethnic composition and open borders, set by a policy to facilitate immigration from the Middle East, and also the connecting infrastructure to facilitate cross-border trade. The TBA gained notoriety in the 1990s after the bombings of the Israeli embassy (1992) and the AMIA center (1994), both in Buenos Aires, by Lebanese Hezbollah militants. The money, operatives and bomb parts all moved through the TBA. After 9/11, it again became the target of US counter-terrorism surveillance, as a 'safe haven' for terrorists from groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas, in addition to Hezbollah. With the world's attention firmly focused on the Middle East since then, the TBA has grown into a mini-state that benefits a corrupt elite while maintaining a large and efficient money laundering center for the world's organized crime and terrorist groups, not just in the region, but throughout the world, yielding TCOs and FTOs an estimated US$ 43 billion a year. Illicit trade of all sorts (including the illicit trade in tobacco products, 'ITTP') has been growing rapidly in recent years, corrupting good governance in all three countries and exploiting the degrading security and economic situation in both Argentina and Brazil. The TBA has become a regional crime fusion center where corrupt politicians work with drug cartels from Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, as well as organized crime groups from China, in conjunction with a large Lebanese merchant community, part of which gives support to Hezbollah. Though illicit funding for Hezbollah is generally high on the US agenda, that is not the case for the countries of the TBA. For historical reasons, Hezbollah is on the political agenda of Argentina. Brazil, however, does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist group; it considers only three groups as terrorists: the Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS. Paraguay considers Lebanese Hezbollah a group that poses a problem for its neighbors Argentina and Brazil, but not for Paraguay. authorities and mandates, Paraguay is constitutionally structured for corruption and illicit trade. Despite its smaller population and economy, it is the source and economic driver of illicit trade and money laundering affecting the other two countries. At the heart is Paraguay's lame-duck president, Horacio Cartes, the architect of the region's ITTP; he is the owner of Tabesa tobacco company. Furthermore, the removal of Cart�s from the presidency and its assumption by his successor (and fellow party member) Mario Abdo Benitez , will not reduce this illicit trade: Cartes will continue to wield tremendous power as a senator; several of his close friends will also enter the Senate, and his party won the presidency in the April 2018 elections. Security is the highest-ranked agenda item in Brazil's upcoming presidential elections in October 2018. This is primarily because of the military operations in Rio's favelas, where the criminal group Comando Vermelho (CV) and its affiliates are so widespread and heavily-armed, they are challenging the state for supremacy. The CV is enabled and funded by drugs and weapons that come mainly from Paraguay. This growing illicit trade has also turned Brazil into a prime export point for narcotics from South America to North America, Europe, Asia and Africa. Because of the complexity of the TBA's organized crime cluster, as well as the weakness of regional counter-terrorist protocols, we recommend engaging international authorities with regional mandates over the core crimes of corruption, money laundering, and proceeds of crime, with the aim of dismantling the source from the fusion centre. These authorities include: the IMF, UNODC, UN CTED, and FATF. Given that the US is largely absent from the region, it is recommended to open pathways to the US and European enforcement communities and the aforementioned authorities through well-structured workshops in Washington, DC and other key cities to build awareness. The other way to influence regional ITTP is to become a larger stakeholder in the Paraguayan tobacco industry. Details: New York: Counter Terrorism Project, 2018. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Dec. 12, 2018 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/The%20Many%20Criminal%20Heads%20of%20the%20Golden%20Hydra%20%28May%202018%29.pdf Year: 2018 Country: South America URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/The%20Many%20Criminal%20Heads%20of%20the%20Golden%20Hydra%20%28May%202018%29.pdf Shelf Number: 154457 Keywords: Illicit Tobacco Illicit Trade Money Laundering Organized Crime Proceeds of Crime Smuggling Terrorists Tobacco

Author: C4ADS Title: Sandcastles: Tracing Sanctions Evasion Through Dubai's Luxury Real Estate Market Summary: Executive Summary Illicit actors, whether narcotics traffickers, nuclear proliferators, conflict financiers, kleptocrats, large-scale money launderers, or terrorists, all share a common need: they must move the proceeds of their criminal endeavors from the illicit marketplace into the licit financial system in order to use them effectively. Luxury real estate has become a significant pathway for this conversion, facilitated by imperfect information regarding ownership and the details behind these substantial financial transactions. This vulnerability affects major real estate markets around the world, including, but not limited to, London, Toronto, Hong Kong, New York, Singapore, Doha, Sydney, and Paris. Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has become a favorable destination for these funds due in part to its high-end luxury real estate market and lax regulatory environment prizing secrecy and anonymity. While the UAE has taken steps to address this issue, its response thus far has failed to fully confront the underlying drivers enabling the manipulation of its real estate market. The permissive nature of this environment has global security implications far beyond the UAE. In an interconnected global economy with low barriers impeding the movement of funds, a single point of weakness in the regulatory system can empower a range of illicit actors. Our research shows that lax regulatory and enforcement environments � in Dubai, but also in other financial centers � have attracted criminal capital from around the world and offered a pathway into the international financial system for illicit actors and funds. In this report, we examine seven individuals and organizations, their associated corporate networks, and their real estate holdings. We identify 44 properties worth approximately $28.2 million directly associated with sanctioned individuals, as well as 37 properties worth approximately $78.8 million within their expanded networks. Each of these people has been sanctioned by the United States (US), and many have also been designated by the European Union (EU) and EU member states. These networks are, therefore, deserving of particularly intense regulatory scrutiny. However, our research reveals that they have invested millions of dollars in luxury UAE real estate while continuing to engage in illicit activity within the last few years. Details: Washington, DC: 2018. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2019 at: https://www.c4reports.org/sandcastles/ Year: 2018 Country: United Arab Emirates URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58831f2459cc684854aa3718/t/5b1fd4bf575d1ff600587770/1528812745821/Sandcastles.pdf Shelf Number: 154241 Keywords: Conflict Financiers Dubai Financial Crime Illicit Actors Illicit Networks Luxury Real Estate Money Laundering Real Estate Terrorists UAE

Author: Jones, Chris Title: The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study in the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy Summary: SECILE is an EU-funded research project examining the legitimacy and effectiveness of European Union counter-terrorism measures (CTMs). This report examines the implementation of Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks (the "Data Retention Directive"). The Directive obliges providers of internet and telephony services to keep detailed "traffic data" (or "metadata") regarding the identities and activities of their subscribers for between 6 and 24 months and provide access to police and security agencies for the purposes of investigating serious crime, and has been described as the "the most privacy-invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU". This report explains the policy-making process that resulted in the Directive, the obligations stemming from it, and the way these have been transposed into the national law of the member states with reference to infringement proceedings, legal challenges and the review of the legislation by the European Commission. Details: SICILE Consortium, 2013. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: SECILE Deliverable 2.4. www.secile.eu : Accessed march 27, 2019 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf Shelf Number: 155181 Keywords: Communications Counter-Terrorism Criminal Investigations Data Retention Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Colomina, Pierre Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France Summary: The worse ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, were undertaken by individuals who had been involved in criminality and illegal trade before they joined the ranks of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisation. It is no longer widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are radicals first and foremost: the bulk of them are criminals who turned to political violence along the way. The threat of a "crime-terror nexus" therefore hangs over Europe. In view of this, GLOBSEC - an independent, non-partisan, nongovernmental organisation aiming to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy - has developed a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?, the remit of the project is to: 1. collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. 2. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. 3. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: France URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155599 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Tapley, Marina Title: The Role of Reformers in Countering Violent Extremism Summary: This policy brief examines the role former extremists and former combatants have in countering violent extremism (CVE). 'The former' as a special category of actor in CVE activities, including in peacebuilding settings, has gained significant attention in recent years. Various organisations and governments have utilised formers in CVE activities yet it remains unclear if and when formers can make a positive contribution to these efforts. The following brief brings together research on the subject to provide contexts in which formers do and do not play a positive role in CVE activities. Formers can often contribute to CVE work due to individual characteristics, such as charisma. However, the purpose of this brief is to identify characteristics attributable to the role of former extremists and former combatant. In doing so, it is possible to discuss the different contexts in which formers may contribute to CVE in a more general sense. Thus, the aim is not to evaluate the effectiveness of programmes involving formers but to provide a conceptual tool for identifying which activities may be appropriate for formers in various CVE settings. We argue that former combatants can play an active and productive role in CVE in contexts where formers have relatively more influence in communities than states, although these contexts are rare and have negative consequences, particularly for victims. Where formers do not fill a gap left by the state, formers have limited capacity to contribute to CVE beyond providing an important but short-term contribution to intelligence and counter-narratives. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed May 14, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICCT-Tapley-Clubb-The-Role-of-Formers-in-CVE-April2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICCT-Tapley-Clubb-The-Role-of-Formers-in-CVE-April2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155827 Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism Extremists Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Fotou, Eleni Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?: Quarterly Report: Greece Summary: In Greece, where terrorism offenses do not follow the current European radicalisation trends, thus being one of the outliers, the links between crime and terror are more clearly evident. Furthermore, the arrestees that have been analysed so far in this project are either Greek citizens or persons with legal permanent residency in the country. Contrary to most global terror trends, religion is not a radicalising factor in Greek terrorism. Following historical precedent, the current active terrorist groups have a far-left or even nihilist ideology. The data analysed so far clearly depict a crime-terror nexus in Greece, with more than 75% of the examined arrestees having served prison time for offenses that are unrelated to terrorism or participation in organised crime. The most frequent offenses present were theft and robbery charges, ranging from misdemeanour to felony offenses. Another phenomenon that could be observed is the fact that Korydallos Prison seems to be the hub where the offenders arrested for the first time for terrorism offenses were recruited. Moreover, the convicts recruited had specific skillsets that could aid the financing of a terrorist organisation. Finally, women seem to have a more active role, expressed through manifestos and radicalised speech and linked with convicted offenders for terrorism acts either through conjugal or familial bonds. The terrorism phenomenon in Greece has several distinctions from other European nations. First, there are terrorist groups that have spanned decades in operation, terrorist organisations with numerous attacks (ELA alone has more than 260 confirmed attacks), ranging from bombings to targeted assassinations. Second, a common element among the groups appears to be a far-left ideology that from the middle of the 2000s seems to shift towards a more anarchist/nihilist theoretical framework. Finally, apart from targeted assassinations, historically and currently, the terrorist attacks are planned in such a manner as to minimize the possibility for human casualty, focusing instead on political targets and persons. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBESEC Policy Institute, 2019. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/publications/criminals-terrorists-report-2018-greece/ Year: 2018 Country: Greece URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Greece.pdf Shelf Number: 155915 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Greece Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?: Quarterly Report: Bulgaria Summary: An initial examination of people arrested for terrorism or related offences in Bulgaria appears to discount any relation between crime and terrorism, as none of the defendants examined thus far had been convicted of a prior offence and there are no indications of any involvement in crime. As such, the data gathered so far does not support the phenomenon of "gangster jihad." Since the majority of the subjects examined are foreigners arrested in transit, with no prior background in Bulgaria, information is scarce, hence it is difficult to generalise based on the available evidence. This is because Bulgaria is not a major source of foreign terrorist fighters but rather a transit country, while the overall risks of homegrown radicalisation are considered low. It should be noted that there are a number of challenges when exploring the crime-terror nexus in Bulgaria. A significant proportion of terrorism arrestees are not Bulgarian citizens, and foreigners are often subjected to what is referred to as Compulsory Administrative Measures (CAMs). As the State Agency for National Security (SANS) indicates, CAMs do not represent a sanction but rather are preventive in character. The CAMs applied to foreigners include three types of measures: expulsion, revocation of right to reside, and a prohibition on entering the territory of the country. When CAMs are applied, individuals are not charged in Bulgaria at all and consequently, information about their background is scarce, making the establishment of a crime-terror nexus (or lack thereof), very difficult. The application of CAMs because of indications of links to terrorism or terrorist organisations do not always involve an arrest, as indicated by the discrepancies between the number of arrests reported to Europol and the number of CAMs that that have been applied by SANS. The high proportion of foreigners among the terrorism arrestees can be explained by the fact that Islamist radicalisation and home-grown religious extremism are not widespread in the country and terrorism can largely be described as an external threat. The data gathered in Bulgaria so far suggests that a relationship between crime and terrorism is tenuous, both in terms of crime financing terrorist activities and with regard to criminals evolving into religious extremists. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Bulgaria.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Bulgaria URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Shelf Number: 155916 Keywords: Bulgaria Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Sirseloudi, Matenia Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: Germany Summary: Our qualitative analysis of 12 biographical profiles of Germans arrested for terrorism offences in 2015 supports the hypothesis of a crime-terror nexus. However, not all cases were related to jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, our analysis also considers the case of a thwarted homegrown terrorist and an individual with links to a victim of the right-wing terrorist group the NSU (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund). The above case studies reflect the diversity of profiles analysed in this report. These include the 58-year-old ringleader of a broader network that was deeply involved in recruitment processes and the transfer of goods and vehicles to Syria, as well as a man with psychiatric problems who attempted a homemade bomb attack at a bicycle race. Also, there is the paradigm crime-terror nexus case of a young man sentenced for burglary offences who became more radical in prison and, upon release, went to Syria to join Islamic State. All the profiles analysed in this report are male. And with the notable exception of one rather successful schoolboy�who was diagnosed with Asperger�s Syndrome, probably self-radicalised and who returned from Syria completely disillusioned�most come from a challenging socio-economic background in which violence and criminality were both known and oft-accepted patterns in the broader social context. The 12 profiles analysed so far confirm the broader assessment that the radicalisation of individuals with criminal backgrounds is becoming a common pattern in one particular segment of the Salafi-jihadi scene. Moreover, such intensely intertwined crime-terror biographies appear to be prevalent among the lower ranks of the jihadi movement. In the case of Germany, most of the profiles are linked to the flow of foreign fighters towards Syria and Iraq and the support of jihadi groups in this region. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Year: 2018 Country: Germany URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Germany.pdf Shelf Number: 155917 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Germany Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Peschak, Jorg Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: Austria Summary: The analysis of an initial small sample suggests that there is indeed a certain crime-terror nexus within the Austrian prison population of interest. These findings are preliminary, and they might change with more cases being examined so that the true extent of the crime-terror nexus remains to be determined. Nevertheless, it can already be concluded that among the imprisoned jihadists there are individuals who displayed violent criminal behaviour ahead of their conviction. In 2015, 48 individuals were arrested for committing terrorist offenses associated with jihadist ideology in Austria. Out of these 48 arrestees, 19 were sentenced to imprisonment, while others received a suspended sentence. This sample of 19 imprisoned jihadists will constitute the object of this initial report, as well as 5 cases analysed in detail. Religion is an important factor in all the five cases examined so far. One individual converted from Christianity to Islam and subsequently became a violent extremist. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Year: 2018 Country: Austria URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Austria-1.pdf Shelf Number: 155918 Keywords: Austria Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Reinares, Fernando Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: Spain Summary: The From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? project team presents another in its series of Quarterly Reports, this time focused on Spain. Its authors are Fernando Reinares, Carola Garc�a-Calvo and �lvaro Vicente. Fernando Reinares is Director of the Program on Global Terrorism at Elcano Royal Institute and Professor of Political Science and Security Studies at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, both in Madrid. He is also Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Carola Garc�a-Calvo is Senior Analyst in the Program on Global Terrorism at Elcano Royal Institute, as well as Associate Lecturer on Terrorism and Security Studies at Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, both in Madrid. �lvaro Vicente is a Research Assistant in the Program on Global Terrorism at Elcano Royal Institute and Associate Lecturer at Rey Juan Carlos University, both in Madrid. In the case of Spain, a total of 62 individuals were arrested and brought before the judges of the Audiencia Nacional (National Court) for activities related to jihadist terrorism during 2015. Ten of these (that is, 16.1%) had prior criminal records unrelated to terrorism. For the more limited period covered in this report, that is, the first quarter of 2015, we have analysed 16 cases included in our Elcano Database on Jihadists in Spain (EDBJS). However, only two of them (12.5%) had prior criminal records. As such, the first quarter of the year is representative of the entire year in terms of the number of jihadist arrests. Over the five-year period, though, between 2013 and 2017, 16.3% of all the 239 individuals arrested had prior criminal records, with the annual percentages showing some variation. With respect to those arrested in Spain during the first quarter and for all of 2015, 12.5% and 16.1%, respectively, had previous criminal records. Therefore, the hypothesis that both types of criminality - ordinary delinquency and terrorism - draw upon the same social base find little empirical support in the Spanish case, at least during 2015. Focusing on the two individuals with prior criminal records referenced above, among all those jihadists arrested during in January - March 2015, a crime-terror link is visible in two of the ways already analysed in the context of incarceration, with prisons being the environment for radicalisation and a nexus for capacity and knowledge transfer (for instance, with respect to access to weapons or adoption of security measures). Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Spain.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Spain URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Shelf Number: 155919 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Security Spain Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Rekawek, Kacper Title: Who are the European Jihadis? Project Midterm Report Summary: GLOBSEC is proud to present Who Are the European Jihadis? From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Midterm Report, a report by co-authors Kacper Rekawek, Stanislav Matejka, Viktor Szucs, Tomas Benuska, Karin Kajzarova and Jakub Rafay. This is the second major output from a two year research project focusing on the existence of the presumed criminal-terrorist (#crimeterror) nexus in Europe. The project is funded under PMI IMPACT, a global grant initiative of Philip Morris International to support projects against illegal trade. GLOBSEC is fully independent in implementing the project and has editorial responsibility for all views and opinions expressed herein. The findings of this report are based on a dataset of 225 cases of individuals about whom the authors were able to collect open-source data between September 2017 and June 2018. Of these, 197 are jihadi terrorists and 28, effectively comprising the project's control group, are far-left or nationalist Greek terrorists. They were all arrested for terrorism offences in 2015 and later convicted (120 individuals), expelled from a given country because of their alleged terrorism links (20), or died while executing terrorist attacks (29) in the 11 examined EU countries - Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK. Included is also a sample of 28 suspects who are still at large and are sought by security authorities, 15 of which have already been convicted in absentia. The phenomenon of the crime-terror nexus, i.e., the scale of the overlap between the two milieus in Europe and the intensity of their interconnections, is at the heart of the report. However, GLOBSEC's multifaceted focus on different subsets of European terrorists and disciplined and thorough data collection allow for a broader analysis of the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism threatening Europe. Thus, this report should also be seen as GLOBSEC's take on "the state of European jihad" and an attempt to map out its features. In the report you will find an analysis showing preliminary conclusions along 8 thematic sets of variables: crime-terror nexus, age and gender, education and employment, financing of terrorist activities, radicalisation, citizenship (national origin), foreign fighting experience, and solo actor phenomenon. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GLOBSEC_WhoAreTheEuropeanJihadis.pdf Shelf Number: 155921 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Europe Illegal Trade Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Giacalone, Giovanni Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: Italy Summary: The fourth quarterly report of the From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? project is focused on the case of Italy. Authors, Giovanni Giacalone and Nicolo Spagna preliminarily reveal that only 2 out of the 14 examined cases have a proven criminal past, with most profiles yet to be examined. Interestingly, a clear-cut division surfaces: propagandist figures and action figures. The first includes all individuals involved in the dissemination of extremist material for propaganda and indoctrination. The second category includes all individuals with the will to act, either by perpetrating terrorist attacks, joining jihad abroad, or facilitating volunteers for warzones on top of performing propagandistic actions. "So far, we have not identified a pronounced crime-terror nexus link in Italy. However, 2015 saw the quick conversion and radicalisation of an ethnically Italian family, performing this process in connection with another, Albanian family. Such cases clearly emphasize the importance of the family/clan connection, also in relation to the links with jihadi/criminal organisations in Albania, the country of origin of the latter family." Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-2018-Italy.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Italy URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Shelf Number: 155922 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Italy Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Sciarone, Jessica Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back Quarterly Report Vol. 2: The Netherlands Summary: The second and final report on the Netherlands' crime-terror nexus has analysed all fourteen profiles of individuals arrested in 2015 for offences of terrorism. Criminal past among terrorism offenders appears to be quite prevalent in this country and this study providing a snapshot of 2015 shows 10 of the 14 arrestees have had a run-in with the law before. Looking at other aspects of their lives, one see the terrorist population is a younger one with almost half of them suffering from some kind of mental illness. The study also briefly touches upon the phenomenon of foreign fighters and radicalisation so to get a more well-rounded picture on the state of Dutch terrorism in 2015, please read the full report prepared by Jessica Sciarone MSc and Bart Schuurman, Ph.D., both affiliated with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the Leiden University below. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/#publications Year: 2019 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/From-Criminals-to-Terrorists-and-Back-Quarterly-Report-The-Netherlands-Vol-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155923 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Crime-Terror Nexus Illegal Trade Netherlands Security Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorists

Author: Nowrasteh, Alex Title: Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017 Summary: Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Foreign-born terrorists were responsible for 86 percent (or 3,037) of the 3,518 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 2017. Of the other 481 murder victims of terrorists, 413 were murdered by native-born Americans, and 68 were murdered by unidentified terrorists. This paper is an update and expansion of a previous Cato policy analysis of the risk of foreign-born terrorists by the visa categories they used to enter the United States. This updated policy analysis also includes native-born terrorists in a separate category, estimates of injuries sustained in terrorist attacks, the terrorist countries of origin, and terrorist ideologies. This version also corrects minor errors such as the exclusion of some non-deadly foreign-born terrorists and changes in their visa statuses before 1990. Including those murdered in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of a person perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil committed by a foreigner over the 43-year period studied here is 1 in 3.8 million per year. The hazard posed by foreigners who entered on different visa categories varies considerably. For instance, the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack by a refugee is about 1 in 3.86 billion per year, while the annual chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant is zero. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by a tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is about 1 in 4.1 million per year. Compared to foreign-born terrorists, the chance of being murdered by a native-born terrorist is about 1 in 28 million per year. There were 192 foreign-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2017. Of those, 65 percent were Islamists, 18 percent were foreign nationalists, 6 percent were right-wingers, 6 percent were non-Islamic religious terrorists, 3 percent were left-wingers, and the rest were separatists or adherents of other or unknown ideologies. By comparison, there were 788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil from 1975 through 2017. Of those, 24 percent were right-wingers, 22 percent were white supremacists, 16 percent were left-wingers, 14 percent were Islamists, 11 percent were anti-abortion, and 6 percent were others. This expanded terrorism risk analysis can aid in the efficient allocation of scarce government-security resources to best counter the small terrorist threat. Details: Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2019. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorists-immigration-status-nationality-risk-analysis-1975-2017 Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa_866_edit.pdf Shelf Number: 155936 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Foreign-Born Terrorists Native-Born Terrorists Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Terrorists

Author: Dion-Schwarz, Cynthia Title: Terrorist Use of Cryptocurrencies: Technical and Organizational Barriers and Future Threats Summary: Given the key role of funding in supporting terrorist operations, counterterrorism finance (CTF) efforts often focus on tracking money and preventing financial transactions that might be used to support attacks and other terrorist activities. However, the success of these strategies in reducing terrorist access to official currencies has raised concerns that terrorist organizations might increase their use of such digital cryptocurrencies as Bitcoin to support their activities. Current cryptocurrencies are not well matched with the totality of features that would be needed and desirable to terrorist groups but might be employed for selected financial activities. The authors' research shows that, should a single cryptocurrency emerge that provides widespread adoption, better anonymity, improved security, and that is subject to lax or inconsistent regulation, then the potential utility of this cryptocurrency, as well as the potential for its use by terrorist organizations, would increase. Regulation and oversight of cryptocurrencies, along with international cooperation between law enforcement and the intelligence community, would be important steps to prevent terrorist organizations from using cryptocurrencies to support their activities. Details: Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2019. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3026.html Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3026/RAND_RR3026.pdf Shelf Number: 155937 Keywords: Bitcoin Counter-Terrorism Finance Cryptocurrencies Cryptocurrency Terrorism Financing Terrorist Groups Terrorists

Author: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Title: Caliphate Soldiers and Lone Actors: What to Make of IS Claims for Attacks in the West 2016-2018 Summary: May 2016, IS began implementing a strategy aimed at inciting lone actor attacks in Western countries, under the supervision of its "external security" body. This report examines changes in the ways in which IS has claimed credit for violent incidents in Western countries under this strategy in an effort to shed light on the links between the external operations and the main leadership of the organisation. IS's claiming behaviour for attacks in the West fluctuated between leaving the initiative to perpetrators and trying to centralise the communication flow. The organisation, however, has experienced increasing difficulties in ascertaining information received from external sources, ultimately leading to the flawed claim for the Las Vegas shooting on 1 October 2017. Since then, communication between IS's central media outlets and external sources seems to have largely broken down. At present, the hierarchical external operations structures of IS seem to have been replaced by individuals that communicate and, possibly, cooperate based on their common experience and acquaintance. The threat they pose will depend on their personal influence on others and their motivation rather than their position in the IS hierarchy. Details: The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2019. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2019 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/caliphate-soldiers-and-lone-actors-what-to-make-of-claims-for-attacks-in-west-2016-2018 Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/caliphate-soldiers-and-lone-actors-what-to-make-of-claims-for-attacks-in-west-2016-2018 Shelf Number: 155938 Keywords: IS Lone Actor Attacks Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Terrorists

Author: Forrester, Andrew C. Title: Do Immigrants Import Terrorism? Summary: The relationship between immigration and terrorism is an important public policy concern. Using bilateral migration data for 174 countries from 1995 to 2015, we estimate the relationship between levels of immigration and terrorism using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy based on the initial distribution of immigrants in destination countries. We specifically investigate rates of immigration from Muslim Majority Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries and countries engaged in conflicts. We find no relationship between stocks of immigrants and terrorism, whether measured by the number of attacks or victims, in destination countries. Details: Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2019. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 21, 2019 at: https://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/do-immigrants-import-terrorism Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-56.pdf Shelf Number: 155961 Keywords: Immigrants Immigration Terrorism Terrorist Attacks Terrorists

Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Assessing Outcomes of Online Campaigns Countering Violent Extremism: A Case Study of the Redirect Method Summary: The number of programs dedicated to countering violent extremism (CVE) has grown in recent years, yet a fundamental gap remains in the understanding of the effectiveness of such programs. This is particularly the case for CVE campaigns, which are increasingly conducted in the online space. The goal of this report is to help CVE campaign planners better evaluate the impact of online efforts. It reviews prior assessments of online CVE campaigns, provides recommendations for future assessments, and provides a case study of one particular CVE campaign - the Redirect Method. A limited evaluation of the Redirect Method process variables suggests that the implementers are able to use advertisements linking to counterextremist videos to effectively expose individuals searching for violent jihadist or violent far-right content to content that offers alternative narratives. Users clicked on these ads at a rate on par with industry standards. However, as is the case with other CVE evaluations, this partial evaluation did not assess the impact of the video content on user attitudes or behavior. The potentially highly radical nature of the Redirect Method's target audience makes evaluation of the campaign particularly complicated and therefore might necessitate the recruitment of former extremists to help gauge audience response. Alternatively, it might be advisable to analyze user comments to understand how a subsample of users respond to the content. Details: Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2018. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2813.html Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2800/RR2813/RAND_RR2813.pdf Shelf Number: 156473 Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism Jihadist Program Evaluation Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Europol Title: Terrorism Situation and Trend Report Summary: In 2018, terrorism continued to constitute a major threat to security in EU Member States. Horrific attacks perpetrated by jihadists like those in Trebes, Paris, Liege and Strasbourg killed a total of thirteen people and injured many more. In addition, one terrorist attack by a right-wing extremist in Italy and numerous arrests of suspected right-wing terrorists for attack-planning across the European Union (EU) indicate that extremists of diverging orientation increasingly consider violence as a justified means of confrontation. Terrorists not only aim to kill and maim but also to divide our societies and spread hatred. We need to remain vigilant if we are to protect our citizens and values in the face of attempts to use violence for political aims. In Europe, the feeling of insecurity that terrorists try to create must be of the greatest concern to us because it has the potential to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Increasing polarisation and the rise of extremist views is a concern for EU Member States. The public debate about sensitive phenomena like terrorism, therefore, must be based on facts before reaching conclusions. I am proud to say that the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) has provided verified facts on terrorism in Europe since 2006. The report has been accepted as a benchmark in discussions about EU counterterrorism policies and academic studies. It is my privilege to hereby hand over the 2019 edition of the TE-SAT to the public. Details: The Hague, The Netherlands: Europol, 2019. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2019 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report Shelf Number: 156800 Keywords: Counterterrorism Extremists Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Powis, Beverly Title: Separating Extremist Prisoners: A Process Study of Separation Centres in England and Wales from a Staff Perspective Summary: This report presents findings of a process study of the set up and early implementation of two Separation Centres. The process study used qualitative methods to obtain staff and stakeholder views of how the centres had been set up and were operating and whether there were any early indicators that the centres were achieving their intended outcome of containing the risk of 'radicalisation' and reducing risk in the main prison population. Details: London: Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2019. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818624/separating-extremist-prisoners.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/separating-extremist-prisoners-a-process-study-of-separation-centres-in-england-and-wales-from-a-staff-perspective Shelf Number: 156736 Keywords: Correctional Officers Correctional Staff Extremism Extremists Prison Population Prisoners Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Powis, Beverly Title: The Structural Properties of the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+): A Structured Formulation Tool for Extremist Offenders Summary: This study explores the structural properties of the ERG22+ formulation tool (Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service, 2011) which is used in the management of extremist offenders by the criminal justice system of England and Wales. The ERG22+ was developed from case studies and the limited theoretical evidence that was available at the time in this area. As data has now been gathered on convicted extremists through the ERG22+, the structure of the tool can be examined as part of a validation process. The formulation tool is made up of 22 factors organised into three domains; Engagement, Intent and Capability. Each factor and domain is assessed and recorded as being 'strongly present', 'partly present' and 'not present'. This allows the construct validity and the internal consistency reliability of the ERG22+ to be examined statistically. One hundred and seventy one ERG22+s were included in the analysis. All had been completed with convicted Islamist extremists. Multidimensional scaling analysis was carried out to identify any potential underlying structures which may inform the development of the tool. The internal consistency reliability of the ERG22+ was examined using Cronbach's alpha. The study found the ERG22+ shows promise as a risk and need formulation tool for extremist offenders, which could be developed further in light of the findings. Five domains were suggested from the analysis (Identity and External Influence, Motivation and Ideology, Capability, Criminality, Status and Personal Influence), which make theoretical sense. However, two factors did not spatially cluster into domains and had some ambiguity (Mental Health and Excitement, comradeship and adventure). These two factors would benefit from further refinement and improvement. The internal consistency reliability analysis found good overall consistency for the tool but low consistency on some domains, especially those with few items. The internal consistency reliability of the ERG22+ is likely to improve if these domains are expanded to include more factors. The study had a number of limitations. Only Islamist extremists were included in the analysis so it may not be possible to generalise the findings to those who support another group, cause or ideology. The women in the study also represented a small group and may have differing motivations to men. Further research is needed to examine the properties of the ERG22+ with those supporting differing groups, causes or ideologies and with a sample of female offenders. The inter-rater reliability between assessors should also be examined to determine the levels of agreement. Further refinement, development and validation of the measure should also be carried out as our understanding of extremist offenders expands and evolves. The analysis carried out in this study should be seen as the first step in this validation process. Details: London: Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2019. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 11, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816507/the-structural-properties-of-the-extremism-risk-guidelines-ERG22.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-structural-properties-of-the-extremism-risk-guidelines-erg22-a-structured-formulation-tool-for-extremist-offenders Shelf Number: 156953 Keywords: Extremists Islamist Extremists Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Ahdash, Fatima Title: Childhood Radicalisation and Parental Extremism: How Should Family Law Respond? Insights from A Local Authority v X, Y and Z Summary: A Local Authority v X, Y and Z (Permission to Withdraw) is a recent case in a series of cases appearing before the family courts, referred to as the radicalisation cases, which deal with concerns related to extremism, radicalisation and terrorism and their impact on children and families. The radicalisation cases represent a significant legal development and a unique legal moment, facilitating an unprecedented interaction between counter-terrorism and family law. The cases pose a number of serious legal questions: how should the law, and in particular family law, respond to fears that a child is at risk of childhood radicalisation? How should it deal with the terrorist and/or extremist as a parent? A Local Authority v X, Y and Z is an important radicalisation case which addresses these questions. In this article, I examine how the case deals with two issues: a) childhood radicalisation and its treatment by family law as a separate, free-standing harm which can justify compulsory state intervention and b) the question of parental extremism and/or involvement in terrorist related activity. I claim that although the case includes a necessary and welcome reaffirmation of the principles of family law in the face of worrying recent developments in the counter-terrorist landscape, this reaffirmation remains fragile. Finally, I argue that A Local Authority v X, Y and Z represents a missed opportunity for the family courts to critically reflect on and appraise the nature and purpose of family law's recent interaction with counter-terrorism. Details: London: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2019. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2019 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393287 Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393287 Shelf Number: 158120 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremists Family Law Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists