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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:54 am
Time: 11:54 am
Results for theft of goods
7 results foundAuthor: Madge, Chris Title: Report on Attacked Transport Drivers 2000-2003 Summary: This study presents information on the extent and nature of assaults on truck drivers, primarily in the U.K. and secondly in Europe. It is based upon face-to-face interviews with truck drivers and more in-depth conversations with senior representatives from trucking industry organizations. Details: Oxford, UK: European School of Management (ESCP-EAP), 2004. 24p. Source: Internet Resource; R.O.A.D. (Research on Attacked Drivers) Year: 2004 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 118336 Keywords: Theft of GoodsTruck HijackingsWorkplace CrimeWorkplace Violence |
Author: Dugato, Marco Title: Maritime Piracy Worldwide Summary: The phenomenon of maritime piracy dates back to the beginning of seafaring. Since the 1980s, maritime piracy has re-emerged as an international problem because of a significant rise in the recorded attacks. The security of maritime routes is a matter of concern for national governments, ship owners and trade companies whose vessels face the risk of being robbed of their cargo or hijacked for a ransom. Maritime piracy is a complex phenomenon that, according to the definition used, comprises different criminal behaviours (e.g., theft, robbery, kidnapping), modus operandi (e.g., massive armed attacks, insiders, use of skiffs and mother ships) and targets (e.g., the goods carried on the ship, the belongings of the crew, the ship itself). These features may change over time and over space. Looking at the evolution and peculiarities of this phenomenon in different areas can help to identify regularities and implement more effective countermeasures. In recent years, Transcrime has been active in promoting the idea that actual reductions of complex crime phenomena can be reached through specific prevention strategies. This approach relies on accurate analyses of the available data to identify regular patterns and risk factors. This study summarises some of the findings that emerged from the research Transcrime conducted on maritime piracy, using a comparative approach. Details: Trento: Transcrime - Universita degli Studi di Trento, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Transcrime Research in Brief no. 1: Accessed march 16, 2015 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/maritime-piracy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/maritime-piracy.pdf Shelf Number: 134932 Keywords: Cargo TheftMaritime Crime (International:Piracy/PiratesShipping IndustryStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions Summary: his paper is based on a detailed review of the scale and nature of organised crime's infiltration of the private sector. These findings are a 'call to arms' for the international private and public sectors to transform their co-operation and teamwork. We have adopted a practical definition of organized crime as that which is carried out by a group of people, suspected of serious criminal offences, over a prolonged period, motivated by profit or power. In our analysis of six major private sector industries, six specific forms of organised crime stood out as either having material impact on the private sector, or using the private sector as facilitators. Money laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean. One estimate puts it at 2% of global GDP - c.$1.5 trillion. Money-laundering is an 'enabling crime', facilitating organized crime (as well as terrorism) with social and economic costs. Asset misappropriation refers to stealing from businesses. For example, cargo thefts cost as much as $30 billion in losses each year worldwide. Counterfeiting and contraband, whilst thought of as being a consumer goods crime, is rife in a broad range of sectors, in particular technology products and pharmaceuticals, to devastating effect. It is estimated by OECD at $461billion, or 2.5% of world trade. Fraud and extortion remain strongly present in the financial, construction and real estate industries. In construction extortion could account for of 20-30 per cent of lost project value. Human trafficking. High volume, low skilled labour enterprises such as construction and building, have the highest penetration of trafficking incidence in the private sector. Cyber Crime. Hacking attacks cost the average American firm $15.4 million per year over. In 2015 68,000 URLs containing child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) images were hosted online on 1,991 domains. The reputational impact means major tech companies apply significant collaborative resources to weeding out criminal, terrorist and CSEA activity. Finding#1: The Scale and Impact of Crime in the Private Sector is Truly Staggering. A conservative estimate of the value of organized crime was $3.6-$4.8 trillion, in 2015/2016, 7% of global GDP. The broader impact of organized crime is difficult to assess as it is multi-dimensional, and shared across the private, public sector, and society itself. The impact on the private sector only - in terms of revenue loss - is estimated at c$130 billion. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) calculated the financial cost of terrorism at over $52 billion in 2014. A conservative estimate of total transnational organized crime is $870 billion a year. This is more than six times the amount of official development assistance and close to 7% of the world's exports of merchandise Finding #2 Private sectors are either facilitators or targets. Crimes are either done 'to' private sector organisations, or 'through' them. Sectors are either the targets of fraud or asset theft themselves, particularly in construction, consumer goods ($460 billion counterfeit goods), and financial card fraud, or they facilitate crime unwittingly, through use of technology networks by fraudsters to target victims, e.g. the real estate sector laundering dirty funds or the transport industry moving illicit goods. Regulation varies between the 'victim' and 'enabling' industries. Laws are in place to criminalise the use of the private sector for technology or money laundering crime. The victim industries, however, often are reliant on existing laws around theft, or copyright infringement, which are not tailored to the activities of TOC groups and tend to have lower penalties for infringement. Finding #3 Organized crime's impact on the private sector is growing not shrinking. Counterfeit goods have risen from $250 billion to $461 billion in the last 8 years. Asset theft in the transport and logistics theft rose by over 90% 2015 to 2016. There is a sense that regulation is not working: money laundering seizures equated to 0.2% of all laundered funds in one study; and after the dark web's Silk Road was taken down, many sites sprung up to take on and indeed grow the trade. Finding #4 Direct impact of Crime Disproportionately felt in the global south. Sweatshops flourish in South Asia; trafficking of labour and sex workers originates predominantly in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; corruption in natural resources damages production in Africa and the Caucasus; technology fraud is driven from eastern and southern Europe, West Africa and the Middle East. Whereas in developed economies counterfeit drugs may comprise less than 0.2 percent of the market developing markets are often beset by 30% fakes, as a UNODC report showed for anti-malarial drugs in Africa. Globalization is increasing the 'attack surface' for TOC groups. The abuse of the often weaker regulatory regimes in the Global South by TOC groups further increases the risk for the private sector operating in these areas. Finding #5 Responses re confrontational rather than collaborative. There are very few examples of successful public and private sector co-operation against TOC groups. Private sector organisations complain that communication with the law enforcement sector is one-way and that the regulatory reporting burden, designed to combat crime, can act as a deterrent to co-operation. Tangible results have been seen when industries take the lead on disrupting the work of TOC groups, such as TAPA the Transported Asset Protection Association Details: Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed December 7, 2017 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/gitoc_tocprivatesector_web-1.pdf Shelf Number: 148755 Keywords: Cargo TheftContrabandCounterfeit GoodsCybercrimeExtortionHuman TraffickingIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePrivate SectorStolen PropertyTheft of Goods |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Value and incident categories for cargo theft in Europe: Analysing TAPA EMEA statistics Summary: Purpose of this paper To analysis the relationship between value (reported stolen value) and different incident categories in order to find patterns and trends in cargo theft within Europe. Design/methodology/approach The research is explorative as this type of research is missing in logistics but also deductive as it utilizes theories from criminology. The analysis is based on TAPA EMEA's IIS transport related crime database. The result is analyzed and discussed within a frame of reference consisting of theories from logistics and criminology. Findings There are seasonal variations of incident categories. This variation is found both between months of the year and the day of the week for many of the incident categories, but the patterns are different for different incident categories. Within this understanding there are many changes in hot spots, modus operandi, theft endangered objects and handling methods during time, but the basic theoretical frame of reference is still more or less the same. Research limitations/implications The research is based on theories deduced from criminology and logistics together with secondary data regarding cargo theft. The geographically limitation to the Europe is done of practical reasons whiles the frame of reference can be used globally for analysis antagonistic threats against transports. Practical implications This research is limited by the content and classification within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Nevertheless, this database is the best available database and the reports comes mainly from the industry itself, represented by the different TAPA members how report their losses anonymous, nevertheless the quality of the data limits the possibility to make normative statements about cargo theft prevention. What is original/value of paper This paper is the first within supply chain risk management that utilizes actual crime statistics reported by the industry itself, in order to analyze the occurrence of cargo theft by focusing on the value of the stolen vehicle/goods in relation with incident categories. Details: Conference paper, 2012. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2018 at: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Shelf Number: 150871 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryRisk ManagementStolen GoodsStolen PropertySupply Chain SecurityTheft of GoodsTransport Security |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Theft of Goods in Ports: A review of TAPA EMEA IIS statistics Summary: This report examines patterns of reported cargo thefts at maritime transport facilities in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) with respect to frequency, incident category, modus operandi, and targeted product category. The analysis is based on data obtained from the Incident Information Service (IIS), a database of transport-related crimes from the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in the EMEA region. The results are analysed and discussed within a frame of reference based on supply chain risk management and criminology theories. We find that maritime transport facilities constitute a rare target location for cargo thieves, as only 102 of more than 24,500 incidents (0.4%) in the IIS database occur there. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be made. First, there seems to be seasonality in day of the week, but probably not in month of the year. Second, violent and fraudulent modi operandi of theft at maritime transport facilities are about as common as in the whole data set. Thus, it could be conjectured that the impact from violent and fraudulent incidents is several times higher than the most common types of incident category or modus operandi, although this is unsupported in this study. The product categories signal that there is big variation in value in stolen goods. Third, it is possible that potential perpetrators consider security levels at maritime transport facilities to be higher, leading to fewer theft attempts. This study is limited by the content of and classifications within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Details: Turku, Finland: HAZARD Project, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, 2018. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Publications of the Hazard Project, 18:2018: Accessed November 27, 2018 at: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.utu.fi/en/sites/hazard/publications/Documents/HAZARD%20Publication%2018%20Theft%20of%20Goods%20in%20Ports.pdf Shelf Number: 153852 Keywords: Cargo SecurityCargo TheftHot ProductsMaritime CrimePort SecurityStolen GoodsTheft of Goods |
Author: van Geffen, Robert Title: Itinerant Groups Target Stores in European Union: An Urgent Cross-Border Problem Summary: The retail trade in North West Europe is increasingly being plagued by itinerant crime groups, a trend also known as mobile banditry. These are mainly (South) Eastern European groups, which conduct a series of crimes in a short space of time, mainly involving shoplifting, ram raids, holdups, payment card fraud and burglaries. Details: Leidschendam, Netherlands: Detailhandel Nederland, 2009. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 22, 2019 at: https://www.slideshare.net/frank/binnenwerk-mobiel-banditisme2009 Year: 2009 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.slideshare.net/frank/binnenwerk-mobiel-banditisme2009 Shelf Number: 155678 Keywords: Cross-border Issue Itinerant Crime Groups Itinerant Criminal Groups Retail Theft Retail Trade Theft of Clothing Theft of Goods |
Author: FreightWatch International Title: Putting a Price Tag on Underreported Cargo Theft in Europe: How Much is Really Stolen Every Year? Summary: Sizeable efforts have been made to estimate the value of the total annual loss of all cargo stolen while transiting European Union (EU) roads. However, as long as the theft of freight is categorized as a subset of other types of crime, cargo crime will remain a vast grey area, the magnitude and economic impact of which can only be estimated. The first highly notable effort was made by the European Parliament (EP), which in July 2007 published a study on "Organized Theft of Commercial Vehicles and Their Loads in the European Union." This study, using data from 2003 to 2006, concluded that "...the total loss of value can be estimated at more than 8.2 billion Euros each year" for the entire EU, which at the time included 27 member states. Our estimate focuses on today's EU member states, minus Malta (due to a lack of data): a total of 27 countries (EU-27). The estimated loss figure of 8.2 billion Euros has been the only official statistic available to quantify the scale of cargo theft to policymakers and stakeholders. Even today, almost a decade later, the 8.2 billion Euros figure remains the primary statistic quoted by industry, law enforcement agencies, and media when it comes to quantifying the economic impact of cargo crime in the European Union. While the 2007 study was significant at the time, the FreightWatch International Supply Chain Intelligence Center (FWI SCIC) revisited the subject and reviewed European lossvalue estimates for three reasons. The first is that FWI SCIC now has increased accessibility to more and better European incident data. Second, the quality of the cargo crime intelligence that FWI SCIC can draw from has substantially improved over the past few years, thanks to help and insight from a growing number of European Law Enforcement Agencies, with whom FWI SCIC has developed professional relationships. This added value makes it possible to better understand geographic and commercial patterns of criminal behaviour within and across national borders, and has allowed FWI SCIC to make valid 'bottom-up' estimates of individual target countries. Third, the cargo crime landscape in Europe has worsened since 2007. Even though freight traffic has actually decreased since 2004 due to the economic crisis, threats to the supply chain are substantially higher today almost everywhere in the EU than they were 10 years ago. Criminal groups have also become better organized and more capable of operating across Europe than they were a decade ago. Consequently, FWI SCIC decided to combine the most recent data, and its best cargo theft intelligence, to update the 8.2 billion Euros figure and provide a more accurate and rationalized estimate of cargo theft in the European Union. Details: Austin, Texas: FreightWatch International, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://files.carrier.com/sensitech/en/contentimages/UnderreportedCargoTheftweb.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://files.carrier.com/sensitech/en/contentimages/UnderreportedCargoTheftweb.pdf Shelf Number: 156352 Keywords: Cargo Theft Freight Industry Supply Chain Theft of Goods |