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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:30 am
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Results for trains
5 results foundAuthor: Armstrong, Nicholas J. Title: Securing America's Passenger Rails: Analyzing Current Challenges and Future Solutions Summary: Homeland security research and recent transnational terrorist trends lend credibility to the prediction that the next major terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland could be on a mass transit transportation system. Mass transit systems remain an easy target even for the terrorists with modest levels of reconnaissance and surveillance training. London, Madrid, Mumbai, Tokyo and other cities have experienced terrorist attacks on their public transportation systems. For the United States, it is only a matter of time. Mass transit security requires a different approach than airport security. Unlike airports, mass transit systems are open with flexible schedules and multiple points of entry for a much larger number of daily passengers (3.8 billion passenger trips in 20071). Consequently, mass transit security often comes at the expense of operational efficiency. For example, implementing single-entry choke points for 100 percent passenger screening at Grand Central Station during rush hour – as employed by airports – would cause crippling operational delays. Furthermore, mass transit authorities receive a sub-optimal allocation of homeland security funding with respect to risk, leaving vulnerable systems open to an attack. The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of domestic and international mass transit screening strategies, current and future screening technologies, and governmental challenges to and cost-benefits of enhancing rail security while maintaining as open a system as possible. In addition to discussing these critical topics and providing recommendations in the following section, this report highlights the following themes: • A layered, system-of-systems approach to screening is most effective in a mass transit environment. The principal challenge of quick and efficient screening is in screening carry-on baggage, not passengers. • Current technologies such as biometrics and intelligent video offer the ability to enhance current security systems in the short-term, while the advent of new technologies like Portable Explosive Detection Devices and Passive Millimeter Wave Screening will provide additional layers of security as they become more cost-effective and efficient over time. • Federal grant funding for rail security has increased substantially, particularly in the FY 2008 Transit Security Grant Program; however, allocation of those funds are somewhat less than proportional to the risk among the recipient agencies. • Coordination is both the problem and solution to effective rail security implementation. Local, regional, and state governments are the implementing authorities for rail security projects; it is the responsibility of the federal government to foster coordination through incentives, best practices, and supportive policies. • A centralized clearinghouse for transit security research and best practices does not exist and U.S. government representation within international clearinghouses is weak. Details: Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 2008. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Workshop%20Project%202008.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://insct.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/insct/uploadedfiles/PDFs/Workshop%20Project%202008.pdf Shelf Number: 119338 Keywords: Mass Transit (U.S.)Passenger SecurityTerrorismTrainsTransit CrimeTransit Safety |
Author: Burgess, Melissa Title: Crime on the NSW Rail System Summary: Aim: To provide an overview of the incidence of offences against the person on the NSW rail system. Method: Analysis of data from the NSW Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS). Results: Recorded rates of personal crime on the NSW rail system are generally very low. On a typical weekday across NSW the rate of personal crimes on trains is 0.3 incidents per 100,000 passenger journeys. Similarly, the rate of personal crimes on railway stations is 0.04 per 100,000 passenger interchanges. Not all stations carry the same risk. On stations where personal offences had occurred, the risk varied from 0.02 per 100,000 interchanges at North Sydney station to 3.2 per 100,000 interchanges at Waratah station. Non-domestic assault is the most commonly recorded personal offence (49.5% of incidents), followed by steal from person (30.2% of incidents), robbery (12.2% of incidents), other sexual offences (7.5% of incidents) and sexual assault (0.6% of incidents). The overall risk of victimisation on weekdays is highest during the afternoon commuter period (3:00pm to 6:30pm) and lowest during the early morning travel period (2:00am to 6:00am). Risk of victimisation on weekends is highest in evening (6:30pm to 2:00am) and early morning (2:00am to 6:00am) periods. Conclusion: Crime on the rail system is not evenly distributed across time and space. It is hoped that the current findings are a useful source of information for public transport users and for policy makers who are tasked with making decisions about crime control on the NSW rail system. Details: Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2011. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Paper no. 64: Accessed March 10, 2014 at: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/documents/pdf/bb64.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/documents/pdf/bb64.pdf Shelf Number: 131846 Keywords: RailroadsTrainsTransit CrimeTransit Safety |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts Summary: On August 26, 1995, the Saturday of the final and busiest weekend of France's summer holiday season, terrorists attempted to derail the TGV (Train a Grande Vitesse) between Lyon and Paris by planting a bomb. Fortunately, their crude triggering mechanism failed to detonate the bomb, and subsequent analysis indicates that even had the bomb gone off, the explosion would not have derailed the train. The TGV episode, one of a continuing series of case studies by the Mineta Transportation Institute, points to a continuing problem: Since 1995, terrorists have attempted to derail trains on at least 144 occasions. Because of the expansion of high-speed rail systems in Europe, Asia, and North America, where 15 high-speed rail projects are in preparation or under way in the United States alone, this case study has been expanded to include a chronology and statistical analysis of attempted derailments worldwide. This analysis examines the geographic distribution of the attempts, the methods used by the saboteurs, and the outcomes. Although based on a small universe of events, it underscores both the attractiveness to terrorists of attacking transportation systems-a successful attack can result in high body counts, significant disruption, dramatic images, and enormous publicity, all things sought by terrorists-and the difficulties of achieving success. Details: San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, College of Business, San Jose State University, 2010. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: MTI Report 09-12: Accessed March 28, 2014 at: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://transweb.sjsu.edu/MTIportal/research/publications/documents/TGV_book%20(with%20covers).pdf Shelf Number: 132014 Keywords: BombingsRailroadsTerrorismTrainsTransit CrimeTransportation Security |
Author: Schulz, Dorothy Moses Title: Video Surveillance Uses by Rail Transit Agencies Summary: Previous TCRP reports, notably Electronic Surveillance Technologies on Transit Vehicles (Maier and Malone 2001) and Transit Security Update (Nakanishi 2009), have studied overall security and the use of electronic video surveillance technology in the transit environment. Improving Transit Security (Needle and Cobb 1997) and Guidelines for the Effective Use of Uniformed Transit Police and Security Personnel (Interactive Elements Inc. 1997) considered how transit agencies were using video surveillance as part of their overall security strategies, primarily in conjunction with uniformed patrol by police or security officers. Most of the examples and case studies in earlier reports combined discussions of the use of electronic video surveillance cameras in bus and rail systems and few considered nonsecurity uses of such technology. This synthesis differs from the earlier ones in several ways. It is the first synthesis to document the current use of electronic video surveillance technology solely by passenger rail agencies and to consider the totality of its use, including onboard railcars and along the right-of-way (ROW). The synthesis also describes current administrative policies on monitoring video images either in real time or for post-event analysis; policies on archiving and storing images and access to them by employees, other public agencies (primarily police), and the general public; and funding sources for installing new or upgrading existing video surveillance systems. Results of a survey emailed to passenger rail agencies throughout the United States are used to document important issues, including the following: - The percentage of stations, station platforms, or shelters where surveillance is employed and how decisions are made on which locations to cover. - The percentage of railcars in which onboard surveillance is employed and how decisions are made on which vehicles to cover. - Whether video surveillance is employed along the ROW and, if so, where. - The type of video surveillance systems in use and any special features they may utilize. - Policies pertaining to monitoring, recording, and archiving images, including chain of custody policies. - Purposes other than for crime/vandalism prevention for which surveillance is employed and its perceived effectiveness for those applications. - Whether patrons or employees have been surveyed regarding their perceptions of security and, if so, what those perceptions are. - Funding sources for installing and/or upgrading electronic video surveillance systems. - Existing plans for installing video surveillance systems in new vehicles or stations. Forty-three completed surveys were received from the 58 passenger rail agencies to which questionnaires were sent, a response rate of 73%. Five agencies were selected as case study sites because they reflected a variety of modes, had different security configurations (transit police or reliance on local agencies), and were upgrading their systems to include technologies that other agencies are likely to be considering. These agencies provided opportunities to share information in a lessons-learned format. Agencies that did not employ surveillance technology were encouraged to complete the survey by answering two brief questions: (1) whether the agency was considering installing a surveillance system and, if so, where, or (2) whether the agency was not considering installing a surveillance system and, if so, why not. All the responding agencies employed video surveillance in some capacity. Although the authors cannot speak for agencies that did not respond, it is reasonable to say that all passenger rail transit agencies make at least some use of electronic video surveillance on their property. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2011. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: TCRP Synthesis 90: Accessed July 16, 2014 at: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_90.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_90.pdf Shelf Number: 132681 Keywords: Crime PreventionTrainsTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation SecurityVideo Surveillance |
Author: Victoria (Australia). Auditor General Title: Public Safety on Victoria's Train System Summary: Public transport services, and in particular trains, play a significant role in the community. Passengers should feel safe as they use these services regardless of the time of day or night. The protective services officers (PSO) program was established to reduce crime and improve perceptions of safety on Melbourne's train system. Perceptions of the safety of the metropolitan train system at night have improved since the start of the PSO program, but the extent to which this can be attributed to the presence of PSOs is unknown. It is also not possible to assess whether PSOs have had any impact on crime on the metropolitan train system. Advice provided to government to support decisions on the establishment and deployment of the PSO program was comprehensive, however, performance monitoring has been limited. Victoria Police does not have an effective performance monitoring regime in place to support ongoing development or future advice on the program's efficiency or effectiveness. Additionally, there is an opportunity to drive greater awareness of the presence of PSOs, further improving perceptions of safety and increasing patronage. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/publications/20160224-Public-Safety/20160224-Public-Safety.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/publications/20160224-Public-Safety/20160224-Public-Safety.pdf Shelf Number: 137972 Keywords: Public TransportTrainsTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation Security |