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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 8:16 pm
Time: 8:16 pm
Results for undercover operations
2 results foundAuthor: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Title: An inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales Summary: In a letter dated 27 June 2013, the Home Secretary commissioned Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to inspect the effectiveness of the arrangements in place in all police forces to carry out, manage and scrutinise undercover operations. Our inspection was to include all regional and national policing units, and the National Crime Agency. This was not an inquiry into the past events that have caused widespread concern about the way the police use undercover tactics; these past events fall to others to examine. Our inspection has examined how well undercover policing is carried out now. HMIC is an independent inspectorate which has responsibility under section 54(2), Police Act 1996 to inspect on the "efficiency and effectiveness of every police force maintained for a police area" in England and Wales. It also has statutory responsibility to inspect the National Crime Agency. We were invited to include Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs in our inspection. In order to provide a comprehensive picture, the British Transport Police, the Home Office Immigration Enforcement and the Royal Military Police - all of which may also carry out undercover operations - were included in our inspection. This is the first time that HMIC has inspected all law enforcement agencies that have the capability and capacity to deploy undercover officers. Details: London: HMIC, 2014. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-undercover-policing-in-england-and-wales.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/an-inspection-of-undercover-policing-in-england-and-wales.pdf Shelf Number: 133941 Keywords: Police EffectivenessPolice InvestigationsUndercover OperationsUndercover Policing (U.K.) |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: A Review of ATF's Undercover Storefront Operations Summary: In this review the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) use of undercover storefront operations - an investigative technique in which law enforcement operates a fake business or establishment from a location where illicit merchandise is exchanged or services are rendered. In 2013 ATF's use of undercover storefront operations came under scrutiny after news reporting about a storefront operation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin described numerous problems, including the theft of firearms, improper handling of sensitive information, and the alleged targeting of persons with disabilities. These and other reports about flaws in ATF's storefront operations prompted members of Congress to request the OIG to initiate this review. The OIG examined five ATF undercover storefront operations to: (1) determine whether there are any systemic deficiencies in ATF's storefront policies; and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ATF's Monitored Case Program (MCP) as an oversight tool for the storefront operations. ATF established the MCP to provide for heightened management scrutiny of the agency's most sensitive cases. We selected five undercover operations that continued or began after the inception of the MCP; these operated in Boston, Milwaukee, Pensacola, St. Louis, and Wichita. The storefront in Boston was mobile and operated from a cargo van. In addition, due to allegations that ATF was targeting persons with disabilities for enforcement action, we examined this issue at ATF's storefront in Portland, Oregon, as well as the other storefronts identified above. Our review determined that while undercover operations can be an important component of ATF's efforts to fight violent crime, ATF failed to devote sufficient attention to how it was managing its undercover storefront operations. It lacked adequate policies and guidance for its agents, and in some cases supervision, necessary to appropriately address the risks associated with the use of this complex investigative technique. Although we did not find overarching problems with ATF's storefront policies as revised following disclosure of problems with the Milwaukee storefront, we determined that ATF should make additional changes to further improve them. We also found that ATF needed to make adjustments to its MCP to better focus on the most significant risks in ATF's investigative operations, including storefronts. We found no evidence that ATF targeted or used individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities in its storefront investigations because of their disability. However, we determined during the course of this review that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had failed to apply Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, which prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, to its federal law enforcement activities. This Act imposes important compliance responsibilities on DOJ's law enforcement components, which include ATF, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). When we inquired with ATF and the other DOJ law enforcement components about their compliance responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act, we found that they lacked policies that addressed the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to law enforcement operations. The OIG raised this important issue with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and, on September 3, 2015 the OIG wrote to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to request quarterly updates on DOJ's efforts to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. The OIG intends to carefully monitor DOJ's progress in meeting its significant duties under the Act. We provided 13 recommendations to assist ATF with its storefront operations. ATF concurred with all of them and has committed to their full implementation. They address the following issues: initiation, planning, safety and security, oversight, intelligence, vulnerable populations, revisions to the Storefront Investigations Manual, and training. In addition to strengthening ATF's policies, improving the MCP, and helping ATF and DOJ to meet their obligations under federal disability law, the recommendations will assist ATF to address three other areas of concern we identified during the review. The first involves predication and targeting. We believe ATF must do a better job in future storefront operations defining the crime problem that the storefront is designed to address and explaining how the strategy underlying it will lead to the apprehension of persons warranting federal prosecution. Our recommendations request ATF to make clear in the storefront initiation paperwork how the storefront will be targeted and how the resulting prosecutions will serve a substantial federal interest. Second, ATF underestimated the level of experience, training, and expertise necessary to manage and oversee its storefront operations, which led to mistakes. Undercover storefront operations are complex and require the management of significant manpower and financial resources. ATF's assignment of inexperienced and shifting staff to run and supervise these operations without adequate Headquarters support and oversight had predictably negative consequences. Our recommendations request that ATF's Undercover Branch designate undercover agents/case agents with significant storefront expertise to work on-scene for the initial period of each storefront's operation to assist with planning, set-up, and early operations; that ATF minimize the turnover of supervisors during the operations; and that at least one undercover agent or the case agent on a storefront team have completed advanced undercover training, including training on storefront operations, before the storefront becomes operational. Third, and closely related to the second issue above, is the problem told to us about ATF Headquarters' historic reluctance to intrude on the domain of its Special Agents-in-Charge. We believe that in addition to supplementing the expertise available for storefront operations, ATF Headquarters units - the Special Operations Division and its Undercover Branch - need to be stakeholders in future operations and provide active oversight of them. ATF undercover storefront operations should not proceed unless experts within these units concur that they are properly designed and are being implemented appropriately. We have included recommendations in our report to encourage this oversight. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Oversight & Review Division 16-06: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140265 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsIllegal GoodsLaw Enforcement InvestigationsUndercover Operations |