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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
Time: 11:34 am
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Results for underground economy
22 results foundAuthor: Kar, Dev Title: The Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit Financial Flows from India: 1948-2008 Summary: India's underground economy is closely tied to illicit financial outflows. The total present value of India's illicit assets held abroad ($462 billion) accounts for approximately 72 percent of India's underground economy. This means that almost three-quarters of the illicit assets comprising India's underground economy—which has been estimated to account for 50 percent of India's GDP (approximately $640 billion at the end of 2008)—ends up outside of the country. The finding that only 27.8 percent of India's illicit assets are held domestically support arguments that the desire to amass wealth illegally without attracting government attention is one of the primary motivations behind the cross-border transfer of illicit capital. In the post-reform period of 1991-2008, deregulation and trade liberalization accelerated the outflow of illicit money from the Indian economy. Opportunities for trade mispricing grew and expansion of the global shadow financial system—particularly island tax havens—accommodated the increased outflow of India's illicit capital flight. There is a statistical correlation between larger volumes of illicit flows and deteriorating income distribution. Tax evasion is a major component of the underground economy, which in turn is a primary driver of India's illicit outflows. Expanding India's tax base and improving tax collection has high potential to curtail illicit flows. Illicit financial flows cannot be curtailed without the collaborative effort of both developing and developed countries. Economic reforms key to stemming the outflow of illicit money from India and the developing world in general include: •curtail trade mispricing (a widely utilized tax avoidance technique of international businesses); •require country-by-country reporting of sales, profits and taxes paid by multinational corporations; •require confirmation of beneficial ownership in all banking and securities accounts; •require automatic cross-border exchange of tax information on personal and business accounts; and •harmonize predicate offenses under anti-money laundering laws across all countries that cooperate on the Financial Action Task Force. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2010. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 6, 2010 at: http://india.gfip.org/ Year: 2010 Country: India URL: http://india.gfip.org/ Shelf Number: 120391 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney Laundering (India)Tax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy Summary: This study provides estimates of illicit financial flows (IFFs) from Mexico over the period 1970 – 2010 and examines the underlying drivers and dynamics in the context of a simulation model. Since the data needed to run the simulation model are only available for the period 1971-2008, the analysis of the factors driving illicit flows is confined to this shorter period. In our definition, money is deemed to be illicit if the source, use or movement of the funds is illegal. All flow estimates are based on cross-border transfers of illicit money and do not take into account illicit money being laundered inside the country. Moreover, illicit flows resulting from drug trafficking and other illicit activities that are settled in cash are not captured by economic models such as the ones used in this study. Given the inherent understatement of illicit flows estimated through economic models and methods, we use the non-normalized (or robust) estimate of illicit flows throughout the study, although normalized or conservative estimates are also presented in the Appendix for purposes of comparison. That said the magnitude and growth rate of illicit flows out of Mexico are indicative of the severity of the problem faced by policymakers. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2012. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2012 at http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/mexico/gfi_mexico_report_english-web.pdf Shelf Number: 124088 Keywords: Drug TraffikcingFinancial Crime (Mexico)Transnational CrimeUnderground Economy |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know? Summary: In this paper the main focus lies on the shadow economy and on work in the shadow in OECD, developing and transition countries. Besides informal employment in the rural and non-rural sector also other measures of informal employment like the share of employees not covered by social security, own account workers or unpaid family workers are shown. The most influential factors on the shadow economy and/or shadow labor force are tax policies and state regulation, which, if they rise, increase both. Furthermore the discussion of the recent micro studies underline that economic opportunities, the overall burden of the state (taxes and regulations), the general situation on the labor market, and unemployment are crucial for an understanding of the dynamics of the shadow economy and especially the shadow labor force. Details: Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2012. 73p. Source: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6423: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6423.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6423.pdf Shelf Number: 126696 Keywords: Crime and EconomicsTax EvasionUnderground EconomyUnderground Markets |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Russia: Illicit Financial Flows and the Role of the Underground Economy Summary: This study presents estimates of various types of capital flows to and from post-Soviet Russia. We argue that while netting out is a valid concept related to licit flows, illicit flows in both directions should be added in order to assess their adverse impact on the economy. Simultaneous equation modeling shows that total illicit flows both drive and are driven by underground economic activities. The latter is used as a proxy for the state of overall governance in Russia, which continues to be a serious issue. We suggest a range of domestic and international policy measures to curtail the cross-border transmission of illicit financial flows to and from Russia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2013. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://russia.gfintegrity.org/Russia_Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_the_Role_of_the_Underground_Economy-HighRes.pdf Shelf Number: 127632 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimeMoney Laundering (Russia)Underground Economy |
Author: Barbour, Aaron Title: Supporting People to Legitimise Their Informal Businesses Summary: There is evidence that an increasing number of people are engaged in informal work, and the scale of these activities makes them an important part of the UK’s local and regional economies. Government policy responses could include a laissez-faire approach, deterrence or encouraging compliance, but have, in the main, been punitive. There needs to be better understanding of the most effective ways to tackle the informal economy in order to choose the best combination of policies. The report: • presents the scale and range of the informal economy in the UK; • defines what is meant by formalisation and current practices; • examines the activities involved in formalisation, the length and cost of the service and the key characteristics needed by the supporting organisation; and • presents a model of a formalisation service that organisations might replicate to help informal entrepreneurs to legitimise their businesses. Details: York, UK: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2013 at: http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/supporting-people-informal-businesses Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/supporting-people-informal-businesses Shelf Number: 128959 Keywords: Business CrimesInformal Economy (U.K.)Tax AvoidanceUnderground Economy |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The Shadow Economy Summary: Summary: • Measurement of the shadow economy is notoriously difficult as it requires estimation of economic activity that is deliberately hidden from official transactions. Surveys typically understate the size of the shadow economy but econometric techniques can now be used to obtain a much better understanding of its size. • The shadow economy constitutes approximately 10 per cent of GDP in the UK; about 14 per cent in Nordic countries and about 20–30 per cent in many southern European countries. • The main drivers of the shadow economy are (in order): tax and social security burdens, tax morale, the quality of state institutions and labour market regulation. A reduction in the tax burden is therefore likely to lead to a reduction in the size of the shadow economy. Indeed, a virtuous circle can 
be created of lower tax rates, less shadow work, higher tax morale, a higher tax take and the opportunity for lower rates. Of course, a vicious circle in the other direction can also be created. • Given this relationship, the high level of non-wage costs (averaging 39 per cent of total labour costs) and the penalty on individuals who move from earning one third to two thirds of the median wage (averaging 58 per cent of the increase in earnings for a one-earner couple) in the European Union should be a matter of real concern. The latter figure
is 79 per cent in the UK and thus low-paid UK workers have a huge incentive to supplement their incomes in the shadow economy. • The number of participants in the shadow economy is very large. Although up-to-date figures are not available, at the end of the twentieth century up to 30 million people performed shadow work in the EU and up to 48 million in the OECD. Reliable detailed studies are not available for many countries. In Denmark, however, the latest studies suggest that about half the population purchases shadow work. In some
sectors – such as construction – about half the workforce
is working in the shadow economy, often in addition to formal employment. Only a very small proportion of shadow economy workers can be accounted for by illegal immigrants in most countries. • In western Europe, shadow work is relatively prevalent among the unemployed and the formally employed. Other non-employed (for example, the retired, homemakers
and students) do relatively less shadow work. This has implications for policy in terms of the importance of social security systems that reduce the opportunities for shadow work among the unemployed and the importance of tax systems that do not discourage the declaring of extra income. • Policies focused on deterrence are not likely to be especially successful when tackling the shadow economy. The shadow economy is pervasive and made up of a huge number of small and highly dispersed transactions. We should also be wary about trying to stamp out the shadow economy as we may stamp out the entrepreneurship and business formation that goes with it. • There are, however, huge potential benefits from allowing 
the self-employed and small businesses to formalise their arrangements. Businesses cannot flourish if they remain in the shadow economy. They might be reluctant to formalise, however, if it involves admitting to past indiscretions. Worthwhile policies include: reducing business compliance regulation; amnesties; providing limited tax shelters 
for small-scale informal activity such as the provision of interest-bearing loans to relatives and friends; and allowing businesses to formalise using simple ‘off the shelf’ models. Such policies have been successful in other countries – and to a limited extent in the UK – with high benefit-to-cost ratios. • Given that the shadow economy constitutes a high proportion of national income, and varies between less than 8 per cent of national income and over 30 per cent of national income in OECD countries, official national income statistics can often be misleading. Comparisons are made even more difficult because some countries adjust figures for the shadow economy (for example, Italy) and others do not. • In less developed countries, the informal sector constitutes typically between 25 and 40 per cent of national income and represents up to 70 per cent of non-agricultural employment. In such countries, informal activity often arises because of the inadequacies of legal systems when it comes to formalising business registration. Details: London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/the-shadow-economy Shelf Number: 128963 Keywords: Commercial CrimesEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimeShadow Economy (U.K.)Tax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Dank, Meredith Title: Estimating the Size and Structure of the Underground Commercial Sex Economy in Eight Major US Cities Summary: In 2010, the National Institute of Justice funded the Urban Institute's Justice Policy Center to measure the size and structure of the underground commercial sex economy in eight major US cities. The goals of this study were to: (1) derive a more rigorous estimate of the underground commercial sex economy (UCSE) in eight major US cities and (2) provide an understanding of the structure of this underground economy. To date, no reliable data exist to provide national or state policymakers with a verifiable and detailed understanding of underground commercial sex trade networks or the ways in which these networks interact with one another on the local, state, or interstate level. In addition, there is no information regarding the relationship between the UCSE and the local commercial sex trade or commercial sex activity conducted over the Internet. This study aimed to close the gap in our understanding about the nature and extent of these activities. Research Questions The study was guided by four main research questions: 1. How large is the underground commercial sex economy in eight major US cities? 2. To what extent are the underground commercial sex, drug, and weapons economies interconnected in the eight major US cities? 3. How do the ties between traffickers within the underground commercial sex economy impact the transportation of sex trafficking victims? 4. What are the network characteristics of the traffickers that operate within the underground commercial sex economy? Methodology The study employed a multi-method approach, using both qualitative and quantitative data, and data were collected in the following eight cities: San Diego, Seattle, Dallas, Denver, Washington, DC, Kansas City, Atlanta, and Miami. -- Existing datasets documenting the market changes for illegal drugs and weapons were analyzed to measure changes in these markets and estimate the overall size of these markets. This was done by measuring changes in a series of "proxy" variables, which we assumed to be proportional to underlying activity. Thus, official national datasets that measured some sort of drug and gun activities over a period of time were collected to measure these changes. Qualitative data was collected through interviews with 119 stakeholders and 142 convicted offenders, including local and federal law enforcement officers, prosecutors, pimps/sex traffickers, sex workers, and child pornographers. Stakeholders and offenders were interviewed about the structure of the UCSE, the profits generated through the UCSE, networking within the UCSE, and changes in the UCSE over time. Underground Commercial Sex Economy Key Findings "Sex sells" does little to explain the multi-million-dollar profits generated by the underground commercial sex economy. From high-end escort services to high school "sneaker pimps," the sex trade leaves no demographic unrepresented and circuits almost every major US city. What we know about the underground commercial sex economy is likely just the tip of the iceberg, but our study attempts to unveil its size and structure while documenting the experiences of offenders and law enforcement. Our study focused on eight US cities- Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, Kansas City, Miami, Seattle, San Diego, and Washington, DC. Across cities, the 2007 underground sex economy's worth was estimated between $39.9 and $290 million. While almost all types of commercial sex venues -- massage parlors, brothels, escort services, and street- and internet-based prostitution -- existed in each city, regional and demographic differences influenced their markets. Pimps and traffickers interviewed for the study took home between $5,000 and $32,833 a week. These actors form a notoriously difficult population to reach because of the criminal nature of their work. Our study presents data from interviews with 73 individuals charged and convicted for crimes including compelling prostitution, human trafficking and engaging in a business relationship with sex workers. Pimps claimed inaccuracy in media portrayals. Most pimps believed that the media portrayals exaggerated violence. Some even saw the term "pimp" as derogatory, despite admitting to occasional use of physical abuse for punishment. Although pimps may have underreported the use of physical violence, they did cite frequent use of psychological coercion to maintain control over their employees. Pimps manipulate women into sex work. From discouraging "having sex for free" to feigning romantic interest, pimps used a variety of tactics to recruit and retain employees. Some even credited their entry into pimping with a natural capacity for manipulation. Rarely, however, were pimps the sole influence for an individual's entry into the sex trade. Women, family, and friends facilitate entry into sex work. Female sex workers sometimes solicited protection from friends and acquaintances, eventually asking them to act as pimps. Some pimps and sex workers had family members or friends who exposed them to the sex trade at a young age, normalizing their decision to participate. Their involvement in the underground commercial sex economy, then extends the network of those co-engaged in the market even further. Unexpected parties benefit from the commercial sex economy. Pimps, brothels, and escort services often employed drivers, secretaries, nannies, and other non-sex workers to keep operations running smoothly. Hotel managers and law enforcement agents sometimes helped offenders evade prosecution in exchange for money or services. Law enforcement in one city reported that erotic Asian massage parlors would purchase the names of licensed acupuncturists to fake legitimacy. Even feuding gang members occasionally joined forces in the sex trade, prioritizing profit over turf wars. The most valuable network in the underground sex economy, however, may be the Internet. The Internet is changing the limitations of the trade. Prostitution is decreasing on the street, but thriving online. Pimps and sex workers advertise on social media and sites like Craigslist.com and Backpage.com to attract customers and new employees, and to gauge business opportunities in other cities. An increasing online presence makes it both easier for law enforcement to track activity in the underground sex economy and for an offender to promote and provide access to the trade. Child pornography is escalating. Explicit content of younger victims is becoming increasingly available and graphic. Online child pornography communities frequently trade content for free and reinforce behavior. Offenders often consider their participation a "victimless crime." The underground sex economy is perceived as low risk. Pimps, traffickers, and child pornography offenders believed that their crimes were low-risk despite some fears of prosecution. Those who got caught for child pornography generally had low technological know-how, and multiple pimp offenders expressed that "no one actually gets locked up for pimping," despite their own incarcerations. Policy and practice changes can help combat trafficking and prostitution. -- Cross-train drug, sex, and weapons trade investigators to better understand circuits and overlaps. -- Continue using federal and local partnerships to disrupt travel circuits and identify pimps. -- Offer law enforcement trainings for both victim and offender interview techniques, including identifying signs of psychological manipulation. -- Increase awareness among school officials and the general public about the realities of sex trafficking to deter victimization and entry. -- Consistently enforce the laws for offenders to diminish low-risk perception. -- Impose more fines for ad host websites. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2014. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2014 at: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413047-Underground-Commercial-Sex-Economy.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413047-Underground-Commercial-Sex-Economy.pdf Shelf Number: 132450 Keywords: Child PornographyHuman TraffickingProstitution (U.S.)Sex TraffickingSex WorkersUnderground Economy |
Author: Maftei, Loredana Title: An Overview Of The Tobacco Black Market In Europe Summary: Cigarette smuggling is a global phenomenon and so well-organized that it poses a serious threat to public health and national economies. The aim of the article is to highlight the main definitions and classifications between illegal tobacco trade and cigarette smuggling and also to describe the general situation of Europe. Based on data retrieved from International Tobacco Trade and UNODC, the paper is focused on the price differences, source countries, supply and demand and on the analysis of reports and articles. Furthermore the main findings emphasize the role of high taxation and corruption which have affected the European economies. Details: Romania: Central and Eastern European Online Library, 2012. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: CES Working Papers, issue 3a/2012: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV3a_MAF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV3a_MAF.pdf Shelf Number: 132804 Keywords: Cigarette Smuggling (Europe) Counterfeiting Illegal Tobacco Tobacco Smuggling Underground Economy |
Author: Caneppele, Stefano Title: Crime Proofing of the New Tobacco Products Directive Summary: This study concerns the crime proofing of the Proposal for the Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive presented in December 2012, and it is an update of a study on the crime proofing of the policy options under consideration of the revision of Directive 2001/37/EC. The crime proofing of legislation is a scientific approach developed by Transcrime in 2006 (Savona, 2006a; Savona, 2006b; Savona, Calderoni et al., 2006; Savona, Maggioni, et al., 2006; Morgan and Clarke, 2006; Albrecht and Kilchling, 2002). The core idea is that legislation may produce unintended opportunities for crime, thereby having potential criminogenic effects. When these opportunities and where they may occur is known, the legislation may be "proofed" against crime. This study is concerned with the impact of the new Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) on crime, and all the more so on the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (henceforth ITTP), an area that has not been considered by any of the impact assessment studies carried out by the EU Commission in preparation of the new Directive. Consequently, no knowledge is officially available on the impact of the new regulation upon the ITTP. This report aims at filling this gap by using the available data and making estimates. In January 2012, Transcrime presented a study which proofed the policy options under consideration for the revision of EU Directive 2001/37/EC against the risks of unintended criminal opportunities for the illicit trade in tobacco products (Calderoni, Savona, & Solmi, 2012). The study highlighted that "DG SANCO paid almost no attention to the impact on the ITTP" and that "certain measures considered for the revision of the TPD may have serious consequences" regarding possible risks of increased ITTP (Calderoni et al. 2012, p.42). The impact assessment (IA) released on December 2012 denies the risks of the ITTP. The EU Commission declared "that the preferred policy options do not [ in the assessment of the Commission - lead to increased illicit trade" (European Commission, 2012a, p. 6). More than being the result of an IA of the policy options and their trade-off on ITTP, this statement is an a priori assumption that excludes the area of crime from the IA carried out by the EU Commission. This is a serious flaw that may compromise the validity of the results of the impact assessment itself, and which does not comply with the EU's official impact assessment guidelines (European Commission, 2009). Details: Trento, IT: Transcrime, 2013. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Crime-Proofing-of-the-NEW-TPD_6.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Crime-Proofing-of-the-NEW-TPD_6.pdf Shelf Number: 132805 Keywords: Cigarette Smuggling (Europe) Counterfeiting Illegal Tobacco Illicit TradeTobacco Smuggling Underground Economy |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Brazil: Capital Flight, Illicit Flows, and Macroeconomic Crises, 1960-2012 Summary: This September 2014 study from Global Financial Integrity found that more than US$400 billion flowed illegally out of Brazil between 1960 and 2012-draining domestic resources, driving the underground economy, exacerbating inequality, and facilitating crime and corruption. The Brazilian economy lost at least US$401.6 billion in illicit financial outflows from 1960 to 2012. These outflows represent the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion, and have serious negative consequences for Brazil. Outflows were found to drain resources from the Brazilian economy, to drive the underground economy, and to exacerbate inequality. Furthermore, the report found that illicit outflows are growing. Annual average illicit outflows increased from US$310 million in the 1960s to US$14.7 billion in the first decade of the twenty first century before jumping to US$33.7 billion over the last three years of the study, 2010-2012. On average, Brazil's illicit outflows are equivalent to 1.5% of the country's official GDP. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2014. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/country-case-study-brazil/ Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/country-case-study-brazil/ Shelf Number: 133183 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial Crimes (Brazil)Socioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Enste, Dominik H. Title: The shadow economy in industrial countries: Reducing the size of the shadow economy requires reducing its attractiveness while improving official institutions Summary: The shadow (underground) economy plays a major role in many countries. People evade taxes and regulations by working in the shadow economy or by employing people illegally. On the one hand, this unregulated economic activity can result in reduced tax revenue and public goods and services, lower tax morale and less tax compliance, higher control costs, and lower economic growth rates. But on the other hand, the shadow economy can be a powerful force for advancing institutional change and can boost the overall production of goods and services in the economy. The shadow economy has implications that extend beyond the economy to the political order. The shadow economy should not be seen as solely an economic problem, to be resolved by attacking the symptoms through higher fines and tougher controls. A country-specific analysis of causes and consequences is necessary in order to develop policy measures appropriate to the country's level of development. Policymakers should view illicit work as a signal of the need to decrease the attractiveness of the shadow economy through better regulation, a fair and transparent tax system, and more efficient institutions (good governance). Organized crime and illegal employment should nevertheless be fought through stricter controls and enforcement. Details: Bonn: IZA World of Labor, 2015. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2015 at: http://wol.iza.org/articles/shadow-economy-in-industrial-countries-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://wol.iza.org/articles/shadow-economy-in-industrial-countries-1.pdf Shelf Number: 135386 Keywords: Financial CrimeIllicit WorkOrganized CrimeShadow EconomyTax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: Gu, Lion Title: The Mobile Cybercriminal Underground Market in China Summary: The mobile Web is significantly changing the world. More and more people are replacing their PCs with various mobile devices for both work and entertainment. This change in consumer behavior is affecting the cybercriminal underground economy, causing a so-called "mobile underground" to emerge. This research paper provides a brief overview of some basic underground activities in the mobile space in China. It describes some of the available mobile underground products and services with their respective prices. Note that the products and services and related information featured in this paper were obtained from various sites and QQ chats. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 15, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-mobile-cybercriminal-underground-market-in-china.pdf Year: 2014 Country: China URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-mobile-cybercriminal-underground-market-in-china.pdf Shelf Number: 135688 Keywords: Computer CrimeCybercrimeInternet CrimeUnderground Economy |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground 101 Summary: This research paper intends to provide a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in Russia. The bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by Russian cybercriminals. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. Online fraud has long since moved from being a mere hobby to a means for cybercriminals to earn a living. This paper examines what is being sold on the most popular cybercrime forums like antichat.ru, xeka.ru, and cardingcc.com; which items are in demand; and what services professional fraudsters offer. The fraudsters consider the Internet a playing field. It has many vulnerable sites and a great deal of unprotected data. While "protected" data do exist, the places they are stored in can still be hacked. Some cybercriminals shared their experience in hacking; generating traffic; and writing code for Trojans, exploits, and other malware via online articles. This paper discusses fundamental concepts that Russian hackers follow and the information they share with their peers. It also examines prices charged for various types of services, along with how prevalent the given services are in advertisements. The primary features of each type of activity and examples of associated service offerings are discussed as well. Each section of this paper focuses on a specific type of criminal activity, good, or service in the Russian underground market. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Russia URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf Shelf Number: 135689 Keywords: Computer CrimeCybercrimeFraudInternet CrimeUnderground EconomyUnderground Markets |
Author: Goncharov, Max Title: Russian Underground Revisited Summary: In 2012, we published "Russian Underground 101," which provided a brief summary of the cybercriminal underground and shed light on the basic types of hacker activity in the region. This year, we revisited the Russian cybercriminal underground market to update the information we provided then. As in the 2012 paper, the bulk of the information in this paper was based on data gathered from online forums and services used by cybercriminals in the region. We also relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums' shopping sites. It also discusses fundamental concepts that hackers follow and the information they share with their peers and compares product and service prices from 2011 to 2013. Primary features of each product or service and examples are also provided. This paper is divided into five main sections - introduction, what characterizes the Russian underground market unique, products, services, and cybercriminal ware offerings in the market. This section discusses how we gathered data, normalized prices, and classified an offering as either a product or a service to answer questions we received when we published the 2012 paper. The second section characterizes the Russian underground market. It differentiates the region's underground market from others. The third and fourth sections, meanwhile, provide detailed descriptions of the most common products and services, respectively, offered in the Russian underground market. The last section provides pricing information on the products and services sold in the market. The cybercriminal underground economy, much like any other type of business economy, experiences pricing highs and lows, depending on demand and supply. In the Russian cybercriminal underground market's case, the huge demand for credit card credentials drives prices up. Then again, incidents such as the massive breaches involving popular retailers a few months ago, which increased the supply of such credentials, drive prices down. Unlike legitimate businesspeople, however, cybercriminals need to keep their identities secret and, as much as possible, hide all traces of their "business" transactions. Factors like this make real-time transactions almost impossible to do in the underground market. That said, business dealings in cybercriminal underground markets are much slower than in the legitimate business world. Even though the prices of most products and services sold in the Russian underground market have been decreasing, that does not mean that business is not doing well for cybercriminals. It can even mean that the market is growing, as we see more and more product and service offerings as time passes. Cybercriminals, like legitimate businesspeople, are also automating processes, resulting in lower product and service prices. Of course, "boutique" products and services remain expensive because these involve specialized knowledge and skills to develop that only a few bad guys have. What we all need to keep in mind is that as long as profit can be made, cybercriminals will continue to offer products and services that can make life easier for themselves and their peers. And as long as customers exist, the cybercriminal underground will thrive. As users and potential victims, we all need to keep an eye out for the latest misdeeds to stay safe from all kinds of digital threats. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Russia URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-revisited.pdf Shelf Number: 135690 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime FraudInternet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: Gu, Lion Title: The Chinese Underground in 2013 Summary: Places in the Internet where cybercriminals converge to sell and buy different products and services exist. Instead of creating their own attack tools from scratch, they can instead purchase what they need from peers who offer competitive prices. Like any other market, the laws of supply and demand dictate prices and feature offerings. But what's more interesting to note is that recently, prices have been going down. Over the years, we have been keeping tabs on major developments in the cybercriminal underground in an effort to stay true to our mission - to make the world safe for the exchange of digital information. Constant monitoring of cybercriminal activities for years has allowed us to gather intelligence to characterize the more advanced markets we have seen so far and to come up with comprehensive lists of offerings in them. The barriers to launching cybercrime have decreased. Toolkits are becoming more available and cheaper; some are even offered free of charge. Prices are lower and features are richer. Underground forums are thriving worldwide, particularly in Russia, China, and Brazil. These have become popular means to sell products and services to cybercriminals in the said countries. Cybercriminals are also making use of the Deep Web to sell products and services outside the indexed or searchable World Wide Web, making their online "shops" harder for law enforcement to find and take down. All of these developments mean that the computing public is at risk of being victimized more than ever and must completely reconsider how big a part security should play in their everyday computing behaviors. We have been continuously monitoring the Chinese underground market since 2011. And by the end of 2013, we have seen more than 1.4 million instant chat messages related to activities in the market from QQ™ Groups alone. This research paper reviews these millions of messages, along with trends observed and product and service price updates seen in the Chinese underground market throughout 2013. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-chinese-underground-in-2013.pdf Year: 2014 Country: China URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-chinese-underground-in-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 135691 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime FraudInternet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: Merces, Fernando Title: The Brazilian Underground: A Market for Cybercriminal Wannabes? Summary: The Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series (CUES) has established that there is a booming underground market where cybercriminals can buy and sell products and services they use for their activities. This thriving market has provided attackers with the tools and knowledge needed to break barriers and launch cybercrime attacks. Very much like any other market, the laws of supply and demand dictate prices of the products and services being offered. The availability of materials used to inflict harm has increased: toolkits are more visible and their prices are getting cheaper. Interestingly enough, as the prices went lower, the features grew richer. In our continuing effort to closely observe booming underground markets scattered in different countries across the globe, this Trend Micro research paper closely looks at the continuing maturity of the Brazilian underground despite the lack of development in available tools and tactics. Similar to other cybercriminal underground markets like those that exist in China and Russia, the Brazilian underground possesses unique characteristics such as the use of popular social media platforms to commit fraud instead of hiding in the deep recesses of the Web with tools that ordinary users normally don't have access to. Cybercrooks in Brazil make use of popular mediums such as social networks like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Skype, and WhatsApp, as these have turned out to be effective venues. Notably, the underground scene in Brazil also has players that market number generators and checkers or testers for more than just credit cards. They offer tools created for attacks against products and services exclusive in Brazil while also offering training services for cybercriminal wannabes. The Underground Market Scene: Product Offerings: Banking Trojans: Brazil has been known for banking Trojans created by Brazilians to target banking customers in the country. Various Trojan-based techniques are being used to steal user credentials from bolware, including domain name system poisoning, fake browser windows, malicious browser extensions, and malicious proxies. Business application account credentials: Confidential data is of utmost value in Brazil, as in any underground market. In their cybercriminal underground market, credentials for popular business application services provided by Unitfour and Serasa Experian are being sold. Unitfour's online marketing service, InTouch, has the capability to keep and access potential or existing customers' personal information, which made it a target for cybercrooks. Such is the case with Serasa Experia, where plenty of information are used and sold for nefarious purposes. Online service account credential checkers: These are essentially tools used to validate account numbers for online services which they obtain by getting log in information from phishing campaigns. Phishing pages: In Brazil, creating phishing pages is simple-cybercriminals copy everything on the legitimate pages they wish to phish and change the destination the data collected goes to, such as a free webmail account that they own. This is how victims are redirected from legitimate websites without noticing it. Phone number lists: Phone number lists per town or city are usually offered by cybercriminals who sell spamming software and hardware. A mobile phone number list for a small town can be bought as well as home phone number lists used in phone-based scams. The list above is by no means comprehensive. Details: Irving, TX: Trend Micro, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Cybercriminal Underground Economy Series: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-brazilian-underground-market.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-brazilian-underground-market.pdf Shelf Number: 135692 Keywords: Computer Crime Cybercrime Fraud Internet Crime Underground Economy Underground Markets |
Author: Kirchgassner, Gebhard Title: On Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy Summary: As long as it is employed cautiously enough, the model approach is a useful tool to estimate simultaneously the size and the development of the shadow economy in several countries. However, a second method is necessary to calibrate the model. The currency demand approach can lead to highly implausible results; the size of the shadow economy might be largely overestimated. An alternative is the survey method. For real tests of whether a variable has an impact, procedures are necessary that do not use the same variables as those used to construct the indicator. Thus, to make progress in analysing the shadow economy, the model approach has a role to play, but it has to be complemented by other methods employing different data. The currency demand approach cannot be used as long as it employs the same variables for its constructions. Details: At. Gallen: SWIT: University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper no. 2016-03: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1603.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Germany URL: http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1603.pdf Shelf Number: 137863 Keywords: Commercial Crimes Economic Crimes Financial Crime Shadow Economy Tax Evasion Underground Economy |
Author: Dank, Meredith Title: The Hustle: Economics of the Underground Commercial Sex Industry Summary: Prostitution is said to be the world's oldest profession, but understanding the size and scope of this economy, and the methods and actors involved in this trade, is still a murky endeavor. Outside the sex sold legally in Nevada, prostitution in the United States transpires in the shadows of an underground economy. There are no accounting records to trace, no receipts to scrutinize, and no legal records to analyze. Simply, it is difficult to grasp the size of this economy. But a groundbreaking study released by the Urban Institute sheds new light on how much money is generated by the underground commercial sex economy in American cities. Knowing the size of the economy is the critical first step for enabling law enforcement, the judicial system, and policymakers to make informed choices about how to fight the harm that happens within these black markets. The research yields the first scientifically rigorous estimates for the revenue generated in the underground commercial sex economies of Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, Miami, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington, DC, in 2003 and 2007. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2017 at: .http://apps.urban.org/features/theHustle/theHustle.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: .http://apps.urban.org/features/theHustle/theHustle.pdf Shelf Number: 146746 Keywords: Prostitutes Prostitution Sex Workers Underground Economy |
Author: Australia. The Treasury Title: Black Economy Taskforce. Interim report Summary: The black economy is a significant, complex and growing economic and social problem. Black economy activities: undermine the community's trust in the tax system; create an unfair commercial environment which penalises businesses and individuals doing the right thing; enable and entrench the exploitation of vulnerable workers; undermine tax revenue; and enable abuse of the welfare system. If unchecked, increasing black economy participation can lead to a dangerous dynamic. It can foster a culture which legitimises and supports this participation, spurring its further growth. As revenues fall, those remaining in the formal economy may ultimately be faced with higher tax burdens, giving them a greater incentive to move into the shadows. All other OECD countries are grappling with the black economy issue. Australia is not alone. While the black economy is a long-standing problem, new vulnerabilities and threats are emerging as a result of fundamental economic, social and technological changes. The high cost of tax and non-tax regulatory burdens, pressure on business margins, the proliferation of new business models (including the sharing economy) and forms of work, complex interactions with illegal activities, exploitation of workers (including migrants), and changing social norms are influencing this landscape. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimated in 2012 that the black economy had grown to 1.5 per cent of GDP ($25 billion per year in today's dollars) in Australia. In the absence of a concerted and sustained whole-of-government effort, this figure can be expected to continue to grow. Given the linkages between different manifestations of the black economy, long-term multi-agency strategies and operations are needed. We must move beyond the business as usual mindset, recognising the limitations of traditional tax enforcement approaches. There is a clear need to act now. Community views on tax avoidance and evasion (particularly by large firms and multinationals) have noticeably hardened in recent years. At the same time, businesses, both large and small, are operating in a more competitive commercial environment, tempting some to push the boundaries (in their supply chain management, use of contractors and payment of wages). But this challenge is also an opportunity. With the intelligent application of emerging technologies, better use of data and a genuine whole-of-government focus, the tools we need are available. It is not too late, but we need to act now rather than wait. Business as usual is not an option. We can't audit our way out of this problem through traditional means. We have seen considerable innovation from other OECD countries in this area. A 21st century black economy strategy is needed in this country. The Black Economy Taskforce is a partnership between Australian Government agencies and the private sector. It is led by an independent chair and supported by a Secretariat in the Commonwealth Treasury. The Government has asked the Taskforce to develop a forward-looking, innovative and whole-of-government black economy strategy. This is our Interim Report, which sets out our initial findings and identifies a number of early actions. Our Final Report will be delivered to the Government in October 2017. Details: Canberra: The Taskforce, 2017. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2017 at: https://consult.treasury.gov.au/tax-framework-division/black-economy-taskforce/supporting_documents/BE_IR.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://consult.treasury.gov.au/tax-framework-division/black-economy-taskforce/supporting_documents/BE_IR.pdf Shelf Number: 146999 Keywords: Black EconomyEconomic CrimesFinancial CrimesTax EvasionUnderground Economy |
Author: New Jersey. Commission of Investigation Title: Corrupt Commerce: Heroin, Thievery and the Underground Trade in Stolen Goods Summary: In two years, he burned through an $800,000 inheritance, lost his home and allowed his family business to die. Desperate and broke, he found a lucrative new way to fund the heroin addiction that consumed his fortune and his life: stolen metal. He tore wire and copper pipe from buildings. He heaved manhole covers from the streets, ripped storm drains from parking lots, pulled heavy metal pins from construction barriers. Then, in an old sedan weighed down nearly to the pavement, he routinely took his haul to a booming scrap yard linked to organized crime in Hillsborough, Somerset County. There, the owner and employees readily bought the stolen metal for cash, no questions asked, not a word to the police. A hundred miles to the south, a young woman hit upon her own way to remedy the dopesickness that dictated her daily rhythms. She led a crew that shoplifted more than $100,000 in goods from major retail chains, then returned the items for gifts cards in the amount of the stolen merchandise. She sold those cards for 50 cents on the dollar to willing businesses across South Jersey. Again, no questions asked, no alert about suspicious behavior. The State Commission of Investigation has found that these circumstances are emblematic of a corrupt and enduring commerce in New Jersey's lightly regulated and often lawless world of scrap yards, pawn shops, cash-for-gold outlets and secondhand goods operations. Driven largely by the heroin and opioid epidemic, this shadowy underground economy is being exploited for profit across the state by convicted felons and elements of organized crime. In business after business, Commission investigators identified owners and employees with extensive criminal histories, including convictions for fraud, burglary, receiving stolen property, assault, firearms violations, narcotics distribution and racketeering. The SCI found evidence of drug-dealing directly from the counter at one shop, the illegal sale of handguns at another and links to a mob-related loansharking scheme at a third. At those locations and others, investigators found that owners and employees regularly accepted stolen goods, from jewelry to power tools, and in some cases directed customers to steal in-demand items likely to maximize profits upon resale. Collectively, the Commission estimates, the businesses have bought and sold tens of millions of dollars in stolen goods in recent years. This thriving marketplace, operating with little oversight or accountability, incentivizes theft and promotes destructive acts against both public and private infrastructure, putting residents in jeopardy. The widespread plundering of copper wiring and heavy-duty backup batteries from cell phone towers undermines cellular service during power outages. The theft of wire that transmits signals along train tracks delays commuters, requires costly repairs and strains an already overtaxed transit system. The removal of electricity-conducting wire from utility substations compromises the power grid. Little is off limits. Scrap hunters have ripped the risers from bleachers at schools, made off with aluminum street lamps from highways and stolen bronze vases from graves. The enormous costs of the illicit bargain between thieves and unscrupulous owners are borne by all New Jerseyans: the ratepayers who see higher bills for cell service and electricity; the consumers who pay more for goods at retail stores; the taxpayers ultimately responsible for replacing infrastructure that has vanished in the night. By providing an easy route for drug addicts and opportunists to cash in on stolen metal and merchandise, these enterprises have helped spawn an endless cycle of theft, one that law enforcement cannot keep pace with, much less end, without a muscular response from the State. The Commission carried out this investigation in keeping with its 50-year-old statutory mandate to identify and expose corruption, to highlight government laxity and gaps in oversight, to determine the effectiveness of New Jersey's laws and to inform the Governor, the Legislature, the Attorney General and the public about the influence and intrusion of organized crime. In particular, the findings set forth in this report build upon groundbreaking investigative work dating back nearly a decade when the SCI became one of the first agencies of government to identify the burgeoning opioid and heroin epidemic. Over the course of this inquiry, SCI investigators issued scores of subpoenas, analyzed banking records and conducted more than 100 interviews with law enforcement officers, metal recyclers, state and municipal officials, representatives of the telecommunications and retail industries, and the owners and employees of outfits engaged in suspect or illegal behavior. Just as significantly, the SCI interviewed those with the clearest view of interactions with these businesses: the addicts and former addicts who carried out thefts for drug money. SCI agents also conducted surveillance at suspect establishments and, in cooperation with police departments and confidential sources, participated in sting operations at scrap yards and secondhand goods stores. In those cases, items purchased by the Commission or lawfully obtained from utilities, phone companies and retail stores were sold to owners or employees with the fictive understanding the items had been stolen. The inquiry found that state and municipal regulations governing these businesses are scattershot, inadequate and unevenly enforced. The State licenses traditional pawn shops, which provide collateral-based loans, while municipalities license cash-for-gold shops, secondhand goods stores and scrap yards. Ordinances vary widely in strength and effectiveness from municipality to municipality. Laws governing some aspects of the businesses have proven to be window dressing, too minimal in scope and so erratically enforced they have failed to deter the prodigious flow of stolen goods. Equally troubling, SCI investigators found that many owners regularly flout the few rules that apply to them with little or no consequence. In some towns, the Commission found, law enforcement officials were unaware their governing bodies had passed ordinances giving police the means to crack down on the businesses - a breakdown in communication and coordination that has sapped accountability. The Commission is mindful that pawn outlets, secondhand goods stores and scrap metal recyclers contribute to the tax base in their communities and provide services helpful to the public. Local scrap yards are building blocks in the international commerce of recycled metal. In addition, not all owners and employees operate flagrantly outside the bounds of decency and the law. But in the absence of meaningful oversight, far too many of these operations have been subverted by criminal activity. The Commission recommends the State take the lead in licensing and regulating these industries. As the Legislature in recent decades has moved to root out organized crime from New Jersey's trash-hauling companies and casinos, so, too, should the State ban mob associates and those with extensive criminal records from trades that remain obvious and attractive pathways for the disposal of stolen property. Further, the Commission recommends requiring owners and employees to record all transactions in an online database accessible by law enforcement. Two such databases are already in use in neighboring states and in a minority of New Jersey municipalities, allowing investigators to more efficiently track sales, identify trends, find stolen merchandise and hold dishonest owners and employees accountable. Details: Trenton: The Commission, 2018. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2018 at: https://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/Stolen%20Goods%20Report%20Final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.nj.gov/sci/pdf/Stolen%20Goods%20Report%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 150626 Keywords: Illegal TradeMetal TheftNarcoticsOpioid CrisisOrganized CrimeScrap Metal TheftStolen GoodsStolen PropertyTrafficking in NarcoticsUnderground Economy |
Author: Trend Micro Title: Cybercrime and the Deep Web Summary: The cybercriminal underground economy changes every minute. Constantly evolving cybercriminal tools and techniques can put anyone at risk in a split second. Trend Micro researchers have been monitoring the underground economy for years. We were the first to describe how the different underground markets in Russia, China, Brazil, Japan, Germany, and North America vary. Each country’s market is as distinct as its culture. The Russian underground, for instance, can be likened to a well-functioning assembly line where each player has a role to play. It acts as the German market’s “big brother” as well in that it greatly influences how the latter works. The Chinese market, meanwhile, boasts of robust tool and hardware development, acting as a prototype hub for cybercriminal wannabes. Brazil is more focused on banking Trojans while Japan tends to be deliberately exclusive to members. We were also among the first security vendors to dive deep into the underground. Our researchers have been digging into as many seedy markets as possible, each year adding a new country/region to our growing list, to gather precious intel. This allows us to know and monitor what wares cybercriminals sell to their peers, what makes them tick, and how they behave. Cybercriminals from every corner of the world take advantage of the anonymity of the Web, particularly the Deep Web, to hide from the authorities. Infrastructure and skill differences affect how far into the Deep Web each underground market has gone. Chinese cybercriminals, for instance, do not rely on the Deep Web as much as their German and North American counterparts do. This could, however, be due to the fact that the “great firewall” of China prevents its citizens (even the tech-savviest of its cybercrooks) from accessing the Deep Web. The fact that Germany and North America more strictly implement cybercrime laws may have something to do with their greater reliance on the Deep Web, too. Crimes aided by wares bought underground can span from simple electronic thievery and selling contraband like drugs and firearms to shocking real-world crimes like engaging in child pornography and offering assassination services. We will continue to aid in seizing cybercriminals across the globe though public-private partnerships (PPPs) and providing intel that law enforcement agencies can use to further their anti-cybercrime efforts. As we go along making the world safe for the exchange of digital information, we will continue to monitor and report the latest in cybercrime developments so our customers can stay safe from these kinds of threats. Details: Irving, TX: 2016. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-cybercrime-and-the-deep-web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/cybercrime-and-the-deep-web Shelf Number: 154208 Keywords: Black Market Cybercrime Cybercriminals Deep Web Digital Information Illicit Market Internet Public-Private Partnerships Security Underground Economy |
Author: Andell, Paul Title: Developing a Context for Change in Gang Affected Neighborhoods: Exploring Synergies and Discords at Micro and Macro Levels Summary: Abstract The paper suggests that there are similar values ie. economic success and a culture of consumerism embedded in both the legitimate and illegitimate economies. It discusses possible micro and macro interventions to reduce the strains that arise from the blocked opportunities in attaining shared values. At a local level the paper discusses an action research model to develop social capital; in the broader context the paper discusses the redistributive potential of the circular economy to facilitate interventions which reduce harms. Details: Ipswich, United Kingdom: University of Suffolk, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2019 at: https://ideas.repec.org/a/icb/wpaper/v4y2017i18-19.html Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/icb/wpaper/ICESBA2017_AndellPaul_P8-19.pdf Shelf Number: 154311 Keywords: Harm Reduction Illegitimate Economies Illicit Economies Macro Interventions Micro Interventions Underground Economy |