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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
Time: 9:13 pm
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Results for vigilantism
25 results foundAuthor: International Crisis Group Title: Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity Summary: In recent years, Guatemala has been crippled by soaring levels of violent crime and impunity, which threaten the security of population and seriously undermine the country's institutions and state authority. While an outright return of civil war is not expected, the government of President Alvaro Colom has been unable to reduce violent crime. The widespread perception of a lack of government capacity to stem the violence has caused some communities to turn to brutal and extra-institutional vigilantism. This report is the first in a new series that will examine different aspects of the effort to recover the rule of law in Guatemala. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010. 27p. Source: Internet Resource; Latin America Report No. 33 - 22 June 2010 Year: 2010 Country: Guatemala URL: Shelf Number: 119138 Keywords: Rule of LawVigilantismViolence (Guatemala)Violent Crime |
Author: Cavallaro, James Louis Title: Crime, Public Order and Human Rights Summary: Crime and street violence cross borders, ideologies, classes, ages and gender. In many societies, ordinary crime and victimisation have come to be perceived not merely as a high priority problem requiring technical resources. A new discourse has developed, emphasising crime as a threat to individual personal security and a potential source of state instability. In addition, where crime is a problem, a pattern has emerged wherein as a result of rising crime, hardline law and order policies attract public support. Increasingly, punitive and authoritarian methods of control and punishment are suggested or implemented without much public opposition. This report examines the problems that surges in criminality pose for the provision of security and the safeguard of human rights. While the perspective and responses of authorities are considered, the report focuses on the role of civil society and the particular issues it faces in this environment. The varied responses of the state — from collaborative efforts with civil society to attacks on rights groups, tolerance of police abuse or vigilantism — provide the context in which rights groups must manoeuvre. The main aim is to analyse the challenges that human rights groups must address in the context of rising crime. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2003. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2010 at: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/8/114_report_en.pdf Year: 2003 Country: International URL: http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/8/114_report_en.pdf Shelf Number: 120198 Keywords: Human Rights WorkersStreet CrimeVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Haas, Nicole Eveline Title: Public Support for Vigilantism Summary: Public support for vigilantism is often seen as being indicative of a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system. After all, one of the main justifications for the existence of the justice system is the prevention of vigilantism. However, while some specific cases of vigilantism receive widespread public support, others do not, or are even strongly condemned by the larger public. Apparently public support for vigilantism is not automatically or exclusively indicative for a lack of legitimacy. A theoretical framework is presented which provides a first step toward a better understanding of this phenomenon. The theory makes predictions about support for vigilantism using insights from the fields of psychology, law and philosophy. Additionally, a distinction is made between different types of support for vigilantism in order to make it a more useful concept for empirical research. Results of a first test of this theory will be presented, and implications for the interpretation of support for vigilantism is discussed. Details: Unpublished Dissertation, University of Leiden, 2010. 194p. Source: Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 120268 Keywords: Vigilantism |
Author: Schnitzler, Antina von Title: Guardians or Gangster? Mapogo a Mathamaga: A Case Study Summary: Since its launch in 1996, the anti-crime group Mapogo a Mathamaga has been embroiled in controversy. Set up by a group of businessmen in the Northern Province in response to a spate of murders and armed robberies, the group soon became known for its illegal and strong-arm tactics when dealing with criminal suspects. Consequently, Mapogo is now commonly referred to as a vigilante group. This report provides insight into the organisation from a range of perspectives offered by those living and working in the Northern Province. This includes the views of Mapogo members (both current and former), traditional leaders, and other political, civic and trade union leaders, as well as the policing authorities and victims of Mapogo. The report examines the political and social context from which Mapogo has emerged, how the organisation was set up, who was involved and some of the key factors that have influenced its development. With crime remaining a major political issue, the report looks at how the criminal justice system is coping in the Northern Province, and examines some of the reasons suggested as to why people take the law into their own hands. It also explores how the intergenerational conflict that characterised aspects of the political revolt of the 1980s continues to manifest itself in the ideology of Mapogo. The report looks at the structure of the organisation, the methodology of Mapogo's practices and the extent to which the organisation is in control of its constituent parts. The report considers Mapogo's various fields of operation from private security services to property recovery, from punishment beatings to intimidation of farm workers. It also tackles the contested terrain of Mapogo's popular appeal and considers how reference to 'African justice' is used as a justification for brutal behaviour. The report also examines the government's seemingly ambiguous response to the criminal conduct of Mapogo during the late 1990s, and explores the implications of Mapogo and its leader's connections to other political parties and rightwing organisations. Despite negative publicity and internal conflict, Mapogo continues to grow and now claims to have over 40,000 members and over 90 branches operating in 5 provinces. This report offers some understanding of the complexities that continue to influence the development of and reaction to South Africa's most popular vigilante group. Details: Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2001. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 3: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/vigilantism/guardianorgangster.pdf Year: 2001 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/vigilantism/guardianorgangster.pdf Shelf Number: 121022 Keywords: GangsVigilantismViolence (South Africa)Violent Crime |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico Summary: Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children’s weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico’s barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the “live and let live” ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Shelf Number: 122800 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceVigilantismViolent Crime |
Author: Title: Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon Summary: Involvement in violent campaigns against vice and religious deviance has become one pathway to terrorism in Indonesia. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon," the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the radicalisation of a group from Cirebon, West Java that was behind the 2011 suicide bombings of a mosque and a church. It argues that ideological and tactical lines within the radical community are blurring, making it harder to distinguish “terrorists” from hardline activists and religious vigilantes. “The Cirebon men moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns, and this may become the common pattern”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser. Poorly educated and underemployed, the Cirebon men represent a generational shift from the jihadists trained abroad or those who fought a decade ago in two major communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. They were radicalised through attending public lectures by radical clerics; most had taken part as well in attacks on stores selling liquor and anti-Ahmadiyah activities. They had been members of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an extremist organisation founded by well-known cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, but then left to form their even more militant group. The two suicide bombers, Mohamed Syarif, who blew himself up at a Cirebon mosque on 15 April 2011, and Ahmed Yosefa Hayat, who died in an attack on a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September, taught themselves bomb-making from the Internet and worked on their own. The others preferred targeted assassinations to suicide attacks and learned bomb-making from friends in a Solo-based group of vigilantes-turned-bombers. The briefing notes that the merging of vigilantes and jihadists has been facilitated by the proliferation of Islamist civil society organisations and the popularity of public taklim (religious lectures), as forums for spreading radical views. The government needs a strategy, consistent with democratic values, to counter clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or tyrants (thaghut), frequently meaning Indonesian officials and, especially, the police. The problem is that there is no agreement within the country’s political elite on the nature of the threat. If the radicalisation of groups like the Cirebon men is to be halted, the government needs to build a national consensus on what constitutes extremism; directly confront hate speech; and promote zero tolerance of religiously-inspired crimes, however minor, including in the course of anti-vice campaigns. “Expressions of shock and horror every time there is an incident of religiously-motivated violence as in Cirebon or Solo are not a substitute for prevention”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2012. 16p. Source: Update Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 132: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Shelf Number: 123846 Keywords: Extremist GroupsJihadismMale OffendersSuicide BombingsTerrorism (Indonesia)Vigilantism |
Author: Scambury, James Title: Groups, gangs, and armed violence in Timor-Leste Summary: Armed groups and gangs are not a new phenomenon in Timor-Leste, but evolved from clandestine resistance groups during the Indonesian colonial period to a heterogeneous multitude of collectives, including disaffected veterans, clandestine groups, political fronts, martial arts groups (MAGs), village-based gangs, youth collectives, and security organizations. Nine years after the end of the Indonesian occupation, the fact that gangs have diversified and multiplied is a testament to a range of social tensions in Timorese society and the continued weakness of the state and its institutions. During the occupation these groups protected their communities from Indonesian security forces and the latter’s proxies; now they protect their communities from one another. This Issue Brief reviews the presence and roles of gangs in Timor-Leste. In doing so, it examines their recent growth, the threats they pose, and their use of and access to weapons, in particular small arms. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment, Small Arms Survey, 2009. 8p. Source: TLAVA Issue Brief No. 2: Internet Resource: Accessed on February 3, 2012 at http://www.timor-leste-violence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-Violence-IB2-ENGLISH.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.timor-leste-violence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-Violence-IB2-ENGLISH.pdf Shelf Number: 123947 Keywords: Armed ViolenceFirearmsGangs (Timor-Leste)VigilantismViolent Crime |
Author: Desai, Ashwin Title: The Cape of Good Dope? A post-apartheid story of gangs and vigilantes Summary: Everything lies in the challenge and the duel – that is to say, everything still lies in the dual personal relation with the opposing power. It is that power which humiliated you, so it must be humiliated. And not merely exterminated. It has to be made to lose face ... it must be targeted and wounded in a genuinely adversarial relation. (Baudillard 2002:25-26) Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs)entered the South African political landscape in dramatic fashion. On the night of the 4th August 1996, Pagad drove in convoy from the Gatesville Mosque to the house of the head of the Hard Livings gang, Rashaad Staggie. He was not home, but in an act of bravado, arrived. Already shots had been fired between Pagad and those inside Staggie’s Salt River home. While trying to alight from his vehicle, he was shot in the head. As he fell out of his bakkie, ‘his inert body, apparently dead, was kicked, jumped on, hit with the butt of a shotgun and shot several more times before a petrol bomb was hurled at the body. Miraculously, this revived the mortally wounded man and he rose and tried to run away, only to be brought down by a volley of gunfire from the crowd’. (Sunday Tribune 11 August 1996) All this happened in the full glare of the media and with the police present. It was one of the first times a movement in post-apartheid South Africa acted with such impunity and with such directness in respect of their aims and objectives. Pagad wanted to rid the flats of gangs and drugs. Participants in its first big mass march had just killed a leading gangster and known drug-dealer. Five years later Pagad was involved in another dramatic incident in the city centre: Shots were fired and pedestrians scrambled for cover as policemen engaged in a shootout with seven men who escaped from court in Cape Town . . . The seven members of Pagad’s G-Force, faced urban terrorism charges. They apparently overpowered a policemen in the high court’s holding cells during a lunch break and seized his gun . . . scaled a gate to reach Queen Victoria Street, and were then involved in a shootout with the police in the after-lunch traffic in the city centre. (The Mercury, 5 October 2001) What had happened in the five years that turned Pagad from being an organisation seeking to rid the Cape Flats of druglords into fugitives from the law? Details: Durban, South Africa: Centre for Civil Society; University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Development Studies, 2004. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Acessed May 1, 2013 at: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Desai%20Pagad%20Research%20Report.pdf Year: 2004 Country: South Africa URL: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Desai%20Pagad%20Research%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 128593 Keywords: Gangs (South Africa)Vigilantes (South Africa)VigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Malcolm X Grassroots Movement. Every 36 Hours Campaign Title: Operation Ghetto Storm: 2012 Annual Report on the Extrajudicial Killings of 313 Black People by Police, Security Guards and Vigilantes Summary: The facts presented in Operation Ghetto Storm: 2012 Annual Report on the Extrajudicial Killing of Black People present us with a deeper understanding of the utter disregard held for Black life within the United States. Operation Ghetto Storm is a window offering a cold, hard, and fact‐based view into the thinking and practice of a government and a society that will spare no cost to control the lives of Black people. What Operation Ghetto Storm reveals is that the practice of executing Black people without pretense of a trial, jury, or judge is an integral part of the governments current overall strategy of containing the Black community in a state of perpetual colonial subjugation and exploitation. Details: Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, 2013. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 28, 2013 at: www.mxgm.org Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 129441 Keywords: BiasExtrajudicial ExecutionsHomicidesRace/Ethnicity (U.S.)Racial ProfilingVigilantism |
Author: Okombo, Okath Title: The Challenge of Mending Ethnic Relations in the Nairobi Slums Summary: Nairobi’s informal settlements and slums were the epicentre of the post-election violence (PEV) that erupted in December 2007 and led to massive destruction of property, looting, displacement and forceful eviction of some ethnic communities from their homes. In many cases, minority rival communities were forced to relocate to other estates where their community members constitute a dominant group. Slum-based vigilante and militia groups consolidated themselves into two main rival factions in order to defend their communities and lawlessness threatened to engulf the city. Despite the fact that youth were at the centre of the crisis, most interventions that were initiated soon after the PEV failed to involve them. It is against this background that the Citizens Against Violence (CAVi) in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) sought to make a contribution to the country’s peace restoration effort, targeting six affected slums in Nairobi. In 2008, the “slum tenants and landlords dialogues” series began. This was a special intervention to reduce ethnic tension and reconcile the two groups so that residents could return to their homes. This led to the formation of interest groups representing the landlords and tenants respectively for purposes of formal negotiation, paving the way for some landlords to recover their houses and tenants to move back. The initiative also enabled youth and community leaders to deliberate on postpoll challenges in their estates as a step towards finding sustainable solutions to violence. Issues of cultural assimilation, access to land titles, widespread poverty and unemployment among the youth and fanatical support for some political players emerged as challenges that could still precipitate future ethnic conflicts. Candid discussions provoked many of the young leaders in the slums to aspire for better living conditions and improved socio-ethnic relations. This led in 2009 to the launch of the Nairobi Slums Assembly, a forum in which the young leaders from the six slums met every month to discuss specific issues affecting their particular environments and to come up with proposals which they then shared with the provincial administration, the police and elected leaders. In many cases, this has led to positive change as well as the building of bridges with the authorities. However, more work needs to be done. Integrated ethnic co-existence may be difficult to achieve in the urban slums without a multi-pronged effort by both government and civil society. It is our hope that sharing the findings of the project with a wider group of stakeholders will mobilize public interest and goodwill towards improving the conditions in the Nairobi slums for sustainable peace and socio-economic development. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 2010. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2013 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Kenya URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/07884.pdf Shelf Number: 129508 Keywords: LootingPoverty and CrimeSlums (Nairobi, Kenya)Socioeconomic ConditionsVigilantismViolence |
Author: Peters, Danya J. Title: Public Acquiescence of Police Brutality and Extrajudicial Killings in Sao Paulo, Brazil Summary: The purpose of the current research was to take a social psychological approach to understanding public acquiescence and support for extra legal police violence in Brazil. Data were drawn from research conducted by NEV- CEPID/FAPESP. The sample consisted of 1000 youth and adults age 16 and greater in the city of Sao Paulo who were representative of the general population based on sex, age, education level, occupation, and geographic area (with an oversampling of people from violent neighborhoods). T-tests and ANOVA techniques were utilized to explore group differences in support for citizen and police extra-legal violence based on race, social class, and gender. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was then used to estimate a mediational model of the relationships between environmental influences (direct and indirect victimization, as well as the presence of neighborhood incivilities), general justice related judgments and paradigms (the justice system as inefficient and ineffective, the traditional human rights paradigm, and the emerging human rights paradigm) and support for specific kinds of extra legal violence (support for citizen vigilante justice, support for procedural violence by the police, and support for retributive violence by the police). As hypothesized, direct victimization, indirect victimization, and neighborhood incivilities were all positively associated with fear of crime. In turn, fear of crime was negatively associated with adopting the emerging human rights paradigm and positively associated with viewing the justice system as inefficient and ineffective. Unexpectedly, fear of crime was not associated with a more traditional human rights paradigm. However, the emerging human rights paradigm was negatively associated with support for citizen vigilante justice, as well as support for procedural and retributive violence by the police. Conversely, the traditional human rights paradigm was positively associated with support for all three types of violence. Furthermore, viewing the justice system as inefficient and ineffective was positively associated with support for citizen vigilant justice and retributive violence, but, unexpectedly, was not related to support for procedural violence. Theoretical implications of the results are discussed. Details: Reno, NV: University of Nevada, Reno, 2006. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 21, 2014 at: http://www.nevusp.org/downloads/down159.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.nevusp.org/downloads/down159.pdf Shelf Number: 134184 Keywords: Extrajudicial HomicidesHomicidesPolice Brutality (Brazil)Police MisconductPolice Use of ForceUrban AreasVigilantismViolence |
Author: Davies, Philip Title: Why is crime In South Africa so violent?: Rapid evidence assessment Summary: Political-Historical Factors South Africa's colonial and apartheid legacy is said to have given way to the 'normalisation' of violence, in which violence is seen as an acceptable means of problem solving and resolving conflict. The policing and justice system of South Africa is also seen as having led to a mistrust of the rule of law and authorities, and to some vigilantism and summary justice. Environmental factors Fractured families, poor socialisation, harsh and inconsistent discipline, physical and emotional abuse, and inadequate limit-setting are contributing factors to why crime in South Africa is so violent. So too are gangs that use violence, guns and other weapons to acquire goods, opportunities, and a sense of identity and self-worth. The misuse of alcohol and other drugs also increases the level of violence in criminal activity. Social attitudes and cultural values about gender condone and reinforce abusive practices against women. Individual Factors The age (younger), gender (males) and educational background (low achievement) of criminals are strongly associated with violent behaviour and violent crime. So too are certain psychological profiles and some psychiatric conditions. Poverty, unemployment inequality and social exclusion also contribute to South Africa's burden of violence, but are inseparably related to other key factors (political-historical, environmental and individual). Social Distribution of Violence Violent crime is not uniform across South Africa. The Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal have the highest rates of homicides, and Gauteng has the highest rates of car and truck hijacking and robberies. Affluent areas of South Africa experience more violent property crime, whilst poorer communities have more domestic violence, male-male assaults, murder and rape. Violent crime is a concern for Black and White South Africans, and the concerns of poorer communities about violence and violent crime need to be given greater attention. Promising Interventions for Reducing Violence and Violent Crime These include interventions at the political, environmental and individual levels, requiring actions that are inter-sectoral, strategic, and evidence-based. Interventions to reduce poverty, increase educational participation and completion, develop work-based skills and job opportunities, and support for programmes that seek to change social attitudes and norms (particularly those related to gender and violence), are suggested. Better control of guns, weapons, alcohol and other drugs are also called for. Multi-modal programmes for violent behaviour seem to be more effective than single component interventions. Inter-personal and social skills training, along with parenting skills training, seem to offer considerable opportunity to reduce violent and other antisocial behaviour. Details: Oxford Evidentia, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.pan.org.za/node/8682 Year: 2011 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.pan.org.za/node/8682 Shelf Number: 129779 Keywords: Gun-Related ViolenceVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Althaus, Dudley Title: Mexico's Security Dilemma: Michoacan's Militias. The Rise of Vigilantism in Mexico and Its Implications Going Forward Summary: Since 2006, violence and criminality in Mexico have reached new heights. Battles amongst criminal organizations and between them have led to an unprecedented spike in homicides and other crimes. Large criminal groups have fragmented and their remnants have diversified their criminal portfolios to include widespread and systematic extortion of the civilian population. The state has not provided a satisfactory answer to this issue. In fact, government actors and security forces have frequently sought to take part in the pillaging. Frustrated and desperate, many community leaders, farmers and business elites have armed themselves and created so-called "self-defense" groups. Self-defense groups have a long history in Mexico, but they have traditionally been used to deal with petty crime in mostly indigenous communities. These efforts are recognized by the constitution as legitimate and legal. But the new challenges to security by criminal organizations have led to the emergence of this new generation of militias. The strongest of these vigilante organizations are in Michoacan, an embattled western state where a criminal group called the Knights Templar had been victimizing locals for years and had co-opted local political power. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2014. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 17, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/MichSelfDefense_Althaus_Dudley.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/MichSelfDefense_Althaus_Dudley.pdf Shelf Number: 136439 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: Zinecker, Heidrun Title: Violence in Peace: Forms and causes of postwar violence in Guatemala Summary: On 29 December, 1996 the conflict in Guatemala between the URNG, a leftist guerrilla organization, and the authoritarian state came to an end. With the implementation of the peace agreements and the completion of peace-building, Guatemala has without doubt taken an important step on the road to democracy. However, the country's regime does not guarantee a civilized life for its citizens. Even by Latin American standards, it permits an extremely high level of violence. This can be characterized as violence in peace. Although the rates of homicide conditioned by this violence are higher than those that prevailed during the civil war, there is no danger of a return to war. During the war political violence was the main cause of death, and violent crime has now taken its place. This report analyses three forms of postwar violence which are especially typical of Guatemala: political violence, the maras, and lynch law. It then goes on to examine their causes. In the course of this examination, a number of elements which are generally supposed to be causes of violence are excluded as causal factors: the perpetuation of a culture of violence or/and war-violence racism and ethnic exclusion, poverty, and inequality in the sense of a general distribution of income as measured by the Gini coefficient. In the next step, an alternative model of explanation is presented. This distinguishes between enabling structures which make violence possible and structures that might prevent it (with particular reference to the absence of preventive structures). The report identifies regime hybridity and a rent economy as structures that make violence possible, and investigates these structures in order to identify the concrete configurations which are immanent to the structures and cause violence. In the case of the rent economy, the specific structures identified are the especially pronounced bipolarity between the oligarchy and the lowest quintile of the population, new rents as outlets for oligarchical structures and catalysts of violence, low rates of investment, and a low level of empowerment of work. However, none of these structures is, on its own, a cause of the high intensity of violence; they form a complex system. The absence in Guatemala of a structure that could prevent violence can be identified in the poor performance of the security sector, i.e. the police and judiciary, and in the lack of democratic commitment on the part of civil society in this sector. This low level of performance is, in addition to political exclusion and the absence of the rule of law, a characteristic feature of regime hybridity. Although this report is a case study, it has an intrinsically comparative character. This is because the other Central American countries (El Salvador and Honduras with a higher, and Costa Rica and Nicaragua with a lower intensity of violence) form the matrix which renders visible the specificity of Guatemala. Nicaragua is of particular significance for this implicit comparison, because it is the only country in Central America that has experienced a civil war in the recent past but seen a low level of violence since the end of that war. The conclusion of the report identifies two ways in which violence, or the intensity of violence, can be limited in the long term. In the Costa Rican model, a low intensity of violence has been achieved directly, via a long historical path in which "Democracy - Performance + Democratic Content" is combined with "Social Market - Empowerment of Labour + Production of Investment Goods". In the Nicaraguan model, a low intensity of violence has been achieved indirectly but over a shorter period of time; here, there can be no doubt about the absence of democracy, and therefore the existence of regime hybridity, or the absence of a social market economy, and therefore the existence of a rent economy. The main finding of the report follows from the Nicaraguan model: the level of violence can be reduced even though ethnically based exclusion, poverty, and inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) are present, and even though a rent economy and regime hybridity are present as well. If violence is to be successfully reduced, it is necessary for the police and judiciary to be supported conceptually and practically in their efforts to prevent violence and to rehabilitate violent offenders, and to bring about improvements in criminal investigation practices, the support provided to victims, and consistent criminal justice policies. Development aid can help in all these areas. Simultaneously, measures must be taken to bring about the empowerment of civil society - which, however, should not mean the empowerment of vigilantism. In addition, the situation of the lowest quintile of the population should be improved in such a way that there is at least a prospect of relative socioeconomic egalitarianism. This can be done if smaller enterprises are strengthened so that they can serve as a counterweight to the ruling oligarchy, in the context of an improvement in the rate of investment in the production of investment goods. In this way it would be possible to reduce both the official level of unemployment and the concealed unemployment that exists in the informal sector, leading to the empowerment of work. These autochthonous policies are necessary for Guatemala, and they should be combined with the exertion of international political pressure on the USA's problematic policies on immigration, integration, and deportation. This should include the provision of support to Guatemala (as well as El Salvador and Honduras) for the integration of young people deported from the USA. This report presents the first systematic analysis of postwar violence in Guatemala. It is based on approximately 50 interviews with Guatemalan academics, politicians, police and judicial officers, Maya priests, and NGO activists, and also with violent offenders, all of whom were interviewed during a month-long period of field research in Guatemala in March 2006. Details: Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2006. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Reports No. 76: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: mercury.ethz.ch Year: 2006 Country: Guatemala URL: mercury.ethz.ch Shelf Number: 139425 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMarasPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeVigilantismViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Madienyane, Dickson Title: The effects of vigilantism on the community of Diepsloot Summary: Vigilantism is a reality that is going to persist into the future for as long as crime exists. The Diepsloot community is not unique to other parts of the country like Khayelitsha, New Brighton, Gugulethu and others in resorting to mob justice. The satisfaction sourced from eliminating a criminal (s) seems to fuel the resolve around this method of justice. The scourge of crime is pretexted as the main reason behind the mob attacks which the community qualifies by the claim that the police are incapable to police crime. The Diepsloot community knows the moral and legal restrictions around crime of this magnitude but their knowledge of police incapacity allows them to justify this horrendous act. Mob justice incidents may not be occurring daily but their spread across the calendar is an uncomfortable reality everyone should be concerned of. The community, especially the victims, suffer permanent scars of fear and the burden on victim families is enormous. Victim families tend to grapple with permanent problem of dependants that have been incapacitated by the mob attacks. By far, victim families believe that perpetrators continue with impunity and the law-enforcement has revised intervention strategies. Multitask teams (like churches, youth, men's forum and sport) have been formed to reach out to the community but somehow no objective needs-analysis have been conducted thus the products are right but have no consumers. The role played by the police in community projects is acknowledged but the coordination structure is too centralised to purport local ownership. The concepts of moral regeneration and social cohesion have to find practical studies in the community of Diepsloot so as to comprehend the interest of the residents and be impactful to do paradigm shift. Details: Johannesburg, South Africa: University of the Witwatersrand, 2013. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 29, 2016 at: http://mobile.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/13113/Vigilantism%20in%20Diepsloot-Edited-Final%20submission%202.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: South Africa URL: http://mobile.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/13113/Vigilantism%20in%20Diepsloot-Edited-Final%20submission%202.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 139539 Keywords: Citizen PatrolsCrime PreventionVigilantism |
Author: Zizumbo-Colunga, Daniel Title: Crime, Corruption and Societal Support for Vigilante Justice: Ten Years of Evidence in Review Summary: Main Findings: - In 2014, support for vigilante justice reached a 10-year high - Suriname, Ecuador, and El Salvador are the countries in which vigilante justice is the most accepted - Brazil, Bahamas, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the countries in which vigilante justice is the least accepted - Variations in societal support within the countries of the Americas are linked to the prevalence of crime and police corruption Details: Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: AmericasBarometer Insights: 2015 Number 120: Accessed September 8, 2016 at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO920en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO920en.pdf Shelf Number: 140247 Keywords: Police CorruptionVigilante JusticeVigilantesVigilantism |
Author: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Title: Current migration situation in the EU: hate crime Summary: Asylum seekers and migrants face various forms of violence and harassment across the European Union (EU). As this month's report on the migration situation underscores, such acts are both perpetrated and condoned by state authorities, private individuals, as well as vigilante groups. They increasingly also target activists and politicians perceived as 'pro-refugee'. Meanwhile, a lack of relevant data is hampering efforts to develop effective measures to prevent these incidents. Outlining recent attacks in 14 EU Member States, this focus of the November report also examines the diverse factors that undermine the reporting of such incidents and highlights promising practices seeking to counter them. Details: Vienna: FRA, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-november-monthly-focus-hate-crime_en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-november-monthly-focus-hate-crime_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145998 Keywords: Asylum SeekersBias CrimesHate CrimesImmigrantsRefugeesVigilantism |
Author: Kreuzer, Peter Title: If they resist, kill them all: Police vigilantism in the Philippines Summary: In May of 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected President of the Philippines and inaugurated into office on June 30. During the election campaign he was already focusing on ridding the country of drug-related crime and indicated his willingness to tolerate, if not support, the killing of suspects by the police. After entering office, he officially launched a comprehensive campaign against drug-related crime that has since cost the lives of several thousand suspects. While anonymous vigilantes are responsible for a significant share, if not the majority of these extralegal killings, in four months the police killed more than 1,000 suspects in so-called "legitimate encounters" that were justified as actions carried out in self-defense. This report then looks at a vastly under-researched phenomenon: extrajudicial police vigilantism involving killings by on-duty police officers that are masked as "legitimate encounters" with criminals. It argues that, while the Philippines have a strong tradition of death-squad killings, this has been complemented for a long time by a practice of "social cleansing" that did not make it necessary for agents of the state to deny complicity: official police vigilantism. On the contrary, such vigilante killings could be utilized as evidence of a strong state. However, in the past such police vigilantism was a local phenomenon. This changed under the new president, who nationalized the local practice and thereby changed its dynamics. This report provides an overview of the pattern of killings of suspects by members of the Philippine National Police while on duty currently taking place. The main section of the report analyzes past patterns of “legitimate encounters” in a number of selected regions and provinces of the Philippines. The integration of these two datasets allows for a comparison not only among regions and provinces but also over time. Consideration of this quantitative data is complemented by sketches of the dynamics driving current reactions to the new policy in a number of provinces and cities. Going beyond the Philippines, this study also provides a comparative dataset on similar forms of deadly police violence for a small set of countries, regions and cities that permits a comparison of past and present Philippines practice. The detailed analysis shows that: • in most, but not all of the various case studies, there has been a long tradition of police-vigilantism, • regions, provinces and cities that have exhibited higher levels of police vigilantism in the past tend to react more strongly to the presidential campaign that legitimized extralegal killings under the pretext of a "legitimate encounter," • those cases with the highest levels of police vigilantism both now and in the past tend to be the most "developed" ones, fulfilling a metropolitan function at either a national or regional level, • there is no link between threats to the police and their willingness to kill suspects in "legitimate encounters," • prior to the present wave of extrajudicial killings, the magnitude of violent "legitimate encounters" was moderate, although they were carried out by clearly vigilante police forces targeting suspects, • while the patterns of "legitimate encounters" have not changed in the current campaign, the number of extra-legal killings has risen dramatically since the election of President Duterte, • Philippines police officers did not have to learn a new practice; they did not have to unlearn firmly established convictions about due process. They transformed an established but sparingly used practice into a key instrument for reducing crime and for strengthening institutions, • local leaders' reactions to the presidential campaign depend to a significant extent on the local leaders' past perceptions of utilizing the police as a force for "social cleansing" and the leaders’ current power base in the face of rising pressure to conform to the central leadership’s expectations. Going beyond empirical analysis of the data on past and present police vigilantism in the Philippines, I maintain that the present administration uses police vigilantism on the national level to simulate a strong state and thereby achieve widespread public acclaim and acquiescence. By establishing the Philippine National Police as his power base, the new president has within a few months successfully hollowed out democratic checks and balances and installed himself as the foremost “boss” at the national level. While forceful personalities are a regular feature of Philippines politics, their power is normally limited by other bosses who contend for power and wealth. Like Ferdinand Marcos before him, Rodrigo Duterte is well on his way to neutralizing this division of powers – the only one that works well in the Philippines during "normal" times. Currently, it seems that the Philippines are on a direct path toward a regime that may be likened to an electoral dictatorship, where a president, through the shrewd manipulation of public discourse and the resulting outstanding public support, and with the help of the national police, is succeeding in subjugating the various political families that make up the Philippines political elite. Details: Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2016. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Report No. 142 : Accessed February 1, 2017 at: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif142.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Philippines URL: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif142.pdf Shelf Number: 145096 Keywords: Deadly ForceDrug OffendersExtrajudicial KillingsPolice BrutalityPolice Use of ForcePolice ViolenceVigilantism |
Author: Probert, Thomas, ed. Title: Unlawful Killings in Africa: a study prepared for the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Summary: This study presents the work of a Research Team convened by the Centre of Governance and Human Rights (CGHR) at the University of Cambridge. This team was tasked with surveying events and reporting from the African continent germane to the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, a mandate focused upon violations of the right to life contrary to international law. This mandate, together with the framing of the right to life itself, establishes a category of violations that will here be referred to as "unlawful killings". While there are many organisations monitoring and reporting on killings both globally and with particular African focus, most do so with the objective frame of reference of violence. The purpose of this report is to narrow that focus to the (international) legal frame of unlawful killing. This is undertaken with a view to increasing attention to the right to life, but also as a means of assisting the Special Rapporteur in prioritisation over the coming years. Since the international human rights framework, of which this mandate is part, speaks primarily to states or state-like actors and not to private individuals—the category of unlawful killings does not include every act of killing, however illegal in domestic law. However this is not to say that the international legal definition of an unlawful killing cannot accommodate killings which are not perpetrated by a state actor. The state’s dual obligation both to respect and to protect the right to life places certain types of killing by non-state actors within the scope of the mandate and therefore of this study. Unlawful Killings in Africa draws attention to the fact that both the level of state control (both direct and indirect) over the act of killing and the scale of the incidence of the killing can be relevant to determining whether that loss of life can be regarded from within the international human rights system. Details: Cambridge, UK: Centre of Governance and Human Rights, University of Cambridge, 2014. 268p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/research-themes/right_to_life/unlawful_killings_in_africa/unlawful_killings_report/pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/research-themes/right_to_life/unlawful_killings_in_africa/unlawful_killings_report/pdf Shelf Number: 141320 Keywords: Arbitrary Executions Extrajudicial ExecutionsHomicidesHuman Rights AbusesVigilantism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram Summary: Vigilante groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad play a major role in the fight against Boko Haram, but their presence raises concerns. They make military operations less blunt and more effective and have reconnected these states somewhat with many of their local communities, but they have also committed abuses and become involved in the war economy. In Nigeria in particular, vigilantism did much to turn an anti-state insurgency into a bloodier civil war, pitting Boko Haram against communities and leading to drastic increases in violence. As the conflict continues to evolve, so will vigilantes. They are enmeshed with high politics, especially in Nigeria, and in local intercommunal relations, business operations and chiefdoms. Their belief that they should be rewarded will need to be addressed, and it is also important for the Lake Chad basin states to address the common gap in community policing, particularly in rural areas. To ensure vigilantes are not a future source of insecurity, these states will each need to devise their own mix of slowly disbanding and formalising and regulating them. Vigilantism, the recourse to non-state actors to enforce law and order (of a sort), has a history in the Lake Chad region. Colonial powers there relied, to a substantial degree, on local traditional chiefs and their retinues. The multi-faceted crisis in governance and decline in services among the Lake Chad states since the 1980s gave rise to new vigilante groups. The law and order challenges vigilantes tried to address were a factor in the formation and growth of Boko Haram, itself an attempt to provide regulation and guidance. The vigilante fight against Boko Haram started in 2013, in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the insurgency's epicentre, under the twin pressure of mounting jihadist violence and security force retaliation. The Joint Task Force (JTF), led by the Nigerian army, quickly realised the vigilantes’ potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower and set out to help organise it, with the assistance of local and traditional authorities. Operating under the unofficial but revealing name of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), vigilantes were essential in flushing Boko Haram out of the city, then began replicating throughout the state. The official use of vigilantes to fight the movement spread further in Nigeria, then to Cameroon in 2014 and Chad in 2015, where the groups are known as comités de vigilance. Niger has been more cautious, partly because of past struggles with armed groups and because it has not needed them as much. Vigilantes have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in Niger to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in Nigeria. For the region’s overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. They have made the military response more targeted and more efficient, but their mobilisation also provoked retribution by Boko Haram against their communities and contributed to the massive levels of civilian casualties in 2014 and 2015. Paradoxically, this, too, has favoured regional governments’ strategy of pushing civilians away from the jihadists. As the insurgency splinters and falls back on more discrete guerrilla operations and terror attacks, however, the time has come to measure the risks posed by such a massive mobilisation of vigilantes (they claim to be about 26,000 in Borno state alone). Their compensation demands will have to be addressed, especially if authorities consider offering deals to Boko Haram militants to lay down their weapons. In the longer term, vigilantes may become political foot soldiers, turn to organised crime or feed communal violence. Vigilantism can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 244: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Chad URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/244-watchmen-of-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram.pdf Shelf Number: 141380 Keywords: Boko HaramJihadistsTerrorismVigilantesVigilantism |
Author: Westervelt, Carline Title: The Insecurity of Security: A study on the effects of community policing initiatives in Cape Town's townships Summary: South Africa has always been known for its violent society. Even after the Apartheid era ended, violence remained very visible in everyday life of an ordinary South African. Even though the country is moving forward and is often seen as one of the most prosperous countries in the whole continent - demonstrated by the fact it is part of the BRICS2 countries - , it does not seem to get rid of its violent past. The South African Police Service (SAPS) has made some significant changes but is struggling with the sudden change from oppressing the political opposition to fighting crime. The SAPS does not seem to cope with the ever growing demand for their services; they arrive hours late or not at all, are ill equipped and have received too little training (Shaw 2002). Even though they are trying to improve their service constantly, they just do not deliver what is asked from them. Mainly because of this malfunctioning of the police service, a lot of different providers of safety and security have arisen: private security guards and companies, neighbourhood watches, street patrols and many more. Most of these initiatives are still monitored by the government, but there are also policing organisations/groups that are the initiative of the community itself. Details: Utrecht, NETH: Utrecht University, 2012. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 18, 2017 at; https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/254170 Year: 2012 Country: South Africa URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/254170 Shelf Number: 131366 Keywords: Community PolicingPolice-Community RelationsVigilantism |
Author: Sana, Olang Title: Taking Stock of Socio-economic Challenges in the Nairobi Slums: An Inventory of the Pertinent Issues between January 2008 and November 2012 Summary: Kenya's post-2007 elections violence was a landmark event in the country's political history. The violence led to the death of over 1, 300 people, displacement of others, and destruction of property of unknown value especially in the then Nyanza, Western, Rift-valley and Coast provinces. Howevwer, the social cost of the violence was greater than the visible dislocations reported in the media and elsewhere. Over four and a half years after the violence, the social cost of the phenomenon still lives with the victims: survivors who suffered in not-so-visible ways, the internally displaced persons, people who lost property, victims of sexual assault, and people who sustained different kinds of physical and emotional injury. And whereas post -2007 elections crisis speeded up the pace of reforms in Kenya's body politic including the completion of the hitherto stalled constitutional review process, it is surprising that the Kenya government has made frail efforts to address the socio-economic needs of the communities and families affected by the scourge of violence. More surprisingly, very little attention to understand and act on the potential effects of post 2007 elections crisis on the forthcoming polls already slated for March 2013. The Nairobi slums are one area that was adversely affected by the December 2007-January 2008 post elections violence. The slums occupy one-eighth of the land space in Nairobi but host three-quarters of the city's population of four million people. Many factors combine to make the Nairobi slums the most violent and vulnerable neighborhoods in Nairobi. And as media reports indicate, post-election violence started in the Nairobi slums (Kibera) before it spread to other parts of the country. Consequently, the slums bore the heaviest brunt of the violence (relative to the up-market neighborhoods of Nairobi). A lot of information is still outside the public domain regarding how the violence erupted, immediate issues that provoked the violence, the ethnic character of the violence, the nature of disruptions wrought by the violence, and how various slum villages are coping with the trauma. Also outside the public domain is information regarding how the actual socio-economic conditions that prevail in the slums add to their violent character, and an exposition of some unresolved issues as well as emerging threats that could affect the stability of these neighborhoods both before and after the March 2013 polls. More importantly, there is an urgent need to re-examine the slums with reference to the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and other gains so far made towards the implementation of the Constitution. Can the (new) Constitution be used as a reference document for increasing service delivery, advancing rights protection, and laying the foundation for the rule of law in the lives of the three million slums dwellers? What can be done in the pre-and post-March 2013 elections to not only rid the slums of their violent character but also to initiate programmes geared towards changing the face of the slum permanently? The purpose of this booklet is to provide some insight into the concerns outlined above. The authors of the booklet note that there has been some good progress towards addressing some or a combination of the above concerns especially in the aftermath of the violence. However, the intellectual discourse about the slums and violence is as yet embryonic and far too incoherent to guide focused interventions before and after the forthcoming polls. Primarily, the booklet aspires to provoke some thought about the slums and slum dwellers with a view to encouraging government policy makers, the civil society, the international community, the academia and other actors to make informed interventions geared towards improving the physical conditions in the slums without depriving the dwellers of dignity and rights. Details: Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09860.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Kenya URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09860.pdf Shelf Number: 146172 Keywords: Neighborhoods and CrimePoverty and CrimeSlums (Nairobi, Kenya)Socioeconomic Conditions and CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: Baldrich, Roxana Title: Taking the Law Into Our Own Hands: Female Vigilantism in India and Mexico Summary: To conclude, the female vigilantes presented in this paper clearly have a positive short and long-term impact on society. In spite of the limitations listed above, they significantly contribute to the improvement of living conditions for people within their respective communities, especially of those of girls and women. I do not agree with Rastogi and White's (2009) conclusion that "violent retributive activities do not challenge fundamental structures of domination in society over the long term" (324) nor with Sen's (2012) conclusion that "Globally, female vigilantism eventually achieves only partial social freedoms for women, while continuing to operate within the constraints and constants of patriarchal structures" (5-6). There might be female vigilante groups for which these claims are true, but they do not hold as a general conclusion. In the case of the female vigilantes presented in this paper, we have seen that the conclusions drawn on women participating in the autodefensas of Michoacan and Guerrero were mixed, as they do not act independently of men and the media sometimes portray them in a way that highlights the inequality between them and their male comrades. Concerning the Ni Una Mas movement, the Gulabi Gang and the Red Brigade, however, this paper has demonstrated that they clearly contribute to the betterment of society. They might not be in a position where they have the means and influence to radically change their communities, but it would be unrealistic to expect them to be able to achieve this in the short run. Considering the highly oppressive and violent contexts in which these women live, the manifold activities and services that they have developed are already revolutionary. And by showing their communities - and the world - that they want change and are ready to fight for it, they have taken the first step to reforming society. Today, there might still be flaws in their strategies and limitations to their impact, but they have already achieved a lot, and each and every of their small achievements contributes to long-term change in their communities. However, it is obvious that it takes a long time to make such change happen. In a nutshell, female vigilantism seems indeed to have "transformative and dynamic properties [...] that support and empower the potential for equitable and viable female agency (Graham-Bertolini, 2011, 4). In fact, the diversity of the activities undertaken by most of the vigilantes described in this paper prove that they do have a long-term, collective vision of what they would like to achieve: in addition to their short-term goals of protecting themselves against male aggression and providing their communities with services and support on a day-to-day basis, they also clearly work towards their long-term goal of empowering women. In fact, by giving women a voice and creating an environment for them in which they can act more self-determinedly and more independently of men, as well as by negating commonly assumed gender roles and prejudices about violent women, they might be able, in the long run, to change the place that is assigned to women within their respective communities, thereby improving women's living conditions and liberating them. The success and popularity of female vigilante groups is a proof of "the power of informal women's collectives to implement change without elite intervention or leadership" (Sen, 2012, 10). However, if the Ni Una Mas movement, the Gulabi Gang and the Red Brigade clearly contribute to the betterment of society, this is in large part thanks to their peaceful activities, not through the violent acts that they perpetrate. As we have seen in this paper, violence merely represents a starting point for these vigilante groups: it is used in order to gain the attention and respect of the community, especially of its male members and of officials, and thereby enable the women to carry out their manifold activities. He have also seen that members of female vigilante groups, especially of the Gulabi Gang and the Red Brigade, "are increasingly called upon by men to challenge not only male authority over women, but all human rights abuses inflicted on the weak" (website of Sampat Pal Devi). These findings are consistent with Rastogi and White's conclusion that Gulabi Gang members are "women with grassroots feminist sensibilities, offering psychological, social and justice-related assistance" (2009, 314), as well as with Graham-Bertolini's claim that female vigilantism can be described as a form of "constructive collective enterprise" (2011, 6). These findings indicate that an important direction for further research lies in the exploration of more traditional scholarly work on activism and social movements. It would indeed be very interesting to analyze female vigilantism from a perspective where the phenomenon is seen as part of more traditional forms of collective action. This approach would allow the researcher to refer to the abundant literature available on social movements, and on the role that violence can play within them. Traditional scholarly work on activism and social movements that would be helpful in this context includes, for instance, the work by Sidney Tarrow (1994) on "protest cycles", also known as cycles of contention or waves of collective action, which help explain the rise and fall in social movement activity, described by the author as being related to cyclical openings in political opportunity which create incentives for collective action. Another important work by Tarrow, developed in cooperation with Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, concerns the concept of "contentious politics" (Doug, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Tarrow and Tilly, 2006), which explains how dynamics of social protest are tied to their social, political and economic contexts. With regard to the study of vigilantism, this concept is important both as a field of study and as a methodological approach, because, amongst other things, it helps describe the use of disruptive techniques to make a political point, or to change government policy. Another important contribution to the study of social movements by Tilly (1995) is the conceptualization of the "social movement repertoire" which describes "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice" (264). These routines "emerge from struggle" and change over space and time (Ibid.). The concepts of protest cycles, contentious politics and repertoires are particularly relevant to the study of vigilantism because they help describe and explain the repression of social movements, as well as consequences of, and reactions to, such repression. The latter include militants' adaptation techniques and their turn to violence (Steinhoff, P.G. and Zwerman, G., 2013). The issue of social movement repression is particularly important to further the study of the Ni Una Mas movement, and has been explored in more detail by Helene Combes (2009) and by Daniela Cuadros and Daniella Rocha (2013), amongst others. Some other sources that are relevant to further research on female vigilantism include work by Etienne Penissat (2009) on the occupation of premises - a strategy used by the Gulabi Gang - and work by Lucie Bargel and Xavier Dunezat (2009) on gender and activism - especially important with regard to the study of women within mixed vigilante groups. Details: Paris: Paris School of International Affairs, 2014. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: http://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/Taking%20the%20Law%20Into%20Our%20Own%20Hands%20-%20Female%20Vigilantism%20in%20India%20%26%20Mexico_Roxanna%20Baldrich.pdf Year: 2014 Country: India URL: http://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/Taking%20the%20Law%20Into%20Our%20Own%20Hands%20-%20Female%20Vigilantism%20in%20India%20%26%20Mexico_Roxanna%20Baldrich.pdf Shelf Number: 146956 Keywords: Female VigilantesVigilantesVigilantism |
Author: Hale, Gary J. Title: Vigilantism in Mexico: A New Phase in Mexico's Security Crisis Summary: The violent struggle between rival Mexican drug cartels and other criminal groups has left tens of thousands dead and towns across Mexico paralyzed with fear. With overwhelmed police forces relatively powerless to control drug-related murders and kidnappings, a growing number of vigilante organizations, or self-defense groups, aim to restore order-but now even they are fighting, and killing, among themselves. The rise of these vigilantes is yet another test for the Mexican government. Will people continue to take security matters into their own hands? How long will they operate as independent security units? In Michoacan, what started as a cooperative agreement between self-defense groups and the federal government has become a tug-of-war over which group will ultimately provide security in Western Mexico. In one incident, police in March 2014 found two charred bodies-believed to be members of a self-defense group-in the back of a pickup truck. Days later, Mexican federal police arrested Hipolito Mora, leader of a prominent, rival self-defense group.1 Internecine fighting among the vigilante groups only means trouble for their future- and the government that deputized them as armed, rural defense forces. Details: Baker Institute, Rice University, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief 04.18.14: Accessed November 16, 2017 at: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/3e645892/BI-Brief-041814-Vigilantism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/3e645892/BI-Brief-041814-Vigilantism.pdf Shelf Number: 148201 Keywords: GangsHomicidesMilitiasOrganized CrimeVigilantismViolence |
Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist ViolenceExtremistsIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismVigilantismViolent Extremism |