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Results for violence (el salvador)

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Author: Cano, Ignacio

Title: Living Without Arms? Evaluation of the Arms-Free Municipalities Project: An Experience in Risk-Tasking in a Risky Contect

Summary: In El Salvador, it is estimated that around half a million firearms are in circulation—arms that cause 80 of every 100 murders that take place in one of the most homicide-prone countries in Latin America, with a rate of over 55 for every 100,000 inhabitants. With exceedingly lax legislation and a segment of the population imbued of an arms culture that considers their need to be armed an indisputable right, few are the practical initiatives undertaken in an attempt to correct this situation. The National Council on Public Security (CNSP), with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), put its stakes on a project that was aimed at improving human development in two pilot municipalities—San Martín and Ilopango—through a reduction in armed violence. The project had been conceived of with a dual strategic perspective: on the one hand, to serve as a model to other municipalities, particularly within the country, but also abroad, and on the other, to stimulate greater debate in favour of putting legal limits on the carrying of firearms at the national level. Two years later, several things have shifted in El Salvador regarding the controversial topic of arms. All public opinion polls concur in pointing toward greater public rejection of the carrying of arms in public places (now around 90%), and even of the possession of firearms. The Firearms Law was just amended by the Legislative Assembly at the behest of the National Commission on Citizen Security and Social Peace, created recently by the President of El Salvador, where different political forces, university rectors, churches and private enterprise are represented. The amendment broadened the prohibition on carrying arms to include plazas, parks and petrol stations, and now provides the option of decreeing spatial and temporal moratoriums in determined places and municipalities. The National Commission also recommended that the President analyze the possibility of, at a minimum, extending the Arms- Free Municipalities Project to the 20 localities in the country with the highest rates of violence and crime. No doubt these are small steps, but significant ones, on the road toward prohibiting the carrying of firearms by civilians in public places in El Salvador. Has the Arms-Free Municipalities project been a total success? Although we do not conceal our pride at the results attained by this pilot project, it would be imprudent, even presumptuous, to attribute to this initiative all the progress made over the last two years in building public awareness and in limiting firearms in El Salvador. No, the Arms-Free Municipalities project, with its bright spots and dark spots, its hits and its misses, is not the only thing responsible for these achievements. But, no doubt it has contributed to sparking new local and national debate, not only on the proliferation of firearms, but also on the right way to design the approach to a problem—escalating violence, crime and insecurity—whose magnitude already borders on the tragic. Likewise, it has also contributed to progress in other essential aspects, such as local management of citizen security. The implementation of this initiative and, especially, the astonishing finding of a notable reduction in homicides (47%) in San Martín, in an almost generalized context of mounting lethal violence, has encouraged other localities such as Santa Tecla, Santa Ana and, lately, San Salvador, the capital, to undertake similar initiatives. The people governing these municipalities, against the current in a strongly centralized and centralist country, where the vision and resources for local management of security are almost nonexistent, have begun to take the reins of a politically sensitive issue.

Details: San Salvador, El Salvador: United Nations Development Programme, 2008. 64p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 27, 2012 at: http://www.pnud.org.sv/2007/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,19/Itemid,56/?mosmsg=Est%E1+intentando+acceder+desde+un+dominio+no+autorizado.+%28www.google.com%29

Year: 2008

Country: El Salvador

URL: http://www.pnud.org.sv/2007/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,19/Itemid,56/?mosmsg=Est%E1+intentando+acceder+desde+un+dominio+no+autorizado.+%28www.google.com%29

Shelf Number: 125071

Keywords:
Gun Control
Guns
Homicides
Violence (El Salvador)

Author: Harvard Law School, Human Rights Program, International Human Rights Clinic

Title: No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador

Summary: Fifteen years after the civil war in El Salvador came to an end, violence and insecurity continue to shape the daily lives of many Salvadorans. This report examines the phenomenon of youth gangs and documents human rights violations associated with gang violence and Salvadoran governmental responses to it. Our examination is situated in the context of an assessment of the current state of the rule of law in El Salvador. The war in El Salvador during the 1980s was one of the bloodiest and most brutal in a region gripped with civil conflicts throughout that decade. The Salvadoran conflict gained worldwide notoriety for the prevalence of human rights abuses and death squads, that operated with the apparent acquiescence of state authorities, to terrorize civilian populations. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section I of this report, efforts since the war to build functioning democratic institutions in El Salvador have largely failed to overcome the legacies of institutional incapacity and politicization. Current levels of violence are extraordinarily high. El Salvador’s homicide rate is nearly double the average for Latin America, a region with high levels of violence by global standards. Continued political polarization, weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and the persistence of extra-judicial violence seriously undermine citizen security and the rule of law in El Salvador. Violent street gangs have grown rapidly in this fractured and dysfunctional socio-political context. The deportation of tens of thousands of Salvadorans from the United States since the late 1990s (a consequence of forced emigration of Salvadoran families during the civil war years and subsequent changes to U.S. immigration laws) helped spur the growth and development of these gangs, a process we describe in Section II. In recent years, and as a result of particularized political conditions and law enforcement responses in El Salvador, the dynamics of the gang phenomenon have evolved. The two major rival gangs – the Mara Salvatrucha and the Mara 18, both of which have U.S. roots and a U.S. presence – engage in brutal battles for control of neighborhoods and communities throughout the country. Gangs’ methods of recruitment, and the sanctions they impose on members who demonstrate disloyalty or who attempt to withdraw from active gang life, are increasingly violent. Active and former gang members report that it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for young people to escape the pressure of gang recruitment or to leave a gang. Gangs frequently use extortion to gather funds and solidify territorial control. There is evidence that organized criminal networks are operating with growing sophistication and impunity in El Salvador. The relationship between these organized criminal networks and the upper tiers of gang hierarchies is uncertain, as is the role of state actors in these activities, but the effect on Salvadoran citizens – a deepening sense of impunity and insecurity – is clear. The primary governmental response to the gang phenomenon, which relies heavily on repressive law enforcement-military tactics, mass arrests, and profiling of youth and alleged gang members, has been ineffective and even counter-productive. Governmental responses to the gang phenomenon are explored in great depth in Section III of this report. Homicide rates have soared since 2003, when former President Francisco Flores launched the Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) crackdown. Meanwhile, the government’s focus on anti-gang efforts has distorted the complex nature of violence in El Salvador. The vast majority of homicides in El Salvador remain in impunity. Human rights organizations and civil society observers believe that some of the upsurge in killings in recent years is attributable to death squads who target alleged gang members or other criminals and who operate with impunity. Also in the past several years, the political roots of violence in El Salvador have become increasingly visible. Clashes between protesters and police on July 5, 2006 are one example of the relationship between political polarization and violence in El Salvador, and spikes in unexplained, brutal homicides in periods prior to national elections are another. In the midst of this social and political conflict, individual Salvadorans living in poor and marginalized communities have no place to hide: they are targeted by violent actors on all sides. Young people and other residents of areas with a gang presence, active gang members, and inactive gang members are targeted for threats, abuses, and even killings by gangs, police, and clandestine actors like death squads. We present narrative excerpts from interviews with victims and witnesses of gang, police, and clandestine violence in El Salvador in Section IV. The report is based on fact-finding visits to El Salvador in March- April and August-September 2006, and months of follow-up research prior to and after these trips. It draws extensively on interviews with current and former gang members and other victims and witnesses of violence in El Salvador, as well as with staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental officials. To protect the safety of confidential sources, we refer to them only by pseudonyms and initials.

Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Human Rights Program, 2007. 111p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2012 at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/FinalElSalvadorReport(3-6-07).pdf

Year: 2007

Country: El Salvador

URL: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/FinalElSalvadorReport(3-6-07).pdf

Shelf Number: 110108

Keywords:
Gang Violence
Gangs
Homicides
Organized Crime
Violence (El Salvador)
Violent Crime

Author: Whitfield, Teresa

Title: Mediating Criminal Violence – Lessons from the gang truce in El Salvador

Summary: During the 1980s El Salvador suffered a bitterly contested civil war. Negotiations mediated by the United Nations concluded in a peace agreement in 1992 and set the course for the, largely smooth, assimilation of former guerrillas in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) into Salvadoran political life. Post-war, violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups escalated as a result of the involvement of gangs and a range of other criminal actors, in parallel to similar crises of security in Guatemala and Honduras. Honduras and El Salvador were subsequently placed first and second in the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime’s global index of homicide with 92 and 69 homicides per 100,000 respectively in 2011. In a shift from previous policies which had emphasized the robust suppression of violent crime, in March 2012 facilitators answerable to the Salvadoran government mediated a controversial truce between the country’s two main gangs. The truce brought about a dramatic reduction in the country’s homicide rate whilst raising multiple questions about the risks and benefits of direct engagement with criminal actors. This paper has been written while the outcomes of the gang truce in El Salvador are still unfolding. It suggests that the truce has been imperfectly managed and remains fragile, but is also a considerable achievement. Lessons that may be derived from it are limited by the specific characteristics and circumstances of the Salvadoran gangs. Yet, they merit consideration for several reasons. The Salvadoran truce, and the arrival in Mexico of a government determined to address the country’s spiralling violence, much of which is exacerbated by competition for the gains of the illicit economy and drug trade, have placed new emphasis on alternative paths to pacification. More broadly, counternarcotics policies that for decades have been framed as a “war on drugs” are being challenged, most recently in a groundbreaking report by the Organization of American States (OAS) that specifically addresses – among other issues – “the violence and suffering associated with the drug problem” in the Americas. Elsewhere, national and international actors are struggling to craft and implement responses to organised violence and crime in situations in which criminal activities have developed as a result of unresolved conflict grievances (in South Africa, Northern Ireland and Kosovo, for example), or where they seek to shape electoral politics (in Kenya, Jamaica and the Solomon Islands), or where they hide behind grievances which are fuelling armed conflict (in Colombia, Mali and Myanmar to name but three examples). They, too, can benefit from the lessons and questions that emerge from the Salvadoran experience.

Details: Geneva, SWIT: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013. 24p.

Source: Internet Resource: Oslo Forum Papers No. 001: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Mediating-Criminal-Violence.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: El Salvador

URL: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Mediating-Criminal-Violence.pdf

Shelf Number: 129373

Keywords:
Drug-Related Violence
Gangs
Violence (El Salvador)
Violent Crime