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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for violence (honduras)
2 results foundAuthor: Zinecker, Heidrun Title: Violence in a Homeostatic System – the Case of Honduras Summary: In Central America there are currently three countries with high levels of violence and two with low levels. Honduras, along with El Salvador and Guatemala, belongs to the countries with high levels of violence, while Nicaragua and Costa Rica have relatively low levels of violence in the context of Central America. After El Salvador, Honduras is the country with the highest incidence of violence not only in Central America, but in Latin America as a whole. Honduras has a homicide rate which is five times higher than the world average. This high rate refers to a violence which is virtually exclusively violent crime, and which has nothing whatsoever to do with civil wars, revolutions or other armed political conflicts. The report begins by discussing empirical findings on violence, before going on to look for the causes of the present violence. It takes as its hypothesis, the fact that a particularly significant cause of the high levels of violence is a state security sector which is failing to function as it should, but which nonetheless does not reflect any fundamental failure of the state as a whole. A homeostatic system which was traditionally characteristic of Honduras operated in the past in such as way as essentially to exclude violence. Nowadays, however, the system integrates violence as one of its sub-systems. The report adopts the aetiological approach as used in criminology, and differentiates between enabling and (absent) preventive structures within the societal structures which cause violence. In its analysis of the enabling structures in Honduras the report initially follows the exclusion principle, by stripping frequently mentioned, anticipated in the long term, but ultimately only putative, enabling structures of any linear-causal sense pertaining to present violence. This involves theories which imply that the present high level of violent crime is a continuation of earlier wartime violence, or that turbulent transitions into democracy simply provide a window of opportunity for high intensity violence in the post-transition phase, or that it is historically handed down economic backwardness, poverty and general inequality of income distribution which cause high levels of violence, or that traditional capacity for reform and political stability are a guarantee of low levels of violence. The fact that Honduras calls these theories into question, and in so doing occupies a key position in a comparison of violence within Central America, is due to the country’s specific historical structural characteristics. These are at the basis of a homeostatic system which for a long time excluded violence over a wide area, because it made reforms, inclusion and conflict mediation possible. These country-specific characteristics are: 1) the absence of an oligarchy as a “national class” and any corresponding mechanisms for rule, 2) relatively widespread democratic traditions and a stable political system, based on two traditional parties, 3) political autonomy for the Army and a “soft”, partially reformist military dictatorship, 4) “well distributed” poverty, 5) a weak left wing, and 6) a democratic transition “from above” with the (armed) support of the USA. Since these long-term anticipations do allow an answer to the question of what is specific to Honduras in the form of a homeostatic system, but not to that of the causes of present violence, the report focuses on new configurations in its quest for enabling structures. These new structures arose from the processes of economic and political transformation at the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, such as 1) from low to high poverty rates and from a relatively fair to a less fair distribution of income, 2) from old (agrarian) rents to new rents (maquila or sweatshop industry, remittances and financial rent), 3) from agrarian rents to financial rents and from a traditionally non-oligarchic elite to a new (financial) oligarchy, and 4) from an inclusive military dictatorship to a more democratic although still politically exclusive regime, as well as from a politicized, politically active to a de-politicized, politically inactive population. In analyzing the (absent) preventive structures the report concentrates on the state security sector. First of all the point is made that in Honduras there has never been a coherent security policy, let alone any security strategy, to contain the new violence. The Honduran security policy followed the Central American cycle customary in intensely violent countries in the region, namely „creation of a new security sector/making the existing one more democratic – ignorance of the security problem – repressive measures – partial withdrawal of repressive measures”. Instead of bad reality being aligned with good laws, the relatively good laws following transition were aligned with the bad reality. This is illustrated especially by the reform of Article 332 of the Honduran penal code, under which the regulations covering illegal gatherings were extended to include the maras. The report goes on to illustrate the poor performance of the police force (poor investigative action, repressive exercise of violence, loss of independence through involvement of the army in domestic security), judiciary (politicization of the judiciary, exemption from punishment, corruption) and penal system (over-crowding, loss of control, massacres). It will be shown that the police, public prosecutor’s office and judges are linked in their lack of performance capacity not in an anarchic way, but in a clear regulatory logic, with the result that non-regulability arises in the security sector system as a whole. Nonetheless the failure of the security sector in Honduras does not equate to state failure, because the failing security sector is compensated by other, particularly well functioning state (party system, presidency and parliament) and informal structures (clientelism, nepotism, personalism or corruption). Not only the weak security sector, but also nonstate violence itself is closely integrated into the system. Political stability exists not in spite of but because of high rates of violence, at least under the precondition that the violence remains criminal and not political in nature. In this way the homeostatic system, from now on with the inclusion of violence, has a new configuration. As a result, violence simultaneously takes the place of capacity for reform, conflict mediation and inclusion, that is, those earlier props of the system, which collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s. At the same time this ensured the continuation of regime hybridity. Instead of putting the (democratic) performance capacity of the security sector at risk, it is in the rational interests of the Honduran oligarchy to incorporate the present violence as a new stabilizing sub-system into the homeostatic system which has been knocked offbalance by processes of economic and political transformation. Oligarchies as a minority rule by definition desire no (inclusive) democracy, because they are not interested in abolishing themselves. For this reason, they can also have no interest in making the security sector completely democratic and subject to the rule of law or making it capable of performing better, because this would in the end rebound on them like a boomerang, against their own involvement in corruption, clientelism and organized crime. In the conclusions drawn by the report, the case is put forward for an integrated strategy for containing violence, aimed not only at all the components of the security sector, but also conceived in both the long and medium term, and at both the economic and political level. At the level of economic enabling structures the report recommends strengthening the middle class and the production of capital goods, so that labour is encouraged instead of criminality, and in the medium term a new kind of conditionality which incites the oligarchy to redirect its rents from the speculative finance sector to that of the production of capital goods. At the level of political enabling structures, inclusion by means of elections should be called for. At the level of preventive structures, focus should be directed at developing an integral security concept and supporting the criminal investigation department and the public prosecutor’s office. At the same time, support must be given to those calling for and those practising the rule of law. The report ends with the hypothesis, explosive in terms of development and peace policy, that it is a mistake to believe that poverty must first of all be tackled so as automatically to bring about the containment of violence as a by-product. Not only war and terrorism, but also violent crime generate extremely high levels of violence and can become a security risk well beyond continental boundaries. Details: Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2008 46p. Source: Internet Resource: PRIF Reports No. 83: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif83.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif83.pdf Shelf Number: 129231 Keywords: HomicidesSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence (Honduras)Violent Crime |
Author: Carvajal, Roger A. Title: Violence in Honduras: An Analysis of the Failure in Public Security and the State's Response to Criminality Summary: The incidence of violence in Honduras currently is the highest in Honduran history. In 2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the Honduras homicide rate, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as the highest in the world for nations outside of war. It is the foundation of this thesis that the Honduran security collapse is due to unresolved internal factors - political, economic, and societal - as well as the influence of foreign factors and actors - the evolution of the global illicit trade. Two of the most important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility of the Honduran state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The emergence of criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and the government's security policies, are all factors that have worsened public security. The crime environment has overwhelmed the police, military, judicial system and overcrowded the prison system with mostly juvenile petty delinquents. Moreover, with a high impunity rate of nearly 95 percent for homicides, killing in Honduras has become an activity without consequences. The latest state's response is with re-militarization of security, highlighting the dilemma of the challenges of combatting internal violence and transnational organized crime in a weak state. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 10, 2014 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 133901 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence (Honduras)Violent Crime |