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Date: November 25, 2024 Mon
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Results for violent extremism
151 results foundAuthor: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism Summary: Efforts to promote “deradicalization,” or to rehabilitate detainees charged with terrorism-related offenses, have taken multiple forms in a wide range of countries, often as part of broader counter-radicalization strategies that seek to prevent the adoption of violent extremist ideologies or behaviors in the first place. This paper draws on recent insights from case studies of deradicalization initiatives in eight Muslim-majority countries and a variety of approaches adopted by countries in Europe and Asia. The paper makes recommendations concerning what role the United Nations might play in furthering such initiatives by states and facilitating broader international efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Shelf Number: 121610 Keywords: Extremist GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe Summary: Populist extremist parties (PEPs) present one of the most pressing challenges to European democracies, but their appeal and the profile of their supporters remain poorly understood. This report examines what is causing citizens across Europe to shift support behind populist extremists and recommends how mainstream political parties can respond to the challenge. PEPs have spent much of the past two decades exchanging strategies, ideas and best practice. This has enabled them to respond to new issues and events more innovatively and effectively than the established parties. Until the mainstream parties similarly begin to exchange lessons, root their responses in the evidence and address the actual anxieties of PEP voters, populist extremists will continue to rally support among a new generation of citizens. If politicians and policymakers are to meet this challenge, they need to radically rethink their current approach to populist extremism. Details: London: Chatham House, 2011. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 122924 Keywords: Radical Groups (Europe)TerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Cortright, David Title: Friend not Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle against Violent Extremism - A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame Summary: Repressive counterterrorism measures (CTMs) have led to an erosion of civil liberties and human rights in many countries. The repercussions have been felt keenly by civil society groups, especially in the global South. Overly restrictive security policies have contributed to a climate of suspicion toward nongovernmental groups, particularly those that challenge social exclusion and unequal power relations. Many of the organizations that work against extremism by promoting human rights and development are themselves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate. Counterterrorism measures include a wide range of policies with differing impacts, which can be loosely characterized as the good, the bad, and the ugly. In the bad and ugly categories are CTMs that overemphasize security and distort development priorities, and that lead to extrajudicial killings, greater state repression, and increased human rights abuse. Repressive counterterrorism measures constrain the operational capacity of civil society actors and impede the work of groups promoting rights-based development. On the positive side are cooperative nonmilitary measures that enhance the capacity of governments to thwart terrorist attacks. Also in the good category are policies that encourage support for sustainable development and the defense of human rights, as recommended in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. The evaluation of particular policies should be based on the degree to which they contribute to genuine security and democratic governance, while also upholding the rule of law and protecting the work of those striving to defend human rights, promote development, and resolve conflict. The recent trend toward the use of development funding for security-related programs has stirred controversy among development agencies and civil society actors. In the United States a growing percentage of development funding is being channeled through the Pentagon or integrated with military operations. Development advocates recognize the connections that exist between development and security, but they oppose the diversion of development funding to serve the security interests of governments in the global North. The integrity and autonomy of development and human rights activities must be respected as ends in themselves, not as means to other purposes. International policies to prevent the financing of terrorism have adversely affected nonprofit charities and have created a chilling effect in the donor community. Transnational Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties in fulfilling the almsgiving obligation of the zakaat. In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on foreign funding. Such restrictions have made it more difficult to finance independent humanitarian assistance, development, and conflict mediation activities. In response to the repressive pressures and restrictions that have been imposed on civil society groups and their supporters, NGOs have established a set of core principles, based on international legal conventions, for protecting the operational and political space of civil society groups. These are: the right to entry, defined as the freedom to associate and form organizations; the right to operate without unwanted state interference; the right to free expression; the right to communicate and cooperate freely internally and externally; the right to seek and secure resources; and the right to have these freedoms protected by the state. States have a duty under international law to assure all citizens the full range of human and civil rights, including freedoms of association and expression. Through their efforts for development and human rights, civil society groups are working to dry up the wells of extremism from which violence springs. Civil society organizations address political grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power imbalances that are among the roots causes of armed conflict. This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism. International policymakers must recognize and protect this vital civil society mission and take action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs. In the global struggle against terrorism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends, not hounded as foes. Details: Goshen, IN: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2008. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 2, 2012 at http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/KROC_FriendFoe_CivilSocietyAgainstViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 124351 Keywords: Civil LibertiesCounterterrorismHuman RightsViolent Extremism |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The Aryan Circle: Crime in the Name of Hate Summary: The Aryan Circle is a large, growing and dangerous white supremacist prison gang based primarily in Texas, though it has a presence in a number of other states. It is active both in prisons and on the streets. It is an extreme and violent group, with a long track record of murder, including the deaths of two police officers in Bastrop, Louisiana, in 2007. The Aryan Circle combines extremism with organized crime. The Aryan Circle is an organized crime group; its white supremacy often takes a backseat to traditional criminal motives. However, it uses its white supremacy as a bond to cement the loyalty of individual members to the group, creating an extended Aryan crime "family." It originated in the Texas prison system in the mid-1980s. For many years it was a small group, but by 2009 it has become the second largest white supremacist gang in the Texas prison system. Most of the group's members are concentrated in Texas, with cells in or near many metropolitan areas, including Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, Waco, San Angelo, Wichita Falls, and Midland/Odessa, among others. The group also has spread its tentacles into surrounding states, has attempted to actively recruit new members in Texas' border states, and individual cells and members have been noted across the country. Details: New York: ADL, 2009. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 21, 2012 at: Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 124630 Keywords: Hate GroupsOrganized CrimePrison Gangs (Texas)Violent Extremism |
Author: Deardorff, Robert B. Title: Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity Summary: It is crucial for the United States to confront the increasing incidence of Americans who turn to violence against their fellow citizens in support of Islamist terrorists. This thesis explores the application of “soft power,” the government’s ability to mitigate the recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists by attraction rather than coercion, in order to prevent “homegrown” terrorism. Methods include a comparative policy analysis of counterterrorism models in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a survey of conservative Muslim leaders in the Houston area, and an extensive literature review. Recent arrests portend an increasing threat if the United States continues along its “hard power” path exclusively. Potential solutions require active engagement by government leaders, coordinated messaging, and continuing contact between government agencies and vulnerable communities. A broad national strategy, refined and implemented at a regional level, is required. Strategies that balance hard and soft power separate radicalizing influences from their recruiting pool, alter the social context of potential recruits in favor of democratic process, and make partners of potential antagonists. Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) offer a mechanism to develop and support strategies that combine government, nongovernment, and community leaders to combat terrorism at the ideological level. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed April 12, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Shelf Number: 124942 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)Violent Extremism |
Author: Fekete, Liz Title: Pedlars of hate: the violent impact of the European far Right Summary: his report brings together over one hundred cases from the beginning of 2010 until April 2012. Many aspects of far-right violence are discussed – from online death threats to arson and murder. While some of the cases suggest that small underground groups are stockpiling weapons and preparing for ‘race war’, with the organisations and individuals attempting to articulate how serious the situation is, now at serious risk themselves from the far Right, it would be wrong to see the situation in terms of one single and coherent far-right movement taking root across Europe. On the contrary, each far-right movement builds on its country’s particular extremist tradition. Details: London: The Institute for Race Relations, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2012 at http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Shelf Number: 125384 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHate CrimesRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Title: How Indonesian Extremists Regroup Summary: Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country’s violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisation programs. The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role. Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done. Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country’s largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers. Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the “enemy” – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder. There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 228: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Shelf Number: 125628 Keywords: Radical GroupsTerrorismTerrorists (Indonesia)Violent Extremism |
Author: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Title: Latin America as an Arena for Iran and Hezbollah's Terrorist, Subversive and Criminal Activities Summary: Since Ahmadinejad was elected president in August 2005, Iran has extended and solidified its relations with several Latin American countries, especially Venezuela and Bolivia, and increased its efforts to obtain a political foothold in the others. According to findings brought before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Iran has significantly increased its diplomatic representation in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil. It was also reported that since 2005 Iran has increased the number of its embassies in Latin America from five to 11, and set up 17 "cultural centers" as well. The common factors in the increasingly close relations between Iran and some of the Latin American countries are their anti-American ideologies and policies, and their desire to present a revolutionary alternative to what they perceive as American imperialism. Iran exploits those relations to strengthen its foothold in Latin America (also employing Hezbollah), to establish a presence and gain political, economic, cultural and religious influence. As in other areas of the world, in Latin America Iran employs terrorism and subversion, and works to instill radical Shi'ite Islamic ideology into the local Muslim communities. Details: Israel: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2012 at: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20318/E_061_12_1444742692.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20318/E_061_12_1444742692.pdf Shelf Number: 125770 Keywords: Terrorism (Latin America)Violent Extremism |
Author: Kabir, Mohammad Title: Safety and Security in North Bengal, Bangladesh: A Youth Perception Survey Summary: There is an increasing recognition that a secure environment is a precondition for development. Armed violence, insecurity and poverty are often inter-connected and not only undermine individual security but also impede progress towards the eradication of poverty. Over the past decade, there has been a perceived increase in incidents of violence, including armed violence, in North Bengal, Bangladesh. The prevalence of armed groups and incidences of violence and crime threaten community safety and security in a region which has often been identified as vulnerable to instability and insecurity. However, there have been no recent empirical studies that have explored perceptions of young women and men in North Bengal regarding safety and security and future options for creating a secure and stable region. Perceptions of the youth are important since they are the future leaders who will determine the future course of their country in both ideological and socio-political development terms. The principal aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of perceived and actual trends in insecurity and ways to address them as seen from the hearts and minds of young people in North Bengal. Details: Dhaka, Bangladesh: Bangaladesh Enterprise Institute; London: Saferworld, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 11, 2012 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/North%20Bengal%20report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/North%20Bengal%20report.pdf Shelf Number: 125986 Keywords: Violence (Bangladesh)Violent CrimeViolent Extremism |
Author: Romaniuk, Peter Title: From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs Summary: In the years following 9/11, threat assessments necessarily focused on the dangers posed by al-Qaida, its affiliates, and those inspired by its ideology. There are signs, however, that the threat today is more complex and diffuse, comprising extremists from all parts of the ideological spectrum who may act in small “self-starter” groups or, in some cases, as “lone wolves.” The paths to extremism are more varied than ever before, and as our understanding of contemporary patterns of radicalization has advanced, terrorism prevention initiatives have become more prevalent in the counterterrorism repertoire at the national and multilateral levels. As many states have elaborated terrorism prevention strategies in recent years, they have begun to confront similar challenges. Among these is the challenge of program evaluation. Is the turn toward prevention an effective response to the diverse extremist threats that states face today? How can the effectiveness of prevention policies be measured? What approaches have states advanced in evaluating the impact of terrorism prevention initiatives? In responding to this challenge, can lessons be gleaned from efforts to evaluate programs in related policy domains? This policy report provides an initial discussion of these questions. It draws on the discussions during a meeting entitled “Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism Programming” and held in Ottawa on 9–10 February 2012, as well as discussions with experts, government officials, and an initial desktop literature review. Details: New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Shelf Number: 126571 Keywords: Crime PreventionCrime Prevention ProgramsEvaluative StudiesExtremist GroupsLone Wolves TerrorismTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes. The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality. DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. Details: Wshington, DC: GAO, 2012. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-79: Accessed November 20, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Shelf Number: 126940 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism TrainingExtremist GroupHomeland Security (U.S.)Police TrainingTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomegrown TerroristsHomeland SecurityJihadist TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation Summary: This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically. After providing definitions of capacity and capacity building, this brief outlines the five basic principles of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as they relate to capacity development. The discussion then turns to how criminal justice and rule of law capacity building can contribute to countering terrorism and to mitigating conditions conducive to violent extremism by enhancing the capacity of weak state institutions to deliver equitable security and justice to all. It concludes by offering guidance based on best practices and lessons learned from past and ongoing capacity-building efforts in accordance with key themes presented over the course of the brief. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: www.globalct.org Year: 2012 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128208 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRule of LawTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Mesoy, Atle Title: Poverty and Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: A Causal Link? Summary: The consensus in past research into terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) is that generally there is no link between poverty and radicalisation, and if such a link exists, it is a weak one. However, insufficient attention has been paid to how terrorism has changed over the last few years to become a phenomenon that frequently occurs in weak, conflict-ridden states. In these states, poverty seems to play an essential role especially with regard to the motivation of suicide bombers. In the case of Pakistan, a current hotbed of terrorism, little research has been done on this issue and what little research that has been conducted points in opposite directions. However, more recent research has concluded that RVE and terrorism have to be researched in each country/area where terrorism exists and conclusions cannot be generalised to all countries. There is reason to believe that there is a causal link between poverty and RVE, especially in countries such as Pakistan, where there are high levels of poverty and militant groups both recruit and supply social services, and where poverty-stricken young men have few livelihood options other than that of joining a militant group. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2013. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: NOREF Expert Analysis: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf Shelf Number: 128212 Keywords: Economic Conditions and CrimePovertyRadical Groups (Pakistan)RadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication principles can strengthen international efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism. The report examines the evolution of the challenge and draws on discussions with officials, diplomats, and experts to offer a series of recommendations for enhancing strategic communications on counterterrorism. While this study focuses on the United Nations, the key principles and recommendations may also be applicable to governments and international organizations confronting this complex transnational threat. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/mastering-the-narrative-counterterrorism-strategic-communication-and-the-united-nations/ Shelf Number: 128312 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists Groups |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Who Matters Online: Measuring influence, evaluating content and countering violent extremism in online social networks Summary: It is relatively easy to identify tens of thousands of social media users who have an interest in violent ideologies, but very difficult to figure out which users are worth watching. For students of extremist movements and those working to counter violent extremism online, deciphering the signal amid the noise can prove incredibly daunting. This paper sets out a first step in solving that problem. We have devised a scoring system to find out which social media accounts within a specific extremist circle were most influential and most prone to be influenced (a tendency we called exposure). Our starting data centered on followers of 12 American white nationalist/white supremacist “seed” accounts on Twitter. We discovered that by limiting our analysis to interactions with this set, the metrics also identified the users who were highly engaged with extremist ideology. Within our total dataset of 3,542 users, only 44 percent overtly identified themselves as white nationalists online. By measuring interactions alone—without analyzing user content related to the ideology—we narrowed the starting set down to 100 top-scoring accounts, of which 95 percent overtly selfidentified as white nationalist. Among the top 200, 83 percent self-identified, and for the top 400, the self-identification rate was 74 percent. A comparison analysis run on followers of anarchist Twitter accounts suggests the methodology can be used without modification on any number of ideologies. Because this approach is entirely new (at least in the public sphere), the paper spends some time discussing the methodology and findings in some detail, before concluding with a series of recommendations for countering violent extremism (CVE) based on the findings. The key terms for understanding the recommendations are: • Influence: The tendency of a user to inspire a measurable reaction from other users (such as a replies or retweets). • Exposure: The flip side of influence, this is the tendency of a user to respond to another user in a measurable way. • Interactivity: The sum of influence and exposure scores, roughly representing how often a user interacts with the content of other users. Our key findings include: • Influence is highly concentrated among the top 1 percent of users in the set. • High scores in both influence and exposure showed a strong correlation to engagement with the seed ideology (white nationalism in our primary analysis, and anarchism in a secondary analysis). • Interactivity, the sum of influence and exposure scores, was even more accurate at identifying users highly engaged with the seed ideology. In the course of collecting the data needed to measure influence and exposure, we incidentally collected a large amount of data on hashtags and links used by people who follow known white nationalists on Twitter. When we examined this data, we discovered that members of the dataset were highly engaged with partisan Republican and mainstream conservative politics. The paper presents a significant amount of context needed to properly evaluate this finding. Working from these findings, the paper makes several recommendations for new CVE initiatives with a focus on NGO efforts, which was the purpose of this research, although we recognize our findings will likely have utility for government efforts in this sphere as well. Our recommendations include: • We believe these metrics offer ways to concretely measure which types of CVE approaches are effective and which are not, bringing some clarity to a realm where strategies are often wishful and based on assumptions, while conclusions are often anecdotal and inconclusive. • The concentration of influence among a very few users suggests that disruptive approaches and countermessaging should be targeted to the top of the food chain, rather than working with the larger base of users. • Our analysis found that the seed accounts—all wellknown white nationalist ideologues and activists—were not necessarily producing the most popular content and links to external Web sites. The collected data can be used to find the most important external content sources, and target them for disruption through terms-of-service violation reporting, or through counter-messaging. • By tracking these metrics on an ongoing basis, NGO efforts to counterprogram against extremist narratives can be evaluated to measure how many users adopt or respond to counter-messaging content, and how much influence accrues to different kinds of positive messaging. • Since the data suggests white nationalists are actively seeking dialogue with conservatives, CVE activists should enlist the help of mainstream conservatives, who may be considerably more successful than NGOs at engaging extremists with positive messaging. Further research may also suggest avenues for engagement between other kinds of extremists and other mainstream political and religious movements. Finally, we believe that these metrics are only a starting point for the study of extremist use of social media. We believe the metrics and approaches here can be further refined, and we believe that additional research may yield substantial new techniques for monitoring and countering the promotion of violent ideologies online. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College London, 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2013 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICSR_Berger-and-Strathearn.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICSR_Berger-and-Strathearn.pdf Shelf Number: 128326 Keywords: Extremists GroupsOnline CommunicationsSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent Extremism Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors Summary: This policy brief explores the conceptual and operational challenges in integrating a gender dimension into counterterrorism policy and programming and offers a set of recommendations for the United Nations and other actors to consider when developing effective and sustainable counterterrorism efforts. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Shelf Number: 128409 Keywords: Extremist GroupsFemale TerroristsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Painter, Anthony Title: Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and Extremist Threat: A call for a new mainstream statecraft and contact democracy Summary: The rise of populism seen across Europe and the US is exposing old and hidden fault-lines in democratic systems. Mainstream parties seem powerless to respond to basic popular anxieties. Many appear blind to the reality that elite political projects have run their course. Democracy is under considerable stress – and fissures are opening up out of which new forms of populism and extremism have emerged. And yet populists are routinely dismissed as ‘protest’ parties, ‘clowns’ and ‘flashes in the pan’. In fact, real demand exists for Europe’s populists – of different kinds – and they must be seen as serious challenger movements that the established parties ignore at their peril. Today, Policy Network launches a significant new report entitled “Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat”. The report is based on a substantial European research project which has over the past 8 months investigated campaigns, policies and political approaches targeted at populism and extremism at the national, local and neighbourhood levels. Working with a wide range of politicians, experts, campaigners, academics and public officials, it has considered how parties – of the left and right – have responded to their different manifestations in countries across Europe. The final report identifies where mainstream politics has failed to date and sets out a strategic evaluation of how the antagonistic and corrosive aspects of populist impulses and identity politics can be resisted and defeated. The conclusion sets forward an approach blending 'statecraft' and 'contact democracy', with case-study examples. Details: London: Policy Network/ Barrow Cadbury Trust, 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.policy-network.net/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.policy-network.net/ Shelf Number: 128430 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Mullins, Samuel J. Title: Australian Jihad: Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Summary: This ARI summarises the findings from an-depth empirical study of all publicly-confirmed cases of Islamist terrorism involving Australians. The domestic situation of Australian Muslims is briefly described, followed by an overview of Islamist terrorism cases to date, including the number and location of cases and the level of threat they have presented, both domestically and internationally. The background characteristics of offenders and details of radicalisation are discussed, followed by an examination of the national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, with a focus upon counter-radicalisation initiatives. Current CT tactics appear to be appropriate to the nature of the threat; however, it will be important to closely monitor preventive measures in order to avoid a potential backlash similar to that in the UK, and to make sure that they are appropriately targeted. Details: Analisis of the Real Instituto Elcano, 2011. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Shelf Number: 128888 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismIslamistsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence (Australia)Violent Extremism |
Author: Perito, Robert M. Title: Empowering the Pakistan Police Summary: Summary •In Pakistan’s struggle against violent extremism, Pakistani police officers have sacrificed their lives to save others. Yet these acts of heroism have done little to alter the fact that most Pakistanis fear the police and seek their assistance as a last resort. •The origins of abusive police behavior are found in Pakistan’s colonial past. The basic police law and the organization of the police date from the period of British rule, as do the attitudes of police toward the public. •Pakistan’s initial response to violent extremism has been to create heavily armed antiterrorist units. The relationship between public support for the police and improved police effectiveness against terrorism has received less attention than it deserves. •Fortunately, the Police Service of Pakistan includes a group of talented senior officers who recognize that improving police-public relations is essential to halting extremist violence. These officers took innovative steps in their districts that brought increased public support. Unfortunately, these initiatives ended when the officers were transferred. •Institutionalizing successful innovations offers a means of improving police effectiveness against terrorism and criminal violence within existing legal authority and available resources. Such an effort would be an appropriate focus for international donor support. Details: Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace, 2013. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 332: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Pakistan URL: Shelf Number: 128896 Keywords: Criminal ViolencePolicing (Pakistan)TerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism Summary: This paper examines radicalization as a social phenomenon through the behavior of individuals and networks. Violent extremists, individuals pursuing political change through violence, remain committed to striking the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad. It is important to understand how radical ideas spread to counter or contain this immediate and persistent threat. This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. This means that there is value in differentiating why radical ideologies resonate among individuals, and how individuals come to adopt and advocate those ideas. This report helps contextualize the current terrorist threat, the role of technology in radicalization, and next steps in decoding radicalization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Shelf Number: 129585 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Perliger, Arie Title: Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right Summary: In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions: (1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right? (2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence? (3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence? It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Shelf Number: 129588 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorist GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mightier than the Sword? The Role of the Media in Addressing Violence and Terrorism in South Asia Summary: The media plays an important role in terrorism and counterterrorism. Because of its capacity to relay information, frame narratives, shape public opinion, and inform both politics and policymaking, the media is a critical vehicle to convey ideas that legitimize or delegitimize terrorists and violent extremist groups and narratives. Violent extremist groups have used the media, particularly the Internet, to link local grievances to global narratives, and to radicalize and mobilize supporters. South Asia has a long history of confronting violence and extremism, particularly from groups espousing a wide variety of ideologies, including ethno-national, separatist, right and left wing, and religious (or sectarian) causes. Within this environment, South Asia's vibrant and diverse media has often been at the forefront of a rich cultural and political discourse and plays an important role in framing and informing public opinion, and in challenging extremist ideas and acts. However, there have also been concerns about the use of the media to incite violence and perpetuate tensions between different communities. This report analyzes the media's important role in contemporary terrorism and argues for greater focus on the role of the media in countering violent extremism (CVE), both as a platform for communication and as a professional body that can shape perceptions, offer balanced information, and create protected spaces for critical debate and dialogue. The publication draws on a desktop literature review, discussions held during a workshop on "The Role of the Media in Addressing Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia" at the Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore, and extensive dialogue with practitioners, experts, and government officials. This report offers a set of recommendations for actors at the national, regional, and international levels to consider when engaging with the media for CVE purposes in South Asia. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 31, 2014 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013Oct_CGCC_MightierThanTheSword_Report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013Oct_CGCC_MightierThanTheSword_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 131832 Keywords: JournalistsMediaTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Christmann, Kris Title: Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence Summary: The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales' (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review. The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis. Furthermore, although a growing body of literature investigating the radicalisation process is emerging, the weight of that literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation. As such, the evidence is concerned with that smaller cohort of individuals who, once radicalised, go on to commit acts of violence in the pursuit of political or religious aims and objectives. This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the radicalisation process that preceeds terrorism, including radicalisation that does not lead to violence. Despite these limitations, the systematic review found that Islamic radicalisation and terrorism emanate from a very heterogeneous population that varies markedly in terms of education, family background, socio-economic status and income. Several studies have identified potential risk factors for radicalisation, and, among these, political grievances (notably reaction to Western foreign policy) have a prominent role. The review found only two evaluated UK programmes that explicitly aimed to address Islamic radicalisation in the UK. These were outreach and engagement projects running in London: the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and the 'Street' Project. In addition, the review drew heavily upon the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) rapid evidence assessment, Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence (Pratchett et al, 2010). This advocated the adoption of capacity building and empowering young people, and interventions that "challenge ideology that focus on theology and use education/training". The Netherlands-based Slotervaart Project was identified as an exemplar of the outreach/community-based approach recommended by the DCLG review. The review also considered a number of de-radicalisation programmes operating in several Islamic countries and programmes tackling right-wing radicalisation. These programmes provide some potential learning points for future UK programmes, chiefly around the need for those engaging with radicalised individuals to carry authority and legitimacy, and to be equipped with profound ideological knowledge. Details: London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Shelf Number: 131942 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsInterventionsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationReligionViolent Extremism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Countering Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort "combating violent extremism" (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting. The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the Administration released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP's three objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: R42553: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Shelf Number: 131948 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationViolent Extremism |
Author: Richardson, Roslyn Title: Fighting Fire with Fire: Target audience responses to online anti-violence campaigns Summary: This report documents young Muslim Sydneysiders' responses to a variety of online campaigns that promote non-violent political activism or aim to 'counter violent extremism' (CVE). In undertaking this study, which involved interviews with Muslim communities in Western Sydney - communities that have been targeted by both violent propaganda and government communication campaigns - two things became apparent. First, there's a pool of highly educated, discerning and media-savvy young people in these communities. Second, rather than merely being an audience for government-sponsored communication campaigns, they're creating their own websites, YouTube clips, radio programs and Facebook groups. - Some of these websites and other initiatives directly challenge violent narratives while others provide avenues for non‑violent political protest and expression. The popularity and reach of this entirely community-generated web content significantly outshines the reach of any government-sponsored internet-based CVE strategies developed to date. - The young people responsible for these initiatives, some of whom are communication professionals, understand and to some extent share their target audiences' needs and wants. As journalism and marketing graduates, they also have the professional know-how to produce high quality and attention-grabbing campaigns. Furthermore, when they take the lead in creating these initiatives they generate more interest and praise from their target audiences than when they merely support government‑sponsored programs. - Outside of the online space, young people from across Sydney's Muslim communities engage in a range of activities that directly assist others to move away from violent and criminal paths. A number of the respondents in this study, for example, are volunteer youth mentors who assist young people identified by their schools, the justice system or both as 'vulnerable' (to criminalisation). These interventions in real life are augmented by their efforts through online forums to reach out to young people they identify as at risk. - The efforts of these young volunteers both inside and outside the online space seem largely unknown beyond their immediate communities. Nevertheless their contribution in creating communities that are empowered and resilient to violent messaging may be considerable. The core recommendation of this report is: Where possible, government agencies should support existing popular community-driven anti-violence online campaigns rather than prioritising the development of new websites to counter violent narratives. Government agencies should directly engage with the young people involved in these popular initiatives and investigate ways to support them and their campaigns where possible. - While this study offers many findings that government agencies and communities might view with optimism, it also reveals that there are significant barriers that undermine young Muslim Sydneysiders' engagement with CVE communication campaigns and government agencies. These barriers are also likely to undermine government agencies' engagement with the young communication professionals who are currently producing a range of popular anti-violence campaigns. The report identifies and discusses these barriers. However, it is anticipated that from the large amount of data collected there will be subsequent publications describing some in greater detail. - The most significant barrier identified in this study relates to the pervasive prejudice young Muslims report experiencing as a result of being Muslim and/or of Arab background. Many of the study's respondents rejected government-produced CVE websites because they felt such strategies perpetuate the stereotyping of Muslim communities as potentially threatening and deviant. From their perspective, Australia's CVE agenda fuels Islamophobia, making them more vulnerable to discrimination including verbal and physical attacks. - The respondents also rejected the government's CVE agenda because they perceived government agencies as doing little to address social issues of greater importance to them. This includes the violent crime and socioeconomic disadvantage experienced by those living in their Western Sydney suburbs. In this respect, they believed that government agencies' engagement with them on CVE issues is largely self-serving and does little to address the 'real' violence they see afflicting their communities. - Another significant barrier undermining young Muslim Sydneysiders' engagement with Australia's CVE agenda is their lack of trust in government agencies. Some perceive an irony when the Australian Government asks them to support campaigns denouncing violence when it is waging violent wars in other countries. Government CVE interventions in Muslim communities have also fuelled community paranoia and young Muslims' belief that they are under constant surveillance. As a result of a variety of issues affecting Muslim communities inside and outside Australia, the respondents perceived the Australian Government as not being 'on their side' and not representing their interests. - While some respondents displayed a deep cynicism about the Australian Government and its CVE agenda, for moral and religious reasons many were devoted to assisting 'at risk' youth in their communities. The ASPI research team also found that even self-described 'radicals', 'conservatives' and those who decry Australia's counterterrorism policies, want to engage better with police and other government agencies. This report offers 13 recommendations to facilitate this engagement and enhance communication campaigns that challenge violence. - However, this report also offers a warning that online communication strategies are unlikely to provide a solution for those at greatest risk of becoming involved in violent extremism. The respondents of this study, who included sheikhs involved in deradicalisation work, argued that one-on-one intervention strategies are a far more effective way to reach and influence vulnerable individuals. - This study shows that it's difficult to motivate young people to view government-sponsored CVE websites; it's undoubtedly much more of a challenge to entice 'at risk' youth to visit such sites. - By focusing on Muslim youth this report potentially supports discourses that position Muslim Australians as a 'problem community' and security threat. The research team doesn't support such views and sees them as counterproductive to our aim of enhancing government agencies' interaction with young Muslims. In fact, this study shows that the securitisation of Muslim communities directly causes young Muslim Sydneysiders to reject CVE websites and shun interaction with government agencies. - Nevertheless, some of our respondents expressed deep concern about groups and individuals in their communities sympathetic to using violence to achieve political-religious aims. Some believed it was important for their communities to develop online strategies to challenge violent narratives and provide more avenues for young people to express their views in a non-violent manner. In addition, some felt it was the correct role of government agencies to support communities in these endeavours. - On the whole this report challenges approaches that only discuss Muslim youth as being highly vulnerable and in dire need of empowerment to resist violent propaganda. Instead, it shows that some have taken a lead role in challenging violent narratives and are empowering themselves. This report is intended for use by government agencies and communities to inform their future work in this area. - Included as an appendix to this report is a separate ASPI study examining the online CVE strategies developed by five countries: UK, US, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf Shelf Number: 132545 Keywords: At-Risk YouthMedia CampaignsMuslimsOnline CommunicationRadical GroupsViolence PreventionViolent ExtremismYouth Violence |
Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government? Summary: It is now recognised that violent extremists have made effective use of the Internet and social media to advance their aims, whether through engagement, propaganda, radicalisation or recruitment. While the quality of their output varies, a growing proportion is professional, well produced, contains compelling messages and is delivered by charismatic individuals. In short, it appeals to the new YouTube generation, which expects high-end products that are well-timed and effective. These extremist groups and networks are also transitioning from their own standalone websites and forums towards social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to take their messages to a much wider audience. Governments are interested in understanding what can be done to counter this content, both illegal and legal, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence. Much of the emphasis to date has been placed on restrictive measures, such as takedowns and filtering. While it is important for governments to enforce the law - and be seen to be doing so - there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies. More recently, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to the problem. One such potential solution is provided by 'counter-narratives'; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, through a range of online and offline means. Counter-narrative has become a catch-all term for a wide range of activities with different aims and tactics, everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by government, to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists. In order to make sense of the complex range of actions and initiatives described as 'counter-narratives', the report sets out a 'counter-messaging spectrum', which is comprised of three main types of activities: government strategic communications, alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The counter-messaging spectrum is summarised in the table overleaf. This report was commissioned by Public Safety Canada. It aims to review the state of knowledge about efforts to counter narratives of violent extremism and make recommendations for governments, such as the Canadian government, to guide their emerging work in this sensitive area of policy. It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in its infancy. While community and civil society groups have been conducting this work for many years, governments are new to the issue and the private sector is feeling its way with extreme caution. This means that there are only a small number of case studies to draw upon. For this reason, as well as the limited scope of the project, the recommendations for government are tentative. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Shelf Number: 133316 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what "Islamist extremism" entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly "acceptable" non-violent extremists and "unacceptable" violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely "not (yet) violent" militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between "non-violent extremism" and "violent extremism" is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, 2014: Accessed September 2, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133388 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsReligious ExtremismViolent Extremism |
Author: Holmer, Georgia Title: Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE Summary: Summary - Accountable and effective policing institutions are key to stability in volatile environments, especially societies transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule. From a development or peacebuilding perspective, community policing can aid in reform of security institutions and give civil society an active role in the process. - Community policing-simultaneously an ethos, a strategy, and a collaboration-helps promote democratic policing ideals and advance a human security paradigm. - Challenges to implementing such programs in transitional societies are considerable and tied to demographic and cultural variations in both communities and security actors. Developing trust, a key to success in all community policing, can be particularly difficult. - Challenges are also unique when dealing with marginalized communities and members of society. Neither a police service nor a given community are monolithic. How police interact with one segment of a community might be - might need to be- completely different than how they approach another. - Community policing programs designed to prevent violent extremism require a common and nuanced understanding between the community and the police as to what constitutes violent extremism and what is an effective response. When they agree, they can develop effective joint solutions to mitigate the threat. - Key competencies can be grouped into four categories: those important to success for any community policing programs, those relevant to efforts to reform the security sector, to promote women's inclusion in security, or to prevent violent extremism. These objectives often overlap. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 352: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 133414 Keywords: Community Policing (Africa)Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Lacher, Wolfram Title: Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel Summary: The rise of extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region from 2005 onwards has gone in parallel with the growth of drug trafficking networks across the area. But are these two developments related - and if so, how? The alleged involvement of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in drug smuggling is being taken for granted by many media outlets. Malian and French government officials have increasingly resorted to dismissing their adversaries in northern Mali as 'narco-jihadists'. This paper reviews the evidence for the links between drug smuggling and extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region. While it demonstrates that such links clearly exist, the paper argues that the widespread talk of a drug-terror nexus in the Sahel is misleading, for several reasons. First, much of the evidence presented as basis for such claims can either be easily debunked, or is impossible to verify. Second, rather than the two extremist groups as such, involvement in drug trafficking appears to concern individuals and groups close to, or within, MUJAO and AQIM: within both groups, members are driven by multiple and, at times, conflicting motivations. Third, numerous other actors are playing an equally or more important role in drug smuggling, including members of the political and business establishment in northern Mali, Niger and the region's capitals, as well as leaders of supposedly 'secular' armed groups. Fourth, the emphasis on links between drug trafficking and terrorism in the Sahel serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption in allowing organized crime to grow. Fifth, the profits derived from kidnap-for-ransom played a much more significant role in the rise of AQIM and MUJAO. Details: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No. 4: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Shelf Number: 133595 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Africa)Drug-Terror NexusExtremist GroupsOrganized CrimeTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Title: Martin Place Siege: Joint Commonwealth - New South Wales review Summary: The Martin Place siege on 15 and 16 December last year was both an atrocity and a tragedy. The review found that there were no major failings of intelligence or process in the lead up to the siege. It is nonetheless important we learn whatever lessons At around 8.33 am on 15 December 2014, Man Haron Monis walked into the Lindt Cafe, on the corner of Martin Place and Phillip Street, in the heart of Sydney's commercial district. Shortly thereafter, he produced a gun and ordered that the customers and staff be locked inside as hostages. After a standoff lasting around 17 hours, the siege ended in gunfire. Three people died: two hostages and Monis. Several of the other hostages sustained injuries. The Martin Place siege has deeply affected the community. The Review analysed the events that led up to the siege and the range of interactions Monis had with agencies including the criminal justice system, beginning with his arrival in Australia. It asked: - were the decisions of government agencies in respect of Monis reasonable given the laws and policies in place when the decisions were made? - should decision-makers have had other information before them when making their decisions? Overall, the Review has found that the judgments made by government agencies were reasonable and that the information that should have been available to decision-makers was available. Changes to laws and policies in relation to national security involve judgments about public safety and personal liberty - i.e. the risk framework within which society operates. We expect that public discussion and consultation about these judgments will continue over the coming months as further information about the circumstances of the conduct of the Martin Place siege operation becomes available. However, the Review has concluded that some modest changes are needed to our laws and government processes to mitigate the public security risks exposed by this case. Some of these changes are already being made. For example, new bail arrangements have now been introduced in New South Wales. New programmes to counter violent extremism in the community are being developed. Other initiatives, such as a review of immigration policies, laws and capabilities in relation to visa applications should be pursued. The Review's recommendations would maintain broadly the current balance in our existing regulatory and legislative framework. The Review's decision to not propose steps beyond this is based on our view that introducing substantial further controls involves a larger choice about the sort of society we wish to live in and is properly the province of the public and our elected representatives. Any further controls would be based on judgments as to whether increases in policing, surveillance and controls and the related extra burden on the taxpayer and intrusions into Australians' lives would make us appreciably safer. Details: Canberra: Australian Government, 2015. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.pm.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/martin_place_siege_review.pdf Shelf Number: 134913 Keywords: Deadly Force (Australia)Decision MakingExtremistsHostage TakingNational SecurityViolent Extremism |
Author: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Title: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach Summary: Terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE. The OSCE participating States are determined to combat all acts of terrorism, without exception, as most serious crimes. States, through their police agencies in particular, have a duty to protect all individuals within their jurisdictions from terrorism, as part of their human rights obligations to guarantee the right to life, the right to security and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. This requires that they adopt a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), while upholding human rights and the rule of law. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's actions against terrorism will be undermined if the state, through any of its agencies, uses its power in violation of international human rights standards. As the police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial that the police be held accountable for their actions in order to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, people advocating the abolition of slavery or who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion or ethnicity. Countering VERLT requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There are many issues, relevant but not specific to terrorism that need to be genuinely addressed, in their own right and without undue security bias. The police have a key role in the criminal-justice response to VERLT, but their role should be limited in proactive prevention efforts. The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon. OSCE participating States have acknowledged the usefulness of such joint efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in countering terrorism. There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Details: Vienna: OSCE, 2014. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Shelf Number: 134917 Keywords: Community-PolicingCounter-terrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists (Europe)Violent Extremism |
Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism Summary: Unlike traditional law-enforcement and military responses to terrorism and conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts take a preventive approach aimed at reducing the appeal and recruiting potential of extremist groups. Recent attacks across the world, such as those in Ottawa and Sydney, for example, have highlighted concerns about smaller groups and individuals who may be acting with little or no formal association with a terrorist group. Consequently, preventive approaches that serve to enhance early identification and response capacities have gained greater traction. The relative youth of foreign fighters traveling from both Western and non-Western countries to Iraq and Syria has also highlighted the need for creative and innovative interventions. However, despite the increased emphasis on countering violent extremism by governments and international actors like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), preventive approaches have continued to focus on measures associated with criminal justice, law enforcement, and legal responses. The use of sports, arts, and culture is sometimes considered by policymakers and practitioners as too peripheral to security issues and yet extremist groups effectively utilize them in their narratives and recruitment strategies. Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism have sought increasingly to engage youth, communities, and marginalized groups, including women, and sports, arts, and culture offer much underutilized platforms to address the ideologies and root causes of violent extremism. As the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy notes, in the long term, such efforts "will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield." To foster a more inclusive discourse on multidimensional approaches to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, have partnered on a series of workshops to bring together governments, practitioners, and experts to share lessons learned and best practices, as well as to inform the development and implementation of CVE policies and programs. One of these workshops, held at Hedayah in Abu Dhabi in May 2014, focused on the role of sports, arts, and culture in CVE efforts, particularly on the ways they might enhance educational initiatives to directly or indirectly contribute to CVE objectives. The workshop drew on, and complemented, other discussions that focused on the role of education and the roles of families and communities in countering violent extremism and enhancing community resilience, and projects focused on counternarratives and strategic communication, among others. This brief explores the history of cultural diplomacy and use of sports in conflict situations and draws on discussions at the May 2014 workshop, as well as desk research, to examine relevant lessons learned and good practices for integrating sports, arts, and culture into CVE efforts. It concludes with some practical policy and programming recommendations for policymakers and practitioners focusing on countering violent extremism. It is important to note that sports, arts, and cultural interventions for CVE purposes should take into consideration the local push and pull factors leading to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism as well as the local context where these policies and programs will be carried out. That is, sports, arts, and cultural programming do not necessarily have to be specifically related to countering violent extremism, but this policy brief outlines ways in which sports, arts, and culture could be effectively integrated into CVE programming. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Shelf Number: 135391 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSportsViolence PreventionsViolent Extremism |
Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention Summary: Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of 'the enemy', and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the 'rise of the far right' remains confused in many ways. Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two? Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for policy makers Summary: Several recent events have focused attention on the growing dangers posed by the far right in Europe. In October 2013, Ukrainian born Pavlo Lapshyn was convicted of racially-motivated murder and for plotting a campaign of terror against mosques in the UK. In May 2013 commenced the trial of Beate Zschape, the only surviving member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a far-right terrorist group which has been linked to a series of murders of immigrants, the murder of a policewoman and the attempted murder of her colleague, the 2001 and 2004 Cologne bombings and 14 bank robberies. In August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was convicted for the murder of 77 people in twin terrorist attacks in Norway. Security agencies such as Europol have documented heightened levels of right-wing extremist activity across a number of countries in Europe. While such high-profile and high impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, intimidation and bullying by extremists targeting minority communities. The dichotomy between national security and community safety means that, as a result, far-right extremism tends to be relegated to a second tier security threat, even though its impact is felt on a daily basis by individuals and communities across Europe. Far-right extremism takes a number of forms. There are four main types of agents: youth gangs, white power and skinhead groups; terrorist cells and lone actors; political movements and paramilitary groups; and nativist, identitarian and anti-Islam movements. They engage in a wide range of activities: spontaneous hate crime, vandalism and hooliganism; street demonstrations; shock tactics; hate speech and incitement; and planned hate crime and terrorism. Though often rooted in its local context, far-right extremism has impacts across borders. Groups and methods in one country are often mirrored elsewhere, and online connectivity is making this more common. There is also evidence of cooperation between national groups and the pooling of knowledge and expertise. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135686 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: This report outlines ideas for strategies, programs, and initiatives that can be implemented to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa and increase human security and community resilience. Suggestions include training officials and frontline practitioners to enhance their engagement with communities, improving service delivery and reform of the security and criminal justice sectors, introducing disengagement and reintegration programs, promoting subregional cooperation and information sharing, fostering youth leadership, engaging the media and the private sector, and strengthening the capacity of and engagement with civil society actors. The recommendations are targeted towards (1) states in the subregion; (2) subregional, regional, and international actors, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the East African Community, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and (3) civil society actors, the private sector, and the media. The Action Agenda stresses the importance of holistic and inclusive approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism that involve a range of actors, including states in the subregion, partner governments, and international and multilateral actors, as well as regional, subregional, and nongovernmental organizations. With an eye toward increasing the sustainability and impact of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, it advises to build on initiatives that are already in place in the Greater Horn of Africa and ensure that current and future activities are embedded in ongoing efforts that aim to build capacity across the criminal justice, security, and development sectors. The ideas proposed in this Action Agenda were developed by the Global Center, based on existing experiences and practices in the Greater Horn of Africa as well as consultations with various stakeholders. An earlier draft of the Action Agenda was circulated at the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Horn of Africa Working Group in March 2015. This report has been made possible by the generous support of the governments of Norway and Turkey. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security , 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Shelf Number: 135838 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent ExtremismViolent Groups |
Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Strengthening Rule of Law Responses to Counter Violent Extremism: What Role for Civil Society in South Asia? Summary: Across South Asia, civil society has made important contributions to enhancing rule of law based efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. Their roles as advocates, monitors, technical experts, trainers, service providers, and information hubs complement the efforts of law enforcement and security actors, and many opportunities exist for partnerships. Civil society actors have also played an important role in promoting development, improved governance and human rights in the region, and in promoting a resilient social contract between citizens and the state. This policy brief reflects on these contributions and explores opportunities for civil society to support cooperative regional efforts to respond to terrorism and violent extremism in the region. It draws largely from a workshop on "Strengthening Rule of Law-Based Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Civil Society?" organized by the Global Center, in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and The Institute for Inclusive Security. Following an overview of the limitations and challenges faced by civil society actors in the region, it offers a set of recommendations for policymakers and practitioners with a view to informing the design and implementation of programming to prevent violent extremism and terrorism in South Asia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Shelf Number: 135839 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Cheong, Damien Title: Western Muslim Converts and Violent Extremism: Issues and Strategies Summary: This commentary discusses Muslim converts in the West who are becoming involved in violent extremism and contends that community intervention and supportive counseling for converts could help prevent radicalism among such individuals. Islam, like many other religions, is not monolithic; "its form and expression vary from one Muslim to another and from group to group". For example, Indonesian Islam, while sharing similar tenets with say Pakistani Islam, is still different in many fundamental ways. This plurality can cause confusion in the convert, and in some cases, alienation, if the convert, while Muslim, is still excluded because he/she belongs to a different ethnic group. In fact a 2013 Oxford Analytica report identified feelings of personal emptiness and social isolation as a major causal factor of radicalization among Muslim converts. The study also argued that the resentment of "modernity, globalization and secular society"; the absence of formal education and training in Islamic doctrine and theology; and the interpretation of "Islamic ideology as a form of protest" were key push factors toward radicalization. The study found that "radicalization is usually the result of social interaction; it is less common for converts to self-radicalize in isolation. The process, which involves the convert developing a more extreme interpretation of his/her faith to legitimize or justify violence, generally takes months or years". It is for these reasons that increased psychological and community support for converts is necessary as it can enable them to become more knowledgeable about their new faith, more confident about their place in the world, and most importantly, more discerning about alternative interpretations of religious doctrine. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2014. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Commentary: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Shelf Number: 135911 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-684: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Shelf Number: 136242 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Walther, Olivier J. Title: Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa Summary: This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate transnationally. Details: Sonderborg, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Department of Border Region Studies Working Paper No. 04/15: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Shelf Number: 136293 Keywords: Border SecurityExtremist GroupsSocial NetworksTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Tahiri, Hussein Title: Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia Summary: Community and Radicalisation: an Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia was a year-long national study designed and conducted as a qualitative research project through a partnership between Victoria Police, Victoria University and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The key aims of the study were: - To identify how communities understand the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism. - To explore community perceptions of the underlying drivers for radicalization and extremism. - To explore perceptions of the impact of radicalization and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion. - To solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism in Australia. - To provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies and strategies to counter radicalisation and extremism in Australia. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University and Victoria Police, 2013. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 136689 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice Summary: This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Conference was also sponsored in part by the European Commission and the United States Department of State. The event was attended by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of its kind in the region, the 2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE. The intention for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of cutting-edge CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers on a global scale. Details: Perth, WA, AUS: Curtin University, 2015. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Shelf Number: 136857 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremists GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: CounterterrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Vurmo, Gjergji Title: Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Albania Summary: This study has collected, generated, and analyzed data on the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism with the aim of informing policymaking and stakeholders involved in addressing this phenomenon and the challenges interrelated with it. The research methodology approaches the identification and comprehensive analysis of the context by employing a variety of sources to understand the extent and relevance of several factors that enable or fuel religious radicalization and forms of violent extremism. These factors and 'drivers' are often combined with one another and interact with the context through various forms. However, the list of drivers analyzed in this study is not exhaustive, because in different contexts and times the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism may be fueled by other factors. During the research period (September 2014 - May 2015), a wide range of official, academic and other reliable sources of data was examined. In addition, a considerable number of actors have been involved in the preparatory phase of the study as well as in the fieldwork to generate data and to conduct the survey and interviews with key informants and focus groups. The entire framework of the research methodology, the findings, the conclusions, and the recommendations drawn in this study have been subjected to validation process to ensure quality, objectivity, compliance with the Albanian context, and inclusive approach based on the data. The IDM study finds that, while religious radicalization in Albania is in its early phase, lack of attention and inclusion in addressing 'push' or enabling factors may serve to aggravate the phenomenon. The study sheds light on the inactivity of most state institutions, particularly those outside the security domain, and of non-state actors in addressing and preventing religious radicalization. The phenomenon of religious radicalization may be further developed due to the lack of contextual cooperation between non-security state authorities and leaders of religious communities on the prevention of the phenomenon. The religious radical groups' agenda may be facilitated and favored by the inexistence of civil society in remote rural areas creating a big gap with regard to "safeguarding" activities on religious radicalization and violent extremism. The broad support of the communities of religious believers to the liberal tradition of faith, religious institutions, and to the values of religious harmony should not serve as an excuse for state and non-state actors' inactivity. On the other hand, misinterpretation of the phenomenon and minimization of its relevance or its identification with consequences (mainly in the security aspect) lead to the wrong approach and eventual counter-productivity of the effects of institutional response. Religious radicalization (as a process) and violent extremism (as a result) are enabled, fueled and/or shaped by a rich array of factors and drivers, which operate in a particular country context at both macro (societal) and micro (individual / group) level. Details: Tirana: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2015. 246p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Albania URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Shelf Number: 137021 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationReligious ViolenceViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist GroupsInternet Online CommunicationsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Schanzer, David Title: The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety Summary: More than four years ago, the White House issued a national strategy calling for the development of partnerships between police and communities to counter violent extremism. This report contains the results of a comprehensive assessment of the challenges and promise of this strategic approach to preventing violent extremism. It is based on a nationwide survey of law enforcement agencies and hundreds of hours of interviews and site visits with police departments and community members around the country. Based on this research, we reached two fundamental conclusions. First, policing agencies face multiple obstacles to creating community partnerships focused on preventing acts of violent extremism. But, second, some policing agencies are following a set of promising practices which, if applied effectively, can result in increasing trust between the police and the communities they serve. These trusting relationships can serve as a platform for addressing many public safety threats, including, but not limited to, violent extremism. Policing agencies are unlikely to be successful in creating partnerships to address violent extremism until they establish trusting relationships with the communities they serve. This is especially true with respect to Muslim American communities, which have experienced significant trauma since 9/11 and have deep concerns about how they are treated by the government. Police outreach and engagement efforts are viewed with some suspicion by Muslim Americans for a number of reasons. First, Muslim Americans perceive they are being unfairly assigned a collective responsibility to attempt to curb violent extremism inspired by al Qaeda, ISIS, and other likeminded groups, but other communities are not being asked to address anti-government, racist, and other forms of extremism. Our research confirmed that while many policing agencies have robust efforts to conduct outreach with Muslim Americans, they do not have organized, overt efforts to reach out to non-Muslim communities that may be targeted for recruitment by anti-government, racist, or other extremist movements. Second, some Muslim Americans believe that policing outreach and engagement initiatives may be linked with efforts to conduct surveillance on Muslim American individuals and organizations. Third, even though most Muslim Americans have favorable impressions of local law enforcement, they see outreach and engagement efforts as part of a federal counter-terrorism program. Their unpleasant experiences with federal agencies, especially with respect to airport security and immigration control, taint their support for partnerships with policing agencies. We also found that willingness to develop partnerships with the police depends on how effectively the police address other, non-terrorism related, public safety concerns of the community. Some Muslim American communities believe that their public safety concerns are not being fully addressed by the police and therefore are not interested in engaging on other issues. Finally, developing effective community outreach and engagement programs is also difficult for the police because the programs absorb significant resources and may detract from other police priorities. Community policing programs require staffing, specialized training, and interpreters or intensive language classes for officers - all at a time when many police departments around the country are experiencing budgetary stress. Furthermore, we found that preventing violent extremism, while a pressing national issue, is not a top priority for local police that must address violent crime, drugs, gangs, and a host of other public safety concerns. Details: Durham, NC: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 2016. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Shelf Number: 137690 Keywords: Community ParticipationCommunity PolicingExtremist GroupsMuslimsPolice-Community PartnershipsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Macdonald, Geoffrey Title: Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh Summary: Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that has shaped its political culture. Since the early 2000s, it has experienced a renewal of violent extremism and an increasingly polarized political climate. By addressing the relationship between radicalization and institutional dysfunctions, this Peace Brief examines how Bangladesh can help undermine the issues that bolster radicalization efforts by strengthening political and social institutions and making them more inclusive. Summary - The role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and current violence. - The polarized political climate and institutionalized repression of Islamic parties appear to enhance radicalization dynamics. - The current environment in Bangladesh presents an opportunity to prevent violent extremism before it fully manifests itself. - Measures to improve democratic governance and inclusive politics could help mitigate the risk of violent extremism in Bangladesh, while also reducing political violence levels. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 200: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 137697 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamPolitical ViolenceRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Groenewald, Hesta Title: "Hammering the Bread and the Nail": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Afghanistan Summary: The international intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was in many respects a watershed for the country and for the global agenda on combating terrorism. The decision to react to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with a military-led response was intended to close down al-Qaeda's operational space in Afghanistan, which the Taliban regime refused to challenge. Yet, the country was also in ongoing civil conflict and the actions of the Taliban regime were as much targeted against the Afghan population as they were causing insecurity for Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Focusing the international intervention on the narrow counter-terrorism aims of defeating al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power meant missing early opportunities to support political transition, development progress and long-term peacebuilding. This research report reviews international engagement in Afghanistan with a view to identifying lessons and recommendations regarding statebuilding, peacebuilding and counterterrorism in the country and elsewhere. Based mostly on existing literature, the report focuses in particular on US, UK and EU involvement. While providing an overview of the key dilemmas, the analysis generates important recommendations for future support to Afghanistan, and also aims to inform ongoing policy debates about international engagement with 'terrorism-generating' contexts. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Shelf Number: 137727 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsHuman Rights AbusesTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadicalsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses Summary: The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years. In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Cafe siege1 and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters. On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the Australian Police Journal estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadis took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries. This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/72ABFCEDB075A6A1CA257F4C0011969F/$File/Radicalisation+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: .https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 137747 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Khan, Khalida Title: Preventing Violence Extremism (PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community Summary: The vast majority of Muslims are against violent extremism and terrorism and would like to help to counteract it. They are as appalled by violent extremism as anyone else and reject any justification that it can be condoned by Islamic teachings. However, the government's approach to dealing with terrorism by targeting the whole Muslim community as 'potential terrorists' in its Prevent Strategy is flawed and fraught with perils. We believe that rather than creating community cohesion and eliminating terrorism it has the potential to create discord and inflame community tensions. Furthermore, we believe this unprecedented strategy constitutes an infringement of civil liberties and human rights. There is a danger that PVE is becoming a well-funded industry with vested interests. Our concern is that political considerations and frictions that have nothing to do with the Muslim community or the hundreds of people who, like us, have been working on the ground for decades are obstructing the vital work of producing communities at peace with themselves and each other. As an organisation with extensive experience of working for the welfare of Muslim families we are seriously concerned about the implications of the Prevent strategy and how it is impacting in local Muslim communities. In this paper we intend to highlight why we believe the government's approach towards its Muslim community is flawed and will offer constructive recommendations as to what the government should be doing. Details: London: An-Nisa Society, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Shelf Number: 137995 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State" Summary: ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counter-narratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives - narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138159 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic StateOnline CommunicationsRadical Groups Religious ExtremismSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Brett, Julian Title: The Evaluation Study: Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts Summary: This evaluation study collates lessons being learned from Danish efforts and those of other development actors on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) that can inform evidence based policy making and increase shared understanding on CVE-related programming in development contexts. The study is based on the premise that CVE concerns policies and actions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social cultural and religious ideologies and groups. As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism. The study notes that, while violent extremism is clearly a global problem, it is developing countries that bear the brunt of its social and economic costs. In the countries most affected, it increases insecurity, has links to organised crime, lowers investment and increases the costs of economic activity, destroys infrastructure, and can cause significant human displacement and migration. The foreign fighter phenomenon, whereby nationals from one country join extremist movements in another, is a significant factor fuelling conflict. With many of these individuals coming from developing countries, preventing and mitigating radicalisation and violent extremism is becoming a development priority. The study provides an overview of current thinking on CVE and the key challenges being faced. The central feature of this is that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. Push factors are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. Pull factors are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social status. Enabling factors relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that, to be successful, CVE initiatives need to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk. In non-permissive environments, this is likely to be particularly challenging. Details: Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Shelf Number: 138466 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCybercrimeData ProtectionDrug TraffickingExtremist GroupsInformation SharingMoney LaunderingPartnershipsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Grimwood, Gabrielle Garton Title: Radicalisation in Prisons in England and Wales Summary: Many prisoners enter prison with a faith and others find one while in prison. Few of these prisoners will be "radicalized" or become involved in extremism or terrorist activity, although (obviously) those that do present huge challenges to the authorities. This Commons Library briefing describes how the Government is seeking to tackle extremism and, in particular, radicalisation in prisons. It examines -The difference between faith and radicalisation -Why people become radicalised -What is happening within prisons -How radicalisation is being countered in prisons and -Whether the National Offender Management Service is doing enough. Details: London: Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper no. 07487: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7487/CBP-7487.pdf Shelf Number: 139055 Keywords: Prisoner RadicalizationPrisonersRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration Summary: is Research Paper explores and questions some assumed causal links between terrorism on the one hand and (forced and irregular) migration on the other. The paper delves into the role that state and non-state terrorism might have in causing migration as well as analysing if and how refugees' camps and the diaspora community might be a target for radicalisation. One of the findings of the paper is how migration control for the control of terrorism is a widely used instrument; however, it might hurt bona fide migrants and legal foreign residents more than mala fide terrorists. Finally, this Research Paper offers recommendations that can go some way towards disentangling the issues of (refugee) migration and terrorism. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 20, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/publication/links-between-terrorism-and-migration-an-exploration/ Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/publication/links-between-terrorism-and-migration-an-exploration/ Shelf Number: 139116 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Migration Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses Summary: This report is part of a program implemented by the Global Center, supported by the U.S. Department of State, and aimed at understanding and strengthening capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It focuses on a subset of countries in the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In short, this report aims to - provide an easily accessible overview of the Greater Horn's regional and national trends and drivers of violent extremism and related sources of insecurity - identify relevant actors and describe their responses aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, and - highlight entry points for developing holistic strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) inclusive of governmental and civil society actors that promote good governance and community-based responses to violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Shelf Number: 139346 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Allan, Harriet Title: Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review Summary: Violent extremism is multi-factorial and extremely diverse: it cannot be predicted by one variable alone. For violent extremist movements to develop, and for individuals to join them, requires an alignment of situational, social/cultural, and individual factors. It is useful to conceptualise these factors in three levels, with situational factors working at the macro level (i.e. country or community-wide), social/cultural at the meso-level (i.e. affecting smaller communities or identity groups), and individual factors at the micro level. Interventions can also be conceptualised using a three-tier model, with development working at the macro level, countering violent extremism (CVE) at the meso-level, and law enforcement and specialist interventions at the micro level. While the effect of political factors - governance deficit, state failure, and grievances - is significant, social/psychological factors concerning group and individual identity are also recognised as important. Although the evidence is mixed, on balance the literature shows that blocked participation can create grievances which may be harnessed to promote extremist violence. Civil society may be crucial in countering extremism. However, under oppression some organisations may also be drawn to violent responses. Religion and ethnicity have been recognised as powerful expressions of individual and group identity. There is robust evidence that radicalisation is a social process and that identity is a key factor in why individuals become involved in violent movements. Psychological research is beginning to examine how identity formation can become 'maladaptive' and whether certain cognitive 'propensities' can combine to create a 'mindset' that presents a higher risk. Although most violent extremists are young men, there is little convincing research to suggest that ideals of masculinity and honour play a significant role in causing violent extremism. More generally, gender issues do not appear to be significant. Education has a minor and/or largely unsubstantiated influence, and there is little evidence that certain types of education (e.g. faith-based) increase the risk of radicalisation, and research shows that the problem of madrassa-based radicalisation has been significantly overstated. Indeed, some research suggests that religious training can be a protective factor. The findings on the relationship between education, employment, poverty and radicalisation are mixed. However, in a departure from earlier studies which identified the absence of any causal or statistical relationship between poverty and transnational terrorism, this study recognises the relevance of economic factors in the context of broad-based violent extremist groups. In conflict situations involving violent extremist groups (as opposed to terrorism directed against the West), socio-economic discrimination and marginalisation do appear to partly explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers. However, because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism. In a number of contexts, extremist groups have proven able to deliver services through which they gain support and legitimacy. While the failure of the state to provide security and justice may not be a necessary factor in the development of violent extremism, failed and failing states are often breeding grounds for extremist activity. The perceived victimisation of fellow Muslims can be instrumentalised by leaders of Islamist violent extremist groups as a justification for extremist violence, although the use of a narrative of oppression to justify violence and recruit and motivate supporters is near-universal among violent extremist groups. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Shelf Number: 139347 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalismTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Hallowell, Beth Title: Mixed Messages: How the Media Covers "Violent Extremism" and What You Can Do About It Summary: Every day, the U.S. news consumer is bombarded with images of spectacular extremist violence and increasingly aggressive and bellicose rhetoric from politicians and pundits. This coverage warrants a close look, as public discourse sinks to new lows in justifying violence against entire racial and religious groups. In this public conversation, the stakes are high; lives are on the line. How is the media helping or hurting our public discussion about political violence? What are they covering when they cover extremism? Ninety percent of the time they also mention Islam, even when it's not part of the events covered, and three-quarters of the time journalists report on violent responses to conflict. And they also amplify voices promoting and stories depicting military intervention far more than peace building or nonviolent resistance to violent extremism - solutions to conflict that research has shown are more effective. How can the U.S. public be expected to do anything but support further military intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries, given this framework for covering violent extremism? In Mixed Messages, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) shares the results of its original content analysis of three months of media coverage of extremism sampled from 20 U.S. news outlets. We sampled articles from 15 national media outlets as well as five major "influencer" outlets that reach a high-level audience of policymakers and government staff. Details: Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 139388 Keywords: DiscriminationExtremist GroupsMediaMuslimsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Netherlands. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Title: Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Summary: The murder of film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 deeply shocked Dutch society. People began to realise that the ideology of violent jihad against the West, which explicitly manifested itself in the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, had also established a foothold in the Netherlands. Since the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the threat of a terrorist attack on European soil had loomed over a number of European countries. The murder of Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 proved that the Netherlands as well had become a scene of terrorist violence. Although it was an individual assassination rather than the large-scale attack feared in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, its background, motives and justification suggested a type of religious- inspired terrorism as propounded by Al-Qaeda since the late 20th century. It ensued that the murderer, and most other members of the extremist network to which he belonged, were young Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands. While on 11 September 2001 New York was hit by an enemy from abroad and the Madrid attacks were perpetrated by a group of North African migrants, the Netherlands had to face the fact that a group of indigenous Muslims had metamorphosed into (potential) terrorists within a short period of time. At an international level, the murder of Van Gogh thrust the Netherlands into the limelight as a country which had now - after years of ethnic and religious tolerance - produced its own jihadists. The attacks on public transport in London in July 2005 by British-Pakistani Muslims, however, have shown that the Dutch situation is by no means unique and that a new phase in the threat from Islamist terrorism appears to have set in. This phase, in which the threat emanates principally from extremist European Muslims who are prepared to commit attacks in their own country, is hereinafter referred to as European jihad. This new phase is in line with developments in Islamist terrorism during recent years. In December 2002 the AIVD pointed out that the future threat would manifest itself in and emanate from the West, and that it would possess a more endogenous character. There were indications that radical Muslims brought up in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for jihad and that they might proceed to perpetrating localised terrorist attacks. The attacks in Madrid, London and Amsterdam confirmed these fears. Increasing numbers of migrants' children with an Islamic background are going through a radicalisation process in Europe, which in some cases leads them to use violence. Young jihadists justify this violence by referring to the Koran - often on the basis of interpretations by radical ideologists - and view themselves as prospective martyrs. In addition to the acute threat of possible terrorist attacks, the problems involved in Islamist radicalism and terrorism also represent a long-term threat, as a polarization between various ethnic-religious population groups may undermine social cohesion. In the long term this may have an undesirable effect on the democratic order in the Netherlands. The murder of Van Gogh inflamed certain interethnic and social issues in the Netherlands. The murder set in motion processes involving both positive and negative aspects as regards the threat assessment in the immediate future, the consequences of which are as yet unpredictable. One negative development is the intensification of radicalisation tendencies among sections of ethnic minorities and the indigenous population, which poses an increasing risk that groups or individuals will resort to violence. It is alarming that certain youth groups among the younger generation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only appear receptive to radicalisation, but perceive violent jihad as positive and 'cool'. A positive aspect, however, is the fact that a process of political and social consciousness-raising has set in, involving a cautious mobilisation of moderate forces in society - also among ethnic minorities - who are prepared to counteract radical and extremist tendencies. The complexity of the problem as well as the lack of organization within certain communities account partly for this initial reluctance. The shortcomings of certain spokespersons also play a part. Furthermore, fear for lack of support from the rest of Dutch society as well as uncertainty about possible repercussions which might ensue as a result of clearly establishing their position within their ethnic group, as well as in regard to their supporters, can delay or impede such initiatives. This paper describes how the threat from Islamist terrorism currently manifests itself in the Netherlands. It attempts, for instance, to answer the question of why young people born and bred in the Netherlands turn their backs on society to propagate and commit acts of violence in the name of Islam. Another question is, to what extent the situation in the Netherlands differs from that in neighbouring countries. Details: The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2006. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Netherlands URL: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Shelf Number: 139419 Keywords: Extremist GroupsIslamic TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Jihad |
Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsIslamic ExtremistsMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schuurman, Bart Title: Converts and Islamist Terrorism: An Introduction Summary: Converts to Islam represent a small percentage of the Muslim community in Western countries. Yet when it comes to Islamist extremism and terrorism, research has suggested that converts are considerably over-represented. This ICCT Policy Brief serves as an introduction to this topic by providing an overview of what is known about converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism and the foreign fighter phenomenon. Notwithstanding considerable reservations about the quantity and quality of the available data, this Policy Brief finds support for the notion of convert over-representation in these activities. This is especially so in the case of foreign fighters. What little data was found on converts' involvement in homegrown jihadism provided a more nuanced picture, emphasizing that over-representation may not be the norm in all Western countries and that it may be a relatively recent development. Numerous explanations for converts' involvement in Islamist extremism and terrorism have been provided, running the gamut from structural-level explanations to distinctly personal motives. At present, however, a comprehensive, theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of how and why converts become involved in Islamist militancy is absent. The Policy Brief concludes by stressing the need to develop our understanding of this important yet under-researched topic. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Schuurman-Grol-Flower-Converts-June-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 139817 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremistsJihadMuslimsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Sebastian, Sofia Title: Atrocity Prevention through Dialogue: Challenges in Dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations Summary: Dialogue with violent extremist groups is a controversial practice, even when used to prevent widespread violence or atrocities. Humanitarian dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, offering short-term relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Though dialogue as a peacebuilding tool has potential in any stage of a conflict, it is ideally undertaken before widespread violence occurs. However, the conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with violent extremist groups are rarely in place. Summary Various forms of dialogue have traditionally been a central mechanism in the toolbox for atrocity prevention. The utility of this noncoercive peacebuilding practice merits reconsideration as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) increasingly embrace mass violence as a means to advance their objectives. If atrocities are imminent or ongoing, dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, with the potential of offering short-term humanitarian relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Despite the broadening recognition of the need to engage extremist groups through dialogue when possible, controversy continues to surround this practice. The conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with VEOs are rarely in place. Those pursuing dialogue need to gradually build trust, conduct a thorough actor mapping, and reflect on their own role and preparedness to engage. Engaging extremists presents significant risks as well, including extremists' manipulation of the dialogue to buy time for planning atrocity campaigns. Efforts to engage VEOs directly through dialogue have been inconsistent and are handled with the utmost discretion. Restrictive legislative frameworks may limit the ability to exploit opportunities for atrocity prevention through dialogue with these groups. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Shelf Number: 147891 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Ali, Abdisaid M. Title: Islamist Extremism in East Africa Summary: The growth of Salafist ideology in East Africa has challenged long established norms of tolerance and interfaith cooperation in the region. This is an outcome of a combination of external and internal factors. This includes a decades-long effort by religious foundations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to promulgate ultraconservative interpretations of Islam throughout East Africa's mosques, madrassas, and Muslim youth and cultural centers. Rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity, this ideology has fostered more exclusive and polarizing religious relations in the region, which has contributed to an increase in violent attacks. These tensions have been amplified by socioeconomic differences and often heavy-handed government responses that are perceived to punish entire communities for the actions of a few. Redressing these challenges will require sustained strategies to rebuild tolerance and solidarity domestically as well as curb the external influence of extremist ideology and actors. Highlights While Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and Somalia, it has been expanding to varying degrees throughout the region. Militant Islamist ideology has emerged only relatively recently in the region-imported from the Arab world-challenging long-established norms of tolerance. Confronting Islamist extremism with heavy-handed or extrajudicial police actions is likely to backfire by inflaming real or perceived socioeconomic cleavages and exclusionist narratives used by violent extremist groups. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 32: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 145573 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsIslamist ExtremismRadical GroupsViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2015-16 Evaluation of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative: Final Report Summary: Program evaluations support accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. They also support deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the expected outcomes efficiently and cost-effectively. Program evaluations support policy and program improvements by helping identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined This evaluation examined the relevance and performance of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative, a $10-million, five-year initiative established in 2011, to address gaps in understanding of terrorism in Canada and the way it manifests itself in Canadian communities. The Initiative has several components, including a grants and contributions component that is designed to fund research studies and support direct engagement with researchers. Given that the Initiative includes a grants and contributions component, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the design, delivery and administration of this component of the Initiative conformed to the requirements of the Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Why it is important Terrorism is considered a threat to Canada's national interest and security. In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents has been increasing steadily, both in Canada and around the world. Many countries, including Canada, are facing radicalization to violence, particularly of youth. More than 180 Canadians are known to have gone abroad to take part in foreign armed conflicts. Preventing, detecting, denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities and responding to these developments are among the Government of Canada's, and by extension, the Department of Public Safety's highest priorities. The Initiative plays an important role in creating networks across sectors, generating knowledge for decision-makers, and increasing Canadians' understanding of terrorism and counter-radicalization to violence, which is increasingly needed to contribute to building a safe and resilient Canada. What we found Relevance The raison d'etre of the Initiative was to invest in research on pressing questions to enable Canada to better understand what terrorism meant in the Canadian context and what could be done to support effective policies and programs to counter-terrorism and violent extremism in Canada. Despite its contribution to date, there is still a continued need for the Initiative to shed more light on these issues. The Initiative is well aligned with the federal government and PS's priorities, as ensuring the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad continues to be among the top priorities of the government. The emphasis on the need for further research communicated as part of the Government's commitment to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization attests to the relevance of the Initiative and ongoing need for similar activities. Performance To a large extent, the Initiative has contributed to the achievement of its expected outcomes: It has supported the creation of various networks and other mechanisms for ongoing dialogue across different sectors on terrorism and counter radicalization; through funding research studies and other mechanisms, the Initiative has facilitated the generation of knowledge and tools to ensure that Canadian policy and decision-makers, as well as frontline officers and other practitioners have access to more relevant and timely information to do their work; and researchers affiliated with the Initiative have more resources and support at their disposal to conduct research and to study the identified priority areas. The Department has put in place a robust governance framework to oversee the delivery of the Initiative. For the most part, the Initiative was delivered efficiently and economically. The design, delivery and administration of the grants and contribution components of the Initiative were found to generally conform to the requirements of Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Notwithstanding the above achievements, the evaluation identified a few opportunities for improvement. The following recommendations are provided in the spirit of continuous improvement. Recommendations The ADM of the Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch and/or the future Senior Departmental Officer responsible for the Office for Community Outreach and Countering Radicalization to Violence should ensure that: 1. Kanishka-related research findings are better communicated to policy and decision makers and the general public. In collaboration with the Assistant Deputy Minister Corporate Management Branch ensure that: 2. funding recipients' reporting requirements are proportionate to their current risk profile. Management Response and Action Plan Management accepts all recommendations and will implement an action plan. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: 2016-06-28: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140524 Keywords: Counter-radicalizationRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Cassim Cachalia, Raesah Title: The dynamics of youth radicalisation in Africa: Reviewing the current evidence Summary: Youth radicalisation towards violent extremism is a global phenomenon that threatens peace, security and stability. This paper reviews the evidence on the factors that may contribute to the dynamics of youth radicalisation. Available findings from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, and North Africa are used to understand the dynamics that may contribute to radicalisation and, potentially, to violent extremism. Many factors emerge including political, economic, social and individual factors. Religion, identity and gender also arise as topics for further analysis. Youth radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that cannot be attributed to any one explanation or set of factors. This paper recognises these complexities, offers recommendations and identifies additional issues that should be explored further. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 296: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140598 Keywords: ISISIslamic StateRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Parvez, Tariq Title: The Islamic State in Pakistan Summary: - The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nearby areas in January 2015. - There is currently no evidence of Daesh's central leadership directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks to demonstrate their support. - Daesh's far-reaching ideology -- which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate - can make it appealing to both existing and potential militants in Pakistan. - A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter Daesh's dangerous ideology. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 2013: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 145074 Keywords: Extremist GroupsISISIslamist StateRadical GroupRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-RadicalizationDe-RadicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Khalil, James Title: Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming Under the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) Summary: While Kenya received global attention in September 2013 due to the attack at the Westgate shopping mall, this event represents just one of many violent incidents in the country over recent years, often considered to be in part a spill-over from instability in Somalia. The tensions in Coastal Kenya also take additional forms and are driven to a considerable degree by the perceived political and economic marginalisation of the region. Drawing upon professed historical injustices, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) reportedly relies upon violence to promote independence, and has encouraged local residents to boycott elections. Tensions between Christians and Muslims are also pronounced on the Coast, particularly after the killing of prominent Muslim clerics such as Aboud Rogo. In this context fits the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme. Since 2011 KTI has been operational in Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012 it expanded to the Coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa. The KTI programme was essentially a pilot of the new CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that supported individuals, networks and organisations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The grants were designed to target the key ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors responsible for driving Violent Extremism (VE). As understood by KTI, the former ‘drive youth to join extremist movements,’ whereas the latter ‘attract youth towards extremism as an emotional struggle for purpose, direction and identity.’1 Examples of push factors may include, for instance, police harassment, elevated unemployment and racial profiling, whereas KTI’s identified pull factors included personal appeal of radical preachers and a radicalised religious environment. 2. THIS STUDY As part of the learning process during closedown, KTI engaged Integrity Research and Consultancy (Integrity) to undertake a qualitative study into its intervention. Following an introduction looking at the background, objectives and the study methods (Section 1), this report is structured loosely to mirror KTI’s lifecycle, sequentially focusing upon the research undertaken to inform the intervention (Section 2), programme design (Section 3), and the selection of grants (Section 4). This is followed by conclusions (Section 5), and a series of actionable recommendations designed to inform future CVE initiatives in Kenya and elsewhere (Section 6). The KTI Terms of Reference (TOR) largely advised our research methods, with a primary focus upon a review of KTI documentation being complemented by key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders, focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries, and grantee observations. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Shelf Number: 145395 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerroristViolent Extremism |
Author: Bilazarian, Talene Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons on Early Intervention from the United Kingdom's Channel Program Summary: Executive Summary: Countries investing in early intervention to prevent terrorism have much to learn from observing the UK’s well-established de-radicalization program and the innovative approaches being developed at the local level to challenge extremism. Interviews with law enforcement and local government officials in UK cities reveal the importance of identifying appropriate intervention providers, educating local service professionals outside of law enforcement, recording personal data sensitively, and maintaining clear language around intervention that increases transparency. Efforts to avoid alienating community members and include a broader range of service providers outside of law enforcement help to remove the stigma associated with deradicalization programs and increase community willingness to engage with early intervention locally. The Channel Intervention Program: Relevance for US Policymakers The United Kingdom has over eight years of experience with early intervention to prevent terrorism. Many of these efforts have centered around the Channel program, a local safeguarding panel designed to support vulnerable individuals who are at risk of being drawn into violent extremism. Channel is looked upon as a model for early intervention to counter radicalization, inspiring similar programming around the world, such as the FBI's Shared Responsibility Committees. The development of Channel has been rapid, with many hard-earned lessons gained nationally and from local experience optimizing Channel programs in diverse contexts. It is vital that practitioners outside the UK aiming to organize similar efforts learn from the UK’s longstanding experience with early intervention. Channel is an admittedly imperfect program with a checkered history--often beleaguered by a lack of transparency and varied implementation quality, particularly surrounding inappropriate referrals of British Muslims for baseless reasons. The program has featured heavily within national debates about whether counter-radicalization efforts curb free speech or discriminate against Muslim communities , a discussion which is beyond the scope of this paper. This report instead focuses on how countries investing in early intervention efforts can maximize the utility of these programs by observing the development of the Channel program, and learn from its triumphs and its mistakes, both nationally and at the local level. It will extract transferable best practice from the UK's experience with Channel in the hope that it will offer guidance to those pursuing effective intervention programming in the US and other countries. Core findings gained from interviews with law enforcement and local government officials across the UK include the importance of identifying appropriate intervention providers, educating local service professionals, recording personal data sensitively, and maintaining clear language around intervention. A sensitive approach to early intervention can avoid alienating community members and include a broader range of service providers outside law enforcement. Among other things, this will contribute towards removing some of the stigma associated with intervention, as a surveillance project maintained exclusively by police. The history of Channel demonstrates how small steps to increase transparency and include community members dramatically increases local willingness to participate in early intervention programs, advancing larger efforts to prevent violent extremism at home and abroad. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Channel%20UK%20Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Channel%20UK%20Final.pdf Shelf Number: 141066 Keywords: Deradicalization Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism |
Author: Green, Shannon N. Title: Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way. Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians. The spread of extremist ideologies and increasingly frequent terrorist attacks are stoking anxiety and fear across the globe. According to a survey conducted by the Commission, people are willing to try just about anything to stop the bloodshed: from military action to stronger border controls and mandatory identification cards to relinquishing privacy and accepting constraints on speech. The increasing potency and reach of terrorist groups—and a sense that governments’ response to the threat has been inadequate—is creating deep political divisions and fueling support for populist solutions. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Neither troops nor police nor economic sanctions alone can address this threat. We cannot close our borders and hope that the problem goes away. And we cannot abandon our commitment to human rights and freedom of expression in an attempt to quell violent extremism. Diminishing the appeal of extremist ideologies will require a long-term, generational struggle. The United States and its allies must combat extremists' hostile and apocalyptic world view with the same level of commitment that we apply to dealing with its violent manifestations. We urgently need a new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism—one that is resolute, rests in soft and hard power, and galvanizes key allies and partners from government, civil society, and the private sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Shelf Number: 147863 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Ogbozor, Ernest Title: Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria Summary: The consequence of violent extremism on rural livelihoods has received less attention in academic literature. This paper addresses three fundamental questions: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent religious movements? What is the root cause of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria? And what are the consequences of Boko Haram's violence on rural livelihoods? Based on a review of the literature and current studies in Nigeria, this paper contends that violent extremism has a correlation with the socio-economic conditions in Northeast Nigeria, and there are direct and indirect impacts of extremism on rural livelihoods. The paper concludes with a suggestion of further studies on the drivers of violent extremism, and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with extremist activities in Nigeria. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, 2016. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 227: Accessed December 8, 2016 at: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/HiCN-WP-227.pdf Shelf Number: 148136 Keywords: Extremists GroupsSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorismViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical groupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Ingram, Haroro J. Title: A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners Summary: This Policy Brief outlines a "linkage-based" approach to combating militant Islamist propaganda tailored for practitioners. It argues for a two-tiered approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications that addresses a spectrum of target audience motivations: antis, curious, engaged, tacit supporters and active supporters. The first tier undermines the key arguments at the heart of militant Islamist narratives and offers alternative narratives. This approach is designed to dismantle the "systems of meaning" at the heart of militant Islamist propaganda via the deployment of pragmatic- and identity-choice messages tailored to dissolve the linkages violent extremists draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. The second tier uses strategies of network disruption and disengagement strategies to catalyse behavioural changes in target audiences away from joining or acting on behalf of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or so-called Islamic State (IS). These tiers are mutually reinforcing: the first degrades the appeal of violent extremist messaging in an effort to constrict those who may become engaged in or even supporters of violent extremists while the second disturbs the trajectory of individuals from tacit to active supporters. The framework is designed to not only assist practitioners with synchronising campaign planning and message design but provides a way to categorise messaging and facilitate metric collection for better informed decision-making. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed December 13, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146040 Keywords: Counter-terrorismIslamic StateTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: Strengthening Regional Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South Asia. What Role for Civil Society? Summary: Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat. This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Shelf Number: 146118 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: A Behavioral Study of the Radicalization Trajectories of American "Homegrown" Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorist Offenders Summary: Purpose of Study: The purpose here is to develop a new approach to the assessment of individuals who are suspected of posing a risk to public safety or attempting to engage in criminal behaviors in support of terrorism at home or abroad. Our research provides compelling evidence that individuals who are in the process of becoming dangerously radicalized will exhibit overt and detectable behaviors that are somewhat predictable. The model differs from most assessment protocols currently in use by focusing on tracking tracking progressive radicalization through the use of behavioral indicators known to be associated with the doctrines of the belief system advocating violent extremism. Evidence was drawn from the biographies of convicted American homegrown terrorism offenders motivated by the Salafi-jihadist belief system. The process view of radicalization may be applicable to other types of violent extremism, but the research does not support the argument for an ideology-blind assessment policy. It is the ideology and the behavioral changes and adaptations required by the Salafijihadist belief system that lends a predictable structure to the radicalization process. Further research will be required to determine if and how the model may be used to track violent White supremacists or antifederalist sovereign-citizen extremists and recruits to other groups advocating terrorist action. Key Findings: Becoming a jihadist terrorist is a life-style choice that is associated with overt behavioral changes. These behavioral signifiers are generally but not always apparent to bystanders, family or friends. Acculturation to extremist and violent action involves a process of identity formation. How long this takes varies greatly, but the American homegrown offenders in the study displayed regular patterns of overt behaviors that signified their newfound religiously-inspired extremist political beliefs and that pointed to progressive radicalization. Most offenders in the study exhibited signs of progressing through all four phases of radicalization elaborated by the process model in a fairly predictable trajectory of radicalization. This progression took the offenders from learning about the extremist belief system to changing their life style and on to criminal action or to making plan for such action. Nevertheless, none of the behavioral indicators we examined was found in every biography. The finding underscores what other researchers have found: there is no uniform profile of jihadist terrorists. Two particular triads of sequential behaviors proved particularly salient and frequent antecedents to criminal action. Pre-radicalization behaviors such as seeking out new religious authority followed by immersion with a group of peers—sometimes 2-3 individuals and sometimes larger groups—leading to expressions of a desire to take action following the prescriptions of the extremist belief system. Overt lifestyle changes characteristic of newfound extremist religious fervor (expressed, for example, by aggressive criticism of other Muslims) followed by immersion with extremist peers, and then expressions of a wish to take action. The importance of real-life peer groups in driving further radicalization was highlighted by the finding that peer immersion nearly always preceded public expressions of a desire for action, either going abroad to fight or doing “something” at home, in the United States. These behaviors are assumed to be particular only to the homegrown terrorists who become radicalized while living in the United States. Not all American jihadists will fit the mold. Some arrive in the country already radicalized. A notable exception are women who often become radicalized privately and are more likely than male offenders to have been radicalized initially through online contacts. Traveling abroad to join a foreign terrorist group is nearly always the first choice of action. Carrying out a domestic attack may become a default option if and when travel proves difficult—or after prompting by recruiters. Methodology: Reducing ambiguity is vital in hypothesis testing. The NYPD model, developed by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt in 2007, was chosen as the basis for creating a typology of overt and detectable behavioral indicators of behaviors widely thought to be associated with extremism. Although well known, the utility of the NYPD model for assessing individual radicalization trajectories has never before been tested empirically. Detailed forensic biographies were collected for 135 American jihadism-inspired homegrown terrorism offenders. A variety of public access documentation was used, e.g. court documents, online communications posted by the terrorist offenders, media profiles and interviews with family members. The subjects were drawn from a larger list of 351 offenders who have been convicted in U.S. courts or killed while engaging in a jihadist terrorist act since 2001. All were judged to have become radicalized while living in the United States. Demographic information was coded for all of the study subjects. The study drew on previous work conducted by the PI on the role of internet-based propaganda and recruitment strategies on patterns of radicalization. From this research and based on the existing literature on radicalization, a list of 24 behavioral indicators commonly associated with radicalization was drawn up. Specific cues were linked to each of the behaviors associated with the model’s four stages, from the initial explorative behavior (pre-radicalization) to criminal action (stage 4). Coders were trained to read the documentation for evidence of the behavioral cues assumed to be associated with radicalization, and instructed to enter the first date at which such behaviors were publicly observed. From this data, retrospective timelines for the radicalization trajectories of each subject were estimated. The timeline data were subjected to a simulation analysis to test for fit with the model expectations and to identify which behavioral cues proved to be most reliable. A timeline for radicalization was then calculated for the offenders. Detailed Findings: It takes years to become a terrorist. Radicalization generally proceeds over the course of several years. Strikingly, the pace of the radicalization process has accelerated in recent years. Efficiency gains from the recruiters’ exploitation of social media to direct new adherents as well as the Islamic State’s settlement policy of taking in all volunteers both played a role in the acceleration of the radicalization process. The median was just over 4 years but excluding a handful of outliers who took a decade or more to make up their minds to “do something,” the average radicalization trajectory was just over three years (38 months). Jihadists offenders arrested or denied abroad in 2015 were radicalized in two years or less. The window of opportunity for preventive intervention is widest before an individual has embraced the radical belief system. A few individuals take a long time to decide to act but once an individual becomes involved with an extremist peer group or exhibit signs of advancing towards a greater commitment to the cause, radicalization generally speeds up. Setting aside the initial period of exploration of the extremist belief system that is characterized as pre-radicalization, the mean time to action was 6.25 months for the cohort of offenders who radicalized after 2010 compared to 15 months for the pre-2010 cohort. The timeline for radicalization also became more uniform. 90% of the offenders radicalized after 2010 took between 4 to 16 months from the initial stage of embracing extremist ideology (stage 1) to making plans to commit an act of terrorism (start of stage 3). The behavioral cues for progressive extremism elaborated by the model proved to work as expected in three-quarters of cases. A few indicators proved disappointing. Ideological rebellion and disengagement from education or work, for example, occurred frequently but randomly across the timelines for radicalization and therefore gave little indication of an individual’s progression to radicalization. Fourteen (14) of the behavioral indicators occurred at the predicted point in the radicalization process. Five (5) indicators appeared as predicted in more than half of the trajectories analyzed. The offenders often sought out like-minded individuals or created “pop-up” cells of co-believers around themselves by converting family members or friends to the cause. Online radicalization became far more prominent after 2010, but few individuals radicalize purely either online or offline. Among the offenders radicalized in 2010 and afterwards, half were initially radicalized though online contacts and the other half through offline connections with radicalized individuals. One (21%) out of four (76%) of the offenders who radicalized before 2010 were found to have initially become tuned on to extremism online. All subjects who radicalized in “a flash”—4 to 6 months—were drawn in by close friends or family. Demographic profiles correlate strongly with the time it takes for the individual to become radicalized to to take action, and sometimes correlate also with the types of action that the radicalized individual pursues. Why these differences exist is unclear. Individuals who grew up in Muslim households radicalized more quickly than converts, taking half the time to be galvanized to take action. Women radicalized at a quicker pace than men, some taking as little as four months from first searching for information about jihadist doctrines to reaching the point of decisive action. Men with previous criminal records unrelated to terrorism took twice as long to “do something.” Former criminals mostly engage in violent domestic attacks, perhaps because they do not have passports. Women have become a new risk factor and are increasingly seeking to become active perpetrators of violent attacks. ISIL has been far more able than any previous terrorist organization in the jihadist umbrella to inspire women. Tashfeen Malik, the female San Bernardino assailant, may be indicative of a broader shift. As yet women typically engage in low-threshold activities, such as marrying a fighter they first met online or participating in what they call the “online jihad.” They are often instrumental in the recruitment of men to commit violent offenses. The role of women as aggressors, supporters and facilitators of violent extremism is an area that should be an urgent priority for quick-response research and, possibly, be made a new focus for anti-terrorism prevention. A great deal of attention has been given to the youthfulness of some of the homegrown offenders who have been inspired by ISIL but jihadist violent extremism is in fact not typically a teenage phenomenon. A noticeable trend towards younger offenders can be observed but offenders under 18 are nevertheless the exception. The median age for becoming radicalized was 22 within the larger study group and 21 in the smaller group. The majority of the offenders (53%) were between 20 and 29 years of age and 15% were over 30 when they radicalized. The majority of homegrown jihadists radicalize between the ages of 18 and 29; an age at which there are few societal and institutional contact points for reaching the individuals, and no legal way to compel a radicalized individual to consent to monitoring or to participate in intervention programs aiming to changes their minds. The lack of a distinct demographic profile and the fact that despite growing in numbers terrorism remains a highly marginal phenomenon combine combine to complicate efforts to apply a public health model in anti-terrorism prevention. Policy Recommendations: The evidence supports a number of recommendations with respect to the methods that law enforcement can marshal to better identify and track individuals who may be in the process of becoming dangerously radicalized and for how to better educate the public about the radicalization process: 1. A dynamic risk assessment protocol focused on tracing progressive extremism is feasible and may more reliably anticipate imminent risk of violent behavior than will unstructured protocols utilizing a list system. Assessment protocols should take a whole-life approach to the assessment of individuals. The Internet is a ubiquitous influence but it is rarely the sole or even the primary source of inspiration for the radicalizing individual. The radicalizing individuals rarely move on to violent action without real-life reinforcement from peers or mentors. 2. Focus on CVE programs on mobilizing families in the fight against violent extremism. Families are often a source of early warnings about risky behaviors but many families misinterpret the signs of growing radicalization or ignore the risk. Two (2) out of five (5) jihadist terrorism offenders come from Christian homes with little knowledge of Islam, and the families may misread extremist behavior as religiosity. Muslim families are often victimized by the extremist family member or misinterpret the changing behaviors that they observe. A carrot and stick approach to mobilize families in the fight against growing extremism may include: Encourage early intervention by allowing juvenile offenders who have not committed serious terrorist crimes to enter probationary programs, and work with family member who do report extremist activity. Juvenile terrorism offenders are often recruited by family members or friends, and become engaged with online recruiters through peer involvement. Make it a duty for family members—wives included—to report known or suspected terrorist activity, such as financing and preparatory acts to purchase weapons or preparation of bombs, or plans to travel abroad with the intention of linking up with a foreign terrorist organization. Mothers and wives, who do not engage in criminal activities, may nevertheless act as facilitators or stand by passively. 3. Local law enforcement should develop outreach programs for Muslim community organizations and mosques. Many terrorism offenders have at some point in their radicalization trajectory come into contact with Muslim community institutions, often in acrimonious ways, and an increasing number of offenders have in recent years come to the attention of law enforcement through reports from Muslim community members and family. It is important that law enforcement continue to work with Muslim community organizations to develop trust and knowledge about the behaviors signifying extremism. 4. Take a long view on early prevention. Mainstreaming CVE programming into middle-school and high school curricula about Islam and with education about online predators and Internet-use hygiene is one avenue. The focus in schools should be on preventing the development of cliques among students endorsing violent extremist belief systems. This means that school staff should understand what radicalization means and be trained to distinguish extremist practices from the expression of legitimate religious attitudes. Following the findings of the research presented here, the emphasis should be on behaviors associated with violent extremism—e.g. denigration of how most Muslims practice their faith and of other religions, and admiration for martyrdom and violence. Merging education and prevention programming on gangs and all types of violent extremist belief systems should be considered. Details: Final report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250417.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250417.pdf Shelf Number: 140810 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homegrown Terrorists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: Key Findings - American Muslims are increasingly using the Web and social media to help counter violent extremism. Discussions with a number of Muslim leaders active in social media suggest that it is possible to expand such efforts even further, and doing so is a major objective of the August 2011 White House strategy to counter violent extremism. - While Muslim Americans play an active role in countering extremism, several factors may work to undermine higher-level engagement, including: low radicalization rates among American Muslims, negative perceptions of U.S. counterterrorism policies, a limited reservoir of leadership capacity and CVE funding (which prevents effective outreach), and being viewed as sell-outs to those most sympathetic to jihadi causes. - In some cases, the First Amendment may limit U.S. government attempts to fund CVE programs of an ideological bent, but this restriction could ultimately benefit CVE discourse as it frees Muslim groups of the taint of government funding and prevents the government from having to "choose sides" in intra-Muslim discourse and debate. - Both the U.S. State Department and the "think-do tank" Google Ideas have initiated insightful programs that seek to build capacity and otherwise promote credible Muslim voices. - Recommendations include desecuritizing efforts to counter violent extremism, addressing sources of mistrust within the Muslim community, focusing engagements and CVE education on social media influencers, building leadership and social media capacity in the Muslim community, enhancing private sector funding and engagement, and finding avenues to enhance government funding. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Shelf Number: 144830 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsMuslimsRadicalizationSocial MediaViolent Extremism |
Author: Patel, Sophia Title: The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism Summary: This paper examines the appeal of Islamic State (IS) to Western women and explores how women can be employed in countering violent extremism (CVE) structures to prevent further involvement. It aims to deliver a comprehensive analysis for academics, policymakers and practitioners working in CVE program and policy design and implementation in order to bridge the gap between community development work and security and intelligence. Two case studies of Australian women - Zehra Duman (a.k.a. Umm Abdullatif al-Australi) and Zaynab Sharrouf (a.k.a. Umm Hafs) - illustrate the appeal as well as the contradictions. A series of recommendations suggests changes to existing CVE structures and their approaches to integrating, women. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 145767 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateViolent Extremism |
Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015 Summary: 1. Purpose of Study: This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL. 2. The Problem: How and why do foreign terrorist organizations recruit Americans to their cause? Three answers have been proposed to this question: Homegrown terrorism is a tactic developed by the foreign terrorist organization to further its strategic interest in attacking Western targets. Command and control is essential to all terrorist organizations. Homegrown terrorism is essentially "leaderless". The root cause of militancy lies at home. US militants may declare allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations, but this is just a matter of aspiration. Terrorist groups are comprised of leaders and foot soldiers, and tailor their operations to meet strategic goals, including, perhaps most importantly, keeping their numbers up. An emphasis on recruitment requires an open structure; fundraising requires centralized control over the flow of money; plotting attacks needs a covert and decentralized and covert organization. 2. Data and Methodology: The data were collected as part of the Western Jihadism Project (WJP), a database of Western nationals associated with terrorist plots related to Al Qaeda and aligned groups, including ISIL, from the early 1990s to the end of 2015. Over the past twenty-five years, close to 800 residents or citizens of the U.S. have committed terrorism offenses inspired by one of the many Islamist terrorist groups that have been active in this country.Of these, about 560 may be described as "homegrown" terrorists: American citizens or residents who have been arrested or have died in incidents related to Al Qaeda and its many affiliates and successors. Foreigners who have attacked the United States, e.g. the September 11 hijackers, or have been brought to trial in the United States, are excluded from this estimate, and are not considered in this study. Data were also collected on Americans convicted on charges related to Hamas and Hezbollah in order to assess differences in network organization that are related to the particular objectives of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. All data were collected from court records and other public documentation. Data collection procedures were designed to facilitate social network analysis through the comprehensive coding of information about communications and relationship between known terrorist offenders. The study uses a method termed social network analysis (SNA). Developed by sociologists to study informal network dynamics, it has proved to be helpful in ascertaining structures, variations and patterns of change in terrorist organizations. 3. Key Findings: 2015 ended with a record number of arrests in the U.S. related to Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism, the highest count since the 9/11 attacks. The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and the ability of home-based if not necessarily homegrown militants to carry out successful mass shooting attacks in 2015 and 2016 are further indications that the country faces a significant and growing threat from Americans who are inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology and who are guided by recruiters acting on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations. Islamist terrorism in the United States has taken many different forms. These range from the pyramidal hierarchy of the Brooklyn-based cell in the 1990s to the family-based criminal fundraising schemes run by Hamas and Hezbollah and the recent decentralized pop-up cells of Americans who have become enamored of the Islamic State’s propaganda. The 1993 Brooklyn-based cell was markedly hierarchical and typical for an enclave-based terrorist organization that combines proselytizing and recruitment with planning and mobilization for terrorism. It was therefore vulnerable to prosecution and suppression, and its legacy for jihadist terrorism in the Untied States was minimal. Only actors who escaped abroad were able to carry on. Hamas and Hezbollah have used the United States as a base for raising funds, and occasionally as a safe harbor for important operatives. They retained the character of diaspora organizations focused on supporting organizations in the Middle East and eschewed domestic recruitment and mobilization for violent action in the United States. Highly centralized and vertical networks, they tend to organize around large-scale family-based fraud conspiracies involving siblings, parents and children, spouses, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and even more distant relatives. While the cells lacked broader connections within the United States, they were linked to the mother organizations in Lebanon or Gaza, often through nodes placed outside the United States. The number of Americans who die abroad in connection with terrorist actions on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations has risen sharply in recent years. Homegrown American militants nearly always first want to go abroad to fight. Later, they may be turned around to carry out attacks at home—or if they are frustrated in their ambition to go abroad, choose to commit acts of terrorism at home. After the 9/11 attacks, jihadist recruitment in the United States recovered only slowly, facilitated by travel to Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and a web-based proselytizing and recruitment strategy. In the last two years, travel to territories controlled by ISIL produced an uptick in deaths. Recruitment networks funneling people abroad look very different from the networks of the past that were intent of organizing attacks at home. The Islamic State’s recruitment structure presents a classic pattern of what is known as a star network, i.e. a communication network in which all nodes are independently connected to one central unit, here the recruiters for the Islamic State. Flat, dispersed, and highly connected through the central hub, all traffic goes through the leadership based abroad. The peripheral nodes may be comprised of just one person linking up via a home computer or the node may be a pop-up cell of friends and family communicating with the central hub. But characteristically those on the periphery have little awareness of each other. The new network structure associated with social media recruitment prioritizes recruitment over exercising control and command of violent plots. It is inaccurate to say that it exemplified “leaderless” terrorism as all information and action scripts run through the central hub of the network, comprised of recruiters and middle-men acting on behalf of the ISIL. Jihadist recruitment has reached into small and mid-sized cities in every state of the country. The impact of online recruitment is evident in the diversity of American terrorism offenders, who today have come from forty different ethnicities and all races. In 2015 investigations related to the Islamic State were in progress in all fifty states. Given the extraordinary diversity of the American homegrown terrorism offenders, no common denominator and no common set of grievances, or even common motivations, can explain what makes a few individuals opt to join groups espousing violent jihad. 4. Inferences and Recommendations For Policy: Family members and spouses are often the first to know when a person is about to do something. American homegrown terrorists rebel against the nation and their parents, and against the American Muslim community. Establish a duty to report: State and federal laws should make it a duty to report suspicions about imminent criminal activity related to terrorism. The legal construction may mirror current rules regarding the obligation to report child abuse if the family member, teacher, or community member has “cause to believe” that a risk to the public exists. But what are bystanders supposed to see? There is a real risk that American Muslims will be unfairly stereotyped in the absence of a clearly formulated public education program that focus on signs of radicalization to violent extremism. Focus on community education: The growing involvement of converts and the diffusion of risk outside the metropolitan areas suggests a need to educate community leaders, teachers, prison wardens and social workers in the detection of the signs of dangerous radicalization. The number of Americans participating in lethal attacks abroad has increased. For this reason and because of the intimate connection between perpetrating an attack at home and going abroad—in whatever order— the expression of a desire to go abroad to fight for a jihadist organization should be treated as an immediate risk to homeland security. Disrupt and intercept travel to foreign terrorist organizations and insurgencies: Withdrawal of passports is one tool. Preventing the development of hidden communities of extremism should continue be a high priority. Radicalization takes place in online and offline networks and peer groups. Profile the networks: Social network analysis may provide a fuller picture of an individual’s risk profile if it is used to profile all contact points, ranging from social media networks to offline engagements with other militants. The focus should be on top-down suppression of the purveyors of extreme political violence rather than bottom-up elimination of militant social media activists. Many would-be terrorists are caught online. That does not mean that they radicalized online. Moreover, online data have proven of value to law enforcement. Suppress Internet Producers of Online Violent Extremism: Policy should focus on targeting and suppressing the recruiters rather than retail-level consumers of terrorist propaganda. Details: Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Shelf Number: 146964 Keywords: Al QaedaExtremistsHomegrown TerrorismHomeland SecurityISILIslamRadical GroupsSocial NetworksTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Snair, Justin Title: Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop Summary: Countering violent extremism consists of various prevention and intervention approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to radicalization toward violent extremism, to provide nonviolent avenues for expressing grievances, and to educate communities about the threat of recruitment and radicalization to violence. To explore the application of health approaches in community-level strategies to countering violent extremism and radicalization, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a public workshop in September 2016. Participants explored the evolving threat of violent extremism and radicalization within communities across America, traditional versus health-centered approaches to countering violent extremism and radicalization, and opportunities for cross-sector and interdisciplinary collaboration and learning among domestic and international stakeholders and organizations. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Shelf Number: 141257 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismExtremist GroupsPublic HealthRadical GroupsTerrorismViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Salifu, Uyo Title: Boko Haram and violent extremism: Perspectives from peacebuilders Summary: The atrocities unleashed by Boko Haram since 2009 have affected millions of people in Nigeria and the region as a whole. This policy brief presents the results of a field-based study on peacebuilders' perspectives of the drivers of violent extremism; and the underlying socio-economic and political factors that influence individuals to join Boko Haram. The study reveals that peacebuilders consider religious dynamics as the most influential factor in individuals' decision to join the terrorist group. As such, the study reveals that peacebuilders' views regarding the drivers of violent extremism are often markedly different to those expressed by former Boko Haram members themselves. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 97: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Shelf Number: 141318 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist GroupsPeacebuildersRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Rueppel, Patrick Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe Summary: Countering violent extremism and terrorism has been a top priority of governments in Asia and Europe for many years. Terrorist cells posed a severe threat to home security, even before the emergence of Daesh. However, as a consequence of Asian and European citizens joining Daesh, terrorists have been able to establish networks among fighters from both regions. It has thus become imperative that governments from Asia and Europe enhance their collaboration and coordination in all dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper, no. 4: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Shelf Number: 145585 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic Title: Tightening the Purse Strings: What Countering Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security Summary: In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the international community brought a new focus and urgency to prioritizing countering terrorism financing (CTF), including through domestic criminalization, expanded legal powers to sanction proscribed individuals and entities, mandatory counter-terrorism clauses in donor funding and partnership agreements, and new reporting requirements for financial institutions that in turn led banks to develop their own increasingly risk-averse controls. The United States (U.S.) government (USG) assumed a prominent role globally, not only in setting international standards on countering terrorism financing, but also through the extraterritorial reach of U.S. financial laws and regulations. As part of this shift, stakeholders traditionally more on the sidelines in developing and implementing national security policies—such as the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF), governmental finance ministries, and private financial institutions—took on a much greater role. Banking institutions were in many ways deputized to police these new standards, a position many did not necessarily welcome given the high compliance costs and risks of government enforcement actions if controls failed. In many contexts, civil society became the direct and indirect target of these rules to counter terrorism financing, losing critical access to resources, as well as the ability to fully use banking facilities, because of a regulatory assumption— much refuted, and since revised—that the sector was "particularly vulnerable" to terrorist financing abuse. While by no means alone in bearing the brunt of this legal and regulatory environment, the specific profile of women's rights organizing and organizations has meant that they experience these rules in a number of adverse and often gender-specific ways. On the frontlines of promoting and protecting human rights and critical to ensuring the success and sustainability of peace processes, women's rights advocates and feminist movements mobilize to cause long-lasting social change in their communities. Yet while governments are required to ensure them a safe and enabling environment, precarious security conditions marked by threats from both State and non-State actors, as well as an acute funding crisis, are increasingly the norm. Highly reliant on foreign funding and often in receipt of short-term or project-based funding, women’s rights organizations have little financial resilience, are nascent or newly-established, are relatively small and often operate at the grassroots level, and already often face some degree of financial exclusion. Women's rights organizations challenging the status quo by promoting gender equality frequently find themselves at odds with, and targeted by, their own governments, including by those that criminalize such legitimate activities as "terrorism." To be able to continue their essential work in promoting gender equality, peace, and human rights, such groups may have to operate below the radar, with the security and confidentiality of their beneficiaries of paramount concern. Ensuring the ability of this work to continue is instrumental in creating long-lasting social change and peace, in a world where human rights and stability are under growing threat. The ways in which countering terrorism financing rules have been designed and implemented take little to no account of these features of women’s rights organizations and the environments in which they operate. In practice, legal and regulatory frameworks to counter terrorism financing often restrict transnational financial flows (e.g., from Western donors to grassroots groups); involve heavy compliance requirements; cause delays in, or block receipt of, funds; favor established and often international organizations; call for detailed information on civil society's activities, including in some cases beneficiaries; and decrease the risk appetite of donors and banks. The full extent of these impacts, however, is unknown as regulatory authorities, donors, and financial institutions do not often collect or share relevant information on impacts or explicitly provide reasons for limiting resources and financial access, while civil society actors typically under-report incidents out of reputational or enforcement concerns or due to low levels of knowledge regarding countering terrorism financing measures. In particular, the gender and human rights implications of these countering terrorism financing policies have to date escaped scrutiny. There has, instead, been a tendency to treat civil society organizations and their activities as homogenous and to diagnose problems with—and then devise solutions to— countering terrorism financing regimes that overlook, and may in some cases, deepen adverse impacts. Tightening the Purse Strings: What Countering Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security represents the culmination of research, interviews, surveys, and statistical analysis carried out by the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Duke University School of Law and the Women Peacemakers Program (WPP) to begin to fill these gaps in understanding how responses to terrorism and violent extremism may, in practice, undermine gender equality. In particular, this Report analyzes these measures from an international human rights law perspective, assessing the extent to which countering terrorism financing measures comply with a host of international law obligations, such as prohibitions on both direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of sex and gender and guaranteeing freedom of association, assembly, and expression, including in ensuring access to resources. From applying this gender and human rights perspective, it is clear that women's rights and their defenders across the globe are frequently squeezed between terrorism and violent extremism on the one hand, and counter-terrorism or preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) on the other. In the survey of grassroots women's organizations undertaken for this Report, 86.67 percent of respondents classified their organization's work—including in areas such as peacebuilding and conflict resolution—as contributing to combatting terrorism and violent extremism. Yet, 90 percent said that counter-terrorism measures had an adverse impact on work for peace, women's rights, and gender equality generally. Details: Durham, NC: Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic, 2017. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2017 at: https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/tighteningpursestrings.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/tighteningpursestrings.pdf Shelf Number: 144648 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Terrorism Terrorist Financing Violent Extremism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts Summary: Why GAO Did This Study - Violent extremism - generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically - motivated acts of violence - has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi-agency efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-300: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Shelf Number: 144734 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Schomerus, Mareike Title: Countering violent extremism: Topic guide Summary: Definitions and concepts There is no consensus on what violent extremism is and how best to prevent or counter it. The term 'violent extremism' has become a catch-all for a number of phenomena, and there is considerable variation in how terminology is used. Radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism are often used interchangeably, even though they describe different processes. The term violent extremism conflates belief and use of force. Critics also see the use of 'extremist' as always politically motivated: it can be used to denounce those that threaten the political status quo. Its use to describe primarily Islamist groups has obscured the fact that extremist beliefs and support for violence are found across different cultures, religions, and political situations. More attention is now being paid to, for example, right-wing or left-wing violent extremism. The breadth of definitions and debate may offer an opportunity for more creative policy and programme engagement. However, it can also encourage ad hoc policymaking. What we know about violent extremism Rigorous empirical research that would allow conclusive statements on violent extremism is rare, so extremist violence tends to be explained through untested theories. Political interests may also inform an explanation or definition. Causes of violent extremism are often divided into 'push' and 'pull' factors. This overlooks links between them, however, and can lead to over-generalisation. 'Individual' and 'community' factors are more useful categories - though still interconnected. Factors at the individual level include: Personal relationships: These are important in spreading or reinforcing extremist ideas, and a radicalising peer group can provide a sense of belonging. Beliefs, values and convictions: Extremist beliefs can be religious, spiritual, moral, or political and tend to express the conviction that a group, a way of life, or a political system needs to be challenged or destroyed. The perception of being denied recognition at a collective and personal level is considered critical. Manipulation: Manipulation by extremist groups happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors. Whether there is a causal relationship between access to information (including to social media) and extremism is under-researched. This also challenges counter-approaches that use media strategies. Trauma and humiliation: How emotions of humiliation and betrayal result in the reproduction of violence is a topic in urgent need of research. Factors at the community level include: History and narratives: Legacies of oppression, subjugation, and interference by dominant powers matter. Sharing an oppression narrative with a community can create a sense of belonging in a marginalised situation. Rejection of an external system: Externally imposed or international systems that are associated with injustice and humiliation can create resistance that can turn violent. Governance: Poor/unjust governance can promote acceptance of an extremist group. Failure of a government to deliver services may enable violent extremists to establish safe havens. Business and crime: Commercial interests can drive violent behaviour. Some extremist groups act as credit institutions where no others are available. Marginalisation and lack of choices: Violence can be seen as a way of gaining more choices, an audible political voice, or a stronger economic position. Those who join violent extremist groups come from diverse backgrounds and arrive via different paths. Violent extremism is not the consequence of a long-term political or religious 'maturation'. There is no straightforward link between violent extremism and religious faith or specific practices. Many of those radicalising have only a faint grasp of the holy texts of the religion they are purportedly defending. This highlights that a belief - which can be a strong driver of violence - is not to be equated with a religious faith based on the interpretation of scriptures. A large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan found neither religious practice nor support for political Islam was related to support for violent extremist groups. A direct link between education and specific attitudes has not been established: lack of education does not cause extremist views. Neither radicalisation nor state collapse necessarily leads to violent extremism. Some scholars argue that in a situation of collapse it is in fact more difficult for extremist ideologies to gain traction. Violent extremism involves local, regional and international dimensions, so strategies to tackle it are needed at different levels. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 144892 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Bonnell, Joe Title: Teaching approaches that help to build resilience to extremism among young people Summary: This report presents the findings from a large-scale, in-depth research study into teaching methods - knowledge, skills, teaching practices and behaviours - that help to build resilience to extremism. The focus is on teaching methods to be used in a general classroom setting rather than as part of interventions targeted at those deemed at risk of extremism. The research methods used were 10 in-depth case studies of relevant projects and interventions, including interviews with teachers, practitioners and students and classroom observation, a literature review conducted according to systematic principles, and close engagement with 20 academic and other experts in the field. The study was commissioned by the former Department for Children Schools and Families (DCSF), now the Department for Education (DfE), with support from the Home Office. The Office for Public Management (OPM), an independent public service research and development centre, conducted the research in partnership with the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER), which is the UK's largest independent provider of research, assessment and information services for education, training and children's services. The primary aim of the research was to provide a strong evidence base for schools and other education providers to help them adopt and commission the appropriate interventions to build resilience to extremism. Following detailed analysis and synthesis of findings from the case study visits, together with findings from the literature review, we identified a number of key ingredients which were important for resilience-building teaching activities. Taken together, these ingredients help to counteract the impact of factors that can help to either push or pull young people towards extremism and / or violent extremism, such as a sense of injustice or feelings of exclusion. The key ingredients can be clustered under three headings: 1. making a connection through good design and a young-person centred approach 2. facilitating a safe space for dialogue and positive interaction 3. equipping young people with appropriate capabilities - skills, knowledge, understanding and awareness. Whatever the setting and resources available, the principles of good design and facilitation - the first two of the three - are crucial and non-negotiable. This research suggests that a well-designed, well-facilitated intervention will go a long way to building resilience. To be more confident of longer-term, sustainable resilience, however, an additional focus is needed, over and above good design and facilitation, on building 'harder' skills, knowledge, understanding and awareness, including practical tools and techniques for personal resilience. Details: Feethams, Darlington, UK: Department of Education, 2011. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report DFE-RR119; Accessed May 9, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teaching-approaches-that-help-to-build-resilience-to-extremism-among-young-people Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teaching-approaches-that-help-to-build-resilience-to-extremism-among-young-people Shelf Number: 145364 Keywords: Educational ProgramsExtremismRadicalizationResilienceViolent Extremism |
Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide Summary: The aim of this compendium is to provide guidance and insight for practitioners, policymakers, governments and civil society organizations in South East Asia that are interested in developing counter-narratives and alternative narratives to the messaging produced by violent extremists. The compendium will draw on international good practice and lessons learned to inform and inspire these actors to utilize the most effective methods and strategies. The compendium begins with a step-by-step approach to counter-narratives, with clear examples from South East Asia. The compendium then dives deeper into several case studies, highlighting elements of good practice from the region before presenting a detailed annex of 80 existing counter-narratives from South East Asia (Annex 3). It should be noted that the narratives and subsequent analysis of the narratives and counter-narratives contained in this report mostly focus on violent extremism of groups that claim to be Islamic, primarily because the majority of the threats posed by violent extremist groups in South East Asia fall under this category. However, this is not to say that violent extremism only relates to the above category, and there are case examples from other non-Islamic forms of violent extremism. For a more robust assessment of the threats of violent extremism in the region, refer to Annex 2: Violent Extremism in South East Asia. It is important to establish the terminology that has been adopted throughout the compendium. The term "narrative" generally refers to the story or recruitment pitch of violent extremists, whereas "counter-narrative" generally refers to the story or counter-argument utilized to reduce the appeal of violent extremism. Counter-narratives include counter-arguments as well as positive, alternative narratives and government strategic communications. The contents of this compendium rely on a number of sources: 1) research on the academic and policy literature conducted by the author; 2) an expert workshop on "South East Asia Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)" hosted by Hedayah and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia in March 2016 and the subsequent report;1 and 3) a consultation process on draft versions of the compendium with regional experts and policymakers from the region. Details: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Hedayah Center, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Shelf Number: 145466 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismExtremist GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Buchanan-Clarke, Stephan Title: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn Summary: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns - the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE. 1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present. Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups: 1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) 2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali). 3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism. Details: Afrobarometer, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Shelf Number: 145467 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al QaedaCounter-TerrorismCountering-ExtremismExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Women and Violent Radicalization: Research Report Summary: Highlights - Women are victims of all forms of violent radicalism, but can also be participants, or active accomplices, of violence in the name of an ideology. - Pursuant to the mandate in the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan, Radicalization in Quebec: Act, Prevent, Detect and Live Together, the Secretariat a la condition feminine (SCF) and the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) were asked to collaborate in defining the angle and scope of the present study, whose purpose is to document the differentiated radicalization factors among women and men in Quebec. The CSF and SCF also drew on the expertise of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) for empirical information. - Radicalization leading to violence is a complex process whereby people adopt a system of extreme beliefs and a willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence, to promote an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation. - Throughout history, women have been involved in violent radicalism, whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia. The violent radicalization of women is not a new phenomenon. - Despite the historical presence of women in violent extremist movements, and episodes of political violence perpetrated by them, violent radicalism is a marginal phenomenon among women in comparison to men. - Often viewed through the distorting lens of gender stereotypes and a presumption of passivity, women who join radical groups, or who engage directly in political violence, should not be thought of exclusively as victims, since they are also active participants. To understand their choices, we must explore the particular paths they have taken. The scholarly literature and most media reports have long seen radical women as manipulated and subservient to men, who are seen as the "true" drivers and actors of violent radical movements. - The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated, controlled by romantic urges, dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency. It also contributes to the belief that women who are recent immigrants are by definition more submissive toward men than women who are not. In contrast, a postcolonial approach avoids this simplistic, erroneous view of immigrant women by considering the perspective of those directly concerned. Details: Montreal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Shelf Number: 145556 Keywords: Extremist GroupsImmigrant WomenRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Exit Strategies Summary: This approach involves setting up de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation), or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the very best of prevention efforts, some individuals still go on to become (violent) extremists. While en route to that stage, they may fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and - in some cases - of judicial and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual - perhaps after finishing a prison sentence, or when he or she is tired of the movement or is pushed by loved ones to change - needs to be re-integrated into society. For successful re-integration into society it is important to offer de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to prisoners charged with violent extremist offences . But "Exit" programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different advanced stages of the radicalisation process: from those that have strong views and legitimise the use of violence, those aligned with extremist groups but who have not yet undertaken violent extremist activities, to those that have themselves executed violent extremist or even terrorist attacks. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145563 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Family support Summary: This approach aims to support families vulnerable to and dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism. The role of families in the process or radicalisation has become central to the debate on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Many believe that one of the keys to stopping the process at an early stage lies behind the door of the family home. Proponents of this approach believe that building resilience and creating awareness for parents and other family members will mean that young people are better protected from extremist influences. In reality, families may be both helpful and harmful in radicalisation processes. A distinction should be made between families' intentions and their behaviour. Family members may sometimes do more harm than good because they are unsure how to talk to a relative who they may fear is becoming radicalised. Family members may also explicitly encourage a relative to take an extremist path, as they believe this is the right direction. Families can however also be the key to creating a safety net and be instrumental in helping someone leave an extremist movement and mind-set. Each scenario and family's involvement will be different and requires tailored solutions. Although we talk about families as a whole, the dynamics within families and the roles of each family member will impact radicalisation processes differently. It is therefore important to understand who constitutes the family? Who is part of this group or network of people that considers itself a family? This may differ quite substantially across different cultural backgrounds. Honorary culture within families might also play an important role in both directions. Once there is an understanding as to who is part of the family, dynamics between these individuals can be observed and analysed. For this to happen, a family's cooperation is of utmost importance. Without a family's commitment it will be very difficult for 'outsiders', whether police, family counsellors, social workers or other actors, to build trust and help build resilient family engagement. A family's connection to the wider environment (other families, the community they are part of, institutions) is also a crucial element in family support. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145567 Keywords: De-radicalizationExtremism Family EngagementRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools: issues and perspectives Summary: Violent radicalization, in and of itself, is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, movements have called upon their followers to use violence in defence of an ideology or cause, whether for religious, social, political or other motives. However, the current context is one of growing activity by violent radical movements that, although extremely diverse in terms of their ideologies and motivations, all eat away at the Promise of Togetherness and pose a direct threat to our collective security. Quebec has not been spared in the emergence and proliferation of radicalization leading to violence, which is how it came about that in 2015 several young Quebecers left for Syria to join extremist groups on the ground there. College de Maisonneuve has been hit especially hard by this state of affairs; it was at the instigation of the college that the CPRLV undertook the present study to document the situation, produce a cross-sectional analysis and propose recommandations. The report explores the following broad topics: - Explaining radicalization leading to violence linked to jihadism and the situation in Syria - Placing Quebec in context with regard to this phenomenon - Understanding the radicalization of some students from College de Maisonneuve and other young people receiving counselling from the CPRLV - Identifying strategies for preventing radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools. The different recommendations generated by this analysis (and presented at the end of the rapport) are directed not only at College de Maisonneuve, schools and government agencies but also at ordinary citizens affected by the question who would like to engage in a helpful and proactive manner with those around them. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Shelf Number: 145633 Keywords: ExtremismRadical ExtremistRadical GroupsRadicalizationSchoolsTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Approaches and Practices Summary: In recent years, the processes of radicalisation leading to violent extremism have greatly evolved. The variety of ideologies that provide inspiration for extremist groups is growing and include religious inspired extremism, left wing, anarchist and right wing ideologies as well as nationalist and separatist ideologies. Extremists are also no longer acting only as part of organised, hierarchical organisations but also within smaller cells and sometimes as lone wolves. All forms of extremism have become more globalised taking full advantage of the opportunities of the interconnected world. Consequently, terrorist or violent extremist actions are becoming harder to detect and predict by the authorities, making traditional law enforcement techniques alone insufficient to deal with these evolving trends, particularly in relation to tackling the root causes of the problem. A broader approach is needed, aimed at earlier intervention and prevention, and engaging a wide spectrum of actors from across society. Within the EU, Member States are facing a variety of challenges. European societies are increasingly confronted with home-grown terrorism - radicalised individuals, born and raised in the West were involved in or responsible for the Madrid bombings in March 2004, the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, the London 7/7 attack, the massacre committed by Anders Breivik, the Jewish Museum attack in Brussels, the assassination of satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo editors and other staff in Paris and the atrocities committed in the same city on 13 November 2015. On- and offline support for terrorist organisations such as Daesh shows an increase in radicalisation among young people on EU territory. It is clear that all available counter terrorism tools need to be enhanced. Prevent efforts are also needed more than ever before. Following such attacks, there is always a risk of copycat style attacks, and attacks against those communities wrongly perceived as being responsible. Preventing radicalisation is key - fighting terrorism can only be successful if we remove the soil out of which it grows. Radicalisation of EU citizens is connected with global issues. The form and intensity with which radicalisation manifests in the streets and neighbourhoods of Europe often follows on from armed conflict in third countries. The rise of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) is among the clearest examples. The armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq have motivated thousands of EU citizens to join those battle fields, often due to recruitment activities by terrorist groups such as Daesh. There are now believed to be thousands of Europeans within the region. Apart from their potentially violent acts abroad, the threat posed by radicalised returnees, who may be traumatised, skilled in combat and/or brainwashed to hate European values and commit acts of violence in Member States, has been revealed all too painfully in terrorist atrocities within the EU. In addition to the risk of uncoordinated attacks by lone actor returnees, Daesh and al-Qaeda recently called upon their followers to bring the terror to the West. So terrorist groups are not only recruiting EU citizens to join their battles abroad, but are also motivating young people vulnerable to radicalisation to commit acts of terrorism at home. Daesh and al-Qaeda are competitors in the recruitment of EU fighters, and successful attacks against European values and societies seem to be among their recruitment tools. In Eastern parts of Europe, right-wing and nationalist extremism is growing and more people are leaving for Ukraine to engage in the conflict there. Southern European countries often serve as transit-countries, and may as a consequence experience home-grown extremism in the long run. In reaction to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, a rise in Islamist extremism and domestic extremism are creating a breeding ground for increased polarisation and intolerance throughout Europe. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 362p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145657 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radical Violence Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism |
Author: El-Said, Hamed Title: De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact on Muslim Majority States Summary: Violent extremism remains a major threat to global security. The global nature of the phenomenon is reflected in its un-selective character. Capitals from Oslo to Cairo, Riyadh to Kuala Lumpur, and London to Washington have had to deal with the consequences. No region, or even country, can claim to be entirely immune from the problem. Recent developments, such al-Qaeda's attempt (via Omar Farouk Abdulmuttalab) to blow up an airliner bound for Detroit in December 2009, and bombs sent from Yemen to Chicago in October 2010, suggest that violent extremist groups and individuals remain more determined, sophisticated, unpredictable, and hard to identify. Counter-terrorism is therefore likely to remain an important policy preoccupation and gain further significance in international relations in the short to medium terms. The continuation of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the deterioration of the situation in Yemen and Somalia, and the volatile nature of the Middle-East peace process all contribute to the persistence of extremism. But so too do other, less obvious factors, and the understanding of this has generated considerable interest in new approaches initiated by several Muslim-majority states to counter the phenomenon of violent extremism. This report is part of a larger project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will be published by Routledge in early 2012. The Report examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states known to have developed 'soft' strategies to counter this problem, and demonstrates how all of these countries have developed varied approaches, strategies and processes. For example, some focus more on countering and preventing further radicalisation in their societies (what we refer to in this report as 'counter-radicalisation strategy'). Countries that fall in this category include Morocco and Bangladesh. Others, such as Yemen and Egypt, focus more on rehabilitating and counselling those who have already become radicalised (De-radicalisation). Some have developed well-structured official programmes (Saudi Arabia), while others rely more on individual initiatives (Jordan). Finally, some have experienced collective de-radicalisation, whereby a group of former radicals decide to take a collective decision to denounce violence, admit their mistake and rejoin society. Such collective de-radicalisation can, and has taken place inside prisons (e.g. Islamic Jihad and Jihad Organisation in Egypt in 1997 and 2007, respectively) and outside prisons (e.g. the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army in 1997). By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the report identifies certain key factors which can be considered as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes. These include the following: the role of popular support combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership; the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and developmental strength of the state is also important, as is the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors and interventions on the other. Finally, no single formula can deal with all cases of violent extremism, even within a single region. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts must take account of the culture, mores, traditions, history, and rules and regulations of each country Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1328200569ElSaidDeradicalisation1.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1328200569ElSaidDeradicalisation1.pdf Shelf Number: 145744 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper Dr. Bibi van Ginkel takes an in depth look at how multi‐lateral institutions, engage with civil society to counter violent extremism. Dr.van Ginkel argues that civil society can play a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways - by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism. The paper finds that over the last decade there has been a more intensive coordination of activities between the UN and other multi‐lateral organisations and civil society but the question remains whether the implementation as well as the drafting of these policies will live up to their potential effectiveness. This paper gauges how effective these measures have been and what more there is to do. The final section concludes with a series of policy recommendations Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 145749 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Title: Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers Summary: Over the past years, the number of reported attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups has risen. As we witness tragedies on all continents, we understand that violent extremism knows no boundaries and affects every society. Young people are, however, most at risk. They are the main targets of recruitment strategies and fall victim to extremist violence. This phenomenon alerts us to the risk of losing a generation of youth to despair and disengagement. In the face of such threats, there is no single solution. Security responses are important, but not sufficient, and will not tackle the many underlying conditions that breed violent extremism and drive youth to join violent extremist groups. We need soft power, such as education. In particular, we need relevant, inclusive and equitable quality education. This is the sine qua non to effective action and requires countries to simultaneously implement short, medium and long-term responses. To assist countries in their efforts, UNESCO has developed this publication Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers. The Guide also responds to the decision of UNESCO's Executive Board at its 197th session (197 EX/Dec46) through which Member States acknowledged the importance of preventing violent extremism through education and requested that UNESCO assist them in this endeavour. Together with the Teachers' Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism produced by UNESCO, this Guide offers technical guidance for education professionals (policy-makers, teachers and various education stakeholders) on how to address the concrete challenges posed by violent extremism within each society. The Guide particularly aims to help policy-makers within ministries of education to prioritize, plan and implement effective preventive actions. Details: Paris: UNESCO, 2017. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Shelf Number: 145803 Keywords: Crime PreventionEducational ProgramsExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorist RecruitmentViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim Title: Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat Summary: Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60-100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to South Africa and the government's response to this challenge. Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress' National Conference in Manguang. Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around violent extremism in South Africa and the state's capacity to respond. While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups. This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa's post-apartheid experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa. Details: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, 2017: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Shelf Number: 145835 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Idris, Iffat Title: Women and countering violent extremism Summary: There is no consensus on the definition of countering violent extremism (CVE), in part because there is no consensus on the definition of violent extremism (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016; Striegher, 2015). The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (UN, 2015) does not provide one because consensus could not be reached due to the political sensitivities involved. A working definition cited in Foreign Affairs that encompasses the key concepts is: 'the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives'. The idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means, but the structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled (Frazer & Nunlist, 2015). Prevention is a major aspect of CVE, aiming to get at the root causes and factors that contribute to extremism and terrorism, by engaging with individuals, communities and others. 'It is not enough to counter violent extremism - we need to prevent it' (UNESCO2). This review looks at the role that women can play in CVE, lessons from programmes on women and CVE, donor policy guidance and programming approaches, and networks supporting women and CVE. Note that 'women' refers to women and girls: this is consistent with concepts of gender equality, gender violence, and so on, which all encompass both women and girls. (Moreover perceptions of when womanhood starts vary across cultures, with some considering puberty as the point at which a girl becomes a woman.) The available literature largely comprised of government and donor agency reports, think-tank papers and grey literature. Note that some literature refers to just women and CVE, and some to women and preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For each source, the review uses the term (CVE or P/CVE) used in that source. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Helpdesk Research Report: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Shelf Number: 145907 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCountering Violent ExtremismExtremist GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Harper, Erica Title: Examining Psychological Drivers of Radicalisation in Jordan Summary: Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, it is estimated that over 35,000 foreign fighters have joined Sunni militant groups, such as Daesh and al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The threat posed by such groups - both inside conflict zones and in countries of origin - has focused attention on the drivers that render individuals vulnerable to recruitment, as well as strategies for bolstering resilience to indoctrination, and rehabilitating those who have defected and returned. To date, most analysis has focused on the contextual, religious, ideological, and socio-economic push and pull factors that drive radicalisation. Less attention has been directed to how governments and development organisations might respond to the psychological drivers of radicalisation. This report aims to fill this gap by examining the relations between individual psychology, group affiliation, and the socio-economic context in Jordan. The report discusses three stages an individual goes through before engaging in violent extremist behaviour. The research finds that psychological dynamics tend to influence four of the driver sets that explain the process of radicalisation into violent extremism: social identity, religious ideology, personal status, and social injustice. The report concludes with a series of recommendations on how to incorporate psychological dimensions of radicalisation into broader response strategies. This report is a collaborative effort. It draws upon research conducted by the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute in radicalisation hotbeds targeting youth and refugees in 2016. It also draws upon primary research data collected by Dr Anne Speckhard in Jordan in November 2016 Details: Amman - Jordan: WANA Institute (West Asia North Africa Institute), 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/examining-psychological-drivers-radicalisation-jordan Year: 2017 Country: Jordan URL: http://wanainstitute.org/en/publication/examining-psychological-drivers-radicalisation-jordan Shelf Number: 145933 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Shtuni, Adrian Title: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo Summary: What started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the Syrian regime escalated in the five years that followed into an intractable sectarian war that has engulfed both Syria and Iraq, drawn in a suite of regional actors and world powers, and attracted an unprecedented number of volunteer combatants from more than a hundred countries. Although so-called foreign fighters have been a common feature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and Dagestan, Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, their flow to Syria and Iraq is the largest influx of its kind in recent history. More than 36,500 individuals, including at least 6,600 from Western countries, are estimated to have traveled to the conflict theater since 2012, mostly to join designated terrorist organizations operating in the region. Not long after the bloody secessionist wars that brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western Balkans became a prime source of foreign fighters for the Syrian conflict. More than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012. The significance of this number becomes apparent in the context of the combined population across these small countries of less than nineteen million. Rates of mobilization relative to the population size - particularly in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia - are far higher than in western European countries most afflicted by the phenomenon. Now that the flow of those traveling to the conflict theater has subsided - for a variety of reasons - and about 37 percent of all Kosovan nationals estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq have returned home, the task of understanding the dynamics of their radicalization has become even more critical. This is not only in regard to managing the security challenge associated with their return but also to adopting effective strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This report explores the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, focusing on the flow of foreign fighters as the most prominent symptom of a multifaceted religious militancy problem facing the country. It is important to emphasize from the outset that though the number of foreign fighters in itself represents a quasi-insignificant minority of the Kosovan society, it also constitutes merely a fraction of an extensive network of like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks. This report shines some light on that less well-understood part of the supply chain of violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Shelf Number: 146019 Keywords: Foreign FightersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Disengagement and De-radicalization Summary: The contents of this brief are based on the discussions that occurred from 3-4 November at an expert workshop on Research Trends in Countering Violent Extremism hosted by Hedayah in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The purpose of this 2-day expert roundtable was to bring together 20-25 researchers, policymakers and practitioners in a closed discussion of the current trends in CVE research. The goals at the meeting were to 1) address the current research outcomes in countering violent extremism; 2) determine the critical gaps in research on CVE; 3) identify the new and emerging threats of violent extremism; and 4) establish a recommended research agenda for Hedayah and CVE researchers in the coming 2 years. In preparation for the meeting, Hedayah worked with Curtin University to map the existing CVE literature and assess the CVE research landscape across four themes: 1) social media and CVE, 2) education and CVE, 3) narratives of victims, survivors and formers for CVE, and 4) Disengagement and De-radicalization.11 Meeting attendees utilized this literature review as a baseline for the discussions. Participants were also invited to prepare short research proposals prior to the meeting for review and discussion by other participants. In addition to the discussions that occurred at the expert workshop on Research Trends in Countering Violent Extremism, this brief also draws from findings of the literature review conducted by Hedayah and Curtin University, the research proposals that were submitted by the participants, and independent research conducted by the author Details: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Hedayah Center, 2014. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: CVE Research Brief 1: Accessed June 17, 2017 at: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-23201693446.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-23201693446.pdf Shelf Number: 146239 Keywords: De-radicalization Radicalization Violent Extremism |
Author: Robinson, Eric Title: What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen? Summary: Why do some individuals become terrorists? Why do some choose to travel overseas to become foreign fighters and others remain home to engage in political violence? More than academic, the answers to these questions inform a central component of U.S. national security strategy: countering violent extremism. This report addresses the topic of radicalization - or individual motivations to engage in political violence-in Yemen. This report uses data from focus groups and a national survey conducted during the spring of 2016. Yemen is in the midst of a civil war. In the wake of the collapse of the government of Tunisia in 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets in major cities to protest the reelection of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After protracted negotiations by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was Saleh's vice president, took over the presidency in February 2012. By then, the internal strife had gained momentum. The Houthis, who had fought several wars against Saleh's forces, had used the unrest to expand from their stronghold in the Sa'ada governorate. They eventually seized the capital of Sana'a in September 2014. President Hadi and his forces retreated to Aden and southern Yemen, but the Houthis pushed south and assaulted Aden's international airport in March 2015. The civil war had begun. More than 10,000 people have died in Yemen's civil war. Nearly 2.2 million-out of a total population of 27 million-are internally displaced and an additional 200,000 are refugees overseas. Various nonstate armed groups exist. Some fight with the aforementioned Houthi movement. Others have joined the local al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Still, others are associated with the Islamic State. These armed groups fight against one another as well as the Yemeni military forces and those of the Arab coalition. With such a widespread conflict, it would be easy to understand the motivations of those who are sympathetic to, or become involved in, political violence. But rather than focus on support for political violence per se, the report looks at the other side of the coin - why individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen. It argues that the more effective approach to countering violent extremism is to reinforce a propensity toward nonviolence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Shelf Number: 146245 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremist GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Glazzard, Andrew Title: Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent Extremism Summary: Counter-terrorist practitioners and policy makers appear to be very interested in narrative. They often describe the worldview of violent Islamist groups and movements as the 'jihadi narrative', while their efforts to confront terrorist propaganda are usually labelled as 'counter-narrative' or 'alternative narrative'. However, while the counter-narrative approach has gained widespread acceptance in governments, think-tanks and civil society organisations, it is built on very shaky theoretical and empirical foundations. Some valuable theoretical contributions to the study of violent extremist narrative have been made by psychologists in particular, but there is one discipline which is conspicuous by its absence from the field: literary studies. This paper makes a case for the value of studying violent extremist narratives as narratives in the literary sense. By employing the tools and techniques of literary criticism, violent extremist communication can be revealed as not only potentially persuasive, but also creative and aesthetically appealing: terrorists inspire their followers, they don't merely persuade them. Understanding the creative sources of this inspiration is vital if counter-narrative is to succeed in presenting an alternative to the propaganda of violent extremist groups. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed June 20, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 146315 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Hayes, Ben Title: The impact of international counter-terrorism on civil society organisations: Understanding the role of the Financial Action Task Force Summary: This report examines the impact of international counterterrorism frameworks on the work of civil society organisations. In particular, it explains the role of the Financial Action Task Force in setting international standards that affect the way in which civil society organisations are regulated by nation-states, their access to financial services, and their obligations to avoid proscribed organisations and other entities deemed to pose a 'terrorism' risk. The introduction to the report frames these developments in the context of the 'shrinking space' of civil society organisations. This narrative describes a new generation of restrictions and attacks on the legitimacy and actions of non-profits and social justice organisations. Chapter two introduces the counterterrorism frameworks that have most affected civil society. This includes UN Security Council measures on combating terrorism, the new international CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) agenda, the FATF's counterterrorist financing requirements, and the EU's development and implementation of these measures. Chapter three examines the worldwide proliferation of restrictive civil society laws and their relationship to the FATF's recommendations on the regulation of the non-profit sector. It draws on existing research showing how these have been used as a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive legislation across the globe, and augments this discourse with new evidence, examples and case studies. It also considers the prospects for reform, and the potential for the FATF to engage proactively in preventing further restrictions. Chapter four addresses a relatively newer phenomenon: the financial exclusion of civil society organisations and resulting from the 'due diligence' obligations mandated by the FATF. Driven by ever-tighter demands on financial institutions to scrutinise their customers for links to terrorism, crime and corruption - and underscored by substantial fines for failures due diligence - banks and intermediaries are cutting ties with non-profits and refusing to process "suspicious" cross-border transactions. This is a process that economists have termed 'de-risking'. While more research is needed, examples show how financial exclusion can fundamentally compromise the ability of affected non-profits to implement their programmes and fulfil their mandates. Chapter five examines the impact of terrorist 'blacklisting' and sanctions regimes more widely on activities such as peacebuilding and the provision of humanitarian assistance. It shows how the rigid interpretation of states' obligations by the FATF is exacerbating what have become often intractable problems for conflict resolutions organisations and NGOs working at close proximity to conflict zones or 'suspect communities'. The report draws three main conclusions. First, without fundamental reform to the FATF's non-profit sector recommendations, the proliferation and legitimisation of restrictive counterterrorism laws is likely to continue unabated. Second, the FATF is undermining international law by directly promoting laws that contravene states' human rights obligations, even where the draft laws have been criticised by UN mandate holders. Third, a rights-based approach to financial services in which the onus is on the banks and regulators to service non-profits and process transactions is the only way to address this particular problem of de-risking. The report makes 11 recommendations to civil society organisations, national and regional parliamentary committees, national governments and the FATF. It also encourages civil society organisations concerned about the developments described in this report to join the international coalition of organisations established to engage with the FATF and create and 'enabling environment' for civil society. Details: Berlin: Bread for the World - Protestant Development Service Protestant Agency for Diakonie and Development, 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis 68: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Shelf Number: 146364 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering ExtremismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremism |
Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: On June 17, 2015, nine people were shot and killed in Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, reportedly hoped that his act of violence would spark a race war. In November 2015, Robert Dear left three people dead and four wounded after he opened fire on a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At a court appearance following his arrest, Dear referred to himself as a "warrior for the babies." Two weeks later, 14 people were killed and 22 wounded in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The assailants, a married couple named Syed Riawan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were self-identified supporters of the Islamic State (ISIL). Malik even proclaimed her loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on Facebook as their attack was under way. Acts of violence inspired by extremist ideologies are a real threat with which communities across the country are increasingly contending. In the wake of each of these attacks, our nation and others have been left to grapple with why they occurred and how they can be prevented. Increasingly, solutions for addressing these types of attacks have been found in partnerships among various types of government service providers-such as between the police and health and human services departments - as well as between government service providers and members of the community. The aims of these partnerships are to strengthen social cohesion within the community and to provide assistance to community members at risk of radicalization to violent extremism, diverting them from the path to violence. Violent extremism is not a problem that law enforcement agencies can solve through arrests and prosecutions alone. At a 2015 National Institute of Justice conference, called "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.," researchers identified issues with identity, a desire for belonging, past trauma, personal connections to violent extremists and extremist narratives, and mental illness among some of the potential risk factors for radicalizing to violence. These are issues that police can address more effectively in cooperation with community leaders, social service providers, and other non-law enforcement stakeholders. To explore these issues, on September 18, 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) held a forum on Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism. This forum, which took place in Minneapolis in partnership with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, and the Saint Paul Police Department, brought together police leaders and community partners from across the country to share their recommendations for how to build successful partnerships to prevent violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2017. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2017 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 146441 Keywords: Extremist GroupsPolice-Community PartnershipsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Hanley, Matthew D. Title: Killing Barney Fife: Law Enforcement's Socially Constructed Perception of Violence and Its Influence of Police Militarization Summary: Police militarization is a complex subject with significant homeland security implications. Efforts to implement militarization reform without a clear understanding of the issue could negatively impact law enforcement's ability to respond to emerging threats from terrorism, homegrown violent extremism, and armed criminals. Conversely, unfettered militarization of domestic policing could result in abuse of authority and loss of public confidence. This thesis proposes a nuanced definition of police militarization based on existing literature. The research then examines the correlation between violence and police militarization. A statistical analysis of crime data found an inverse relationship between levels of reported violence and militarization. However, the research discovered a strong nexus between perceptions of violence by the police and efforts to militarize. Social identity theory was used to explain why isolated acts of violence against police officers are perceived as attacks on the law enforcement community and lead to deep social divisions between the police and the public. This socially constructed reality of violence, which is reinforced by the media and training, has a powerful effect on police attitudes and behavior. The conclusion is that police militarization has been influenced by violence, and appropriate levels of militarized capabilities are needed to protect both the police and the public. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 29, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788377 Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=788377 Shelf Number: 146466 Keywords: Assaults Against PolicePolice MilitarizationViolenceViolent Extremism |
Author: Samuel, Thomas Koruth Title: Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case study of DAESH in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines Summary: This research looks at the issue of Daesh-type radicalisation in the region, focusing particularly on Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Having identified that Daesh's narrative was the key driver and catalyst for such radicalisation, the study then goes on to propose a '4-Step Counter-Narrative Developmental Model' to deal with this specific challenge. A qualitative approach was employed for this study and this encompassed roundtable discussions and both structured and non-structured interviews. Participants were relevant policy makers, law enforcement officials, academics, researchers, the military, experts and civil society leaders mainly, but not limited to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Insights were also obtained from various workshops, conferences and seminars both within and beyond the Southeast Asian region. Numerous reports, briefings and commentaries from various sources in this field were also examined. Drafts of the research study were then sent to academics and practitioners both locally and internationally to obtain their feedback and critique. Chapter One of the research starts by looking at the terms associated with the subject matter; exploring briefly the concept of radicalisation and FTF and justifying the usage of the term Daesh to describe the group in question. The study then traces the history and evolution of Daesh from the beginning, looking closely at its leaders, ideology, funding, relations with other groups, its operations and exploitation of the media and its past attacks. Chapter Two takes a closer look at Daesh's interest in the Southeast Asian region. Based on the group's activities in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, coupled with justifications and reasons by leading experts in this field, this chapter attempts to study the objectives and intentions that Daesh has planned for Southeast Asia, discussing the probability and possibility of a member-state/s evolving to become a 'Daesh satellite state.' Chapter Three looks at how Daesh evolved in Indonesia, tracing its history and the key idealogues that both supported and developed the group to reach its current status. The establishment and subsequent growth of Katibah Nusantara and its implications not just to Indonesia but to the region as a whole are given special attention. Issues such as how religion is used by Daesh, the method and impact of radicalisation and recruitment in prisons and among students and undergraduates as well as the response and reaction of the Indonesian public and civil society and the push back against Daesh measured in terms of the counter-narratives are also studied. The Government's response, particularly through the existing legislature and the proposed laws together with the deradicalisation programmes conducted by the authorities are also discussed. Chapter Four then proceeds to study the genesis of Daesh in Malaysia. It looks at Malaysia's history with FTF, from the period when Malaysians fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s (the so-called Afghan Alumni) to the current crop of Malaysians in Syria and Iraq. A chronological look at the developments taking place on the ground, and in particular the arrests made upon Daesh supporters, sympathisers and recruits and the subsequent response by the authorities, particularly in terms of legislation is also closely examined. Issues related to Daesh-type radicalisation such as the motivational factors driving Malaysians to commit to the group's ideology, the pre-radicalisation indicators exhibited by potential recruits and the possibility of non-violent, radical groups acting as 'conveyor belts' and subsequently paving the way for violent extremism is touched upon. The characteristics of Malaysian FTF and the impending danger they pose should they return are also considered. Chapter Five then attempts to study the impact of Daesh in the Philippines. Emphasis is placed upon tracing the home-grown terror groups that have pledged their allegiance to Daesh as well as to consider the kind of relations that exist between the former and the latter. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is also closely looked at together with the possible impact its failure to pass through Congress would have on the radicalisation process in the Philippines. The issue of motivational factors that could drive people to radicalisation is also discussed. Chapter Six collates the significant findings from the research in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and identifies seven areas, which are deemed noteworthy, and these include, the role of religion, Daesh's capacity to disseminate their narrative, the issue of returning FTF, the Daesh directed/inspired type of radicalisation models, the dual narrative of shame and the need to do something, the lack of counter-narratives and dissemination channels and lastly, Daesh's push to become a satellite state in the region. Also, the chapter looks at three areas that are in need for further research, not only in terms of qualitative analysis but especially in terms of quantitative research. Among the knowledge-gaps identified include the need for theoretical models that could be used as predictive indicators for those prone to radicalisation, the need to understand the role of ideology and the need for cross cutting research to understand radicalisation in the respective three countries. The final chapter is predicated on a needs-analysis study, based on the research findings in the three countries. The needs-analysis points to the need for a comprehensive framework to develop and disseminate an effective and robust counter-narrative that has the ability to debunk the narrative composed and disseminated by Daesh. Based on this, the study proposes a '4-Step Counter-Narrative Developmental Model' that seeks to develop four main pillars for an effective counternarrative to function. These four components include research networks, resource centres, training and dissemination hubs and monitoring groups. The study ends with recommendations for 'value-based needs' in the region, which includes the need for passion, creativity and coordination, without which there can be little success against an organisation like Daesh. Details: Lampur, Malaysia: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), 2016. 170p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 2, 2017 at: https://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/Monograph-Daesh-By-Mr-Thomas.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: https://www.searcct.gov.my/images/PDF_My/publication/Monograph-Daesh-By-Mr-Thomas.pdf Shelf Number: 147028 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism |
Author: Ligon, Gina Scott Title: The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles Summary: The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, funded by DHS S&T OUP since 2010, uses a longitudinal, industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology approach to assess organizational features in relation to their capacity for innovative and violent performance. The scope of the present effort is to use the LEADIR database and an internal strategic organizational approach to gain insight into 10 different violent extremist organizations (VEO) with a foothold in the current "Jihadi Industry." In addition, a VRIO analysis was performed to assess each VEO's unique set of strategic resources (e.g., cyber infrastructure) and capabilities (e.g., attack innovation) that provide a competitive advantage among their industry peers. When examining 10 VEOs in the Jihadi Industry, what are the features that differentiate them? This report, commissioned by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), seeks to address this question by examining a sample of 10 active jihadi organizations through December 31, 2015. Drawing on longitudinal data analytics, organizational science literature, and computer science techniques, this report provides a picture of key organizations operating in the Jihadi Industry. The report's main findings indicate that leadership, organizational structure, and innovation vary across the Jihadi Industry, which has implications for how government resources should be allocated for monitoring and analysis. In addition, the findings highlight the need for additional research to determine advanced indicator and warning signals of which groups will emerge as the most strategically differentiated and capable of malevolent innovation in coming years. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Shelf Number: 147366 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Sheppard, Jill Title: Attitudes to National Security: Balancing Safety and Privacy Summary: The most recent ANUpoll explores Australians' willingness to trade off their personal rights and freedoms for national security. Government responses to the threat of terrorism often incur a cost to citizens, by way of reductions in privacy, freedom of movement, and other individual rights and civil liberties. Such a 'trade-off' approach, where the respect for fundamental liberal rights and values is reconciled with the need for communal security, according to the threat level, is meant to strike an appropriate balance between these two cornerstones of liberalism. Sacrificing some freedoms to protect the Australian community is therefore presented by governments as a necessary cost, but one that is proportionate to the need for safety. Yet this trade-off between increased security and the reduction in some civil liberties also presents a dilemma to democratic societies: namely, the extent to which the risk of terrorist attacks can actually be contained without compromising the defining principles of Australia's liberal order. While in theory the idea of finding an appropriate balance seems straightforward, in practice it can be difficult to determine how much weight should be attached to the respective values of security versus privacy. When examining attitudes towards safety and privacy, it is consequently important to understand national security in terms of not only preventing terrorist violence, but also considering the political consequences any such measures have for our democratic societies. This is why this survey took particular interest in how the public views this increased need for surveillance with regard to the Muslim population, who are commonly perceived as being at a higher risk of radicalization and of being susceptible to violent extremist ideologies. The survey of 1200 Australians finds widespread support for current counter-terrorism measures, such as retention of telecommunications metadata, strict border control policies, revocation of citizenship of 'foreign fighters' with more than one nationality, and bans on travel to sites of certain international conflicts. Even when posed as a trade-off between an individual's rights and the protection of national security, the Australians surveyed express support for freedom-limiting policies in the fight against terrorism. The findings also illustrate substantial public awareness of Muslims identified as being at a higher risk of radicalization and affiliation with terrorist groups than the rest of the population. More importantly, this ANUpoll supports the notion that many Australians conflate terrorism and Islamic extremism, with 22 per cent of Australians 'not much' or 'not at all' bothered by the possibility of Muslims being singled out for additional surveillance and monitoring. This indicates a disconnect from the Australian Government's emphasis on cooperation with the Muslim community over enhanced law enforcement. This is significant insofar as it highlights an ongoing public perception of Muslims in Western societies as a potential danger to national security. This can result in stigmatisation, social divisions, and public backlash against the government counter-terrorism measures from those who feel unfairly targeted. Details: Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 22: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 148149 Keywords: Extremist ViolenceHomeland SecurityMuslimesNational SecurityTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist GroupsHomeland Security Preventive DetentionTerrorism TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Eerten, Jan-Jaap van Title: Developing a social media response to radicalization The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization Summary: Radical groups thrive by spreading their message. They have increasingly used social media to spread their propaganda and promote their extremist narratives. Including on websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In this study, the main question that we investigate is to what extent it is possible to use counter-narrative programs via social media to de-radicalize individuals or prevent violent extremism. We focus on violent radicalization connected to SalafiJihadism. Due to the political and societal context in which this project was initiated, NCTV and WODC were interested in this specific form of radicalization. The method we used consisted of a literature study, interviews (n=8) and three focus groups (n=6, n=7 and n=8) with people with different expertise and backgrounds (including academics, field workers, social media students and a former radical. In this study, narratives are conceptualized as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through (online) strategic communication activities by state and non-state actors in attempts to shape how target audiences feel about or understand events or issues, and ultimately, guide their behavior in a manner that is conducive to their aims and goals. We conceptualize counter-narratives as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through strategic communication (or messaging) activities with the intention to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives of violent extremist groups. Narratives have been projected by radical groups through a wide range of social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. For counter-narratives on social media, we identify three domains: (1) countermessaging (e.g., activities that challenge extremist narratives head on); (2) alternative messaging (e.g., activities that aim to provide a positive alternative to extremist narratives); and (3) strategic communication by the government (e.g., activities that provide insight in what the government is doing). A central outcome of our analysis is that to the extent that people have become more radical and strongly identify with an extremist ideology or group, they are less likely to be persuaded by any counter-narrative campaign. In general, it's challenging to persuade people with strong convictions through (online) campaigning. They are typically not very receptive to messages that aim to change their views. However, it will be very difficult to challenge people with extremist attitudes. They may not pay attention to these messages or even may adopt a stronger attitude in the other direction than intended as a reaction to this persuasive attempt. Thus, we argue that counter-narrative campaigns may be most useful for prevention purposes. They could perhaps focus on those that appear to be sensitive to extremist views and information - to the extent that they can be identified meaningfully. In addition, we have raised the question whether or not such counter narrative efforts may have some effect for the individuals from radical groups who show a glimpse of doubt about their group. For such individuals, a counter-narrative message may fall on fertile grounds and a seed may be planted, although this is highly speculative at the moment and more research is needed to support this notion. A sound starting point for designing a counter-narrative campaign is research. One should develop a sound understanding of (the context of) 'the problem', underlying determinants, where communication can potentially contribute to a solution. Here it is advisable to consider relevant theories and insights about radicalization and attitude and behavioral change. Beyond borrowing from existing theory, program planners do well to develop a sound theory of change that explicates how campaign efforts are expected to lead to the desired result. In addition, the audience should be carefully defined and segmented on the bases of meaningful variables. This requires thorough audience research. Campaigns targeting an overly broad and general target audience run the risk of being ineffective and may be counterproductive. It is therefore recommendable to focus on narrow, specific audience segments. In addition to studying the audience, it is important to develop an in-depth understanding of the extremist narratives one aims to counter. When deciding upon which elements of, for example, the Salafi-Jihadi narrative one aims to counter, we argue it is also important to consider why members of the target audience in question may be attracted to these narratives. Radicalizing individuals that are looking for extremist content may have different motives. Different motives of radical people may request different alternative or counter-narrative content. Some may be drawn to an extremist ideology. However, there are a variety of other reasons that may motivate people, such as the need for group-membership and camaraderie, a search for meaning, the need for excitement and adventure. As suggested, it is important to clarify the desired outcome, and the steps towards that outcome. Relatedly, at the outset of a campaign, goals and objectives should be delineated that clearly specify which change one aims to achieve. Well-defined objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Running an effective social media effort also requires adequate resources (time, finances, people) which should be assessed at the outset of a program. It is also important to give consideration to potential partners. Involving partners from within local communities in campaign development and delivery may benefit a campaign effort. Control over the message is not strictly assured when it is released on social media. Of course, it is still important to give consideration to the content of the message. As put forward earlier, to the extent that this is possible, it may be fruitful to consider the different motives of radical people. Besides content, it is important to think about different aspects of the message. Messages that use the narrative format have the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people and may overcome various forms of resistance. In addition, double-sided messages (in which one side is being discredited) and messages with a strong emotional appeal may prove to be particularly persuasive. In terms of sources, it is clear that they need to be perceived as credible by the audience in order to function as trustworthy messengers. Commonly mentioned candidates are former extremists, victims of violence, peers and family, as well as key members of communities and civil society actors. The potential of the government to serve as a credible source might be limited. Among other things, the government often suffers from a say-do gap in the eyes of relevant target audiences. Yet, which messenger will in fact effective will depend on the context, the target audience, and the message one wants to relay. Also, it should be noted that source is a murky entity in social media environments. For instance, processes of information transfer may obscure the original source of a message or make it difficult to interpret who the source is. Some researchers also maintain that social media environments complicate traditional insights about credibility indicators. In terms of selected channels, obviously they should be frequently utilized by the audience one intends to reach. Using multiple channels is argued to be beneficial. Importantly, social media may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and linking online with offline activities is suggested to be particularly effective. In terms of message dissemination, one may join already on-going 'conversations'. Also, it may be beneficial to partner up with people and organizations that have already established a strong social media presence and are popular among the target audience. In some cases, it may also be useful to ask established online (news) outlets to share the message. Furthermore, it may be important to create opportunities for audience engagement. One should also give consideration to aspects such as timing and volume. Finally, we argue it is important to assess the potential risks, challenges and limitations when developing a communication strategy. These might include losing control of the message, counter-campaigns, threats to safety and well-being of messengers, and multi-tier approval processes that hamper campaign efforts, as well as the notorious difficulty of demonstrating the effect of counter-narrative efforts. Generally speaking, it is not easy to establish an effect of a policy or measure in counter violent extremism (CVE). For the potential effectiveness of a counter-narrative campaign, it is important to distinguish between a formative evaluation, a process evaluation and a summative evaluation. Specifically tailored at online interventions, we argue that a combination of awareness (e.g., reach and views) and engagement metrics (e.g., likes, shares, comments and emoji responses) can provide some insight into the extent to which a counter-narrative campaign achieved its desired effect. More traditional research techniques such as interviews and focus groups can give insight in the reception of online materials (thus useful in the formative phase), but can also provide input in the interpretation of quantitative data in the summative evaluation phase. Experiments (either offline or online) offer insight in the cause-and-effect-relationship, while "netnography" makes use of data usually obtained from observations of people in their regular social media environments. Sentiment and content analyses are methods to distract the overall evaluation towards a counter-narrative campaign as well as the specific narratives that were put forward in a particular online community. Finally, social network analyses may give insight into the structure of a group and potentially how this might change over time, although the use of this technique in this field has not yet been fully established. Government actors are not well-suited to act as a counter-narrative producer or messenger. They tend to lack credibility as effective messengers with relevant target audiences. In part, because they are perceived to suffer from a say-do gap, which means their actions and words do not always match in the view of the audience. However, they still can still their part. First, governments can fruitfully engage in streamlining their own strategic communications in terms of explaining their own actions locally and in an international context. Second, the government can play a valuable role by facilitating grassroots and civil society actors best placed to act as counter-narrative messengers. They can do so by establishing an infrastructure to support these initiatives and by sponsoring such efforts (providing help, expertise or financial support) as well as. Yet, they should be cautious, as government endorsement or support for such initiatives may act as a 'kiss of death' and undermine them. Thirdly, they could stimulate thorough monitoring and evaluation, as there is only limited evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narrative efforts. Finally, government efforts could focus on supporting the development of programs in the area of strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption skills In terms of limitations of the current study, in our analysis, we have focused only on counter-narratives with respect to the Jihadi ideology. As such, it is not possible to generalize these findings to other groups (e.g., extreme right wings groups). Furthermore, due to the fact that there is hardly any strong empirical research available, we had to base some of our analysis on the general literature on persuasion and communication campaigns, as well as some "grey literature" (e.g., policy papers, working papers, and recommendations). This undermines the options to draw strong conclusions from the current analysis, as one might question the extent to which it is possible to generalize from the general field of persuasion to the specific field of online counternarratives. We conclude that, although presenting online counter-narratives appears to be intuitively an appealing strategy to employ, our analysis shows that this may not be an ideal option to deradicalize people. It might be more fruitful to use counter-narratives in a prevention context, in which people's minds are still open enough to register and process the information presented. Alternatively, it might be possible to explore the options to expose known individuals (e.g., a convicted prisoner) with specific counter-narratives, but ideally not in an online context, but an offline context, in order to directly monitor the reactions of the individuals. Details: Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology/Department of Political Science, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Shelf Number: 148510 Keywords: Counter-radicalizationExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocial MediaTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Ferguson, Kate Title: Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies: A review of the evidence Summary: This report presents the analysis of a corpus of academic and grey literature relevant to a key challenge facing our society. How can media and communications be used to counter identity-based violence (IBV) or Violent Extremism (VE)? Part I focuses on "Counter-Narratives", looking at the evidence relating to strategic policy communication strategies and counter-propaganda techniques. This reflects literature from policymakers, think-tanks, and civil society initiatives rather than the academic literature base. Key findings include the following: - Current literature and policy concerned with countering propaganda is dominated by the language of 'counter-narratives' but a common understanding of this relatively new lexicon has yet to emerge. - There is little hard evidence that proves interaction with VE content leads to participation in VE activities. - The hypothesis that VE narratives or the real life threat of VE can be countered by an alternative set of communications is an assumption that remains unproven. These findings challenge claims that responding to propaganda strategies by firing back with "counter-narratives" can be effective. Part II looks at "Alternative Approaches" to the use of the media to counter violent extremism, drawing on insights from the "media development" and "media assistance" sectors, and research into whether mass media and new communication interventions can inhibit identity-based violence in certain crisis situations. Key findings include the following: - The theoretical foundations for these alternative approaches are supported by a stronger and more established research base, drawn from the multi-disciplinary fields of development, peace building, and social cohesion. - Media projects have less impact if seen to be linked to a political agenda. - A growing evidence base suggests that radio and television drama addressing issues of identity, reconciliation and tolerance have a positive an impact on public attitudes and behaviour. - Media assistance can ensure that local and domestic media can respond appropriately to VE narratives. - There is an emerging evidence base regarding the potential for rapid reaction media and communication strategies in situations where there is a threat of IBV. These findings suggest that alternative media strategies can help. But the trust and credibility of information providers is crucial. The final section "Reflections" concludes that the research landscape is fragmented and disconnected. but suggests several professional/practitioner sectors and academic disciplines could shed light on potentially effective media and communication CVE strategies. More needs to be done to draw the threads together to learn lessons and to identify and prioritise gaps in our knowledge and understanding. Details: Cambridge, UK: Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research University of East Anglia, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2018 at: http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf Shelf Number: 148926 Keywords: ExtremismMass MediaMedia CampaignsRadicalizationViolence PreventionViolent Extremism |
Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-TerrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Sheikh, Sanah Title: Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK Summary: The Office of Public Management (OPM) has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) to conduct a literature review that provides a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. The specific objectives of the review are to provide an overview of evidence on: - what Muslim communities' attitudes are towards violent extremism; - what Muslim communities understand by 'violent extremism' and how this understanding is shaped; - the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism; - any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and - how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism. The literature search, review and synthesis were informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies1 and universities. 2,3 These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK. The search was conducted in partnership with search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP). The review as conducted over a number of stages and literature was identified from a number of sources including database searches, expert and prevent lead consultation, website searches and OPM and CLG collected literature. After a rigorous sifting process, 36 items were included for review. The review found that there is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and 'support' for it. Additionally, there are also some limitations to the methods utilized in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, 4 which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, the purpose of these studies is to conduct a snap shot of public attitudes, rather than a more rigorous research study of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings. Details: London: Great Britain, Office for Public Management, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Shelf Number: 118589 Keywords: Extremist GroupsMuslimsPublic AttitudesRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Van Der Lijn, Jair Title: Multilateral peace operations and the challenges of organized crime Summary: Multilateral peace operations are increasingly confronting a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing security challenges that are relatively new to them, that do not respect borders, and that have causes and effects which cut right across the international security, peacebuilding and development agendas. As a result, the New Geopolitics of Peace Operations III: Non‑Traditional Security Challenges initiative seeks to enhance understanding about peace operations and non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and violent extremism, irregular migration, piracy, organized crime and environmental degradation. As a part of this initiative, this SIPRI Background Paper explores the 'non-traditional' security challenges that organized crime presents to multilateral peace operations. The challenges of organized crime may be of direct or indirect relevance to multilateral peace operations. Directly, it may behave as a spoiler or evade peace processes. Indirectly, it may decrease the effectiveness of peace operations, particularly long term, contributing to the continued fragility of countries and their peace processes in its role as partner. Based on this understanding, this SIPRI Background Paper explores the role that peace operations play in preventing and combating organized crime, particularly in weak or collapsed states. Details: Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: SIPRI Background Paper: Accessed March 26, 2018 at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/bp_1802_pko_ngp_iii_no._2_1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/bp_1802_pko_ngp_iii_no._2_1.pdf Shelf Number: 149564 Keywords: Environmental crimes Organized Crime Peace Building Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Institute for Integrated Transitions Title: The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism Summary: The Limits of Punishment is a research project led by the United Nations University's Centre for Policy Research, in partnership with the Institute for Integrated Transitions, and supported by the UK Department for International Development. It seeks to understand if, when and how transitional justice, in combination with other conflict resolution tools, can contribute to transitions away from conflict in settings affected by major jihadist groups. Specifically, it aims to answer two questions: 1. What are the effects of current approaches toward punishment and leniency for individuals accused of association with jihadist groups in fragile and conflict-affected states? 2. What factors should policymakers consider in designing alternative and complementary strategies leveraging transitional justice tools to better contribute to sustainable transitions away from conflict? To answer the first question, the project undertook three fieldwork-based case studies that assessed nationally-led approaches to handling individuals accused of having been associated with: al Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The case studies look at a broad range of formal and informal mechanisms of punishment and leniency. These include, inter alia: amnesties; prosecutions; traditional justice; and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), rehabilitation, and similar programs that, in practice, offer some individuals alternatives to criminal justice. The case studies demonstrate the risks of excessively heavy-handed and at times indiscriminate approaches that penalise broad sectors of local populations accused of association with these groups, and assess the quality and limitations of existing leniency programs for such individuals. To answer the second question, the Institute for Integrated Transitions' Law and Peace Practice Group - a group of leading transitional justice experts - analysed the empirical evidence of the case studies in light of broader lessons learned from decades of international practice in the field of transitional justice. On this basis, the Group developed a framework to assist national policymakers and practitioners - as well as their international partners - in applying transitional justice tools as part of a broader strategy to resolve conflicts involving groups deemed violent extremist. The framework offers a range of approaches toward effectively balancing leniency and accountability, that can be tailored to conflict settings marked by violent extremism. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150732 Keywords: Conflict ResolutionExtremist GroupsJihadistsPunishmentRadical GroupsTerroristsTransitional JusticeViolent Extremism |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: Countering Terrorist Narratives Summary: This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, provides an overview of current approaches to countering terrorist narratives. The first and second sections outline the different responses developed at the global and European Union levels. The third section presents an analysis of four different approaches to responding to terrorist narratives: disruption of propaganda distribution, redirect method, campaign and message design, and government communications and synchronisation of message and action. The final section offers a number of policy recommendations, highlighting five interrelated 'lines of effort' essential to maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communication. Details: Brussels: Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, 2017. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 1, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Reed-Ingram-Whittaker-Narratives.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Reed-Ingram-Whittaker-Narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 150995 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremists Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko HaramExtremist ViolenceExtremistsIslamic StateRadical GroupsTerrorismVigilantismViolent Extremism |
Author: Nemr, Christina Title: It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism Summary: This report examines the role of civil society organisation (CSOs) in the rehabilitation and reintegration of those associated with and affected by violent extremism. It builds on the work conducted by ICCT and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, together with four subregional partners over the past two-and-a-half years in Africa and South-East Asia. The project aimed to first understand how CSOs work within their communities and with their governments to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, victims of violence, and affected communities. It then supported the work of select CSOs by facilitating small grants to bolster existing efforts or pilot innovative approaches. The findings and lessons learned from the project have culminated in the development of this action agenda, which provides policy and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders working on rehabilitation and reintegration and the role of CSOs in supporting that process. The project focused on three regions: the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). While each region has its own rich experiences and unique challenges, there are overarching lessons that emerged-lessons that are applicable to a variety of rehabilitation and reintegration contexts. The action agenda therefore is not divided by region but, rather, by themes and the audiences to whom the recommendations are directed. Overall, the report consists of six guiding principles and 10 recommendations targeted to a range of audiences. Each guiding principle and recommendation is followed by examples that illustrate the ways a recommendation has been put into practice or offer suggestions for implementing a given recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151328 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering Violent ExtremismRadical GroupsTerrorist RehabilitationTerroristsViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: Beyond the Homeland: Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile States Summary: Since the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement has stopped many terrorists from entering the United States, and U.S. armed forces have eliminated large numbers of terrorists overseas. Seventeen years later, the threat has evolved. Violent extremism has spread across a wide arc of instability stretching through fragile states in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. These groups are present in 19 out of 45 countries in these regions and have held and governed territory in 10 of them. The United States has responded by conducting combat operations in 5 of the 45 countries and providing security assistance to 39 of them. But to stop extremists from spreading further and roll back their gains, we need a new strategy, one that focuses on the incubators of extremism: fragile states. Congress has charged this Task Force to devise such a strategy. We confront a different strategic environment than on 9/11. The Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel have become increasingly fragile. Extremists' strategies have evolved, and their focus is now on establishing a new political order. Meanwhile, America's rivals have seized on this disorder to grow their power and influence, preying on the weakness of state fragility. As a result, the threat that extremism in fragile states poses to the United States has also changed. The dangers of extremism now extend beyond our homeland. Violent extremism dulls America's ability to compete on the world stage. It undermines U.S. regional influence and the open, rules-based international order by fueling chaos that destabilizes neighboring countries, weakens U.S. allies, and triggers further crises, such as the unprecedented wave of refugees. As long as extremism fuels instability, the United States cannot compete effectively against strategic rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran. Nor can the United States confront extremism without addressing the ways our rivals exploit and contribute to this threat. The time has come for a new U.S. strategy. We need not only to defeat individual terrorists but also to mitigate the conditions that enable extremist ideologies to take root, spread, and thrive. Going forward, the priority for U.S. policy should be to strengthen fragile states - to help them build resilience against the alarming growth of violent extremism within their own societies. This interim report assesses the threat posed by extremism in fragile states, analyzes the conditions that fuel extremism, proposes a new set of strategic objectives for U.S. policy, and examines what we know about how to achieve these objectives. The Task Force will issue a final report in early 2019 to propose a comprehensive strategy for reducing extremism in fragile states Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2018. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Interim Report of the Task Force on extremism in Fragile States: Accessed September 12, 2018 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Taskforce-Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Taskforce-Extremism-Fragile-States-Interim-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 151500 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Bellasio, Jacopo Title: Counterterrorism evaluation: Taking stock and looking ahead Summary: In 2010, a study commissioned by the Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, WODC) in the Netherlands first aimed to assess evaluation practice and culture in the fields of counterterrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE). Seven years on from this initial study, in light of the continuous developments and investments occurring in the fields of CT and PCVE, there was a growing necessity for a renewed analysis of how strategies, policies and initiatives in these fields are evaluated and what advances could be made. Mindful of this, in December 2017 the WODC commissioned RAND Europe to conduct a study aimed at investigating how evaluations of CT and PCVE policies in the Netherlands and abroad have been designed and conducted over the last five years, and what practical lessons can be drawn regarding such evaluations. To achieve this goal, the study entailed the undertaking of three interconnected research tasks. First, the study opened with the production of an inventory of evaluations of CT and PCVE strategies, policies and interventions conducted since 1 January 2013. In parallel to this, the study team developed an analytical framework to be used for assessing evaluations collected. Lastly, the study team conducted a structured analysis and review of the evaluations inventory. This report discusses the activities, results and findings of this study and presents recommendations for future work in this area. It is aimed at a specialist audience of academics, practitioners and policy-makers with an intimate understanding of evaluation, particularly in the context of CT and PCVE. Key Findings -- The scope, purpose and activities characterising CT have evolved in recent years in parallel with the growth of the PCVE field. This is both a response to changes in the threat landscape and a result of a growing understanding of terrorism and violent extremism. Dutch authorities have designed and implemented a wide array of CT and PCVE legislation and measures, in recognition of the need for an approach that goes beyond traditional CT measures. The study produced an inventory comprising of 48 CT and PCVE evaluations manuscripts (38 in English, 6 in Dutch and 4 in German). These were analysed through an analytical framework to identify trends, patterns and characteristics of CT and PCVE evaluation. When compared with results from previous reviews, results from this study suggest that a growing volume of CT and PCVE evaluations is being undertaken and that the majority of these rely on primary data from multiple sources, perspectives and methods. Nonetheless, there appear to be limits to the extent to which evaluation practice has advanced and grown evenly across all areas of CT and PCVE work as significant gaps and shortcomings continue to mar a number of evaluations (e.g. evaluations characterised by designs that undermine their ability to draw robust conclusions about an initiative's impact). A number of issues and challenges continue to mar evaluations in the fields of CT and PCVE, not all of them are exclusive to these fields. Lessons and reflections identified from evaluations reviewed pertain to: (i) inherent complexities of the fields of CT and PCVE; (ii) challenges associated with measuring real-world phenomena; (iii) challenges associated with existing evaluation designs; (iv) practical difficulties of conducting evaluations; and (v) drawbacks and benefits of specific evaluation methods. Recommendations -- Continue to invest in the evaluation of planned and existing initiatives in the CT and PCVE policy areas, setting minimum quality and robustness requirements for future evaluations. Develop new evaluation designs, frameworks and approaches for conducting evaluation in the CT and PCVE policy areas, encouraging the adoption wherever possible of (quasi-)experimental designs. Encourage further research on the dynamics, drivers and factors governing the phenomena of radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. Conduct regularly mapping and stocktaking exercises akin to the present study, providing resources and means required to gain access to CT and PCVE initiatives' evaluators and beneficiaries. Details: Brussels: RAND Europe, 2018. 169p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2018 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2628.html Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2628.html Shelf Number: 153147 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: A Closer Look: Gender Dynamics in Violent Extremism and Countering Violent Extremism in Southeast Asia Summary: As policymakers and practitioners in Southeast Asia increasingly recognize the importance of investing in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) measures, it is critical to integrate a gender analysis when developing related national action plans, strategies, and programs. This policy brief examines examines key challenges, gaps, and needs of national and regional stakeholders and concludes with recommendations for these actors to consider in advancing gender sensitive P/CVE policy and practice in the region. The brief draws on desk research and extensive consultations with a range of civil society actors, experts, policymakers, and practitioners from the region, including a regional workshop and gender-sensitive P/CVE projects undertaken by local civil society organizations, supported by the Global Center and the government of the Netherlands. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2018 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GC_2018-Sept_Gender_and_CVE.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Asia URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/publications/a-closer-look/ Shelf Number: 153881 Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism Foreign Assistance Gender Analysis Preventing Violent Extremism Violent Extremism |
Author: Glazzard, Andrew Title: Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter-Terrorism Summary: This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the EU's external interventions in counter-terrorism (CT), including preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) carried out in the first semester of 2018. The evaluation does not cover the entirety of the EU's CT interventions, but only those financed by the EU's external instruments. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the relevance, coherence, efficiency and impact of the EU's interventions in order to determine the extent to which the objectives and desired outcomes of the EU's CT policy have so far been achieved. Details: The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2018. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/publication/global-evaluation-of-the-european-union-engagement-on-counter-terrorism/ Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/eu-ct-evaluation-v7-final.pdf Shelf Number: 153949 Keywords: Countering Terrorism FinancingCountering Violent ExtremismCounterterrorismImpact EvaluationIntervention ProgramsPreventing Violent ExtremismProgram EvaluationViolent Extremism |
Author: Alexander, Audrey Title: Digital Decay?: Tracing Change over Time Among English-Language Islamic State Sympathizers on Twitter Summary: Until 2016, Twitter was the online platform of choice for English-language Islamic State (IS) sympathizers. As a result of Twitter's counter-extremism policies - including content removal - there has been a decline in activity by IS supporters. This outcome may suggest the company's efforts have been effective, but a deeper analysis reveals a complex, nonlinear portrait of decay. Such observations show that the fight against IS in the digital sphere is far from over. In order to examine this change over time, this report collects and reviews 845,646 tweets produced by 1,782 English-language pro-IS accounts from February 15, 2016 to May 1, 2017. This study finds that: - Twitter's policies hinder sympathizers on the platform, but counter-IS practitioners should not overstate the impact of these measures in the broader fight against the organization online. ‐ Most accounts lasted fewer than 50 days, and the network of sympathizers failed to draw the same number of followers over time. ‐ The decline in activity by English-language IS sympathizers is caused by Twitter suspensions and IS' strategic shift from Twitter to messaging platforms that offer encryption services. ‐ Silencing IS adherents on Twitter may produce unwanted side effects that challenge law enforcement's ability to detect and disrupt threats posed by violent extremists. - The rope connecting IS' base of sympathizers to the organization's top-down, central infrastructure is beginning to fray as followers stray from the agenda set for them by strategic communicators. - While IS' battlefield initiatives are a unifying theme among adherents on Twitter, the organization's strategic messaging output about these fronts receive varying degrees of attention from sympathizers. - Terrorist attacks do little to sustain the conversation among supporters on Twitter, despite substantive attention from IS leadership, central propaganda, and even Western mass media. ‐ Over time, there has been a decline in tweets following major attacks. This suggests that attacks in the West have diminishing effects in mobilizing support. - Current events - such as the attempted coup in Turkey and the 2016 U.S. presidential election - are among the most popular topics within the sample. ‐ Events unrelated directly to IS cause some of the greatest spikes in activity. ‐ These discussions are ongoing despite Twitter's policies. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations ‐ English-language IS sympathizers on Twitter defy straightforward analysis and convenient solutions. ‐ They are skilled problem-solvers in the digital sphere. Rather than ruminating over losses, angered adherents fight to be heard, either on Twitter or other digital platforms. ‐ Counter-IS practitioners must show a similar willingness to adapt and explore alternative ventures. ‐ While some collaboration is beneficial, the government cannot rely predominantly on the efforts of tech companies to counter IS and its supporters. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 18, 2018 at: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/DigitalDecayFinal_0.pdf Shelf Number: 154039 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismExtremismSocial NetworksTerrorismTweetsTwitterViolent Extremism |
Author: Counter Extremism Project Title: Extremists and Online Propaganda Summary: Official propaganda materials produced by the media arms of groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and al-Shabab are intentionally crafted to radicalize, inspire, and incite individuals to violence. These groups have produced propaganda in a myriad of textual, audio, and video forms - from music videos to glossy magazines - that have helped to convince individuals around the world to travel abroad to join extremist groups and to conduct deadly attacks in their home countries. At times, they have even offered specific guidance on how to do so. Abdirizak Warsame, who was arrested at the age of 19 for attempting to join ISIS abroad, stated that while watching violent ISIS execution videos on YouTube, he started to believe that he was "doing something for a greater cause --- for good" by supporting the group. Warsame was one of 57 individuals documented by the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) who attempted to join an extremist group abroad, and one of 72 individuals who accessed explicitly violent propaganda materials. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev - who detonated two homemade bombs along with his brother, Tamerlan, at the April 2013 Boston Marathon - told investigators that he and his brother built the bombs using instructions from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula"s Inspire propaganda magazine. The Tsarnaev brothers were two of 26 individuals documented who successfully enacted an act of terror, and two of 25 individuals who accessed propaganda materials that provided instructions on how to prepare or execute violent terrorist acts. (Sources: U.S. Department of Justice 2013, Slate, Foreign Policy, CBS News) Official extremist group propaganda materials are easily disseminated and accessed on the Internet. The individuals documented in this report accessed extremist group propaganda on a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, Google Plus, Skype, Paltalk, and WhatsApp. Several individuals also played a part in further propagating extremist propaganda materials. Of the 168 individuals documented by CEP, at least 51 disseminated propaganda materials either online, in person, or via mail, and 59 viewed or discussed propaganda materials with another individual. Even if extremist groups lose control over territory in their respective regions of operation, their ability to reach out and spread propaganda online will allow them to continue to attract support from across the globe. For example, even as ISIS steadily lost ground in Iraq and Syria throughout 2017, U.S. permanent resident Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov was still inspired by the group's propaganda videos to carry out a vehicular attack in New York City on October 31, 2017, that killed eight people. As long as extremist groups continue to produce compelling propaganda that plays a part in inspiring and inciting individuals to violence - and remains easily accessible online - terrorism in the name of these extremist groups will remain a threat worldwide. (Source: U.S. Department of Justice 2017) Details: New York, NY: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists-online-propaganda Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Extremists%20and%20Online%20Propaganda_040918.pdf Shelf Number: 154062 Keywords: al-Qaedaal-ShababCounter Extremism ProjectExtremismInternet ISISRadicalizationSocial MediaTalibanTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Abebe, Tsion Tadesse Title: Algeria and Morocco: Developing Inclusive Strategies can Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: Algeria and Morocco have been hosting thousands of sub-Saharan African migrants for a growing period of time. The migrants live in poor socio-economic conditions and face discrimination, providing fertile ground for radicalisation. Except for one Chadian who was arrested in Morocco in relation with a Daesh (also known as Islamic State, or IS) plot, sub-Saharan African migrants havent been implicated in terrorism in either country. Before radicalisation manifests, Algeria and Morocco should develop migration policies that promote social and economic inclusion. Details: Dakar, Senegal: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 14, 2019 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb112.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/algeria-and-morocco-developing-inclusive-strategies-can-prevent-violent-extremism Shelf Number: 154140 Keywords: Algeria Inclusion Islamic State Migrants Morocco Radicalization Sub-Saharan Africa Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Conway, Maura Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2018: The Year in Review Summary: This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018.1 It is divided into three parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of violent jihadis, particularly the so-called 'Islamic State' (hereafter IS); Part II supplies information on contemporary extreme right online activity; and Part III identifies issues in the violent extremism and terrorism online realm that bear watching in 2019. In terms of overarching trends, the focus of policymakers, internet companies, media, and thus also publics has, since 2014, been almost exclusively on IS's online activity. A growing concern with extreme right activity, both its online and offline variants, began to be apparent in 2017 however, especially in the wake of events in Charlottesville. This solidified in 2018 due to a number of factors, including a decrease in IS terrorist attacks in the West and an uptick in extreme right and hate attacks and terrorist events, a number of the latter of which appeared to have significant online components. Having said this, IS is still active on the ground in numerous locales globally and continues to produce and widely disseminate online content, as do a large number of other groups that share core tenets of its ideology. IS may be down therefore, but it is certainly not out. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE), 2019. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154690 Keywords: Internet CrimesIslamic State Jihadism Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |
Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Busher, Joel Title: The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology Summary: Why do some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of violence? Why is it that even in deeply violent groups there are often thresholds of violence that members rarely if ever cross? The basic premise of this project is to look at the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the intra-group mechanisms through which group members themselves contribute to establish and maintain parameters on their own violence. Such internal brakes are often evident in detailed accounts of decision-making within groups that use or flirt with violence, yet they are rarely examined systematically. The aim of this project was to develop a descriptive typology of the internal brakes on violent escalation that could provide a basis for more systematic analysis of such brakes. The authors used three very different case studies to construct, test and refine the typology: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s. The typology -- The typology is based around five underlying logics on which the internal brakes identified in this project operate: Brake 1 - strategic logic: Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than more violent alternatives. Brake 2 - moral logic: Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence. Brake 3 - logic of ego maintenance: Self-identification as a group that is either nonviolent or uses only limited forms of violence. Brake 4 - logic of out-group definition: Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups such as opponents, opponents' perceived supporters, the general public or state actors. Brake 5 - organisational logic: Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence. A number of issues require careful attention if this typology is to be used, as intended, to support evaluation of the threats from and opportunities to inhibit, escalation towards violence, and it is clear that the typology cannot be use as a straightforward 'checklist'. However, in recent years a growing number of academics have begun to highlight the need for a more detailed understanding of the processes of non- or limited escalation. This typology provides an important step in that direction. Details: Lancaster, UK: Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2019. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 12, 2019 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Shelf Number: 154902 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Ackerman, Gary Title: On the Horizon: Security Challenges at the Nexus of State and Non-State Actors and Emerging/Disruptive Technologies Summary: Innovation and new technologies have many positive attributes and provide significant improvement to humanity, much that is likely unforeseen at the time of initial discovery. The unpredictability of the technology trajectories can lead to significant negative consequences. This white paper aims to discuss the massive leaps in innovation and understand what this means for national security. The articles are briefly summarized below. In Chapter 1, entitled "Third Offset Implications for Homeland Security: Tranquility or Turbulence," Robert McCreight states that the overall future trajectory of modern technologies hinges on a fairly imperfect and periodically naive grasp of dual-use science and technology and what it portends for our planet and its inhabitants. He goes on to say that one immediate concern is to determine not only how it is affecting our current way of life, geopolitics, the economy, social stability, governance, security, and the ordinary functions and determinants of the natural world around us, but also weigh the downstream consequences of technology growth, diversity, and convergence on all of those things ten to twenty years on. If advanced dual-use technologies hold the potential for a vast array of unanticipated threats in the next few years, we will need effective doctrine, strategy, and deterrence measures. He asks a key question: How to begin to establish criteria which guarantees that humans retain ultimate control, management, and direction of advanced dual-use technologies and thereby thwart untoward and dangerous outcomes arising from their mix of expected and unexpected outcomes. He advances five possible criteria for wrestling with the emergence of ADUCT (advanced dual-use convergent technologies) in a manner that sketches out an approach for the short term and allows flexibility for modifications and improvements along the way over the next decade. Gina Ligon and Michael Logan in Chapter 2, "Malevolent Innovation: Novelty and Effectiveness in Terror Attacks," state that terrorism provides a model context for examining creativity, as the need for survival and innovation pervades these destructive and malevolent groups. Despite this, creativity and innovation remain underdeveloped concepts in terrorism research. One reason for this is the limited empirical data about this phenomenon, making it unclear which tenets of creativity research hold versus which do not translate in the domain of terrorism. The present effort overcomes this by examining the dimensions of malevolent innovation in a large sample of terrorist attacks. To anticipate adversary threats, it is critical that we examine all of the possible combinations of VEO innovation developed in the past. This particular effort can provide planners with exemplars of the highest levels of VEO innovation across a large dataset of violent extremist organizations, providing a comprehensive look at what is possible and what should be prevented. Don Rassler in Chapter 3 "Back to the Future: The Islamic State, Drones, and Future Threats" states that the Islamic State is an irony of sorts, as while the organization looks to, is inspired by, and seeks to recreate the past certain aspects of the group's behavior also provide a window into conflicts of the future. A key case study in this regard is the Islamic State's drone program, and specifically how the group "overcame technical and cost asymmetries," and creatively developed a novel and scalable drone-based weapons system "constructed from commercial components that challenged - at least for a period of time - states' ability to respond." He goes on to state that the Islamic State's drone accomplishments speak to, and have a number of important implications regarding, the character and style of future threats that are either constructed around or that significantly leverage dual-use commercial technologies. He concludes by stating to stay ahead of the issue, and to better prepare for a future that will almost certainly be typified by the proliferation of other hybrid threats that leverage and/or repurpose commercial systems in dangerous ways, the United States should identify the pathways and methods that allowed the Islamic State to acquire and scale its fleet of quad-copter drones in the first place, and trace the evolution of functional threat streams. Bennett Clifford in Chapter 4, "Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram," makes several key observations: - English-speaking supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) use the messaging application Telegram to distribute a range of information, including instructional material - manuals and guides designed to aid operatives with step-by-step procedures for providing assistance to the group. - Channel administrators distribute whichever manuals they believe can be of aid to aspiring operatives, regardless of its ideological background. - Telegram's internal file-sharing features and lax approach to content moderation allow channel administrators to create repositories of instructional information within Telegram channels. - While attack-planning manuals available on Telegram channels understandably pose a large concern for counter-terrorism authorities, operational security and cyber-security manuals are also frequently distributed, relatively easy to implement, and help operatives successfully conduct activities in support of terrorist groups while minimizing the risk of detection or apprehension. In Chapter 5 entitled "Examining the Present and Future Role of Cybercrime-as-a-Service in Terror and Extremism," Thomas Holt makes the case that the rise of online illicit markets that enable the sale of cybercrime tools and stolen personal information have made it possible for individuals to engage in technically sophisticated forms of crime regardless of level of computer skill. Ideological and terror groups over the last decade have expressed an interest in cyber-attacks as a means to cause harm, though it is not clear how much ability they have to perform such attacks. As a result, cybercrime markets may engender their attacks, though it is not clear how often this may occur, or what conditions would lead to their use. He provides recommendations for policy and research to disrupt cybercrime markets and improve our knowledge of ideologically-motivated cyber-attackers generally. - Cybercrime markets generate millions of dollars in revenue and enable non-technical actors to perform sophisticated attacks. - They may provide a point of entry for ideologically-motivated extremists and terrorists to engage in cyber-attacks. - These markets can be disrupted through traditional law enforcement investigations, and may also be affected through other extra-legal efforts such as Sybil attacks. - Research is needed on the radicalization process of ideologically-motivated actors who engage in cyber-attacks, and how this differs from those who have engaged in physical attacks. Rebecca Earnhardt and Gary Ackerman in Chapter 6 entitled "Modelling Terrorist Technology Transfer," make the point that while technology transfer occurs as a part of routine life, the topic remains relatively understudied in the terrorism literature. As terrorists engage in increasingly lethal and technologically sophisticated attacks, the concern surrounding terrorists acquiring cutting-edge weaponry and related technologies is accumulating. They go on to describe the Terrorist Technology Transfer (T3) project which provides a first cut at addressing this critical operational gap in knowledge through the exploration of extant technology transfer literature, construction of the first iteration of the T3 Model, and illustrative application of the model to an emerging technological threat. They conclude by stating the T3 project indicates the promise of having not only research, but also operational and policy impacts. It raises the possibility of providing government stakeholders, including intelligence, law enforcement, military, and policy agencies with a variety of insights and operational tools In Chapter 7, "Hacking the Human Body: The Cyber-Bio Convergence," Rebecca Earnhardt makes the point that the increasing convergence between the fields of biosecurity and cybersecurity may result in consequences that analysts have yet considered. Biotechnology use and expertise expansion beyond practitioners have stoked concerns about a wide range of traditional biosecurity issues including shielding the outputs from advanced gene editing systems or protecting university lab data storage systems. As biotechnology advances, including digitization and automation of systems that were once localized and only accessible to those directly involved on related research, biosecurity and cybersecurity fields continue to intersect. She concludes by stating a fully-fledged research project would explore the cyber security risk factors that are cited commonly as key vulnerabilities, and filter these cyber security risk factors through an adversary technology adoption decision making and motivational analysis. In Chapter 8 entitled "Evolving Human and Machine Interdependence in Conflict: Advantages, Risks, and Conundrums," R. E. Burnett makes several key points: - Emerging science and technology will continue to disrupt customary characteristics of political and kinetic conflicts among states and non-state actors. - The increasing complex interdependence between humans and machines is one area for particular examination. - We cannot reliably predict whether or not human roles will rapidly give way to a more dominant robotic style of war, so we must prepare for a variety of futures, per the Scharre/Horowitz autonomy typologies. - Humans involved with machines that operate at vastly greater speeds and volumes of data will further create problems of cognitive demand for the human soldier that need to be examined. - We must investigate this not only in terms of technical performance, but also from a more holistic perspective, to include the social, political, and psychological dimensions of the soldier and of the citizen. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security2019. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication: Accessed May 4, 2019 at: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 155659 Keywords: BiosecurityCybercrimeCybersecurityDronesEmerging TechnologiesExtremismHomeland SecurityRadicalismTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: European Crime Prevention Network Title: Monitor Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Summary: In 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy identified the prevention of radicalisation as a pillar of the fight against terrorism. Concrete actions started to take shape when the European Commission established the Radicalisation Awareness Network in 2011. The 2015-2020 European Agenda on Security reiterates that terrorism and radicalisation constitute one of the three priorities for security. All this means that national and European funds for radicalisation research and prevention initiatives have risen significantly, but also that radicalisation research and prevention are still frontier work. This EUCPN monitor on radicalisation presents an overview of the current state of affairs in the prevention of radicalisation. After discussing the concept of radicalisation and the problems connected to it, it presents the most important European data on the phenomenon as well as recent trends in jihadist, right-wing, left-wing, and nationalist extremism and terrorism. Chapter three briefly introduces various strategies for the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism and goes on to list the most important European and international agencies and organisations in the field of radicalisation prevention. Chapter four canvasses the state of the art in radicalisation research and its consequences for policy and practice. Finally, the challenge posed by risk assessments, essential to many preventive efforts, is discussed. The monitor concludes that it is necessary to continue to invest in an evidence-based approach to the prevention of radicalisation and a cross-fertilisation between practice and research. Details: Brussels, Belgium: European Crime Prevention Network, 2019. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2019 at: https://eucpn.org/document/monitor-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism Year: 2019 Country: Europe URL: https://eucpn.org/sites/default/files/content/download/files/monitor_radicalisation_and_violent_extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 156036 Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism Jihadists Radicalization Risk Assessment Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Fox, Emma Title: Islamic Human Rights Commission: Advocating for the Ayatollahs Summary: The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) is a London-based advocacy group established in 1997, inspired by the worldview of Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolutionary, theocratic societal aims he established in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IHRC has gained prominence in recent years for its pro-Hezbollah AlQuds Day parades, its controversial 'Islamophobia Awards' and the anti-Semitic rhetoric espoused by the group's senior figures. However, less attention has been given to IHRC's wider extremist links and terrorist sympathies. There is also a lack of understanding as to how extremist groups can exploit the charitable sector; obtain public funds; acquire status via academic associates; attain international recognition; and influence governments. IHRC is an institutionally pro-terrorist and anti-Semitic organisation. Senior figures have espoused support for violent jihad, expressed sympathy for convicted terrorists, and advocated for the extraction and eradication of 'Zionists'. Campaigns have supported high-profile associates of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Hezbollah. Events have hosted representatives from PFLP and Hezbollah, and have been used to seek out those "looking for martyrdom". One IHRC briefing claims that use of force against Israel can include the "destruction of installations" on her territory and "the financial, logistical and informational support" of Hezbollah. Some remarks, views or material advanced by individuals associated with IHRC, or at IHRC-organised events, may warrant criminal investigation with regard to S.11-13 Terrorism Act 2000 and S.1-4 Terrorism Act 2006. IHRC's alignment with the Iranian state's foreign and domestic agenda is typified through IHRC co-founder and director Saied Amelis appointment to President Hassan Rouhani's Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in 2019, having previously served as a member of Ayatollah Khamenei's Supreme Council of Cyberspace. Despite Ameli's role as a senior Iranian state official, he has continued to play an active role at IHRC. IHRC advisors have expressed sympathy for martyrdom and jihad, as well as support for militant resistance movements. Multiple advisors have been linked to overseas proscribed groups. This includes Muhammad al-Massari, a "key influence on young jihadists" who previously helped establish a press office for Osama Bin Laden in London. IHRC sells literature authored by Islamist and SalafiJihadist ideologues, including one book that is banned in UK prisons. This includes publications that have inspired violent Islamist movements across the globe, such as Sayyid Qutb's Milestones, Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi's work on jihad, and writings by Ibn Taymiyyah. They have also sold Abdullah el-Faisals violent interpretations of the Quranic hadith. Convicted of inciting racial hatred in this country, el-Faisal is currently fighting extradition from Jamaica to the US, where he is accused of recruiting for the Islamic State terror group (IS). Proceeds from the bookshop go towards the organisation's subsidiary charity, IHRC Trust.IHRC has acquired UN Special Consultative Status, European Commission funds, and public subsidies through its charitable affiliate, IHRC Trust. IHRC Ltd is also an accredited immigration advisor. It is particularly concerning that several academics who have engaged with IHRC have recently gained government and cross-party parliamentary influence. This includes Salman Sayyid, who coauthored the APPG on British Muslims' definition of Islamophobia, and Sadek Hamid and Tahir Abbas who were selected by the Commission for Countering Extremism to research extremism. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2019 at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/HJS-IHRC-Report-WEB.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/islamic-human-rights-commission-advocating-for-the-ayotollahs/ Shelf Number: 156139 Keywords: Anti-Semitic Hezbollah Human Rights Islamic Extremists Jihad Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Lloyd, Monica Title: Extremism Risk Assessment: A Directory Summary: This directory has been assembled from frameworks that have been developed in recent years to assess aspects of extremist violence, a term used here to encompass terrorist violence that is framed by ideology and targeted violence that is framed by idiosyncratic beliefs. Each of these frameworks was developed in a slightly different context, and optimised for a different purpose and group of users. The frameworks covered are: ERG22+ (Extremist Risk Guidance), developed by the UK's Prisons and Probation Service; IR-46 (Islamic Radicalization), used by the Dutch National Police; IVP (Identifying Vulnerable People), developed out of open-source material on violent extremists; MLG Version 2 (Multi-Level Guidelines), used in North America and Europe; TRAP-18 (Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol) in use since 2015 in Canada, the US and Europe; VERA-2R (Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 Revised), available in Dutch, English, French and German. These all conform, to a greater or lesser extent, to an approach that structures professional judgment from a number of potential indicators of risk derived from clinical and correctional research and practice, with the exception of the IVP framework that consists of a checklist for the assessment of escalating behaviours that open source research suggests correspond with more serious intent and/or imminence of attack. None of these frameworks claims to be able to straightforwardly predict future violence. In accordance with good practice in risk assessment, most claim instead to be able to identify behaviours or scenarios that signal when and in what circumstances an attack is more likely, in order to prevent it through appropriate action. Each is presented as work in progress, within a standard template that allows for some comparison across frameworks, together with a strengths and limitations appraisal informed by the comments of peer reviewers and users. Details: Lancaster, UK: CREST (Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats), headquartered at Department of Psychology, Lancaster University 2019. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 12, 2019 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/extremism-risk-assessment-directory/ Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/extremism-risk-assessment-directory/ Shelf Number: 156402 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Radicalization Risk Assessment Terrorists Violent Extremism |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Alleged Convergent Transnational Crimes in Somali-American Communities: A Qualitative Study of Risks and Practices Summary: This study aimed to build scientific knowledge on the emergence and trajectories of alleged violent extremism and trafficking in persons in Somali-American communities in the U.S. It aimed to generate better understanding of possible convergence issues involved so as to inform policy and practice. Details: Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2019. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2019 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252138.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252138.pdf Shelf Number: 156995 Keywords: Radicalization Terrorism Trafficking in Persons Transnational Crime Violent Extremism |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Helpful and Harmful Practices for Addressing Alleged Transnational Crimes in Somali-American Communities Summary: Some risk factors that contribute to both violent extremism and trafficking in persons for commercial sex include perceived discrimination due to racial and ethnic identity, including social exclusion and discrimination because Muslims are regarded as being linked to terrorism. Another risk factor is the view among many Somali-Americans that sex work and violent extremism are not crimes in themselves, but are reflective of subjective moral perspectives. Another risk factor is weak collective efficacy, which fuels a sense of community dis-empowerment. There is also mistrust of law enforcement agencies among Somali-Americans, as well as a lack of familiarity with and reluctance to cooperate with criminal justice agencies. Recommended practices for Somali-American communities include building effective and sustainable prevention programming, the strengthening of police-community relations, an increase in programming that targets community needs, and avoidance of profiling Somalis and engaging in other discriminatory assumptions and practices. In addition to recommendations for strengthening community practices among Somali-Americans, recommendations for strengthening criminal justice policy and practices regarding Somali-Americans are also outlined. Details: Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2019. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2019 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252137.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=274360 Shelf Number: 156996 Keywords: Commercial Sex Work Police-Community Relations Racial Profiling Terrorism Trafficking in Persons Violent Extremism |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Transnational Crimes among Somali-Americans: Convergences of Radicalization and Trafficking Summary: Data were obtained from public sources on the possible involvement of Somali-Americans in violent extremism and trafficking in persons, as well as ethnographic interviews of young adults, parents, community leaders, and service providers in three American cities that have large Somali communities. These cities are Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; and Nashville, Tennessee. Law enforcement agents who worked with the Somali-American community in the three cities were interviewed. Recently, there have been investigations, arrests, and trials concerning violent extremism and trafficking in persons that involve some Somali-Americans in those cities. The model developed is based on the data collected from research participants who may have assumed that a violation occurred even though the charges for trafficking in persons were pending and before the alleged defendants were acquitted. The assumption that trafficking in persons is relevant for any U.S. community, including the Somali-American community, is thus deemed tenable by the researchers. The study found that both violent extremism and trafficking in persons apparently involve common and selective risks and practices, which can be explained by a convergent risks and practice model informed by "push-and-pull" theory. Risk factors ("push") and protective factors ("pull") are reported for violent extremism and trafficking in persons. The report recommends building effective and sustainable prevention programming, strengthening law enforcement and community relations, increasing programs based on community needs, and stopping discriminatory practices. 14 tables and 92 references Details: Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois at Chicago, 2019. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2019 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252135.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=274358 Shelf Number: 156997 Keywords: Police Collaboration Police-Community Relations Racial Profiling Trafficking in Persons Violent Extremism |
Author: Allington, Daniel Title: Violent Extremist Tactics and Ideology of the Sectarian Far Left Summary: This study addresses the question of whether a relationship exists between sympathy for violent extremism and openness to ideological positions associated with the revolutionary far left. We begin by analysing the characteristics of British far-left sectarian groups: that is, small, ideologically homogeneous organisations, each of which rejects parliamentary politics as a route to socialism and instead aspires to become the 'vanguard party' of Leninist revolutionary theory. We distinguish the members of such groups from members of the public who identify as 'very left-wing'. We then develop a survey instrument derived from publications by sectarian far-left groups and pilot it on a stratified random sample of the self-identified 'very left-wing' (N = 1073). The data collected is then re-used as a boost sample for a nationally-representative sample of the British public (N = 3823). Using these data, we test the hypothesis of a positive association between the belief system disseminated by the sectarian far left - which we term 'revolutionary workerism' - and sympathy with violent extremist tactics. We find a relationship which is highly significant in both statistical and substantive terms: those who express strong agreement with revolutionary workerist ideas are far more likely to express sympathy with violent extremist tactics than those who express strong disagreement. We also find a positive relationship between sympathy for violent extremism and a geopolitical outlook resembling the 'anti-imperialist' ideology promoted by the sectarian far left, in that those who see the US and the UK (and, among the 'very leftwing', also Israel) as a greater threat to world peace than NATO strategic adversaries such as North Korea tend to be more sympathetic to violent extremism than those who do not. Details: London: King's College London, 2019. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2019 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818862/Allington-McAndrew-Hirsh-2019-Jul-19.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/violent-extremist-tactics-and-the-ideology-of-the-sectarian-far-left Shelf Number: 157045 Keywords: Far LeftViolent ExtremismViolent Extremist |
Author: Allen, Chris Title: National Action: Links Between the Far Right, Extremism and Terrorism Summary: In December 2016, National Action was proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Deemed to be concerned in terrorism, it was a landmark decision:the first time in British history a far-right group had been proscribed. Accordingly, it became a criminal offence to be a member of National Action, invite support or help organise any meetings connected with it. Likewise, to wear clothing, carry symbols or display articles which suggest support. Since its proscription, the police have announced 28 arrests on suspicion of membership - four relating to members of the British armed forces resulting in 11 successful convictions for membership alongside other offences, specifically three convictions for possessing information likely useful to a person preparing to commit an act of terrorism, and one conviction apiece for inciting racial hatred, distributing a terrorist publication, preparing an act of terrorism and making threats to kill a police officer. At the time of writing, further trials are pending. Members of National Action (pre- and post-proscription) have additionally been arrested and convicted of other offences, including inciting racial hatred, possession, making explosives and conspiracy to commit violent disorder. This paper offers a detailed examination of National Action exploring the links between the far-right, extremism and terrorism. In doing so, this paper generates new knowledge and understanding about the group's commitment to 'authentic' nationalist ideologies, the relationship between those ideologies and violence, the trajectories taking the group and its activists from non-violence to violence, the impact of proscription and its potential legacy. Details: Leicester, United Kingdom: University of Leicester, Department of Crimnology, The Centre for Hate Studies, 2019. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2019 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-action-links-between-the-far-right-extremism-and-terrorism Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/827232/Chris_Allen_-_National_Action_Post_Publication_Revisions.pdf Shelf Number: 157050 Keywords: Extremism Extremists Far Right Racism Terrorism Violent Extremism |