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Date: November 22, 2024 Fri
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Results for violent extremists
34 results foundAuthor: Feakin, Tobias Title: The new frontiers of Islamist extremism: Understanding the threat that al-Qaeda affiliates pose to African security Summary: Over the past decade various groups that had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three groups- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. All of these groups are separate from the al-Qaeda core. They haven't taken up the al-Qaeda model because they've been told to, but they're emulating it. They're all looking to become dispersed, decentralised movements that frame local grievances in the language of the global jihad. For the international community, the danger lies not so much in the immediate threat to Western targets from African Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state that would provide a base for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists. The proven capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups' most immediate international impact. There are no clear solutions for African states combating the Islamist groups but any solution will necessarily be complex. Unfortunately, if the situation's allowed to continue, there is danger that we'll see a rise in instability in the regions where the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 133413 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Africa)Radical GroupsRadicalizationViolent Extremists |
Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: On the Front Line. A guide to countering far-right extremism Summary: Far-right extremism remains a worrying problem across Europe. The most visible cases are those that hit the headlines, such as the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany or Anders Behring Breivik's attacks in Norway. In the past decade, both Hungary and Sweden were hit by a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities. Though attacks of this magnitude and scale remain rare, they are not unheard of. In some cases, those personally touched by these violent attacks are still fighting for justice. While high-profile and high-impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, bullying and hate crime by extremists targeting minority communities. These kinds of incidences often go undetected, and indeed they are hard to quantify. They manifest in the sectioning off of some local areas as no-go zones for ethnic minorities, graffiti of far-right symbols on mosques and synagogues, or threats received by individual members of the community. Those carrying out these actions - far-right extremists - are a broad group, ranging from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, anti-Islam activists and registered political parties. Though they differ in their aims and methods, there are some defining features: racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism. The actions they take aim to intimidate and assert power over particular communities and undermine democracy. In some countries, the capacity for violence within the far right is on the rise, and it remains challenging to ascertain at what point ideology can turn to violence. With the proliferation of extremist content online, and the ease with which anyone can access communities advocating violence across the web, this challenge has only grown. There are thousands of front-line professionals across Europe who come face-to-face with this issue on a regular basis, whether it is those working specifically on countering violent extremism, or those who encounter the far right as part of their daily responsibilities policing communities or educating young people. Though European countries differ on the particular problems they face and the ways in which they address them, there are more commonalities than differences when it comes to specific challenges posed by the far right. Front-line professionals and local communities often develop innovative solutions to these challenges, though these rarely make headlines or send ripples beyond the community immediately affected. This project aims to change this. This is one of the first projects aiming to enhance understanding of what works in prevention, intervention and response to far-right extremism across Europe. It has developed a package of resources which include ISD's report Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe which sets out government approaches to far-right extremism and provides guidance to policymakers, as well as an online platform called The FREE Initiative - Far-Right Extremism in Europe (www.theFREEinitative.com), which aims to inspire and connect those tackling the far right and showcase best practices. This is a practical guide for front-line professionals and activists. It is based on the collective experiences of over 120 individuals tackling far-right extremism across 10 countries (Sweden, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic). This includes both governmental and non-governmental professionals coming into contact with far-right individuals or those who are impacted by them, on a daily basis. These professionals are thus in a unique position to influence those within or vulnerable to far-right extremism, and limit their impact. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Shelf Number: 135709 Keywords: Counter-ExtremismCounter-RadicalizationExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsViolent Extremists |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? Summary: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies. Summary - Afghanistan's population is among the world's youngest and fastest growing: half its population is under eighteen and more than three-quarters under forty. - The need is dire for strategies and policies to respond to the largest and fastest-growing segment of the population and to enable these citizens to meaningfully engage in their country's affairs. - Many young men are frustrated with real and perceived injustice, regular and observable impunity and corruption, and lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities. - All those who want to learn more about radical and violent extremist ideologies do not necessarily become violent extremists. - Violent extremist groups such as the Taliban use traditional and modern media tools and platforms to lure youth into jihad. - Being proactively opposed to extremism not only undermines the appeal of such messages but also offers alternative narratives. - To address grievances appropriately, the international community must continue to provide assistance to the Afghan state on fundamental issues, such as corruption and rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief No. 188: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Shelf Number: 136458 Keywords: ExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Violent Extremists in Federal Institutions: Estimating Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization in the Federal Offender Population Summary: There is a growing recognition of the need to understand and address violent extremist threats in Western countries. Given that the majority of research in this area has been conducted on nonoffender populations outside of Canada, there is a need to better understand the scope, nature, and process of radicalization in Canada. In recognition of the fact that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is in a position to contribute to addressing this gap, Public Safety Canada entered into a Letter of Agreement with the CSC to produce a report focused on CSC's data holdings on and estimation of violent extremism. This report summarizes the data holdings and gaps in the area, as well as the results of three studies focused on the examination and estimation of radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization of offenders under CSC's jurisdiction. The first study was a qualitative examination of the unique characteristics of offenders who are radicalized and who are susceptible to radicalization, from the perspective of operational staff. Based on data collected at a total of 10 focus groups involving institutional and community security and front-line staff from each of CSC's five regions, a number of themes emerged. Participants recognized the complex, multi-faceted nature of radicalization, and identified a wide range of behaviours indicative of radicalization or susceptibility to radicalization. In most cases, responses (e.g., vocalization of shared grievance, changes in religion) were consistent with the literature, though staff also suggested unique responses. Staff also drew attention to areas of possible improvement. The second study was a quantitative examination of differences between radicalized and nonradicalized offenders. Informed by literature and by the results of study 1, radicalized and nonradicalized offenders were compared on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data. There were many areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders, including ethnicity and citizenship, education and employment, substance abuse history, previous contact with the criminal justice system, and characteristics of their offence(s). The data suggested that, in some ways, radicalized offenders may be more similar to radicalized individuals in the community than to other offenders. The third study involved a theory-drive attempt to identify constructs associated with susceptibility to radicalization. Based on a literature and data review, frequency analysis of variables, and principle component analysis, nine constructs were identified and explored. Though considerable additional work is required to confirm the role and nature of these constructs in influencing susceptibility, this study represents an important first step in this endeavour. Together, the three studies have allowed the CSC to contribute to the evidence base surrounding violent extremism in Canada. The results of these studies may also inform institutional operations and policies at CSC. They consistently demonstrate the need for additional research focused on population management for radicalized offenders, with a particular need for research focused on effective interventions for this group. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. R-313: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136785 Keywords: Extremist GroupsInmatesPrisonersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia Summary: Many convicted Indonesian terrorists will be released over the next several years after serving time in prison. he Indonesian government has little capacity at present to provide adequate post-release monitoring, although it is taking some steps to remedy this. Under the circumstances, how much of a security risk do these releases pose? he answer is probably not as much as some people fear; the recidivism rate for convicted extremists remains low. he problem is that systems are not yet in place to keep track of individuals who are considered potential problems. Any evaluation of risk must take several factors into account. One is the numbers involved. In early 2013, articles appeared in the regional media suggesting that 300 prisoners were due for release by the end of 2014. he National Anti-Terror Agency (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) later stated the real figure was only 39. A more reasonable estimate is about 80 releases in 2013-2014, some of which have already taken place, with over 100 more in 2015-2016. No one has exact data, however, and accurate predictions are close to impossible. A second factor is the prison experience of those scheduled for release. It is simply not possible to assess risk on the basis of the activities that led to their convictions. Some of the men that might have been judged most dangerous appear to have modified their views and behavior; others who might have seemed low risk have grown more militant because of associations made in prison. Which way an individual turns may depend less on government "deradicalisation" programs -- although interventions that provide status and income can help -- than on the nature and influence of fellow inmates and connections maintained on the outside. In general, senior JI leaders tend to exert a moderating influence, whereas those who follow radical preacher Aman Abdurrahman are likely to keep the level of militancy high. Other factors can also come into play, including the degree to which inmates can mix with ordinary criminal offenders. he problem of released prisoners does not relate just to those charged with terrorism but also to others they may have recruited. he largest cluster of repeat offenders among convicted extremists consists of men whose first offense had nothing to do with terrorism. The riot in Tanjung Gusta prison, Medan, on 11 July 2013 was a reminder that in thinking about scheduled releases, one should think of unscheduled ones, too, even if the number of terrorist escapes over the last decade has been remarkably low. Overcrowding, understaffing and the poor physical condition of many Indonesian prisons combine to produce escapes of ordinary criminals so frequently that it is a wonder that not more extremists make the attempt. To address these risks, improving the capacity of the Indonesian corrections system to analyse and respond to developments in prison is essential. It is also important for the government as a whole to recognize the need for improved post-release monitoring and allocate the necessary resources to put a better system in place. Managing convicted extremists goes to two much larger issues, however. One is overall prison reform: the government acknowledges that the prison system as a whole is in a state of crisis and the Corrections Directorate with the Law and Human Rights Ministry has been receptive to donor assistance in trying to address it. The second is the spread of extremist teachings in a way that generates new groups of young radicals convinced that violence is the way to address injustice, religious deviance and vice. Until the government does more to address this much more sensitive problem, the best monitoring program in the world will be of limited value. Details: Indonesia: IPAC, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 2: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129777 Keywords: DeradicalizationPrisonersRadical GroupsTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Cilliers, Jakkie Title: Violent Islamist extremism and terror in Africa Summary: This paper presents an overview of large-scale violence by Islamist extremists in key African countries. The paper builds on previous publications of the Institute for Security Studies on the nexus between development and conflict trends, and it seeks to provide an overview of the evolution of the associated terrorism through quantitative and contextual analysis using various large datasets. The focus is on the development and links among countries experiencing the worst of this phenomenon, especially Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, as well as the impact of events in the Middle East on these African countries. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 286: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Violent%20Islamist%20extremism%20and%20terror%20in%20Africa.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Violent%20Islamist%20extremism%20and%20terror%20in%20Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 136942 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Africa) Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremists |
Author: Vurmo, Gjergji Title: Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Albania Summary: This study has collected, generated, and analyzed data on the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism with the aim of informing policymaking and stakeholders involved in addressing this phenomenon and the challenges interrelated with it. The research methodology approaches the identification and comprehensive analysis of the context by employing a variety of sources to understand the extent and relevance of several factors that enable or fuel religious radicalization and forms of violent extremism. These factors and 'drivers' are often combined with one another and interact with the context through various forms. However, the list of drivers analyzed in this study is not exhaustive, because in different contexts and times the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism may be fueled by other factors. During the research period (September 2014 - May 2015), a wide range of official, academic and other reliable sources of data was examined. In addition, a considerable number of actors have been involved in the preparatory phase of the study as well as in the fieldwork to generate data and to conduct the survey and interviews with key informants and focus groups. The entire framework of the research methodology, the findings, the conclusions, and the recommendations drawn in this study have been subjected to validation process to ensure quality, objectivity, compliance with the Albanian context, and inclusive approach based on the data. The IDM study finds that, while religious radicalization in Albania is in its early phase, lack of attention and inclusion in addressing 'push' or enabling factors may serve to aggravate the phenomenon. The study sheds light on the inactivity of most state institutions, particularly those outside the security domain, and of non-state actors in addressing and preventing religious radicalization. The phenomenon of religious radicalization may be further developed due to the lack of contextual cooperation between non-security state authorities and leaders of religious communities on the prevention of the phenomenon. The religious radical groups' agenda may be facilitated and favored by the inexistence of civil society in remote rural areas creating a big gap with regard to "safeguarding" activities on religious radicalization and violent extremism. The broad support of the communities of religious believers to the liberal tradition of faith, religious institutions, and to the values of religious harmony should not serve as an excuse for state and non-state actors' inactivity. On the other hand, misinterpretation of the phenomenon and minimization of its relevance or its identification with consequences (mainly in the security aspect) lead to the wrong approach and eventual counter-productivity of the effects of institutional response. Religious radicalization (as a process) and violent extremism (as a result) are enabled, fueled and/or shaped by a rich array of factors and drivers, which operate in a particular country context at both macro (societal) and micro (individual / group) level. Details: Tirana: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2015. 246p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Albania URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Shelf Number: 137021 Keywords: Radical GroupsRadicalizationReligious ViolenceViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index: 2015. Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socioeconomic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism. In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries - Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon. While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year. Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State)as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens. The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries. The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally, Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137333 Keywords: Extremist GroupsLone Wolf TerroristsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State’s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State JihadMedia Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-QaedaExtremist GroupsISISIslamic StateJihadistsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles, and Opportunities Summary: A consensus is building that violent extremism and terrorism are both international security and development issues. It is well documented that economic and social development are better attained in the absence of violent conflict. Furthermore, although poverty does not have a direct causal relationship with violent extremism and terrorism, poorer countries are the most affected by terrorism. Beyond socioeconomic challenges, a lack of hope and future prospects, real or perceived marginalization and sociopolitical exclusion, and weak governance and rule of law are considered conducive to the spread of terrorism and challenging to sustainable development. Indeed, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)16, one of the United Nations - supported set of targets related to international development, focuses on the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and the building of effective, accountable, and representative institutions at all levels. Moreover, violent extremism and terrorism are direct threats to development as they impact economic stability, tourism, and the human security and freedom of citizens, including their freedom from physical threat, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Lastly, violent extremism is increasingly part of the context in which development organizations operate, with violent extremist groups impeding, endangering, and diverting the delivery of development assistance and aid services. In certain cases, terrorism and violent extremism are the primary factors contributing to the need for continued assistance. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Brief: Accessed March 24, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 138408 Keywords: Development AssistanceExtremismExtremist GroupsRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh Summary: As the Awami League (AL) government's political rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government's legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to de-politicise and strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can address the country's myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic collapse. The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of violence and a brutal state response. The government's excesses against political opponents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Police tasked with targeting the government's rivals and an overstretched justice system compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creating opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. The government's reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that these groups can further exploit. Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by investing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts and sentences. The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict. The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate avenues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the trust of citizens in the state's provision of both justice and security. So long as there is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and political rights, and in New Delhi's by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If mainstream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to view violence and violent groups as their only recourse. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 277: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 139829 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsPolitical ViolenceRadical GroupsRadicalizationViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Regional Risk Assessment on terrorism Financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia Summary: The Syria-Iraq conflict and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 have energised extremists and their sympathisers across South-East Asia and Australia. The region is also dealing with long-running domestic conflicts and insurgencies that share the characteristics of terrorism, even if they are not connected to ISIL or violent global extremism. This highly-charged and dynamic security environment has intensified terrorism financing risks in the region, posing new challenges for authorities. Small-cell terrorist activity, foreign terrorist fighter travel and the growing number of lone actors will see continued use of self-funding to raise funds and cash smuggling to move them. These proven, easy-to-use terrorism financing methods reduce the need for terrorists and their supporters to resort to more complex financial activity or adopt new payment systems. The region's porous land and close maritime borders, as well as informal cash-intensive economies, also influence the continued use of established methods. Terrorism financing funds flowing out of the region are currently channelled mainly into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but comprise only a small portion of international funding to factions fighting in that area. While outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140160 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismISISIslamic StateRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremists |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign FightersHomeland SecurityISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Ingram, Haroro J. Title: A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda: A Two-Tiered Framework for Practitioners Summary: This Policy Brief outlines a "linkage-based" approach to combating militant Islamist propaganda tailored for practitioners. It argues for a two-tiered approach to counter-terrorism strategic communications that addresses a spectrum of target audience motivations: antis, curious, engaged, tacit supporters and active supporters. The first tier undermines the key arguments at the heart of militant Islamist narratives and offers alternative narratives. This approach is designed to dismantle the "systems of meaning" at the heart of militant Islamist propaganda via the deployment of pragmatic- and identity-choice messages tailored to dissolve the linkages violent extremists draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. The second tier uses strategies of network disruption and disengagement strategies to catalyse behavioural changes in target audiences away from joining or acting on behalf of violent extremist groups like al Qaeda or so-called Islamic State (IS). These tiers are mutually reinforcing: the first degrades the appeal of violent extremist messaging in an effort to constrict those who may become engaged in or even supporters of violent extremists while the second disturbs the trajectory of individuals from tacit to active supporters. The framework is designed to not only assist practitioners with synchronising campaign planning and message design but provides a way to categorise messaging and facilitate metric collection for better informed decision-making. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Policy Brief: Accessed December 13, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146040 Keywords: Counter-terrorismIslamic StateTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating, or Preventing? Summary: Summary • Women’s role in violent extremism has too often been simplified to a binary: either victim of the choices of men or deviant anomaly. • Women play a diverse range of roles in violent extremism in Afghanistan—as they do around the world—not only as peacebuilders but also as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and preventers. • Roles and motivations vary, but what is clear is that the construct of disempowered victims simply does not hold true for all women involved. • Women’s roles in violent extremism and the underlying reasons behind those roles need to be fully understood and appropriately reflected in policy and practice. • Women’s rights and place in society are central to the narratives of violent extremist groups, and these narratives are the terrain on which women in Afghanistan fight to establish their rights. • Women have the potential, whether through their own involvement or as family members of those who are involved, to counter radicalization dynamics. • Countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming needs to include women as specific target groups, be engendered more generally, and address the underlying issues of women’s status and agency. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 396: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146123 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismExtremismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Lamb, Robert Dale Title: Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens Summary: Individuals and groups who use violence in ways that threaten the United States, its allies, or its partners habitually find or create ways to operate with impunity or without detection. Whether for private financial gain (e.g., by narcotics and arms traffickers) or for harmful political aims (e.g., by insurgents, terrorists, and other violent extremists), these illicit operations are most successful "and most dangerous" when their perpetrators have a place or situation that can provide refuge from efforts to combat or counter them. Such places and situations are often called safe havens, and potential safe havens are sometimes called ungoverned areas. A key component of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stabilization, peacekeeping, and other such efforts is to reduce the size and effectiveness of the safe havens that protect illicit actors. Agencies in defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and other areas all have capabilities that can be applied to countering such threats and building the capacity and legitimacy of U.S. partners to prevent ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas from becoming safe havens. To do this effectively requires careful consideration of all the geographical, political, civil, and resource factors that make safe havens possible; a sober appreciation of the complex ways those factors interact; and deeper collaboration among U.S. government offices and units that address such problems - whether operating openly, discreetly, or covertly - to ensure unity of effort. This report offers a framework that can be used to systematically account for these considerations in relevant strategies, capabilities, and doctrines/best practices. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479805.pdf Shelf Number: 146248 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingPublic SafetySafe HavensViolenceViolent Extremists |
Author: Assanvo, William Title: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Summary: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue 10: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Shelf Number: 146970 Keywords: Boko HaramCounter-TerrorismRadical GroupsTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Public Opinion Survey Data to Measure Sympathy and Support for Islamist Terrorism: A Look at Muslim Opinions on Al Qaeda and IS Summary: This Research Paper seeks to explore what 'sympathy' and 'support' actually mean when it comes to terrorism. The text addresses some of the problems of public opinion surveys, includes a conceptual discussion and then continues with the presentation of data from public opinion surveys. It notes that opinion polls can be helpful in gauging (verbal) support for terrorism but also finds that the questions asked in opinion polls are generally lacking precision while the answers are often influenced by political pressures. When translating (generally low) percentages of sympathy and support for al Qaeda and so-called Islamic State in various countries into actual population figures, it emerges that there is a sizeable radical milieu in both Muslim-majority countries and in Western Muslim diasporas, held together by the world wide web of the internet. While large majorities of Muslims in most countries have no love for jihadist extremists, there are more than enough breeding grounds for terrorism. The Research Paper concludes that better instruments for measuring sympathy and support for jihadist terrorism are needed to inform counter-terrorist strategies Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Schmid-Muslim-Opinion-Polls-Jan2017-1.pdf Shelf Number: 141336 Keywords: al QaedaCounter-TerrorismExtremists GroupsIslamic StateJihadistsPublic OpinionTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Rueppel, Patrick Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe Summary: Countering violent extremism and terrorism has been a top priority of governments in Asia and Europe for many years. Terrorist cells posed a severe threat to home security, even before the emergence of Daesh. However, as a consequence of Asian and European citizens joining Daesh, terrorists have been able to establish networks among fighters from both regions. It has thus become imperative that governments from Asia and Europe enhance their collaboration and coordination in all dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts. Details: Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper, no. 4: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48006-1522-2-30.pdf?170301114252 Shelf Number: 145585 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: Almohammad, Asaad Title: The ISIS Prison System: Its Structure, Departmental Affiliations, Processes, Conditions, and Practices of Psychological and Physical Torture Summary: This paper endeavors to explore the ISIS prison system, the arrest or abduction, interrogation and confession and total detention processes; as well as the condition of detention facilities, and the physical and psychological torture taking place within the terrorist organization's jails. Fifty-five ISIS cadres (defectors, returnees or prisoners) and 17 Syrian civilian interviewees who had been detained by ISIS were interviewed regarding their knowledge of and first experiences of incarceration in ISIS prison facilities. Their reports are compiled and dissected into three phases: 1) abduction/arrest, 2) initial processing including interrogation and confession phases, and 3) post interrogation processing. The accounts obtained from ISIS cadres, detainees and sources on the ground provided a chilling portrayal of ISIS' prison system. The detention facilities are run by different entities. These entities are namely: the Islamic police, military police, hisbah (morality police), raid squads, and Emni (security forces). Methods of detention, conditions, and torture and punishment varied across the aforementioned entities. Throughout their abduction/arrest and interrogation, detainees are subjected to a number of psychological methods of torture. These include the threat of execution, promises to receive similar fates as other tortured fellow detainees, solitary confinement, and the placement of severed heads in cages in which detainees are being held. Elaborate physical torture includes seven methods named as follows: Lashing, the Fuel, Bisat al-Rih (Flying Carpet), Shabeh (Ghost), German Chair, the Biter, and the Tire. It is hard to assess whether ISIS operatives gained actionable information or confessions as result. For many of the tortured interviewed detainees as well as the defectors, confessions meant that they would be executed by the terrorist organization. Though, detainees appear to collectively develop coping mechanisms and strategies including sharing information to avoid coerced confessions to inhibit the effectiveness of ISIS' interrogations. The use of torture serves as a reinforcement of ISIS' brand of terror. In that sense, torture is a violent method that scares civilians into submitting to ISIS' theological codes and socio-political aims. Throughout detainees' time in shared cells, they were expected to participate in sharia courses. The first course was called Redemption. The sharia lectures were often delivered by highly ranked sharia figures. The courses are carried out to indoctrinate detainees in ISIS ideology prior to their release. The last phase of the incarceration starts when the interrogation is concluded. Former detainees reported that they were not made aware beforehand of meeting sharia judges. Detainees who have been cleared of their purported offences and those who have survived ISIS' punishment are subjected to conditional release. ISIS is reported to offer former detainees to either make a ransom-like payment, or for those with skills needed by the terrorist organization to work for ISIS directorates. ISIS operatives try to coerce former detainees who can neither make the payment nor possess the skills deemed valuable by the terrorist organization to commit suicide operations. The presented findings illustrate that ISIS jailors cooperate with media operatives to use, most probably coerced, pre-execution testimony for its propaganda. The current paper also puts forth a number of names and details on ISIS operatives engaged in detaining, torturing, and extorting civilians to supply the terrorist organization with material support. Evidence of the terrorist organization's handling of hostages suggests that they were subjected to various methods of psychological and elaborate physical torture. The category of detainees that ISIS uses as sabaya or sex slaves include the Yazidis captured in Iraq, wives and daughters of captured Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al Nusrah cadres. These women are either sold or given to foreign fighters, ISIS cadres or outsiders or held in detention facilities in both Syria and Iraq. Those held in detention centers are subjected to repeated rapes by ISIS cadres who are given access to them as a reward for service. The report also demonstrates a level of sophistication in the organizational structure and governance of ISIS' prison system and interrogation processes. Based on evidence provided throughout the paper, ISIS has been observed to move its detention facilities when fearing territorial loss. This trend may be informative in reading future movements of the terrorist organization. Alongside ISIS cash reserves and ISIS leadership, the cities of Mayadin and al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor received a significant number of detainees and hostages. The aforementioned indicators suggest the operational significance of the two cities in taking the fight to ISIS. Details: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremists, 2017. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 29, 2017 at: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Year: 2017 Country: Syria URL: http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-prison-system-its-structure-departmental-affiliations-processes-conditions-and-practices-of-psychological-and-physical-torture/ Shelf Number: 146928 Keywords: ISISPrisonersPrisonsTerroristTortureViolent Extremists |
Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Correcting the Course: Advancing Juvenile Justice Principles for Children Convicted of Violent Extremist Offenses Summary: Children have always been among the most vulnerable victims of violence and, at times, some of its brutal purveyors. They have played various roles in furthering violent extremism and participating in acts of violence, ranging from inciting propaganda online to carrying out deadly attacks. Rather than exceptionalizing these children, their treatment under the criminal justice system should be grounded in juvenile justice standards. To advance the work of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the government of Australia commissioned the Global Center and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT) to prepare a report and accompanying policy brief putting forward guiding principles, recommendations, and considerations for the detention, rehabilitation, and reintegration of juveniles convicted of terrorism and violent extremism offenses. Together, they advance a juvenile justice approach for authorities responsible for their care and support the notion that national security interests and juvenile justice imperatives are compatible and mutually reinforcing in preventing and countering violent extremism. Responding to a call from the GCTF Neuchatel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context to collect and collate information on children engaged in terrorism-related activity, the report takes stock of theory, policies, and practice globally. The recommendations draw from international juvenile justice standards, the emerging body of principles and practices in the detention of adult violent extremist offenders, and the national experiences in demobilizing and reintegrating child combatants and members of organized criminal groups. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security; The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2017 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Correcting-the-Course_Global-Center_ICCT.pdf Shelf Number: 147499 Keywords: Child CombatantsCounter-terrorismJuvenile JusticeJuvenile OffendersTerrorismViolent Extremists |
Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism Summary: This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year. The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country. However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL. The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility. More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group. The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals. The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt. The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired. Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can be more difficult to detect. It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD counties is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970. The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns. The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached $14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications. Details: New York: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149443 Keywords: Extremist GroupsLone Wolf TerroristsRadical GroupsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Rushchenko, Julia Title: Prison Management of Terrorism-Related Offenders: Is Separation Effective? Summary: - In the European Union, many states do not have any terrorist prisoners in their jails, and most of the countries house only a handful of terrorism-related offenders. When such prisoners appear in the correctional system, they can have a powerful effect on other inmates. The presence of violent extremist offenders in the criminal justice system generates unique challenges for most states worldwide, and this issue has prompted an ongoing debate concerning the rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, and on the successes and failures of the prison policies. - According to Europol, in recent years there has been an increase in terrorism-related arrests in the UK, France and Spain. The largest proportion of arrests in the EU in 2013- 2015 was linked to Islamist terrorism, compared to smaller numbers of arrests for separatist, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. The phenomenon of returning foreign fighters is yet another concern for criminal justice systems worldwide, including the processes of prosecution and incarceration. In October 2017, the BBC reported that 121 British foreign fighters have been convicted, but little information is available about how exactly inmates with foreign military training are managed in the UK prison system. - British prisons have a long history of coping with terrorists and political and religious extremists. Most recently, the increase in legislative scope and security responses in the wake of 7/7 led to a significant increase in conviction rates for terrorist offences. As of June 2015, there were 182 offenders convicted of, or on remand for, offences linked to terrorism and extremism in prisons in England and Wales, including people who hold neo-Nazi views and Islamist extremists. Current trends of returning foreign fighters suggest that the number of people to be prosecuted is likely to increase. - Most of those who appear to be radicalised in prisons begin their incarceration with not particularly strong religious affiliation. Radicalisation in prisons has been mentioned repeatedly by academics and practitioners as one of the most pressing security concerns, particularly in the context of Islamist ideology. While both prison and probation are supposed to be strong partners in deradicalisation and resettlement, instead of promoting disengagement from violence, these systems frequently facilitate extremism because of the push and pull factors discussed in this report. - Unlike traditional criminals whose illicit activities are often disrupted in prisons, violent extremists might be comfortable with their convictions because of opportunities to preach in correctional institutions. According to an inquiry carried out by Ian Acheson in 2016, Islamist ideology in prisons could be threatening in various ways, including Muslim gang culture, charismatic prisoners acting as self-styled "emirs" and exerting a radicalising influence on Muslim inmates, aggressive encouragement of conversions to Islam, availability of educational materials promoting Islamist extremism, exploitation of staff's fear of being labelled racist, and so on. - Following the above-mentioned inquiry, the government announced its plans to crack down on the spread of Islamist ideology in prisons by creating three "separation centres" (HMP Frankland near Durham, HMP Full Sutton near York and HMP Woodhill in Milton Keynes) which are expected to hold the most subversive offenders, including Michael Adebolajo and Anjem Choudary. As of January 2018, HMP Frankland near Durham has been created, and it is the first time the UK government has practised the policy of separating terrorism-related offenders. - At the same time, most of the mass media coverage of the UK experiment with regard to tackling radicalisation in prisons has been negative and focused on drawing parallels between UK separation centres and Guantanamo Bay, labelling the centres "jihadi jails". One of the main points of criticism revolves around the idea that segregation is counterproductive as it could potentially give an elevated status to the most dangerous extremists and intensify the issue of Islamism in prisons. - Currently, a more balanced and nuanced evaluation of the containment policy is absent from UK discourse. Although there is a risk that a new intervention will generate additional safety concerns, this report argues that separating the most dangerous terrorism-related offenders is the only viable solution for mitigating the threat of prison radicalisation. However, it is crucial to develop a comprehensive policy framework that takes into account the recent dynamics of radicalisation threats, including demographic changes such as gender and age. Details: London: Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/HJS-Prison-Management-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149566 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationIsolationMuslimsRadicalizationRestrictive HousingTerrorist-Related OffendersTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: investigating Ideologically Inspired Violent Extremists: Local Partners Are An Asset. A Case Study of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad Summary: The U.S. Secret Service conducts threat assessment investigations on individuals who come to attention for having a threatening or concerning interest in Secret Service protected interests (e.g., the White House, the Inauguration). A routine part of the investigative process is working within local communities to gather additional information that enhances the assessment of the risk these individuals may pose. Federal investigations into ideologically motivated violent extremists, who are at risk for engaging in targeted violence, can also be enhanced by gathering such community-level information from those who have knowledge about these individuals. These efforts involve working with local law enforcement and other public safety partners to learn more about those under investigation, as well as interviewing others who are familiar with these individuals. Using examples from the case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, this document shares some of the information local agencies and individuals had about his behavior prior to the incident. Muhammad opened fire on two uniformed service members outside the Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, in June 2009. A case summary of Muhammad's life also follows. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Shelf Number: 149672 Keywords: ExtremismHomeland SecuritySecret ServiceThreat AssessmentViolent Extremists |
Author: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Title: Action Agenda on Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali: Gaps, Challenges and Action Plans for the Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders in Prison in Mali Summary: he violent conflict in Mali, initiated in 2012, is complex and continuously evolving: the groups involved include terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour l'Unicite and le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Al Mourabitoune. As the number of extremist detainees has increased due to the country's situation, it is important to consider issues that come along with this: how to deal with violent extremists when they are in prison? What different actors can play a role during this detention time? As most of the detainees will eventually be released, it is also important to take into consideration challenges linked to re-integration. This Action Agenda aims to address a number of these issues by outlining four Action Areas that currently deserve the attention of both national and international actors in order to efficiently deal with problems associated with detaining Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs). In August 2016, UNICRI conducted an assessment mission in Mali to present its programme on Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, developed within the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The presentation was addressed to key national and international stakeholders and aimed to ensure their engagement. From September 2016 onwards, ICCT and UNICRI joined their efforts in Mali on Reintegration and Rehabilitation (R&R) of violent extremists. Three trainings have been jointly organised so far: first, a training on the psychological aspects of violent extremism for prison staff in the Central Prison of Bamako (December 2016); second, a training for religious leaders on radicalisation (April 2017); and third, a training on risk assessment with a special focus on violent extremism for personnel of the National Prison Administration, DNAPES (August 2017). These training workshops have been designed in close consultation with national authorities and international partners, such as the Justice and Correction Section of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA/JCS). Throughout the needs assessment mission and training workshops, and in consultation with different actors on the ground, ICCT and UNICRI have identified four target areas that deserve the attention of both national and international actors, namely (1) increasing awareness of the causes and consequences of violent extremism in the Malian context, (2) intake and risk assessment of violent extremist offenders, (3) empowerment of youth leaders, and (4) disengagement of VEOs through vocational training and engagement of communities through dialogue sessions in prison. These areas will be further discussed below, outlining specific actions recommended to increase capacity building, intensify inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and design and implement an R&R program, all using research to ensure that actions are tailored to local needs and guided by an evidence-based approach. This Action Agenda is composed of three sections: the first briefly discusses the background of the conflict in Mali as well as some of the issues faced in Mali with regards to VEOs in prison. The second section describes the four Action Areas and outlines proposed activities to address concerns and needs identified by ICCT and UNICRI throughout the initiatives implemented by both organisations so far. Finally, next steps and recommendations will be discussed. Details: The Hague: ICCT, 2018. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mali URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mali-Action-Agenda-2.pdf Shelf Number: 150408 Keywords: ExtremistsPrisoner ReintegrationRehabilitationTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: European Police Office - EUROPOL Title: TE-SAT 2018: Terrorism Situation and Trend Report Summary: his 2018 edition of the annual TE-SAT provides an overview of the nature and volume of terrorism that the EU faced in 2017. Although the majority of Member States reported that they did not experience any terrorist attacks during the reporting period, the human suffering and the threat of attacks remains high. In this report you will not only find information about how many terrorist attacks took place in 2017, but also the number of arrests and convictions for terrorist crimes. A brief overview of the terrorist situation outside the EU is also included. In 2017 European countries were again hit by terrorist attacks and there were many innocent victims of this indiscriminate violence. It therefore goes without saying that combatting terrorism remains a top priority for Europol. To fight terrorism, it is essential to have optimal information exchange and accurate data. That is why the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was created in 2007 so that the European Parliament and all national governments and police forces have an overview of the European situation on an annual basis. Since the first report, which gave an overview of the situation in 2006, many things have changed. Although it already appeared that the internet played an important role in the radicalisation of some perpetrators, and terrorists showed a preference for improvised explosive devices, the terrorist landscape has further diversified and the threat has increased. Details: The Hague: INTERPOL, 2018. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018 Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018 Shelf Number: 150610 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Jihadists Security Terrorism Violent Extremists |
Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Dispositif d'intervention sur la radicalisation violente en milieu ouvert : identification des difficultes et des besoins des professionnels des SPIP, aide a l'adaptation des pratiques Summary: The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) carried out a research-action over 18 months in collaboration with the French Penitentiary Administration (DAP) in order to develop an intervention response for individuals who have been radicalized or are in the process of radicalization within the Penitentiary Services for Integration and Probation (SPIP) within the probation system. This project was developed in three pilot sites: Grenoble, Lyon and Nice. This "intervention response" is understood as a set of actions and initiatives implemented at the institutional level to counter violent radicalization, namely: - A decision-making support system in the process of identifying and reporting individuals who have been or are being radicalized. For this purpose, the following products were developed by the research-action: - An Identification and Reporting Protocol for individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence, and - A Semi-Structured Interview Guide for the Identification of individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence. - A support system for individuals who are at risk or are already radicalized. For this component, three different actions were developed: - Two collective actions, one of which is primary-secondary prevention (Vivre Ensemble) and the other is secondary-tertiary prevention (CODE), as well as - An individual program for the prevention of recidivism (Accordeon). This research-action is a world first. Never has a project of such magnitude been implemented within the probation system. Violent radicalization although very popular remains very difficult to apprehend. This is the reason why this research-action is quite unique considering its very great ambition that is to think of and create identification and support procedures and methods. This Report is aiming to present the work achieved from July 4, 2016 to December 31, 2017, by pilot research units (mainly professionals of the Ministry of Justice and the ICPC) in the framework of the project: "Intervention response to violent radicalization within the probation system: identifying the challenges and the needs of the SPIPs professionals, and support to adapt practices". This report describes the methodology used, developed products, the results of the process evaluation and the impact of this approach as well as the actions implemented. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2018 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Year: 2018 Country: France URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Shelf Number: 150761 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsExtremist ViolencePrisonersProbationersRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Nemr, Christina Title: It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism Summary: This report examines the role of civil society organisation (CSOs) in the rehabilitation and reintegration of those associated with and affected by violent extremism. It builds on the work conducted by ICCT and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, together with four subregional partners over the past two-and-a-half years in Africa and South-East Asia. The project aimed to first understand how CSOs work within their communities and with their governments to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, victims of violence, and affected communities. It then supported the work of select CSOs by facilitating small grants to bolster existing efforts or pilot innovative approaches. The findings and lessons learned from the project have culminated in the development of this action agenda, which provides policy and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders working on rehabilitation and reintegration and the role of CSOs in supporting that process. The project focused on three regions: the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). While each region has its own rich experiences and unique challenges, there are overarching lessons that emerged-lessons that are applicable to a variety of rehabilitation and reintegration contexts. The action agenda therefore is not divided by region but, rather, by themes and the audiences to whom the recommendations are directed. Overall, the report consists of six guiding principles and 10 recommendations targeted to a range of audiences. Each guiding principle and recommendation is followed by examples that illustrate the ways a recommendation has been put into practice or offer suggestions for implementing a given recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151328 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering Violent ExtremismRadical GroupsTerrorist RehabilitationTerroristsViolent ExtremismViolent Extremists |
Author: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Title: The Use of Social Media by United States Extremists Summary: Emerging communication technologies, and social media platforms in particular, play an increasingly important role in the radicalization and mobilization processes of violent and non-violent extremists (Archetti, 2015; Cohen et al., 2014; Farwell, 2014; Klausen, 2015). However, the extent to which extremists utilize social media, and whether it influences terrorist outcomes, is still not well understood (Conway, 2017). This research brief expands the current knowledge base by leveraging newly collected data on the social media activities of 479 extremists in the PIRUS dataset who radicalized between 2005 and 2016. This includes descriptive analyses of the frequency of social media usage among U.S. extremists, the types of social media platforms used, the differences in the rates of social media use by ideology and group membership, the purposes of social media use, and the impact of social media on foreign fighter travel and domestic terrorism plots. Details: College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2018. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2018 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_ResearchBrief_July2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/use-social-media-united-states-extremists Shelf Number: 153342 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Plot Electronic Communication Extremists Foreign Fighters Ideological Motivations Ideology Non-violent Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremists |
Author: Morton, Jesse Title: When Terrorists Come Home: The Need for Rehabilitating and Reintegrating America's Convicted Jihadists Summary: The United States Government (USG) has prosecuted more than 400 jihadist terrorists since 9/11. While several of those convicted will spend the rest of their lives in prison, the overwhelming majority will one day re-enter society. In fact, over the next five years, nearly a quarter of the United States' terror convicts will complete their terms of imprisonment. Moreover, since the average age of those charged with ISIS-related crimes is only 27, they will be released back into American society with a long life to live. This raises a critical and little examined question regarding U.S. counterterrorism strategy: what is being done in U.S. prisons to prepare this growing and unique segment of the prison population for re-entry into society? To further complicate the scenario, these individuals, who were at violent odds with American society, will face the complex process of reintegrating against the strong headwinds of extraordinarily high recidivism rates for those that were previously imprisoned. A 2016 United States Sentencing Commission study calculated that federal prisoners have a 44.7 percent re-arrest rate after five years. At 76.6 percent, that number is much higher for state prisoners. While the re-offender rate for violent extremist offenders appears to be much lower, it is worth considering that, in 2010, the Director of National Intelligence assessed that approximately 20 percent of former Guantanamo Bay detainees were suspected of re-engaging in terrorist or insurgent activities, a figure confirmed by the Obama administration. Thus, the recidivism rate among violent extremist offenders within the U.S. is unlikely to be zero. And, if terrorists go back to their original activity after prison, the damage they could to do is likely to be much higher than by ordinary offenders. While several programs for violent extremists have emerged across the globe in the last few years, to date, there exists no formal national rehabilitation and re-entry program for convicted terrorists in the United States and little, if any, developed infrastructure to support individuals upon their release. Rather, analysts have suggested that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has "been content to apply whatever programs it has in place for the general criminal population to the population of terrorism-related convicts." This scenario invites at least a few questions: should the United States be doing more to rehabilitate violent extremists and prepare them for re-entry? After all, there are domestic re-entry programs for gang members both during their imprisonment and post-release; they arguably pose less of a threat to society than former terrorists, yet there are no programs in place for terrorists. If so, what might be implemented? With many already released and many more to follow, how does the United States prepare for the day convicted terrorism-related offenders return to the streets of America? Details: New York: Counter Extremism Project, 2018. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 9, 2019 at: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Report_When%20Terrorists%20Come%20Home_120618.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Report_When%20Terrorists%20Come%20Home_120618.pdf Shelf Number: 154063 Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism Counterterrorism Guantanamo Bay ISIS-related Crimes Jihadists Recidivism Rates Rehabilitation Terrorism-Related Convicts Terrorists Violent Extremists |
Author: Conway, Maura Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online in 2018: The Year in Review Summary: This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 December 2017 to 30 November 2018.1 It is divided into three parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of violent jihadis, particularly the so-called 'Islamic State' (hereafter IS); Part II supplies information on contemporary extreme right online activity; and Part III identifies issues in the violent extremism and terrorism online realm that bear watching in 2019. In terms of overarching trends, the focus of policymakers, internet companies, media, and thus also publics has, since 2014, been almost exclusively on IS's online activity. A growing concern with extreme right activity, both its online and offline variants, began to be apparent in 2017 however, especially in the wake of events in Charlottesville. This solidified in 2018 due to a number of factors, including a decrease in IS terrorist attacks in the West and an uptick in extreme right and hate attacks and terrorist events, a number of the latter of which appeared to have significant online components. Having said this, IS is still active on the ground in numerous locales globally and continues to produce and widely disseminate online content, as do a large number of other groups that share core tenets of its ideology. IS may be down therefore, but it is certainly not out. Details: Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE), 2019. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2019 at: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Year-in-Review-2018.pdf Shelf Number: 154690 Keywords: Internet CrimesIslamic State Jihadism Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |
Author: Nemr, Christina Title: Integrative Complexity Interventions to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism Summary: The body of literature on violent extremism has established that several key economic, social, and political drivers of violence and conflict are equally applicable to terrorism-related violence. Corrupt governance, human rights abuses, inequality, and marginalization are just a few of the grievances that can fuel support for violent extremism. These fall into the category of structural drivers, requiring state-level policy action to make an impact on broad trends of conflict and violence. These structural drivers are often intertwined with individual-level vulnerability factors, such as a desire for belonging, a search for identity, or demands for quick answers to issues of injustice and inequality. Under these circumstances, individuals can be drawn to easy, black-and-white answers that seem to offer simplicity, clarity, and certainty. Unfortunately, a hallmark of violent extremist ideologies is this binary thinking, stripped of complexity and with an identifiable in-group/out-group dynamic that offers a sense of community and belonging and helps people make sense of the world. The various structural and individual drivers of violent extremism and their interaction merit a range of responses, of which there have been numerous during the preceding decade. Yet, programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) continue to lack rigor, precision, and adequate evaluation. These efforts are notoriously difficult to evaluate because of challenges inherent to measuring the absence of what is be prevented, such as extremist activity or violence. Furthermore, ambiguities concerning what constitutes violent extremism, what works to counter it, and what are the merits of doing so have hampered rigorous appraisals of P/CVE intervention and program effectiveness. With a few notable exceptions, this has resulted in a field based largely on anecdotes and assumptions in lieu of empirical research and practice. To increase and add to the knowledge base of empirical research and practice in the P/CVE field, this brief explores a construct from the field of psychology that offers practitioners and policymakers a tested and validated measurement and intervention that has been applied to prevent and counter violent extremism. This psychological construct is known as integrative complexity (IC). Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2019. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: accessed May 15, 2019 at: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/GCCS-PB-IC-Interventions-Prevent-Counter-Violent-Extremism-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/GCCS-PB-IC-Interventions-Prevent-Counter-Violent-Extremism-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155838 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |
Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Overview of the Far-Right Summary: This paper provides readers with an overview of the far-right in the UK. It covers the various ideological strains that inhabit the far-right space (broadly interpreted) as well as some of their different aims and objectives. The paper finishes by setting out some of the available indicators of the scale of far-right support in the UK. Details: Lancaster, United Kingdom: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, Lancaster University, 2018 Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2019 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overview-of-the-far-right Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816692/Ben_Lee_-_Overview_of_the_far_right.pdf?_ga=2.16690622.944050908.1566684102-2006361964.1565550813 Shelf Number: 157046 Keywords: Extremists Far-Right Violent Extremism Violent Extremists |