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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:54 am
Time: 12:54 am
Results for warlords
3 results foundAuthor: Isacson, Adam Title: Consolidating "Consolidation": Columbia's "security and development" zones await a civilian handoff, while Washington backs away from the concept Summary: Colombia's government is negotiating peace with the country's largest and oldest guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). If the talks succeed- a strong possibility - Colombia faces a big question: what will be different in the vast territories where the guerrillas have been in control, or operated freely, for decades? In these areas, violence, drug trafficking, and warlordism have long been the norm, and the government's presence has been virtually nonexistent. If the government does not establish itself in these jungles, mountains, plains, coasts, and borderlands, the FARC's negotiated end will make little difference; illegality and violence will continue to fill the vacuum. Colombia must follow a successful negotiation with getting the government into the country's ungoverned zones. And not just military occupiers: a real, civilian state whose members provide basic services, operate without impunity, and thus enjoy the population's support. Will Colombia be able to fill the vacuum and end the cycle of violence? As WOLA's new report Consolidating "Consolidation" describes, the record of the National Territorial Consolidation Plan - a five-year-old program with that very goal - should worry us that it might not. Backed by at least half a billion dollars in U.S. assistance, this ambitious program seeks to bring the government into several areas of the country with histories of illegal armed groups, violence, drug trafficking, and statelessness. (It is often called the "La Macarena" program, after the southern Colombian zone where the most advanced pilot project has taken place.) Today, while "Consolidation" has brought security improvements and more soldiers and police to a few territories, the governance vacuum remains far from filled. In the Consolidation zones, armed groups remain very active, especially outside of town centers. Soldiers are by far the most commonly seen government representatives, and the civilian parts of the government - such as health services, education, agriculture, road-builders, land-titlers, judges, and prosecutors - are lagging very far behind. In Consolidating "Consolidation," WOLA sought to identify the reasons why the Consolidation program's military-to-civilian transfer has stalled. Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy Adam Isacson found that while the U.S. and Colombian governments underestimated the difficulty of achieving security and the cost of "state-building," much of the blame lies with civilian government agencies themselves, most of which have been very reluctant to set up a presence in Consolidation zones. But we found something even more serious: the entire Consolidation model is losing momentum quickly and may have begun to deteriorate. Based on dozens of interviews and a very close read of available evidence, Consolidating "Consolidation" portrays a program lacking interest and backing at high levels of government. What was once a showcase program stagnated during a year and a half-long "rethinking," followed by several months of infighting that culminated in the sudden exit of the program's director. Meanwhile, in places like Afghanistan, the United States is edging away from similar missions, which it calls "Stability Operations," that sought to provide basic services to citizens in ungoverned areas. Instead, U.S. forces are relying more on Special Forces operations and drone strikes. Programs continue in Consolidation zones in Colombia, thanks in great part to US$227 million in USAID contracts awarded since 2010. But Consolidation, which once promised to bring a functioning government to areas that never had one, may be on its way to becoming a politically driven handout program attached to an open-ended military occupation. If Consolidation fades away, the report warns, it is not clear what will replace it in Colombia's neglected territories. As Colombia faces the possibility of peace in zones of historic guerrilla control, it is crucial that a plan be in place to prevent a re-emergence of violence. If the peace talks succeed, for a brief period Colombia will have a window of opportunity to bring the government to areas that have long generated violence, bringing their citizens into national civic and economic life for the first time. The National Territorial Consolidation Plan could offer a way to do this, but only if it returns to its initial vision of a phased, coordinated entry of civilian government. If this scheme, or something like it, is to succeed, it will require political will from the highest levels to ensure that the civilians take over as quickly as security conditions allow. And it will require a renewed - but far more civilian-centered - commitment from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Shelf Number: 136802 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolenceWarlords |
Author: Cockayne, James Title: Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime: Sicily, New York and the Caribbean, 1859- 1968, and Mexico and the Sahel. Summary: Criminologists have long recognized that some groups govern criminal markets. Strategists and political scientists, however, downplay the role organized crime plays in domestic and international politics - though the United Nations Security Council, World Bank and White House have warned that role may be growing. The assumption has been that states and insurgents exist in a political 'upperworld' while organized crime exists in a separate, profit-driven 'underworld'. We consequently lack a framework for understanding the strategic logic of organized crime: how it uses force, and other means, to compete, cooperate and collaborate with states and other political organizations for governmental power. This dissertation develops such a framework, drawing on strategic theory, criminology, and economic and management theory. It applies the framework to the emergence, development and movement of mafias in Sicily, New York, and the Caribbean between 1859 and 1968. Using unpublished judicial, intelligence and diplomatic material, mafia memoires, and published secondary sources, the dissertation reveals mafias becoming autonomous strategic actors in both domestic and international politics. They deliberately influenced elections, organized domestic insurgency and transnational armed attacks, attempted regime change, and formed governmental joint ventures with ruling groups. Mafias played important and unappreciated military and political roles during the Second World War, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Based on this historical analysis, the dissertation identifies six ways criminal groups position themselves in the 'market for government'. These positioning strategies help explain the emergence and behaviours of mafias, warlords and gang rulers; political-criminal alliances; acts of terrorism by criminal groups; and criminal sponsorship of new political structures ('blue ocean' strategy). The final section applies these concepts to two contemporary cases - Mexico and the Sahel - and considers the overall implications for strategic theory, efforts to combat organized crime and the management of criminal spoilers in peace processes. Details: London: King's College London, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/44634722/2015_Cockayne_James_1018212_ethesis.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/44634722/2015_Cockayne_James_1018212_ethesis.pdf Shelf Number: 140599 Keywords: Criminal NetworksGangsMafiaOrganized CrimeWarlords |
Author: The Sentry Title: Fear, Inc. War War Profiteering in the Central African Republic and the Bloody Rise of Abdoulaye Hissene Summary: Since 2013, the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) has repeatedly made international headlines, with alarms being raised over the escalating violence and even precursors to genocide in the country. Ethnic purges and other mass atrocities continue to take place on a near-daily basis against entire communities. A great, but unknown, number of civilians have died in the conflict and the instability has led to a major humanitarian crisis. In May 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that an unprecedented 1.27 million people have been internally displaced or forced to flee the country. Over the past 20 years, there have been a growing number of initiatives aimed at ending the CAR conflict, but these have had little impact. The country has seen a series of peace, disarmament and amnesty agreements; long-term UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance; foreign military operations; and elections. Billions of dollars have been spent in an attempt to restore stability and compensate for the lack of state control. Since 2014, the UN mission in CAR, also known as MINUSCA, has cost more than $3.2 billion. The European Union, a long-term and major development partner in CAR, has also disbursed nearly $200 million during the same period. Despite these efforts, the various mediation initiatives have failed to obtain a political compromise sufficient to manage the simple respect of a ceasefire. Today, there are multiple armed gangs, self-defense and politico military groups that control or exercise influence across the entire national territory. Worse yet, the perpetrators of atrocities are recognized by regional and international actors as legitimate political interlocutors with whom dialogue is necessary and peace must be negotiated. In August 2018 the African Union announced the end of a series of meetings with representatives of 14 armed groups to record their claims, even though some of the leaders have been placed under sanctions by the United Nations (UN) and the United-States (US). The African Union presented a list of more than 100 demands made by armed groups, including power sharing and amnesty. At the same time, a parallel dialogue was initiated by the Russian government, which invited to Khartoum the military leaders of the most violent armed groups active in the CAR conflict for almost a decade. Today, these so-called dialogues aimed at ending the deadly war have been captured by the agenda of perpetrators of mass atrocities who have shown no intention of making peace. Between 2016 and 2018, The Sentry investigated one such armed group representative, Abdoulaye Hissene, a notorious warlord involved in CAR's conflict for almost a decade. Formerly a diamond and gold trader, and since 2009 the leader of various politico-military groups, Hissene has been recognized as being responsible for an attempted coup in late 2015 and for targeted violence against UN and humanitarian staff. Since 2017, the United States, then followed by the full UN Security Council, have decided to impose sanctions through an asset freeze and travel ban. Chad announced it had implemented these sanctions, and the CAR government issued an international arrest warrant for him in 2016. Despite these measures and several attempts to arrest him, he remains a free man. The Sentry's investigation also reveals that Hissene has been successful building a profitable business and even since he has been under sanctions. He has amassed a fortune out of devastating sectarian violence. By inciting hatred and sowing divisions between ethnic and religious communities, he has gradually become a central player in the country's conflict. Hissene's rise has been possible thanks to strong ties he has developed over time with national and regional heads of state, their close allies, and with foreign business partners. In 2014, amid the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in CAR, Hissene enjoyed diplomatic status and traveled abroad, notably to Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Chad, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and France. During these travels, he expanded his list of partners and created lucrative business opportunities. At the end of 2014, after being fired from office and formally joining the armed opposition movement, he declared to the Chadian and Congolese heads of state that "what we want is to destroy everything to rebuild the country." He also convinced a Swiss oil company that he would be able to secure an oil contract with the Chadian national oil petroleum company. Acting as a "minister" and a leader of armed groups, and advertising his control of rich mining sites, Hissene has also developed an illicit trade in diamond and gold, particularly in Cameroon and in Kenya. Hissene's rise illustrates a violent system endemic in CAR, and similar to other countries in east and central Africa, that incentivizes conflict over peace. War profiteers and their allies hamper political and peace efforts, since conflict and state collapse are seen as lucrative business and smart politics. Sectarian violence is used as a political negotiation tool and actors who chose to pursue peace are largely kept out of negotiations. In this system, the greater the perpetrators of atrocities and their accomplices represent a threat to the central power, the more they will become essential political interlocutors and increase their financial gain. In 2015, the UN Security Council took a strong step when It decided to impose sanctions on a diamond company, Badica/Kardiam, accused of financing armed groups at the peak of the 2014 crisis. Despite this positive step, no other entities or businessmen faced any consequences for their role in the financing of the deadly conflict. By focusing on Hissene to illustrate war profiteering, this report calls for an in-depth reassessment of the strategy to support the emergence of CAR from its crisis. As long as violence is profitable for those behind the atrocities and their business networks both inside and outside the country, long-term peace in CAR and the rest of the Central African region will remain an illusion. It is time to send a strong signal to war profiteers so that their crimes will be less lucrative and bear increasingly costly consequences. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentry, 2018. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2018 at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FearInc_TheSentry_Nov2018-web.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Central African Republic URL: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/FearInc_TheSentry_Nov2018-web.pdf Shelf Number: 153409 Keywords: GangsGenocideIllicit TradeProfiteeringViolenceViolent ConflictWarlords |