94 N.J.L.J. 44
January 21, 1971
OPINION 194
Conflict of Interest
Representing Client and
Witnesses Against Him
The inquirer states that he formerly represented an out-of-
state insurance company in the defense of negligence claims against
its policyholders in New Jersey. The company was placed in
receivership in its state and, under a reinsurance treaty between
it and another company, this second company has assumed and is
defending the actions. The inquirer is now representing the second
company.
The former president and secretary of the insolvent company
have been indicted by a federal grand jury for S.E.C. violations
and mail fraud. The inquirer has been retained by the former
secretary to defend him in the criminal action. The latter is
familiar with the fact that counsel is defending claims for the
second insurance company.
In the course of discovery proceedings in the criminal case,
it has been revealed that certain officers of the insolvent
company, who now are officers of the second insurance company, were
the main witnesses against the inquirer's client during the grand
jury proceedings and presumably will be witnesses for the
government when the case goes to trial. The attorney inquires
whether he is exposing himself to a conflict of interest charge in
representing the former secretary while representing the present
company, whose officers will be testifying against his client. He
has advised them of his representation of the former secretary,
who, as noted above, is already aware of the attorney's continued
representation of the second insurance company.
We said, in Opinion 42, 87 N.J.L.J. 285 (1964), that a lawyer
should never accept a retainer where his position may be adverse to
that of a former client, without taking extreme care to make
certain that the new matter is one which will not affect in any way
any confidential information that he may have obtained in his
former relationship. In his former representation of the insolvent
insurance company in the defense of negligence claims, the inquirer
says that he obtained no confidential information with respect to
the inner workings of that company, nor any information relating to
the alleged S.E.C. or mail fraud violations.
This is not such a situation as was present in our Opinion 57,
87 N.J.L.J. 737 (1964), where we found that a conflict did exist
when an attorney who had represented a husband in connection with
difficulties with his wife was a partner in a law firm which
thereafter proposed to defend a suit brought by the wife as a
result of the wrongful death of the husband, with whom she had
become reconciled. We said there that the one partner might have
obtained information in his representation of the husband which
could be used against the wife in the death case in order to prove
that the marital relationship between the parties had been a stormy
one, thus perhaps limiting the amount of damages which she could
recover. Nor is this a case of suing a former client in an
unrelated matter, which we dealt with in Opinion 154, 92 N.J.L.J.
353 (1969), where we said that a lawyer may bring suit against a
former client if the representation of the former client has ended
and the matter does not involve confidential communications.
Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) 112.
As we noted above, counsel points out that both his client
(the former secretary) and the other defendant (the former
president of the involvent insurance company) are completely aware
of his relationship with the new company but that, nevertheless,
his client insists that he continue to represent him. And, the new
company is also aware of the situation.
It seems to us that Canons of Professional Ethics, Canons 6
and 37 are involved in this problem, the first having to do with
conflicting interest and the second with confidences of a client.
Canon 6 is not violated because there has been a complete
disclosure of the situation to the client (the former secretary).
It seems clear that Canon 37 has not been violated because there
are no confidences which this attorney obtained which could
adversely affect his representation of the defendant in the
criminal case nor his continued representation of the new insurance
company in the defense of the negligence action.
We, therefore, conclude that counsel may continue to represent
the former secretary of the company in connection with the federal
indictment.