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94 N.J.L.J. 65
February 4, 1971
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Appointed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
OPINION 196
Conflict of Interest
Attorney Representing Law Enforcement
Agency and Many Accused of Crime
The Supreme Court has directed this Committee to consider and
report to it on the following questions:
1. May an attorney regularly engaged in the defense of those
accused of criminal acts also serve as attorney for organizations
of law enforcement officials?
2. May an attorney regularly engaged in defense of those
accused of criminal acts generally associated with organized or
syndicated crime also serve as attorney for organizations of law
enforcement officials?
In order to aid the Committee in considering these problems,
the Supreme court requested any member of the bar desiring to
comment on them to submit a written memorandum to the Committee.
Several such memoranda were received by the attorneys whose
representation of the law enforcement agency is involved, and all
were considered in arriving at its conclusions.
Since the Committee has arrived at the decision that question
1 should be answered in the negative, we think it unnecessary to
make any decision regarding question 2, as the answer to that is
encompassed in our conclusions as to the first query.
The facts that brought this matter to the attention of the
Supreme Court were that the attorneys in question were retained by
a law enforcement group and that these attorneys are almost
continuously engaged in the state and federal courts in the
representation of persons accused of those types of crime which
generally are referred to in the public press as being controlled
by organized or syndicated groups. An examination of the court
records discloses that in recent years these attorneys have
represented numerous persons whose names, rightly or wrongly, have
been associated in the public press with organized or syndicated
crime, and some of whom have been stated to be leaders of some of
these groups.
Counsel involved in this case contend that, even if this be
so, their representation of the law enforcement group does not
create a conflict of interest, and they argue that Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 6 has not been violated. They contend
that the worst that could happen would be that they could be
representing a member of the law enforcement group as a defendant
in a criminal proceeding in which another member of the same group
would be the principal witness against the defendant. But, they
say, this does not create a conflict since both members of the
organization are aware of the situation.
We need not decide whether such a situation creates a conflict
and violates Canon 6. It does create a situation where the public
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that some
advantage will not accrue to the defendant as a result of this
relationship between the attorney and the defendant and his
representation of all of the members of the group, including the
witness testifying against the defendant.
While counsel states that his representation is of the
organization, rather than the individuals, it is clear that it is
the representation of the individuals comprising the group which is
the important factor involved. For example, in the letter written
by counsel to the president of the organization in question,
counsel advises the members, among other things, that they should,
upon being approached by any officer, agent or inspector, demand
the opportunity to call an attorney; refuse to answer any questions
until they have been afforded an opportunity to consult with an
attorney and that attorney is present; insist upon the postponement
of any proceeding until they can consult with an attorney; and
demand to know the nature of the investigation so that the
information can be conveyed to counsel. In the letter written by
the executive board of the organization to its members, the name of
the law firm in question is mentioned and it is stated "A member of
the firm will accompany any ... member called for questioning
whether he is called as a witness or the subject of an
investigation if the member so desires." A copy of counsel's letter
to the president, excerpts from which we have just cited,
accompanied this letter from the executive board. Certainly, it was
not intended that counsel, under these circumstances, would not
represent the members of the organization in any situation which
arose.
Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 35, which permits a
lawyer to accept employment from a trade organization, association
or group, says that he shall render legal services to the
organization as an entity, "but this employment should not include
the rendering of legal services to the members of such an
organization in respect to their individual affairs."
It cannot be denied that representation as contemplated by
counsel could in many situations give the appearance of
impropriety. As the Supreme court said in In re Abrams, 56 N.J.
271, 277 (1970), "Appearances too are a matter of ethical concern,
for the public has an interest in the repute of the legal
profession."
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the
American Bar Association (1969), it is stated in DR 7-104 that in
his representation of a client the lawyer shall not communicate
with one having an adverse interest. In the example cited above,
where one organization member is a defendant and the proposed
witness against him is another member of the same organization, the
opportunity, if not the temptation, to communicate with the witness
- who under the circumstances would have an adverse interest -
would be difficult to resist. And, even if resisted, the
appearances inevitably would lead to inferences of wrongdoing.
Much of what we have said in Opinion 113, 90 N.J.L.J. 473
(1967), is apropos here. There, we held with respect to a law
enforcement organization (not the same involved in this case) that:
The real ethical problem is created once the
attorney representing the P.B.A. and its members,
directly or indirectly, appears in court representing
either defendants on complaints made by the police
officer, or complainants where the police officer is
called as a witness for the complainant. In the minds of
some, and outspoken in others, will always be the belief
that success in the trial was achieved by unfair help and
assistance from the police officer and the P.B.A.
Here, the attorneys regularly represent persons accused of crime in
both the state and federal courts. This being so, it is impossible
to believe that their representation of an organization composed of
law enforcement officers could do other than give rise to the
belief in the minds of the general public that the administration
of justice was in some way being compromised.
A lawyer is admonished in Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon
29, "at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity
of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice." Lawyers should also conduct themselves
in such a way as to improve the confidence of the community in the
administration of justice and government.
Counsel has cited for our consideration United Mine Workers v.
Illinois Bar Asso., 389 U.S. 217, 19 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1967);
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 89
(1964); and N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405
(1963), for the proposition that unions or other organizations have
the right to hire attorneys to represent their members. We have
considered these cases, but the holdings therein are not, in our
opinion, in conflict with the conclusions herein stated.
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