86 N.J.L.J. 713
December 19, 1963
OPINION 1
Confidential Communications
Substitution Of Attorney
A client employed a lawyer to represent him in the collection
of a number of accounts receivable. Suits to collect were
instituted in the name of a close member of the client's family,
who as also a business associate, as assignee. The assignment of
the claims was without consideration and made only for the
convenience of the assignor with a view to the institution of suits
in the name of the assignee instead of in the name of the assignor.
Many claims were reduced to judgment, and all judgments and
collections were considered the property of the assignor.
The lawyer, who no longer represents the assignor, has
received a request from another lawyer, who represents the
assignee, for information as to certain of the various suits,
judgments and collections. The former lawyer for the assignee has
not advised the assignor of such request, nor obtained his consent
to the furnishing of the requested information.
Following this initial request, the former lawyer for the
assignee received a further request from another lawyer
representing the assignee in one of the collection matters which
apparently had not been referred by the assignee to his first
attorney, indicating that the assignee had been served as a
defendant in a foreclosure suit against the property of the
defendant in the original collection suit and requesting a
substitution of attorney.
The former attorney for the assignor wishes to know whether,
under the circumstances, the furnishing of the requested
information and the giving of the requested substitution of
attorney are ethically proper.
Confidential communications between an attorney and his
client, made because of the relationship and concerning the
subject-matter of the attorney's employment, are generally
privileged from disclosure without the consent of the client, and
this privilege outlasts the attorney's employment. A.B.A. Model
Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 37; A.B.A. Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion 154 (1957); Drinker,
Legal Ethics 131 (1953). The rule applies only where the
communications by the client were made under circumstances clearly
indicating that they were intended to be confidential. Drinker,
Legal Ethics 135 (1953). Nevertheless a communication must be
regarded as confidential where it possibly is so, although it is
not entirely clear that the relations exist. Id. at 134.
It does not appear here whether the information requested by
the assignee's first attorney involves confidential Communications
between the assignor and his former attorney or was acquired by the
attorney in confidence. Since his representation of the assignor
in a variety of collection matters may well have involved
confidential communications, it would not be ethically proper for
him to comply with the request of the assignee's attorney without
informing the assignor of such request and obtaining his consent to
comply with the request, unless, of course, it became clear that
compliance with the request did not involve violation of the rule
prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications.
Should it become impossible to advise the assignor of the
request or to obtain his consent, his former attorney would still
not be justified in complying with the request unless it was clear
that compliance with the request did not involve violation of the
rule prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications and
he ascertained and was satisfied that there was good cause for the
request. As to the giving of the requested substitution of attorney
to the assignee's second attorney, since the assignee had no
beneficial interest in the assignment and was acting as such only
for the accommodation of the assignor, it is not ethically proper
for the assignor's former attorney to give the requested
substitution of attorney without the knowledge and consent of the
assignor. See A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
Canons 7 and 22; A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Opinions 10, 149 and 209 (1957).