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95 N.J.L.J. 1145
November 9, 1972
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
OPINION 243
Conflict of Interest
Representing Mortgagor and
Mortgagee Representing Vendor and Vendee
An attorney asks this Committee what would constitute full
disclosure of potential conflict of interest positions in which he
might find himself if he represents, for example, the lender and
borrower in a mortgage transaction or the purchaser and seller in
a real estate transaction. The attorney has proposed forms of
letters, of disclosure which might be written prior to embarking
upon such representation, in an endeavor to apprise the prospective
clients of the possible conflicts which might arise. Twelve
possible conflict situations are suggested by the inquirer in a
proposed form of letter. One might conceive of other possible
situations. However, we believe that any such form letters would
prove more confusing than helpful to an uninformed layman.
In considering the problem, the bar has for guidance the
Supreme Court's opinion in In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588 (1963), in
which, the Court cited the Canon of Professional Ethics, Canon 6
then part of our court rules, and pointed out that an attorney who
primarily represented a vendor of realty as, well as the purchaser,
without disclosing such fact to the purchaser, violated the canon.
The Court stated that the fact that there had existed in that
transaction no situation which cast doubt upon the advisability of
the purchaser accepting title did not exculpate the attorney. At
page 596, the Court pointed out that, where the same attorney
represents the purchaser of real estate and also the party
financing the transaction (such as a bank or savings and loan
association), to the extent that both parties seek a marketable
title there is no conflict of interest, but that a conflict might
arise concerning the terms of financing and, therefore, it was, the
duty of the attorney to make clear to the purchaser the potential
area of conflict.
Canon 6 is now superseded by the Disciplinary Rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by our Supreme Court
and now part of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New
Jersey. DR 5-105(C) provides that a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if he believes that he can adequately represent the
interests of each and if each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the facts and of the possible effect of such
representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each.
It seems clear that there is a greater potential danger in the
representation by an attorney of a buyer and a seller in a real
estate transaction than there is in his representing a lender and
a borrower. In the latter transaction, as noted in In re Kamp,
supra, each side seeks a clear and marketable title and, therefore,
there can be no conflict on that score. The attorney representing
the lending institution is concerned that there be no possible
cloud on the title and, hence, he is equally protecting both
parties.
With respect to the terms of the financing arrangement between
the lending institution and the borrower - the inquirer concerns
himself principally with this type of representation, although
obviously the same situation might arise between a private lender
and a borrower - the attorney rarely enters the picture until these
are resolved and they generally are specifically set forth in a
letter sent to the borrower by the lending institution. In re Kamp,
supra. The borrower is asked to sign a copy of the letter approving
the terms and return it to the lending institution. The provisions
of the mortgage and the note or bond will be in accordance with the
commitment for the loan originally sent to the borrower.
It is true that at this stage of the proceedings, where the
borrower is represented by the lender's counsel, the latter, in
drawing the mortgage and note or bonds could depart from the terms
of the commitment to the detriment of the borrower, but this is an
unlikely situation. Mortgagors are now given protection by statute
against such things as being improperly charged without their
consent for obtaining a loan, improper prepayment provisions,
changes in interest rate, etc. N.J.S.A. 46:10A and 46:lOB. These
statutes contain penal provisions. See, also, Federal Reserve
Regulation Z, where, under certain circumstances, copies of
mortgages, notes and other incitements evidencing indebtedness are
required to be given to the borrower.
While we believe that the better practice would be to have the
borrower separately represented practical consideration must be
given to the cost of one attorney for the borrower, rather than
two, and the fact that in protecting the lender the attorney will
also protect the borrower. The possible conflict of interest
situation weighed in that frame of reference is so minimal as not
to require us to find it unethical. An attorney for a lending
institution may represent both the institution and the borrower,
providing, of course, that he makes it plain to the borrower that
he is representing the lender also and that, if an unforeseen
conflict does arise, he will advise the borrower so that the latter
can then obtain his own attorney.
As DR 5-105(C) states, the attorney in each case first must
decide that he can properly exercise his independent professional
judgment on behalf of both sides of the transaction. DR 5-105(A),
in referring to when a lawyer should decline employment, says that
he must do so if his independent professional judgment "will be or
is likely to be adversely affected." Paragraph (C) of that rule
uses the language that the lawyer may represent multiple clients
"if he believes that he can adequately represent the interests of
each." Therefore, it is a judgment to be made by each attorney as
the situation arises, and any attempt by this Committee to
promulgate guidelines would be presumptuous and raise the inference
that lawyers could not be trusted to make proper decisions under DR
5-105. Lawyers have been put on notice by the Kamp case and by
decisions of this Committee that they cannot with impunity
represent obviously conflicting positions.
It seems to us that this Committee should not suggest or
approve any form of letter from attorney to client but that it
should be left to each individual attorney to make clear to the
client that he is representing both parties.
The inquirer also asks whether the situation would be
different if the attorney for the lending institution were also one
of its directors. We think not. While as a director he might pass
upon the loan and its terms, his responsibilities as an attorney
are entirely different. See our Opinion 229, 95 N.J.L.J. 81 (1972).
We do conclude, however, that one attorney should not
represent both parties in connection with the preparation and
execution of a contract of sale. Generally, it is at this stage of
negotiations for the sale of property that a buyer and a seller
have their greatest difficulties. Their interests are in conflict
if for no other reason than the buyer wishes to obtain the property
as cheaply as possible and the seller wishes to get the highest
price. At this juncture, also, there can and frequently do arise
disputes concerning fixtures to be left in the premises, assumption
of mortgages, mortgage contingencies, and other matters in which
there can be serious disagreements, in all of which the interests
of the buyer and seller will be diametrically opposed.
There are many reported cases which illustrate these problems
and we cite but two, Winter v. Toldt, 32 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div.
l954), and Clark v. Jelsma, 40 N.J. Super. 58 (App. Div. 1955).
While these are both suits by real estate brokers, they provide
examples of disputes between parties as to the provisions of a
contract of sale.
Further difficulties are presented if the same attorney tries
to represent both parties at the closing, where there may be
disputes about the changed condition of the property between the
date of the contract of sale and the closing, adjustments of taxes
and assessments, and escrow funds. Other matters might be
mentioned, but these suffice to point up the danger involved. In
such situations, the attorney cannot exercise his independent
professional judgment in behalf of one client without adversely
affecting the other. DR 5-105(A).
We, therefore, conclude that, assuming full disclosure and
consent, the practice of one attorney representing both the
borrower and the lender may present problems in some instances, but
is not unethical and is not precluded by decisional law and should
be approached with great caution. However, the representation of a
buyer and a seller in connection with the preparation and execution
of a contract of sale of real property is so fraught with obvious
situations where a conflict may arise that one attorney shall not
undertake to represent both parties in such a situation.
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