101 N.J.L.J. 209
March 9, 1978
Conflict of Interest
Foreclosure Against Former Client
The problem posed by this inquiry is one with which we have
dealt heretofore, i.e., an attorney suing a client whom he has
previously represented. The attorney says that he has been retained
by a lending institution to foreclose a mortgage against a former
client of mine." He states that he represented the client in
purchasing the property in question while he was a review attorney
for the lending institutions. He had never previously represented
the client nor has he had any subsequent relationship with him. The
attorney is now asked by the lending institution to foreclose the
mortgage. The inquirer cites this Committee's Opinion 94, 89
N.J.L.J. 333 (1966), but thinks it does not apply here. There, we
said that it would be improper for the attorney to foreclose a
mortgage against a former client. In that case, there had been
representation by the attorney of the client on several occasions.
There we discussed at length, citing other opinions, that to
foreclose against a former client under such circumstances would
tend to impair the confidence which a client has a right to repose
in his attorney and would thus tend to destroy one of the
essentials of the professional relationship.
The inquirer relies upon the case of Hansen v. Janitschek, 57
N.J. Super. 418 (App Div. 1959), reversed 31 N.J. 545 (1960). In
reversing, the Supreme Court adopted the dissenting opinion of
Judge Conford in the Appellate Division. We cited and considered
Janitschek in Opinion 94, supra. However, a careful reading of
Judge Conford's opinion reveals that he came to the conclusion that
no attorney-client relationship existed between the plaintiff and
the lawyer involved and he said, at page 43l: "It does not appear
that he had ever previously represented or acted as legal advisor
to Mr. or Mrs. Hansen in any capacity whatever." He repeated, at
page 433, that there was no basis for inference in the proofs that
the plaintiff and the attorney contemplated any rendition by the
latter of legal services to the former. Here the inquirer states
specifically that the proposed defendant was "a former client of
mine" and in several places in the inquiry he refers to the
mortgagor as a "client." Obviously, he considered that an attorney-
client relationship existed.
For recent decisions discussing the disqualification of
attorneys to sue former clients, see Akerly v. Red Barn System,
Inc., 551 F. 2d 539, 544 (3 Cir. 1977), and Fund of Funds v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., F. 2d (2 Cir. 1977). Cf., 64 Yale L.J.
917, 928 (1955), "Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing
Interests Adverse to Former Clients. In the Fund of Funds case,
the court prefaced its opinion with the statement, "[w]hen dealing
with ethical principles . . . we cannot paint with broad strokes.
The lines are fine and must be so marked [citing several cases]."
Under the circumstances, it would be clearly improper for the
attorney to represent the lending institution in the foreclosure
action against his former client.