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103 N.J.L.J. 495
May 24, 1979
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
OPINION 426
Conflict of Interest
Defending Indicated Defendant
After Advising Witnesses
Defense counsel for a criminal defendant inquires whether he
may represent the defendant after counseling persons subpoenaed to
appear before grand juries which investigated the crime for which
the defendant was ultimately indicated. Witness 1 was subpoenaed
and testified before Grand Jury 1 being represented by the
inquiring attorney. No indictment was returned. Witness 2, advised
by the inquirer, refused to answer questions to Grand Jury 2.
Shortly thereafter, Grand Jury 2 indicted the defendant, who
engaged the inquirer as defense counsel. Witness 2 had previously
given the police an oral statement, and after indictment the
inquirer withdrew from any representation of witnesses 1 and 2, and
witness 2 testified before Grand Jury 2 suffering a "lapse of
memory." Additionally, counsel represents in a civil suit a
witness 3, who testified before Grand Jury 1.
The inquiry arises as a result of the State's moving to
disqualify the inquirer from representing the criminal defendant.
The inquirer states that he withdrew from representation of the
criminal defendant and the criminal proceeding is no longer pending
because the indictment has been dismissed for lack of evidence.
The inquirer requests our opinion for future guidance.
This Committee will assume full disclosure to the parties and
further that the oral statement of witness 2 was somehow
inculpatory of the defendant. Our Opinion 278, 97 N.J.L.J. 121
(1974), while referring to an attorney under grand jury
investigation, is of particular application. There, as here, the
ability of the inquirer to serve the client's interest with
unquestioned fidelity was threatened. The witness' self-interest in
cooperating fully, honestly and openly before the grand jury or
testifying for the State, conflicts directly with the not too
unnatural desire of the attorney in such circumstances to avoid the
presentation of any evidence that would embarrass his present
defendant.
Opinion 278 provides as follows:
The ethical considerations for DR 5-
101(A) are found in Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association which states, EC5-1:
The professional judgment of a
lawyer shall be exercised, within
the bounds of the law, solely for
the benefit of his client and free
of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal
interest, the interests of other
clients, nor the desire of third
persons should be permitted to
dilute his loyalty to his
client.(Emphasis added)
Neither the informed consent of the clients, nor the
disassociation of the inquirer from the potential witnesses against
his defendant removes the ethical objections. The appearance of
impropriety would certainly be present were such a representation
permitted. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Opinion 16 (1929). Here, the appearance of the lawyer representing
the defendant and a potential witness against the defendant in a
homicide makes the comments of Opinion 278 particularly applicable.
In commenting upon former Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics (predecessor to
DR 5-101(A), supra), Drinker in his Legal
Ethics (1953) notes at p. 105:
'even where all parties agree,
the appearance of a lawyer on both
sides of the same controversy,
particularly in cases of some
notoriety, will often give an
impression to the public which is
most unfortunate for the reputation
of the bar, and which of itself
should be decisive.'
Aside from the appearance of impropriety,
the matter has the potential for adversely
affecting the administration of justice. Thus,
such representation directly involves the
public interest, and is particularly improper
and undesirable. N.J. Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics, Opinion 4, 86 N.J.L.J.
357 (1963). The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Schear v. Elizabeth, 41 N.J. 321, 329 (1964)
quoting Ahto v. Weaver) 39 N.J. 418, 431
(1963), noted that such representation is
absolutely barred where a conflict affecting
the public interest is involved.
Here, the representation of the defendant clearly falls within the
bar of Opinion 278. Opinion 194, 94 N.J.L.J. 44 (1971), is
inapposite. Not only was there a remoteness of representation, but
the following comments from Opinion 194 clearly indicate the
direction of the opinion:
that a lawyer should never
accept a retainer where his position
may be adverse to that of a former
client, without taking extreme care
to make certain that the new matter
is one which will not affect in any
way any confidential information
that he may have obtained in his
former representation of the
insolvent insurance company in the
defense of negligence claims, the
inquirer says that he obtained no
confidential information with
respect to the inner workings of
that company, nor any information
relating to the alleged S.E.C. or
mail fraud violations. (Emphasis
added)
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