105 N.J.L.J. 441
May 15, 1980
OPINION 455
Bar Foundation Legal Services Financing
Plan Reversing Prior Opinions 115 and 180
The New Jersey State Bar Association has submitted a proposed
plan for the financing of legal fees. In broad outline the plan
contemplates that the New Jersey State Bar Foundation as sponsor
will enter into an agreement with one or more financial
institutions in the State whereby legal services may be financed
for clients of attorneys who participate in the plan.
The procedure is essentially as follows. An attorney who
wishes to participate enters into an agreement with the bank which
provides the basis for the bank to accept contracts for fees from
the attorney. A client wishing to finance his fee fills out a
credit application which is submitted to the bank. If the bank
approves the credit, the attorney and the client enter into a
contract for the fee and the contract is assigned by the attorney
to the bank. The bank pays the attorney the amount of the fee
specified in the contract less a discount and thereafter collects
the amount due plus interest from the client. The bank also pays to
the Bar Foundation 5% of the gross amount financed. The contract
between the attorney and the bank provides among other things for
the circumstances under which the attorney will be obligated to
repurchase from the bank a fee contract assigned to it, the
principal circumstance relating to a dispute between the attorney
and the client as to services rendered.
In 1966 one of the county bar associations submitted to this
Committee a proposed legal services financing plan not unlike the
one now being considered. This plan was referred to as the Erie
County, New York Plan. That plan had received the award of merit
from the American Bar Association and was also presented to the
Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,
but at the time our Opinion 115, 90 N.J.L.J. 681 (1967), was
issued, no opinion had been rendered by the American Bar
Association. In Opinion 115 we said the plan should be disapproved,
not so much because it violates any particular canon of ethics, but
because it connotes the commercialization of the practice of law.
"A lawyer is not a tradesman and therefore he should not be a
retail seller of his services." Subsequently to the adoption of
Opinion 115, we had equation to consider an inquiry from the New
Jersey State Bar Association which submitted essentially the Erie
County Plan in slightly revised form. Once again we disapproved the
plan, Opinion 180, 93 N.J.L.J. 481 (1970). At about the same time
we also issued our Opinion 175, 93 N.J.L.J. 132 (1970),
disapproving the use of credit cards in payment of clients'
bailiwick essentially for the reasons expressed in Opinion 115.
Later Opinion 293, 97 N.J.L.J. 929 (1974), disapproved of
attorneys' demanding interest on clients' accounts.
Since the adoption of Opinions 115, 175 and 180 many changes
have occurred which bear on the propriety of participation in a
legal services financing plan. Not long after Opinion 115 was
published, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility did have occasion to
consider the Erie County Plan. It reviewed all the pertinent
canons, considered the commercialization aspect of such plan and
concluded that it is not per se unethical for an attorney to
participate in a plan of this nature sponsored by a bar
association.See footnote 1
1
The opinion of the American Bar Association Committee
quotes at length from a Los Angeles Bar Association Committee
opinion disapproving a similar plan, referring to that opinion as
the best statement of the objections to the plan. In essence the
principal objection of the Los Angeles County Committee was the
same as ours in Opinion 115, namely that of commercialization of
the practice of law. Nevertheless, the American Bar Association,
after noting some distinguishing features of the Los Angeles County
Plan, concluded that the plan before it should be approved. In the
mid-1970's other changes came quickly. The legal profession was
held to be subject to the antitrust laws of the United States.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.C.
2004, 44 Law Ed. 2d 572 (1976); advertising was permitted, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 360, 97 S.C. 2691, 63 L. Ed. 2d 810
(1977); and the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated rules covering
advertising by New Jersey attorneys, DR 2-101, et seq. The
Legislature of New Jersey authorized the use of credit cards by
lawyers, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq.; the Supreme Court of New Jersey
advised our Committee in March 1978 that Opinion 293 and every
authority to the contrary were modified or vacated; and we have
approved participation in a nationwide prepaid legal services plan,
Opinion 383, 100 N.J.L.J. 1206 (1977).
We conclude that our Opinions 115 and 180 can no longer stand
scrutiny and should be reversed. While the proposed plan no doubt
advances the commercialization of the practice of law with such
terms as buy-sell agreements, discounts, franchises, retail
installment contracts and the like appearing throughout the plan,
nevertheless we agree with the American Bar Association that it is
the duty of the profession to utilize such methods as may be
developed to bring the services of its members to those who need
them so long as this can be done ethically and with dignity. As
society changes, these methods must necessarily change; otherwise
the profession will become dormant and static and fail to fulfill
its proper function. Accordingly, participation of attorneys in
this plan sponsored by the New Jersey State Bar Foundation is
approved. We express no opinion on the merit of the details of the
plan other than to say there do not appear to be any ethically
improper provisions in the plan submitted to us.