116 N.J.L.J. 257
August 22, 1985
Affirmed, In re
Petition for Review
of Opinion 569 of
the ACPE, 103 N.J.
325 (1986)
OPINION 569
Conflict of Interest -
Former Deputy Attorney General
Representing License Before Professional
Board for which He Formerly Served
The inquirer is a former deputy attorney general who was
assigned to represent various professional and occupational
licensing boards of the Division of Consumer Affairs during his
tenure with the State. Now in private practice, he asks whether he
may properly represent a licensee who faces possible disciplinary
action by a licensing board as the result of an investigation which
began while the inquirer was employed by the State but of which he
had no knowledge. The inquirer stresses that he had no contact
whatever with the investigation, informing us that such matters are
handled by the Enforcement Bureau of the Division of Consumer
Affairs, and not by the Division of Law and Public Safety. We are
told that while a deputy attorney general assigned to represent a
particular board might or might not participate in a given
investigation as conditions warrant, this investigation was
completely outside the scope of the inquirer's participation,
knowledge and responsibility. The sole nexus of concern is the fact
that the investigation originated while the inquirer was a deputy
attorney general representing several of the professional boards.
Although the inquiry does not so specify, we shall assume that
the inquirer at some point represented the board before which the
disciplinary proceeding is pending even though he was unaware of
this investigation, a circumstance he says is not unusual. Because
the inquirer had no actual or supervisory involvement whatever with
the investigation which he now wishes to contest as a private
attorney, the focus here is upon the appearance of impropriety.
R.P.C. 1.11(b). In In Re Advisory Opinion No. 361, 77 N.J. 199
(1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court had occasion to review a
ruling of this Committee, Opinion 361, that the appearance of
impropriety precludes a firm from representing a defendant who was
investigated or indicted during the time an associate of the firm
was on the staff of the county prosecutor concerned. Relying in
part on In re Biederman, 63 N.J. 396 (1973), we said that "the fact
the assistant prosecutor had no connection whatever with the
investigation or with the preparation of the ease is immaterial."
Opinion 361, 100 N.J.L.J. 1 (1977). On review the Supreme Court
reconsidered the wording of its opinion in Biederman, saying:
We believe that the language that disqualification
follows 'even though the attorney had played no part in
the investigation and prosecution' or because the ease
'had originated while he was connected with the office'
is somewhat over-broad. Of course, actual responsibility
for or participation in any aspect of a proceeding is, as
stated above, disqualifying. And where the attorney
because of his or her status becomes aware of any
information or material on a matter pending in the
prosecutor's office, then he or she should refrain from
related private employment, even though no other
responsibility had existed. [citation omitted]. But where
each of these factors is missing, then a conflict of
interest does not exist. 77 N.J. at 205.
The Court went on to hold that in order to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, a former assistant prosecutor not
disqualified by reason of his involvement in a particular matter
nevertheless should not appear in any criminal matter in the county
where he served for a period of six months from the date of
termination of his public employment, a temporary disqualification
personal to him and not applicable to others in his firm. 77 N.J.
at 206. Our Opinion 361 was modified accordingly.
The situation here is analogous. On the authority of In re
Advisory Opinion No. 361, supra, we believe that an assistant
deputy attorney general no less than an assistant county prosecutor
should be allowed to represent a private client in connection with
an investigation which began while the attorney was in government
service but with which he had no connection whatever, subject to
the same six month period of personal disqualification.
Accordingly, and since the inquirer has now been in private
practice for over six months, we hold that the proposed
representation would be proper.