117 N.J.L.J. 414
April 3, 1986
OPINION 584
Conflict of Interest -
Ownership of Office Building
Between Municipal Court Judge,
Municipal Prosecutor, and Municipal Attorney
In Opinion 189, 93 N.J.L.J. 789 (1970), our Committee made the
statement that:
Of the almost 200 opinions of this Committee published so
far, 66 have involved questions arising out of the
relationship between lawyers or law firms and
governmental agencies in which the lawyer or a member of
his firm occupies an official position, either elective
or appointive. In addition, the Committee has voted to
reject a great many inquiries concerning such situations
where it seemed obvious that prior opinions had
adequately answered the question presented.
The facts as presented by the inquirer are that an attorney
who is a municipal court judge and is a sole practitioner (at the
time of the inquiry) has plans to erect an office building as
co-owner with a partner who is a non-lawyer; the attorney to have
his office in the building as a tenant. Another law firm,
consisting of two attorneys, one of whom is municipal attorney and
the other of whom is municipal prosecutor for the same municipality
for which the inquirer is judge, proposes to maintain its offices
in the same building. Thus, the municipal court judge, the
municipal attorney, and the municipal prosecutor would have their
offices located within the same office complex. The latter two
attorneys (that is, the law firm consisting of the municipal
attorney and the municipal prosecutor) desire to become partners
with the inquirer and his partner in the ownership of the office
building. The inquirer further states that there would be no
sharing of space; there would be separate libraries, separate
conference rooms, and separate reception areas. He states further
that he has reviewed the opinions of our Committee and has been
unable to find an opinion on point.
We are of the opinion that the foregoing suggested
relationship would involve a matter of the equivalent of sharing
office space and certainly, at the least, would present an absolute
appearance of impropriety. For example, what impression can the
average layman have in a situation in which the municipal court
judge and the municipal prosecutor are business partners with
offices in the same office building?
Opinion 185, 93 N.J.L.J. 505 (1970) appears to be almost
directly on point. In that Opinion, we held that the relationship
would be of such a nature as to constitute "office associates",
citing Opinion 74, 88 N.J.L.J. 357 (1965). The Opinion contains the
following statement:
The facts here are similar to the facts in our Opinion
74, supra, except that the only office facility shared in
common is the parking area. But does the non-sharing of
"common office facilities" exclude from consideration all
other elements of what may constitute an association?
Lawyers cannot be considered office associates merely
because their offices are in the same building or because
they share a common parking area, but here there are
additional factors. There are ownership of the property
as tenants in common, equal participation in payment of
mortgage interest, tax and maintenance expenses, and the
fact that they are presently office associates and merely
propose to relocate their offices to avoid the
implication of the words "common office facilities" as
used in the Rule. The thrust of R. 1:15 is to promote
public confidence in the legal profession and in our
system of justice. One of its purposes is to enhance the
public image of the profession by preventing even the
appearance of impropriety. In N.J. Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics, Opinion 8, 86 N.J.L.J. 718 (1963),
we said: "An attorney should not only avoid all
impropriety, but should likewise avoid the appearance of
impropriety." The American Bar Association, Committee on
Professional Ethics, Opinion 49 (1931), used the
following language to express the ethical principle
involved:
... If the profession is to occupy that
position in public esteem which will enable it
to be of the greatest usefulness, it must
avoid not only all evil but must likewise
avoid the appearance of evil.
See also Opinion 189, supra, 415, 103 N.J.L.J. 38 (1979); and
563, 116 N.J.L.J. 203 (1985).