121 N.J.L.J. 1010
May 19, 1988
OPINION 612
Conflict of Interest: Relationships
Between Attorneys and Title Insurance Agencies
Two separate inquiries made by separate attorneys have been
submitted to this Committee for an advisory opinion. These
inquiries involve substantially similar questions arising out of
the relationship of attorneys either acting as agents for companies
issuing policies of title insurance in the State of New Jersey or
having a financial interest in a title company with whom they cause
policies of title insurance to be issued in behalf of their
personal clients.
In the first inquiry, the inquirer states the facts to be as
follows:
Two law firms, consisting of three and four principals,
respectively, are contemplating purchasing stock
interests in a local title abstract company, which is an
agent for a nationally known underwriter. The stock
interests will be held by the principals, individually,
while no one person or firm (if the stock interests of
the respective principals are aggregated) will hold a
majority interest, the individual attorneys collectively
will hold a majority interest. The abstract company's
offices are independently staffed and independently
operated. The individual principals will be entitled to
dividends as any other shareholders.
The inquirer further states that:
The two law firms contemplate utilizing the local title
abstract company for the benefit of real estate purchaser
clients (and those purchasers' mortgage lenders) in the
same manner as would other attorneys who have no stock
interest, after full disclosure to their clients.
In addition, the law firms both serve as counsel to a
real estate developer of residential condominium units
and represent the developer in connection with the sale
of those units. It is contemplated that a specimen title
policy to be issued by the local company (as agent for
the national underwriter) will be attached to the public
offering statement for the condominium and the agency
will attempt to solicit orders. The attorneys for the
buyers of the units will be free to use any title company
they choose, although it is contemplated the agent would
receive a high percentage of the business for this
condominium. The developer will consent to this
arrangement after full disclosure.
it also appears that "one of the law firms may serve as legal
counsel to the local agency and receive a retainer or other fees
for legal services rendered."
The inquirer seeks an advisory opinion on the following
issues:
1. Can the law firms utilize the agency for the bene
fit of their respective real estate purchaser
clients after full disclosure?
2. Can the law firms represent the seller of the con
dominium units in the development referred to above
if the attorneys are shareholders of the local
title abstract company which may issue title
policies for the benefit of the purchasers of those
units? If so, is disclosure required?
3. Can one of the law firms serve as counsel to the
local title abstract company?
4. Would any of the above opinions be different, if
instead of buying interests in an existing title
abstract company, the attorneys set up a new
company?
It is our considered opinion that the first three questions clearly
fall within the parameters of Opinion 513, 111 N.J.L.J. 392 (1983),
as well as Opinion 495, 109 N.J.L.J. 329 (1982), where we
identified the sources of conflict:
[R]eliance by purchasers of real estate of good
marketable title has shifted from lawyers who examined
and certified title to title insurance companies. The
lawyer now plays the role of reviewing the commitment
binder and obtaining or negotiating the removal of
exceptions. Thus the title insurance company seeks to
limit its liability while counsel for the purchaser and
lender has a duty to try to expand the liability of the
title company. The title insurance company agent acts as
an agent for the company and binds it. If he is also an
attorney representing the purchaser and lender in the
transaction, he also acts for them. In all instances, he
owes a duty of fidelity to each interest.
...
In the case presented here, each title binder which
contains standard exceptions and specifically related
exceptions presents an absolute conflict requiring
independent evaluation in every case and, conceivably,
hard negotiation; on the one hand, as set forth at the
outset, to expand liability and, on the other, to limit
or restrict liability. The situation presented is
basically contrary to the professional standards required
and inherently creative of an appearance of impropriety
such that it cannot be permitted even if disclosure is
made to all parties.
As to the fourth issue, namely: "Would any of the above
opinions be different, if instead of buying interests in an
existing title abstract company, the attorneys set up a new
company?" the answer is also in the negative. We perceive no reason
for changing our opinion simply because the abstract company in
question is newly formed rather than by separate purchase of stock
interests in the existing local title abstract company.
The second inquirer apparently is acting as a "title insurance
agent" for a title insurance company. There is no specific inquiry
set forth by the inquirer, but rather, the inquiry is couched in
the presentation of factual argument. If we understand the inquiry
correctly, the real question is whether the attorney may act as a
title insurance agent with reference to policies of title insurance
to be issued by that insurance company based upon the agent's
abstract for and in behalf of his personal clients. It is our
understanding that the attorney does not have a beneficial interest
in the title company, nor does he have a minority stock interest,
but is the agent for the title company in an individual proprietary
capacity, apparently doing and performing the abstract work.
Again, it is our considered opinion that our Opinions 495,
supra, and 513, supra, as well as the other citations referred to
in said Opinions, fully and adequately answer this inquiry. The
guidelines are clear, and the facts and conduct of the attorney
will determine whether his activity will constitute a conflict of
interest, which can be cured by a full disclosure.