character explicitly allowed for differential adjustments based upon circumstances in individual industries and firms and hence diverged from the principle of a national job evaluation system.

Notwithstanding, these elements of change and restiveness, central negotiation and coordination of wage policy in the Netherlands has continued. A unanimous report of the social and economic council on the problem of correcting the adverse balance of payments led to the introduction in early 1957 of another wage stabilization program which brought changes in the cost of living once more to the fore as the principal basis of wage adjustment. But there has apparently been as well a continuing trend toward increasing flexibility of wage changes when general economic conditions permit, as evidenced by a Government announcement this year authorizing wage raises where they can be financed, without price increases, out of increased productivity and profits and provided they do not lead to "objectionable results" in the labor market.

Norway

Norway, like the Netherlands, relied to a great extent upon extensive and detailed direct government regulation of the economy to meet the immediate problems of reconstruction after the war. A basic foundation of the whole reconstruction effort was a stabilization program worked out with the central labor and employer federations to prevent industrial conflict and excessive money wage increases while the country's economic resources were being strained to replace the capital losses of the war and to reestablish a viable foreign trade position. But even in these early postwar years, the coordination of wage settlements with general economic policy was less formally organized than in the Netherlands. While wage demands were generally subject to compulsory arbitration, the arbitration tribunals or wage boards were not formally bound by any government policy directives. Moreover, the Norwegian trade unions maintained their traditional opposition to governmental wage-fixing. In 1949, compulsory arbitration was restricted to cases where wage demands had not received the approval of the central federations and in 1952 was abandoned (except for particular cases requiring special parliamentary action). In effect national wage policy in Norway has been left to be determined in central negotiations between the trade union federation and the employers' association. Such a procedure was feasible only because of the highly centralized organization of both groups which made the national settlements controlling for the individual agreements between their constituent members.

The legally autonomous status of these central negotiations, however, has not meant the absence of governmental influence over the terms of general wage settlement. The close association between the trade unions and the Norwegian Labor Party (which has maintained a parliamentary majority since 1946) has provided both the motivation and the vehicle for the union leaders to formulate their wage demands in the light of general economic policies and conditions. Thus the Government has been a constant, if somewhat circumspect, party to national wage bargaining even though it has sought to limit the extent of its interventions.

Until rising import prices, following the exchange depreciation in the fall of 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war, made inevitable