

Because of the magnitude of the problem involved, the social revolutionary process will be a long-drawn-out affair. Resolution of the rising dissatisfaction of the masses will probably be the most overwhelming problem of the area for the remainder of the present century. The transitional period will be far from smooth. Until the new, more broadly based social, economic, and political equilibrium is achieved, Latin America will remain an area of turmoil. Demagogues will spring forth to exploit the popular discontent and aspirations—neo-Peronists or neo-Nassers may rise. Exaggerated nationalism will again rear its ugly head. The traditional ruling groups will compound the difficulties by calling on the armed forces to preserve the traditional order. Civil wars and violent social upheavals are not improbable. Political instability will vary in relation to the degree of extremism of the competing new and old forces, as well as the extent to which civilian demagogues, Communist conspirators, and armed forces political adventurers attempt to exploit the struggle for their own personal advantage. However, the United States will probably be able, by intelligent action, to moderate, and to some extent subdue, dangerous extremisms.

As inevitable as the process of social change, and intimately related to it, is the ultimate political emancipation of the great mass of the people. While the social struggle rages, attempts at authoritarian political solutions, either left-wing dictators or right-wing autocrats, will be common, and it will appear at times that Latin America is adopting a system of less, rather than more, freedom and democracy. But authoritarian regimes cannot be but temporary. The long-term trend is firmly against dictatorship, for as the social problem is progressively resolved, the conditions that gave rise to despotism must then disappear. Increasing realization of the people's social and economic desires will inevitably intensify their demands for political freedom and responsible representative government.

This means that the long-term future political role of the armed forces is almost certain to be a declining one. The emerging new balance of social forces as embodied in labor organizations and the middle groups will offer increasingly effective resistance to armed forces political preponderance. Militarism is likely to be a strong political factor as long as the social crisis rages and as long as government is not firmly rooted in a broad representative base, but ultimately the armed forces political control must wane. The wave of popular pressure against it will become irresistible. Neither political holding operations against social change nor predatory militarism can last long beyond the point where the people become aware of their political rights and power potential.

Therefore, the basic consideration for any nation which desires Latin America as a future ally must not be the political allegiance of the on-the-way-out military caste. Rather, it must be the cooperation and association with the people to whom the future belongs.

Latin America's orientation vis-a-vis the current and future world crisis can take three possible courses. It can ally with the United