

come increasingly difficult, principally because the aims of the United States and of the Latin American nations have become increasingly incompatible. Even before World War II ended, many Latin American countries were undergoing rather sweeping political and social changes. Then their "revolution of rising expectations" spread and gained momentum at the very time that the United States was fixing its attention almost exclusively on the cold war. Thus, while the United States increasingly insisted that the security of the hemisphere against the Communist threat must be the major consideration in a common foreign policy, Latin Americans were more concerned with their internal socio-economic problems, and their governments looked to the United States less for leadership against communism than for cooperation in meeting these problems, chiefly in the form of easing their economic burdens.

### *1. Collective security*

After World War II the United States was anxious to continue the cooperation with Latin America which had already served both so well, in order to meet whatever new challenges might arise to security and other common interests. To this end it took a leading part in placing the inter-American system on a more permanent treaty basis. But Latin America inevitably took a subordinate place in the newly developing global foreign policy of the United States, a fact which was only too obvious to the Latin Americans themselves. In fact, the United States did not find it easy to determine just where Latin America fitted into its strategy for the new situation, increasingly dominated by the cold war with the Soviet Union. And the Latin American nations, for their part, were quite naturally taking stock of their relationship to the United States, and looking at the problems of "hemisphere defense" in that context.

Though victories in Europe in late 1944 and early 1945 eliminated the Axis military threat to the Western Hemisphere, the United States showed no inclination to let lapse the defense system it had so laboriously been constructing since 1938. Accordingly, in February of 1945, a meeting in Mexico was called to plan the future of the inter-American system. That conference reaffirmed the vital provision made at Havana in 1940 which declared that an attack by any state, American or foreign, on an American state would be considered to be an attack against them all, and that collective measures would be taken to repeal such aggression. This provision, formally embodied in a treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, has become the cornerstone of the inter-American defense system. At this time, the United States was more concerned with guarding the peace within the hemisphere, rather than with the fading danger of aggression from without. Not until later did communism become the key problem.

It was also decided at the 1945 meeting in Mexico that the Inter-American Defense Board, a wartime agency, would be made a permanent organization. Eight months later, in October 1945, the IADB issued its first peacetime recommendations for insuring the military defense of the hemisphere. These included standardization of equipment, organization, and training,<sup>3</sup> a goal long favored by the United

<sup>3</sup> "Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook," 1946, p. 395.