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POST WORLD WAR II POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

A STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

SCHOOL OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

In the spring of 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations took initial steps toward planning a broad and long-range review of U.S. foreign policy. Hearings were held with regard to U.S. policies respecting specific geographic areas, among them Latin America. Coincidentally, public attention throughout the world was abruptly and sharply focused on Latin America as a result of the incidents attending Vice President Nixon's visit there.

Consequently, the Committee on Foreign Relations instructed its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to engage in a thoroughgoing, nonpartisan, critical but constructive, inquiry into U.S. relations with the other American republics. In Senate Resolution 330 of the 85th Congress, agreed to July 28, 1958, the Senate authorized expenditures of $150,000 for the purposes of the study and likewise authorized the committee to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals." This authority was continued in Senate Resolution 31 of the 86th Congress, agreed to February 2, 1959. The study published herewith is the first of a series resulting from contracts with various private groups. Others which are in the process of preparation are:

"Problems of Economic Development," by the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oreg.;

"Commodity Problems," by International Economic Consultants, Washington, D.C.;

"Latin American Activities of U.S. Business and Labor," by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.;

"United States-Latin American Economic Relations," by the National Planning Association, Washington, D.C.;

"Soviet Bloc Activities and Their Implications for United States-Latin American Relations," by the Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research, Arlington, Va.;

"The Organization of American States," by Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.; and

"Organization of the U.S. Government for Dealing With Latin American Affairs," part of a larger study being done by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

It is our hope that these studies will assist the subcommittee in formulating its own recommendations for the improvement of this Nation's relations with our neighbors to the south. However, it is to be kept firmly in mind that the study presented herewith, as well as subsequent studies which will be published, do not reflect the findings, opinions, or recommendations of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs. They represent the work and possible biases of competent specialists, but will serve the subcommittee only as background material in preparation for the hearings to be held later on, and as

outside suggestions to be considered in concert with other extensive information—gathered partly through the personal study missions to Latin America of individual Senators—when the subcommittee formulates its own conclusions and recommendations to the full committee. It will be the subcommittee's duty to evaluate the studies in light of the information and experience gained in the course of its inquiry. It will feel free to accept or to reject, in part or in whole, the substance of any of the reports submitted to it by the contracting organizations and institutions.

WAYNE MORSE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs.

NOVEMBER 19, 1959.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

SCHOOL OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO,
Albuquerque, N. Mex., September 14, 1959.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is transmitted herewith a report on post-World War II political developments in Latin America. The study was undertaken on March 18, 1959, and completed on September 14, 1959.

It is hoped that the information which the report contains will be useful to the members of the committee and to the Congress as background information on legislative matters affecting United States-Latin American relations. Should the committee so desire, we will be happy to come to Washington to testify on any matters contained in the report.

MIGUEL JORRÍN, *Director.*
EDWIN LIEUWEN.

POST-WORLD WAR II POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

SUMMARY

The overwhelming political development in Latin America since World War II has been the attainment of political power by the people. In most of the countries of the area, the old rural oligarchy and their allies in the church and army hierarchy were replaced, at least for a time, by rising labor, industrial, and middle-class urban groups generally backed by young army officers.

A very important recent political development is the antimilitaristic, antidictatorial trend that has been running in Latin America since 1954. In that year, 13 presidents were military; today only 4 remain (Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador).

The political spectrum of contemporary Latin America, on balance, displays a moderate picture.

Concerning recent United States-Latin American relations, the harmony of World War II cooperation tended to obscure the deep-seated sociopolitical changes taking place in Latin America, and with the coming of the cold war the achievement of U.S. objectives has become increasingly difficult, principally because the aims of the United States and the Latin American nations have become increasingly incompatible. While the United States insisted that the security of the hemisphere against the Communist threat must be the major consideration in a common foreign policy, Latin Americans were more concerned with their internal socioeconomic problems, and their governments looked to the United States less for leadership against communism than for cooperation in meeting these problems, chiefly in the form of easing their economic burdens.

The principal features of the collective security system are a hemispheric alliance (Rio Treaty of 1947) and the provision by the United States of military aid to Latin America under the Mutual Security Act. Because military emphasis in U.S. policy toward Latin America appears seriously out of line with our political and economic objectives and long-term interests, we recommend a disarmament program for Latin America and abandonment of the use of military programs as a means to win the political support of the Latin American military.

Since World War II, the U.S. Government has shown little concern for the problem of dictatorship in Latin America, aside from paying occasional lip service to the principles of democracy. We believe that Latin Americans should no longer be allowed to feel that the United States, in its determination to resist communism, is willing to sacrifice democracy in the process. Accordingly, we recommend that the United States, both in its aid program and general attitude, make

47266—59——2

more distinction between highhanded military dictatorship and struggling civilian democracy.

Postwar U.S. economic aid to Latin America has been inadequate. Instead of continued year-to-year minimum economic programs, the United States should develop long-range economic assistance policies based less upon a concern for sound banking and business principles, although these should by no means be ignored, and more upon the value to the U.S. security system of Latin America's friendship and cooperation.

Nonintervention has remained a thorny issue in the hemisphere ever since World War II. We believe that the United States should carefully abide by the doctrine of nonintervention, as defined in the charter of the Organization of American States. We feel that in the long run the United States will gain by observing this policy and will be more respected throughout Latin America.

The breadth-of-territorial-sea issue offers no such simple solution at present. We believe the United States should make an effort to achieve a settlement of the continental shelf problem on a regional basis and of the fisheries control problem on an individual state basis.

In general, Latin America has cooperated with the United States in the United Nations, except on certain economic and colonial matters. To further harmonize hemispheric interests inside the United Nations, we recommend that the United States encourage the present trend toward declining hegemony of the Security Council and increasing importance for the General Assembly. We recommend no changes in our presently restrictive United Nations economic policy, but we feel that a stronger anticolonialist stand would greatly enhance U.S. prestige in Latin America.

Despite differences over the colonialism issue, Latin America has progressively cemented its political and economic ties with Western Europe since World War II. Even the immediate postwar antagonism toward Spain has all but withered away. On the other hand, Latin American relations with Africa have been strained by the latter's competition in the sale of coffee and industrial raw materials in the world market. With Asia, the closest postwar ties have been with Japan, whose commercial influences in the area has grown rapidly over the past decade.

Because Latin American political theory and philosophy have developed along lines markedly different from that of the United States, the area's conception of its role in the contemporary world is unique. Though the 20 republics differ greatly in their problems and the vigor with which they attempt to solve them, they are all determined to direct their own destinies using their own methods.

The most important post-World War II development in the nonself-governing territories was the creation by the United Kingdom of the Federation of the West Indies in 1958. With these islands, as well as with the French and Dutch possession in the Caribbean, the Latin Americans hew to a strongly anti-colonialist line. So long as the United States refuses to take a similar stand, the Soviet Union will continue to exploit this issue.

Latin America is an area of very rapid growth. Its population is increasing at a faster rate than any other area in the world today. The economic growth of the area over the next 20 years may well be

double the extraordinary development that has occurred during the past 20. Consequently the strategic value of Latin America's friendship and cooperation will increase as its manpower and material resources move more and more into the balance in the cold war struggle.

The overwhelming problem in Latin America today and for the foreseeable future is the social revolution. The entire area is in the throes of a painful process of fundamental social, economic, and political transformation.

I. BACKGROUND

Until the time of World War II, political power in most Latin American countries remained in the hands of the same institutional and social elite groups which had dominated the area ever since the early 19th century. The 20 Republics south of the Rio Grande were generally controlled by the traditional order of society.

This old order was characterized by a rural-oriented society and economy in which wealth and social position were dominated by a landed aristocracy. The latter either controlled politics directly or shared political control with the armed forces, which, until the time of World War II, were generally allied with the landed gentry. Also included in the traditional social order was the Roman Catholic Church. Its clergymen connived with the landowner and army officer components of an oligarchic triarchy whose principal aim was preservation of the status quo.

However, by the time of World War II the popular opposition pressures to the static political system dominated by the representatives of the old order had reached the breaking point. For a quarter century prior to World War II, the society and economy of Latin America had been undergoing fundamental transformations which progressively rendered political control by the traditionalist groups more anachronistic.

World War I marked the beginning of the end of the old system under which Latin America's well-established economic and social organization was firmly tied to a stable Old World order. Fractures in the neat international system of trade and diplomacy precipitated by the 1914–18 upheaval were compounded by the great depression; added to this was the impact of socialism, fascism, and communism, and the influence of the New Deal, all of which helped hasten the breakdown of the old order.

Economic change was characterized by a tendency of the rural-oriented, colonial-type economy of Latin America to give way to industrialization and urbanization. The disturbances and dislocations caused by the outbreak of the First World War, particularly the experience of being suddenly cut off from foreign manufactured goods, stimulated a drive for greater economic independence. To this end, a determined and sustained program of industrialization began in most of the area in order to bring an end to exaggerated dependence upon undependable prices and demand in overseas markets, and to raise living standards. Industrialization was accelerated by the failure of attempts in the 1920's to rebuild the international economy, by its collapse in the 1930's, and by the experience of the early 1940's which again demonstrated the hardships suffered by colonial economies during wartime.

Industrialization proceeded most rapidly in the larger countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, which had the minimum essen-

tials of capital, a limited technological "know-how," and sufficient consumers for an internal market. The other Latin American countries also attempted industrialization, though with considerably less success, as a way out of their colonial economic status. Particularly in the little Republics of the Caribbean and Central America, primitive subsistence agriculture remained the principal basis of livelihood for most of the population. However, considering Latin America as a whole, an economy that was basically agricultural in 1914 was transformed into one that was both industrial and agricultural by the time of World War II.

The economic changes induced by World War I were major causes of—and also partial effects of—profound social change. The traditional order of society, which had held virtually unquestioned supremacy, began to be challenged as new social and institutional forms started to reshape the Latin American environment. This society was challenged by middle class and laboring groups in the larger countries, and a shift in the locus of social power began in the lesser Republics.

The transformation of the economy from rural and agricultural to urban and industrial was the fundamental cause of the rising social disturbance. The absorbing force of manufacturing activity, in cities such as Buenos Aires, Saõ Paulo, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and Mexico City, sucked in labor from the countryside, swallowed up the bulk of the postwar immigrants, and created conditions and opportunities which stimulated the growth of middle class and labor groups. All this led to even larger concentrations of population in metropolitan areas.

In Mexico, the violent social upheaval that began in 1910 hastened the shift in that nation's socioeconomic center of gravity from rural agriculture to urban industry. Meanwhile, by the time of the outbreak of World War II, southern South America had become one of the most heavily urbanized areas in the world. Latin America's urbanization involved more than a simple migration from farm to city, for although half the urban increase was due to rural migrants, the latter represented less than a quarter of the natural increase in farm population.[1] This meant that the entire population of Latin America was expanding at an extraordinarily rapid pace. By World War II it was growing at the rate of 2.5 percent annually—faster than any other area in the world.

It was this industrialization-urbanization trend which gave rise to new social groups and classes. No longer did society consist only of an elite of large landholders, an insignificant professional and commercial middle class, and a great mass of illiterate agricultural workers. By the time of World War II there were also industrial entrepreneurs and small capitalists, large professional groups, and masses of literate city wage earners. It was these new urban-oriented groups which brought pressure to bear for fundamental political change.

European ideologies and movements, particularly the Fascists and the Communists, made determined efforts to use the indigenous social and political crisis as a means of gaining power for themselves. Fascism enjoyed its heyday during the 1930's when Hitler and Mus-

[1] Kingsley Davis, "Latin America's Multiplying Peoples" in Asher Christensen, ed., "The Evolution of Latin American Government" (New York, 1951).

solini were flowering in Europe and when the great depression was building up pressure for reform everywhere. Significant Fascist movements appeared in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay, and on the eve of World War II many Latin American strongmen, such as Vargas of Brazil, Ubico of Guatemala, and Benavides of Peru, displayed a sympathetic affinity for the Axis; during the war, the Peronist movement in Argentina and the Villaroel regime in Bolivia showed similar tendencies.

The Communist pre-World War II challenge came earlier than the Fascist, but was never as serious. No Latin American nation was in real danger of a Communist coup. Communist parties began their activities in Latin America a few years after the Russian revolution of 1917. During the 1920's they gained toeholds in several countries, usually inside the embryonic labor movements. Their strength became significant in Chile, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay during the late 1930's but declined nearly everywhere in Latin America during World War II.

Now the broad interwar economic and social changes taking place in Latin America, further complicated by the appearance of Fascist, Communist, and other foreign ideologies, provoked intense political pressures upon the traditional political system. The industrialization-urbanization process and the accompanying growth of new classes precipitated new political movements, nearly all of them more broadly based than in the past. Political processes became more complex. The personalistic, intraclass power struggle among the oligarchy was no longer typical. Popular parties arose which demanded sweeping economic and social reforms. Politics was no longer an exclusive game; now nearly everyone demanded an opportunity to play.

The traditional order, ruled by the landlords, the church, and the army, each day became more anachronistic. No more meaningful were personal feuds, federalist-centralist bickering and church-state battles. The creation of new sources of wealth, the spread of new ideas, and the awakening of the urban masses produced far-reaching dislocations. The church began to lose its grip over the minds of the populace, the hacendado became powerless to prevent his peons from trying to find escape from their miseries in the city's factories, and the caudillo coud no longer win and hold power by the sheer force of personal courage and character. The new economic and social conditions demanded a new balance of political forces. The old feudal loyalties to the general, the landlord, and the bishop were progressively replaced by impersonal ties with the business firm or the labor organization. Personal rivalries gave way to party rivalries. The politician became less arbitrary and more the representative of well-organized and institutionalized pressure groups.

The basic new political development was the demand by the people for a voice in government. They demanded economic independence, social justice, and political sovereignty. Government, they insisted, had to serve the humble as well as the great. The old order quite naturally resisted these demands and yielded only to overwhelming popular pressures.

The chief political vehicle for Latin America's awakening masses in the period from World War I to 1930 were middle-class parties,

such as the Radicals of Argentina and Chile, the Colorados of Uruguay, and the Liberals of Colombia. After the great depression, however, labor-oriented parties were formed in most Latin American countries and rapidly became the chief challengers to the traditional political system.

These new broadly based parties, whether labor-oriented or middle-class oriented, or both, were reform parties. To a large degree they had common programs. They were exponents of political democracy; they called for universal suffrage, secret ballots, free elections, an end to army intervention in politics, and genuine representative governments. Industrialization was their panacea, to them the only means of attaining economic independence, social equality, and a higher standard of living. For the rural sector of the economy, such parties demanded agrarian reform, the breakup of the latifundia system, and distribution of land to the peons. Claiming to represent the people, they called for broad programs of social security and for the setting aside of increasing percentages of the national budget for public health and welfare. They introduced the concept of universal education and promoted an expanded school system and reduction of illiteracy. In international relations, these popular parties were generally anti-imperialistic and anti-totalitarian.

The traditionalist political system, despite the sweeping economic and social changes and the growth of popular opposition parties, was able to withstand the pressures against it in most Latin American countries until the final 2 years of World War II.

Demands for political change and reforms by post-World War I working class and middle income professional and commercial groups were generally ignored during the 1920's. The world economic crisis of 1930 brought into sharp focus the tensions between the traditional upper-group rulers and the new aspirants for power. But in the face of the threat from popular groups, the oligarchy turned over the presidential palace to their allies, the army generals. They were determined to preserve the ancient regime by force, if necessary.

When World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, the old order was still entrenched in Latin American politics. Half the 20 republics were ruled by conservative military men. Rightist, unrepresentative military dictatorships prevailed in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Traditionalist civilian regimes, maintained in office by the armed forces, prevailed in Argentina, Panama, and Haiti. The army-backed Vargas and Batista dictatorships were entrenched in Brazil and Cuba respectively. Only Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay had reasonably democratic representative governments.

The net effect of World War II upon Latin American politics was to freeze traditionalist regimes in power as long as the security of the hemisphere was threatened. The international crisis permitted no leeway for political experimentation, social change, or economic reform. The wartime emergency provided dictatorial regimes with justification for outlawing change for the duration. Also, the United States, whose overriding consideration was strategic, did its best to maintain stability in Latin America by providing incumbent regimes with military and economic aid.

II. BROAD TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1943–59

The overwhelming political development in Latin America since World War II has been the attainment of political power by the people. In most of the countries in the area, the old rural oligarchy and their allies in the church and army hierarchy were replaced, at least for a time, by rising labor, industrial, and middle-class urban groups generally backed by young army officers.

The war itself produced pressures that made the maintenance of the status quo progressively more difficult. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe seriously disturbed Latin America's economy. The immediate shock, due to the transportation squeeze, was shortage, particularly of manufactured goods, but also of foodstuffs. The sudden interruption of imports from the United States and from Europe gave a great new impetus to industrialization. This trend was stimulated by financial assistance from the United States. Despite wartime shortages of labor and equipment, Latin America's industrial establishment grew by leaps and bounds. New installations included steel mills, textile mills, paper mills, chemical factories, food-processing plants, highways, shipyards, and airfields.

Wartime prosperity, however, was not broadly based. Despite inflation, governments froze wages, prohibited strikes, and even outlawed labor movements in some countries. The hardships suffered by the middle and lower income groups increased social stresses and strains. As economic development and social change intensified under the World War II stimulus, the pressures upon the anachronistic political system became unbearable. It was merely a matter of time before the populace would break through the oligarchy's political dikes and bring in a flood of social and economic change.

Civilian foes of the status quo were joined by military ones, mostly young officers restless under a static armed forces organization that offered little opportunity for change and advancement. From 1943 on, an assortment of disgruntled, patriotic, and ambitious colonels and majors began joining aspiring popular groups. The upshot of these alliances was evidenced by revolutions which were far more fundamental than the palace-type revolts which had occurred in the past.

The first such successful challenges to the old order were the Argentine and Bolivian revolutions of 1943. The following year similar popular young officer political upheavals toppled traditionalist regimes in Ecuador and Guatemala, and Batista was obliged to surrender his grip upon Cuba when his handpicked candidate lost the 1944 elections. During 1945, the contagion of revolution spread to Venezuela, as popular forces and young army officers ousted the traditionalist forces. That same year, the Vargas dictatorship was brought to an end in Brazil, and in Peru, the popular Aprista Party helped elect a middle-of-the-road President, and, for the first time, won

control of Congress. Popular, liberalizing revolutions occurred in Costa Rica and El Salvador during 1948, in Panama and Bolivia in 1952, and in Colombia in 1953. Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico had broken the traditionalists' political hold early in the century and consolidated their democratic, representative traditions during World War II and postwar years. Thus, the only Latin American Republics which did not see the modern pressures of economic and social change reflected in popular political upheavals were Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, which countries contained only about 6 percent of Latin America's total population.

The emergence of popular reform governments was an unsettling political phenomenon. Such governments, reflections as they were of broad economic and deep social tensions, ran into severe problems in their attempts to destroy the traditional order and carry out their revolutionary reform programs. Those who expected a sudden democratic upsurge to result from the emergence of these new popular political forces were often disappointed. Once in power, the new groups frequently felt it necessary to be most undemocratic, in order to maintain themselves in power against the intransigent oligarchy and to carry out basic reforms. Perhaps it was impossible for genuine democracy to take root until the gulf between rich and poor had narrowed, until education had overcome illiteracy, until the masses of the people had become conscious of their political rights, duties, and responsibilities, and until the various groups struggling for political control had compromised their differences and worked out a compatible concept of national aims and aspirations.

Then too, the new reform-minded governments soon ran into severe difficulties as they attempted, often overhastily, to implement their revolutionary economic programs. Determined to end their colonial economic status, they launched broad, state-sponsored industrialization schemes, generally accompanied by elaborate social welfare and prolabor programs. A high degree of nationalism and a tendency on the part of the state to play an ever-increasing role in the development process characterized the drive for economic independence. Between 1945 and 1952, most Latin American economies prospered and expanded, but afterward problems began to accumulate. Factors contributing to this situation included the exhaustion of international reserves amassed during World War II, price declines in foodstuffs and minerals, shrinkage in export markets, and the slacking off of new investment. In this situation, the insistence of most Latin American governments upon maintaining high levels of consumption discouraged badly needed investments in basic power and transportation enterprises as well as in agriculture and industry. In addition, the adverse shift in the terms of trade after 1952 created serious balance-of-payments problems for most of the South American countries, and their economic woes were compounded by chronic inflation, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia.

The manifold political and economic problems encountered by these reform-minded governments set in motion a reaction by the traditionalist groups. Also, the rising middle groups in some countries began to lose enthusiasm for reform before the threat of leftist demagogery, violence, and extremism. Concurrently, the ardor of the armed forces for continued cooperation with the left began to cool.

47266—59——3

By 1953, the 1943–53 cycle of popular revolution and reform had already been overlapped by a new cycle of counterrevolution. As early as 1947, when the political reform wave seemed to be carrying all before it and 85 percent of Latin America's total population was living under broadly based regimes apparently intent on fundamental change, political currents in some countries began to flow in the other direction.

Beginning in 1947, 6 years before the postwar cycle of political and social revolution had run its full course, counterrevolutions began. The reaction to popular reform governments set in and continued for an entire decade, until nearly every government of this type had been either overthrown or forced to adopt a more moderate course. Generally, it was the armed forces that stepped in, either at the behest of the oligarchy or of the frightened middle class, to halt any further leftward political evolution. Reformist rulers lost a measure of popular support when they failed to deliver on demagogic promises, yet it does not appear that the people turned against them. Rather, the military was generally provoked to intervene by the middle and upper groups, who reacted against labor-backed leaders' deliberate efforts to widen existing social cleavages. Often the military unmade the very revolutions they themselves had launched several years previous. This counterrevolutionary process began in Ecuador in 1947, and the following year rightist military dictators seized control in neighboring Peru and Venezuela. By the early 1950's the brief reformist experiment petered out in El Salvador. In 1952, Batista once more seized power in Cuba. Perverted reform regimes were brought to an end by military force in Brazil and Guatemala in 1954, in Argentina in 1955, and in Colombia in 1957, and all these labor-leftist governments were replaced by regimes of a moderate-to-conservative stripe.

The rightist drift in Latin America after 1947 was not of pure military origin, but was rather the result of a complex of factors involving leftist failures, middle group fears, oligarchic resistance, and the cold war. This became evident when similar political trends appeared in countries where the military was nonpolitical. In Mexico, after the 1946 elections, the life seemed to have left the social revolution. Even the radical MNR government in Bolivia became more moderate after consolidating its position and after U.S. aid began flowing into the country in 1954. Also, rightist party victories in the 1958 elections in Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay suggested that the immediate postwar radicalism of the new broadly based political parties had become considerably more moderate.

A very important recent political development is the anti-militaristic, anti-dictatorial trend that has been running in Latin America since 1954. In that year, 13 Presidents were military; today only four remain—General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, General Stroessner in Paraguay, General Ydigoras in Guatemala, and Colonel Lemus in El Salvador. Although this development is too recent to justify conclusions, the natural reaction to a decade of militarism is one obvious explanation for it. Once the trend of resurgent militarism reached its apogee in the year 1954, it was perhaps inevitable that civilian reaction to military rule would soon set in, bring the movement to a halt, and then begin to roll it back. In the alternation of trends

toward and away from military rule in Latin America, the pendulum since 1954 seems to have swung in the latter direction, as it has before, with the added consideration that civilian regimes now coming into office have a wider basis for democratic government than existed in the past.

The recent decline in militarism began in Panama in 1955 with the assassination of Colonel Remón. The following year General Somoza of Nicaragua was also assassinated, General Magloire of Haiti was driven from power by a revolution, and General Odría retired from the Peruvian scene following the election of an opposition civilian president. During 1957, Honduras' armed forces turned the Government over to civilians. The election of civilian regimes in Argentina and Colombia in 1958 and Venezuela in 1959 and the transference of power from military juntas to moderate civilian regimes merely represented consolidation of the anti-dictatorial revolutions against Generals Perón (in 1955), Rojas Pinilla (in 1957), and Pérez Jiménez (in 1958). The most recent, and in many ways the most spectacular defeat of military dictatorship occurred in Cuba early in 1959.

The political spectrum of contemporary Latin America, on balance, displays a moderate picture. Gone are the military dictatorships (except in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic) and gone are the radical revolutionary regimes (except in Cuba and perhaps Bolivia) which characterized the immediate post-World War II period. Traditionalist-type governments now prevail in Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador; moderately conservative regimes have power in Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Peru. Middle-of-the-road parties dominate Mexico and Brazil. Mildly left-of-center governments are running Venezuela, Honduras, and perhaps Haiti.

Briefly, the postwar political undulations in each of the 20 Latin American countries have been as follows:

ARGENTINA

The decade immediately following the end of World War II was dominated by the dictatorial figure of Juan Domingo Perón. He was a leader in the 1943 colonels' conspiracy, which ousted the traditionalist regime that had ruled Argentina in the 1930–43 period, and, with the support of junior officers and labor, he obtained virtually absolute power by 1945. For a full decade Perón headed a radical military-labor regime, and during this period he precipitated social and economic changes so fundamental that they can probably never be undone.

Backed by urban labor, the tenant farmers, the army, and an assortment of extreme nationalists, Perón was able to win overwhelming victories at the polls in the presidential elections of 1946 and 1951. Abetted by a rubberstamp Congress, a brutal Federal police force, and mobs inspired by his demagogic appeals, Perón muzzled the opposition. Sweeping labor benefits and social welfare programs were promulgated, and a large-scale, state-subsdized industrialization program was launched in an effort to revolutionize the Argentine economy and society. In foreign affairs nationalism and imperialism were the keynotes.

For 6 years the regime thrived, but after 1952 Perón began to run into serious economic troubles, largely due to the near prostration of agriculture which resulted from overhasty industrialization. Also, his authoritarian methods and demagogery provoked increasing opposition from traditionalist forces, the middle groups, segments of the armed forces, and the church. In September of 1955 these elements conducted a successful rebellion, whereupon a de facto military government was set up. With the general elections of February 1958, and the May 1958, inauguration of President Arturo Frondizi, constitutional government was restored. Since then, the Frondizi administration has maintained a precarious hold upon the Argentine Government. The President faces a political dilemma, for he must reward labor with political privileges and material gains in order to retain their support; while, if he favors this element too much, he will provoke a new rightist military coup. Argentina, of course, is currently suffering from the ill-advised economic policies and revolutionary social programs conducted by the Perón regime.

BOLIVIA

The struggle for control of Bolivia between the popular nationalist forces and traditional order broke out in 1943, when a group of young officer veterans of the Chaco war, led by Maj. Gualberto Villaroel, and the popular national revolutionary movement (MNR), led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, seized control of the Government. Three years later, however, counterrevolutionary elements rebelled, hanging Villaroel from a lamppost and forcing Paz Estenssoro into exile in Perón's Argentina. After 5 succeeding years of rule by the old oligarchy, the MNR, with Paz Estenssoro as its presidential candidate, won the 1951 elections. When a military junta was set up to prevent Paz Estenssoro from assuming power and to preserve the status quo, the MNR, in April of 1952, instigated a mass rebellion, defeated the army and assumed power, which it has held ever since.

The MNR is a broadly based government supported by the middle classes, by urban and mining labor, and by the peasantry. It has swept all elections since 1952, the most important being the national elections of 1956, which brought Hernán Siles Suazo to the presidency. The MNR has embarked upon a program of revolutionary political reforms (universal suffrage and representative government), economic reforms (nationalization of the tin industry and diversification), and social reform (redistribution of the large landed estates to the peasantry and social welfare legislation). Despite a steady flow of emergency financial assistance from the United States ever since 1954, this poverty-stricken country still faces very serious economic problems, particularly inflation and inadequate food production.

BRAZIL

The end of World War II also brought an end to a 15-year dictatorship. In 1945 Getulio Vargas, in the face of army prodding and popular pressures, was forced to step down and allow the election of Gen. Eurico Gaspar Dutra. The moderate Dutra administration (1946–50), however, either unaware of, or indifferent to, the nation's changing social realities, did virtually nothing to alleviate the economic hardships suffered by growing middle class and labor groups.

In fact, both main political organizations, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Democratic National Union (UDN), largely controlled by traditionalist elements, also ignored the mounting social problem. But Vargas recognized the political potential of the new social classes. Resorting to demagogic techniques, he posed as the champion of the downtrodden, launched a new organization, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and won the 1950 presidential elections.

Though the armed forces permitted Vargas to assume the presidency, they kept an extremely short rein on him. Faced with a moderate-conservative opposition majority in Congress, he was powerless, by constitutional means, to fulfill his campaign promises. As the country's economic deterioration and political stagnation continued, Vargas tried desperately to intrigue his way out of his constitutonal limitations by manipulating strikes and by directing the pressure of the masses against existing institutions. But the generals became increasingly restless. Late in 1954, the army stepped in and forced the President to resign, whereupon he committed suicide.

The government then passed into the hands of a caretaker administration while the nation girded itself for the 1955 presidential elections. In an atmosphere of severe political and social tension, these were won by a PSD–PTB coalition ticket headed by Vargas' supporter Juscelino Kubitschek, who was opposed by the armed forces.

In obvious fear of the latter, the Kubitschek administration, since taking office in 1956, has refrained from encouraging any further leftward political evolution in Brazil. Meanwhile, the economic situation has grown steadily worse. A spirit of sensitive nationalism prevents the administration from freeing the country's economy from retarding nationalistic and monopolistic restrictions. An anti-inflationary program, badly needed to promote sound development of the economy, is viewed as politically suicidal, particularly in view of the upcoming 1960 presidential elections. Finally, the decline of the coffee market has added to, and compounded, the nation's economic woes.

CHILE

Chile is politically unique in South America (along with Uruguay) in that it has strong democratic traditions and institutions and a nonpolitical military organization. Political changes in this country occur in an orderly constitutional manner. The Radical Party, a middle-class organization which received substantial support from labor, supplied the nation's president during World War II, and its candidate, González Videla, also won the 1946 elections.

The González Videla administration (1946–52), however, soon began to lose the support of labor as its overhasty industrialization program produced runaway inflation and severe economic hardships for all lower income groups. Exploiting politically the nation's economic crisis, former strong man and independent candidate, Carlos Ibáñez, won the 1952 elections on a platform that promised nearly all things to all men. During his 6-year term of office (1952–58), however, he was able to do virtually nothing toward fulfilling these campaign promises. A badly splintered Congress prevented positive legislative action, and Ibáñez's attempts to have the army intervene to strengthen

his hand ended in failure. Under the Ibáñez administration the nation's economic problems showed little improvement, and its already severe social tensions increased.

The 1958 elections were won by Conservative Party candidate Jorge Alessandri, largely due to a split in the majority left-of-center vote. It is too early to determine the success, or failure, of the present administration in meeting Chile's manifold problems.

COLOMBIA

Colombia, since World War II, has been a country in crisis. The problem developed in 1946, when, after 16 years of rightwing Liberal Party rule, victory in the primary elections of the Liberal Party went to the radical, labor-backed Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Thereupon rightwing liberals, alarmed at the rising power of the lower income groups, joined the Conservatives, which enabled the latter, under Mariano Ospina Pérez, to return to power. The economic and political aspirations of Colombia's newly awakened lower and middle groups, however, were intensified by severe postwar inflationary pressures which the status quo regime of President Ospina did nothing to alleviate. These economic hardships stretched political and social tensions to the breaking point. In April 1948, while the Ninth Inter-American Conference was in session in Bogotá, the assassination of Gaitán set off a wave of mob violence, and the country drifted into civil war.

As violence spread to the provinces, the beleaguered Ospina regime increasingly harassed and intimidated the Liberals, whom it suspected of abetting the violence. In November 1949, Laureano Gómez, leader of the uncompromising rightwing of the Conservative Party, was "elected" President while the country was under a state of siege. His reactionary tactics only made the bloodletting worse. His determined attempt to set up a Falange-type state and his inability to end the civil war provoked the armed forces, led by Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, to seize control of the Government in June 1953.

The army's coup aroused great popular enthusiasm, and most of the fighting in the countryside subsided as General Rojas promised to bring order and hold elections as soon as possible. Rojas Pinilla, however, saw his role as something more than that of an interim pacifier. Instead, he began to think of himself as a sort of messiah, and Perón-like, began a program of broad social reform. He levied heavier taxes upon the upper-income groups, adopted a social welfare program, sponsored a Government labor union, and launched a "Third Force" political movement, seeking support from the long neglected lower and middle classes. The alarmed traditionalist parties thereupon went into uncompromising opposition and violence again erupted. In the spring of 1957, the armed forces, faced with the prospect of intensification of the civil war, ousted Rojas Pinilla. He was succeeded by a new military junta which remained in power until August 1958, when the newly elected President, rightwing Liberal Party leader Alberto Lleras Camargo, was inaugurated.

Over the last year the Lleras administration, which is a coalition of the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties, has brought a modicum of political stability and economic responsibility to Colombia.

COSTA RICA

Costa Rica's liberalizing postwar revolution occurred right after the 1948 presidential elections when incumbent President Teodoro Picado Michalski refused to hand over control of the Government to the victorious National Union Party. Thereupon party leader José Figueres launched an uprising and attained power by force. This was no popular-versus-traditional group struggle, for broadly based forces had been in control of Costa Rican political processes since the beginning of World War II. The 1948 revolution was, however, a liberalizing movement in that its program called for effective political democracy and economic independence.

For a full decade, Figueres dominated the scene. He restored internal order, abolished the army, reestablished responsible constitutional government, and sought to achieve greater economic independence by nationalizing foreign industry, diversifying agriculture, and greatly expanding the role of the state in the development of the nation's economy.

These moderately socialistic policies were halted in May of 1958 when the conservative Mario Echandi was inaugurated as president following honest elections. The present government has thus far maintained political stability and is placing more emphasis upon economic development through private enterprise.

CUBA

Cuban politics for the past quarter century have been dominated by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. He came to power in the September 1933 revolution which ousted the corrupt, traditionalist-type dictatorship of Gerardo Machado. Batista gave Cuban politics order and stability and sponsored modest advances in labor legislation and social welfare. He ran Cuba from behind the scenes, through civilian puppets, until 1940 when he was elected president. At the end of his constitutional term of office in 1944, he accepted the defeat of his hand-picked candidate, and went into exile in the United States.

On the Cuban political scene there then occurred an 8-year civilian interlude, during which time Presidents Ramón Grau San Martín (1944–48) and Carlos Prío Socorrás (1948–52) made attempts to liberalize political institutions and bring the Government into closer conformity with Cuba's democratic constitution. Also, some attempts were made to improve the lot of the poverty-stricken masses. Increasingly, however, Cuba under the Prío regime was characterized by notorious corruption in public life, widespread gangsterism, public violence, and restlessness in the armed forces. Batista took advantage of this situation to carry out a military coup, and returned to power in March of 1952.

For several years he had little trouble maintaining a military dictatorship, backed by the armed forces and organized labor, both of whom received material benefits from the regime. A serious challenge to the strong man's reputed omnipotence began in late 1955 with student disturbances, and during 1956 Batista had to deal with army conspiracies, increasing terrorism and assassinations, and a successful invasion of eastern Cuba by radical young civilian revolutionaries

led by Fidel Castro. This movement ultimately triumphed as the armed forces were crushed, and Batista fled into exile on January 1, 1959.

The government of Fidel Castro is broadly based and has as its keynote a sweeping program of political reform, economic nationalism, and social revolution. It is still too early to tell whether the movement will be successful or be perverted either by the inexperience and overambitiousness of Fidel Castro or by the intrigues of the Communists.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic holds the dubious distinction of having the most primitive political structure in all Latin America. For the past 29 years this unfortunate Republic has been under the tyrannical thumb of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. He conducts the most brutal and predatory dictatorship in Latin America today. The nation is run as his personal family estate. There has been no significant political change in the Dominican Republic since Trujillo assumed power in 1930.

ECUADOR

The emergence of a more broadly based government in Ecuador can be traced to the May 1944 revolution, in which young army officers toppled Arroyo del Río's old-order regime and invited José María Velasco Ibarra, presumably the popular choice, to take over the presidency. What purported to be a popular reform administration, however, was soon perverted by the demagoguery and ineptness of Velasco. Late in 1947 the armed forces decided to save the country from his increasingly irresponsible rule. Thereupon a national unity coalition elected the moderate Galo Plaza Lasso.

President Plaza (1948–52) brought political stability and fiscal responsibility to the nation but did little to alleviate the suffering or improve the miserable lot of the lower income groups. The popular discontent was successfully exploited by Velasco, who was reelected president in 1952.

Velasco's attempts to launch a reform program designed to benefit the downtrodden were effectively frustrated by Congress and by the armed forces, which refused to permit an unconstitutional resolution of the nation's social problem. Since 1956, the Conservative Party, headed by President Camilo Ponce, has been in power. It has been reasonably successful in maintaining political order by constitutional means, has generally followed responsible fiscal policies, and has promoted development of the nation's economy along free-enterprise lines.

EL SALVADOR

El Salvador's young-officer-led popular revolution, following the familiar post-World War II pattern in Latin America, came in December 1948. It nearly occurred 4 years earlier when the cumulative pressure of population upon limited rural resources, the rise of small urban labor and middle-class commercial and professional groups, and the defeat and discrediting of military dictatorships elsewhere in World War II threatened the traditionalist regime of General Maximiliano Martínez. The military uprising which deposed him in 1944

revealed serious discontent among the junior officers, but from the brief internecine struggle for power the generals under Salvador Castañeda Castro, emerged triumphant. Castañeda Castro held power for 4 years by harsh, arbitrary rule under a near constant state-of-siege.

Initially, the December 1948 revolution, spearheaded by radical-talking majors and colonels and backed by reform-minded middle group intellectuals, appeared to signal the beginning of the end of militarism and feudalism in El Salvador. For the revolutionary junta announced plans for honest government, the conversion of the army into a faithful defender of the constitution, and sweeping social reforms.

The young officers who led the popular, liberating revolution of December 1948 soon turned their backs upon fundamental political change and social reform. They refused to give up political power. Revolt leader Maj. Oscar Osorio, who had assumed the provisional presidency a month after the revolt, was "elected" to the presidency in 1950, and when his 6-year constitutional term of office ended in 1956, the presidency was transferred to his colleague, Col. José María Lemus, the present ruler of El Salvador. Though the army at first introduced modest welfare measures, in the face of firm planter resistance, they forgot about land reform and social changes. Urban labor, but not rural, was authorized to organize and bargain collectively, but only under strict government tutelage. Thus the 1948 "revolution" has not turned out to be a revolution in any fundamental sense. The colonels merely replaced the generals.

GUATEMALA

During the summer of 1944, while the rest of the world watched the Allies crush the Fascist tyranny in Germany, the attention of Guatemalans was focused upon crushing their local military despotism. The beginning of the end of the ancien régime came in June 1944, with the ouster of dictator Jorge Ubico. Four months later, in October of 1944, young officers and popular elements drove out the old generals. Dr. Juan Arévalo, a left-of-center intellectual, became the triumphant revolutionaries' choice for president.

The October 1944 revolution began as a true social revolution. It was a movement of the nation's hitherto-neglected lower and middle-income groups. In response to their demands, the new administration quickly passed a rash of reform legislation directed toward expansion of education, protection of organized labor, social welfare, industrialization, and agrarian reform.

The increasing political and social tensions arising from Arévalo's radical reform program gave rise to two distinct army factions—a leftist group led by Col. Jacobo Arbenz and a moderate faction led by Col. Francisco Javier Araña. The assassination of the latter and the silencing and exile of his supporters in 1949 made Arbenz an easy victor in the 1950 presidential campaign. Soon after his inauguration, the revolution veered decidedly leftward; the energetic Communist minority influenced the new president and rapidly began to usurp control of the movement. Essentially agents of the U.S.S.R., they sought to destroy U.S. influence, to provoke a violent class struggle, and to spread communism into neighboring republics.

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The June 1954 shipment of Soviet-bloc arms to Guatemala gave the ousted pro-Araña army exiles, now led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, their opportunity to return. The shipment also provoked the U.S. Government, which saw its vital strategic interests in jeopardy, to counter the Russian move by sending armaments to Nicaragua and Honduras—armaments which apparently found their way into the hands of Castillo, whose liberation army promptly ousted Arbenz and the Communists.

For 3 difficult years Castillo's middle-of-the-road regime tried to restore a semblance of order and moderation to the disturbed country. It was a difficult matter for him to uphold, even to a limited extent, the liberal principles of the October 1944 revolution in the face of the oligarchy's desire to make a comeback. Castillo's assassination in the summer of 1957 did little to resolve the moderate-rightist struggle for power. When a moderate civilian candidate won the October 1957 election, the conservatives stirred up so much resistance that the armed forces felt obliged to nullify the victory. Then in early 1958, Gen. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, a moderate conservative, won the elections.

The Guatemalan political situation is far from stable, for although a substantial cross section of the middle and lower income groups still cling to many of the principles of the 1944 popular revolution, the conservatives appear determined to restore the old social and political order.

HAITI

Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world, and throughout its independent national history it has been plagued by near political and economic chaos. After the U.S. Marines ended their occupation (1915–34), the educated mulatto elite governed the country, with the backing of the army, down through World War II. However, the failure of mulatto leadership to improve the miserable lot of the Negro masses brought irresistible pressure for political change. In the face of a general strike, the army in 1946 ousted mulatto President Elie Lescot, whereupon Dumarsais Estimé, an anti-mulatto Negro, was elected to the presidency.

Corruption soon became rife inside the Estimé regime, and the President responded to the deepening economic crisis by decreeing martial law. His undoing was his expanded political ambitions. When he attempted to amend the constitution to provide for his continuation in office, the palace guard, led by the same group that installed him 4 years previously, ousted him in 1950.

Thereupon, army strong man, Col. Paul Magloire, was elected to the presidency. The Magloire administration (1950–56) soon turned into a military dictatorship. This despotism was, for a time, useful in bringing about a modicum of material progress, but Magloire ultimately ran afoul of the same difficulties that plagued his predecessor—economic problems, graft and corruption on public projects, and attempts to continue in power beyond his constitutional term of office. The political upshot in 1956 was a general strike and the collapse of the Magloire dictatorship.

During the course of the following year several provisional governments rose and fell because of the intense rivalry among various candi-

dates aspiring to the presidency. In the September 1957 election, victory went to Dr. François Duvalier, a popular candidate with a moderate reform program. The continuance of chronic economic difficulties and severe political strife has provoked this initially democratic administration to assume an increasingly authoritarian complexion during 1958 and 1959.

HONDURAS

The development of a stable government and a sound economy in Honduras is handicapped by a lack of material resources and the underdevelopment of human resources. The high rate of illiteracy and lack of capital and communications have long hampered her political and economic progress. A minor political thaw came to the country in 1948, when Gen. Tiburcio Carías Andino, strong man since 1932, was succeeded by the more democratically inclined Gen. Juan Manuel Gálvez. Result of the new political freedom was the winning of a plurality in the 1954 presidential election by the popular-backed Liberal Party, led by Dr. Villeda Morales. In the absence of any of the three presidential contestants having a majority, Vice President Dr. Julio Lozano assumed the top political office.

In 1956, in the face of widespread antagonism toward the increasingly unpopular Lozano government, young army officers staged a successful coup d'etat. The late 1957 elections were decisively won by the Liberals, whereupon the armed forces stepped aside and allowed the presidency to be assumed by Villeda Morales. The present government, since its assumption of power, has been politically stable and economically viable. It is representative and appears to be responsible and honest.

MEXICO

In contrast to the turbulent post-World War II political histories of most other Latin American nations, that of Mexico has been peaceful and orderly. There have been no crises, no revolutions. Such political calm can be largely attributed to the fact that this nation underwent a liberating political and social upheaval earlier in the century (1910–20). Ever since, the political energies of the nation have been focused upon consolidation of the gains achieved in the great revolution. Slowly but steadily internal order was restored, the people began to be educated, agrarian reform (principally land redistribution) proceeded, economic reconstruction and development took place, the material lot of the masses was improved, political democracy began to become more effective, and the army was relegated to its proper place as defender of the nation and custodian of order.

The radical, social-reform phase of the great revolution ended on the eve of World War II with the termination of the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas. All four of his successors in the presidential office—Avila Camacho (1940–46), Miguel Alemán (1946–52), Ruíz Cortines (1952–58), and López Mateos (1958–), have been moderates who identified themselves with Mexico's rapidly growing urban middle groups. Since World War II, the economy has grown steadily, and political processes have been conducted quietly and efficiently.

Mexico still has the problems of raising living standards for millions of peasants, reducing illiteracy, and making democracy still more effective by the development of opposition political forces to contest with the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI), which has run the country ever since the 1920's. In her record of political and economic progress from the end of World War II to date, however, Mexico has set an example which many another Latin American nation would do well to follow.

NICARAGUA

There has been little political change or development in Nicaragua since 1936. In that year, Gen. Anastasio Somoza, the head of the national guard, seized the presidency and ruled as a dictator for the next generation. Like his counterpart, General Trujillo, in the Dominican Republic, Somoza's monopoly on the means of violence was used to promote the selfish ends of the family. Systematic graft and the accumulation of vast commercial and agricultural holdings through use of political power made the Somozas one of the wealthiest families in the Americas.

Following the assassination of the dictator in 1956, his two sons have tried to carry on. Luis Somoza is now President, and his younger brother, "Tachito," heads the national guard. During the past year, there have been indications—notably popular demonstrations and an attempted invasion by exiles—that the Somoza family may not be able to continue to dominate and exploit Nicaragua in the manner they have so long become accustomed to.

PANAMA

Panama, at the end of World War II, was still being ruled by the small group of "first families" that had controlled the politics of this tiny Republic for most of its independent history. In the immediate postwar period, however, the growing social tensions and the political awakening of the lower and middle income groups, neither of which seemed to possess cohesion, responsible leadership, or positive national programs, provided an increasingly larger political power vacuum into which the national police steadily moved. By 1947, Police Chief Col. José Antonio Remón had become the arbiter of Panamanian politics. This he demonstrated by making and breaking five civilian Presidents in the 4 years preceding his assumption of presidential power in late 1952.

Remón was a genuine reformer. He insisted upon integrity in the hitherto corrupt bureaucracy, thoroughly reorganized the country's finances, promoted agricultural and industrial development, and conducted a reasonably responsible foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States. Also, he sought to make the Government the servant of all social classes rather than only the privileged. He introduced social welfare and labor legislation, and he catered to the mass vote, even to the hitherto ignored Negroes. Broad material benefits to the national police helped protect him against the opposition of the oligarchy.

The 1955 assassination of Remón brought the brief reform movement to a halt; for the first families, under the presidency of Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., resumed power again and control Panama today.

PARAGUAY

Paraguay, one of the most primitive nations in all of South America, has experienced no fundamental political change—only palace-type revolutions—since the end of World War II. For the most part, predatory military despots have ruled this unfortunate nation ever since it became independent.

Gen. Higinio Morínigo ruled as dictator during and immediately after World War II. His was a status quo military regime, backed by the Colorado Party of the land-holding oligarchy. In 1949, Colorado Party leader, Dr. Federico Chaves, obtained the necessary military backing to win the presidency, and held office for 5 years, during which time Paraguay was incorporated into the Argentine (under Perón) sphere of influence.

Since 1954, the nation has been under a military regime headed by Gen. Alfredo Stroessner. The armed forces monopolize political privileges and prerogatives and take the lion's share of the budget. Although the Stroessner regime is very conservative and neither permits political experimentation nor promotes social change, the traditionalist Colorado Party is unhappy that they are not allowed a share in running the government.

PERU

In the 1945 elections, the Democratic Front candidate, Dr. José Luis Bustamante, the popular choice, won an overwhelming victory over the hitherto dominant traditionalist Conservative Party in the nation's first free election. Bustamante set up the first democratic government in Peruvian history. The backbone of his political support was the reformist Aprista Party, which had been prevented from assuming power by the oligarchy, even though it was the majority party, ever since the early 1930's. Bustamante was a middle-of-the-road President, but he cooperated with the Aprista-controlled Congress on many reform needs such as economic development and diversification, social welfare measures, and labor legislation.

Though the Aprista Party had a plurality in Congress, the Conservative opposition soon brought a halt to the initial rash of reform legislation by refusing to form a quorum, thereby bringing the legislative machinery to a standstill. They then began conspiring with the armed forces, which, under the aegis of Gen. Manuel Odría, staged a successful coup d'etat in October 1948. Odría held power for the next 8 years, during which time the oligarchy was made secure against such annoyances as land reform demands and labor agitation.

By the mid-1950's, however, the alliance between the armed forces and the traditionalist elements began to collapse. Odría's arbitrary policies, both economic and political, and his harsh treatment of some members of the oligarchy chilled their ardor for continued cooperation with the military. Also, the armed forces appear to have had some qualms about their ability to subdue indefinitely popular reform pressures. The political result was Odría's retirement and the victory of Manuel Prado in the free elections of 1956. Though most of the Apristas supported Prado, they have been able to make very little headway toward reactivating the temporarily stalled social revolution under the moderate administration which now governs Peru.

URUGUAY

In Uruguay politics in the 20th century have been more orderly than in any other nation in Latin America. Its stable two-party system is supported by a literate population of European ancestry, sufficient material resources to provide a relatively high standard of living, and a nonpolitical armed forces organization. The liberal, urban-oriented, mildly socialistic Colorado Party dominated the nation's politics throughout the 20th century, until 1958 when the conservative, rural-oriented National (old Blanco) Party finally won an election.

When World War II ended, the pro-Allied Dr. Juan José Amézaga was in the middle of a 4-year presidential term. In 1947 he was succeeded by another Colorado, Luis Batlle Berres, who continued the party's traditional policies of extending state control over industry and commerce and championing the rights and promoting the welfare of labor and the white-collar workers. In 1950, the Colorados elected Andrés Martínez Trueba, who sponsored a plural executive system, on the Swiss model, which became effective in 1952. Since their 1958 election victory, the Blancos have not tried to undo the broad social and economic innovations carried out by the Colorados, but no new ones, nor extensions of the old, are apt to be forthcoming under the present administration.

VENEZUELA

"Venezuela is a barracks," said its founder, Gen. Simón Bolívar, at the time of independence. The political history of the nation down to the end of World War II could be told in terms of the lives of its military dictators. Twentieth century politics were dominated by Gen. Juan Vicente Gómez (1909–35) and his associates, Gen. Eleázar López Contreras (1935–41), and Gen. Isafas Medina (1941–45).

In 1945, traditionalist President Medina, whose legal term was about to expire, made plans for perpetuating Venezuela's customary political pattern under which senior army officers ran the Government as their personal domain. These plans went awry, however, when a group of disgruntled and reform-minded young officers decided to rebel. In October 1945, they joined forces with the popular civilian opposition represented by the Acción Democrática Party, and in a relatively bloodless coup ousted the Medina regime. Acción Democrática, which represented Venezuela's hitherto ignored lower and middle income groups, quickly launched a broad program of fundamental reforms. Under the aegis of the party's political and intellectual leader, Rómulo Betancourt, taxes on the foreign oil companies, and the larger Venezuelan businesses were sharply increased; labor was encouraged to organize, and its wages and welfare benefits were improved; a thorough reorganization of the educational system was begun with an eye to reducing illiteracy; economic development and diversification programs were set in motion; and a blueprint for land reform was drawn up. To get a verdict on their program, Acción Democrática went to the people. After providing for universal suffrage, in the liberal democratic constitution of 1947, it launched its candidate, the novelist Rómulo Gallegos, for the presidency, and elected him by an overwhelming majority.

However, the young officers who had launched the popular-liberalizing revolution of 1945 began, after 1947, to become dissatisfied with Acción Democrática's radical program. After several attempts had failed, a coup d'etat succeeded in November of 1948. Acción Democrática was ousted and outlawed, and the army once more took charge of the Government. They decided to halt the political and social revolution and resume their long tradition of exclusive domination of Venezuela's politics. A military junta ruled until 1953, when Col. Marcos Pérez Jiménez, after staging a notorious electoral farce which clearly demonstrated popular antipathy to him, assumed the office of President. For the next 5 years he ruled as an absolutist military dictator. The political reforms introduced by Acción Democrática disappeared. The material gains achieved by the lower and middle income groups were preserved, but few new ones were introduced.

In January 1958, the dictatorship, which appeared firmly entrenched, succumbed with surprising ease to naval and air force opposition backed by the populace. A revolutionary junta then arranged for free elections, which were won in late 1958 by Acción Democrática. Early in 1959 Betancourt was inaugurated as President. He is now reactivating the long-range political, economic, and social reform program he began back in 1945.

III. PROBABLE COURSE OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Latin America is an area of very rapid growth. Its population is increasing at a faster rate than that of any other area in the world today (over 2½-percent net gain per year). Already the area contains over 180 million people. By the year 2000, its population is expected to exceed half a billion.

Also, the Latin-American economy is on the rise. Since it has room to develop and expand and untapped resources to exploit, its relative world importance will rise. The economic growth of the area over the next 20 years may well be double the extraordinary development that has occurred during the past 20.

The relative importance of Latin America in world affairs will expand. Its weight in international organizations will grow, and the strategic value of its friendship and cooperation will increase as its material and manpower resources move more and more into the balance in the cold war struggle. The role that Latin America will play in that struggle will be largely determined by the approaches taken to her developing problems by the two major rivals for her international affection.

The overwhelming problem in Latin America today and for the foreseeable future is the social revolution, the revolution of rising popular expectations. This is a problem not only for the Latin Americans themselves, but also for any outside power that hopes to have influence there. The entire area is in the throes of a painful process of social, economic, and political transformation. Only a few countries are yet into the advanced stages of the ordeal. Most of them are just beginning.

The problems are tremendous. Over half the people are undernourished; nearly half are illiterate. The overwhelming majority are propertyless, for both land and natural resources are concentrated in the hands of the few. Over half the working popualtion lives and toils under semifeudal conditions which retard health, welfare, and education.

All the same, those growing numbers who have over the past generation begun to escape their miseries, to resist rural exploitation, to read, and to enjoy the benefits of improved health, are pointing the way to their less fortunate brethren. Emancipation from semifeudal working conditions through economic opportunities in booming cities, an end to political apathy through realization of one's power potential when used as part of a cooperative organization, the taste of a better life at home and the knowledge of living conditions far better still abroad—all these are making irrepressible the force of Latin America's revolution of rising expectations. Demographic pressures and economic development will further accelerate the social revolution.

Because of the magnitude of the problem involved, the social revolutionary process will be a long-drawn-out affair. Resolution of the rising dissatisfaction of the masses will probably be the most overwhelming problem of the area for the remainder of the present century. The transitional period will be far from smooth. Until the new, more broadly based social, economic, and political equilibrium is achieved, Latin America will remain an area of turmoil. Demagogs will spring forth to exploit the popular discontent and aspirations—neo-Peronists or neo-Nassers may rise. Exaggerated nationalism will again rear its ugly head. The traditional ruling groups will compound the difficulties by calling on the armed forces to preserve the traditional order. Civil wars and violent social upheavals are not improbable. Political instability will vary in relation to the degree of extremism of the competing new and old forces, as well as the extent to which civilian demagogs, Communist conspirators, and armed forces political adventurers attempt to exploit the struggle for their own personal advantage. However, the United States will probably be able, by intelligent action, to moderate, and to some extent subdue, dangerous extremisms.

As inevitable as the process of social change, and intimately related to it, is the ultimate political emancipation of the great mass of the people. While the social struggle rages, attempts at authoritarian political solutions, either left-wing dictators or right-wing autocrats, will be common, and it will appear at times that Latin America is adopting a system of less, rather than more, freedom and democracy. But authoritarian regimes cannot be but temporary. The long-term trend is firmly against dictatorship, for as the social problem is progressively resolved, the conditions that gave rise to despotism must then disappear. Increasing realization of the people's social and economic desires will inevitably intensify their demands for political freedom and responsible representative government.

This means that the long-term future political role of the armed forces is almost certain to be a declining one. The emerging new balance of social forces as embodied in labor organizations and the middle groups will offer increasingly effective resistance to armed forces political preponderance. Militarism is likely to be a strong political factor as long as the social crisis rages and as long as government is not firmly rooted in a broad representative base, but ultimately the armed forces political control must wane. The wave of popular pressure against it will become irresistible. Neither political holding operations against social change nor predatory militarism can last long beyond the point where the people become aware of their political rights and power potential.

Therefore, the basic consideration for any nation which desires Latin America as a future ally must not be the political allegiance of the on-the-way-out military caste. Rather, it must be the cooperation and association with the people to whom the future belongs.

Latin America's orientation vis-a-vis the current and future world crisis can take three possible courses. It can ally with the United

47266—59——5

States, with the Russians, or remain neutral. If the two major antagonists in the cold war both exploit the area for their advantage, Latin America, feeling that it has no stake in the international conflict, will assume a neutral position. To the Communists will belong the future if they succeed in capturing control of popular nationalist revolutions, either by default due to insufficient U.S. vigilance with respect to the subversive threat or as a reaction against too close United States identification with the traditional order.

IV. U.S. AND LATIN AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD EACH OTHER IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD[1]

A. BACKGROUND

It was not until the end of the 19th century that U.S. relations with Latin America began to become a prominent feature in the conduct of our foreign policy. The pan-American movement was initiated by the United States in 1889, its chief object being the promotion of trade. To this end three pan-American conferences were held prior to World War I, but little was achieved due to Latin America's apparent indifference concerning commercial problems and its suspicion of U.S. motives in creating closer hemisphere ties.

Latin America's apprehensions sprang from a fear of "Yankee imperialism." The emergence of the United States as a world power following the Spanish War and the subsequent encroachments in the Caribbean area by Great Britain and Germany suddenly made security precautions a key consideration in U.S. policy toward Latin America. A number of reasons, including concern for the rights of U.S. creditors and for the safety of U.S. property, lay behind the active policy of intervention in five Latin American republics in the early decades of this century. But the primary motive was to stabilize chaotic political situations that loomed as a threat to this nation's security. In the Caribbean, the fear of European intervention was the main reason for U.S. action; in Central America, the safety of the Panama Canal was at issue. In every military intervention the formula for the establishment of stability was the same, namely to restore order in the finances and to build up responsible armed forces that would preserve internal order and thus insure orderly political processes. This latter part of the task was entrusted directly to U.S. Armed Forces on the spot. In 1906, the U.S. Army began the process in Cuba. The Marine Corps extended it to Haiti in 1915, to the Dominican Republic in 1916, to Panama in 1918, and finally to Nicaragua in 1926. The operation did not come to an end till the last of the marines left Haiti in 1934. Meanwhile, on the eve of World War I, the U.S. Navy had occupied Veracruz, and an army expedition entered northern Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa.

The prewar failure to cement trade ties and the rash of interventions were at least two of the reasons for the lack of hemispheric cooperation during World War I. Brazil was the only South American nation to declare war on Germany. However, during the war itself and the immediate postwar period, United States-Latin American trade expanded greatly, and U.S. investments began to flow southward in ever-increasing volume. Also, intervention began to wane in the 1920's, even though the United States insisted upon maintaining the "right to intervene."

[1] The recent disturbances in the Caribbean along with certain policy recommendations are discussed in the appendix.

The cornerstone of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy of the 1930's was the unequivocal abandonment of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American republics. At the Seventh Pan American Conference in Montevideo in 1933 the United States accepted with reservations the Latin American proposal, the same one which it had rejected at the Sixth Pan American Conference in Havana in 1928, namely, that "no state has the right to intervene in the affairs of any other." During the 1933–36 period the United States concluded treaties with Cuba and Panama which abrogated the U.S. right to intervene, and withdrew the marines from Nicaragua and Haiti. All that remained were customs receiverships in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, both of which were voluntarily given up in 1941 just prior to the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor.

The "good neighbor" policy also had its positive economic aspects. This involved principally attempts to rebuild inter-American trade, which had virtually collapsed following the stock market crash in 1929, by tariff reduction. At the Montevideo Conference, the United States proposed that the American governments negotiate bilateral reciprocal trade treaties and that each include a "most favored nation" clause. Under the Reciprocal Trade Act, passed by Congress in 1934, the President was given authority to make agreements with foreign nations to reduce existing tariffs by as much as 50 percent of the 1930 schedule. This tariff bargaining measure, which did not go far enough so that additional reductions were authorized in later years, resulted in a number of mutually beneficial bilateral trade treaties between the United States and various Latin American nations.

The enlightened U.S. political and economic policies of the 1933–39 period helped repair much of the damage resulting from earlier policies and served to prepare Latin America psychologically for joining the United States in meeting an external threat to the hemisphere. Already by 1937, U.S. policy was to oppose Nazi infiltration in Latin America, but in doing so the Roosevelt administration wisely chose not to use the Monroe Doctrine to do this unilaterally as in the past, but instead sought Latin America's cooperation. At the Eighth Inter-American Conference held in Lima in 1938, the U.S. sponsored Declaration of Lima reaffirmed continental solidarity and provided for consultation, at the Foreign Minister level, if aggression threatened. Such a consultative meeting was called in September 1939, as soon as World War II broke out in Europe, and the resulting Declaration of Panama established a 300-mile-wide neutrality zone around the shores of the entire hemisphere, leaving out Canada. Ten months later at Havana, in July of 1940, the American Foreign Ministers agreed to act cooperatively against possible Nazi aggression in the French, Dutch, and Danish colonies in the Caribbean.

For the practical task of cooperation for hemisphere defense, closer relations began to be developed between the U.S. Armed Forces and those of Latin America. Beginning in 1938, U.S. military advisers began to replace the long-established German and Italian military missions, and by the time of Pearl Harbor all the European missions had been eliminated, and the United States had Army, Air, or Navy advisers in nearly all the Latin American Republics. At the same time the United States helped to bolster the Latin American economies against the dislocations resulting from the outbreak of war in Europe

by embarking upon a vigorous program of buying up their strategic raw materials, such as rubber, antimony, copper, manganese, tungsten, tin, and zinc, and stockpiling them in the United States.

From the time of the December 7, 1941, attack upon Pearl Harbor until mid-1945, the United States waged total war and did its best to get Latin America to play a supporting role in the conflict. At a consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, all the Latin American nations, except Argentina and Chile, agreed to sever relations with the Axis. Soon thereafter the United States stepped up measures for the common defense of the hemisphere. An Inter-American Defense Board was set up to plan for cooperative defense of the coastlines and the lines of communication, and under the Lend-Lease Act $400 million was set aside for war goods for Latin America.[2] In exchange for military assistance the United States obtained base facilities from Brazil, Cuba, Panama, and Ecuador.

In general, U.S. policy objectives in Latin America were achieved during World War II. These included (1) elimination of the threat of Nazi subversion, (2) hemispheric unity for both military and political ends, (3) maximum utilization of Latin America's limited military potential for primarily defensive roles, (4) political stability of the region and its sympathetic association with U.S. policy aims, and (5) use of bases and full access to Latin America's strategic raw materials. The main U.S. political goal was cooperation, and this we got—except from Argentina. Eventually all 20 Latin American Republics declared war upon the Axis, and the inter-American system was strengthened and improved by the wartime crisis. At the same time the Latin American economies were shored up by U.S. war purchases.

B. MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS, 1945–59

Prior to the end of World War II, before the sociopolitical ferment in Latin America had reached serious proportions, U.S. policy problems were relatively simple, despite the antagonisms engendered by the issue of "Yankee imperialism." The consequences of political change in Latin America were not unduly disturbing, for politics was the privilege of the upper groups and the armed forces, and revolutions were generally of the palace variety. Sudden changes in the government in power, save in the case of Mexico after 1910, were not apt to involve significant shifts in foreign policies. With the adoption of the "good neighbor" policy and the increasing inter-American solidarity resulting from the deepening danger of war in Europe, relations between the United States and Latin America seemed easier and friendlier than ever before. This spirit was carried over into the period of the war—though notably absent from the United States-Argentine relations—as the Latin American governments generally agreed that the external menace to the hemisphere had to be met.

The harmony of wartime cooperation, however, tended to obscure some of the changes taking place in Latin America, and with the coming of the cold war the achievement of U.S. objectives has be-

[2] Mark Skinner Watson, "U.S. Army in World War II (Prewar Plans and Preparations)" (Washington, 1950), pp. 89–96. Only $260 million in lend-lease aid was sent to Latin America during World War II, most of it to Brazil.

come increasingly difficult, principally because the aims of the United States and of the Latin American nations have become increasingly incompatible. Even before World War II ended, many Latin American countries were undergoing rather sweeping political and social changes. Then their "revolution of rising expectations" spread and gained momentum at the very time that the United States was fixing its attention almost exclusively on the cold war. Thus, while the United States increasingly insisted that the security of the hemisphere against the Communist threat must be the major consideration in a common foreign policy, Latin Americans were more concerned with their internal socio-economic problems, and their governments looked to the United States less for leadership against communism than for cooperation in meeting these problems, chiefly in the form of easing their economic burdens.

1. Collective security

After World War II the United States was anxious to continue the cooperation with Latin America which had already served both so well, in order to meet whatever new challenges might arise to security and other common interests. To this end it took a leading part in placing the inter-American system on a more permanent treaty basis. But Latin America inevitably took a subordinate place in the newly developing global foreign policy of the United States, a fact which was only too obvious to the Latin Americans themselves. In fact, the United States did not find it easy to determine just where Latin America fitted into its strategy for the new situation, increasingly dominated by the cold war with the Soviet Union. And the Latin American nations, for their part, were quite naturally taking stock of their relationship to the United States, and looking at the problems of "hemisphere defense" in that context.

Though victories in Europe in late 1944 and early 1945 eliminated the Axis military threat to the Western Hemisphere, the United States showed no inclination to let lapse the defense system it had so laboriously been constructing since 1938. Accordingly, in February of 1945, a meeting in Mexico was called to plan the future of the inter-American system. That conference reaffirmed the vital provision made at Havana in 1940 which declared that an attack by any state, American or foreign, on an American state would be considered to be an attack against them all, and that collective measures would be taken to repeal such aggression. This provision, formally embodied in a treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, has become the cornerstone of the inter-American defense system. At this time, the United States was more concerned with guarding the peace within the hemisphere, rather than with the fading danger of aggression from without. Not until later did communism become the key problem.

It was also decided at the 1945 meeting in Mexico that the Inter-American Defense Board, a wartime agency, would be made a permanent organization. Eight months later, in October 1945, the IADB issued its first peacetime recommendations for insuring the military defense of the hemisphere. These included standardization of equipment, organization, and training,[3] a goal long favored by the United

[3] "Encyclopedia Britannia Yearbook," 1946, p. 395.

States. Indeed, ever since 1938 it had expended considerable time, money, and effort to achieve hemispheric adoption of U.S. methods and equipment. It was to protect this investment in national security and hemisphere defense that the Truman administration, accepting the recommendations of the IADB, requested Congress in May 1946, to approve a continuing program of inter-American military cooperation. In this program, the United States would undertake to modernize Latin American military equipment, and to continue its wartime program of equipping Latin America's armed forces.[4] Congress, however, apparently unimpressed by the administration's proposal and perhaps also swayed by its critics, failed to act on the bill in 1946 and delayed action once more when it was presented in 1947.

The inaction was characteristic of the early postwar period in which, except for the conclusion of the Rio Pact, little was done in the way of holding to any minimum level of hemisphere defense. The U.S. military mission program continued, but after the end of lend-lease it was hardly possible to maintain in Latin America even the existing defense posture. As the administration feared, the wartime program of standardization of material began to disintegrate, for now that Latin American governments had to pay for military equipment, they began to purchase where prices and terms were most favorable. All too often, in the opinion of the Pentagon, they turned to European suppliers.

World events, however, were taking a turn that soon served to reactivate a positive and vigorous U.S. security policy in Latin America. By 1947, in the face of repeated aggressive moves by the U.S.S.R., the United States felt itself obliged to concentrate heavily on containment of the Communist threat, at first in Europe and then throughout the entire world. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 inaugurated a comprehensive system of military aid to NATO countries. Then, when open war came in Korea, Washington was forced to the unpleasant conclusion that defense against the persistent and worldwide Communist acts of aggression could be achieved only by programs of military, economic, and technical assistance for many countries throughout the non-Communist world. Congressional authorization for such a program was provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the objectives of which were—

> to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.

Under this act, authorization was granted to furnish military assistance "to any nation whose increased ability to defend itself * * * is important to the security of the United States." Military equipment furnished under the act was to be used "solely" to maintain the internal security and legitimate self-defense of the recipient nation, or to permit it to participate in the defense of its area or in collective arrangements and measures consistent with the charter of the United Nations. Assistance programs were to be administered under four separate titles—I Europe, II Near East and Africa, III Asia and the Pacific, and IV

[4] New York Times, May 7, 1946, p. 1.

Latin America. Concerning title IV, the act specified that "military assistance may be furnished to the other American Republics only in accordance with defense plans which * * * require the recipient nations to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."[5]

Even before the Mutual Security Act was passed, the Truman administration had already acted to secure the cooperation of Latin America in the cold war. Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, a consultative meeting of American foreign ministers took place in Washington in March and April of 1951. Here the President requested that the American Republics support the war effort in Korea with their combined military strength, and that they plan a common program for resistance to the Communist threat. The response was a resolution recommending that the American Republics—

> orient their military preparation in such a way that through self-help and mutual aid * * * they can without prejudice to their individual self-defense and their internal security: (a) increase those of their resources and strengthen those of their armed forces best adapted to the collective defense, and maintain those armed forces in such status that they can be promptly available for the defense of the Continent; and (b) cooperate with each other, in military matters, in order to develop the collective strength of the Continent necessary to combat aggression against any of them.[6]

To support this combined effort, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Edward G. Miller, Jr., appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1951, requested $40 million of mutual security funds for a new program of military aid to Latin America. Such assistance, he asserted, would help overcome limitations on the ability of Latin America to contribute to hemisphere defense. In addition, Mr. Miller requested, as an integral part of the overall mutual security program for Latin America, $22 million for technical assistance.[7] This $62 million program was comparatively modest, actually only three-fourths of 1 percent of the total requested in the mutual security appropriations bill for 1951.

Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Chairman of the IADB, supported the request for military aid to Latin America, arguing that such assistance would relieve U.S. troops of the burden of defending the hemisphere in the event of war. He indicated that the IADB was planning specific defense tasks for each nation to assume in strategic areas. To help protect the critical Panama Canal area, for example, the IADB had recommended that the adjacent countries contribute an antiaircraft battalion. General Bolte indicated that though the grant aid would help maintain modern standards in Latin America's armed forces, the United States expected that most of its military shipments to Latin America would continue, as in the past, to be on a reimbursable basis.[8] Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall tied the military aid program to the problem of future availability of Latin America's strategic resources, as well as to the need to help the Latin American republics play a more active role in hemisphere defense.[9]

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[5] Sec. 105, Mutual Security Act of 1951.
[6] U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Apr. 9, 1951, pp. 566–567.
[7] United States, 82d Cong., 1st sess., House, Foreign Affairs Committee, hearings on MSA for 1951 (Washington, 1951), pp. 1080–1082.
[8] Ibid., pp. 1084–1089.
[9] United States, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, hearings on MSA for 1951 (Washington, 1951), p. 38.

Congress having appropriated $38 million for Latin American military aid for 1951, negotiations were opened with eight countries—Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Cuba. In preliminary discussions, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay balked at U.S. insistence upon limitation of trade with the Soviet bloc. They also were unwilling to grant the United States exclusive access to their strategic resources. Ultimately, however, seven countries, all except Mexico, made formal requests for military aid from the United States.[10] With U.S. advice the estimated needs of each country were calculated with reference to its potential contribution to hemisphere defense, its ability to supply part of its own requirements, and its capacity for effectively utilizing and maintaining various types of military equipment. The programs were then subjected to review by the Defense Department, the State Department, and Representatives of the Congress prior to formal signing of the agreements.[11]

The first Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with a Latin American country was concluded with Ecuador on January 20, 1952. Under its terms the U.S. Government agreed "to make available * * * equipment, materials, services, and other military assistance designed to promote the defense and maintain the peace of the Western Hemisphere." In return Ecuador promised to make effective and exclusive use of this assistance for implementing defense plans, to build up and maintain its own defensive capacities, "to facilitate the production and transfer * * * of * * * strategic materials required by the United States," and to cooperate with the United States in limiting its trade with the Soviet bloc.[12] Before the year was out similar pacts had been signed with Cuba, Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

To expand the program, the administration, in the mutual security bill for 1952, asked Congress for an additional $62 million for Latin American military aid. The continuing program resulted in MDA pacts with Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay during 1953, with Nicaragua and Honduras during 1954, and with Haiti and Guatemala during 1955. By the end of fiscal 1958, the 12 countries included in the program had received about $317 million in grants for military aid.

Military assistance program shipments to Latin America[1]

[Fiscal years—Figures in millions of dollars]

1952	0.2	1956	21.2
1953	65.2	1957	32.0
1954	37.9	1958	56.8
1955	36.9	1959	67.0

[1] United States, 86th Cong., 1st sess., House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Staff Memorandum on Background Material in Mutual Security Program for Fiscal 1960" (committee print, Washington, 1959), p. 27; United States, President, "The MSP for Fiscal 1960" (Washington, 1959), p. 132.

In addition, these 12 countries and seven others were obtaining about $20 million worth of military equipment annually under the reimbursible provisions of the Mutual Security Act.[13]

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[10] Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States in World Affairs," 1952 (New York, 1953), p. 2.

[11] United States, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Senate, Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program, "The Military Assistance Program" (Committee Print No. 10, Washington, 1957), pp. 100–102.

[12] U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Mar. 3, 1952, pp. 336–338.

[13] United States, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, "Control and Reduction of Armaments: Disarmament and Security in Latin America" (staff study No. 7, Washington, 1957), p. 15.

2. Democracy and dictatorship

Prior to World II U.S. efforts to promote democracy by military intervention and by nonrecognition of dictatorial regimes consistently failed to achieve their objective. After one more such failure in Argentina in 1946, it has been the policy of the U.S. Government ever since to maintain correct relations with all de facto governments in Latin America regardless of their political coloration.

However, in the immediate postwar period the U.S. Government, in its public statements, continued to emphasize support of democratic principles. Following the overthrow by military officers of the popularly elected Acción Democrática government in Venezuela in 1948, President Truman wrote to ousted-President Gallegos:

> I believe that the use of force to effect political change is not only deplorable, but also contrary to the ideals of the American peoples. The Government of the United States proposes to do everything possible, in accordance with its international obligations, to fortify the democratic forces in this hemisphere.[14]

A State Department press release of December 21, 1948, referring to military coups in Peru and Venezuela, warned that "if this use of force continues, it cannot fail to become a sufficiently serious issue to engage the American Republics as a whole." Secretary of State Dean Acheson the following year underscored this line of policy by publicly proclaiming that "we deplore the action of any group in substituting its judgment for that of the electorate."[15]

Although the "use of force" continued, as for example the 1950 army coup in Haiti or that of 1952 in Cuba, no further U.S. official concern was expressed. During 1952, the Truman administration apparently had few qualms about signing mutual defense assistance pacts with the dictatorial regimes then in power in Cuba, Peru, and Colombia, and the Eisenhower administration followed a similar practice with the Dominican Republic in 1953 and Nicaragua in 1954.

In addition to the aid, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations have on occasion given public commendation to dictatorial regimes. For example, on June 9, 1952, Ambassador Ralph H. Ackerman, expressing his appreciation for the guided-missile tracking base facilities the United States had just received from the Dominican Government, said to the people of the Dominican Republic:

> All western nations today are striving * * * for the amelioration of mankind. Governments are taking interest in the welfare of people * * *. Your own illustrious president * * * Trujillo * * * gave illustration of this trend when, in a speech he made only a few days ago, he reiterated an aspiration he has often voiced before, to raise the standard of living of the Dominican Republic so that the people may benefit from a fuller life. No one can gainsay the great benefits he has already succeeded in bringing about.[16]

The Eisenhower administration has gone even further in manifestations of open support for authoritarian military regimes. Soon after assuming office it undertook a rapprochement with the Perón regime in Argentina and granted a loan. In November 1954 President Eisenhower presented Legion of Merit citations to Presidents Odría and Pérez Jiménez, the very men who 6 years previously had seized power, forcefully overthrowing freely elected, popular, civilian governments. As these dictatorships had recently collapsed, it should

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[14] Bohemia (Havana), Feb. 13, 1949.
[15] U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, No. 3647, Inter-American Series No. 88.
[16] U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, July 14, 1952.

have occasioned no surprise when resurgent popular elements demonstrated their resentment against Vice President Nixon during his 1958 visits to Peru and Venezuela.

3. Economic assistance

American private investment in Latin America has grown from less than $3 billion at the end of 1945 to more than $9 billion by 1959. Today, the area accounts for more than a third of U.S. private investment abroad, more than for any other region in the world. During the postwar period inter-American trade has undergone a similar, though somewhat less spectacular, expansion, so that today the volume of inter-American trade is between $7 and $8 billion annually, an amount greater than with any other area of the world except Western Europe. In addition, American tourism has provided an ever-increasing source of dollars to the Latin American nations ($350 million annually by 1955).[17]

Although the United States has developed no large-scale assistance program to promote economic development in Latin America, such as it has in other parts of the world, various governmental sources of funds have been made available to the Latin American nations. The chief source has been the Export-Import Bank, which in the past decade has loaned Latin America more than $2 billion, which amounts to more than 40 percent of all the bank's loans.[18] Also, the World Bank (IBRD), for which the United States has put up a major share of the capital, has supplied various nations of Latin America with financial aid since the end of World War II. Between 1948 and 1955, for example, $579 million was supplied.[19] Currently, IBRD credits to Latin America are being extended at the rate of about $75 million annually.

Under the Mutual Security Act, Latin America over the past decade has received Technical Cooperation Assistance (Point 4 aid) in the amount of $225 million. Under the current program about $40 million annually is being supplied. A similar amount of emergency economic assistance, a program begun in 1954, is being granted annually to Bolivia and Haiti, and until recently to Guatemala, to help these countries establish self-reliant economies. Finally, since 1954, Latin America has been receiving surplus agricultural commodities, under the agricultural trade development and assistance program in the amount of approximately $90 million worth annually.[20]

4. Nonintervention

The Latin American Republics, since the early days of independence, have always maintained the principle of full juridical equality of all nations. This concept is the backbone of the doctrine of nonintervention, accepted without reservations by all the countries of the New World (with the exception of Canada) at the Inter-American Conference of Buenos Aires of 1936.

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[17] U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, press release No. 775, Dec. 29, 1958, and No. 202, Apr. 11, 1957.

[18] Ibid.

[19] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "10th Annual Report" (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 42.

[20] United States, 86th Cong., 1st sess., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Staff Memorandum on Background Material on the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1960" (Committee Print, Washington, 1959), p. 58; U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, press release No. 775, Dec. 29, 1958.

The Buenos Aires Protocol reads: "The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other Parties.[21] This principle was incorporated in the Declaration of American Principles of Lima of 1938: "The intervention of any state in the internal or external affairs of another is inadmissible.[22] The Declaration of Mexico of 1945 repeats the doctrine, saying: "Each state is free and sovereign, and no state may intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."[23]

In the Inter-American Conference of Bogotá of 1948, when the OAS was founded, the doctrine was incorporated in the Charter of the organization as follows:

> Article 15. No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.
>
> Article 16. No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
>
> Article 17. The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.[24]

Article 15, in defining intervention as an "attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements," introduced a very important change. This definition is so broad that if applied literally, almost anything can be classified as intervention. It might outlaw not only political or diplomatic pressure, but even common practices of economic bargaining. Any threat of force, including traditionally accepted practices in foreign affairs, might be condemned as constituting intervention. Among these may be mentioned concentration of troops along the border, military maneuvers, mobilization and what is generally described as "the showing of the flag." Under this provision, the sending of marines to the Caribbean area during last year's Nixon incident in Venezuela can be described as intervention (and it was considered as such in some Latin American circles). Under the clause "cultural elements" Haiti in 1949 complained to the OAS of "moral aggression" of the Dominican Republic, because of the belligerent broadcast of a radio station in Ciudad Trujillo. Similarly, the terms "coercive measures" (art. 16) and "measures of force * * * directly or indirectly" (art. 17) are extremely vague.

Intervention, as defined in Bogotá, is only 11 years old, but it is possible to look at its practice during this period. Under articles 15, 16, and 17 of the OAS Charter, both intervention and accusations of intervention have been frequent since 1948. Thirteen of the 21 American Republics have been involved at least once. Only Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay

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[21] James W. Gantenbein, "The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy, a Documentary Record," New York, 1950, p. 778.
[22] Gantenbein, op. cit., p. 778.
[23] Gantenbein, op. cit., p. 820.
[24] Gantenbein, op. cit., p. 858. But see, also, in this connection, Art. 19: "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17."

have not been charged with violations of the principle of nonintervention.

The United States has been involved in various incidents. In 1950, the Guatemalan Government requested the recall of U.S. Ambassador Patterson, charged with interference in internal affairs. In 1953, the Dominican Republic complained of the interference of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Moors Cabot. Prior to the 1954 revolution, the Guatemalan Government openly accused the United States of political pressure and interference. The conduct of the United States during the 1954 revolution was considered as intervention in many Latin American circles.

As already indicated, the sending of Marines to the Caribbean area in 1958 could be considered a threat of force prohibited by the Bogotá charter. During the recent civil war in Cuba, American Marines entered Cuban territory to protect the water supply of the Guantánamo Naval Base. Cuban public opinion considered the behavior of Ambassadors Gardner and Smith, apparently in favor of Batista, as interference in Cuban domestic affairs. The Cuban press accused U.S. Ambassador Smith of having made last-minute efforts to form a provisional government in Havana after the flight of Batista, without the approval of Castro.

Unlike the United States, which has been charged only with indirect intervention, various Latin American states have been involved in cases of direct intervention. In 1948, Nicaraguan troops crossed the Costa Rican border, producing a strong protest from the Costa Rican Government. The quick action of the OAS prevented a serious conflict. In 1950, a small group of rebels attacked Honduras from Guatemalan territory. In 1951, there was some shooting between Ecuadorian and Peruvian troops on their border. In 1954, the troops of Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala from Honduras, overthrowing the Arbenz Government. In this case, the invaders openly assembled in the streets of Tegucigalpa before the invasion. In the same year, there was a border clash between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and President Somoza marched to the border at the head of a strong army.

The following year, 1955, there was a serious attack from Nicaragua against Costa Rica. The rebels, consisting principally of political exiles, entered Costa Rican territory, and Venezuela sent planes to Nicaragua, presumably to assist the Somoza Government. The fighting ended when OAS mediators reported that the rebels had received aid from Nicaragua. Two years later the Nicaraguan Army invaded the territory of Honduras, and Honduran planes retaliated by dropping bombs on Nicaragua. The OAS sent a five-man investigating committee which negotiated a cease-fire.

During 1959, there took place the "invasions" of Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua by small groups of rebels trained in Cuba and Costa Rica. (See Appendix I, p. 69.)

Among the incidents that can be considered as indirect intervention or interference by Latin American States are the following: In 1949, the Dominican Republic accused Cuba, Costa Rica, and Guatemala of having supported the rebels that landed at Luperón Bay. In the same year, Haiti charged the Dominican Republic with "moral aggression." In 1950, the OAS found the Dominican Republic guilty of interfering in Haiti's domestic affairs. In 1952, Bolivian exiles accused Argen-

tina of having aided the victorious revolution of Paz Estenssoro. In 1953, Bolivia charged Peru with interfering in its domestic affairs. In 1955, Ecuador accused Peru before the OAS of having massed some 20,000 soldiers along the borders of disputed areas. In 1958, Argentina accused the Dominican Republic of interference, because of Peronist activities in Dominican territory.

During 1959 the Caribbean was the scene of frequent charges of indirect intervention made by the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti against the Governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. Cuba and Venezuela charged the Dominican Republic with engaging in activities and propaganda to overthrow Castro and Betancourt.

5. Breadth of territorial sea

There are three aspects of this problem: (*a*) The width of the maritime belt, or territorial sea of the State; (*b*) the State's sovereignty on the adjacent Continental Shelf; and (*c*) the State's rights in a contiguous zone outside of the territorial sea.

There is no doubt that the marginal sea up to a limit of 3 nautical miles from the coast is under the jurisdiction of the littoral state. Nevertheless, the modern trend among some countries, especially the Latin American ones, is to try to extend their jurisdiction beyond the traditional 3-mile limit. They feel that the width of the territorial sea is not actually based on any universally accepted practice of general international law. On the other hand, nations controlling nearly 80 percent of the world's merchant shipping subscribe to the traditional 3-mile limit.[25]

The problem of state jurisdiction on the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial waters is a new one. President Truman's proclamation of September 28, 1945, stated that the Continental Shelf was "naturally appurtenant" to the littoral state.[26] Several Latin American countries made similar proclamations with important modifications. These countries were Mexico (1945 and 1949); Argentina (1946); Nicaragua, Chile, and Peru (1947); and Costa Rica (1948). Great Britain also made declarations for the Bahamas and Jamica in 1948.

The Argentine declaration claimed sovereignty over the Continental Shelf and over the sea covering the shelf. This meant an extension of the traditionally recognized 3 miles of territorial waters. The U.S. Government, in a note of July 2, 1948, objected to this aspect of the declaration. The note stated that the declaration, with respect to fishing, failed to recognize the rights and interests of the United States in the high seas off the coast of Argentina.

Navigation of the high seas is free to all states but international law allows the littoral states to exercise certain control over the waters adjacent to their maritime belts. This control is aimed at the enforcement within the territory of the state of its custom, navigation, sanitary, or police laws. This jurisdiction includes the custom zones, security zones, neutrality zones (in case of war), and fishery zones.

In relation to these zones, the one that has caused most trouble in our relations with Latin America is that dealing with coastal fisheries. National claims to fisheries beyond the 3-mile limit have been made by many countries, claiming two types of rights: (*a*) The right of the

[25] See S. Whittemore Boggs, "National Claims in Adjacent Seas," Geographical Review (1951), pp. 185–209.
[26] 10 Federal Register, 12303.

state to regulate the fishing of nationals and foreigners in order to conserve marine resources; (*b*) the right to establish fishing monopolies for the nationals of the state, to the exclusion of other countries.

The Hague Codification Conference of 1930 was opposed to the idea of any contiguous zone for fisheries in the absence of a treaty. It was stated that international law recognizes no rights of a littoral state beyond the legal maritime belt. Nevertheless, President Truman's proclamation indicated that the Government of the United States regarded it as proper to establish conservation zones for its own nationals in some areas of the high seas contiguous to the coast where fishing activities were maintained on a substantial scale.[27] Thus, the United States favored zoning for conservation but not for monopolies. This trend has been followed by many other countries and is growing stronger among international jurists. One of the foremost authorities in this matter, Dr. Gilbert Gidel, in a report to the United Nations, supported contiguous zones for fisheries, provided that the purpose was conservation and not monopoly.[28]

The main reason for controversy in the contiguous zone is in connection with tunafish companies in California, Oregon, and Washington. These companies fish off the Pacific coast of North and South America. The tuna is not caught near the shores, but the live bait is. Because the bait fish are within the territorial seas, permits have to be obtained from the various Latin American governments for that purpose. The Latin American countries do not participate actively in the tuna industry, but, realizing its possibilities, fear that the United States might deplete their resources of both the tuna and the bait fish. Some countries have attempted to assert their sovereignty beyond the 3-mile limit, claiming jurisdiction over an area extending 200 miles from their coast (El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, Chile).

The alarm began when, in 1947, the Costa Rican Government, noting the disappearance of bait fish from Nicoya Bay, accused U.S. fishermen of depleting their resources. The Peruvian Government proclaimed a 200-mile limit that same year, but did not file complaints against U.S. fishermen until 1952, when a shortage of tuna was noted. The issue was aggravated when American tuna industries attempted, though unsuccessfully, to obtain a tariff on fresh and frozen tuna imported from Peru and other countries. Declarations of a 200-mile limit were made also by El Salvador and Ecuador in 1954.

Ecuador and Peru made seizures within the 200-mile zone, either detaining or penalizing American fishing vessels. The fines were usually $1,000 per ship. Once the fine was $3 million against a naturalized U.S. citizen who "infringed" upon the zone claimed by Peru with five vessels, all flying the Panamanian flag.

The U.S. Government has continuously upheld the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, opposing any changes in the contiguous zone claimed by the Latin American countries. A Federal statute of August 1954 has authorized the Treasury to reimburse the American owners for the fines assessed outside the 3-mile limit.

The U.S. Government's policy has been to try to settle the argument by means of conservation agreements with the Latin American coun-

[27] 10 Federal Register 12304.
[28] Herbert W. Briggs, "The Law of Nations," 1952, p. 383.

tries. In 1949, it signed a convention with Costa Rica to create a joint commission to investigate the cases and make recommendations. This agency became the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission in 1950. It has a small operating budget; and Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Mexico showed interest in the project, but only Panama joined. The other countries did not join because they claimed the United States failed to carry out a commitment made to Costa Rica under the treaty. As principal beneficiary of the tuna industry, the United States subscribed to practically all expenses of the Commission. The purpose of the Commission is to maintain tuna and tuna-bait population that would permit maximum sustained catches year by year. The Commission has an independent staff and publishes its findings in Spanish and in English.

Instead of collaborating with the Commission, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador formed, in 1952, a group of their own to assert their claims over extensive territorial waters and formulate policy.

6. The United Nations

During the course of the last war, Latin America was interested in a postwar organization. In 1942, at the Rio Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Juridical Committee was instructed to make a study of the matter. The recommendations of the Committee constituted the background of the policies stressed later in San Francisco.

When the Latin American countries were not invited to the Dumbarton Oaks discussion, they deeply resented their exclusion as well as the secrecy of the meetings. They were aware of the struggle within the State Department of the United States, between Sumner Welles, who advocated regionalism, and Cordell Hull, who advocated the global approach. They feared for the future of the inter-American system. Secretary Stettinius' efforts to placate them at a series of conferences held in Washington was considered a tardy gesture.

At the Inter-American Conference held at Mexico City in 1945, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were discussed and endorsed, with some modifications. There, Argentina was invited to join the other American states in the war effort, and the Argentine Government declared war on the Axis Powers on April 4. The Argentine participation provided for a common bloc of American States in the forthcoming conference at San Francisco. Nevertheless, because of Argentina's war record in favor of the Axis, the U.S. policy of inviting Argentina was criticized by several Latin American countries. It seemed to them that the United States was following a policy of expediency and departing from the ideologies maintained during the course of the war.

At San Francisco the Latin American Republics struggled against the privileged position of the Big Five in the Security Council, and especially against the veto. In this they were consistent with their traditional stand maintained in the League of Nations. (See below, pt. V.) When they failed in their efforts, they tried to get more representation for themselves in the Council and to give more power to the General Assembly. Their criticism of the power of the Big Five was in harmony with the equally traditional principle of juridical equality of all nations. Latin American emphasis on the political role of the General Assembly anticipated the philosophy endorsed

by the United States 5 years later, in the resolution "Uniting for Peace."

The Latin American states also showed great interest in a stronger International Court of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction. They championed the principle of absolute domestic jurisdiction of the states in their internal affairs, however, and defended the doctrine of nonintervention.

They fought successfully to preserve the inter-American system by means of article 51 of the charter, which allows regional groupings of states within the structure of the United Nations.

Since the first meeting of the General Assembly in London, Latin America has shown itself aware of the importance of its 20 votes. Because of common international traditions, the Latin Americans decided to function as a group. Their delegates caucus frequently during the sessions of the Assembly in order to exchange views and to formulate common policies. It is not that they are always in agreement or that they always vote in a bloc, but the caucus system provides them an opportunity to cooperate toward common ends, which they generally do.

The three basic problems confronted by the United Nations, in which Latin America has participated actively, are the political conflicts of the cold war, the economic problems of underdeveloped countries, and the struggles of dependent peoples for self-government.

In the major political conflicts between East and West, the Latin American States have nearly always sided with the West. Nevertheless, they have often taken a more compromising attitude than that of the big powers, principally because of the fear of a total war in which they might be involved. In the Greek crisis of 1946 and during the Berlin blockade of 1948, Latin America supported the West but took a conciliatory position and favored the mediation of the disputes. When the Korean war broked out in 1950, the republics backed the U.S. stand wholeheartedly, and of course supported the important resolution "Uniting for Peace." They also backed the United States during the Suez, Hungarian, and Lebanon crises. However, in some countries the United States was criticized for sending the Marines to Lebanon, while the U.N. was acting on the problem.

Also, there has been disagreement between Latin America and the United States in the implementation of recommendations calling for sanctions. During the Korean war, only Colombia, which was then ruled by a rightist authoritarian regime, sent military aid. Some Latin American countries claimed that their constitutions would not allow them to send troops outside of their territory, but the real reason was their lack of a feeling of responsibility to participate in U.N. actions in geographically remote regions.

The only important U.N. political problem that has involved the Western Hemisphere was Guatemala. When Glatemala protested to the Security Council, in June of 1954, against direct aggression from Honduras and Nicaragua, the U.S. delegation, with the support of the two Latin American members of the Council (Brazil and Colombia), insisted that the complaint should be referred to the OAS. The U.S. delegate, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, stated that Guatemala's request was "an effort to create international anarchy, rather than inter-

national order." [29] The Soviet Union, Denmark, Lebanon, and New Zealand voted for the U.N. discussion of the case. Nationalist China, Turkey, Brazil, and Colombia voted with the United States against the request, while France and the United Kingdom abstained. The invading forces defeated the Guatemalan Government before the OAS had a chance to take any action. The Guatemalan case is still a source of criticism of U.S. policy in many Latin American countries. Although they sympathize with the anti-Communist stand of the U.S. Government, they fear a serious blow has been dealt to the U.N.'s prestige.

In general, the Latin Americans in the United Nations have followed the same principles which they maintained at San Francisco. They have defended the rights of small countries, favored the principle of universal membership in the Organization, advocated charter revisions to establish juridical equality of all nations, and defended domestic jurisdiction, nonintervention, and compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. In most of these policies they have naturally conflicted with the U.S. point of view.

Concerning economic problems of underdeveloped countries, the main point of contention between Latin America and the United States has been over sources of funds. The Latin Americans (backed by the underdeveloped nations of the Eastern Hemisphere) have always supported large-scale U.N. financial aid to modernize backward economies, while the United States (supported by the industrial powers of Western Europe) has sought to limit the U.N.'s financial programs, such as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, and to encourage world economic development by private enterprise. Latin America and the United States have also been on opposing sides in U.N. discussions involving international commodity agreements and raw material pricing.

In connection with the struggle for independence of colonial areas, the relations between Latin America and the United States are also in conflict. The United States, because of the ties with colonial powers (Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc.), cannot openly support independence without offending its allies. The Latin American republics, on the other hand, have always favored independence and anticolonialism. They have gone on record, in several inter-American meetings, as favoring the abolition of the existing colonies in the Western Hemisphere, while the United States has not supported this policy. The voting record of Latin America in the U.N., in matters of colonialism has, in most cases, supported the Arab-Asian bloc and Soviet Russia. (See below, pt. V.)

Another conflict between Latin America and the United States arises in connection with the utilization of the United Nations. Latin American diplomats often feel that the United States has gone along in world affairs, making its own decisions and formulating its own policies, using the U.N. only as a last remedy when a deadlock is reached. The Latin American countries in general, with the experience of their own international organization and their faith in international law, believe in less unilateral action and more collective action through the U.N.

[29] John A. Houston, "Latin America and the United Nations," 1956, p. 110.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In order for the U.S. Government to deal with Latin America intelligently, it must gear its programs to the probable future of the area. The policy recommendations that follow are accordingly based upon the following three fundamental assumptions about that future:

(*a*) That the social revolution now in progress will not only continue but will accelerate, regardless of any domestic or international policies designed to halt it or slow it down, for the people of Latin America are determined to catch up with the more advanced nations of the world.

(*b*) Because this social upheaval will offer new opportunities for the Communists to exploit, the Soviet Union will place increased energies into turning this "revolution of rising expectations" to their own imperialistic advantage.

(*c*) The United States, whose security interests will thereby be increasingly threatened, will have to intensify its efforts to resist this challenge, and, as a result, the prospect is for an indefinite period of cold war tension in the Latin American area.

1. Collective security

U.S. security policy in Latin America is based generally on the purpose of obtaining and maintaining the cooperation of all the American republics in meeting any threat to the independence or security of any one of them. The assumptions upon which our military assistance programs to Latin America are based,[30] however, are open to serious question. Inasmuch as Latin America is more isolated than any other area in the world from the East-West struggle, Communist aggression from without is not currently a real danger. Also, the nature of the Communist threat from within is in all Latin American countries a police problem rather than a military problem, and accordingly has little relation to military assistance upon which our present collective security system is based.

Also, U.S. policy assumptions to the contrary, the Latin Americans do not consider the Communist threat from without as a common responsibility, for only Colombia responded to U.S. requests for military cooperation in the fighting in Korea. Anyway, the actual military and warmaking potential of Latin America's armed forces is so limited, despite our military assistance programs, that they are incapable of making a significant contribution to the security of the hemisphere. As a purely military proposition, the hemispheric concept of collective planning and defense has no practical application. Justification for military assistance to Latin America makes sense only in political terms, if at all. The importance of military assistance in securing Latin America's political cooperation flows principally from the political role of Latin America's armed forces and their continuing desire for more arms. Military assistance apparently has the added political objective of promoting internal stability in Latin America.

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[30] U.S. security policy officially rests upon the three following fundamental assumptions: (1) That the hemisphere is threatened by Communist aggression both from within and without, (2) that the security of strategic areas in the hemisphere and of inter-American lines of communication is vital to the security of every American republic, (3) that the protection of these strategic areas and communications is a common responsibility. See U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 30, 1954, pp. 463–464.

Yet it appears that Latin America's cooperation with the United States is more readily explicable in terms of its political and economic stake in the U.S. position than as a matter of exchange for military aid. For political cooperation has come just as readily from countries that received no such aid, like Mexico and Costa Rica, as those that did. While it can be argued that military ties will result in political support in those nations where the military is influential in politics, nevertheless, when the whole situation is considered, the United States still runs the risk that the present military elite with whom alliances have been made, may be out of power tomorrow. The recent experience in Cuba well illustrates this point.

Insofar as military aid promotes an artificial political stability inside the dynamic Latin American environment, the inexorable buildup of popular pressures for change threatens to bring about violent upheavals. Also, U.S. security policy offers the Communists opportunity to cooperate and make common cause with the civilian resistance to militarism.

It is because the military emphasis in U.S. policy toward Latin America appears seriously out of line with our political and economic objectives and long-term interests that the following recommendations for changes in our collective security system are made:

(*a*) The United States should promote disarmament in Latin America. Such a policy would provide a simple method under which some of the current inconsistencies in our foreign policy could be reconciled. It would draw Latin American public opinion to our side, relieve us of much of the onus of supporting unpopular governments, and allow the savings on arms to be plowed into economically productive endeavors.

(*b*) The first step is to de-emphasize the military aspects of our policy toward Latin America. This does not mean that we should suddenly abandon our whole complex of military programs in the area, but a firm guiding principle should be the discouragement of any further arms buildup. To this end the United States should gradually reduce its military aid with a view to eliminating it within a few years. The reimbursable aid program can be reduced by curtailing the role of prestige weapons and tightening credit controls on arms purchases.

(*c*) The United States should abandon use of military programs as a means to win the political support of the Latin American military. By doing so we will free ourselves of much of the ill will heretofore engendered among the Latin American people by overemphasis upon military thinking and military policies. Also, it will soon become apparent that the risks of possible political alienation of the armed forces of a few countries are outweighed by the political advantages accruing from enthusiastic support of U.S. policies by the mass of the people.

2. Democracy and dictatorship

De-emphasis upon military policies is intimately related to the problem of democracy and dictatorship. It has already been demonstrated that most Latin American countries are moving toward greater democracy. However, events of the past decade have shown that insofar as the military aid programs increase the political influence of the armed forces, the chances for democracy suffer. For the military, far more

often than not, tend to resort to nondemocratic procedures to achieve the internal order and stability which both they and the United States for quite different reasons, so ardently desire. The military threat to the security of the hemisphere is certainly not such that our concern for the future growth of democracy must continue to be sacrificed. Profound disillusionment and distrust is felt by democratic leaders in Latin America when the United States, leader of the free world, provides military aid, which is so frequently put to internal political use, and thereby appears to be underwriting undemocratic forces. The political advantages of trying to win the cooperation of military leaders is simply not worth the risk of losing the good will and support of those who oppose them. Furthermore, by its present policies, the United States lays itself open to the charge that its insistence upon maintaining political stability as a defense against the Communist menace leads it into a policy of coddling dictators.

It is because the Latin Americans should no longer be allowed to feel that the United States, in its determination to resist communism, is willing to sacrifice democracy in the process, that the following policy changes are urged:

(*a*) The United States must offer something more than lip-service to democratic principles. It should make some distinction between highhanded military dictatorship and struggling civilian democracy.

(*b*) In both its aid and its general attitude, the United States should take into consideration the degree of democracy or dictatorship. This does not mean it should have nothing to do with dictatorial regimes. Rather, an attitude of neither friendship nor antagonism, but one of correct neutrality, should be displayed. In this manner the United State can subtly persuade the people it has no confidence in their oppressors.

(*c*) Conversely, with those regimes that by acceptable democratic processes are making progress in the development of their human and material resources, more positive encouragement and material assistance should be given.

(*d*) Also, the United States should work through the inter-American system to make effective the OAS Charter aim of "political organization * * * on the basis of effective exercise of representative democracy."

3. Economic policy

Despite the undeniable benefits received from U.S. trade, investment, and public assistance, Latin American governments, supported by their public opinion, have been far from satisfied with U.S. economic policies. Well aware of the much larger public assistance programs the United States is sponsoring in Europe and Asia, they resented treatment which looked like that reserved for a poor relation. As their own postwar economic problems became more critical, due to the exhaustion of wartime accumulated international reserves and to difficulties in the production and marketing of agricultural commodities and industrial raw materials, and as the popular material demands arose from the area's social evolution, Latin American pressures upon the United States for more economic support have steadily increased.

Latin American governments have complained that U.S. insistence upon sound monetary and fiscal policies is not politically feasible. They are not convinced that private capital can handle the job of basic economic development and demand more public funds for this purpose. Because of fundamental differences in economic policy, they have over the past decade been unable to get the United States to join in an inter-American economic treaty designed to ease their credit and commodity problems. In their search for a solution to their economic problems, many of which are problems of their own making, the Latin American governments have been generally frustrated by what they feel to be the "business and banking mentality" that dominates U.S. economic thinking and policy toward Latin America. It is not the purpose here, in a study devoted to the political aspects of policy, to take up such thorny questions as commodity agreements, stabilization of prices for basic Latin American exports, the volume of future U.S. investment in Latin America, and the proper division between private investment and public loans or grants. It is the purpose, however, to stress the need for economic policies which will result in favorable political consequences. It is because the key Latin American determinant of political cooperation is U.S. assistance in the resolution of economic problems that the following recommendations are made:

(*a*) Instead of the year-to-year bare minimum economic programs, the United States should develop long-range economic assistance policies based less upon a concern for sound banking and business principles, although these should by no means be ignored, and more upon the value to the U.S. security position of Latin America's friendship and cooperation. To achieve this, it is recommended that a long-range program for public loans and grants for Latin America be worked out on roughly the same scale as our existing programs for underdeveloped countries elsewhere in the world.

(*b*) Inasmuch as the further expansion of trade is basic to mutually beneficial economic ties, the United States should take into account, more fully than it has in the past, Latin America's dependence upon exports of foodstuffs and minerals.

(*c*) Since economic aid is intimately related to the resolution of Latin America's sociopolitical problems, care should be taken that no aid is granted regimes bent on preserving an outworn order. The United States should also be wary of granting economic assistance to any military regime in Latin America, for the experience of the past has demonstrated that even when men in uniform have assumed leadership of the social revolution they have shown little capacity for resolving their nation's problems. The best way to insure intelligent use of economic aid is to supply it only to broadly based civilian governments.

4. Nonintervention

The term "nonintervention" is a negative one. It cannot be correctly understood without knowing the affirmative: "intervention." But of all the terms used in international law, the latter is one of the most difficult to define. Charles G. Fenwick, the well-known American jurist, puzzled once about this question and wrote: "Scarcely any two

writers are to be found who define the term in the same way or who classify the same situations under it." [31]

Nonintervention is a precept of the legal order of the OAS, but, as indicated above, it has not actually become a rule of conduct for many of the American states. Here we have a gap between theory and practice, or between an ideal norm and the living law habits of the countries involved. The situation is still more complicated because nonintervention is a principle of regional or American international law that does not oblige us in other areas. Intervention is permissible, for example, when authorized by treaty, or at the invitation of a government of another country, as in the recent case of Lebanon. Under the terms of the OAS Charter, it is very doubtful whether the United States can intervene in Latin America even at the invitation of a legitimate government. The American public and the press, in general, do not seem to be informed of these circumstances and further complicate the situation by irresponsible statements and demands. The answer to all this, of course, is education of the public and of the journalists, and this should by all means be attempted. The misunderstanding exists also in Latin America. Many non-Communist Latin American newspapers and private citizens criticize our sending marines to Lebanon, because they consider this an intervention, having in mind the Latin American interpretation of the doctrine of nonintervention.

The United States is under treaty obligation—the charter of the OAS—to observe the doctrine of nonintervention as defined in Bogotá in 1948. Legally and politically there is no other course to take. We recommend that the United States carefully abide by the doctrine of nonintervention, even if conditions that are not agreeable have to be tolerated temporarily. In the long run, this country will gain by observing this policy, and we will be more respected, especially by the countries that have carefully practiced this principle themselves. This long-range objective will undoubtedly produce better results.

5. Breadth of territorial sea

The problem of the breadth of the territorial sea has been the subject of detailed study for many years without arriving at any definite solution. One authority on this matter, Gilbert Gidel, in his treatise, "Le Droit Internationel Publique de la Mer" (1934), rejects the proposition that the breadth of the territorial sea is fixed by international law at 3 miles. According to him, the legal status of the territorial sea does not actually depend upon any universal understanding. In fact, the 3-mile limit has not been universally accepted. Efforts to secure agreement have failed. Our recommendation, therefore, is to attempt to reach an agreement in a future conference on codification of international law, or if this is not possible, at least among the members of the OAS.

Conversely, we believe that the problem of the Continental Shelf should be carefully studied either in the U.N. or on a regional basis, first starting in the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists of the OAS. The Latin American countries have always shown great interest in the development of sound principles of regional international law. A strong U.S. leadership

[31] Charles G. Fenwick, "Intervention: Individual and Collective," American Journal of International Law, vol. 39, No. 4, 1945, p. 645.

in this matter would be welcomed and help to improve the legal structure of the American regional system.

The problem of control of fisheries is complicated by the fact that in terms of international law, the fish are not "property" until caught. On this problem, we recommend that an effort be made to reach agreements with individual states or groups of states. This should be done by diplomatic negotiation until a certain consensus is reached, whereupon the whole matter should then be brought to the consideration of the OAS.

6. The United Nations

The United States must realize that Latin America has a more idealistic, a less realistic conception of the world role of the U.N. than the United States has. For Latin America, the role of the U.N. is not to preserve a peace that in reality has not been achieved, but to create a more genuine one out of present hopes and dreams. Also U.S. apparent policies to preserve peace by collective action of the major powers conflicts with Latin America's envisagement of peace by agreements based on the relationships of all countries with sovereign equality. To the extent that such a policy does not conflict with its overall security interests, we recommend that the United States encourage the present trend toward declining hegemony of the Security Council and increasing importance for the General Assembly, for this development will tend to harmonize Latin American-United States political viewpoints inside the U.N.

With respect to our economic policies in the U.N., we recommend no changes in our present position which is not to support large-scale developmental financing for underdeveloped economies through the U.N. We believe that promising developments in our hemispheric economic policy, particularly the creation of an Inter-American Development Bank, will ultimately remove the major source of Latin American-United States economic differences inside the U.N.

Finally, we recommend that the United States publicly announce an acceptance of the probability that the nationalistic ambitions of colonial areas the world over will ultimately be realized whether its Western European allies like it or not. Such an anticolonialist stand would greatly enhance U.S. prestige in Latin America. Accordingly, we should act to win over embryonic national forces before they are used and exploited by the Communists.

V. LATIN AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD FREE WORLD COUNTRIES

A. TRADITIONAL LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES, MAINLY TOWARD EUROPE, UNTIL 1945

After independence, the new republics feared a Spanish reconquest and possible aggression by other European powers. These fears were not unfounded, for Spain attempted an invasion of Mexico in 1829 and returned to rule the Dominican Republic between 1861 and 1865. Also, in 1864, she captured some islands off the coast of Peru, producing a brief state of war with that country as well as with Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile.

In 1833, England occupied the Falkland Islands, which Argentina still considers as belonging to her. Between 1838 and 1850, France and England intervened frequently in the La Plata River region. In 1861, England, Spain, and France occupied Veracruz. The British and Spanish soon withdrew, but the French troops conquered Mexico and remained until 1867 when Napoleon III, under pressure from the United States, withdrew.

During all of the 19th century, England was the most active foreign power in Latin America. She invested heavily and contributed much to the economic development of many countries in the area. British investors remained dominant in Latin America until World War I. Since then, however, the nationalization and purchases of British railroads, utilities and other investments, and Mexico's oil expropriation of 1938 have reduced considerably England's stake in the area.

France, despite the Mexican intervention of 1861, has always been greatly respected and admired. Her cultural influence has been paramount, her philosophy, literature, art, and law all having left a definite mark. (See below pt. VI.) French trade, though never as large as England's, was important until World War II.

In spite of the Wars of Independence, ties of language and religion, and human contacts provided by the large numbers of immigrants have helped maintain a strong Spanish influence in Latin America. Also, Spain's writers and philosophers of the "generation of 1898" helped strengthen her cultural influence in the early 20th century. The end of the Republic in 1939, and the resulting stagnation of cultural life have loosened considerably Spanish ties with the area. Only in some conservative circles and among certain extreme rightist groups is the influence of Franco's Spain felt at all.

In Brazil, the influence of the mother country has not been so great, for Brazil developed a culture of her own and became the leader of the Portuguese-speaking world. Brazil's cultural ties have understandably been closer with Portugal than with any other European country. Until World War I, however, British commercial influence was preeminent.

Italy, because of her large emigration, has exercised an important cultural and economic, as well as ethnic, influence over Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Similarly, German contacts with Latin America were cemented by migration (especially in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), although her cultural influence, particularly in philosophy, was transferred indirectly by Spain. After 1871, Germany began to build increasingly strong commercial ties. She lost her favorable trade position during World War I but began to recapture it during the 1930's. After Hitler took power in 1933, the Nazis attempted to win the support of countries with large German populations. Vigorous Nazi groups operated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, and pro-Axis movements were launched in other countries as well.

During World War I, eight Latin American Republics declared war on Germany (Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), but their military help was negligible. Five others severed relations (Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic). Significantly, the two most important countries of Spanish America, Argentina and Mexico, remained neutral.

Thirteen Latin American Republics attended the Versailles Conference and 11 signed the Peace Treaty. Ten became charter members of the League of Nations, and several others joined later. During the 1920's, most of the Latin American countries participated actively in the League. Their idealism, internationalistic traditions, and the desire for protection against possible U.S. expansion explains their support for the League. Their statesmen served as presidents in the Assembly and the Council, and two of their distinguished jurists served on the Permanent Court of Justice. Latin American policies in the League anticipated those they reiterated in San Francisco in 1945. They defended the admission of all states and the principle of equality in the election of members of the Council. Also, they advocated a stronger World Court and compulsory arbitration of international disputes. Although the League was successful in solving the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru in 1934, and sent a commission to investigate the Chaco conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay, it generally showed great timidity in participating in the problems of the New World. In the 1930's, when the League of Nations became more concerned with European affairs, and the world depression made it difficult to pay the assessments, many Latin American countries withdrew. The role of Latin America in World War II is covered in part IV, above.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES (1945–59)

1. Europe

The great geopolitical change of 1945 was the emergence of two new superpowers and the reduction of the prewar European powers and Japan to secondary roles. The division of the world between East and West found Latin America geographically and culturally inclined, as well as politically and legally committed, toward the latter.

Latin American relations with Western Europe after 1945 were consistent with their general attitude taken at San Francisco (see above,

pt. IV). Conflicts with England and France were mainly the colonialism issue. When the Soviet Union tried to exploit this issue in the United Nations Assembly, however, many countries departed from their traditional stand. In the cases of Tunisia, Morocco, Cyprus, and Italy's colonies for example, they sided with Western Europe. In general, however, in colonial problems, the Latin American Republics have cast their votes against colonialism. Latin American relations with Spain have gradually improved since the end of World War II. They turned against Franco Spain not only because of their dislike of totalitarianism, but because of the Franco government's support of the Axis during the war. At San Francisco, Mexico introduced a resolution, unanimously approved, barring Spain's membership in the U.N.

Later on, differences of opinion developed among the Latin American countries in connection with their future relationships with Spain. Several authoritarian governments resumed diplomatic relations with the Spanish dictator. They argued that the case of Spain was exclusively an internal affair and that, accordingly, the principle of domestic jurisdiction should be respected by U.N. members. When, in 1950, the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that his Government favored the abandonment of the 1946 resolution, seven Latin American Republics (Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru) introduced a resolution which softened the 1946 declaration and permitted U.N. members to resume diplomatic relations with Franco. Only Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay voted against it, with Cuba abstaining. Latin America's change of attitude toward Spain can be explained in terms of political realism, solidarity with the United States, Franco's anticommunism, and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church.

In connection with postwar economic relations with Europe, the most important change to be noted is the spectacular resurrection of West German trade. France has also recovered her prewar trade status.

Cultural ties with Europe have continued as in the past. With the defeat of the Axis, fascism has almost disappeared. World War II has not produced in Europe any new important political philosophy. Perhaps most significant has been the strength shown by the Christian Socialist parties in Germany, France, and Italy, and, to a lesser degree, in Spain and Portugal. In Latin America, similar Catholic parties, under different names, have also grown and become active. Christian Socialist-type parties in Latin America lack the organization and strength of the European parties, but undoubtedly enjoy the unofficial support of Rome.

2. Relations with Asia and Africa

First place in voting strength in the U.N. has passed from Latin America (20 votes) to the Afro-Asian bloc (29 votes). The two blocs, the largest in the Organization, have common anticolonialist policies. For example, the Afro-Asian efforts to have the U.N. investigate discrimination in colonies have been supported by the Latin American bloc. Mexico and Brazil requested an antidiscriminatory policy for South Africa, and, in 1952, the Dominican chairman of the

Trusteeship Council led a unanimously approved resolution to end discrimination in all dependent territories. On another occasion, Brazil joined Syria in a complaint that the Union of South Africa had failed to promote the political advancement of the natives.

Representation of China in the U.N. is for Latin America, as well as for the rest of the world, a very important problem. In 1949, when the Soviet Union asked for the expulsion of the Nationalist delegate, Council members (Cuba and Ecuador) voted against the motion. Red China's intervention in Korea made many Latin American countries take a dim view of the possibility of immediate acceptance of the People's Republic in the U.N. However, the general feeling in Latin America is that sooner or later Red China will have to be admitted. This is in harmony with their traditional belief in the universality of membership. When, in 1950, India proposed that Communist China be seated, 17 Latin American countries voted "no," with Argentina, Ecuador, and Guatemala abstaining. On the most recent vote, in 1959, on the question of considering the Chinese representation issue, the United States was supported by all the Latin American countries except Cuba, which abstained.

During the British-Iranian oil dispute, Ecuador opposed U.N. intervention on the ground that Iran had the sovereign right to nationalize the oil industry. The right of expropriation is a principle of general international law which has always been supported by the Latin American Republics.

More recent aspects of the Middle East problem have also had repercussions in Latin America. During the Suez crisis, Panama protested because she was not invited to the London Conference and accepted an invitation to the Nasser-sponsored meeting. Here she supported Egypt by ordering all Panamanian ships to pay toll directly to the Nasser government. Venezuela, at an international petroleum conference held at Cairo in 1959, suggested that the Arab countries curtail production and increase their prices. Her motive was to make Venezuelan oil competitive with lower cost Middle East crudes.

3. Africa as a competing source of commodity production

The competitive nature of the Latin American and African economies, particularly in production of such export crops as coffee, cotton, sugar, and cereals, has produced economic conflicts between the two areas. Because Brazil, Colombia, and several Central American Republics depend so heavily upon coffee exports, increases in the lower cost African production of this commodity injures their economies. For example, all these countries felt the impact of the United Kingdom's development projects in African colonies after 1949. By 1951, several Latin American coffee-producing countries were complaining that the growing competition from Africa was indirectly the fault of the United States because Marshall plan aid had enabled European countries to develop export agriculture in their African colonies.

African coffee production rose from 1½ million bags in 1933 to 5 million in 1951. By 1955 Africa was producing 15 percent of the world's coffee. Although the quality was not as good as that of Latin America, the price was lower. Accordingly, the product began to gain favor, especially in European markets.

In 1955 Brazil proposed the creation of an International Coffee Bureau. In 1957, she convoked a conference of the world's coffee-producing countries but inasmuch as Africa sent no delegates, nothing important was accomplished. In January of 1959, at Rio de Janeiro, 14 Latin American countries and Portugal created the International Coffee Organization. The United States, Spanish Africa, French Africa, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, and Tanganyika sent observers to the meeting, but refused to participate in a worldwide agreement on prices or production quotas.

All the same, Brazil and six other Latin American Republics made a special agreement to limit their exports for a period of 3 months. Soon afterward, Brazil dumped 250,000 bags of surplus coffee in the instant coffee market, underpricing African competitors in the process. In September of 1958, 15 Latin American nations signed another agreement to control production. France and Portugal were willing to curtail exports from their African colonies, but the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Ethiopia refused. Thereupon Brazil decided to meet African competition by selling inferior grades at low prices.

To the most recent annual Pan-American Coffee Bureau meeting (June 1959) many African producers sent observers, but they signed no agreement. The political status of the coffee-producing areas of Africa renders cooperative action extremely difficult. Some are independent, like Ethiopia; others are free to make their own decisions, like several Portuguese colonies, while still others must depend on the authorization of their mother countries. A proposal for more cooperation was made in 1957, as many Latin American Republics supported the creation in the U.N. of the Economic Commission for Africa.

This economic conflict between Latin America and Africa results from Africa's dynamic postwar economic development. Despite the fact that several Latin American countries are taking a realistic view of the new competition by shifting from coffee to other crops, most of them feel that the only effective long-range solution is well-coordinated international control.

Latin America is facing competition in the industrial raw material market also. Copper export from the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia affect Chile, Peru, and Mexico in particular. Chile suffers most, as the demand for her copper decreased after the Korean war, and, to make matters worse, the price of African copper is 27 cents per pound, as compared to Chile's 36½ cents.

Bolivian tin exports are also suffering from African and Asian competition, mainly from the Belgian Congo, Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand. Bolivia's economy has been badly hurt by the decline in the price of tin on the world market. It was estimated that the fall in prices in 1958 cancelled out the aid received from the United States during the year. Furthermore, the Soviet Union dumped a great deal of the mineral on the market, reducing the prices to a still lower level. Several mines have been closed down as a result and more than 5,000 miners laid off.

4. Commercial relations with Japan

After World War II, Japan's main economic concern has been domestic recovery and the development of world trade to support her

already large and expanding population. As a result, her traditionally strong commercial relations with Latin America are being reconstructed. Of her total trade in 1948, Japan imported 12.5 percent from Latin America and exported 1.3 percent to the area. By 1949, Latin America took about 7 percent of Japan's exports and supplied 14 percent of her imports. 1949 trade was limited to Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Paraguay, but by 1952 Japan had expanded her commercial relations to include Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela as well.[1]

In July of 1951, a barter agreement was concluded for the exchange of Japanese-built ships for 20 million sacks of Brazilian rice. A 1952 agreement exchanged more ships for cotton, and that same year a Japanese industrial fair was held at Rio.

Brazil is Japan's best customer in Latin America.[2] During 1954, Brazil imported 26,580 million yen (equivalent to approximately $73.8 million) worth of Japanese goods, including several troop transports and merchant vessels. The 1955–56 trade decline was only a temporary phenomenon. In August of 1958, the Brazilian Government authorized a Japanese company to exploit and process tuna and other fish in the South Atlantic. The growth of Japanese-Brazilian commerce is explained by their complementary economies and by the large-scale Japanese migration to Brazil (over 400,000 since the turn of the century).

More recently, Argentina has developed trade relations with Japan. In 1954, a $180 million commercial treaty was signed, wherein Japan agreed to send iron and steel products, industrial machinery, fabrics, and chemicals in return for hides, wool, vegetable oil, and milk products.

Since 1951, Chile has been selling nitrates to Japan, and in 1952 a Japanese trade mission visited Santiago to renew extensive prewar agreements. In 1958, Japan purchased a copper mine near Antofagasta, their first outright purchase of an overseas mine. It is expected to export to Japan 3,600 tons of ore a month.

Cuba, in 1954, concluded a sugar agreement with Japan, and sent delegates to a trade conference in Tokyo. Japan is the third largest importer of Cuban sugar, and in 1959 she agreed to increase imports if Cuba would import more Japanese goods. Cuba's new revolutionary government has expressed interest in merchant ships, agricultural tools and machinery.

A trade mission from Japan visited El Salvador early in 1956. A $2,500,000 textile mill is being currently built with joint Salvadorean-Japanese capital. Japan is contributing the machinery, building material, and technical knowledge.

Mexico renewed diplomatic relations with Japan in 1952. That same year Japan bought the entire crop of cotton of the state of Sinaloa, and helped to finance a new salt plant. During 1953, she tried to negotiate an oil barter agreement. By 1953, she had become Mexico's second best customer. During 1955, she had further increased her capital investments and offered to help develop Mexico's fishing industry by installing processing factories and refrigerating

[1] See Jerome B. Cohen, "Economic Problems of Free Japan," 1952.
[2] See "The Oriental Economist," 1955–57, for Japan's recent trade relations with individual Latin American countries.

vaults, and by training Mexican fishermen. In 1956, she held an important industrial fair in Mexico City.

Japan has long been interested in the agricultural potentialities of Paraguay. Japanese immigration, which began in 1923, was resumed on a large scale in 1955. There is no immigration accord, however, for Paraguay prefers artisans and factory workers to farmers.

Peru has recently increased her trade with Japan. In 1954, she sent her 70,000 sacks of rice. Recently, Japanese firms have been negotiating for joint exploitation of various mines, and for building a chemical plant at Chimbote.

A 1952 trade agreement between Uruguay and Japan provided for a $5,800,000 exchange of goods, Japan's exports to be mainly textiles and machinery.

A Japanese mission visited Venezuela in 1953 to discuss the installation of textile plants. The following year, a $5 million glass factory was opened in the Paraguaná Peninsula. In 1958, negotiations were concluded for a Japanese-Venezuelan fishing firm. Japan will contribute an 80-ton vessel and $160,000 of the $350,000 capital investment.

VI. DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY

The ideas of the enlightenment inspired the emancipation of the Hispanic colonies of the New World (1800–1825)—the 17th century English enlightenment, the 18th century French variety, and, to a certain degree, the "enlightened despotism" of 18th century Spain. The revolutionary example set by the 13 British colonies (1776–83) also contributed to the revolutionary spirit in Latin America. The enlightened liberalism of the U.S. Revolutionary War, however, was close to Locke and Montesquieu, whereas in Latin America there was a decided inclination toward Rousseau. U.S. liberalism was, accordingly, individualistic and tolerant in intellectual matters while that of Latin America was emotional and ethically self-assertive. As Bertrand Russell has indicated, Rousseau's liberalism traveled from the intellectual sphere to that of the passions, and its anarchistic aspect was made explicit.

This romantic liberalism was ultra-nationalistic. It worshipped liberty, the splendor of war, and the cult of the successful hero. The latter found its way from a pure ideological conception into constitutional practice. Hence the domination of the executive branch in the structure of the new governments and the tradition of strong man rule that has plagued Latin American politics ever since.

Early European liberalism represented a middle class revolt against aristocratic and ecclesiastical privilege. It aimed at political reform and was willing to compromise and to tolerate dissenters. The Latin American independence movement, however, was not a revolt of the middle class, for none existed. Independence instead was merely a victory of the colonial oligarchs over the authority of the mother countries. The new republics were governed at the beginning by the landed gentry and the military caste. Rousseau's theory that society naturally endows the state with an all-powerful "general will" from which it is treason to dissent was accepted by the new rulers.

Important Latin American political thinkers of the independence period included Manuel Belgrano (1770–1820), an Argentine greatly inspired by the egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution; and his countryman, Mariano Moreno (1728–1811), who was deeply influenced by Rousseau, whose "Social Contract" he published in Buenos Aires. Venezuela produced Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), a follower of Rousseau, and Andrés Bello (1781–1865), an outstanding scholar who took a more moderate position in politics and displayed early in his life the characteristic Latin American interest in international law in his "Principios del Derecho de Gentes" (1832). From Colombia came Antonio Nariño (1765–1823), a precursor of independence who suffered imprisonment for publishing the "Declaration of the Rights of

Man" (1793). Another such precursor was the Mexican priest, Miguel Hidalgo (1753–1811), a great admirer of the liberal ideas of the encyclopedists and leader of the Mexican uprising of 1810.

In Latin America, as in all revolutionary movements of the period, freemasonry was important. Of this influence, the Mexican Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi (1771–1817) was a prime example. Lizardi was imprisoned and excommunicated for his defense of the Masons in his newspaper, El Pensador Mexicano.

The independence process in Brazil was different. The enlightenment influence here was not so close to Rousseau. Achievement of freedom from Portugal was by political evolution rather than violent revolution, and the moderating power of the executive under the Constitution of 1824 reflects the influence of Montesquieu and Benjamin Constant. José Bonifacio de Andrada y Silva (1763–1838), outstanding Brazilian thinker of the period, always advocated political moderation.

In the years 1825 to 1860, Latin American political thought was concerned with the adjustment of the new constitutions to the legal, social, and economic realities of the ex-colonies. The first charters were modeled after the liberal Spanish, French, and U.S. Constitutions. However, it was hard to impose the new liberalism upon the administrative centralization, trade monopolies, rigid social hierarchies, and the political absolutism which had characterized the rule of Spain. What was needed was a legal order that would harmonize the new constitutional principles with the old colonial system.

Political struggles in this period were mainly between liberals and conservatives. The first were backed by intellectuals and a nascent middle class, the second found support amongst the army, the church, and the landed aristocracy. The most important movements took place in Argentina and in Mexico and later transcended to other countries. In Argentina, where the main need was reorganization, the great liberal statesman, Bernardino Rivadavia (1780–1845), abolished ecclesiastical privilege, facilitated the acquisition of land by peasants, fostered immigration, and even tried to help the liberals in Spain in 1823. Although these reforms were interrupted by the long dictatorship of Rosas (1835–52), they were resumed as Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–84) authored a liberal Argentine Constitution in 1853 under which the economic development of his country progressed along laissez-faire lines. Argentina's liberal political thinkers were romantics of the traditional school, with their eyes often closed to the country's social realities.

In Mexico the liberal movement, known as the Reform, was drastic and revolutionary. Armed and ideological conflicts between liberals and conservatives continued unabated from 1824 to 1867, with political power oscillating between the two. The liberals demanded an end to church and military privilege, civil liberties, and land reform. Their creed was expressed in the important constitution of 1857. Among the liberal philosophers of this period were Valentín Gómez Farías (1781–1858), the first to advocate the complete separation of church and state; Benito Juárez (1806–72), the most distinguished leader and statesman of the Reform; José María Luis Mora (1794–1850), a priest with pronounced liberal political ideas; the brothers Miguel (1812–61) and Sebastián (1827–89) Lerdo de Tejada, formu-

lators of several of the important laws of the Reform; and Ignacio Ramírez (1812–79), a bitterly anticlerical and materialistic lawyer and writer. The extremism of the Mexican liberal thinkers is accounted for by the extraordinarily privileged position of the church and the uncompromising attitude of the oligarchy. The political thought of the 1824–67 period constitutes the prelude to the important revolutionary changes which took place in Mexico after 1910.

Liberal reform and reorganization philosophy was not, of course, limited to Argentina and Mexico. Other thinkers tried to lead their countries down similar paths. The Chilean thinker, Francisco Bilbao (1823–65), whose well-known study "La Sociabilidad Chilena" was publicly burned by the conservative authorities, was influenced by the early European Socialists.

By midcentury, Latin American political thinkers began taking to positivism. It was the dominant political philosophy in the 1870–1900 era. The main inspiration came from Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the French founder of this school. Latin American political thinkers often blended with Comte the philosophies of Herbert Spencer (1810–1903) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73).

Since positivism aimed at the improvement of human society by scientific means, at peaceful social transformation through scientific progress, it fitted in very well with the needs and conditions of the Latin American States. Its "world view" and its religion had nothing to do with the supernatural; it proclaimed only the religion of humanity.

After the 1860's, when the political turmoil of the early national period had somewhat abated and respect for law and order began to characterize political action, the positivists' influence became strong in Latin American education and politics. Public education, especially, was made more practical and scientific, and the old humanistic approach was abandoned. This positivist educational reform began in Mexico under the Díaz regime and was extended to the rest of the area, last of all to Cuba in the early 20th century. Gabino Barrera (1818–81) and Enrique José Varona (1848–1933) were the leading educational philosophers in Mexico and Cuba respectively.

In politics, the positivists were progressive liberals, emphasizing evolutionary change. In Mexico, a group of such thinkers known as Científicos provided the Government with an official positivist philosophy from 1890 to 1910. In Brazil, the phenomenon was repeated; here the country even took from Comte the motto for its flag—"Order and Progress." Positivist political thinkers enjoyed prestige and respect in nearly every Latin American country in the late 19th century.

Positivism substituted empiricism for romanticism. Its practical approach allowed free inquiry into philosophical problems, but its thinkers all too often engaged in extraphilosophical activities, particularly politics. The positivists advocated for Latin America the methods used by the most advanced countries of Europe without taking into consideration differing social and cultural realities. For example, the Mexican Científicos, obsessed with the progress of the white European nations, ignored the miserable conditions of the mestizo and Indian masses. Positivism thus became ill suited to the

Latin American environment, and a reaction against it set in at the turn of the century.

During the positivist era, two Argentine political theorists made important contributions in the field of international law. Carlos Calvo (1824–1906) formulated the principles of juridical equality and absolute domestic jurisdiction for all nations. He advocated abolishment of the use of force in the collection of international debts. This latter principle, since known as the Calvo clause, was developed and expanded by Luis María Drago (1859–1921). His "Drago Doctrine" was accepted by the Hague Conference of 1907.

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the institutional formulation of its principles in the Constitution of 1917 is still considered the most important political event of this century in Latin America. It has influenced the American Republics much as the French Revolution influenced 19th century Europe. Intellectuals paved the way for violent revolution. One of the most notable was Andrés Molina Enríquez (1865–1940). In his book, "Los Grandes Problems Nacionales" (1908), he attacked the latifundia system and advocated restoration of the old Spanish ejidos (communal lands).

Since the Mexican Government supported positivism, the philosophical reaction against it was necessarily political. The return to idealism was led by young philosophers Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos, who had been influenced by Bergson and William James.

The Mexican upheaval combined the economic demands of the rural masses and the urban proletariat with the political aspirations of the nascent middle classes. In the aftermath of the revolution these three elements allied to form a powerful, integrated political movement unprecedented in Latin American history. Their revolutionary consitution of 1917 combined socialist labor theory with traditional Spanish legal theory. In matters of religion, the 1917 constitution repeated the anticlerical philosophy of the constitution of 1857.

Twentieth century Latin American thought was characterized by new ideas that had greater flexibility than positivism. Reaction against the latter had begun in Europe in the late 1860's with neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism. These philosophies, together with those of Boutroux, Bergson, Groce, and James, reached Latin America directly. The phenomenology of Husserl and the existentialism of Kierkegaard and Heidegger were transferred indirectly via the influence of Spain's "Generation of 1898." Among the Latin American thinkers who expounded the new idealism should be mentioned Alejandro Deústua (1849–1954) of Peru, Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1873–) of Uruguay, Caso and Vasconcelos of Mexico, and Alejandro Korn (1860–1936) of Argentina. But perhaps the most notorious of the new idealists was the Uruguayan José Enríque Rodó (1871–1917), who denounced the materialistic civilization of the United States. He warned Latin America's youth against following Yankee leadership, lest they lose their own cultural values.

Socialism began to develop rapidly in the early 20th century, as mirrored by the appearance of Socialist clubs and publications in Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile. Until the end of the 19th century, labor had been more influenced by anarchism. Michael Bakunin, the anarchist leader, had gained many proselytes among Spanish and Italian workers, who upon emigrating to the Latin

American contributed to the early organization of workers along anarchist lines. After the Second International (1889), however, democratic socialism became increasingly popular with Latin American labor.

Socialist unions, clubs, publications, and parties appeared in various countries, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, around the turn of the century. This socialism was Marxist or "scientific," but democratic and reformist, rather than conspiratorial or totalitarian. The prime example of socialist influence was seen in Uruguay with the reforms of President José Batlle Ordóñez (1856-1929), the leader of the Colorado (liberal) Party. He introduced sweeping institutional changes of a socialist nature. He also originated the plural executive consisting of a nine-man council representing both major parties.

Students, during this period, began to participate actively in the political struggle. This phenomenon, often baffling to foreign observers, has to be understood in its historical context. Latin American universities were modeled upon the Spanish University of Salamanca, which in turn had been modeled upon early Italian universities. The latter consisted of student guilds dealing on an equal basis with the professors' guilds. As early as the 17th century, students in Latin American universities, in imitation of the Salamanca practice, participated in the election of rectors. Down to the present day, Latin American universities have enjoyed full autonomy. This status has provided the students license to participate freely in politics, especially in revolutionary activities. As a rule, students are the first to protest political oppression, the first to offer opposition to dictatorships. It is primarily at the universities, of course, that fledgling politicians receive their philosophical indoctrination.

Following World War I, political ideas began to change. Democratic socialism, overwhelmed by the force of nationalism, had been unable to prevent the war. Furthermore, the Russian Revolution of 1917 split the movement into democratic Socialists and Communists.[1] The failures of liberal parliamentarism and the impotence of the League of Nations deepened further the democratic crisis. As a result, new ideologies of the right, such as nazism, fascism, and corporatism, gained in strength and prestige. Europe's political crisis attracted the attention of many Latin American thinkers, and serious attempts to try out the new totalitarian ideologies were made by Vargas in Brazil and Perón in Argentina.

A lesser, though all the same important, role in Latin America was played by Spanish liberal thought that prepared the ground for the Republic of 1931. The philosophies of José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) and Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) were closely followed in intellectual and academic centers. Ortega popularized existentialism and neo-Kantian criticism, while Unamuno developed his own version of existentialism, though based heavily on Soren Kierkegaard.

An important new leftist political philosophy also appeared in Latin America after World War I. This was the indigenous APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) movement. The

[1] Communism, the object of a separate study, is not covered in this report.

Aprista Party was founded in 1924 by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1898–) and a group of young Peruvian intellectuals and politicians. They favored planned economy, integration of the Indian masses into the nation's economic and political life, nationalization of land and industries, and opposition to imperialism. In external affairs, they favored a close cooperation amongst the Latin American Republics to counterbalance the influence of the United States, and asked for the internationalization of the Panama Canal. Though dialectical materialism characterized Aprista ideology, the party never accepted the political or philosophical theories of Marxian communism.

Another peculiarly American philosophy, closely akin to aprismo, which gained ground between the two World Wars, was indigenismo. It was characterized by scholarly and scientific study of Latin American social problems. Attention was centered on the Indian masses, and a sociopolitico philosophy was elaborated on the assumption that Latin America's contemporary cultural history is continuous with the pre-Conquest civilization. Indigenismo appeared in the political platforms of the PRI in Mexico, APRA in Peru, and the Guatemalan revolution party under José Arévalo. Afro-American idealism, which stressed African cultural values, influenced sociopolitical thought in Brazil, Cuba, and Haiti.

Neo-Thomistic ideas appeared in Latin America in the late 1930's. Jacques Maritain's attacks on secularism appealed to Catholics, especially during and after the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39. After World War II, neo-Thomism gained more ground, as Christian Socialist parties appeared in various countries.

After 1950, because of the era of military dictatorships, liberals and Socialists became more concerned with political action than with thought. (See above, pt. II.) The recent defeats of dictatorships in Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba, however, appear to have inaugurated a political cycle characterized by reformism combined with nationalism. Argentina and Colombia have serious economic difficulties and peculiar political conditions that inhibit social change. The philosophy of the present government of Venezuela is socialistic, but it is still too early to tell whether the ideas of President Betancourt and the Democratic Action Party can be put into practice.

Similarly, it is too early to detect with accuracy any definite political direction of the revolutionary government of Cuba. Some of the programs decreed by Castro, such as the agrarian reform, and formulated by the revolutionary groups which defeated Machado in 1933, were expressed in the constitution of 1940. The Cuban revolution of 1959, however, with its strong nationalism and revolutionary mystique, has many of the same characteristics of the mass movement of the Mexican revolution of 1910.

In the political philosophy of contemporary Latin America, statism has assumed great prominence. Thinkers and writers of both left and right strongly urge state intervention in social and economic problems. Parties that traditionally were conservative and favored the status quo are often revolutionary today—judging by U.S. standards—and advocate sweeping social and economic reforms. Latin American political thinkers are acutely aware that their area is behind in the march of civilization and are determined to catch up with it.

The postwar generation is imbued with a sort of revolutionary mystique. They have learned to distinguish between mere revolts against the abuse of power and revolutions that change the use of power and the social and economic structures as well.

Latin American political thinkers have not created a basic new theory of the state or an original form of government. Their political culture is western and has followed ideas of this civilization. On the other hand, they have developed some typically Latin American political theories. In domestic politics, for example, they consider successful revolution as a source of law, all revolutionary acts being legal and obligatory for the population. True, this conception is based on the teachings of European jurists, like Stammler and Duguit, but in Latin America it has been developed and implemented. Also, the Latin American concept of private ownership is unique for, in most of the constitutions, property is defined as "a social function." It is no longer the absolute right, as originally conceived by the philosophy of liberalism, but only a privilege granted to the individual as long as it is useful to society. Finally, the typical Latin American constitution is anticipatory. It deals with what ideally ought to be, rather than realities. Its provisions may lack for many years the legislation necessary to enforce them.

B. LATIN AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF THEIR OWN ROLE IN THE WORLD

The above survey offers a notion as to how Latin America has seen itself historically in its relations with the world community. Its wars for independence were not fundamental revolutions. They were a mere conflict between two factions of the social heirarchy: the creole patriciate and the Spanish rulers. Their disagreement was political only. When the struggle ended, the victorious creoles ruled a basically unaltered economic and social structure.

After independence, the three Spanish viceroyalties broke up into numerous independent states. The latter dealt with the rest of the world individually until the late 19th century. Then they began to associate themselves with the Pan-American movement which, in 1948, evolved into the OAS.[2] In world organizations, such as the League of Nations and the U.N., Latin America has preferred to deal with other countries as a bloc, either through the OAS or their own U.N. caucus.

As soon as liberation was achieved, the most important task was the preservation of independence. Hence strong nationalism, characteristically exaggerated by weak and small nations, appeared. In domestic affairs, the Latin American people defended freedom and saw themselves as democrats. This may sound paradoxical, in view of the long history of dictatorships, but it is a fact. There has never been an original Latin American philosophy advocating dictatorial or totalitarian regimes. The political "theories" of dictators, like the recent justicialismo of Perón, were merely a posteriori rationalizations to justify oppression. On the other hand, popular and democratic thought has always formulated its programs of action. A most recent example of this is the 1959 Declaration of Caracas (upholding democracy, opposing totalitarianism and dictatorships, favoring a common

[2] The O.A.S. is to be covered in a separate study.

market and international relations based on economic justice) made by a distinguished group of intellectuals on the occasion of the inauguration of President Betancourt.

In Latin American democratic thought, liberalism is idealistic and romantic. It is also assertive and uncompromising, the exponent believing that only he knows what is good for his country. This extreme subjectivism has understandably provoked authoritarianism. In economic matters, the Latin American liberal believes that the state is not only the guarantor of the constitution and laws, but that it also has a purpose and a mission to achieve economic improvements and social justice for all the people.

In world affairs Latin America, realizing the importance of joint action, has voted with the West in the cold war, but it is also true that she is idealistically inclined toward pacifism, in some cases toward neutralism. In domestic affairs, Latin America is determined to progress and to progress rapidly. It hopes to do so democratically, but if this is not possible, it is willing to use revolutionary means, sacrificing, if necessary, the established order and the temporary well-being of a generation. Communism will undoubtedly try, and has already done so, to profit from this condition. In the Latin American political mind a non-Communist revolution is the major contemporary goal. It is crucial for the United States, in shaping its foreign policy, to distinguish this nationalistic revolutionary thought from communism.

C. LATIN AMERICAN ASPIRATIONS AS TO THE DIRECTION OF THEIR OWN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

For many years after independence, Latin American political thinkers were satisfied with the preservation of their freedom and the organization of the new states along traditional lines. It was the era of the liberalism of laissez-faire, of belief in the evolutionary progress that would come inevitably. Though they considered themselves masters of their own destiny, they placed their faith in the free play of economic laws and scientific progress.

With the advent of the 20th century, this passive attitude changed dramatically. The expected progress had not come. Control of the economy, in a large number of countries, had passed into foreign hands, while latifundia stifled development. A middle class had not developed. Political control remained in the hands of the native oligarchy or military groups.

Hence 20th century writers and thinkers rejected the evolutionary concept of change and advocated revolutionary nationalism instead. Again, though there are 20 Latin American Republics that differ greatly in their problems and the vigor with which they attempt to solve them, they possess one common mental characteristic: They are all determined to direct their own destinies, using their own methods. That is why the United States should never insist that mid-20th century Latin America pattern its political, economic, and social future along 19th century North American lines.

VII. NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

These territories do not form a geographical, administrative, or economic unit. The present population is descended from European settlers, African slaves, and East Indian farm hands. The great majority are Negroes. The colonies are poor in natural resources and heavily dependent on a few export crops or commodities.

1. British possessions

Jamaica.—The 1944 constitution provides for universal suffrage, a bicameral legislature with an appointed upper house and an elected lower house. The major party is the People's National Party, led by Chief Minister Norman Manley, who advocates moderate socialism and self-government. The main opposition, the Labor Party, led by Alexander Bustamante, is more conservative. The Communistic People's Freedom Party has few followers.

Trinidad and *Tobago* constitute one administrative unit. The government consists of a legislative council with 24 elected members, 5 nominated, and 2 ex officio, and an executive council of 7 elected members, the Governor, the Chief Minister, and 2 ex officio. A ministerial system of government, with the Chief Minister elected by the Legislative Council, was established in 1958. The largest party, the People's National Movement, led by Dr. Eric Williams, is democratic-socialist, antinationalist, and interracial. It is opposed by the People's Democratic Party, mainly an East Indian group. There are other small left- and right-wing parties.

Barbados.—Barbados has a bicameral legislature consisting of an appointed council and an assembly. Executive authority is vested in a governor, an executive council, and an executive committee. In 1951 universal suffrage was introduced, and further constitutional advances are now under consideration. The strongest political group is the middle-of-the-road Barbados Labor Party, which controls 15 out of 24 congressional seats. The socialistic Democratic Labor Party and the Progressive Conservative Party represent the left- and right-wing opposition, respectively.

The *Leeward Islands* (12 in number) were associated in a federation in 1871, with each unit retaining its legislative institutions. The federation was abolished in 1956 to allow the individual islands to join the proposed West Indies Federation, but they are still under one governor. Suffrage was introduced in 1951. The Labor Party won a complete victory in 1956.

The *Windward Islands* (five in number) have one governor, but each colony has its own local institutions. Constitutions introduced in 1951 provided for adult suffrage and an elected majority in the legislative council. Parties are organized for elections and then disbanded.

The *Bahamas* are ruled by a governor, assisted by an executive and legislative council. The latter is a representative assembly elected by limited male suffrage.

British Guiana's 1943 constitution created ministerial government based on universal suffrage. The lower chamber consists of 24 elected and 4 appointed members. The higher chamber has nine members, six nominated by the governor, two by the majority party, and one by minority political groups. The strongest political organization is the Communist-inclined People's Progressive Party, led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan. The centrist United Democratic Party won only one seat in the last elections.

British Honduras Constitution of 1954 provides for adult suffrage, an elected majority in the legislative council, and an executive council. Ministerial government began in 1955. The People's United Party, leftwing and nationalistic, controls all elective seats in the legislature.

The *Falkland Islands* is a crown colony administered by a Governor. He is assisted by an executive and a legislative council. In 1949, the latter became an elective body.

2. French possessions

French possessions are Martinique, Guadeloupe (with its dependencies Marie Galante, Les Saintes, Désirade, St. Barthelemy, and St. Martin) and French Guiana. The French Constitution of 1946 made these territories overseas departments. They are all ruled by a prefect, appointed by the French Minister of the Interior. They have an elected general council with jurisdiction in local matters, especially taxes. In France they are represented in the national assembly, in the senate, and in the Assembly of the French Union. Because of the centralized structure, political groups follow mostly the lines of the parties in the mother country.

3. Netherlands possessions

The *Netherlands Antilles* consist of the Leeward Islands (Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire) and the Windward Islands (St. Martin, St. Eustatius, and Saba). Though autonomous in internal affairs, these islands are considered part of the kingdom. Executive power in internal affairs is vested in a Governor and the Council of Ministers. In external affairs, it resides in the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, in which the Antilles are represented. Domestic legislative power belongs to a unicameral legislature of 22 members, popularly elected.

Surinam (Dutch Guiana) is ruled by a Crown Governor, and a Council of Ministers responsible to a popularly elected legislative council. As is in the case of the French possessions, local political groups take their cues from parties in the mother country.

4. The West Indies Federation

The most important post-World War II development in the non-self-governing territories was the creation by the United Kingdom of the Federation of the West Indies in 1958. The primary purposes of the federation are to foster economic development and self-government in the British territories. The mother country recognized the need for a Caribbean association as early as 1922, but it was not until the depression of the 1930's that the idea gained ground in the

territories themselves. In 1938, a West India Royal Commission reported favorably on the idea of federation, but positive action was held up by World War II.

In September of 1947, a conference was held at Montego Bay, at which all the island delegates accepted the federation principle. In the London Conference of 1953, a general plan for a constitution was drawn up. In a second London conference in 1956, the parties agreed on a Federal Constitution, which provided for a Crown Governor to be asisted by a council of state, an elected house of representatives, and an appointed senate. Lord Hailes, the first Governor General, took office on January 3, 1958, and on March 25, Federal elections were held in which the Federal Labor Party won a large majority. On April 22, the Parliament held its first session at Port Spain, Trinidad, the provisional capital, where Sir Grantley Adams of Barbados was elected Prime Minister.

The Federal Labor Party, which draws its support from the urban, clerical, and artisan classes, advocates moderate socialism and internal self-government. The opposition Democratic Labor Party, led by Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica and Albert Gomes of Trinidad, is more conservative.

The federation consists of Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad, Tobago, and the Windward Islands, and has a combined population of more than 3 million. British Guiana and British Honduras have not joined. The former favors the federation only on condition of first receiving dominion status, while the latter is outrightly opposed to joining.

5. The situation in British Guiana

Political trouble began after the elections of 1953 were won by the Communist-inclined People's Progressive Party, led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan and his American-born wife, Janet. Jagan, an East Indian dentist educated in the United States, draws the bulk of his support from the sugar workers. In October of 1953, the British Government, fearful of a Communist coup, suspended the Constitution, gave the Governor emergency powers, and sent armed forces to support the local police.

In February 1955, the PPP split when L. F. Burnham, a Georgetown lawyer of African descent, withdrew his support on the ground that Jagan was following the Communists too closely. Burnham, however, also hates the sugar interests. A recent British study [1] suggested that British Guiana's troubles spring largely from the apathy, graft, and profiteering of the business classes. Jagan, who exploits these abuses, is still the undisputed popular leader. This was confirmed in the August 1957 elections, in which his faction of the PPP won a clear victory. A modus vivendi has since been reached between the Governor and Jagan. The latter accepted the post of Minister of Trade and Industry, and his wife became Minister of Labor.

B. ATTITUDES OF LATIN AMERICA

In general, the opinion in Latin America is strongly anti-colonialist, among the most vociferous countries being Guatemala and Argentina. The American Republics in their attitude toward the non-self-govern-

[1] Royal Institute of International Affairs, "The British Caribbean," Oxford, 1957.

ing territories always distinguish between "colonies" and "occupied territories." For the first, which they consider as legally belonging to another country, they favor independence. The second, various American States claim as their rightful property which has been illegally occupied by non-Latin American powers. In this category, Guatemala claims British Honduras, and Argentina the Falkland Islands.

At the Bogota Conference of 1948 a declaration was approved calling for "colonialism and the occupation of American territories by extracontinental countries to come to an end."[2] An American Committee on Dependent Territories was thereupon created to study the problems of colonialism in the New World. In March of 1949 this Committee met at Havana. Here Argentina reaffirmed her claims to the Falkland Islands and the Conference proposed that the United Kingdom, France, and Holland give up their colonial possions. Realizing that some of the latter were unprepared for self-government, they recommended U.N. trusteeship. The United States and several Latin American States did not attend the meetings.

At the Caracas Conference of 1954 the Latin American Republics again passed a strong resolution against colonialism. The United States opposed it on the ground that relations with the three European colonial powers were outside the jurisdiction of the OAS.

Puerto Rico has a peculiar position in the inter-American system. Since 1952, she has enjoyed commonwealth status and full self-government, but she is not sovereign. She cannot, therefore, legally join the OAS and deal on an equal basis with the republics of the hemisphere. When the Havana meeting on dependent territories was held, Gov. Muñoz Marín declined representation and declared that Puerto Rico could not be considered a colony. All the same, the Nationalist and Independent Parties of Puerto Rico were permitted to bring their case for independence before the Committee.[3] There is no doubt that today a large majority of the Puerto Rican people favor the commonwealth status. They appreciate the trade and taxation advantages that such status assures them. In general, however, the Latin American countries are more cautious in dealing with Puerto Rico than with the European possessions, if only because the case involves a dependency of an American State.

C. PROSPECTS

Future development of the West Indies Federation would be enhanced by the membership of British Honduras and British Guiana. It is too early to report on any basic accomplishments of the Federation, but it does appear to represent a step in the direction of increased trade and more self-government. In British Guiana, domestic political conditions are still deeply troubled. So long as the PPP retains its present leadership there is little hope that a responsible government will be restored to the colony. In British Honduras, the dominant People's United Party is adamantly opposed to joining the federation, because undersirable immigration from the islands and unemployment might result. Besides, British Honduras has strong

[2] Gantenbein, op. cit., p. 840.
[3] Inasmuch as the Bogotá resolution of 1948 referred only to European colonies, many delegates felt that the Committee was not empowered to act on the request.

cultural and religious ties with Central America; the Catholics in particular are suspicious of Protestant-oriented institutions, such as the University College of the West Indies.

The Federation will not affect the inter-American system in any significant way within the foreseeable future. The OAS members look favorably upon the association of British colonies in the Caribbean, particularly because they believe this a step in the direction of independence. If the Federation succeeds in achieving sovereignty, however, it will in all probability prefer to maintain its ties with the British Commonwealth, as Canada has done, rather than associate with the OAS.

Guatemala and Argentina will undoubtedly continue agitating for the recovery of the colonies they consider their own. All Latin American republics will probably continue to favor increased self-government and ultimate independence for the European possessions.

The present position of the United States vis-a-vis the colonialism issue is an embarrassing one. Since the principle of self-determination was proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson, the United States had always defended the right of the people to decide their own political status. It is an historical irony that because of the cold war and the need for support from her European allies, the United States is now cautious and refuses to take a strong anticolonialist stand. So long as we refuse to do so, the Soviet Union will exploit the issue and Latin America will oppose our present stand.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

CARIBBEAN CONFLICT

The present Caribbean unrest can, in general, be attributed to two factors: one endemic and the other epidemic. The first is the traditional struggle between dictatorships and democracies—a struggle which has spawned predatory rulers like Somoza, Trujillo, Batista, and Pérez Jiménez, and popular democratic upheavals in Guatemala, Cuba, and Venezuela. The most recent epidemic broke out with the spectacular overthrow of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in January of 1958. A year later, an even more sensational upheaval occurred in Cuba. Castro's victory over Batista punctured the Latin American myth that a popular civilian rebellion cannot defeat a dictatorship supported by the armed forces, for in Cuba, the revolutionary success was due solely to improvised guerrilla groups supported by a strong civilian underground movement. Castro's victory inspired the opposition to dictatorship throughout the Caribbean.

In April 1959, the U.S. Ambassadors of the area held a meeting at El Salvador to assess the Caribbean crisis. They discussed revolutionary activities of exiled groups in the countries in which they were serving, and the possibilities of these groups organizing invasions. The consensus was that the exiles were incapable of launching a successful attack against any incumbent regime, and this—so far—has been correct.

Curiously enough, the troubles began in Panama, a country not under a dictatorship, at the end of April. The attack against the ruling conservative government came from political opponents of the traditionalist type. Hence, the small group of invaders received no popular support and, therefore, failed. The situation was described by the New York Times, as a "fantastic affair with its handsome ex-diplomat rebel, his lovely and famous prima ballerina wife, a yacht, a shrimp boat, digging up a cache of arms from the ocean bottom." The main opposition party, the Liberals, were not even involved. The rebel force of about 90 men sailed from Cuba; most of them appeared to be adventurers who thought they were fighting dictatorship. The Panamanian Government lodged no protest against Cuba. The United States supplied Panama with small arms from the Canal Zone, and two U.S. Navy ships patrolled the coast. At the request of the President of Panama, the OAS sent an investigating committee which negotiated a surrender on May 1, 1959.

The next episode took place in Nicaragua. Rumors of an exile invasion and an internal uprising were circulated widely at the end of May 1959. A general strike and establishment of martial law by the Government intensified the unrest. On June 2, two planeloads of rebels flew into Nicaragua from Costa Rica. The Government took the case before the OAS, which appointed a commission to investigate, despite Cuba's opposition to the investigation on the ground that the invaders were Nicaraguans and that a country cannot be invaded by its own people. Soon thereafter, the Nicaraguan Army chief, Gen. Anastasio Somoza, accused Fidel Castro's government of having aided the rebels, which charge was promptly denied by the Cuban Premier.[1] By this time, the small group of rebels which had taken to the jungles, closely pursued by the national guard, had surrendered. A captured rebel leader attributed their failure to the lack of popular support and discipline, as well as poor military equipment. Despite rumors of another invasion from Honduras in mid-June, the Government has since maintained its hold on the situation.

[1] The OAS investigating committee reported later that the military equipment had been acquired in Costa Rica's black market and made no statement whatever with regard to external aggression. On July 28, 1959, the OAS Council declared the case closed.

At the end of June, a group of invaders attempted a landing in the Dominican Republic. The Trujillo government claimed that their ships had sailed from Cuba and were flying the U.S. flag. A Dominican pilot, Capt. Juan Ventura Simó, had been sent by Trujillo to join the rebels. He tricked them into believing he had defected, and then delivered them to the landing place where they were massacred.[2]

The abortive invasion prompted the Dominican delegates to the OAS to invoke the Rio pact, charging Cuba and Venezuela with aggression. These two countries, after making it clear that they would not permit the OAS to send a mission of inquiry into their countries, countercharged the Trujillo dictatorship with violation of human rights and opposed the service of the OAS in behalf of dictatorial governments. In their stand, Cuba and Venezuela found sympathy with the majority, whereupon the Dominican delegate withdrew his request for invocation of the Rio Treaty.

The crisis deepened when Cuba and Venezuela severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. Cuba accused the Trujillo government before the U.N. of violation of human rights in indiscriminate bombings of the civilian population and brutal murder of citizens. Dominican diplomat Dr. Emilio Cordero resigned his U.N. post in protest against such crimes and requested U.S. asylum. The Dominican Ambassador to Ecuador had previously resigned for similar reasons. In July, Cuba announced that Trujillo was preparing to invade.

An uprising occurred in Honduras in mid-July 1959. This case was not an attempt to oust a dictator; rather, it represented the reaction of rightist forces against democratic, middle-of-the-road President Villeda Morales. The rebellion was led by Colonel Armando Velásquez, former head of the Honduran armed forces. For more than 3 days, heavy fighting took place in Tegucigalpa, as rebels occupied important buildings which were recaptured by the loyal army in a regular battle. Casualties were high, and President Villeda accused the Government of Nicaragua of having backed the uprising. It was rumored that they also had Trujillo's help. While the fighting was going on, the official Dominican radio station accused President Villeda of communism, along with Castro, Betancourt, and even Gov. Muñóz Marín, of Puerto Rico.

On August 10, a strong conspiracy against the Government was discovered in Cuba and thousands of men formerly of Batista's army were arrested all over the island. Important civilians connected with the dictator's regime, as well as cattlemen and big landowners were involved, and many arrested. For several days communications with the Isle of Pines and Las Villas province were cut off by Government orders, while rumors circulated widely about invasion and fighting in the mountains. On the 14th, the Government announced that an arms-laden plane flown from the Dominican Republic had been captured, after landing in Trinidad.

Anti-Castro elements operating from the Dominican Republic had contacted Majs. Gutiérrez Menoyo and William Morgan, of Castro's army and had asked them to lead a movement against the Government. They promptly accepted but informed Castro. The exiles, completely taken in by Gutiérrez and Morgan, sent them a boatload of arms that was seized. Morgan and his men then went to Las Villas Mountains and pretended to be fighting the Government troops. Later he radioed to the Dominican Republic and asked for a plane, which on arrival was captured. In the fight, two of the invaders were killed and the remainder arrested.

Haiti was drawn into the Caribbean turmoil when, on August 13, a small group of 30 men landed in the southwestern part of the island. It was reported that the invaders were led by a follower of Louis Dejoie, political opponent of President Duvalier. The landing party was composed mostly of Cubans. Most of the invaders were killed or captured by the Haitian Army, while a few remained in the mountains. The Haitian Foreign Minister asked the OAS at the Santiago meeting to act on the case. The Cuban delegate acknowledged the fact that the boat had left from Cuba and offered full cooperation in the investigation.

In July, the Council of the OAS had voted unanimously for a meeting of Foreign Ministers to deal with the Caribbean unrest. Later, the original resolution was broadened to include the problems of representative democracy and

[2] For this Simó was promoted and presented to the members of the diplomatic corps at Ciudad Trujillo. Here U.S. Ambassador Joseph S. Farland was trapped into having his picture taken while shaking hands with Simó, a picture widely publicized by Trujillo's government.

respect for human rights. This was done to accommodate Cuba and Venezuela, who claimed that the application of the principle of nonintervention would only strengthen the dictatorships of Trujillo and Somoza.

The Ministers convened in Santiago on August 12, and after a few days of heated discussion, agreed to expand the power of the Inter-American Peace Commission, provided that it have the consent of the affected countries before any investigation was undertaken on their own territories.

The Commission is composed of five countries: the United States, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, under the chairmanship of U.S. Ambassador John C. Dreier. Besides attempting to keep the peace by conciliation and investigation of conflicts, it is instructed to study violations of human rights, failure to exercise representative democracy, and political tension that affects international peace. The group is to report to the 11th International Conference of American States, to be held at Quito in February of 1960.

The Caribbean conflict has many aspects and cannot be considered solely as a concerted effort to liberate countries from dictatorships, for in addition to the liberalizing efforts of exiles, there is a strong counterrevolutionary movement in the area. The Honduras rebellion is only one example of this. There are thousands of Cuban exiles with plenty of money who are plotting counterrevolution, as evidenced by the recent events described above. Venezuelan exiles in the United States, also with plenty of funds, may also be involved in counterrevolutionary activities.

The events of Panama were not revolutionary in the correct sense of a popular mass movement. The Nicaraguan invasion had no broad support. The events of the Dominican Republic also indicate an absence of effective cooperation by the people. Nonetheless, Trujillo's regime has given signs of deterioration for the first time in many years, with acts of sabotage and terrorism reported frequently. The opposition to Castro in Cuba comes from Batista's group, dissatisfied businessmen, and persons affected by the drastic reform laws, but it has little popular backing. It is too early to evaluate the nature of Haiti's invasion.

The rest of the Latin American republics are in a dilemma with regard to this crisis. Legally, they realize that the OAS condemns aggression and requires adherence to nonintervention. On the other hand, most of the countries are politically and ideologically against Trujillo and Somoza and would like to see them ousted.

The United States, in the whole crisis, is in a difficult position. There is a strong feeling in Latin America that we are using nonintervention to show unnecessary friendliness toward dictators. Our position has probably been politically unwise although legally correct. On the whole we should show sympathy, or at least understanding, for the liberating efforts of the Nicaraguans and Dominicans.

Appendix II. Outline for Study—Post World War II Political Developments

I. Main findings.
II. Conclusions and recommendations.
III. Body of report.
Part I. Background
  Brief description of the Political setting in the hemisphere at the end of World War II put in its historical context.
Part II. Broad trends in Latin American politics, 1945–59.
  A. Analysis of changes, either revolutionary or peaceful, in Latin American governments and government policies. These changes should be dealt with, briefly, country-by-country.
  B. Generalized conclusions, if any, which can be drawn from this record.
  C. Probable course of future developments.
Part III. United States and Latin American policies toward each other in the postwar period.
  A. Brief background to set the historical context.
  B. Major policy problems and decisions, 1945–59—e.g., nonintervention, breadth of the territorial sea, collective security, Latin American support of U.S. positions in the U.N. (N.B.: Economic policy—trade, aid, private investment etc.—will be the subject of a separate study. These economic matters play such a large role in United States-Latin American political relations that obviously they cannot be ignored in a study of

political developments, but they should be treated in very general terms with emphasis upon the political consequences of economic policies.)

C. Current and foreseeable policy problems.

1. Optional decisions open to United States and the probable consequences of each.

2. Recommended decisions and courses of action.

Part IV. Latin American policies toward free world countries other than the United States.

A. Background—Traditional Latin American relations and attitudes, mainly toward Europe.

B. Development of such attitudes since 1945—including changes in Latin American relations with Europe; Latin American relations with Afro-Asian bloc in U.N.; Latin American relations with Africa as a competing source of commodity production; Latin American relations with Asia, especially commercial relations with Japan. (N.B.: Latin American relations with the Soviet bloc will be covered in a separate study.)

Part V. Development of Latin American political thought.

A. Latin American contributions to political theory and philosophy.

B. Latin Americans' conceptions of their own role in the world.

C. Latin Americans' aspirations as to the direction of their own political development.

Part VI. Non-self-governing territories in Latin America and the Caribbean.

A. Political developments.

B. The attitudes of the American Republics toward such territories.

C. Future prospects.