relief against persons who may be depriving other persons of certain rights.

Now, it is proposed after there shall have been a decree granting such preventive relief, and declaring a pattern or practice to exist, to permit—

applicants not parties to the original suit to be granted mandatory relief, to be by a Federal court registered as voters at all elections, State or Federal.

Up to now, it has been the law that even a real case or controversy, as distinguished from an application, cannot be regarded as ancillary so that jurisdiction can be made to depend upon the jurisdiction in the original suit unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit (*Oils, Inc.* v. *Blankenship*, 145 F.2d, 354, 356).

Even if these so-called applications could be dignified with the title of "supplemental bills," they would be unauthorized under presently existing and adjudicated principles of law and equity and equity practice in the Federal courts (*Walmac Company* v. *Isaacs*, 220 F.2d 108, 113–14; *Dugas* v. *American Surety Co.*, 300 U.S. 414, 428, 57 S. Ct. 515, 521, 81 L. Ed. 720).

The bill provides for the issuance of a supplementary decree by the court after these proceedings before the voting referees which proceedings Judge Walsh characterizes as "ex parte," his statement, page 6.

The phrase "supplementary decree" is not recognized or defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor in title 28 of the United States Code.

Heretofore an action in equity has ended with the final decree adjudicating the rights of the complainants and defendants in the cause.

A court of chancery has had jurisdiction of course to effectuate its decree by appropriate process (19 Am. Jur. Equity, sec. 420).

Heretofore, in the United States and in England, that effectuation has been confined to the enforcement of the rights of and relief granted to the parties to the cases.

Never before has it been thought that a supplementary decree could be promulgated by a court granting relief to applicants who were not parties to the case in which the decree was promulgated, and granting relief of an entirely different nature from that prayed or granted in the main suit.

The only supplementary decrees known to equity practice in the United States and England as it heretofore existed resulted from supplemental bills founded upon matter arising after entry of the decree.

See, for example, *Root* v. *Woolworth* (150 U.S. 401), *Independent Coal and Coke Co.* v. *United States* (274 U.S. 640), *Looney* v. *East Texas R. Co.* (247 U.S. 214).

The so-called supplementary decree here sought to be authorized would be nothing more or less than what in some countries have been called ukases—which in czarist Russia were "imperial orders or decrees, having the force of law."

I am not familiar with the registration laws of other States. I do know that we have a very full and fair law in Georgia. The one now in force was enacted in 1958, Georgia Laws 1958, page 269 and the following, approved and effective as of March 25, 1958.